instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void pndisc_redo(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
ndisc_recv_ns(skb);
kfree_skb(skb);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: Don't reduce hop limit for an interface
A local route may have a lower hop_limit set than global routes do.
RFC 3756, Section 4.2.7, "Parameter Spoofing"
> 1. The attacker includes a Current Hop Limit of one or another small
> number which the attacker knows will cause legitimate packets to
> be dropped before they reach their destination.
> As an example, one possible approach to mitigate this threat is to
> ignore very small hop limits. The nodes could implement a
> configurable minimum hop limit, and ignore attempts to set it below
> said limit.
Signed-off-by: D.S. Ljungmark <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 43,733 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init syscall_exit_define_fields(struct ftrace_event_call *call)
{
struct syscall_trace_exit trace;
int ret;
ret = trace_define_field(call, SYSCALL_FIELD(int, nr), FILTER_OTHER);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = trace_define_field(call, SYSCALL_FIELD(long, ret),
FILTER_OTHER);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: tracing/syscalls: Ignore numbers outside NR_syscalls' range
ARM has some private syscalls (for example, set_tls(2)) which lie
outside the range of NR_syscalls. If any of these are called while
syscall tracing is being performed, out-of-bounds array access will
occur in the ftrace and perf sys_{enter,exit} handlers.
# trace-cmd record -e raw_syscalls:* true && trace-cmd report
...
true-653 [000] 384.675777: sys_enter: NR 192 (0, 1000, 3, 4000022, ffffffff, 0)
true-653 [000] 384.675812: sys_exit: NR 192 = 1995915264
true-653 [000] 384.675971: sys_enter: NR 983045 (76f74480, 76f74000, 76f74b28, 76f74480, 76f76f74, 1)
true-653 [000] 384.675988: sys_exit: NR 983045 = 0
...
# trace-cmd record -e syscalls:* true
[ 17.289329] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address aaaaaace
[ 17.289590] pgd = 9e71c000
[ 17.289696] [aaaaaace] *pgd=00000000
[ 17.289985] Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
[ 17.290169] Modules linked in:
[ 17.290391] CPU: 0 PID: 704 Comm: true Not tainted 3.18.0-rc2+ #21
[ 17.290585] task: 9f4dab00 ti: 9e710000 task.ti: 9e710000
[ 17.290747] PC is at ftrace_syscall_enter+0x48/0x1f8
[ 17.290866] LR is at syscall_trace_enter+0x124/0x184
Fix this by ignoring out-of-NR_syscalls-bounds syscall numbers.
Commit cd0980fc8add "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
added the check for less than zero, but it should have also checked
for greater than NR_syscalls.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/p/[email protected]
Fixes: cd0980fc8add "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
Cc: [email protected] # 2.6.33+
Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 35,916 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_get_one_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_one_reg *reg)
{
int r = 0;
union kvmppc_one_reg val;
int size;
size = one_reg_size(reg->id);
if (size > sizeof(val))
return -EINVAL;
r = kvmppc_get_one_reg(vcpu, reg->id, &val);
if (r == -EINVAL) {
r = 0;
switch (reg->id) {
#ifdef CONFIG_ALTIVEC
case KVM_REG_PPC_VR0 ... KVM_REG_PPC_VR31:
if (!cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC)) {
r = -ENXIO;
break;
}
val.vval = vcpu->arch.vr.vr[reg->id - KVM_REG_PPC_VR0];
break;
case KVM_REG_PPC_VSCR:
if (!cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ALTIVEC)) {
r = -ENXIO;
break;
}
val = get_reg_val(reg->id, vcpu->arch.vr.vscr.u[3]);
break;
case KVM_REG_PPC_VRSAVE:
val = get_reg_val(reg->id, vcpu->arch.vrsave);
break;
#endif /* CONFIG_ALTIVEC */
default:
r = -EINVAL;
break;
}
}
if (r)
return r;
if (copy_to_user((char __user *)(unsigned long)reg->addr, &val, size))
r = -EFAULT;
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: PPC: Fix oops when checking KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM
The following program causes a kernel oops:
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <linux/kvm.h>
main()
{
int fd = open("/dev/kvm", O_RDWR);
ioctl(fd, KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM);
}
This happens because when using the global KVM fd with
KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension() gets
called with a NULL kvm argument, which gets dereferenced
in is_kvmppc_hv_enabled(). Spotted while reading the code.
Let's use the hv_enabled fallback variable, like everywhere
else in this function.
Fixes: 23528bb21ee2 ("KVM: PPC: Introduce KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Gibson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 60,532 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SoftMPEG4Encoder::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mSignalledError || mSawInputEOS) {
return;
}
if (!mStarted) {
if (OMX_ErrorNone != initEncoder()) {
return;
}
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
while (!mSawInputEOS && !inQueue.empty() && !outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
outHeader->nTimeStamp = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
uint8_t *outPtr = (uint8_t *) outHeader->pBuffer;
int32_t dataLength = outHeader->nAllocLen;
if (mNumInputFrames < 0) {
if (!PVGetVolHeader(mHandle, outPtr, &dataLength, 0)) {
ALOGE("Failed to get VOL header");
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, 0);
return;
}
ALOGV("Output VOL header: %d bytes", dataLength);
++mNumInputFrames;
outHeader->nFlags |= OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG;
outHeader->nFilledLen = dataLength;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
return;
}
InputBufferInfo info;
info.mTimeUs = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
info.mFlags = inHeader->nFlags;
mInputBufferInfoVec.push(info);
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
mSawInputEOS = true;
}
if (inHeader->nFilledLen > 0) {
const uint8_t *inputData = NULL;
if (mInputDataIsMeta) {
inputData =
extractGraphicBuffer(
mInputFrameData, (mWidth * mHeight * 3) >> 1,
inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset, inHeader->nFilledLen,
mWidth, mHeight);
if (inputData == NULL) {
ALOGE("Unable to extract gralloc buffer in metadata mode");
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, 0);
return;
}
} else {
inputData = (const uint8_t *)inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
if (mColorFormat != OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar) {
ConvertYUV420SemiPlanarToYUV420Planar(
inputData, mInputFrameData, mWidth, mHeight);
inputData = mInputFrameData;
}
}
CHECK(inputData != NULL);
VideoEncFrameIO vin, vout;
memset(&vin, 0, sizeof(vin));
memset(&vout, 0, sizeof(vout));
vin.height = align(mHeight, 16);
vin.pitch = align(mWidth, 16);
vin.timestamp = (inHeader->nTimeStamp + 500) / 1000; // in ms
vin.yChan = (uint8_t *)inputData;
vin.uChan = vin.yChan + vin.height * vin.pitch;
vin.vChan = vin.uChan + ((vin.height * vin.pitch) >> 2);
ULong modTimeMs = 0;
int32_t nLayer = 0;
MP4HintTrack hintTrack;
if (!PVEncodeVideoFrame(mHandle, &vin, &vout,
&modTimeMs, outPtr, &dataLength, &nLayer) ||
!PVGetHintTrack(mHandle, &hintTrack)) {
ALOGE("Failed to encode frame or get hink track at frame %" PRId64,
mNumInputFrames);
mSignalledError = true;
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, 0);
}
CHECK(NULL == PVGetOverrunBuffer(mHandle));
if (hintTrack.CodeType == 0) { // I-frame serves as sync frame
outHeader->nFlags |= OMX_BUFFERFLAG_SYNCFRAME;
}
++mNumInputFrames;
} else {
dataLength = 0;
}
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
CHECK(!mInputBufferInfoVec.empty());
InputBufferInfo *inputBufInfo = mInputBufferInfoVec.begin();
outHeader->nTimeStamp = inputBufInfo->mTimeUs;
outHeader->nFlags |= (inputBufInfo->mFlags | OMX_BUFFERFLAG_ENDOFFRAME);
outHeader->nFilledLen = dataLength;
mInputBufferInfoVec.erase(mInputBufferInfoVec.begin());
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
}
}
Commit Message: SoftMPEG4: Check the buffer size before writing the reference frame.
Also prevent overflow in SoftMPEG4 and division by zero in SoftMPEG4Encoder.
Bug: 30033990
Change-Id: I7701f5fc54c2670587d122330e5dc851f64ed3c2
(cherry picked from commit 695123195034402ca76169b195069c28c30342d3)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 158,113 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *set_merge_trailers(cmd_parms *cmd, void *dummy, int arg)
{
core_server_config *conf = ap_get_module_config(cmd->server->module_config,
&core_module);
conf->merge_trailers = (arg ? AP_MERGE_TRAILERS_ENABLE :
AP_MERGE_TRAILERS_DISABLE);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 64,302 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ip_mc_source(int add, int omode, struct sock *sk, struct
ip_mreq_source *mreqs, int ifindex)
{
int err;
struct ip_mreqn imr;
__be32 addr = mreqs->imr_multiaddr;
struct ip_mc_socklist *pmc;
struct in_device *in_dev = NULL;
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ip_sf_socklist *psl;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
int leavegroup = 0;
int i, j, rv;
if (!ipv4_is_multicast(addr))
return -EINVAL;
rtnl_lock();
imr.imr_multiaddr.s_addr = mreqs->imr_multiaddr;
imr.imr_address.s_addr = mreqs->imr_interface;
imr.imr_ifindex = ifindex;
in_dev = ip_mc_find_dev(net, &imr);
if (!in_dev) {
err = -ENODEV;
goto done;
}
err = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
for_each_pmc_rtnl(inet, pmc) {
if ((pmc->multi.imr_multiaddr.s_addr ==
imr.imr_multiaddr.s_addr) &&
(pmc->multi.imr_ifindex == imr.imr_ifindex))
break;
}
if (!pmc) { /* must have a prior join */
err = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
/* if a source filter was set, must be the same mode as before */
if (pmc->sflist) {
if (pmc->sfmode != omode) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
} else if (pmc->sfmode != omode) {
/* allow mode switches for empty-set filters */
ip_mc_add_src(in_dev, &mreqs->imr_multiaddr, omode, 0, NULL, 0);
ip_mc_del_src(in_dev, &mreqs->imr_multiaddr, pmc->sfmode, 0,
NULL, 0);
pmc->sfmode = omode;
}
psl = rtnl_dereference(pmc->sflist);
if (!add) {
if (!psl)
goto done; /* err = -EADDRNOTAVAIL */
rv = !0;
for (i=0; i<psl->sl_count; i++) {
rv = memcmp(&psl->sl_addr[i], &mreqs->imr_sourceaddr,
sizeof(__be32));
if (rv == 0)
break;
}
if (rv) /* source not found */
goto done; /* err = -EADDRNOTAVAIL */
/* special case - (INCLUDE, empty) == LEAVE_GROUP */
if (psl->sl_count == 1 && omode == MCAST_INCLUDE) {
leavegroup = 1;
goto done;
}
/* update the interface filter */
ip_mc_del_src(in_dev, &mreqs->imr_multiaddr, omode, 1,
&mreqs->imr_sourceaddr, 1);
for (j=i+1; j<psl->sl_count; j++)
psl->sl_addr[j-1] = psl->sl_addr[j];
psl->sl_count--;
err = 0;
goto done;
}
/* else, add a new source to the filter */
if (psl && psl->sl_count >= sysctl_igmp_max_msf) {
err = -ENOBUFS;
goto done;
}
if (!psl || psl->sl_count == psl->sl_max) {
struct ip_sf_socklist *newpsl;
int count = IP_SFBLOCK;
if (psl)
count += psl->sl_max;
newpsl = sock_kmalloc(sk, IP_SFLSIZE(count), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!newpsl) {
err = -ENOBUFS;
goto done;
}
newpsl->sl_max = count;
newpsl->sl_count = count - IP_SFBLOCK;
if (psl) {
for (i=0; i<psl->sl_count; i++)
newpsl->sl_addr[i] = psl->sl_addr[i];
/* decrease mem now to avoid the memleak warning */
atomic_sub(IP_SFLSIZE(psl->sl_max), &sk->sk_omem_alloc);
kfree_rcu(psl, rcu);
}
RCU_INIT_POINTER(pmc->sflist, newpsl);
psl = newpsl;
}
rv = 1; /* > 0 for insert logic below if sl_count is 0 */
for (i=0; i<psl->sl_count; i++) {
rv = memcmp(&psl->sl_addr[i], &mreqs->imr_sourceaddr,
sizeof(__be32));
if (rv == 0)
break;
}
if (rv == 0) /* address already there is an error */
goto done;
for (j=psl->sl_count-1; j>=i; j--)
psl->sl_addr[j+1] = psl->sl_addr[j];
psl->sl_addr[i] = mreqs->imr_sourceaddr;
psl->sl_count++;
err = 0;
/* update the interface list */
ip_mc_add_src(in_dev, &mreqs->imr_multiaddr, omode, 1,
&mreqs->imr_sourceaddr, 1);
done:
rtnl_unlock();
if (leavegroup)
return ip_mc_leave_group(sk, &imr);
return err;
}
Commit Message: igmp: Avoid zero delay when receiving odd mixture of IGMP queries
Commit 5b7c84066733c5dfb0e4016d939757b38de189e4 ('ipv4: correct IGMP
behavior on v3 query during v2-compatibility mode') added yet another
case for query parsing, which can result in max_delay = 0. Substitute
a value of 1, as in the usual v3 case.
