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+"{\"id\": \"1018421\", \"name\": \"MADISON HILLS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP v. TOWN OF MADISON ET AL.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Madison Hills Ltd. Partnership v. Town of Madison\", \"decision_date\": \"1996-02-20\", \"docket_number\": \"14081\", \"first_page\": \"404\", \"last_page\": \"409\", \"citations\": \"40 Conn. App. 404\", \"volume\": \"40\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Appellate Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Appellate Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:19:35.343580+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"MADISON HILLS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP v. TOWN OF MADISON ET AL.\", \"head_matter\": \"MADISON HILLS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP v. TOWN OF MADISON ET AL.\\n(14081)\\nDupont, C. J., and Foti and Daly, Js.\\nArgued December 11, 1995\\ndecision released February 20, 1996\\nBernard Green, with whom, on the brief, was Mami Smith Katz, for the appellant (plaintiff).\\nSteven R. Dernbo, with whom was Andre E. Becker, for the appellees (TEPA Associates et al.).\", \"word_count\": \"1789\", \"char_count\": \"10673\", \"text\": \"FOTI, J.\\nThis is an appeal taken by the plaintiff Madison Hills Limited Partnership from the granting of a motion to set aside or open a default quiet title judgment. The plaintiff alleges that, pursuant to General Statutes \\u00a7 52-212, the trial court, lacked jurisdiction to open the judgment. We affirm the decision of the trial court.\\nThe following facts are relevant to the resolution of this appeal. In December, 1988, the plaintiff filed a one count complaint seeking a declaratory judgment to quiet title to property located in the town of Madison. Named as defendants were the town of Madison and all unknown persons having an interest in the property. In compliance with the trial court's orders, the plaintiff published notice of the action in the New Haven Register on December 26 through December 28, 1988. Fol lowing defaults against the town for failure to plead, and against all other defendants for failure to appear, the trial court rendered judgment on May 8,1989, ordering that the plaintiff had clear title to the parcel in question.\\nOn March 10, 1992, TEPA Associates (TEPA) and Candlewood Development Company (Candlewood) moved to set aside or open the judgment, claiming title to a seventeen acre tract of land located within the 600 acre parcel that is the subject of the judgment. The trial court conducted a hearing over several days during which the parties presented evidence. The trial court granted the motion to open the judgment on September 19, 1994.\\nThe sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction to open the judgment. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that TEPA and Candlewood are non-party entities that lack standing. The plaintiff argues that TEPA and Candlewood do not have standing to file the motion to set aside or open the judgment because they are not parties to the proceeding, they have failed to file a motion for permission to be made parties to the proceeding and they have failed to present evidence from which the court could find that they had an interest in the subject real property. All of these factors, the plaintiff maintains, deprived the court of jurisdiction to set aside the default judgment. We do not agree.\\n\\\"[The] plaintiff must have standing for the court to have jurisdiction. Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion [requiring] . . . some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Unisys Corp. v. Dept. of Labor, 220 Conn. 689, 693, 600 A.2d 1019 (1991).\\nThe question to be answered is whether the interest sought to be protected by the complaint is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected by the statute in question, and whether the party has alleged a colorable claim of injury to that interest. See United Cable Television Service Corp. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 235 Conn. 334, 345, 663 A.2d 1011 (1995). We examine the parties, not the merits of the action. Manchester Environmental Coalition v. Stockton, 184 Conn. 51, 64, 441 A.2d 68 (1981).\\n\\\" 'Standing requires no more than a colorable claim of injury; a plaintiff ordinarily establishes his standing by allegations of injury. Similarly, standing exists to attempt to vindicate \\\"arguably\\\" protected interests.' \\\" (Emphasis in original.) Residential Capitol Corp. v. Reale, 231 Conn. 500, 505, 652 A.2d 489 (1994), quoting Maloney v. Pac, 183 Conn. 313, 321 n.6, 439 A.2d 349 (1981).\\n\\\"[T]he standing doctrine requires a plaintiff to demonstrate two facts. First, the complaining party must be a'proper party to request adjudication of the issues.'. . . Second, the person or persons who prosecute the claim on behalf of the complaining party must have authority to represent the party.\\\" (Citation omitted.) Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Southbury, 231 Conn. 563, 571, 651 A.2d 1246 (1995). A showing that one is a \\\"proper party\\\" can ordinarily be done by making a colorable claim that alleges a direct injury suffered or likely to be suffered in an individual or representative capacity. Id., 572.\\nThe allegations of TEPA and Candlewood are sufficient to establish a colorable claim of a direct injury to their ownership interest in land located within the property that is the subject of the plaintiffs quiet title action. Among other things, they allege under oath that they \\\"own a parcel of property consisting of seventeen plus or minus acres known as The Pond Lot within the area claimed by [the] Plaintiff . . . [that they] have a deed to this property and a continuous chain of title which can be established . . . [and that their] property is located within the property to which [the] Plaintiff is seeking to quiet title.\\\" (Emphasis added.) We conclude that the allegations are sufficient to establish TEPA and Candlewood as \\\"proper parties\\\" to request adjudication of the issues.\\nThe granting of the motion to open is affirmed.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 52-212 provides in pertinent part: \\\"(a) Any judgment rendered or decree passed upon a default or nonsuit in the superior court may be set aside, within four months following the date on which it was rendered or passed, and the case reins) ated on the docket, on such terms in respect to costs as the court deems reasonable, upon the complaint or written motion of any party or person prejudiced thereby, showing reasonable cause, or that a good cause of action or defense in whole or in part existed ai the time of the rendition of the judgment or the passage of the decree, and that the plaintiff or defendant was prevented by mistake, accident or other reasonable cause from prosecuting the action or making the defense.\\\"\\nThe complaint set forth in part, \\\"and all unknown persons, claiming or who may claim any rights, title, interest or estate in or lien or encumbrance upon the real property described in this complaint, adverse to the plaintiff, whether such claim or possible claim be vested or contingent . . . .\\\"\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 47-31 provides in pertinent part: \\\"(b) The complaint in such action shall describe Ihe property in question and state the plaintiffs claim, interest, or title and the manner in which the plaintiff acquired the claim, interest or title and shall name the person or persons who may claim the adverse estate or interest. In any such action the plaintiff may join as defendant any unknown person or persons who claim or may claim any rights, title, estate or interest in or lien or encumbrance on the property described in the complaint, adverse to that of the plaintiff, whether the claim or possible claim be vested or contingent. If in the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that there are or that there may be persons who have or may have some right, title, estate or interest in or lien or encumbrance on the real or personal property but the persons cannot be located or are unknown to the plaintiff, or both, and describes the actual or possible estate or interest of such person or persons, and how derived, so far as may be known to him from a reasonable search of Ihe available land records or otherwise, he may join as defendants all unknown persons who may have made any such claim by stating in the summons, after setting forth the names of known claimants, the words, 'and all unknown persons, claiming or who may claim any rights, title, interest or estate in or lien or encumbrance upon the real property described in this complaint, adverse to the plaintiff, whether such claim or possible claim be vested or contingent', and it shall not be necessary to set forth therein any further description of the unknown person or persons. If, there are no known claimants, or possible claimants, to the property described in the complaint, the action shall be deemed to be maintained against all unknown persons claiming or who may claim any rights, title, estate, or interest, or lien or encumbrance upon the real or personal property described in the complaint, adverse to that of the plaintiff, whether the claim be vested or contingent, and the action may be prosecuted to judgment in the same manner and with like effect as though there had been known claimants or possible claimants designated as party defendants.\\n\\\"(c) If the plaintiff or his attorney annexes to the complaint in any such action an affidavit setting forth such facts and in addition sets forth the efforts which were made to ascertain the names and addresses as well as the interest or estates of the unknown persons, the court to which the action is brought or a judge thereof may make such order relative to the notice which shall be given in such cause as the court or judge deems reasonable. That notice having been given according to the order and duly proven shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction of all such unknown persons and the court may proceed to a hearing of the cause at any time that it deems proper. The court shall not be required to appoint any guardian or other person to represent such unknown persons under any legal disabilities and all such persons shall be concluded by any decree or judgment in respect to the real or personal property involved in the action. . . .\\\"\\nIn granting the motion, the trial court found that the plaintiffs affidavit for service of notice was insufficient, \\\"completely lacking of any statement showing that the plaintiff undertook any efforts to locate the \\\"unknown persons' . . . and did not comply with the requirement of General Statutes \\u00a7 47-31 (c).\\\" The court concluded that \\\"the insufficiency of the affidavit makes the order for publication and the default judgment void.\\\" A request for articulation was not filed.\\nThe issue as stated in the plaintiffs amended preliminary statement of issues provides: \\\"Did the court, on September 19, 1994, under the circumstances of this case, lack jurisdiction necessary to open the judgment of May 8, 1989?\\\"\\nThe moving parties attached an affidavit to their motion signed by one of the partners of TEPA, who is also one of the shareholders of Candlewood.\\nIn addition to the written allegations, TEPA and Candlewood also claim that a colorable claim of direct injury was shown by evidence presented to the court through the testimony of both lay and expert witnesses.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1063658\", \"name\": \"TOWN OF STRATFORD v. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 998\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Town of Stratford v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, Local 998\", \"decision_date\": \"1998-06-02\", \"docket_number\": \"AC 16764\", \"first_page\": \"849\", \"last_page\": \"864\", \"citations\": \"48 Conn. App. 849\", \"volume\": \"48\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Appellate Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Appellate Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:27:51.686090+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"TOWN OF STRATFORD v. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 998\", \"head_matter\": \"TOWN OF STRATFORD v. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 998\\n(AC 16764)\\nLavery, Schaller and Hennessy, Js.\\nArgued December 1, 1997\\nofficially released June 2, 1998\\nJ. William Gagne, Jr., for the appellant (defendant).\\nRichard J. Buturla, for the appellee (plaintiff).\", \"word_count\": \"4732\", \"char_count\": \"29471\", \"text\": \"Opinion\\nSCHALLER, J.\\nThe defendant, the International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, Local 998 (union), appeals from the judgment of the trial court vacating an arbitration award. The principal issue in this appeal is whether the trial court improperly vacated the arbitration award on the ground that the arbitration panel failed to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel with respect to a prior arbitration award on the same issue. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.\\nThe following facts are relevant to the disposition of this appeal. The plaintiff, town of Stratford, and the union at all relevant times were parties to a collective bargaining agreement (agreement) that contained an arbitration clause. Under the arbitration clause, the parties agreed to submit unresolved grievances to the state board of mediation and arbitration (board). The parties further agreed that an arbitration decision by the board would be final.\\nOn December 12, 1991, the date on which the grievances involved in this appeal were filed, article I of the agreement provided that \\\"the positions of assistant fire prevention chief, assistant fire chief, deputy fire chief and chief are not members of the union bargaining unit.\\\" Section one of article XXII of the agreement, however, provided that \\\" all promotions in the Fire Department shall be made from eligibility lists for each promotional classification, which lists shall be established through competitive merit examinations . . . .\\\" (Emphasis in original.) The agreement also provided that when a vacancy occurred, it was to be filled by one of the three highest ranking candidates and that subsequent appointments were to be generated in the order of standing on the list. Moreover, the agreement provided that when an eligibility list expired, a new list had to be established within ninety days.\\nIn 1991, the eligibility lists for the positions of assistant fire chief and lieutenant in the fire prevention bureau expired, and replacement lists were not created within ninety days. On December 12, 1991, the union filed a class action grievance against the town, no. 91-04, on behalf of the firefighters seeking positions in the fire prevention bureau. The grievance alleged that the town had violated the agreement because it had failed to establish new examinations and eligibility lists for the positions of assistant fire chief and lieutenant for the fire prevention bureau.\\nOn December 12, 1991, the union also filed grievance no. 91-03, which was submitted to the board to determine if it was arbitrable. As did grievance no. 91-04, which was filed on the same day, no. 91-03 alleged that the town had violated article XXII, \\u00a7 1, of the agreement. This grievance concerned the following events, which had occurred earlier in 1991. In April, 1991, the town administered a promotional examination for the position of assistant fire chief in the fire suppression division. On May 30, 1991, the results of the examination were posted and a list was established with eight individuals, ranked one through eight, with the candidate receiving the highest score ranked as number one. On or about June 3, 1991, the town interviewed the first three candidates on the eligibility list for a vacancy for the position of assistant fire chief in the fire suppression division. This vacancy was filled by the candidate who was ranked first. On or about December 11, 1991, the town interviewed the candidates ranked two through four for the assistant fire chief position, and the town selected the third ranked candidate over the second ranked candidate. On or about January 4, 1993, the town interviewed the remaining candidates for the assistant fire chief position for two additional vacancies in the fire suppression division. The town again selected lower ranked candidates over individuals with higher ranks. The union's ground for grievance no. 91-03 was that the town had failed to promote employees on the eligibility list to assistant fire chief vacancies in the fire suppression division in the manner in which firefighters are to be selected from such lists as provided by \\u00a7 1 of article XXII.\\nOn December 28, 1993, a panel of arbitrators of the board issued an award in grievance no. 91-04, holding that article XXII of the agreement did not apply. The board found that the grievance was not arbitrable because the promotions clause of the agreement did not apply to promotions to jobs outside of the bargaining unit, including promotions to the position of assistant fire prevention chief. A unanimous panel rejected the union's contention that the parties had agreed orally in the 1987 negotiations to continue to apply article XXII to the assistant fire chief position.\\nOn March 17, 1994, a different panel of arbitrators issued an award holding that grievance no. 91-03 was arbitrable, which was inconsistent with the earlier decision. This second panel also decided that the issue to be decided was whether article XXII applies to employee promotions to the assistant fire chief position. The subject matter of this grievance thereafter proceeded on the merits before a third panel of arbitrators.\\nOn May 25, 1995, the third panel of arbitrators addressed the merits of no. 91-03 and issued an award holding that article XXII, \\u00a7 1, did apply to promotions to the position of assistant fire chief and that the town had violated this provision. The two panels of arbitrators deciding aspects of grievance no. 91-03, therefore, reached conclusions on the issue of arbitrability that were at odds with the prior arbitration award, namely, that article XXII applies to promotions to the assistant fire chief position.\\nOn February 22, 1996, the town filed an application to vacate the May 25, 1995 arbitration award in grievance no. 91-03 pursuant to General Statutes \\u00a7 52-418 (a) (4). The town argued that the arbitrators in no. 91-OS had incorrectly decided the award by failing to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to preclude relitigation of the interpretation of the agreement. The town argued that the decision of the panel in no. 91-04 controlled the contractual interpretation issue regarding the applicability of article XXII, \\u00a7 1. A hearing was held on August 19,1996, and on August 27,1996, the Superior Court vacated the May 25, 1995 arbitration award in case no. 91-03. The union filed this appeal challenging the trial court's decision to vacate the arbitration award in case no. 91-03.\\nThe union claims that the trial court improperly vacated the award in case no. 91-03 on two grounds. The union contends that because the submission of the parties pertaining to grievance no. 91-03 was unrestricted, the award in that case was final and binding and cannot be reviewed for errors of law or fact. The union contends, moreover, that even if the submission of an unrestricted arbitration award is reviewable for errors of law or fact, arbitrators in general are not bound by the decisions of other arbitrators. In this respect, the union argues that the trial court improperly applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to vacate the award in case no. 91-03. The town claims that the trial court correctly vacated the arbitration award because the arbitrators exceeded their powers under \\u00a7 52-418 (a) (4) and because the award violates clear public policy in that the arbitration board did not apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel.\\n\\\"At the outset, we note that as a reviewing court we afford great deference to arbitrators' decisions . . . .\\\" Greater Bridgeport Transit District v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1336, 28 Conn. App. 337, 341, 610 A.2d 1324 (1992), citing Board of Education v. AFSCME, 195 Conn. 266, 270, 487 A.2d 553 (1985), and Board of Education v. Hartford Federation of School Secretaries, 26 Conn. App. 351, 352, 600 A.2d 1053 (1992). The reason for this deference is that the scope of our review is expressly limited by \\u00a7 52-418 and by the terms of the parties' agreement. Metropolitan District Commission v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 184, 237 Conn. 114, 118, 676 A.2d 825 (1996). It is well settled law in Connecticut that \\\"[a]ny challenge to an award on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his powers is . . . properly limited to a comparison of the award with the submission.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191 Conn. 336, 340, 464 A.2d 785 (1983), aff'd, 472 U.S. 703, 105 S. Ct. 2914, 86 L. Ed. 2d 557 (1985). \\\"Where the submission is unrestricted, 'the award is . . . final and binding and cannot be reviewed for errors of law or fact.' Milford Employees Assn. v. Milford, 179 Conn. 678, 683, 427 A.2d 859 (1980).\\\" Carroll v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 189 Conn. 16, 19, 453 A.2d 1158 (1983). \\\"Where the submission does not otherwise state, the arbitrators are empowered to decide factual and legal questions and an award cannot be vacated on the grounds that the construction placed upon the facts or the interpretation of the agreement by the arbitrators was erroneous. Courts will not review the evidence nor, where the submission is unrestricted, will they review the arbitrators' decision of the legal questions involved.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, supra, 340-41. \\\"Because we favor arbitration as a means of settling private disputes, we undertake judicial review of arbitration awards in a manner designed to minimize interference with an efficient and economical system of alternative dispute resolution.\\\" Garrity v. McCaskey, 223 Conn. 1, 4-5, 612 A.2d 742 (1992).\\nIn the present case, the parties concede that both of the awards, the \\\"first grievance decided\\\" and the \\\"second grievance decided,\\\" arose out of unrestricted submissions. Even though both grievances were unrestricted and our review is limited accordingly, \\\"we have . . . recognized three grounds for vacating an award: (1) the award rules on the constitutionality of a statute . (2) the award violates clear public policy . or (3) the award contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of \\u00a7 52-418.\\\" (Citations omitted.) Id., 6. The town challenges the award on the basis of the latter two grounds.\\n\\\"In spite of the general rule that challenges to an arbitrator's authority are limited to a comparison of the award to the submission, an additional challenge exists . . . when the award rendered is claimed to be in contravention of public policy. . . . This challenge is premised on the fact that the parties cannot expect an arbitration award approving conduct which is illegal or contrary to public policy to receive judicial endorsement any more than parties can expect a court to enforce such a contract between them. . . . When a challenge to the arbitrator's authority is made on public policy grounds, however, the court is not concerned with the correctness of the arbitrator's decision, but with the lawfulness of enforcing the award. . . . Accordingly, the public policy exception to arbitral authority should be narrowly construed and [a] court's refusal to enforce an arbitrator's interpretation of [a collective bargaining agreement] is limited to situations where the contract as intepreted would violate some explicit public policy that is well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests. . . . The party challenging the award bears the burden of proving that illegality or conflict with public policy is clearly demonstrated.\\\" (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Watertown Police Union Local 541 v. Watertown, 210 Conn. 333, 339-40, 555 A.2d 406 (1989). Therefore, given the narrow scope of the public policy limitation on arbitrators' authority, the trial court's determination to vacate the award will stand only if the town can demonstrate that the board's award clearly violates an established public policy mandate.\\n\\\"We have historically construed narrowly the two common law grounds for vacating an arbitration award. We denominate the constitutionality and public policy exceptions as common law grounds although we have, on occasion, implied that the basis for these grounds is to be found within the statutory scheme of \\u00a7 52-418 (a) (4). . It is more appropriate to recognize that the power to determine the constitutionality of a statute and the power to strike an arbitration ruling as violative of public policy exist apart from any particular grant of authority from the legislative branch. Because of the multiple sources authorizing judicial review of arbitration awards, we therefore deem inaccurate the implication in these earlier cases that \\u00a7 52-418 (a) (4) is the sole source of the court's power of review.\\\" (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) Garrity v. McCaskey, supra, 223 Conn. 6.\\nThe town acknowledges that in deciding whether arbitrators have exceeded their powers under \\u00a7 52-418 (a) (4), courts have generally compared the award with the submission to determine if the award exceeds the scope of the submission. New Haven v. AFSCME, Council 15, Local 530, 208 Conn. 411, 415-16, 544 A.2d 186 (1988); Board of Education v. AFSCME, supra, 195 Conn. 271. The town argues, however, that this general analysis is not appropriate to determine whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel should be applied to preclude the arbitrator from deciding the same issue of contractual interpretation again. We are not per suaded. In this case, the town and the union submitted to the arbitrator the question of whether the grievance was arbitrable. The award was issued stating that \\\"[t]he matter is arbitrable and the employees are entitled to know whether or not article XXII will be operative should an employee choose to aspire to the position of Assistant Fire Chief.\\\" Therefore, in comparing the award with the submission, the arbitrators did not exceed their powers under \\u00a7 52-418 (a) (4).\\nIn addition, the town argues that although the submission in this case was unrestricted, courts have the authority to vacate an award pursuant to \\u00a7 52-418 (a) (4) when it violates clear public policy. The town maintains that the second arbitration board failed to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel and, therefore, did not adhere to the public policy consideration that requires giving collateral estoppel effect to prior arbitration awards in subsequent arbitrations. The town argues that \\\" [conflicting contractual interpretation awards are repugnant to the fundamental policy underlying the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel that a multiplicity of the same disputes should be avoided.\\\" The town asserts, therefore, that the trial court was justified in vacating the arbitration award at issue.\\nWe acknowledge that the doctrine of collateral estop-pel is based and enforced on the ground of public policy. Brady v. Anderson, 110 Conn. 432, 435, 148 A. 365 (1930). \\\"To prevent a multiplicity of actions, equity will enjoin further litigation of a cause of action which has already been adjudicated. A final judgment on the merits is conclusive on the parties in an action and their privies as to the cause of action involved. If the same cause of action is again sued on, the judgment is conclusive with respect to any claims relating to the cause of action which were actually made or might have been made. . . . Collateral estoppel is that aspect of res judicata which is concerned with the effect of a final judgment on the subsequent litigation of a different cause of action involving some of the issues determined in a former action between the parties.\\\" (Citations omitted.) Corey v. Avco-Lycoming Division, 163 Conn. 309, 316-17, 307 A.2d 155 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116, 93 S. Ct. 903, 34 L. Ed. 2d 699 (1973). As stated previously, the narrow exception that allows an award involving an unrestricted submission to be vacated by a court is premised on the fact that the parties cannot expect an arbitration award approving conduct that is illegal or contrary to public policy to receive judicial endorsement any more than parties can expect a court to enforce such a contract between them.\\nAlthough it can be said that collateral estoppel is a public policy notion in a general sense by virtue of its being well established in the law, we conclude that the failure of an arbitration board to apply this doctrine does not violate a well defined and dominant public policy in the sense that gives rise to the narrow excep tion. In the few cases where courts have vacated arbitration awards on public policy grounds, those awards contravened a well defined public policy mandate. See Board of Trustees v. Federation of Technical College Teachers, 179 Conn. 184, 195, 425 A.2d 1247 (1979). Other cases have held similarly. In State v. Connecticut Council 4, CEU, AFSCME, 7 Conn. App. 286, 290, 508 A.2d 806 (1986), awards were set aside pursuant to \\u00a7 52-418 (a) (4) because they were found to be in direct conflict with the policy of the state and the legislative intent that was clearly expressed in provisions of a state statute. In International Brotherhood of Police Officers v. Windsor, 40 Conn. Sup. 145, 148, 483 A.2d 626 (1984), an arbitration award that upheld the disciplining of a police officer for refusing to falsify an arrest warrant was set aside. Another example where a court vacated an arbitration award that contravened a well defined and specific public policy occurred in Avco Corp. v. Preteska, 22 Conn. Sup. 475, 174 A.2d 684 (1961). In Avco, the court held that the arbitration board exceeded its authority when the award was found to contravene public policy because it called for the reinstatement of an employee who had been convicted under a state statute for gambling on his employer's premises. Id., 477-81. We conclude that rendering two inconsistent opinions in the context of arbitration proceedings is not a violation of a well defined and dominant public policy, and does not warrant court-ordered application of collateral estoppel.