Reported-by: Simon McVittie <[email protected]>
References: http://bugs.debian.org/654876
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 21,649 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillManager::OnHeuristicsRequestError(
const std::string& form_signature,
AutofillDownloadManager::AutofillRequestType request_type,
int http_error) {
}
Commit Message: Add support for the "uploadrequired" attribute for Autofill query responses
BUG=84693
TEST=unit_tests --gtest_filter=AutofillDownloadTest.QueryAndUploadTest
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6969090
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87729 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,472 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void setScaleAndScrollAndLayout(blink::WebView* webView, WebPoint scroll, float scale)
{
webView->setPageScaleFactor(scale, WebPoint(scroll.x, scroll.y));
webView->layout();
}
Commit Message: Revert 162155 "This review merges the two existing page serializ..."
Change r162155 broke the world even though it was landed using the CQ.
> This review merges the two existing page serializers, WebPageSerializerImpl and
> PageSerializer, into one, PageSerializer. In addition to this it moves all
> the old tests from WebPageNewSerializerTest and WebPageSerializerTest to the
> PageSerializerTest structure and splits out one test for MHTML into a new
> MHTMLTest file.
>
> Saving as 'Webpage, Complete', 'Webpage, HTML Only' and as MHTML when the
> 'Save Page as MHTML' flag is enabled now uses the same code, and should thus
> have the same feature set. Meaning that both modes now should be a bit better.
>
> Detailed list of changes:
>
> - PageSerializerTest: Prepare for more DTD test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove now unneccesary input image test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove unused WebPageSerializer/Impl code
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI morph test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move namespace test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move SVG Image test
> - MHTMLTest: Move MHTML specific test to own test file
> - PageSerializerTest: Delete duplicate XML header test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move blank frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move CSS test
> - PageSerializerTest: Add frameset/frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old iframe test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old elements test
> - Use PageSerizer for saving web pages
> - PageSerializerTest: Test for rewriting links
> - PageSerializer: Add rewrite link accumulator
> - PageSerializer: Serialize images in iframes/frames src
> - PageSerializer: XHTML fix for meta tags
> - PageSerializer: Add presentation CSS
> - PageSerializer: Rename out parameter
>
> BUG=
> [email protected]
>
> Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/68613003
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73673003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 118,919 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserView::BookmarkBarStateChanged(
BookmarkBar::AnimateChangeType change_type) {
if (bookmark_bar_view_.get()) {
bookmark_bar_view_->SetBookmarkBarState(
browser_->bookmark_bar_state(), change_type,
browser_->search_model()->mode());
}
if (MaybeShowBookmarkBar(GetActiveTabContents()))
Layout();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,301 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct xt_table *xt_find_table_lock(struct net *net, u_int8_t af,
const char *name)
{
struct xt_table *t, *found = NULL;
mutex_lock(&xt[af].mutex);
list_for_each_entry(t, &net->xt.tables[af], list)
if (strcmp(t->name, name) == 0 && try_module_get(t->me))
return t;
if (net == &init_net)
goto out;
/* Table doesn't exist in this netns, re-try init */
list_for_each_entry(t, &init_net.xt.tables[af], list) {
if (strcmp(t->name, name))
continue;
if (!try_module_get(t->me))
return NULL;
mutex_unlock(&xt[af].mutex);
if (t->table_init(net) != 0) {
module_put(t->me);
return NULL;
}
found = t;
mutex_lock(&xt[af].mutex);
break;
}
if (!found)
goto out;
/* and once again: */
list_for_each_entry(t, &net->xt.tables[af], list)
if (strcmp(t->name, name) == 0)
return t;
module_put(found->me);
out:
mutex_unlock(&xt[af].mutex);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: check for bogus target offset
We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff.
Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry).
Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the
match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta.
We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 52,416 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: msPostGISFindBestType(wkbObj *w, shapeObj *shape)
{
int wkbtype;
/* What kind of geometry is this? */
wkbtype = wkbType(w);
/* Generic collection, we need to look a little deeper. */
if ( wkbtype == WKB_GEOMETRYCOLLECTION )
wkbtype = wkbCollectionSubType(w);
switch ( wkbtype ) {
case WKB_POLYGON:
case WKB_CURVEPOLYGON:
case WKB_MULTIPOLYGON:
shape->type = MS_SHAPE_POLYGON;
break;
case WKB_LINESTRING:
case WKB_CIRCULARSTRING:
case WKB_COMPOUNDCURVE:
case WKB_MULTICURVE:
case WKB_MULTILINESTRING:
shape->type = MS_SHAPE_LINE;
break;
case WKB_POINT:
case WKB_MULTIPOINT:
shape->type = MS_SHAPE_POINT;
break;
default:
return MS_FAILURE;
}
return wkbConvGeometryToShape(w, shape);
}
Commit Message: Fix potential SQL Injection with postgis TIME filters (#4834)
CWE ID: CWE-89 | 0 | 40,816 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Editor::DeleteSelectionWithSmartDelete(
DeleteMode delete_mode,
InputEvent::InputType input_type,
const Position& reference_move_position) {
if (GetFrame()
.Selection()
.ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated()
.IsNone())
return;
const bool kMergeBlocksAfterDelete = true;
const bool kExpandForSpecialElements = false;
const bool kSanitizeMarkup = true;
DCHECK(GetFrame().GetDocument());
DeleteSelectionCommand::Create(
*GetFrame().GetDocument(), delete_mode == DeleteMode::kSmart,
kMergeBlocksAfterDelete, kExpandForSpecialElements, kSanitizeMarkup,
input_type, reference_move_position)
->Apply();
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 124,678 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnLockMouse(bool user_gesture,
bool privileged) {
if (pending_mouse_lock_request_) {
Send(new ViewMsg_LockMouse_ACK(routing_id_, false));
return;
}
pending_mouse_lock_request_ = true;
if (delegate_) {
delegate_->RequestToLockMouse(this, user_gesture,
is_last_unlocked_by_target_,
privileged && allow_privileged_mouse_lock_);
is_last_unlocked_by_target_ = false;
return;
}
if (privileged && allow_privileged_mouse_lock_) {
GotResponseToLockMouseRequest(true);
} else {
GotResponseToLockMouseRequest(false);
}
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,507 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DownloadManagerImpl::SetDownloadFileFactoryForTesting(
std::unique_ptr<DownloadFileFactory> file_factory) {
file_factory_ = std::move(file_factory);
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,458 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pgp_pin_cmd(sc_card_t *card, struct sc_pin_cmd_data *data, int *tries_left)
{
struct pgp_priv_data *priv = DRVDATA(card);
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx);
if (data->pin_type != SC_AC_CHV)
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS,
"invalid PIN type");
/* In general, the PIN Reference is extracted from the key-id,
* for example, CHV0 -> Ref=0, CHV1 -> Ref=1.
* However, in the case of OpenGPG, the PIN Ref to compose APDU
* must be 81, 82, 83.
* So, if we receive Ref=1, Ref=2, we must convert to 81, 82...
* In OpenPGP v1, the PINs are named CHV1, CHV2, CHV3.
* In v2, they are named PW1, PW3 (PW1 operates in 2 modes).
*
* The PIN references (P2 in APDU) for "VERIFY" are the same in both versions:
* 81 (CHV1 or PW1), 82 (CHV2 or PW1-mode 2), 83 (CHV3 or PW3),
* On the other hand from version 2.0 "CHANGE REFERENCE DATA" and
* "RESET RETRY COUNTER" don't support PW1-mode 2 (82) and need this
* value changed to PW1 (81).
* Both of these commands also differ between card versions in that
* v1 cards can use only implicit old PIN or CHV3 test for both commands
* whereas v2 can use both implicit (for PW3) and explicit
* (for special "Resetting Code") PIN test for "RESET RETRY COUNTER"
* and only explicit test for "CHANGE REFERENCE DATA".
*
* Note that if this function is called from sc_pkcs15_verify_pin() in pkcs15-pin.c,
* the Ref is already 81, 82, 83.
*/
/* convert the PIN Reference if needed */
data->pin_reference |= 0x80;
/* check version-dependent constraints */
if (data->cmd == SC_PIN_CMD_CHANGE || data->cmd == SC_PIN_CMD_UNBLOCK) {
if (priv->bcd_version >= OPENPGP_CARD_2_0) {
if (data->pin_reference == 0x82)
data->pin_reference = 0x81;
if (data->cmd == SC_PIN_CMD_CHANGE) {
if (data->pin1.len == 0 &&
!(data->flags & SC_PIN_CMD_USE_PINPAD))
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS,
"v2 cards don't support implicit old PIN for PIN change.");
data->flags &= ~SC_PIN_CMD_IMPLICIT_CHANGE;
}
} else {
if (data->pin1.len != 0) {
sc_log(card->ctx,
"v1 cards don't support explicit old or CHV3 PIN, PIN ignored.");
sc_log(card->ctx,
"please make sure that you have verified the relevant PIN first.");
data->pin1.len = 0;
}
data->flags |= SC_PIN_CMD_IMPLICIT_CHANGE;
}
}
if (data->cmd == SC_PIN_CMD_UNBLOCK && data->pin2.len == 0 &&
!(data->flags & SC_PIN_CMD_USE_PINPAD))
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS,
"new PIN must be provided for unblock operation.");
/* ensure pin_reference is 81, 82, 83 */
if (!(data->pin_reference == 0x81 || data->pin_reference == 0x82 || data->pin_reference == 0x83)) {
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS,
"key-id should be 1, 2, 3.");
}
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, iso_ops->pin_cmd(card, data, tries_left));
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,602 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::IsRendererDebugURLBlacklisted(
const GURL& url,
content::BrowserContext* context) {
PolicyBlacklistService* service =
PolicyBlacklistFactory::GetForBrowserContext(context);
using URLBlacklistState = policy::URLBlacklist::URLBlacklistState;
URLBlacklistState blacklist_state = service->GetURLBlacklistState(url);
return blacklist_state == URLBlacklistState::URL_IN_BLACKLIST;
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,712 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::TabMoved(WebContents* contents,
int from_index,
int to_index) {
DCHECK(from_index >= 0 && to_index >= 0);
SyncHistoryWithTabs(std::min(from_index, to_index));
}
Commit Message: Don't focus the location bar for NTP navigations in non-selected tabs.
BUG=677716
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2624373002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#443338}
CWE ID: | 0 | 139,075 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: media::VideoCaptureSessionId session_id() const { return session_id_; }
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 153,270 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmxnet3_reset_interrupt_states(VMXNET3State *s)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(s->interrupt_states); i++) {
s->interrupt_states[i].is_asserted = false;
s->interrupt_states[i].is_pending = false;
s->interrupt_states[i].is_masked = true;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 9,046 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CreateTestAutofillProfiles() {
AutofillProfile profile1;
test::SetProfileInfo(&profile1, "Elvis", "Aaron", "Presley",
"[email protected]", "RCA", "3734 Elvis Presley Blvd.",
"Apt. 10", "Memphis", "Tennessee", "38116", "US",
"12345678901");
profile1.set_guid("00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001");
personal_data_.AddProfile(profile1);
AutofillProfile profile2;
test::SetProfileInfo(&profile2, "Charles", "Hardin", "Holley",
"[email protected]", "Decca", "123 Apple St.", "unit 6",
"Lubbock", "Texas", "79401", "US", "23456789012");
profile2.set_guid("00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000002");
personal_data_.AddProfile(profile2);
AutofillProfile profile3;
test::SetProfileInfo(&profile3, "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "",
"");
profile3.set_guid("00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000003");
personal_data_.AddProfile(profile3);
}
Commit Message: [AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
CWE ID: | 0 | 155,022 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OnInterestingUsageImpl(int usage_pattern) {
DCHECK(main_thread_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (handler_) {
handler_->OnInterestingUsage(usage_pattern);
}
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 152,978 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterPSImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=SetMagickInfo("EPI");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPSImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePSImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsPS;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->blob_support=MagickFalse;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString(
"Encapsulated PostScript Interchange format");
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("application/postscript");
entry->module=ConstantString("PS");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("EPS");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPSImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePSImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsPS;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->blob_support=MagickFalse;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString("Encapsulated PostScript");
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("application/postscript");
entry->module=ConstantString("PS");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("EPSF");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPSImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePSImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsPS;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->blob_support=MagickFalse;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString("Encapsulated PostScript");
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("application/postscript");
entry->module=ConstantString("PS");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("EPSI");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPSImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePSImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsPS;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->blob_support=MagickFalse;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString(
"Encapsulated PostScript Interchange format");
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("application/postscript");
entry->module=ConstantString("PS");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("PS");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPSImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePSImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsPS;
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("application/postscript");
entry->module=ConstantString("PS");
entry->blob_support=MagickFalse;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString("PostScript");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/715
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 1 | 167,763 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UserCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS::StartRefreshSchedulerIfReady() {
if (core()->refresh_scheduler())
return; // Already started.
if (wait_for_policy_fetch_)
return; // Still waiting for the initial, blocking fetch.
if (!service() || !local_state_)
return; // Not connected.
if (component_policy_service() &&
!component_policy_service()->is_initialized()) {
return;
}
core()->StartRefreshScheduler();
core()->TrackRefreshDelayPref(local_state_,
policy_prefs::kUserPolicyRefreshRate);
}
Commit Message: Make the policy fetch for first time login blocking
The CL makes policy fetching for first time login blocking for all users, except the ones that are known to be non-enterprise users.
BUG=334584
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/330843002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@282925 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 110,401 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int64 ExtractPostId(HistoryEntry* entry) {
if (!entry)
return -1;
const WebHistoryItem& item = entry->root();
if (item.isNull() || item.httpBody().isNull())
return -1;
return item.httpBody().identifier();
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,121 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: person_get_leader(const person_t* person)
{
return person->leader;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 75,082 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SecurityContext::InsecureRequestsPolicy FrameLoader::getInsecureRequestsPolicy() const
{
Frame* parentFrame = m_frame->tree().parent();
if (!parentFrame)
return SecurityContext::InsecureRequestsDoNotUpgrade;
if (!parentFrame->isLocalFrame())
return SecurityContext::InsecureRequestsDoNotUpgrade;
ASSERT(toLocalFrame(parentFrame)->document());
return toLocalFrame(parentFrame)->document()->getInsecureRequestsPolicy();
}
Commit Message: Disable frame navigations during DocumentLoader detach in FrameLoader::startLoad
BUG=613266
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2006033002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#396241}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 132,678 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: enter_record(struct ftrace_hash *hash, struct dyn_ftrace *rec, int not)
{
struct ftrace_func_entry *entry;
int ret = 0;
entry = ftrace_lookup_ip(hash, rec->ip);
if (not) {
/* Do nothing if it doesn't exist */
if (!entry)
return 0;
free_hash_entry(hash, entry);
} else {
/* Do nothing if it exists */
if (entry)
return 0;
ret = add_hash_entry(hash, rec->ip);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 30,125 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int asf_build_simple_index(AVFormatContext *s, int stream_index)
{
ff_asf_guid g;
ASFContext *asf = s->priv_data;
int64_t current_pos = avio_tell(s->pb);
int64_t ret;
if((ret = avio_seek(s->pb, asf->data_object_offset + asf->data_object_size, SEEK_SET)) < 0) {
return ret;
}
if ((ret = ff_get_guid(s->pb, &g)) < 0)
goto end;
/* the data object can be followed by other top-level objects,
* skip them until the simple index object is reached */
while (ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_simple_index_header)) {
int64_t gsize = avio_rl64(s->pb);
if (gsize < 24 || avio_feof(s->pb)) {
goto end;
}
avio_skip(s->pb, gsize - 24);
if ((ret = ff_get_guid(s->pb, &g)) < 0)
goto end;
}
{
int64_t itime, last_pos = -1;
int pct, ict;
int i;
int64_t av_unused gsize = avio_rl64(s->pb);
if ((ret = ff_get_guid(s->pb, &g)) < 0)
goto end;
itime = avio_rl64(s->pb);
pct = avio_rl32(s->pb);
ict = avio_rl32(s->pb);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG,
"itime:0x%"PRIx64", pct:%d, ict:%d\n", itime, pct, ict);
for (i = 0; i < ict; i++) {
int pktnum = avio_rl32(s->pb);
int pktct = avio_rl16(s->pb);
int64_t pos = s->internal->data_offset + s->packet_size * (int64_t)pktnum;
int64_t index_pts = FFMAX(av_rescale(itime, i, 10000) - asf->hdr.preroll, 0);
if (pos != last_pos) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "pktnum:%d, pktct:%d pts: %"PRId64"\n",
pktnum, pktct, index_pts);
av_add_index_entry(s->streams[stream_index], pos, index_pts,
s->packet_size, 0, AVINDEX_KEYFRAME);
last_pos = pos;
}
}
asf->index_read = ict > 1;
}
end:
avio_seek(s->pb, current_pos, SEEK_SET);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: avformat/asfdec: Fix DoS in asf_build_simple_index()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 167,758 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int Downmix_Configure(downmix_module_t *pDwmModule, effect_config_t *pConfig, bool init) {
downmix_object_t *pDownmixer = &pDwmModule->context;
if (pConfig->inputCfg.samplingRate != pConfig->outputCfg.samplingRate
|| pConfig->outputCfg.channels != DOWNMIX_OUTPUT_CHANNELS
|| pConfig->inputCfg.format != AUDIO_FORMAT_PCM_16_BIT
|| pConfig->outputCfg.format != AUDIO_FORMAT_PCM_16_BIT) {
ALOGE("Downmix_Configure error: invalid config");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (&pDwmModule->config != pConfig) {
memcpy(&pDwmModule->config, pConfig, sizeof(effect_config_t));
}
if (init) {
pDownmixer->type = DOWNMIX_TYPE_FOLD;
pDownmixer->apply_volume_correction = false;
pDownmixer->input_channel_count = 8; // matches default input of AUDIO_CHANNEL_OUT_7POINT1
} else {
if (pConfig->inputCfg.channels == 0) {
ALOGE("Downmix_Configure error: input channel mask can't be 0");
return -EINVAL;
}
pDownmixer->input_channel_count =
audio_channel_count_from_out_mask(pConfig->inputCfg.channels);
}
Downmix_Reset(pDownmixer, init);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,360 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ext_ensure_tag_table(regex_t* reg)
{
int r;
RegexExt* ext;
CalloutTagTable* t;
ext = onig_get_regex_ext(reg);
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(ext);
if (IS_NULL(ext->tag_table)) {
r = callout_tag_table_new(&t);
if (r != ONIG_NORMAL) return r;
ext->tag_table = t;
}
return ONIG_NORMAL;
}
Commit Message: fix #147: Stack Exhaustion Problem caused by some parsing functions in regcomp.c making recursive calls to themselves.
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 87,860 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateRenderFrame(int previous_routing_id,
int opener_routing_id,
int parent_routing_id,
int previous_sibling_routing_id) {
TRACE_EVENT0("navigation", "RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateRenderFrame");
DCHECK(!IsRenderFrameLive()) << "Creating frame twice";
if (!GetProcess()->Init())
return false;
DCHECK(GetProcess()->IsInitializedAndNotDead());
service_manager::mojom::InterfaceProviderPtr interface_provider;
BindInterfaceProviderRequest(mojo::MakeRequest(&interface_provider));
blink::mojom::DocumentInterfaceBrokerPtrInfo
document_interface_broker_content_info;
blink::mojom::DocumentInterfaceBrokerPtrInfo
document_interface_broker_blink_info;
BindDocumentInterfaceBrokerRequest(
mojo::MakeRequest(&document_interface_broker_content_info),
mojo::MakeRequest(&document_interface_broker_blink_info));
mojom::CreateFrameParamsPtr params = mojom::CreateFrameParams::New();
params->interface_bundle = mojom::DocumentScopedInterfaceBundle::New(
interface_provider.PassInterface(),
std::move(document_interface_broker_content_info),
std::move(document_interface_broker_blink_info));
params->routing_id = routing_id_;
params->previous_routing_id = previous_routing_id;
params->opener_routing_id = opener_routing_id;
params->parent_routing_id = parent_routing_id;
params->previous_sibling_routing_id = previous_sibling_routing_id;
params->replication_state = frame_tree_node()->current_replication_state();
params->devtools_frame_token = frame_tree_node()->devtools_frame_token();
params->replication_state.frame_policy =
frame_tree_node()->pending_frame_policy();
params->frame_owner_properties =
FrameOwnerProperties(frame_tree_node()->frame_owner_properties());
params->has_committed_real_load =
frame_tree_node()->has_committed_real_load();
params->widget_params = mojom::CreateFrameWidgetParams::New();
if (render_widget_host_) {
params->widget_params->routing_id = render_widget_host_->GetRoutingID();
params->widget_params->hidden = render_widget_host_->is_hidden();
} else {
params->widget_params->routing_id = MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
params->widget_params->hidden = true;
}
GetProcess()->GetRendererInterface()->CreateFrame(std::move(params));
if (parent_routing_id != MSG_ROUTING_NONE && render_widget_host_) {
RenderWidgetHostView* rwhv =
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame::Create(render_widget_host_);
rwhv->Hide();
}
if (previous_routing_id != MSG_ROUTING_NONE) {
RenderFrameProxyHost* proxy = RenderFrameProxyHost::FromID(
GetProcess()->GetID(), previous_routing_id);
proxy->set_render_frame_proxy_created(true);
}
SetRenderFrameCreated(true);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,234 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: parse_OUTPUT_REG(const char *arg, struct ofpbuf *ofpacts,
enum ofputil_protocol *usable_protocols OVS_UNUSED)
{
return parse_OUTPUT(arg, ofpacts, usable_protocols);
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 77,057 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nl80211_dump_wiphy(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
int idx = 0;
int start = cb->args[0];
struct cfg80211_registered_device *dev;
mutex_lock(&cfg80211_mutex);
list_for_each_entry(dev, &cfg80211_rdev_list, list) {
if (!net_eq(wiphy_net(&dev->wiphy), sock_net(skb->sk)))
continue;
if (++idx <= start)
continue;
if (nl80211_send_wiphy(skb, NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).pid,
cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq, NLM_F_MULTI,
dev) < 0) {
idx--;
break;
}
}
mutex_unlock(&cfg80211_mutex);
cb->args[0] = idx;
return skb->len;
}
Commit Message: nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,681 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CL_ShutdownAll(qboolean shutdownRef)
{
if(CL_VideoRecording())
CL_CloseAVI();
if(clc.demorecording)
CL_StopRecord_f();
#ifdef USE_CURL
CL_cURL_Shutdown();
#endif
S_DisableSounds();
CL_ShutdownCGame();
CL_ShutdownUI();
if(shutdownRef)
CL_ShutdownRef();
else if(re.Shutdown)
re.Shutdown(qfalse); // don't destroy window or context
cls.uiStarted = qfalse;
cls.cgameStarted = qfalse;
cls.rendererStarted = qfalse;
cls.soundRegistered = qfalse;
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,726 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perf_event_free_filter(struct perf_event *event)
{
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,082 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void *Sys_LoadDll(const char *name, qboolean useSystemLib)
{
void *dllhandle;
if(useSystemLib)
Com_Printf("Trying to load \"%s\"...\n", name);
if(!useSystemLib || !(dllhandle = Sys_LoadLibrary(name)))
{
const char *topDir;
char libPath[MAX_OSPATH];
topDir = Sys_BinaryPath();
if(!*topDir)
topDir = ".";
Com_Printf("Trying to load \"%s\" from \"%s\"...\n", name, topDir);
Com_sprintf(libPath, sizeof(libPath), "%s%c%s", topDir, PATH_SEP, name);
if(!(dllhandle = Sys_LoadLibrary(libPath)))
{
const char *basePath = Cvar_VariableString("fs_basepath");
if(!basePath || !*basePath)
basePath = ".";
if(FS_FilenameCompare(topDir, basePath))
{
Com_Printf("Trying to load \"%s\" from \"%s\"...\n", name, basePath);
Com_sprintf(libPath, sizeof(libPath), "%s%c%s", basePath, PATH_SEP, name);
dllhandle = Sys_LoadLibrary(libPath);
}
if(!dllhandle)
Com_Printf("Loading \"%s\" failed\n", name);
}
}
return dllhandle;
}
Commit Message: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 1 | 170,090 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string BrowserView::GetClassName() const {
return kViewClassName;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,345 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
WORK_STATE ret;
ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE)
return ret;
}
#endif
/* clean a few things up */
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
* in case there are any unexpected retransmits
*/
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
s->init_buf = NULL;
}
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
s->init_num = 0;
if (!s->server || s->renegotiate == 2) {
/* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
s->renegotiate = 0;
s->new_session = 0;
if (s->server) {
ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
} else {
ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
if (s->hit)
s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
}
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* done with handshaking */
s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
}
}
return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 9,383 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jpc_dec_decode(jpc_dec_t *dec)
{
jpc_ms_t *ms;
jpc_dec_mstabent_t *mstabent;
int ret;
jpc_cstate_t *cstate;
if (!(cstate = jpc_cstate_create())) {
return -1;
}
dec->cstate = cstate;
/* Initially, we should expect to encounter a SOC marker segment. */
dec->state = JPC_MHSOC;
for (;;) {
/* Get the next marker segment in the code stream. */
if (!(ms = jpc_getms(dec->in, cstate))) {
jas_eprintf("cannot get marker segment\n");
return -1;
}
mstabent = jpc_dec_mstab_lookup(ms->id);
assert(mstabent);
/* Ensure that this type of marker segment is permitted
at this point in the code stream. */
if (!(dec->state & mstabent->validstates)) {
jas_eprintf("unexpected marker segment type\n");
jpc_ms_destroy(ms);
return -1;
}
/* Process the marker segment. */
if (mstabent->action) {
ret = (*mstabent->action)(dec, ms);
} else {
/* No explicit action is required. */
ret = 0;
}
/* Destroy the marker segment. */
jpc_ms_destroy(ms);
if (ret < 0) {
return -1;
} else if (ret > 0) {
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integral type promotion problem by adding a JAS_CAST.
Modified the jpc_tsfb_synthesize function so that it will be a noop for
an empty sequence (in order to avoid dereferencing a null pointer).