\\nAccordingly, we conclude that the trial court improperly interpreted the public policy exception as a basis for vacating the arbitration award as to grievance no. 91-03.\\nThe judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment denying the application to vacate the arbitration award.\\nIn this opinion HENNESSY, J., concurred.\\nAlthough the trial court employed the term \\\"res judicata\\\" in its memorandum of decision, it is undisputed that issue preclusion rather than claim preclusion is involved and, therefore, collateral estoppel is the appropriate doctrine.\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 52-418 (a) provides in relevant part: \\\"Upon the application of any party to an arbitration, the superior court . . . shall make an order vacating the award if it finds any of the following defects . (4) if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.\\\"\\nThe union also claims that the trial court improperly vacated the award because arbitration awards do not have the same stare decisis effect as court judgments, and the fact that inconsistencies exist between prior arbitration awards in itself is not a basis to vacate an award. Furthermore, the union claims that the trial court improperly relied on Corey v. Avco-Lycoming Division, 163 Conn. 309, 307 A.2d 155 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116, 93 S. Ct. 903, 34 L. Ed. 2d 699 (1973), which is inapposite to this case. Finally, the union claims that the trial court cannot vacate an arbitration award that draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. We need not address these claims in view of our determination on the inapplicability of collateral estoppel.\\nAn unrestricted submission has been characterized as follows: \\\"The authority of an arbitrator to adjudicate the controversy is limited only if the agreement contains express language restricting the breadth of issues, reserving explicit rights, or conditioning the award on court review. In the absence of any such qualifications, an agreement is unrestricted. Carroll v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 189 Conn. 16, 20, 453 A.2d 1158 (1983); Bic Pen Corporation v. Local No. 134, 183 Conn. 579, 584-85, 440 A.2d 774 (1981); Bridgeport v. Bridgeport Police Local 1159, 183 Conn. 102, 106-107, 438 A.2d 1171 (1981).\\\" Garrity v. McCaskey, 223 Conn. 1, 5, 612 A.2d 742 (1992).\\nThe town also claims that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to arbitration awards. See Corey v. Avco-Lycoming Division, 163 Conn. 309, 307 A.2d 155 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116, 93 S. Ct. 903,34 L. Ed. 2d 699 (1973). The town argues that the trial court was correct in vacating the second arbitration panel's award because under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the issue had already been decided in a previous proceeding. Furthermore, the town claims that the trial court properly considered Corey to be analogous and on point. We find the decision in Corey to be distinguishable. In Corey, the court determined the question of whether the decision of an arbitration panel precluded a hearing tribunal or another agency from deciding the same issue. Upon reviewing the same grievance the arbitration panel had already decided, the hearing tribunal reached a different result. In reaching its decision, the court in Corey held that a prior arbitration award was binding and conclusive on the hearing tribunal under the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata. In the present case, however, the conflicting decisions involve two arbitration panels acting on an unrestricted submission.\\nThe dissent fails to address the unrestricted nature of the submissions and the consequent limitations on our review.\\nIn support of its argument, the town cites International Assn. of Firefighters v. Las Vegas, 107 Nev. 906, 823 P.2d 877 (1991). Furthermore, the town rests this claim on the doctrine that an award interpreting a collective bargaining agreement becomes a binding part of the agreement. Fournelle v. National Labor Relations Board, 670 F.2d 331, 344 (D.C. Cir. 1982) citing F. Elkouri & E. Elkouri, How Arbitration Works (1973) p. 377. While that doctrine is cited in Fournette and Elkouri, no Connecticut authority is cited nor have we found any such case. Moreover, the doctrine appears to relate principally to the filling in of gaps \\\"by reference to the practices of the particular industry and of the various shops covered by the [collective bargaining] agreement.\\\" United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580, 80 S. Ct. 1347, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1409 (1960).\\nAlthough the dissent purports to extend our Supreme Court's decision in Corey to cover the situation presented in the case at hand, we have previously noted in footnote five that Corey is factually distinguishable from the present case.\\nCiting a Nevada case, International Assn. of Firefighters v. Las Vegas, 107 Nev. 906, 823 P.2d 877 (1991), the dissent relies on the proposition that an arbitrator's interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement becomes part of the contract and binds both parties. That proposition has not been adopted in Connecticut.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1158485\", \"name\": \"ALICE RAYNOR v. HICKOCK REALTY CORPORATION\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Raynor v. Hickock Realty Corp.\", \"decision_date\": \"2000-12-26\", \"docket_number\": \"AC 19578\", \"first_page\": \"234\", \"last_page\": \"244\", \"citations\": \"61 Conn. App. 234\", \"volume\": \"61\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Appellate Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Appellate Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:13:44.127586+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"ALICE RAYNOR v. HICKOCK REALTY CORPORATION\", \"head_matter\": \"ALICE RAYNOR v. HICKOCK REALTY CORPORATION\\n(AC 19578)\\nLandau, Spear and Daly, Js.\\nArgued October 26\\nofficially released December 26, 2000\\nKevin F. Nelligan, for the appellant (plaintiff).\\nJ. Michael Sconyers, for the appellee (defendant).\", \"word_count\": \"3098\", \"char_count\": \"19013\", \"text\": \"Opinion\\nLANDAU, J.\\nThe plaintiff, Alice Raynor, appeals from the trial court's judgment rendered upon the granting of the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant, Hickock Realty Corporation, because the plaintiff did not commence her personal injury action before the applicable statute of limitations expired. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that (1) she failed to commence her action within the time permitted by the applicable statute of limitations and (2) the statute of limitations was not tolled when the defendant was served with prejudgment remedy documents. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.\\nThe applicable facts and procedural history of the action are undisputed. The plaintiff alleged that she was injured when she fell on June 19, 1995, on premises in Salisbury that she leased from the defendant. She first sought a prejudgment remedy by way of attachment of the defendant's real property, utilizing an order of notice permitting out-of-state service by mail. See General Statutes \\u00a7 52-278a through 52-278d. The plaintiff obtained a prejudgment order dated May 6,1997, and a notice for a hearing on her application for prejudgment remedy to be held on May 27, 1997. A deputy sheriff served the order, along with the prejudgment remedy documents, via the postal service.\\nThe plaintiff filed an application for a subsequent order of notice because the defendant failed to appear, and the plaintiff did not know whether the defendant had received actual notice. The court granted her application for a subsequent order of notice and signed it on June 6,1997. A deputy sheriff served the defendant's officers via mail.\\nThe court held a hearing on the plaintiffs application for prejudgment remedy on August 28,1997. Following receipt of the parties' briefs, the court, Pickett, J., granted the plaintiffs application to attach the defendant's real property. In February, 1998, the plaintiff served signed copies of the writ of summons and complaint on the defendant's officers. In February, 1999, the defendant moved for summary judgment on the basis of the plaintiffs failure to commence her action within two years of the date of injury, as required by General Statutes \\u00a7 52-584.\\nThe plaintiff raised a twofold argument in her objection to the motion for summary judgment. First, she claimed that she had instituted her action within the two year statute of limitations; second, if the court determined that service was untimely, Connecticut should adopt a rule that service of the prejudgment remedy documents tolls the statute of limitations. The court, DiPentima, J., agreeing with the defendant that the plaintiff failed to bring her action within two years of the date of injury, concluded that prejudgment remedy documents are not the equivalent of a writ of summons and complaint, and do not commence an action. We agree with the trial court.\\n\\\"The standards governing our review of a trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment are well established. Practice Book [\\u00a7 17-49] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . Miller v. United Technologies Corp., 233 Conn. 732, 744-45, 660 A.2d 810 (1995). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. . Id., 745. The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law; D.H.R. Construction Co. v. Donnelly, 180 Conn. 430, 434, 429 A.2d 908 (1980); and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Practice Book [\\u00a7 17-46], . . . Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 229 Conn. 99, 105, 639 A.2d 507 (1994). Summary judgment may be granted where the claim is barred by the statute of limitations. See Daily v. New Britain Machine Co., 200 Conn. 562, 566-70, 512 A.2d 893 (1986); Burns v. Hartford Hospital, 192 Conn. 451, 472 A.2d 1257 (1984). . . . Doty v. Mucci, 238 Conn. 800, 805-806, 679 A.2d 945 (1996).\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Altfeter v. Naugatuck, 53 Conn. App. 791, 800-801, 732 A.2d 207 (1999). Where the trial court is presented with undisputed facts, as it was here, our review of its conclusions is plenary, as \\\"we must determine whether the court's conclusions are legally and logically correct . . . .\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of Social Services v. Saunders, 247 Conn. 686, 697, 724 A.2d 1093 (1999).\\nI\\nThe plaintiffs first claim is that the court improperly relied on Howard v. Robertson, 27 Conn. App. 621, 608 A.2d 711 (1992), and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment because service of the prejudgment remedy documents tolled the statute of limitations. We disagree because Howard is controlling authority for the summary judgment motion before the court.\\nIn Howard, the plaintiff filed an application for a prejudgment remedy prior to serving a petition for a new trial. After the action was commenced, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the action was commenced within the statute of limitations. The parties did not dispute the dates at issue. The plaintiff claimed, however, that the defendant had notice of her claim because he had been served with prejudgment remedy documents.\\nIn affirming the trial court's judgment, this court stated: \\\"It is well settled that an action is brought on the date on which the writ is served on a defendant. Hillman v. Greenwich, 217 Conn. 520, 527, 587 A.2d 99 (1991); Lacasse v. Burns, 214 Conn. 464, 475, 572 A.2d 357 (1990); Seaboard Burner Corporation v. DeLong, 145 Conn. 300, 303, 141 A.2d 642 (1958); Consolidated Motor Lines, Inc. v. M & M Transportation Co., [128 Conn. 107, 109, 20 A.2d 621 (1941)].\\\" Howard v. Robertson, supra, 27 Conn. App. 625. \\\"[A] writ of summons is a statutory prerequisite to the commencement of a civil action. . . . [I]t is an essential element to the validity of the jurisdiction of the court. . . . Although the writ of summons need not be technically perfect, and need not conform exactly to the form set out in the Practice Book . . . the plaintiffs complaint must contain the basic information and direction normally included in a writ of summons. . . . Hillman v. Greenwich, supra, 526. A writ must contain a direction to a proper officer for service and a command to summon the defendant to appear in court. General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Pumphrey, 13 Conn. App. 223, 228, 535 A.2d 396 (1988).\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Howard v. Robertson, supra, 626. This court concluded in Howard that although prejudgment remedy documents give a party sufficient notice of a prejudgment remedy hearing, they are not the equivalent of a writ necessary to toll the statute of limitations. Id.\\nHere, the plaintiff attempts to distinguish Howard by noting the factual distinctions between the documents served on the defendant in that case and the documents served on the defendant in this case. They are, however, factual distinctions without a difference with respect to whether an action has been commenced. First, the plaintiff notes that Howard concerned only the statutory prejudgment remedy documents, which do not contain any of the elements needed to commence an action. More specifically, the plaintiff argues that this court held that the defendant in Howard had not been notified that an action had been commenced because the statutory prejudgment remedy application states that the plaintiff \\\"is about to commence an action.\\\" The plaintiff further asserts that her prejudgment remedy documents provided notice of not only the prejudgment remedy application, but of \\\"the institution of this action\\\" because they included the proposed writ of summons and complaint, albeit unsigned. The plaintiff notes that she also served the defendant with an application for order of notice and an order of notice signed by the court.\\nA\\nThe plaintiff is mistaken as to her first contention that service of the prejudgment remedy documents tolls the running of the statute of limitations in \\u00a7 52-584 because they contain the words \\\"the institution of this action,\\\" and include the proposed writ of summons and complaint. She clothes her argument in the ill-suited raiment of notice, whereas the issue in this appeal is whether the service of an unsigned writ of summons and complaint has the effect of commencing a civil action. A summons is not synonymous with notice. See Village Creek Homeowners Assn. v. Public Utilities Commission, 148 Conn. 336, 339, 170 A.2d 732 (1961). The plaintiffs failure to sign the writ of summons and complaint is fatal to her claim.\\nB\\nThe plaintiff asks this court to overlook the fact that the summons and complaint accompanying the prejudgment remedy documents were not signed. We cannot ignore an omission of that nature. Process \\\"in civil actions shall be a writ of summons or attachment, describing the parties, the court to which it is returnable and the time and place of appearance, and shall be accompanied by the plaintiffs complaint. Such writ may run into any judicial district or geographical area and shall be signed by a commissioner of the superior court or a judge or clerk of the court to which it is returnable. . . .\\\" (Emphasis added.) Practice Book \\u00a7 8-1 (a); see also General Statutes \\u00a7 52-45a; Stewart-Brownstein v. Casey, 53 Conn. App. 84, 87, 728 A.2d 1130 (1999). \\\"The writ in order to be 'due process of law' must be signed by . . . a . . . commissioner of the Superior Court . . . or a . . . clerk of the court to which it is returnable.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brunswick v. Inland Wetlands Commission, 25 Conn. App. 543, 547, 596 A.2d 463 (1991), rev'd on other grounds, 222 Conn. 541, 610 A.2d 1260 (1992).\\nThe leading case concerning the necessity of a writ's being signed is Hillman v. Greenwich, supra, 217 Conn. 520, in which our Supreme Court stated: \\\"A summons is part of a citation. The citation . is a command to a duly authorized officer to summon the [defendant] . to appear in court on a specific day to answer the [complaint]. Village Creek Homeowners Assn. v. Public Utilities Commission, [supra, 148 Conn. 338-39].\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hillman v. Greenwich, supra, 524-25. \\\"The citation, signed by competent authority, is the warrant which bestows upon the officer to whom it is given for service the power and authority to execute its command. . . . Without it, the officer would be little more than a delivery man.\\\" (Citations omitted; emphasis added.) Village Creek Homeowners Assn. v. Public Utilities Commission, supra, 339. A writ of summons is a \\\"statutory prerequisite\\\" to the commencement of an action, and \\\"it is an essential element to the validity of the jurisdiction of the court.\\\" Hillman v. Greenwich, supra, 526.\\n\\\"A complaint is a pleading. Practice Book [\\u00a7 10-20]; see also Practice Book [\\u00a7 10-6]; General Statutes \\u00a7 52-91; 1 Stephenson, Conn. Civ. Proc. (2d Ed.) \\u00a7 18 (b). A pleading must 'be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name.' Practice Book [\\u00a7 4-2]; see also General Statutes [\\u00a7 52-45b]. A pleading shall not be filed in couit unless it is signed by counsel. Practice Book [\\u00a7 7-6].\\\" Housing Authority v. Collins, 38 Conn. Sup. 389, 390, 449 A.2d 189 (1982). Although there is authority that an unsigned complaint may be amended; see General Statutes \\u00a7 52-128; Practice Book \\u00a7 10-59; Shokite v. Perez, 19 Conn. App. 203, 206-207, 561 A.2d 461 (1989); the plaintiff never amended the unsigned complaint that was served with the prejudg ment remedy documents to include the necessary signature.\\nC\\nMoreover, the prejudgment remedy documents lacked a return date. The plaintiff claims that the court clerk caused that omission by marking out the return date that was provided. The absence of a return date on the writ, whether the fault of a plaintiff or a court clerk, is unforgivable. The prejudgment remedy papers served in Howard v. Robertson, supra, 27 Conn. App. 626, also did not specify a return date by which the defendant in that case would have had to file an appearance. The return date \\\"is a necessary component of a writ by which a civil action is commenced. General Statutes \\u00a7 52-45a.\\\" Howard v. Robertson, supra, 626. \\\"Both the time within which process must be served after its issuance and the time within which the writ must be filed with the court after service are determined by reference to the 'return day.' \\\" R. Bollier, N. Cioffi, K. Emmett, J. Kavanewsky, L. Murphy, Stephenson's Connecticut Civil Procedure (3d Ed. 1997) \\u00a7 16 a, p. 31.\\nThe prejudgment remedy documents lacked a signed writ of summons and complaint. Therefore, the action was not \\\"commenced\\\" within the meaning of \\u00a7 52-45a or the rule enunciated in Hillman v. Greenwich, supra, 217 Conn. 520, until February, 1998, long after the expiration of the limitation period set forth in \\u00a7 52-584.\\nII\\nIn her second claim, the plaintiff asserts that this court should adopt the rule that the statute of limita tions is tolled when the prejudgment remedy documents are served. Specifically, she encourages this court to adopt such a rule because it will promote judicial economy without prejudice to the defendant and will conform with statutoiy authority. In support of her position, the plaintiff cites Grimes v. Housing Authority, 242 Conn. 236, 698 A.2d 302 (1997), as she did in the trial court. Grimes is not relevant to the facts here because it concerns the tolling of the statute of limitations in class actions, which involve multiple plaintiffs.\\nAlthough the plaintiff concedes that Grimes is limited to class actions, she argues that it is relevant because she would otherwise have an incentive to file two separate actions, one for a prejudgment remedy and one for personal injury, resulting in a multiplicity of litigation. The plaintiff attempts to bootstrap the Grimes rationale to remedy her failure to commence timely her action against the defendant. The court properly refused to apply to a common personal injury action a rationale appropriate to the procedural complexities of class actions.\\nFurthermore, pursuant to our statutory prejudgment remedy scheme, there was no need for the plaintiff to institute two actions. She simply could have availed herself of the provisions of General Statutes \\u00a7 52-278h by bringing her action within the statute of limitations together with an application for a prejudgment remedy.\\nThe plaintiff asks this court to create an exception to the statute of limitations in \\u00a7 52-584. Our discussion of the plaintiffs claims demonstrates that \\u00a7 52-584 applies to bar her action. We discern no basis for reaching another result.\\nThe judgment is affirmed.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\\nIn this opinion, the prejudgment remedy documents to which we refer are those documents included in the deputy sheriffs return of June 7,1997, specifically, the notice of application for prejudgment remedy/claim for hearing to contest application or claim exemption, the application for prejudgment, remedy, the schedule A, the affidavit of the plaintiff, the application for subsequent order of notice, the subsequent order of notice, the order, the summons, the order for prejudgment remedy, the writ of summons and direction of attachment, and the complaint and ad damnum.\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 52-584 provides in relevant part: \\\"No action to recover damages for injury to the person . . . caused by negligence . . . shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered . . .\\nThe defendant in Howard had constructed a house for the plaintiff, who refused to pay the full contract price because of unworkmanlike construction. Howard v. Robertson, supra, 27 Conn. App. 623. The defendant first brought an action against the plaintiff, who then filed a counterclaim. On February 3,1986, the trial court rendered judgment awarding damages to the defendant. Id. The plaintiff subsequently discovered previously undetectable defects in the house and informed the defendant in June, 1988, that she intended to petition for a new trial. Id. The plaintiff then served the defendant with an application for a prejudgment remedy on January 30, 1989. Id. The plaintiff served the defendant with a writ of summons and complaint on April 10, 1989. Id., 624. The statute of limitations at issue was General Statutes \\u00a7 52-582, which contains a three year limitation period. Howard v. Robertson, supra, 624-25.\\n\\\"All process involves a reasonable attempt to give notice to the defendant of the pendency of an action against him or his property. But notice alone is not enough.\\\" R. Bollier, N. Cioffi, K. Emmett, J. Kavanewsky, L. Murphy, Stephenson's Connecticut Civil Procedure (3d Ed. 1997) \\u00a7 11 b, p. 21.\\nThe absence of a return date is not the sole reason the plaintiff failed to commence her cause of action within the time permitted by \\u00a7 52-584. We therefore decline to address whether the clerk was at fault for striking out the return date that the plaintiff inserted or whether the clerk's striking out of the date was necessitated by the fact that the court had set the date by which the defendant was to be summoned to the prejudgment remedy hearing and the date of that hearing.\\nIn Grimes, our Supreme Court adopted the rule in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554, 94 S. Ct. 756, 38 L. Ed. 2d 713 (1974), that \\\" 'the commencement o\\u00ed a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted, members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action.' \\\" (Emphasis in original.) Grimes v. Housing Authority, supra, 242 Conn. 243. Practice Book \\u00a7 9-7 and 9-8, \\\"like rule 23 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure], are designed to increase efficiencies in civil litigation by encouraging multiple plaintiffs to join in one. lawsuit.\\\" Grimes v. Housing Authority, supra, 244.\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 52-278h provides: \\\"The provisions of this chapter shall apply to any application for prejudgment remedy filed by the plaintiff at any time after the institution of the action, and the forms and procedures provided therein shall be adapted accordingly.\\\"\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"12123723\", \"name\": \"Tuttle and Holt against Clark\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Tuttle v. Clark\", \"decision_date\": \"1822-06\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"153\", \"last_page\": \"157\", \"citations\": \"4 Conn. 153\", \"volume\": \"4\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:07:37.366037+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"The other Judges were of the same opinion.\", \"parties\": \"Tuttle and Holt against Clark.\", \"head_matter\": \"Tuttle and Holt against Clark.\\nA sheriff having demanded payment of an execution in his hands against the defendant, which was neatly out, the defendant made his promissory note payable to the order of a third person, and by him indorsed in blank, and delivered it to the sheriff, contracting with him, that if the defendant should not pay the execution in ten days, it might be sold in market, or otherwise disposed of, and the avails applied in payment of the execution. After the expiration of the ten days, the execution remaining unpaid, the sheriff delivered the note, in the state in which he received it, to the plaintiffs, on their advancing to him a sum of money less than the face of the note, by more than the legal interest for the time the note had to run. Held, that the note so received by the sheriff, was in security of the execution; that he had an interest in it, coupled with a power to sell; and that consequently, it was an effective instrument in his hands, and not being usurious in its original concoction, it did not become so, by the subsequent sale to the plaintiffs.\\nThis was an action on a promissory note, made by the defendant, for 150 dollars, dated the 10th of August, 1819, payable to the order of Chester Whittlesey, at the Eagle bank, 90 days after date. The defendant pleaded non-assumpsit, with notice of usury.\\nThe cause was tried at Hartford, September term, 1821, before Hosmer, Ch. J.\\nNoah A. Phelps, Esq. sheriff of Hartford county, having in his hands for collection an execution against the defendant, demanded payment thereof; whereupon the defendant, on the 3d of September, 1819, delivered to him this note, on the terms specified in the following writing: \\u201cWhereas Noah A. Phelps, sheriff of Hartford county, has an execution to collect against me, in favour of the Eagle bank, for 129 dollars, 84 cents, debt, and cost of execution, dated the 6th day of July, 1819, and signed Roger S. Skinner, clerk of New-Haven city court; and whereas I have, this day, left with said Phelps my note, dated August 10th, 1819, payable at the Eagle bank, 90 days after date, to the order of Chester Whittlesey, for 150 dollars, and indorsed by said Whittlesey, and also by Roger Whittlesey; now, in case I shall not well and truly pay said Phelps the whole amount of said execution, and his fees thereon, within ten days from this date, I hereby agree, that said Phelps may sell said note in market, or otherwise dispose of it, and apply the avails thereof in payment of said execution, and the fees thereon, and the balance of the avails of said note, if any, to retain in his hands until called for. Hartford city, September 3d, 1819. Alphin Clark.\\u201d After the expiration of the ten days mentioned in this writing, Phelps delivered the note to the plaintiffs, indorsed as above stated, without indorsing it himself, and received of them therefor the sum of 139 dollars only; the plaintiffs having retained 11 dollars, for the advancement of the money. In answer to the plaintiff\\u2019s enquiry, he informed them, at the time of the delivery, that he could not say, that the maker of the note was a responsible man, but the indorsers were responsible. It did not appear, that the plaintiffs had any knowledge of the terms on which the note had been put into Phelps's hands. Phelps applied so much of the money received of the plaintiffs on the execution as was sufficient to pay it, with his fees, being about 137 dollars; and the balance he paid to the defendant. The questions between the parties were, whether the note was sold to the plaintiffs bona fide, or the money was loaned on a usurious reservation; whether the note was made merely to be disposed of by Phelps, without his being interested in it; and whether the ignorance of the plaintiffs concerning the terms on which the note was received by Phelps, made any difference in the case. The Judge instructed the jury, That as the defence made was usury, to sustain it, there must appear to have been a corrupt agreement for the loan of money, and the reservation of more than six per cent per ann. for the forbearance; and in this enquiry, the cover, if there was any, must be stripped off, and the transaction viewed in its genuine colours: That the question was, whether the plaintiffs bought the note bona fide, which legally they might do, or loaned their money, taking for the use of it a sum beyond what the law permitted: That on the legal construction of the writing recited, the note was not received by Phelps, in payment of the execution, it being put into his hands to sell or dispose of, as the agent of the defendant, if the execution were not paid in ten days: That the note first became an effective instrument on the delivery of it to the plaintiffs: And that the ignorance of the plaintiffs concerning the contract between Phelps and the defendant, made no difference in the case; but if the money was loaned for usury, it was at the peril of the plaintiffs, and they were liable to the consequences. Under this direction, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant; and the plaintiffs moved for a new trial, for a misdirection.