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 70,420 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLCanvasElement::UnregisterContentsLayer(cc::Layer* layer) {
GraphicsLayer::UnregisterContentsLayer(layer);
OnContentsCcLayerChanged();
}
Commit Message: Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 152,125 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ImageResource::UpdateImage(
scoped_refptr<SharedBuffer> shared_buffer,
ImageResourceContent::UpdateImageOption update_image_option,
bool all_data_received) {
bool is_multipart = !!multipart_parser_;
auto result = GetContent()->UpdateImage(std::move(shared_buffer), GetStatus(),
update_image_option,
all_data_received, is_multipart);
if (result == ImageResourceContent::UpdateImageResult::kShouldDecodeError) {
DecodeError(all_data_received);
}
}
Commit Message: Check CORS using PassesAccessControlCheck() with supplied SecurityOrigin
Partial revert of https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535694.
Bug: 799477
Change-Id: I878bb9bcb83afaafe8601293db9aa644fc5929b3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/898427
Commit-Queue: Hiroshige Hayashizaki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Takeshi Yoshino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#535176}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 149,674 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleInsertFenceSyncCHROMIUM(
uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
const volatile gles2::cmds::InsertFenceSyncCHROMIUM& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::InsertFenceSyncCHROMIUM*>(
cmd_data);
const uint64_t release_count = c.release_count();
client_->OnFenceSyncRelease(release_count);
ExitCommandProcessingEarly();
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Implement immutable texture base/max level clamping
It seems some drivers fail to handle that gracefully, so let's always clamp
to be on the safe side.
BUG=877874
TEST=test case in the bug, gpu_unittests
[email protected]
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I6d93cb9389ea70525df4604112223604577582a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1194994
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#587264}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 145,909 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::RestoreEvictedContext(
WebGLRenderingContextBase* context) {
DCHECK(!ForciblyEvictedContexts().Contains(context));
DCHECK(!ActiveContexts().Contains(context));
unsigned max_gl_contexts = CurrentMaxGLContexts();
while (ActiveContexts().size() < max_gl_contexts &&
ForciblyEvictedContexts().size()) {
WebGLRenderingContextBase* evicted_context = OldestEvictedContext();
if (!evicted_context->restore_allowed_) {
ForciblyEvictedContexts().erase(evicted_context);
continue;
}
IntSize desired_size = DrawingBuffer::AdjustSize(
evicted_context->ClampedCanvasSize(), IntSize(),
evicted_context->max_texture_size_);
if (!desired_size.IsEmpty()) {
ForciblyEvictedContexts().erase(evicted_context);
evicted_context->ForceRestoreContext();
}
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,681 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::DoubleOrStringOrNullAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_doubleOrStringOrNullAttribute_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
test_object_v8_internal::DoubleOrStringOrNullAttributeAttributeSetter(v8_value, info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,700 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ff_put_rv40_qpel8_mc33_c(uint8_t *dst, uint8_t *src, ptrdiff_t stride)
{
put_pixels8_xy2_8_c(dst, src, stride, 8);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 28,134 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int64_t MetricsLog::GetCurrentTime() {
return (base::TimeTicks::Now() - base::TimeTicks()).InSeconds();
}
Commit Message: Add CPU metrics provider and Add CPU/GPU provider for UKM.
Bug: 907674
Change-Id: I61b88aeac8d2a7ff81d812fa5a267f48203ec7e2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381376
Commit-Queue: Nik Bhagat <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618037}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,449 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int FFmpegVideoDecoder::GetVideoBuffer(AVCodecContext* codec_context,
AVFrame* frame) {
VideoFrame::Format format = PixelFormatToVideoFormat(codec_context->pix_fmt);
if (format == VideoFrame::UNKNOWN)
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
DCHECK(format == VideoFrame::YV12 || format == VideoFrame::YV16 ||
format == VideoFrame::YV12J);
gfx::Size size(codec_context->width, codec_context->height);
int ret;
if ((ret = av_image_check_size(size.width(), size.height(), 0, NULL)) < 0)
return ret;
gfx::Size natural_size;
if (codec_context->sample_aspect_ratio.num > 0) {
natural_size = GetNaturalSize(size,
codec_context->sample_aspect_ratio.num,
codec_context->sample_aspect_ratio.den);
} else {
natural_size = config_.natural_size();
}
if (!VideoFrame::IsValidConfig(format, size, gfx::Rect(size), natural_size))
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
scoped_refptr<VideoFrame> video_frame =
frame_pool_.CreateFrame(format, size, gfx::Rect(size),
natural_size, kNoTimestamp());
for (int i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
frame->base[i] = video_frame->data(i);
frame->data[i] = video_frame->data(i);
frame->linesize[i] = video_frame->stride(i);
}
frame->opaque = NULL;
video_frame.swap(reinterpret_cast<VideoFrame**>(&frame->opaque));
frame->type = FF_BUFFER_TYPE_USER;
frame->width = codec_context->width;
frame->height = codec_context->height;
frame->format = codec_context->pix_fmt;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Replicate FFmpeg's video frame allocation strategy.
This should avoid accidental overreads and overwrites due to our
VideoFrame's not being as large as FFmpeg expects.
BUG=368980
TEST=new regression test
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/270193002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268831 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 171,677 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool showing_close_button(Tab* tab) const {
return tab->showing_close_button_;
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 140,862 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XMLRPC_CASE_COMPARISON XMLRPC_GetDefaultIdCaseComparison() {
XMLRPC_OPTIONS options = XMLRPC_GetDefaultOptions();
return options->id_case_compare;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,141 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: iperf_set_test_reporter_interval(struct iperf_test *ipt, double reporter_interval)
{
ipt->reporter_interval = reporter_interval;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 53,429 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FocusInputInFrame(RenderFrameHostImpl* frame) {
ASSERT_TRUE(ExecuteScript(frame, "window.focus(); input.focus();"));
}
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 143,841 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Textfield::Paste() {
if (!read_only() && model_->Paste()) {
if (controller_)
controller_->OnAfterPaste();
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,405 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nested_svm_exit_handled_msr(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
u32 offset, msr, value;
int write, mask;
if (!(svm->nested.intercept & (1ULL << INTERCEPT_MSR_PROT)))
return NESTED_EXIT_HOST;
msr = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
offset = svm_msrpm_offset(msr);
write = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1 & 1;
mask = 1 << ((2 * (msr & 0xf)) + write);
if (offset == MSR_INVALID)
return NESTED_EXIT_DONE;
/* Offset is in 32 bit units but need in 8 bit units */
offset *= 4;
if (kvm_vcpu_read_guest(&svm->vcpu, svm->nested.vmcb_msrpm + offset, &value, 4))
return NESTED_EXIT_DONE;
return (value & mask) ? NESTED_EXIT_DONE : NESTED_EXIT_HOST;
}
Commit Message: KVM: svm: unconditionally intercept #DB
This is needed to avoid the possibility that the guest triggers
an infinite stream of #DB exceptions (CVE-2015-8104).
VMX is not affected: because it does not save DR6 in the VMCS,
it already intercepts #DB unconditionally.
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 41,898 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void wifi_cleanup(wifi_handle handle, wifi_cleaned_up_handler handler)
{
hal_info *info = getHalInfo(handle);
char buf[64];
info->cleaned_up_handler = handler;
if (write(info->cleanup_socks[0], "Exit", 4) < 1) {
ALOGE("could not write to the cleanup socket");
} else {
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
int result = read(info->cleanup_socks[0], buf, sizeof(buf));
ALOGE("%s: Read after POLL returned %d, error no = %d", __FUNCTION__, result, errno);
if (strncmp(buf, "Done", 4) == 0) {
ALOGE("Event processing terminated");
} else {
ALOGD("Rx'ed %s", buf);
}
}
info->clean_up = true;
pthread_mutex_lock(&info->cb_lock);
int bad_commands = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < info->num_event_cb; i++) {
cb_info *cbi = &(info->event_cb[i]);
WifiCommand *cmd = (WifiCommand *)cbi->cb_arg;
ALOGI("Command left in event_cb %p:%s", cmd, (cmd ? cmd->getType(): ""));
}
while (info->num_cmd > bad_commands) {
int num_cmd = info->num_cmd;
cmd_info *cmdi = &(info->cmd[bad_commands]);
WifiCommand *cmd = cmdi->cmd;
if (cmd != NULL) {
ALOGI("Cancelling command %p:%s", cmd, cmd->getType());
pthread_mutex_unlock(&info->cb_lock);
cmd->cancel();
pthread_mutex_lock(&info->cb_lock);
/* release reference added when command is saved */
cmd->releaseRef();
if (num_cmd == info->num_cmd) {
ALOGI("Cancelling command %p:%s did not work", cmd, (cmd ? cmd->getType(): ""));
bad_commands++;
}
}
}
for (int i = 0; i < info->num_event_cb; i++) {
cb_info *cbi = &(info->event_cb[i]);
WifiCommand *cmd = (WifiCommand *)cbi->cb_arg;
ALOGE("Leaked command %p", cmd);
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&info->cb_lock);
internal_cleaned_up_handler(handle);
}
Commit Message: Fix use-after-free in wifi_cleanup()
Release reference to cmd only after possibly calling getType().
BUG: 25753768
Change-Id: Id2156ce51acec04e8364706cf7eafc7d4adae9eb
(cherry picked from commit d7f3cb9915d9ac514393d0ad7767662958054b8f https://googleplex-android-review.git.corp.google.com/#/c/815223)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 173,964 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void cm_deref_id(struct cm_id_private *cm_id_priv)
{
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&cm_id_priv->refcount))
complete(&cm_id_priv->comp);
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 38,356 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int x509_name_cmp( const mbedtls_x509_name *a, const mbedtls_x509_name *b )
{
/* Avoid recursion, it might not be optimised by the compiler */
while( a != NULL || b != NULL )
{
if( a == NULL || b == NULL )
return( -1 );
/* type */
if( a->oid.tag != b->oid.tag ||
a->oid.len != b->oid.len ||
memcmp( a->oid.p, b->oid.p, b->oid.len ) != 0 )
{
return( -1 );
}
/* value */
if( x509_string_cmp( &a->val, &b->val ) != 0 )
return( -1 );
/* structure of the list of sets */
if( a->next_merged != b->next_merged )
return( -1 );
a = a->next;
b = b->next;
}
/* a == NULL == b */
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: Improve behaviour on fatal errors
If we didn't walk the whole chain, then there may be any kind of errors in the
part of the chain we didn't check, so setting all flags looks like the safe
thing to do.
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 61,943 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderMessageFilter::OnMediaLogEvent(const media::MediaLogEvent& event) {
if (media_observer_)
media_observer_->OnMediaEvent(render_process_id_, event);
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 117,147 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int iwbmp_write_bmp_v45header_fields(struct iwbmpwcontext *wctx)
{
iw_byte header[124];
unsigned int intent_bmp_style;
iw_zeromem(header,sizeof(header));
if(wctx->uses_bitfields) {
iw_set_ui32le(&header[40],wctx->bf_mask[0]);
iw_set_ui32le(&header[44],wctx->bf_mask[1]);
iw_set_ui32le(&header[48],wctx->bf_mask[2]);
iw_set_ui32le(&header[52],wctx->bf_mask[3]);
}
if(wctx->csdescr.cstype==IW_CSTYPE_SRGB && !wctx->no_cslabel)
iw_set_ui32le(&header[56],IWBMPCS_SRGB);
else
iw_set_ui32le(&header[56],IWBMPCS_DEVICE_RGB);
switch(wctx->img->rendering_intent) {
case IW_INTENT_PERCEPTUAL: intent_bmp_style = 4; break;
case IW_INTENT_RELATIVE: intent_bmp_style = 2; break;
case IW_INTENT_SATURATION: intent_bmp_style = 1; break;
case IW_INTENT_ABSOLUTE: intent_bmp_style = 8; break;
default: intent_bmp_style = 4;
}
iw_set_ui32le(&header[108],intent_bmp_style);
iwbmp_write(wctx,&header[40],124-40);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 64,875 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ut64 boffset(RBinFile *bf) {
return Elf_(r_bin_elf_get_boffset) (bf->o->bin_obj);
}
Commit Message: Fix #9904 - crash in r2_hoobr_r_read_le32 (over 9000 entrypoints) and read_le oobread (#9923)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,918 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GraphicsContext::setPlatformStrokeColor(const Color& color, ColorSpace colorSpace)
{
if (paintingDisabled())
return;
if (m_data->context)
m_data->context->SetPen(wxPen(color, strokeThickness(), strokeStyleToWxPenStyle(strokeStyle())));
}
Commit Message: Reviewed by Kevin Ollivier.
[wx] Fix strokeArc and fillRoundedRect drawing, and add clipPath support.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60847
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@86502 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,113 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UsbChooserContext::GetGrantedObjects(const GURL& requesting_origin,
const GURL& embedding_origin) {
std::vector<std::unique_ptr<base::DictionaryValue>> objects =
ChooserContextBase::GetGrantedObjects(requesting_origin,
embedding_origin);
if (CanRequestObjectPermission(requesting_origin, embedding_origin)) {
auto it = ephemeral_devices_.find(
std::make_pair(requesting_origin, embedding_origin));
if (it != ephemeral_devices_.end()) {
for (const std::string& guid : it->second) {
auto dict_it = ephemeral_dicts_.find(guid);
DCHECK(dict_it != ephemeral_dicts_.end());
objects.push_back(dict_it->second.CreateDeepCopy());
}
}
}
return objects;
}
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,134 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs4_lock_reclaim(struct nfs4_state *state, struct file_lock *request)
{
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(state->inode);
struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
int err;
do {
/* Cache the lock if possible... */
if (test_bit(NFS_DELEGATED_STATE, &state->flags) != 0)
return 0;
err = _nfs4_do_setlk(state, F_SETLK, request, NFS_LOCK_RECLAIM);
if (err != -NFS4ERR_DELAY)
break;
nfs4_handle_exception(server, err, &exception);
} while (exception.retry);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,933 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int_unix_date(uint32_t dos_date)
{
struct tm t;
if (dos_date == 0)
return(0);
interpret_dos_date(dos_date, &t);
t.tm_wday = 1;
t.tm_yday = 1;
t.tm_isdst = 0;
return (mktime(&t));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12893/SMB/CIFS: Add a bounds check in name_len().
After we advance the pointer by the length value in the buffer, make
sure it points to something in the captured data.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,608 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool CallBoolMethodAndBlock(dbus::MethodCall* method_call,
bool* result) {
scoped_ptr<dbus::Response> response(
blocking_method_caller_->CallMethodAndBlock(method_call));
if (!response.get())
return false;
dbus::MessageReader reader(response.get());
return reader.PopBool(result);
}
Commit Message: Cleanup after transition to new attestation dbus methods.
The methods with the 'New' suffix are temporary and will soon be
removed.
BUG=chromium:243605
TEST=manual
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/213413009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260428 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,050 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int mailimf_quoted_string_parse(const char * message, size_t length,
size_t * indx, char ** result)
{
size_t cur_token;
MMAPString * gstr;
char ch;
char * str;
int r;
int res;
cur_token = * indx;
r = mailimf_cfws_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if ((r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) && (r != MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE)) {
res = r;
goto err;
}
r = mailimf_dquote_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto err;
}
gstr = mmap_string_new("");
if (gstr == NULL) {
res = MAILIMF_ERROR_MEMORY;
goto err;
}
#if 0
if (mmap_string_append_c(gstr, '\"') == NULL) {
res = MAILIMF_ERROR_MEMORY;
goto free_gstr;
}
#endif
while (1) {
r = mailimf_fws_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r == MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
if (mmap_string_append_c(gstr, ' ') == NULL) {
res = MAILIMF_ERROR_MEMORY;
goto free_gstr;
}
}
else if (r != MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE) {
res = r;
goto free_gstr;
}
r = mailimf_qcontent_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &ch);
if (r == MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
if (mmap_string_append_c(gstr, ch) == NULL) {
res = MAILIMF_ERROR_MEMORY;
goto free_gstr;
}
}
else if (r == MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE)
break;
else {
res = r;
goto free_gstr;
}
}
r = mailimf_dquote_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto free_gstr;
}
#if 0
if (mmap_string_append_c(gstr, '\"') == NULL) {
res = MAILIMF_ERROR_MEMORY;
goto free_gstr;
}
#endif
str = strdup(gstr->str);
if (str == NULL) {
res = MAILIMF_ERROR_MEMORY;
goto free_gstr;
}
mmap_string_free(gstr);
* indx = cur_token;
* result = str;
return MAILIMF_NO_ERROR;
free_gstr:
mmap_string_free(gstr);
err:
return res;
}
Commit Message: Fixed crash #274
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 66,224 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jpc_ppt_getparms(jpc_ms_t *ms, jpc_cstate_t *cstate, jas_stream_t *in)
{
jpc_ppt_t *ppt = &ms->parms.ppt;
/* Eliminate compiler warning about unused variables. */
cstate = 0;
ppt->data = 0;
if (ms->len < 1) {
goto error;
}
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &ppt->ind)) {
goto error;
}
ppt->len = ms->len - 1;
if (ppt->len > 0) {
if (!(ppt->data = jas_malloc(ppt->len))) {
goto error;
}
if (jas_stream_read(in, (char *) ppt->data, ppt->len) != JAS_CAST(int, ppt->len)) {
goto error;
}
} else {
ppt->data = 0;
}
return 0;
error:
jpc_ppt_destroyparms(ms);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,867 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pgx_getuint32(jas_stream_t *in, uint_fast32_t *val)
{
int c;
uint_fast32_t v;
do {
if ((c = pgx_getc(in)) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
} while (isspace(c));
v = 0;
while (isdigit(c)) {
v = 10 * v + c - '0';
if ((c = pgx_getc(in)) < 0) {
return -1;
}
}
if (!isspace(c)) {
return -1;
}
*val = v;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,957 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int handle_rdmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u32 ecx = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
u64 data;
if (vmx_get_msr(vcpu, ecx, &data)) {
trace_kvm_msr_read_ex(ecx);
kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
return 1;
}
trace_kvm_msr_read(ecx, data);
/* FIXME: handling of bits 32:63 of rax, rdx */
vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] = data & -1u;
vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX] = (data >> 32) & -1u;
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 37,084 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_ple(void)
{
return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING;
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 37,016 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionDevToolsClientHost::InfoBarDismissed() {
detach_reason_ = api::debugger::DETACH_REASON_CANCELED_BY_USER;
SendDetachedEvent();
Close();
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
[email protected]
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 173,238 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: syncer::SyncError AppListSyncableService::ProcessSyncChanges(
const tracked_objects::Location& from_here,
const syncer::SyncChangeList& change_list) {
if (!sync_processor_.get()) {
return syncer::SyncError(FROM_HERE,
syncer::SyncError::DATATYPE_ERROR,
"App List syncable service is not started.",
syncer::APP_LIST);
}
model_observer_.reset();
VLOG(1) << this << ": ProcessSyncChanges: " << change_list.size();
for (syncer::SyncChangeList::const_iterator iter = change_list.begin();
iter != change_list.end(); ++iter) {
const SyncChange& change = *iter;
VLOG(2) << this << " Change: "
<< change.sync_data().GetSpecifics().app_list().item_id()
<< " (" << change.change_type() << ")";
if (change.change_type() == SyncChange::ACTION_ADD ||
change.change_type() == SyncChange::ACTION_UPDATE) {
ProcessSyncItemSpecifics(change.sync_data().GetSpecifics().app_list());
} else if (change.change_type() == SyncChange::ACTION_DELETE) {
DeleteSyncItemSpecifics(change.sync_data().GetSpecifics().app_list());
} else {
LOG(ERROR) << "Invalid sync change";
}
}
model_observer_.reset(new ModelObserver(this));
return syncer::SyncError();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,917 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: process_colour_pointer_common(STREAM s, int bpp)
{
extern RD_BOOL g_local_cursor;
uint16 width, height, cache_idx, masklen, datalen;
uint16 x, y;
uint8 *mask;
uint8 *data;
RD_HCURSOR cursor;
in_uint16_le(s, cache_idx);
in_uint16_le(s, x);
in_uint16_le(s, y);
in_uint16_le(s, width);
in_uint16_le(s, height);
in_uint16_le(s, masklen);
in_uint16_le(s, datalen);
in_uint8p(s, data, datalen);
in_uint8p(s, mask, masklen);
logger(Protocol, Debug,
"process_colour_pointer_common(), new pointer %d with width %d and height %d",
cache_idx, width, height);
/* keep hotspot within cursor bounding box */
x = MIN(x, width - 1);
y = MIN(y, height - 1);
if (g_local_cursor)
return; /* don't bother creating a cursor we won't use */
cursor = ui_create_cursor(x, y, width, height, mask, data, bpp);
ui_set_cursor(cursor);
cache_put_cursor(cache_idx, cursor);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 92,988 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebSocketJob::AddCookieHeaderAndSend() {
bool allow = true;
if (delegate_ && !delegate_->CanGetCookies(socket_, GetURLForCookies()))
allow = false;
if (socket_ && delegate_ && state_ == CONNECTING) {
handshake_request_->RemoveHeaders(
kCookieHeaders, arraysize(kCookieHeaders));
if (allow) {
if (socket_->context()->cookie_store()) {
CookieOptions cookie_options;
cookie_options.set_include_httponly();
std::string cookie =
socket_->context()->cookie_store()->GetCookiesWithOptions(
GetURLForCookies(), cookie_options);
if (!cookie.empty())
handshake_request_->AppendHeaderIfMissing("Cookie", cookie);
}
}
if (spdy_websocket_stream_.get()) {
linked_ptr<spdy::SpdyHeaderBlock> headers(new spdy::SpdyHeaderBlock);
handshake_request_->GetRequestHeaderBlock(
socket_->url(), headers.get(), &challenge_);
spdy_websocket_stream_->SendRequest(headers);
} else {
const std::string& handshake_request =
handshake_request_->GetRawRequest();
handshake_request_sent_ = 0;
socket_->net_log()->AddEvent(
NetLog::TYPE_WEB_SOCKET_SEND_REQUEST_HEADERS,
make_scoped_refptr(
new NetLogWebSocketHandshakeParameter(handshake_request)));
socket_->SendData(handshake_request.data(),
handshake_request.size());
}
}
}
Commit Message: Use ScopedRunnableMethodFactory in WebSocketJob
Don't post SendPending if it is already posted.