\\nHartford,\\nJune, 1822.\\nN. Smith and Johnson, in support of the motion,\\ncontended, 1. That a note may be sold at a discount exceeding the legal interest, without usury. 1 Swift's Dig. 313. Lloyd v. Keach, 2 Conn. Rep. 175. Musgrove, q. t. v. Gibbs, 1 Dall. 217. Wycoff v. Longhead, 2 Dall. 92, Churchill v. Suter, 4 Mass. Rep. 156. 162.\\n2. That on the legal construction of the writing, given by the defendant, to Phelps, the note was received by him as security for the execution, with a conditional power to sell. The note, therefore, first became effective when delivered to Phelps. He had an interest in it. The defendant could not take back the note, before it was sold; nor could he revoke Phelps's authority to sell it, as he clearly might have done, had not that authority been coupled with an interest. Suppose bank stock had been pledged to Phelps, for the same purpose; would he, in that case, have been a mere agent to sell? Would the power to sell deprive him of his interest in the pledge?\\n3. That if this note was not an effective instrument until it came into the hands of the plaintiffs, their ignorance of that fact exempted them from the imputation of usury, and was proper to be considered by the jury. It was material to shew, that the plaintiffs meant to purchase a note, and not to loan money. They could not commit usury against their will.\\nT. S. Williams, contra,\\nadmitting, as the judge in his charge had admitted, that the bona fide purchase of a note at a greater discount than the legal interest, is not usury, contended, 1. That the note in question did not become effective until the plaintiffs took it. Neither of the indorsers ever owned it, or had any interest in it. For what purpose was it left with Phelps? Merely to raise money to pay the execution in his hands. He had a power to make it effective; and this is all the interest he had in it. Suppose the defendant had left with Phelps a blank note, having on it a blank indorsement, with power to fill it up, and negotiate it; would he not, in that case, have had the same interest as in this? And yet no one would claim, that such a note would be effective in that condition. If this was Phelps's note, what need was there of a from the defendant to sell it? He was, evidently, the mere agent of the defendant, to raise money, by means of this note, to satisfy the execution in his hands. If this point is established, it makes an end of the case: the plaintiffs cannot recover. Munn v. The Commission Company, 15 Johns. Rep. 44. 55.\\n2. That ignorance of the plaintiffs in relation to the previous history of the note, was properly excluded from the consideration of the jury. Jones v. Hake, cited 3 Johns. Ca. 68. reported 2 Johns. Ca. 60. Whether the transaction between Phelps and the plaintiffs amounted to a sale of the note, depended upon the facts, and not upon the plaintiffs\\u2019 knowledge or ignorance of them.\", \"word_count\": \"2063\", \"char_count\": \"11520\", \"text\": \"Hosmer, Ch. J.\\nWhether the charge to the jury, that the note declared on first became an effective instrument on the delivery of it to the plaintiffs, is the only point on which I shall express an opinion. The resolution of this question entirely depends on the construction of the receipt, given by sheriff Phelps, on the reception of the note. From this it appears, that he had in possession an execution for 129 dollars, 84 cents, against the defendant, in favour of the Eagle bank, to secure the payment of which, Clark made his note for 150 dollars, payable at the Eagle bank, in 90 days, to the order of Chester Whittelsey, and procured the said Whittelsey and Roger Whittelsey to indorse it. In this condition, the defendant delivered the note to the sheriff, at the same time contracting, if he should not pay the whole amount of the above execution, and the fees thereon, in ten days, that it might be sold in market, or otherwise be disposed of, and the avails be applied in payment of the execution: If a balance should remain, it was to be retained in the hands of the sheriff, until the defendant should call for it.\\nWithout adhering too tenaciously to the words of the contract, it is very obvious, that the note was made and delivered in security of the execution; and to attain this object, the construction should be favourable; and if necessary, most strongly against the defendant. Any exposition of the agreement, which would have a manifest tendency to defeat the in tended security, cannot be in accordance with the intention of the parties. The opinion expressed in the charge to the jury, was of this description: If the note was not an effective instrument, in the hands of the sheriff, anterior to the sale of it, during this period, it was no security to him; and the death of the maker, the impossibility of selling the note, or other similar causes, would frustrate the principal object of the negociation. On the other hand, there exists no good reason to deny, in behalf of the sheriff, who unquestionably had an interest in the note, the usual construction, resulting from the delivery of the instrument to him; more especially, when this, in no respects, is opposed to the defendant's interest, but is necessary to effectuate the security intended. For much stress has been put on on the express authority given to sell the note in the market; as if this were incompatible with the idea, that it was intended to be effective in the sheriff's hands. Although the note existed, when in his possession, in full force; yet, out of abundant caution, it was a point of prudence, to take an agreement from the defendant, which should preclude all future controversy relative to the loss, which might arise, from a forced sale of the instrument.\\nOn the whole, I am of opinion, that the note was an effective instrument in the hands of the sheriff, with the superadded power of disposal, should it be necessary, even at a loss, on the responsibility of the maker. In this view of the subject, the note was not usurious in its original concoction, or made with an usurious intent; but it was perfect and available in the sheriff's hands, and he could have maintained an action upon it against the maker. Munn v. Commission Company, 15 Johns. Rep. 44. 55. By necessary legal consequence, this note, free from the taint of usury, in its origin, he had a right to sell at a discount.\\nThe other Judges were of the same opinion.\\nNew trial to be granted.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"12254815\", \"name\": \"Robin Mae Neder v. Thomas Wildrick\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Neder v. Wildrick\", \"decision_date\": \"1985-12-03\", \"docket_number\": \"3660\", \"first_page\": \"551\", \"last_page\": \"551\", \"citations\": \"5 Conn. App. 551\", \"volume\": \"5\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Appellate Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Appellate Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:56:06.912770+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Robin Mae Neder v. Thomas Wildrick\", \"head_matter\": \"Robin Mae Neder v. Thomas Wildrick\\n(3660)\\nHull, Daly and Bieluch, Js.\\nArgued November 14\\ndecision released December 3, 1985\\nCharles K. Thompson, for the appellant (defendant).\\nDouglas B. Sherman, assistant attorney general, with whom were Eugene C. Cushman and, on the brief, Joseph I. Lieberman, attorney general, for the appellee (plaintiff).\", \"word_count\": \"58\", \"char_count\": \"376\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nThere is no error.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/conn/1237188.json b/conn/1237188.json
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+"{\"id\": \"1237188\", \"name\": \"HENRY KUDLACZ v. LINDBERG HEAT TREATING COMPANY ET AL.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Kudlacz v. Lindberg Heat Treating Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1999-09-14\", \"docket_number\": \"SC 15994\", \"first_page\": \"581\", \"last_page\": \"591\", \"citations\": \"250 Conn. 581\", \"volume\": \"250\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:40:55.753979+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"HENRY KUDLACZ v. LINDBERG HEAT TREATING COMPANY ET AL.\", \"head_matter\": \"HENRY KUDLACZ v. LINDBERG HEAT TREATING COMPANY ET AL.\\n(SC 15994)\\nCallahan, C. J., and Borden, Berdon, Katz and Palmer, Js.\\nArgued April 20\\nofficially released September 14, 1999\\nJacek I. Smigelski, for the appellant (plaintiff).\\nRichard S. Bartlett, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).\", \"word_count\": \"3498\", \"char_count\": \"21330\", \"text\": \"Opinion\\nPALMER, J.\\nUnder General Statutes \\u00a7 31-301 (a), a party aggrieved by a decision of a workers' compensation commissioner (commissioner) has ten days within which to appeal that decision to the compensation review board (board). This certified appeal requires us to decide whether that ten day appeal period is tolled when the aggrieved party fails to file his appeal within the ten day period because, through no fault of his own, he does not receive notice of the commissioner's decision prior to the expiration of that ten day period. The Appellate Court concluded that the appeal period is not tolled in such circumstances. We disagree and, consequently, reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.\\nThe opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following undisputed facts. The plaintiff, Henry Kudlacz, \\\"claimed to be injured on May 29, 1992, in the course of his employment as a delivery driver, and on June 4, 1992, in the course of his employment as a package sorter handler. In considering the evidence and testimony presented, the . . . commissioner . . . concluded that the plaintiff was not credible and that he was not injured at either [employment] as he alleged and, to the extent [that] he may have had a repetitive trauma injury to his back at [the second employment], there was no resulting permanent disability and no compensable period of temporary disability since the [plaintiff] continued to work after the injury . The commissioner vacated a voluntary agreement issued by the first employer and its insurance carrier based on mutual mistake of fact, and dismissed all claims for compensation and medical treatment presented by the plaintiff.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kudlacz v. Lindberg Heat Treating Co., 49 Conn. App. 1, 2-3, 712 A.2d 973 (1998).\\nThe commissioner sent notice of his decision via certified mail to all parties, including the plaintiff, on August 8, 1996. The plaintiff filed his petition for review of the commissioner's decision with the board on August 21,1996. The named defendant and its insurance carrier, also a defendant in this case, moved to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, they claimed that the plaintiff had failed to file his petition within the ten day appeal period prescribed by \\u00a7 31-301 (a) because, under controlling precedent, \\\"the ten day period begins to run on the day on which the party wanting to appeal is sent meaningful notice of the commissioner's decision.\\\" (Emphasis added.) Conaci v. Hartford Hospital, 36 Conn. App. 298, 303, 650 A.2d 613 (1994). In response, the plaintiff acknowledged that he had not filed the petition within ten days of August 8, 1996, the date on which the commissioner had sent notice to him. The plaintiff claimed, however, that, through no fault of his own, he did not receive such notice until after the expiration of the ten day period. Under such circumstances, the plaintiff asserts, the limitation period was tolled, and the petition was timely because it was filed within ten days of the date that he received notice of the commissioner's decision. The board rejected the plaintiffs claim, stating that, under binding Appellate Court precedent, \\\"the date of receipt of notice is not the issue . [Rather,] it is the date meaningful notice of the [commissioner's] decision is sent, by [the commissioner].\\\" (Emphasis in original.) Kudlacz v. Lindberg Heat Treating Co., 3407 CRB 8-96-8 (June 6,1997). The board concluded, therefore, that it had \\\"no choice but to dismiss the [plaintiffs] appeal for failure to timely file under \\u00a7 31-301 (a).\\\" Id.\\nThe plaintiff appealed from the decision of the board to the Appellate Court, claiming that the board improperly determined that his petition was untimely under \\u00a7 31-301 (a). The Appellate Court, with one judge dissenting, affirmed the board's decision dismissing the plaintiffs petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Kudlacz v. Lindberg Heat Treating Co., supra, 49 Conn. App. 6. In rejecting the plaintiffs claim, the Appellate Court reaffirmed its prior precedent, holding that the ten day appeal period of \\u00a7 31-301 (a) commences on the date meaningful notice of the commissioner's decision is sent to the party wanting to appeal. Id., 3-5. The court declined to make an exception for cases in which the aggrieved party can prove receipt of such notice after ten days from the date notice is sent. Id., 5-6. The court stated that to conclude that the ten day \\\"appeal period [set forth in \\u00a7 31-301 (a)] commences when notice of the appealable decision is received would create undue delay and difficulties in proving receipt by the party wanting to appeal. Conaci v. Hartford Hospital, supra, 36 Conn. App. 303. In determining when the appeal period commences, we rely, rather, on the records of the commission as to when notice is sent. Id., 304. As we recently stated, [t]his court must construe [\\u00a7 31-301 (a)] as it finds it without reference to whether we feel that the law might be improved . [We] cannot rewrite a statute to accomplish a particular result. That is the function of the legislature. . . . Vega v. Waltsco, Inc., [46 Conn. App. 298, 304, 699 A.2d 247 (1997)].\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kudlacz v. Lindberg Heat Treating Co., supra, 5-6.\\nWe granted the plaintiff's petition for certification limited to the following issue: \\\"Did the Appellate Court properly affirm the decision of the compensation review board that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs appeal because it was untimely, pursuant to General Statutes \\u00a7 31-301 (a)?\\\" Kudlacz v. Lindberg Heat Treating Co., 247 Conn. 909, 719 A.2d 903 (1998). On appeal to this court, the plaintiff seeks reversal of the Appellate Court judgment on the ground that, under the circumstances of this case, we must construe the ten day appeal period of \\u00a7 31-301 (a) as having been tolled until the plaintiff received notice of the commissioner's decision. The plaintiff contends that it would be fundamentally unfair to deprive him of his statutory right to appeal the commissioner's decision because, through no fault of his own, he did not receive notice of the commissioner's decision until the ten day period for filing his petition already had expired. The plaintiff maintains that, in such circumstances, the legislature reasonably could not have intended the result reached by the Appellate Court. We agree with the statutory construction advocated by the plaintiff.