BUG=89795
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7488007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93599 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 98,365 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual ~TabContextMenuContents() {
if (controller_)
controller_->tabstrip_->StopAllHighlighting();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,525 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ArrayBufferAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "arrayBufferAttribute");
TestArrayBuffer* cpp_value = v8_value->IsArrayBuffer() ? V8ArrayBuffer::ToImpl(v8::Local<v8::ArrayBuffer>::Cast(v8_value)) : 0;
if (!cpp_value) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError("The provided value is not of type 'ArrayBuffer'.");
return;
}
impl->setArrayBufferAttribute(cpp_value);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,524 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_start_of_pic(dec_struct_t *ps_dec,
WORD32 i4_poc,
pocstruct_t *ps_temp_poc,
UWORD16 u2_frame_num,
dec_pic_params_t *ps_pps)
{
pocstruct_t *ps_prev_poc = &ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc;
pocstruct_t *ps_cur_poc = ps_temp_poc;
pic_buffer_t *pic_buf;
ivd_video_decode_op_t * ps_dec_output =
(ivd_video_decode_op_t *)ps_dec->pv_dec_out;
dec_slice_params_t *ps_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
dec_seq_params_t *ps_seq = ps_pps->ps_sps;
UWORD8 u1_bottom_field_flag = ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag;
UWORD8 u1_field_pic_flag = ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
/* high profile related declarations */
high_profile_tools_t s_high_profile;
WORD32 ret;
H264_MUTEX_LOCK(&ps_dec->process_disp_mutex);
ps_prev_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = ps_cur_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb;
ps_prev_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_msb = ps_cur_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_msb;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0];
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1];
ps_prev_poc->u1_bot_field = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag;
ps_prev_poc->i4_prev_frame_num_ofst = ps_cur_poc->i4_prev_frame_num_ofst;
ps_prev_poc->u2_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->i1_prev_mb_qp_delta = 0;
ps_dec->i1_next_ctxt_idx = 0;
ps_dec->u4_nmb_deblk = 0;
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 1)
ps_dec->u4_nmb_deblk = 1;
if(ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag == 1)
{
ps_dec->u4_nmb_deblk = 0;
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores > 2)
ps_dec->u4_num_cores = 2;
}
ps_dec->u4_use_intrapred_line_copy = 0;
if (ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag == 0)
{
ps_dec->u4_use_intrapred_line_copy = 1;
}
ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm = 0;
/* If degrade is enabled, set the degrade flags appropriately */
if(ps_dec->i4_degrade_type && ps_dec->i4_degrade_pics)
{
WORD32 degrade_pic;
ps_dec->i4_degrade_pic_cnt++;
degrade_pic = 0;
/* If degrade is to be done in all frames, then do not check further */
switch(ps_dec->i4_degrade_pics)
{
case 4:
{
degrade_pic = 1;
break;
}
case 3:
{
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type != I_SLICE)
degrade_pic = 1;
break;
}
case 2:
{
/* If pic count hits non-degrade interval or it is an islice, then do not degrade */
if((ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type != I_SLICE)
&& (ps_dec->i4_degrade_pic_cnt
!= ps_dec->i4_nondegrade_interval))
degrade_pic = 1;
break;
}
case 1:
{
/* Check if the current picture is non-ref */
if(0 == ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc)
{
degrade_pic = 1;
}
break;
}
}
if(degrade_pic)
{
if(ps_dec->i4_degrade_type & 0x2)
ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm = 1;
/* MC degrading is done only for non-ref pictures */
if(0 == ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc)
{
if(ps_dec->i4_degrade_type & 0x4)
ps_dec->i4_mv_frac_mask = 0;
if(ps_dec->i4_degrade_type & 0x8)
ps_dec->i4_mv_frac_mask = 0;
}
}
else
ps_dec->i4_degrade_pic_cnt = 0;
}
{
dec_err_status_t * ps_err = ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status;
if(ps_dec->u1_sl_typ_5_9
&& ((ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type == I_SLICE)
|| (ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type
== SI_SLICE)))
ps_err->u1_cur_pic_type = PIC_TYPE_I;
else
ps_err->u1_cur_pic_type = PIC_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
if(ps_err->u1_pic_aud_i == PIC_TYPE_I)
{
ps_err->u1_cur_pic_type = PIC_TYPE_I;
ps_err->u1_pic_aud_i = PIC_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
}
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL)
{
if(ps_err->u1_err_flag)
ih264d_reset_ref_bufs(ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr);
ps_err->u1_err_flag = ACCEPT_ALL_PICS;
}
}
if(ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag && ps_dec->s_prev_seq_params.u1_eoseq_pending)
{
/* Reset the decoder picture buffers */
WORD32 j;
for(j = 0; j < MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW; j++)
{
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
j,
BUF_MGR_REF);
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_mv_buf_mgr,
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_id_mv_buf_id_map[j],
BUF_MGR_REF);
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
j,
BUF_MGR_IO);
}
/* reset the decoder structure parameters related to buffer handling */
ps_dec->u1_second_field = 0;
ps_dec->i4_cur_display_seq = 0;
/********************************************************************/
/* indicate in the decoder output i4_status that some frames are being */
/* dropped, so that it resets timestamp and wait for a new sequence */
/********************************************************************/
ps_dec->s_prev_seq_params.u1_eoseq_pending = 0;
}
ret = ih264d_init_pic(ps_dec, u2_frame_num, i4_poc, ps_pps);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_pic_tu_coeff_data;
ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_pic_tu_coeff_data;
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info = ps_dec->ps_frm_mb_info;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
UWORD16 pic_wd;
UWORD16 pic_ht;
UWORD32 num_mbs;
pic_wd = ps_dec->u2_pic_wd;
pic_ht = ps_dec->u2_pic_ht;
num_mbs = (pic_wd * pic_ht) >> 8;
if(ps_dec->pu1_dec_mb_map)
{
memset((void *)ps_dec->pu1_dec_mb_map, 0, num_mbs);
}
if(ps_dec->pu1_recon_mb_map)
{
memset((void *)ps_dec->pu1_recon_mb_map, 0, num_mbs);
}
if(ps_dec->pu2_slice_num_map)
{
memset((void *)ps_dec->pu2_slice_num_map, 0,
(num_mbs * sizeof(UWORD16)));
}
}
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice = &(ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf[0]);
ps_dec->ps_decode_cur_slice = &(ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf[0]);
ps_dec->ps_computebs_cur_slice = &(ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf[0]);
/* Initialize all the HP toolsets to zero */
ps_dec->s_high_profile.u1_scaling_present = 0;
ps_dec->s_high_profile.u1_transform8x8_present = 0;
/* Get Next Free Picture */
if(1 == ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf)
{
UWORD32 i;
/* Free any buffer that is in the queue to be freed */
for(i = 0; i < MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW; i++)
{
if(0 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_to_be_freed[i])
continue;
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr, i,
BUF_MGR_IO);
ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_to_be_freed[i] = 0;
ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[i] = 0;
}
}
if(!(u1_field_pic_flag && 0 != ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded)) //ps_dec->u1_second_field))
{
pic_buffer_t *ps_cur_pic;
WORD32 cur_pic_buf_id, cur_mv_buf_id;
col_mv_buf_t *ps_col_mv;
while(1)
{
ps_cur_pic = (pic_buffer_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free(
(buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
&cur_pic_buf_id);
if(ps_cur_pic == NULL)
{
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T;
return ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T;
}
if(0 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[cur_pic_buf_id])
{
break;
}
}
ps_col_mv = (col_mv_buf_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_mv_buf_mgr,
&cur_mv_buf_id);
if(ps_col_mv == NULL)
{
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T;
return ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T;
}
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic = ps_cur_pic;
ps_dec->u1_pic_buf_id = cur_pic_buf_id;
ps_cur_pic->u4_ts = ps_dec->u4_ts;
ps_cur_pic->u1_mv_buf_id = cur_mv_buf_id;
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_id_mv_buf_id_map[cur_pic_buf_id] = cur_mv_buf_id;
ps_cur_pic->pu1_col_zero_flag = (UWORD8 *)ps_col_mv->pv_col_zero_flag;
ps_cur_pic->ps_mv = (mv_pred_t *)ps_col_mv->pv_mv;
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_ref_flag[cur_pic_buf_id] = 0;
if(ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream)
{
/*make first entry of list0 point to cur pic,so that if first Islice is in error, ref pic struct will have valid entries*/
ps_dec->ps_ref_pic_buf_lx[0] = ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[0];
*(ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[0][0]) = *ps_cur_pic;
}
if(!ps_dec->ps_cur_pic)
{
WORD32 j;
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("------- Display Buffers Reset --------\n");
for(j = 0; j < MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW; j++)
{
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
j,
BUF_MGR_REF);
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_mv_buf_mgr,
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_id_mv_buf_id_map[j],
BUF_MGR_REF);
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
j,
BUF_MGR_IO);
}
ps_dec->i4_cur_display_seq = 0;
ps_dec->i4_prev_max_display_seq = 0;
ps_dec->i4_max_poc = 0;
ps_cur_pic = (pic_buffer_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free(
(buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
&cur_pic_buf_id);
if(ps_cur_pic == NULL)
{
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T;
return ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T;
}
ps_col_mv = (col_mv_buf_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_mv_buf_mgr,
&cur_mv_buf_id);
if(ps_col_mv == NULL)
{
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T;
return ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T;
}
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic = ps_cur_pic;
ps_dec->u1_pic_buf_id = cur_pic_buf_id;
ps_cur_pic->u4_ts = ps_dec->u4_ts;
ps_dec->apv_buf_id_pic_buf_map[cur_pic_buf_id] = (void *)ps_cur_pic;
ps_cur_pic->u1_mv_buf_id = cur_mv_buf_id;
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_id_mv_buf_id_map[cur_pic_buf_id] = cur_mv_buf_id;
ps_cur_pic->pu1_col_zero_flag = (UWORD8 *)ps_col_mv->pv_col_zero_flag;
ps_cur_pic->ps_mv = (mv_pred_t *)ps_col_mv->pv_mv;
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_ref_flag[cur_pic_buf_id] = 0;
}
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u1_picturetype = u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ = SKIP_NONE;
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("got a buffer\n");
}
else
{
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("did not get a buffer\n");
}
ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got = 1;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_poc = i4_poc;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_pic_num = u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt = ps_pps->i4_top_field_order_cnt;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt =
ps_pps->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_avg_poc = ps_pps->i4_avg_poc;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_time_stamp = ps_dec->u4_pts;
ps_dec->s_cur_pic = *(ps_dec->ps_cur_pic);
if(u1_field_pic_flag && u1_bottom_field_flag)
{
WORD32 i4_temp_poc;
WORD32 i4_top_field_order_poc, i4_bot_field_order_poc;
/* Point to odd lines, since it's bottom field */
ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf1 += ps_dec->s_cur_pic.u2_frm_wd_y;
ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf2 += ps_dec->s_cur_pic.u2_frm_wd_uv;
ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf3 += ps_dec->s_cur_pic.u2_frm_wd_uv;
ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv +=
((ps_dec->u2_pic_ht * ps_dec->u2_pic_wd) >> 5);
ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_col_zero_flag += ((ps_dec->u2_pic_ht
* ps_dec->u2_pic_wd) >> 5);
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u1_picturetype |= BOT_FLD;
i4_top_field_order_poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt;
i4_bot_field_order_poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt;
i4_temp_poc = MIN(i4_top_field_order_poc,
i4_bot_field_order_poc);
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_avg_poc = i4_temp_poc;
}
ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag = ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag
&& (!u1_field_pic_flag);
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u1_picturetype |= (ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag
<< 2);
ps_dec->ps_cur_mb_row = ps_dec->ps_nbr_mb_row; //[0];
ps_dec->ps_cur_mb_row += 2;
ps_dec->ps_top_mb_row = ps_dec->ps_nbr_mb_row;
ps_dec->ps_top_mb_row += ((ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs + 2) << (1 - ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag));
ps_dec->ps_top_mb_row += 2;
/* CHANGED CODE */
ps_dec->ps_mv_cur = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv;
ps_dec->ps_mv_top = ps_dec->ps_mv_top_p[0];
/* CHANGED CODE */
ps_dec->u1_mv_top_p = 0;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = 0;
/* CHANGED CODE */
ps_dec->ps_mv_left = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv;
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded = 0;
ps_dec->i4_submb_ofst = -(SUB_BLK_SIZE);
ps_dec->u4_pred_info_idx = 0;
ps_dec->u4_pred_info_pkd_idx = 0;
ps_dec->u4_dma_buf_idx = 0;
ps_dec->ps_mv = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv;
ps_dec->ps_mv_bank_cur = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv;
ps_dec->pu1_col_zero_flag = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_col_zero_flag;
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = -1;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = 0;
ps_dec->u2_mv_2mb[0] = 0;
ps_dec->u2_mv_2mb[1] = 0;
ps_dec->u1_last_pic_not_decoded = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num_dec_thread = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num_bs = 0;
ps_dec->u4_intra_pred_line_ofst = 0;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_y_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_y_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_u_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_u_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_v_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_v_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_y_intra_pred_line_base = ps_dec->pu1_y_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_u_intra_pred_line_base = ps_dec->pu1_u_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_v_intra_pred_line_base = ps_dec->pu1_v_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_prev_y_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_y_intra_pred_line
+ (ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs * MB_SIZE);
ps_dec->pu1_prev_u_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_u_intra_pred_line
+ ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs * BLK8x8SIZE * YUV420SP_FACTOR;
ps_dec->pu1_prev_v_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_v_intra_pred_line
+ ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs * BLK8x8SIZE;
ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn = ps_dec->ps_deblk_pic;
/* Initialize The Function Pointer Depending Upon the Entropy and MbAff Flag */
{
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag)
{
ps_dec->pf_compute_bs = ih264d_compute_bs_mbaff;
ps_dec->pf_mvpred = ih264d_mvpred_mbaff;
}
else
{
ps_dec->pf_compute_bs = ih264d_compute_bs_non_mbaff;
ps_dec->u1_cur_mb_fld_dec_flag = ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
}
}
/* Set up the Parameter for DMA transfer */
{
UWORD8 u1_field_pic_flag = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
UWORD8 u1_mbaff = ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
UWORD8 uc_lastmbs = (((ps_dec->u2_pic_wd) >> 4)
% (ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp >> u1_mbaff));
UWORD16 ui16_lastmbs_widthY =
(uc_lastmbs ? (uc_lastmbs << 4) : ((ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp
>> u1_mbaff) << 4));
UWORD16 ui16_lastmbs_widthUV =
uc_lastmbs ? (uc_lastmbs << 3) : ((ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp
>> u1_mbaff) << 3);
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.pu1_dest_y = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf1;
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.pu1_dest_u = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf2;
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.pu1_dest_v = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf3;
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_frm_wd_y = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_y
<< u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_frm_wd_uv = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_uv
<< u1_field_pic_flag;
if(u1_field_pic_flag)
{
ui16_lastmbs_widthY += ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_y;
ui16_lastmbs_widthUV += ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_uv;
}
/* Normal Increment of Pointer */
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u4_inc_y[0] = ((ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp << 4)
>> u1_mbaff);
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u4_inc_uv[0] = ((ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp << 4)
>> u1_mbaff);
/* End of Row Increment */
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u4_inc_y[1] = (ui16_lastmbs_widthY
+ (PAD_LEN_Y_H << 1)
+ ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_frm_wd_y
* ((15 << u1_mbaff) + u1_mbaff));
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u4_inc_uv[1] = (ui16_lastmbs_widthUV
+ (PAD_LEN_UV_H << 2)
+ ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_frm_wd_uv
* ((15 << u1_mbaff) + u1_mbaff));
/* Assign picture numbers to each frame/field */
/* only once per picture. */
ih264d_assign_pic_num(ps_dec);
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_mv_top_left_inc = (ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp
<< 2) - 1 - (u1_mbaff << 2);
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_mv_left_inc = ((ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp
>> u1_mbaff) - 1) << (4 + u1_mbaff);
}
/**********************************************************************/
/* High profile related initialization at pictrue level */
/**********************************************************************/
if(ps_seq->u1_profile_idc == HIGH_PROFILE_IDC)
{
if((ps_seq->i4_seq_scaling_matrix_present_flag)
|| (ps_pps->i4_pic_scaling_matrix_present_flag))
{
ih264d_form_scaling_matrix_picture(ps_seq, ps_pps, ps_dec);
ps_dec->s_high_profile.u1_scaling_present = 1;
}
else
{
ih264d_form_default_scaling_matrix(ps_dec);
}
if(ps_pps->i4_transform_8x8_mode_flag)
{
ps_dec->s_high_profile.u1_transform8x8_present = 1;
}
}
else
{
ih264d_form_default_scaling_matrix(ps_dec);
}
/* required while reading the transform_size_8x8 u4_flag */
ps_dec->s_high_profile.u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag =
ps_seq->u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag;
ps_dec->s_high_profile.s_cavlc_ctxt = ps_dec->s_cavlc_ctxt;
ps_dec->i1_recon_in_thread3_flag = 1;
ps_dec->ps_frame_buf_ip_recon = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
memcpy(&ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon_parse, &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon,
sizeof(tfr_ctxt_t));
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores >= 3 && ps_dec->i1_recon_in_thread3_flag)
{
memcpy(&ps_dec->s_tran_iprecon, &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon,
sizeof(tfr_ctxt_t));
ps_dec->ps_frame_buf_ip_recon = &ps_dec->s_tran_iprecon;
}
}
ih264d_init_deblk_tfr_ctxt(ps_dec,&(ps_dec->s_pad_mgr), &(ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon),
ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs, 0);
ps_dec->ps_cur_deblk_mb = ps_dec->ps_deblk_pic;
ps_dec->u4_cur_deblk_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->u4_deblk_mb_x = 0;
ps_dec->u4_deblk_mb_y = 0;
H264_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&ps_dec->process_disp_mutex);
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Initialize slice parameters before concealing error MBs
Also memset ps_dec_op structure to zero.