\\n\\\"[T]he process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature. . As with any issue of statutory interpretation, our initial guide is the language of the statute itself. . . . Furthermore, we interpret statutory language in light of the puxpose and policy behind the enactment.\\\" (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Willow Springs Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Seventh BRT Development Corp., 245 Conn. 1, 26, 717 A.2d 77 (1998). Finally, in seeking to ascertain the intent of the legislature regarding the proper construction of \\u00a7 31-301 (a), we are guided by \\\"the golden rule of statutory interpretation . . . that the legislature is presumed to have intended a reasonable, just and constitutional result.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hudson House Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Brooks, 223 Conn. 610, 615, 611 A.2d 862 (1992).\\nConstrued literally, \\u00a7 31-301 (a) mandates that a party who wishes to appeal from an adverse ruling of the commissioner do so within ten days after the commissioner renders his or her decision. We previously have eschewed a literal interpretation of the ten day limitation period of \\u00a7 31-301 (a), however, concluding that the legislature \\\"[undoubtedly . . . intended this provision to mean ten days after notice to the party of the entry of such finding-, otherwise, in the event of the failure of the commissioner to notify the party of his finding and award within the ten-day period, the taking of the appeal would be fruitless.\\\" (Emphasis added.) Murphy v. Elms Hotel, 104 Conn. 351, 352, 133 A. 106 (1926) (interpreting General Statutes [1918 Rev.] \\u00a7 5366, as amended by Public Acts 1919, c. 142, \\u00a7 14, predecessor to \\u00a7 31-301). \\\"Fundamental rights to procedural due process mandate such a construction.\\\" Trinkley v. Ella Grasso Regional Center, 220 Conn. 739, 743, 601 A.2d 515 (1992).\\nWe reach a similar conclusion with respect to the issue of statutory interpretation presented by this appeal. In light of the obvious unfairness inherent in depriving an aggrieved party of the right to appeal the commissioner's decision solely because of a failure of notice beyond that party's control, we will not lightly presume that the legislature intended such a result. See id.; Kron v. Thelen, 178 Conn. 189, 193, 197, 423 A.2d 857 (1979); Murphy v. Elms Hotel, supra, 104 Conn. 352.\\nAlthough the short appeal period contained in \\u00a7 31-301 (a) reflects the \\\"intention of the framers of the [Workers' Compensation Act (act)] . to establish a speedy, effective and inexpensive method for determining claims for compensation\\\"; Chieppo v. Robert E. McMichael, Inc., 169 Conn. 646, 653, 363 A.2d 1085 (1975); there is nothing in the act to suggest that the quick resolution of compensation claims trumps all other considerations, including the right of an aggrieved party to obtain meaningful review of a commissioner's decision. On the contrary, the availability of such review is an integral part of the statutory scheme because, under the act, both the employer and employee surrender important rights otherwise available to them at common law. See, e.g., Hunnihan v. Mattatuck Mfg. Co., 243 Conn. 438, 446, 705 A.2d 1012 (1997) (\\\"The purpose of the [act] . . . is to provide compensation for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, regardless of fault. . . . Under the statute, the employee surrenders his right to bring a common law action against the employer, thereby limiting the employer's liability to the statutory amount. . In return, the employee is compensated for his or her losses without having to prove liability.\\\" [Internal quotation marks omitted.]). To bar an appeal by a party who, through no fault of his own, has not received notice of the commissioner's adverse decision, would be inconsistent with the right to appellate review expressly granted to an aggrieved party under \\u00a7 31-301 (a). It is one thing to conclude that an aggrieved party has forfeited the right to such review by failing to take appropriate steps to perfect that right; it is another matter entirely, however, to deprive a party of the right to appeal solely because of a failure of notice for which that party bears no responsibility.\\nThe defendants contend that the construction of \\u00a7 31-301 (a) urged by the plaintiff will further tax our already burdened workers' compensation system. Allowing an aggrieved party the opportunity to rebut the presumption of timely notice, the defendants maintain, is bound to spawn time-consuming litigation concerning when the aggrieved party actually received notice of the commissioner's decision, and whether that party bears any responsibility for the late notice. We are not persuaded by the defendants' argument. It will be the rare case in which notice sent to the parties by the commissioner via certified mail fails to arrive at an aggrieved party's address within ten days of the date that it was sent. In light of the significant interests at stake, our workers' compensation system must be prepared to bear whatever slight burden may result from the need to resolve the unusual case in which a claim of lack of notice is raised.\\nWe recognize that the statutory interpretation we adopt today may give rise to some inequities. For example, as the Appellate Court observed in Conaci v. Hartford Hospital, supra, 36 Conn. App. 304, a party receiving notice of a decision nine days after it has been sent by the commissioner has only one day within which to appeal, whereas a party who receives notice on the eleventh day has ten days within which to do so. Nevertheless, we agree with the observation of Judge Spear that \\\"[tjhere is no logic to the notion that the plaintiff, who received no notice during the ten day period, should lose his right to appeal because of the possibility that a case may arise in the future in which notice is received so late in the ten day period that the time to appeal is severely compressed. Such a case can be addressed if and when it arises.\\\" Kudlacz v. Lindberg Heat Treating Co., supra, 49 Conn. App. 12 (Spear, J., dissenting).\\nAccordingly, we conclude that the ten day appeal period of \\u00a7 31-301 (a) is tolled when the aggrieved party establishes that, through no fault of his own, he did not receive notice of the commissioner's decision within ten days of the date that it was sent. On remand, therefore, the plaintiff shall be afforded the opportunity to show that he did not receive notice of the commissioner's decision until August 20, 1996, as he has asserted; see footnote 7 of this opinion; and, furthermore, that he failed to receive such notice through no fault of his own.\\nThe judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court with direction to remand the case to the board for further proceedings according to law.\\nIn this opinion CALLAHAN, C. J., and BORDEN and KATZ, Js., concurred.\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 31-301 (a) provides in relevant part: \\\"At any time within ten days after entry of an award by the commissioner . . . either party may appeal therefrom to the Compensation Review Board by filing in the office of the commissioner from which the award or the decision on a motion originated an appeal petition and five copies thereof. . . .\\\"\\nWhen we refer throughout this opinion to a party receiving notice of a commissioner's decision, including the plaintiff, we are referring to the receipt of notice by that party's counsel, to the extent that the party is represented by counsel. In Schreck v. Stamford, 250 Conn. 592, 600-601, 737 A.2d 916 (1999), also decided today, we held that when aplaintiff wishing to appeal an adverse decision of a commissioner is represented by counsel in that appeal, the ten day appeal period prescribed by \\u00a7 31-301 (a) begins to run on the date that the commissioner sends notice to the party's counsel, rather than to the party. As in Schreck, the plaintiff in this case was represented by counsel.\\n\\\"The plaintiff claims that the first injury was to his head and neck, and the second was to his back. The plaintiff sought [workers' compensation] benefits from his employers, the defendants Lindberg Heat Treating Company and United Parcel Service, Inc., and their respective insurance carriers, the defendants Crawford and Company and liberty Mutual Insurance Company.\\\" Kudlacz v. Lindberg Heat Treating Co., 49 Conn. App. 1, 2 n.3, 712 A.2d 973 (1998).\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 31-321, which prescribes the manner of serving notice for purposes of this state's Workers' Compensation Act, provides in relevant part: \\\"Unless otherwise specifically provided, or unless the circumstances of the case or the rules of the commission direct otherwise, any notice required under [the Workers' Compensation Act] to be served upon an employer, employee or commissioner shall be by written or printed notice, service personally or by registered or certified mail addressed to the person upon whom it is to be served at his last-known residence or place of business. . . .\\\" See also Kudlacz v. Lindberg Heat Treating Co., 3407 CRB 8-96-8 (June 6, 1997) (\\\"[i]n order to facilitate a determination of when notice of a decision is sent . all commissioners [must] send out notices of their decisions via certified mail\\\").\\nNotice of the commissioner's decision was sent to the plaintiffs attorney, whose mailing address at that time was a post office box.\\nThe Appellate Court consistently has reaffirmed this interpretation of \\u00a731-301 (a). See, e.g., Vega v. Waltsco, Inc., 46 Conn. App. 298, 301, 699 A.2d 247 (1997); Cyr v. Domino's Pizza, 45 Conn. App. 199, 203-204 n.5, 695 A.2d 29 (1997); Freeman v. Hull Dye & Print, Inc., 39 Conn. App. 717, 720, 667 A.2d 76 (1995). As we have concluded today in Kulig v. Crown Supermarket, 250 Conn. 603, 610, 738 A.2d 613 (1999), we agree with this construction of \\u00a7 31-301 (a).\\nThe plaintiffs attorney represented that he received a facsimile copy of the decision on August 20, 1996, and an original copy on August 22, 1996.\\nThe plaintiff does not challenge the board's determination that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a petition for review that has not been filed within the period prescribed by \\u00a7 31-301 (a). See, e.g., Chieppo v. Robert E. McMichael, Inc., 169 Conn. 646, 648, 363 A.2d 1085 (1975); Freeman v. Hull Dye & Print, Inc,., 39 Conn. App. 717, 720, 667 A.2d 76 (1995).\\nIn dissent, Judge Spear agreed with the plaintiff that principles of fundamental fairness precluded the construction of \\u00a7 31-301 (a) adopted by the majority. Kudlacz v. Lindberg Heat Treating Co., supra, 49 Conn. App. 6 (Spear, J., dissenting). Judge Spear addressed the rationale underlying the majority's decision as follows: \\\"Finally, the majority correctly states that we must construe \\u00a7 31-301 as we find it without regard to whether the law might be improved. The construction that I advocate does not change \\u00a7 31-301 in any way. It simply requires that the applicable time period be construed in a manner that is consistent with constitutional due process. It is a fundamental rule that, if its language permits, a statute will be construed so as to render it constitutionally valid. Grega v. Warden, 178 Conn. 207, 210, 423 A.2d 873 (1979). [The Connecticut] Supreme Court, in reliance on Gi-ega, later stated that a court is justified in holding that a statute was intended to be subject to constitutional requirements, and that those requirements are to be considered as embodied in the statute, if its terms do not exclude such requirements. . . . Bridgeport Bowl-O-Rama, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 195 Conn. 276, 283, 487 A.2d 559 (1985). I see nothing in \\u00a7 31-301 that would preclude us from construing it so that the plaintiff, who acted promptly after receiving notice, is not barred from pursuing his appeal. I conclude that the appeal was timely filed.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kudlacz v. Lindberg Heat Treating Co., supra, 12 (Spear, J., dissenting).\\nThe plaintiff relies primarily on Kron v. Thelen, 178 Conn. 189, 423 A.2d 857 (1979), in which we stated that \\\"[t]he right of appeal, if it is to have any value, must necessarily contemplate that the person who is to exercise the right be given the opportunity of knowing that there is a decision to appeal from and of forming an opinion as to whether that decision presents an appealable issue. Until the prospective appellant has either actual or constructive no\\u00fcce that a decision has been reached, the right of appeal is meaningless.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 193.\\nWe note that neither party has presented us with any legislative history relative to the issue we decide today, and we are aware of none.\\nOf course, if an aggrieved party, either by action or inaction, thwarts reasonable efforts at notification, then that party reasonably cannot claim any unfairness if those efforts prove to be unavailing. Moreover, as this court has noted, a party's \\\"own inaction in response to actual notice cannot be made the basis of a claim that he was not afforded due process.\\\" Rogers v. Commission of Human Rights & Opportunities, 195 Conn. 543, 548, 489 A.2d 368 (1985).\\nSee footnote 4 of this opinion.\\nOf course, the party also must establish that the appeal was filed within ten days from the date that he actually received notice of the commissioner's decision. It does not appear, however, that that fact is disputed in this case.\\nThe plaintiff claims that the board made a factual finding that he did not receive notice within the ten day appeal period and, consequently, that no further proceedings on that issue are necessary. We disagree with the plaintiff's characterization of the board's decision. Although the board did state that \\\"[o]nly the [plaintiff] failed to receive notice within the ten-day appeal period\\\"; Kudlacz v. Lindberg Heat Treating Co., 3407 CRB 8-96-8 (June 6, 1997); that statement was made in connection with the board's discussion of the argument that the plaintiffs attorney had made in support of the plaintiff's claim that his petition for review should not be dismissed. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the board actually made a finding that the plaintiff had not received notice within the ten day period.\"}"
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diff --git a/conn/12489159.json b/conn/12489159.json
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--- /dev/null
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+"{\"id\": \"12489159\", \"name\": \"Donald GIBSON v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Gibson v. Comm'r of Corr.\", \"decision_date\": \"2016-11-16\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 37505\", \"first_page\": \"330\", \"last_page\": \"330\", \"citations\": \"155 A.3d 330\", \"volume\": \"155\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Appellate Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-27T20:57:14.012355+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"Fastcase\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Donald GIBSON\\nv.\\nCOMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION\", \"head_matter\": \"Donald GIBSON\\nv.\\nCOMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION\\nNo. 37505\\nAppellate Court of Connecticut.\\nSubmitted on briefs November 16, 2016\\nOfficially released December 13, 2016\", \"word_count\": \"29\", \"char_count\": \"199\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nThe appeal is dismissed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/conn/12509247.json b/conn/12509247.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..eaa2af924d2192f21bf22414514a01cc0a1e7b53
--- /dev/null
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"12509247\", \"name\": \"STATE of Connecticut v. EUCLIDES L.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Euclides L.\", \"decision_date\": \"2019-04-09\", \"docket_number\": \"AC 40032\", \"first_page\": \"93\", \"last_page\": \"100\", \"citations\": \"207 A.3d 93\", \"volume\": \"207\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Appellate Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-27T20:57:49.725062+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"Fastcase\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE of Connecticut\\nv.\\nEUCLIDES L.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE of Connecticut\\nv.\\nEUCLIDES L.\\nAC 40032\\nAppellate Court of Connecticut.\\nArgued January 15, 2019\\nOfficially released April 9, 2019\\nRobert L. O'Brien, assigned counsel, with whom, on the brief, was William A. Adsit, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).\\nNancy L. Walker, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Matthew C. Gedansky, state's attorney, and Elizabeth C. Leaming, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).\\nAlvord, Prescott and Eveleigh, Js.\\nIn accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline to identify the victim or others through whom the victim's identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes \\u00a7 54-86e.\", \"word_count\": \"3898\", \"char_count\": \"22845\", \"text\": \"EVELEIGH, J.\\nThe defendant, Euclides L., appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of one count of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes \\u00a7 53-21 (a) (1). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by failing to instruct the jury that it should acquit the defendant if it concluded that his use of force in caring for his daughter, V, was an accident. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.\\nThe jury reasonably could have found the following facts. The defendant and J have one child together, V. From October, 2014, to January 9, 2015, the defendant, J and V lived together in an apartment in Vernon. During this time, the defendant and J were V's primary caregivers.\\nOn January 9, 2015, V, who was four months old at the time, was fussy because she was suffering from a cold and had received vaccinations two days earlier. At approximately 9:30 p.m., the defendant and J took V upstairs to put her to bed. While the defendant prepared V for bed, J was downstairs, although she periodically came upstairs to check on the defendant and the child. At approximately 11:10 p.m., after V\\nfell asleep, the defendant joined J downstairs.\\nAfter spending \\\"about a minute [downstairs] . [the defendant] asked J if [he] should wake [V] up and feed her because she didn't eat before bed.\\\" After J agreed that they should try to feed V, the defendant \\\"grabbed [V's] bottle and went upstairs and [woke] her up.\\\" When the defendant woke V, the child began to cry hysterically. Because V was congested and \\\"mucous was coming out of her nose in bubbles,\\\" the defendant tried to suction mucous out of her nose using a plastic bulb syringe. V wiggled and resisted the defendant so the defendant \\\"grabbed her face.\\\" This episode lasted approximately a minute to a minute and a half.\\nJ, who was downstairs while the defendant attempted to suction V's nose, heard V crying and went upstairs to check on the defendant and the child. As J approached the room in which the defendant was tending to V, she heard a muffled cry. When J entered the room, she saw that there was blood around V's nose and that the child's skin was blue in color. J believed that V needed oxygen and feared that this was a side effect of the vaccinations V had received two days earlier.\\nJ and the defendant immediately drove V to Rockville General Hospital (hospital). They arrived at the hospital at approximately 11:30 p.m. While the defendant parked the car, J ran into the hospital carrying V in her arms. J told the hospital staff that V was turning blue and needed oxygen V was crying when she arrived, butstopped after being comforted by hospital staff.\\nDanielle Mailloux, a physician employed at the hospital, attended to V. Mailloux observed a red mark under the child's nose and a purple round mark that was approximately two centimeters in diameter on her left cheek. During the first two hours that V was at the hospital, this mark grew in size and two additional marks developed on the right side of the child's face. Mailloux believed that the marks on V's face were bruises.\\nMailloux inquired as to V's medical history and concluded that the injuries could not be accounted for by any preexisting medical condition, including the vaccines V had received two days earlier. Mailloux asked V's parents how the child acquired the injuries, but neither the defendant nor J was able to provide Mailloux with an explanation. Because the unexplained bruising on V suggested abuse, Mailloux determined that she would need to file a report with the Department of Children and Families (department).\\nMailloux recommended that V be transferred to Connecticut Children's Medical Center in Hartford for inpatient treatment. Mailloux informed the defendant and J that after V was transferred, the department was going to become involved. At this point, the defendant became upset and said he would not sign the paperwork to have V transferred to Connecticut Children's Medical Center.\\nDespite the defendant's protestations, on January 10, 2015, V was transferred to Connecticut Children's Medical Center. Once V arrived, the police interviewed the defendant and J separately. During the interviews, neither the defendant nor J was able to explain how V had sustained her injuries. On January 12, 2015, William Olsen, an employee of the department, interviewed the defendant and J. Both the defendant and J indicated that they did not hurt V but again failed to provide an explanation for the child's injuries.\\nAlso on January 12, 2015, Nina Livingston, a physician and the director of the Suspected Child Abuse and Neglect team at Connecticut Children's Medical Center, evaluated V. Livingston noted that V had \\\"facial bruising in a wraparound distribution [from] ear to ear....\\\" Specifically, V had bruises on her forehead, left eyelid, cheeks, temples, jawline, both ears, and above and below her left eye. Additionally, V had abrasions below her right nostril, right ear, and left temple, as well as subconjunctival hemorrhages in both eyes. Because the injuries could not be accounted for by alternative medical causes and V could not yet roll over, Livingston concluded that V's injuries had been caused by someone else. On the basis of Olsen's and Livingston's findings, the department invoked a 96 hour administrative hold on behalf of V.\\nOn January 19, 2015, a week after the department invoked the 96 hour hold, the defendant revealed to J that he had caused V's bruises by holding her face while trying to suction mucous from her nose. J encouraged the defendant to disclose this information to the police. The defendant agreed to speak with the police, and J drove him to the police station, where, in a recorded video statement, the defendant admitted that he was responsible for V's bruises.\\nThe defendant also provided the police with a written statement in which he stated the following in regard to his attempts to suction V's nose: \\\"I was almost taking my anger out on [V]. It was almost like we were having a conversation and she was not letting me do it and I was going to do it. I was holding her face hard to keep her head still, I would say it was a 10 on a scale from 1 to 10. She was fighting me and flailing her face back and forth. I was holding [her] harder than I should hold a baby.... I am devastated . that I had to put my daughter through this because I couldn't control myself.... It was just the frustration of what I was going through and I lost control.\\\"\\nIn February, 2015, the defendant was arrested in relation to V's injuries. On June 28, 2016, the state charged the defendant with one count of risk of injury to a child in violation of \\u00a7 53-21 (a) (1). The defendant entered a not guilty plea and elected to be tried by a jury.\\nOn September 29, 2016, following a trial before a jury, the defendant was convicted of one court of risk of injury to a child in violation of \\u00a7 53-52 (a) (1). The defendant then filed the present appeal in which he argues that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by failing to instruct the jury that his use of force in caring for V was an accident. The state argues that the defendant's claim fails because (1) he waived his appellate claim by abandoning the precise language of his request to charge on accident, (2) the trial court's instruction on general intent was legally correct and gave ample guidance to the jury on the issue of accident, and (3) any error in failing to instruct the jury more fully on accident was harmless. Even if we assume, without deciding, that the defendant did not waive his appellate claim by abandoning the precise language of his request to charge, we conclude that his claim fails on the merits because the court's charge was legally correct.\\nThe following facts are necessary for the resolution of this issue. On August 31, 2016, the defendant submitted the following request to charge: \\\"For you to find the defendant guilty of risk of injury, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally squeezed [V's] face too hard. If you find that the defendant accidentally used excessive force, i.e., he did not know that he was squeezing [V's] face too hard, then you must find him not guilty. The evidence to which this charge applies is the testimony of the defendant and [J] that the defendant held [V's] head while suctioning her nose.\\\"\\nOn September 2, 2016, the state argued, with respect to the defendant's proposed charge: \\\"I would also take issue with the claim of accident, when this is a . general intent . crime and all the state must prove is that the defendant intended to do the act.... [In a risk of injury charge] the state need only prove [the defendant] intended to do the act, not inflict the injury . [A]n accident defense isn't relevant to this kind of charge. The defendant isn't claiming he accidentally grabbed the child's face. He's claiming he accidentally inflicted the injury.... [T]here is no accident defense in this case because . by [the defendant's] own admissions . he purposely grabbed the child's face, but thereafter used excessive force and inflicted the injury.\\\" The defendant did not respond to the state's objection to his request to charge.\\nOn September 28, 2016, the court provided counsel with a draft of the proposed charge. This version of the charge provided: \\\"Intent relates to the condition of mind of the person who commits the act, his purpose in doing it. I instruct you now as to general intent because it applies to the charge of risk of injury. General intent is the intent to engage in conduct. As to the charge of risk of injury, it is not necessary for the state to prove that the defendant specifically intended to endanger [V's] physical well-being. Rather, the state is required to prove that the defendant intentionally and not inadvertently or accidentally engaged in his actions which did constitute blatant physical abuse. In other words, the state must prove that the defendant's actions in forcefully covering her face with his hands were intentional, voluntary and knowing rather than unintentional, involuntary and unknowing.\\\"\\nIn discussing the second draft of the charge with counsel, the court explained: \\\"This [instruction] touches upon the issue of intent to engage in conduct as opposed to inadvertently or accidentally engaging in actions. This is the only part in the charge where some conjugation of the word accident is going to occur. I mention that . because of [the] prior request [of counsel for the defendant]. I also think it's consistent with State v. Martin [189 Conn. 1, 454 A.2d 256, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 933, 103 S.Ct. 2098, 77 L.Ed.2d 306 (1983) ].\\\" The court then asked if counsel had any problems with the instruction. The defendant did not reply to the court's inquiry. The court thereafter informed counsel that it would give charges on unanimity and parental justification and that accident was \\\"subsumed under general intent.\\\" The following day, on September 29, 2016, the court suggested minor changes to the charge and asked whether counsel wanted to add anything before the jury was brought out for closing argument. Both counsel indicated that they had nothing to add.\\nDuring closing argument, defense counsel stated: \\\"This is a case about a father trying to help his daughter, not hurt her. She had a cold that he suctioned her nose with a bulb syringe to get the mucous out, caused the bruises, but he did that in order to treat her cold, to treat her stuffy nose and he held her head too hard, but he didn't do that on purpose. He did it accidentally. He is not the kind of father that would do that. He's calm. He's patient. He's gentle.\\\" In response, the state argued: \\\"The defendant wants you to consider the fact that this was an accident and you're not going to hear that as a defense, when the judge instructs you on the law. The judge is going to indicate to you that the state must prove that the defendant's actions in forcefully covering the face of a child with his hands were intentional, voluntary and knowing . rather than unintentional, involuntary and unknowing. So, the state must prove that the defendant intentionally and forcefully cover[ed] the child's face, but . need not prove the defendant desired the ultimate outcome or intended the ultimate outcome. So, he may not have meant to cause the bruising on the child, he may not have thought in advance that that is what's going to happen. That doesn't matter. That doesn't make [it] an accident that relieves him of his criminal responsibility for his actions.\\\"\\nFollowing closing argument, the court charged the jury with the following general intent instruction: \\\"Intent relates to the condition of mind of the person who commits the act, his purpose in doing it. I instruct you now as to general intent because it applies to the charge of risk of injury. General intent is the intent to engage in conduct. As to the charge of risk of injury, it is not necessary for the state to prove that the defendant specifically intended to endanger [V's] physical well-being. Rather, the state is required to prove that the defendant intentionally and not inadvertently or accidentally engaged in his actions. In other words, the state must prove that the defendant's actions in forcefully covering her face with his hand were intentional, voluntary, and knowing rather than unintentional, involuntary and unknowing.