For error input, this ensures dimensions are initialized to zero
Bug: 28165661
Change-Id: I66eb2ddc5e02e74b7ff04da5f749443920f37141
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 174,165 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int btreeOverwriteContent(
MemPage *pPage, /* MemPage on which writing will occur */
u8 *pDest, /* Pointer to the place to start writing */
const BtreePayload *pX, /* Source of data to write */
int iOffset, /* Offset of first byte to write */
int iAmt /* Number of bytes to be written */
){
int nData = pX->nData - iOffset;
if( nData<=0 ){
/* Overwritting with zeros */
int i;
for(i=0; i<iAmt && pDest[i]==0; i++){}
if( i<iAmt ){
int rc = sqlite3PagerWrite(pPage->pDbPage);
if( rc ) return rc;
memset(pDest + i, 0, iAmt - i);
}
}else{
if( nData<iAmt ){
/* Mixed read data and zeros at the end. Make a recursive call
** to write the zeros then fall through to write the real data */
int rc = btreeOverwriteContent(pPage, pDest+nData, pX, iOffset+nData,
iAmt-nData);
if( rc ) return rc;
iAmt = nData;
}
if( memcmp(pDest, ((u8*)pX->pData) + iOffset, iAmt)!=0 ){
int rc = sqlite3PagerWrite(pPage->pDbPage);
if( rc ) return rc;
/* In a corrupt database, it is possible for the source and destination
** buffers to overlap. This is harmless since the database is already
** corrupt but it does cause valgrind and ASAN warnings. So use
** memmove(). */
memmove(pDest, ((u8*)pX->pData) + iOffset, iAmt);
}
}
return SQLITE_OK;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 151,676 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGuest::UpdateFrameInfo(
const gfx::Vector2d& scroll_offset,
float page_scale_factor,
float min_page_scale_factor,
float max_page_scale_factor,
const gfx::Size& content_size) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 115,067 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InputHandler::learnText()
{
if (!isActiveTextEdit())
return;
if (m_currentFocusElementTextEditMask & NO_PREDICTION || m_currentFocusElementTextEditMask & NO_AUTO_TEXT)
return;
WTF::String textInField(elementText());
textInField = textInField.substring(std::max(0, static_cast<int>(textInField.length() - MaxLearnTextDataSize)), textInField.length());
textInField = textInField.stripWhiteSpace();
ASSERT(textInField.length() <= MaxLearnTextDataSize);
if (textInField.isEmpty())
return;
InputLog(LogLevelInfo, "InputHandler::learnText '%s'", textInField.latin1().data());
sendLearnTextDetails(textInField);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,535 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLCanvasElement::ShouldAccelerate(AccelerationCriteria criteria) const {
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kAlwaysAccelerateCanvas)) {
if (context_ && !Is2d())
return false;
if (GetLayoutBox() && !GetLayoutBox()->HasAcceleratedCompositing())
return false;
base::CheckedNumeric<int> checked_canvas_pixel_count = Size().Width();
checked_canvas_pixel_count *= Size().Height();
if (!checked_canvas_pixel_count.IsValid())
return false;
int canvas_pixel_count = checked_canvas_pixel_count.ValueOrDie();
if (criteria != kIgnoreResourceLimitCriteria) {
Settings* settings = GetDocument().GetSettings();
if (!settings ||
canvas_pixel_count < settings->GetMinimumAccelerated2dCanvasSize()) {
return false;
}
if (global_gpu_memory_usage_ >= kMaxGlobalGPUMemoryUsage)
return false;
if (global_accelerated_context_count_ >=
kMaxGlobalAcceleratedResourceCount)
return false;
}
}
base::WeakPtr<WebGraphicsContext3DProviderWrapper> context_provider_wrapper =
SharedGpuContext::ContextProviderWrapper();
if (!context_provider_wrapper)
return false;
return context_provider_wrapper->Utils()->Accelerated2DCanvasFeatureEnabled();
}
Commit Message: Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 152,119 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoFenceSync(GLenum condition,
GLbitfield flags,
GLuint client_id) {
if (resources_->sync_id_map.HasClientID(client_id)) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
CheckErrorCallbackState();
GLsync service_id = api()->glFenceSyncFn(condition, flags);
if (CheckErrorCallbackState()) {
return error::kNoError;
}
resources_->sync_id_map.SetIDMapping(client_id,
reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(service_id));
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,959 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: alloc_sglist(int nents, int max, int vary, struct usbtest_dev *dev, int pipe)
{
struct scatterlist *sg;
unsigned int n_size = 0;
unsigned i;
unsigned size = max;
unsigned maxpacket =
get_maxpacket(interface_to_usbdev(dev->intf), pipe);
if (max == 0)
return NULL;
sg = kmalloc_array(nents, sizeof(*sg), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sg)
return NULL;
sg_init_table(sg, nents);
for (i = 0; i < nents; i++) {
char *buf;
unsigned j;
buf = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf) {
free_sglist(sg, i);
return NULL;
}
/* kmalloc pages are always physically contiguous! */
sg_set_buf(&sg[i], buf, size);
switch (pattern) {
case 0:
/* already zeroed */
break;
case 1:
for (j = 0; j < size; j++)
*buf++ = (u8) (((j + n_size) % maxpacket) % 63);
n_size += size;
break;
}
if (vary) {
size += vary;
size %= max;
if (size == 0)
size = (vary < max) ? vary : max;
}
}
return sg;
}
Commit Message: usb: usbtest: fix NULL pointer dereference
If the usbtest driver encounters a device with an IN bulk endpoint but
no OUT bulk endpoint, it will try to dereference a NULL pointer
(out->desc.bEndpointAddress). The problem can be solved by adding a
missing test.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 59,841 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FormAssociatedElement::didChangeForm()
{
}
Commit Message: Fix a crash when a form control is in a past naems map of a demoted form element.
Note that we wanted to add the protector in FormAssociatedElement::setForm(),
but we couldn't do it because it is called from the constructor.
BUG=326854
TEST=automated.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/105693013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@163680 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 123,819 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const SegmentInfo* Segment::GetInfo() const { return m_pInfo; }
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 160,776 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: process_realpath(u_int32_t id)
{
char resolvedname[PATH_MAX];
char *path;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (path[0] == '\0') {
free(path);
path = xstrdup(".");
}
debug3("request %u: realpath", id);
verbose("realpath \"%s\"", path);
if (realpath(path, resolvedname) == NULL) {
send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
} else {
Stat s;
attrib_clear(&s.attrib);
s.name = s.long_name = resolvedname;
send_names(id, 1, &s);
}
free(path);
}
Commit Message: disallow creation (of empty files) in read-only mode; reported by
Michal Zalewski, feedback & ok deraadt@
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 60,365 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int clientsCronHandleTimeout(client *c, mstime_t now_ms) {
time_t now = now_ms/1000;
if (server.maxidletime &&
!(c->flags & CLIENT_SLAVE) && /* no timeout for slaves */
!(c->flags & CLIENT_MASTER) && /* no timeout for masters */
!(c->flags & CLIENT_BLOCKED) && /* no timeout for BLPOP */
!(c->flags & CLIENT_PUBSUB) && /* no timeout for Pub/Sub clients */
(now - c->lastinteraction > server.maxidletime))
{
serverLog(LL_VERBOSE,"Closing idle client");
freeClient(c);
return 1;
} else if (c->flags & CLIENT_BLOCKED) {
/* Blocked OPS timeout is handled with milliseconds resolution.
* However note that the actual resolution is limited by
* server.hz. */
if (c->bpop.timeout != 0 && c->bpop.timeout < now_ms) {
/* Handle blocking operation specific timeout. */
replyToBlockedClientTimedOut(c);
unblockClient(c);
} else if (server.cluster_enabled) {
/* Cluster: handle unblock & redirect of clients blocked
* into keys no longer served by this server. */
if (clusterRedirectBlockedClientIfNeeded(c))
unblockClient(c);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 70,004 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ArthurOutputDev::endType3Char(GfxState *state)
{
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 852 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int adev_open_input_stream(struct audio_hw_device *dev,
audio_io_handle_t handle __unused,
audio_devices_t devices,
struct audio_config *config,
struct audio_stream_in **stream_in,
audio_input_flags_t flags,
const char *address __unused,
audio_source_t source)
{
struct audio_device *adev = (struct audio_device *)dev;
struct stream_in *in;
struct pcm_device_profile *pcm_profile;
ALOGV("%s: enter", __func__);
*stream_in = NULL;
if (check_input_parameters(config->sample_rate, config->format,
audio_channel_count_from_in_mask(config->channel_mask)) != 0)
return -EINVAL;
usecase_type_t usecase_type = (source == AUDIO_SOURCE_HOTWORD) ?
PCM_HOTWORD_STREAMING : PCM_CAPTURE;
pcm_profile = get_pcm_device(usecase_type, devices);
if (pcm_profile == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
in = (struct stream_in *)calloc(1, sizeof(struct stream_in));
in->stream.common.get_sample_rate = in_get_sample_rate;
in->stream.common.set_sample_rate = in_set_sample_rate;
in->stream.common.get_buffer_size = in_get_buffer_size;
in->stream.common.get_channels = in_get_channels;
in->stream.common.get_format = in_get_format;
in->stream.common.set_format = in_set_format;
in->stream.common.standby = in_standby;
in->stream.common.dump = in_dump;
in->stream.common.set_parameters = in_set_parameters;
in->stream.common.get_parameters = in_get_parameters;
in->stream.common.add_audio_effect = in_add_audio_effect;
in->stream.common.remove_audio_effect = in_remove_audio_effect;
in->stream.set_gain = in_set_gain;
in->stream.read = in_read;
in->stream.get_input_frames_lost = in_get_input_frames_lost;
in->devices = devices;
in->source = source;
in->dev = adev;
in->standby = 1;
in->main_channels = config->channel_mask;
in->requested_rate = config->sample_rate;
if (config->sample_rate != CAPTURE_DEFAULT_SAMPLING_RATE)
flags = flags & ~AUDIO_INPUT_FLAG_FAST;
in->input_flags = flags;
/* HW codec is limited to default channels. No need to update with
* requested channels */
in->config = pcm_profile->config;
/* Update config params with the requested sample rate and channels */
if (source == AUDIO_SOURCE_HOTWORD) {
in->usecase = USECASE_AUDIO_CAPTURE_HOTWORD;
} else {
in->usecase = USECASE_AUDIO_CAPTURE;
}
in->usecase_type = usecase_type;
pthread_mutex_init(&in->lock, (const pthread_mutexattr_t *) NULL);
pthread_mutex_init(&in->pre_lock, (const pthread_mutexattr_t *) NULL);
*stream_in = &in->stream;
ALOGV("%s: exit", __func__);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix audio record pre-processing
proc_buf_out consistently initialized.
intermediate scratch buffers consistently initialized.
prevent read failure from overwriting memory.
Test: POC, CTS, camera record
Bug: 62873231
Change-Id: Ie26e12a419a5819c1c5c3a0bcf1876d6d7aca686
(cherry picked from commit 6d7b330c27efba944817e647955da48e54fd74eb)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 162,251 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void pcnet_rmd_load(PCNetState *s, struct pcnet_RMD *rmd,
hwaddr addr)
{
if (!BCR_SSIZE32(s)) {
struct {
uint32_t rbadr;
int16_t buf_length;
int16_t msg_length;
} rda;
s->phys_mem_read(s->dma_opaque, addr, (void *)&rda, sizeof(rda), 0);
rmd->rbadr = le32_to_cpu(rda.rbadr) & 0xffffff;
rmd->buf_length = le16_to_cpu(rda.buf_length);
rmd->status = (le32_to_cpu(rda.rbadr) >> 16) & 0xff00;
rmd->msg_length = le16_to_cpu(rda.msg_length);
rmd->res = 0;
} else {
s->phys_mem_read(s->dma_opaque, addr, (void *)rmd, sizeof(*rmd), 0);
le32_to_cpus(&rmd->rbadr);
le16_to_cpus((uint16_t *)&rmd->buf_length);
le16_to_cpus((uint16_t *)&rmd->status);
le32_to_cpus(&rmd->msg_length);
le32_to_cpus(&rmd->res);
if (BCR_SWSTYLE(s) == 3) {
uint32_t tmp = rmd->rbadr;
rmd->rbadr = rmd->msg_length;
rmd->msg_length = tmp;
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,527 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int effect_create(struct effect_s *effect,
struct session_s *session,
effect_handle_t *interface)
{
effect->session = session;
*interface = (effect_handle_t)&effect->itfe;
return effect_set_state(effect, EFFECT_STATE_CREATED);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix AudioEffect reply overflow
Bug: 28173666
Change-Id: I055af37a721b20c5da0f1ec4b02f630dcd5aee02
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 160,365 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::takeDOMWindowFrom(Document* document)
{
ASSERT(m_frame);
ASSERT(!m_domWindow);
ASSERT(document->domWindow());
ASSERT(!document->inPageCache());
m_domWindow = document->m_domWindow.release();
m_domWindow->didSecureTransitionTo(this);
ASSERT(m_domWindow->document() == this);
ASSERT(m_domWindow->frame() == m_frame);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,642 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HTREEITEM TreeView::GetTreeItemForNodeDuringMutation(TreeModelNode* node) {
if (node_to_details_map_.find(node) == node_to_details_map_.end()) {
return NULL;
}
if (!root_shown_ || node != model_->GetRoot()) {
const NodeDetails* details = GetNodeDetails(node);
if (!details->loaded_children)
return NULL;
return details->tree_item;
}
return TreeView_GetRoot(tree_view_);
}
Commit Message: Add OVERRIDE to ui::TreeModelObserver overridden methods.
BUG=None
TEST=None
[email protected]
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7046093
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88827 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 100,782 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::SetGLError(
GLenum error, const char* function_name, const char* msg) {
if (msg) {
last_error_ = msg;
LogMessage(GetLogPrefix() + ": " + std::string("GL ERROR :") +
GLES2Util::GetStringEnum(error) + " : " +
function_name + ": " + msg);
}
error_bits_ |= GLES2Util::GLErrorToErrorBit(error);
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 103,685 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int Browser::GetExtraRenderViewHeight() const {
return window_->GetExtraRenderViewHeight();
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,220 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error_detected(uint32_t errnum, char *errstr, ...)
{
va_list args;
va_start(args, errstr);
{
TSK_ERROR_INFO *errInfo = tsk_error_get_info();
char *loc_errstr = errInfo->errstr;
if (errInfo->t_errno == 0)
errInfo->t_errno = errnum;
else {
int sl = strlen(errstr);
snprintf(loc_errstr + sl, TSK_ERROR_STRING_MAX_LENGTH - sl,
" Next errnum: 0x%x ", errnum);
}
if (errstr != NULL) {
int sl = strlen(loc_errstr);
vsnprintf(loc_errstr + sl, TSK_ERROR_STRING_MAX_LENGTH - sl,
errstr, args);
}
}
va_end(args);
}
Commit Message: hfs: fix keylen check in hfs_cat_traverse()
If key->key_len is 65535, calculating "uint16_t keylen' would
cause an overflow:
uint16_t keylen;
...
keylen = 2 + tsk_getu16(hfs->fs_info.endian, key->key_len)
so the code bypasses the sanity check "if (keylen > nodesize)"
which results in crash later:
./toolfs/fstools/fls -b 512 -f hfs <image>
=================================================================
==16==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x6210000256a4 (pc 0x00000054812b bp 0x7ffca548a8f0 sp 0x7ffca548a480 T0)
==16==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
#0 0x54812a in hfs_dir_open_meta_cb /fuzzing/sleuthkit/tsk/fs/hfs_dent.c:237:20
#1 0x51a96c in hfs_cat_traverse /fuzzing/sleuthkit/tsk/fs/hfs.c:1082:21
#2 0x547785 in hfs_dir_open_meta /fuzzing/sleuthkit/tsk/fs/hfs_dent.c:480:9
#3 0x50f57d in tsk_fs_dir_open_meta /fuzzing/sleuthkit/tsk/fs/fs_dir.c:290:14
#4 0x54af17 in tsk_fs_path2inum /fuzzing/sleuthkit/tsk/fs/ifind_lib.c:237:23
#5 0x522266 in hfs_open /fuzzing/sleuthkit/tsk/fs/hfs.c:6579:9
#6 0x508e89 in main /fuzzing/sleuthkit/tools/fstools/fls.cpp:267:19
#7 0x7f9daf67c2b0 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x202b0)
#8 0x41d679 in _start (/fuzzing/sleuthkit/tools/fstools/fls+0x41d679)
Make 'keylen' int type to prevent the overflow and fix that.
Now, I get proper error message instead of crash:
./toolfs/fstools/fls -b 512 -f hfs <image>
General file system error (hfs_cat_traverse: length of key 3 in leaf node 1 too large (65537 vs 4096))
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 87,231 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CloseSession() {
if (opened_device_label_.empty())
return;
media_stream_manager_->CancelRequest(opened_device_label_);
opened_device_label_.clear();
opened_session_id_ = kInvalidMediaCaptureSessionId;
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 153,272 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs_zap_caches_locked(struct inode *inode)
{
struct nfs_inode *nfsi = NFS_I(inode);
int mode = inode->i_mode;
nfs_inc_stats(inode, NFSIOS_ATTRINVALIDATE);
nfsi->attrtimeo = NFS_MINATTRTIMEO(inode);
nfsi->attrtimeo_timestamp = jiffies;
memset(NFS_COOKIEVERF(inode), 0, sizeof(NFS_COOKIEVERF(inode)));
if (S_ISREG(mode) || S_ISDIR(mode) || S_ISLNK(mode))
nfsi->cache_validity |= NFS_INO_INVALID_ATTR|NFS_INO_INVALID_DATA|NFS_INO_INVALID_ACCESS|NFS_INO_INVALID_ACL|NFS_INO_REVAL_PAGECACHE;
else
nfsi->cache_validity |= NFS_INO_INVALID_ATTR|NFS_INO_INVALID_ACCESS|NFS_INO_INVALID_ACL|NFS_INO_REVAL_PAGECACHE;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,825 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderFrameImpl::CreatePlaceholderDocumentLoader(
const blink::WebNavigationInfo& info) {
auto navigation_params = blink::WebNavigationParams::CreateFromInfo(info);
navigation_params->service_worker_network_provider =
BuildServiceWorkerNetworkProviderForNavigation(
nullptr /* request_params */,
nullptr /* controller_service_worker_info */);
return frame_->CreatePlaceholderDocumentLoader(
std::move(navigation_params), info.navigation_type, BuildDocumentState());
}
Commit Message: Fix crashes in RenderFrameImpl::OnSelectPopupMenuItem(s)
ExternalPopupMenu::DidSelectItem(s) can delete the RenderFrameImpl.
We need to reset external_popup_menu_ before calling it.
Bug: 912211
Change-Id: Ia9a628e144464a2ebb14ab77d3a693fd5cead6fc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381325
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618026}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 152,852 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: newSWFInput_filename(const char *filename)
{
FILE *file;
SWFInput input;
file = fopen(filename, "rb");
if(file == NULL)
{
SWF_warn("newSWFInput_filename: %s: %s\n",
filename, strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
input = newSWFInput_file(file);
if(input == NULL)
return NULL;
input->destroy = SWFInput_dtor_close;
return input;
}
Commit Message: Fix left shift of a negative value in SWFInput_readSBits. Check for number before before left-shifting by (number-1).
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 89,580 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: psf_binheader_readf (SF_PRIVATE *psf, char const *format, ...)
{ va_list argptr ;
sf_count_t *countptr, countdata ;
unsigned char *ucptr, sixteen_bytes [16] ;
unsigned int *intptr, intdata ;
unsigned short *shortptr ;
char *charptr ;
float *floatptr ;
double *doubleptr ;
char c ;
int byte_count = 0, count ;
if (! format)
return psf_ftell (psf) ;
va_start (argptr, format) ;
while ((c = *format++))
{ switch (c)
{ case 'e' : /* All conversions are now from LE to host. */
psf->rwf_endian = SF_ENDIAN_LITTLE ;
break ;
case 'E' : /* All conversions are now from BE to host. */
psf->rwf_endian = SF_ENDIAN_BIG ;
break ;
case 'm' : /* 4 byte marker value eg 'RIFF' */
intptr = va_arg (argptr, unsigned int*) ;
ucptr = (unsigned char*) intptr ;
byte_count += header_read (psf, ucptr, sizeof (int)) ;
*intptr = GET_MARKER (ucptr) ;
break ;
case 'h' :
intptr = va_arg (argptr, unsigned int*) ;
ucptr = (unsigned char*) intptr ;
byte_count += header_read (psf, sixteen_bytes, sizeof (sixteen_bytes)) ;
{ int k ;
intdata = 0 ;
for (k = 0 ; k < 16 ; k++)
intdata ^= sixteen_bytes [k] << k ;
}
*intptr = intdata ;
break ;
case '1' :
charptr = va_arg (argptr, char*) ;
*charptr = 0 ;
byte_count += header_read (psf, charptr, sizeof (char)) ;
break ;
case '2' : /* 2 byte value with the current endian-ness */
shortptr = va_arg (argptr, unsigned short*) ;
*shortptr = 0 ;
ucptr = (unsigned char*) shortptr ;
byte_count += header_read (psf, ucptr, sizeof (short)) ;
if (psf->rwf_endian == SF_ENDIAN_BIG)
*shortptr = GET_BE_SHORT (ucptr) ;
else
*shortptr = GET_LE_SHORT (ucptr) ;
break ;
case '3' : /* 3 byte value with the current endian-ness */
intptr = va_arg (argptr, unsigned int*) ;
*intptr = 0 ;
byte_count += header_read (psf, sixteen_bytes, 3) ;
if (psf->rwf_endian == SF_ENDIAN_BIG)
*intptr = GET_BE_3BYTE (sixteen_bytes) ;
else
*intptr = GET_LE_3BYTE (sixteen_bytes) ;
break ;
case '4' : /* 4 byte value with the current endian-ness */
intptr = va_arg (argptr, unsigned int*) ;
*intptr = 0 ;
ucptr = (unsigned char*) intptr ;
byte_count += header_read (psf, ucptr, sizeof (int)) ;
if (psf->rwf_endian == SF_ENDIAN_BIG)
*intptr = psf_get_be32 (ucptr, 0) ;
else
*intptr = psf_get_le32 (ucptr, 0) ;
break ;
case '8' : /* 8 byte value with the current endian-ness */
countptr = va_arg (argptr, sf_count_t *) ;
*countptr = 0 ;
byte_count += header_read (psf, sixteen_bytes, 8) ;
if (psf->rwf_endian == SF_ENDIAN_BIG)
countdata = psf_get_be64 (sixteen_bytes, 0) ;
else
countdata = psf_get_le64 (sixteen_bytes, 0) ;
*countptr = countdata ;
break ;
case 'f' : /* Float conversion */
floatptr = va_arg (argptr, float *) ;
*floatptr = 0.0 ;
byte_count += header_read (psf, floatptr, sizeof (float)) ;
if (psf->rwf_endian == SF_ENDIAN_BIG)
*floatptr = float32_be_read ((unsigned char*) floatptr) ;
else
*floatptr = float32_le_read ((unsigned char*) floatptr) ;
break ;
case 'd' : /* double conversion */
doubleptr = va_arg (argptr, double *) ;
*doubleptr = 0.0 ;
byte_count += header_read (psf, doubleptr, sizeof (double)) ;
if (psf->rwf_endian == SF_ENDIAN_BIG)
*doubleptr = double64_be_read ((unsigned char*) doubleptr) ;
else
*doubleptr = double64_le_read ((unsigned char*) doubleptr) ;
break ;
case 's' :
psf_log_printf (psf, "Format conversion 's' not implemented yet.\n") ;
/*
strptr = va_arg (argptr, char *) ;
size = strlen (strptr) + 1 ;
size += (size & 1) ;
longdata = H2LE_32 (size) ;
get_int (psf, longdata) ;
memcpy (&(psf->header [psf->headindex]), strptr, size) ;
psf->headindex += size ;
*/
break ;
case 'b' : /* Raw bytes */
charptr = va_arg (argptr, char*) ;
count = va_arg (argptr, size_t) ;
if (count > 0)
byte_count += header_read (psf, charptr, count) ;
break ;
case 'G' :
charptr = va_arg (argptr, char*) ;
count = va_arg (argptr, size_t) ;
if (count > 0)
byte_count += header_gets (psf, charptr, count) ;
break ;
case 'z' :
psf_log_printf (psf, "Format conversion 'z' not implemented yet.\n") ;
/*
size = va_arg (argptr, size_t) ;
while (size)
{ psf->header [psf->headindex] = 0 ;
psf->headindex ++ ;
size -- ;
} ;
*/
break ;
case 'p' :
/* Get the seek position first. */
count = va_arg (argptr, size_t) ;
header_seek (psf, count, SEEK_SET) ;
byte_count = count ;
break ;
case 'j' :
/* Get the seek position first. */
count = va_arg (argptr, size_t) ;
if (count)
{ header_seek (psf, count, SEEK_CUR) ;
byte_count += count ;
} ;
break ;
default :
psf_log_printf (psf, "*** Invalid format specifier `%c'\n", c) ;
psf->error = SFE_INTERNAL ;
break ;
} ;
} ;
va_end (argptr) ;
return byte_count ;
} /* psf_binheader_readf */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 170,064 |
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