\\\"\\nThe court further instructed the jury on the elements of the risk of injury to a child pursuant to \\u00a7 53-21, stating: \\\"The first element is that the defendant did an act that was likely to impair the health of the child. Please recall my earlier instruction on general intent. To be likely to impair the health of a minor, the statute requires that the defendant committed blatant physical abuse that endangered the child's physical well-being.\\\" Furthermore, the court instructed that \\\"the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that . the defendant did an act of blatant physical abuse that endangered the child's physical well-being and was likely to impair the health of the child .\\\"\\nThe court also instructed the jury on the defense of justification, stating: \\\"The evidence in this case raises the issue that the defendant, as a parent, was justified in the use of physical force upon [V] because he was promoting her welfare by suctioning her nose. After you have considered all of the evidence in this case, if you find that the state has proved each element of risk of injury, you must go on to consider whether or not the defendant was justified in his use of force. When, as in this case, evidence of justification was introduced at trial, the state must not only prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime charged but must also disprove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was justified in his use of force.\\\"\\nWith these facts in mind, we set forth the relevant standard of review and legal principles that guide our analysis. \\\"Our review of the defendant's claim requires that we examine the [trial] court's entire charge to determine whether it is reasonably possible that the jury could have been misled by the omission of the requested instruction.... While a request to charge that is relevant to the issues in a case and that accurately states the applicable law must be honored, a [trial] court need not tailor its charge to the precise letter of such a request . If a requested charge is in substance given, the [trial] court's failure to give a charge in exact conformance with the words of the request will not constitute a ground for reversal.... As long as [the instructions] are correct in law, adapted to the issues and sufficient for the guidance of the jury . we will not view the instructions as improper.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Boyd , 176 Conn. App. 437, 449, 169 A.3d 842, cert. denied, 327 Conn. 972, 174 A.3d 192 (2017). A court, however, \\\"is under no obligation to give a requested jury instruction that does not constitute an accurate statement of the law.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Harper , 184 Conn. App. 24, 40, 194 A.3d 846, cert. denied, 330 Conn. 936, 195 A.3d 386 (2018).\\nSection 53-21 (a) provides: \\\"Any person who (1) wilfully or unlawfully causes or permits any child under the age of sixteen years to be placed in such a situation that the life or limb of such child is endangered, the health of such child is likely to be injured or the morals of such child are likely to be impaired, or does any act likely to impair the health or morals of any such child . shall be guilty of a class C felony .\\\"\\n\\\"Specific intent is not an element of the crime defined in [ \\u00a7 53-21 (a) (1) ].... A general intent to do the proscribed act is required, however, as it is ordinarily for crimes of commission rather than omission.\\\" (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Martin , supra, 189 Conn. at 12-13, 454 A.2d 256. Put another way, to support a conviction under \\u00a7 53-21 (a) (1), the jury need not \\\"find any intent to injure the child or impair its health. All that [is] required [is] the general intent on the part of the defendant to perform the act which resulted in the injury, that is, that the bodily movement [that] resulted in the injury was volitional.\\\" (Emphasis omitted.) State v. McClary , 207 Conn. 233, 240, 541 A.2d 96 (1988).\\n\\\"Accident is not a justification for a crime . it negates only one element of the crime, namely, intent.... A claim of accident, pursuant to which the defendant asserts that the state failed to prove the intent element of a criminal offense, does not require a separate jury instruction because the court's instruction on the intent required to commit the underlying crime is sufficient in such circumstances.\\\" (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Moye , 119 Conn. App. 143, 153-54, 986 A.2d 1134, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 907, 995 A.2d 638 (2010).\\nThe defendant argues that pursuant to our Supreme Court's decision in State v. Martin , supra, 189 Conn. 1, 454 A.2d 256, the trial court erred in failing to adequately instruct the jury on accident. The defendant's case, however, is distinguishable from Martin , in which the facts were uniquely suited to an accident instruction. In Martin , the defendant testified that he injured a child when he fell and reflexively put his hands out to prevent his fall, thereby pushing the child against a nearby table. Id., at 10-11, 454 A.2d 256. Specifically, the defendant in Martin stated that \\\"someone grabbed him from behind. He spun around, his plastic kneecap locked and he fell . He did not know whether he had touched [the child] as he fell . but he admitted that his reflex action in swinging out his arms to prevent his fall might have caused the child to be pushed against a table.\\\" Id., at 11, 454 A.2d 256. Whereas the resulting injury in Martin was \\\"wholly accidental\\\" and reflexive, the injury in the present case was a result of the defendant intentionally holding V's head in his effort to suction mucous from her nose. The defendant in the present case maintains that he inadvertently used too much force in holding V's face, thereby accidentally causing the child's injuries. This, however, confuses an intentional act that causes an accidental outcome with a reflexive, involuntary act like that in Martin . Unlike in Martin , where the defendant placed his hands out as a reflexive reaction to external forces, in the present case, the defendant intentionally held his child's face.\\nMoreover, unlike in Martin , where the court entirely failed to mention accident in its charge, the court in the present case mentioned accident in its instruction on general intent. Our Supreme Court in Martin stated: \\\"The failure of the court even to allude to this defense as one which the state had to disprove was a serious deficiency in the charge.\\\" Id., at 13, 454 A.2d 256. Furthermore, our Supreme Court in Martin went on to state that \\\"a curative instruction should have been given discussing the general intent requirement in the context of the defense of accident which had been raised.\\\" Id., at 14, 454 A.2d 256. In the present case, the court did more than allude to accident. In fact, it expressly mentioned accident in the context of the general intent requirement, stating: \\\"[T]he state is required to prove that the defendant intentionally and not inadvertently or accidentally engaged in his actions.\\\" Although the court in the present case did not provide the jury with a separate accident charge, a separate charge was not required under the law. See State v. Singleton , 292 Conn. 734, 752, 974 A.2d 679 (2009).\\nOn the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the court's charge was legally correct and adequately instructed the jury on the issue of accident.\\nThe judgment is affirmed.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 53-21 (a) provides in relevant part: \\\"Any person who (1) wilfully or unlawfully causes or permits any child under the age of sixteen years to be placed in such a situation that the life or limb of such child is endangered, the health of such child is likely to be injured or the morals of such child are likely to be impaired, or does any act likely to impair the health or morals of any such child . shall be guilty of . a class C felony .\\\" Although \\u00a7 53-21 had been amended in 2015, those amendments have no bearing on the merits of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute.\\nJ, who is a trained respiratory therapist, told the police that she took V to the hospital because she believed the child might have been suffering from encephalitis.\\nBecause we conclude that the charge was legally correct and affirm the decision on that basis, we do not address the state's argument that the court's failure to instruct the jury more fully on accident was harmless error.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1312729\", \"name\": \"ULYSSES J. BURRIDGE, ET AL vs. JOSEPH FIELD\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Burridge v. Field\", \"decision_date\": \"1935-03-19\", \"docket_number\": \"File #10609\", \"first_page\": \"108\", \"last_page\": \"109\", \"citations\": \"1 Conn. Supp. 108\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Supplement\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:19:11.792207+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"ULYSSES J. BURRIDGE, ET AL vs. JOSEPH FIELD\", \"head_matter\": \"ULYSSES J. BURRIDGE, ET AL vs. JOSEPH FIELD\\nSuperior Court New London County\\nFile #10609\\nPresent: Hon. ALLYN L. BROWN, Judge.\\nJohn Gallagher, Attorney for the Plaintiff.\\nSamuel Gruskin, Attorney for the Defendant.\\nMEMORANDUM FILED MARCH 19, 1935.\", \"word_count\": \"496\", \"char_count\": \"2965\", \"text\": \"BROWN, J.\\nUnder their-prayers for relief in this action, the plaintiffs seek (1) to be repossessed of real estate in Mystic including the building thereon, heretofore used as a laundry, and certain enumerated personal property used in connection therewith, and (2) $3,000. damages. It is undis puted upon the evidence that on May 27, 1933, the plaintiffs, as owners of said property, delivered possession thereof, pur' suant to the instrument \\\"Exhibit B\\\" annexed to the complaint, which is \\\"Exhibit C\\\" in evidence, and that in July, 1934, \\\"Joseph G. Geisler & Co.\\\" to whom possession was so given, defaulted in the performance of the agreement.\\nI find that Joseph G. Geisler in negotiating this agreement with the plaintiffs, was acting for himself and the defendant as partners, his participation as it affected the latter being an' alogous to that of an agent for an undisclosed principal. I further find that the defendant had full knowledge of the terms of the transaction both when it was consummated and when he subsequently acquired Geisler's interest. So far as the issues of this case are concerned therefore, the defendant is a \\\"vendee of the personal property in question under #4699 of the General Statutes, and he is bound by the pro' visions of the conditional sale evidenced by Exhibit C.\\nWhile Exhibit C affords a splendid example of the unwisdom of the parties' failure to employ a competent scrivenor to give expression to their agreement, in the light of its terms and all of the circumstances, I find that the agreement was, that a default of three days upon the part of the vendees to perform, should result in a forfeiture of their interest in the property at the vendors' election and entitle' the latter to forthwith resume possession thereof, the monthly payments of $100. up to such time constitute liquidated damages. By Exhibit D in evidence the plaintiffs on August 10, 1934, exer' cised such election.\\nThe monthly payments due from the vendees under the contract were made until July 1, 1934. Of the $100. then due, but $58 was paid. Of the $100 due August 1, 1934, nothing was paid. Upon receiving notice of the plaintiffs' election by Exhibit D above referred to, the defendant wrongfully refused to surrender possession of the property to the plaintiffs. I find $75. per month to be the reasonable value of the use thereof. Under their claim for damages, the plaintiffs are entitled to recover $158. as liqui' dated damages, and $425. for the seven months during which the defendant has wrongfully kept the plaintiffs out of pos' session.\\nJudgment may be entered for the plaintiffs for (1) posses' sion of the premises and personal property, and (2) $583. damages, plus costs of suit.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1313417\", \"name\": \"JOHN P. CURRY vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF BRIDGEPORT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Curry v. Civil Service Commission\", \"decision_date\": \"1938-02-28\", \"docket_number\": \"File #53879\", \"first_page\": \"505\", \"last_page\": \"506\", \"citations\": \"5 Conn. Supp. 505\", \"volume\": \"5\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Supplement\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:26:06.842952+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"JOHN P. CURRY vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF BRIDGEPORT\", \"head_matter\": \"JOHN P. CURRY vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF BRIDGEPORT\\nSuperior Court Fairfield County\\nFile #53879\\nPresent: Hon. KENNETH WYNNE, Judge.\\nShannon & Wilder, Attorneys for the Plaintiff.\\nJohn V. Donnelly, Attorney for the Defendant\\nMEMORANDUM FILED FEBRUARY 28, 1938.\", \"word_count\": \"206\", \"char_count\": \"1261\", \"text\": \"WYNNE, J.\\nMemorandum on motion to expunge and motion to make more specific. The very nature of the present appeal is a sufficient answer to the pending motion. A review of the acts of the Civil Service Commission can come only before a judge of the Superior Court. The proceeding is not judicial but rather one where a judge is designated as the reviewing authority over an administrative municipal commission. In such capacity everything that is here raised, time as well as circumstance, should be before the judge. It would seem that the appellee is in the position of asking to have expunged matter that is directly pertinent to what he seeks in the other motion to make more specific. A judge can be expected to conform to the philosophy underlying enactments seeking municipal reform and at the same time protect the individual from a too rigid interpretation that through jealousness might conflict with the very things that civil service contemplates.\\nThe motions are denied.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1324013\", \"name\": \"Anna Doherty v. Town of Winchester et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Doherty v. Town of Winchester\", \"decision_date\": \"1954-02-09\", \"docket_number\": \"File No. 13994\", \"first_page\": \"475\", \"last_page\": \"479\", \"citations\": \"18 Conn. Supp. 475\", \"volume\": \"18\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Supplement\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:06:49.829315+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Anna Doherty v. Town of Winchester et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Anna Doherty v. Town of Winchester et al.\\nSuperior Court Litchfield County\\nFile No. 13994\\nMemorandum filed February 9, 1954.\\nHowd, Pruyn & Lavieri, of Winsted, for the Plaintiff.\\nJames L. Glynn, of Winsted, and Carmody & Torrance, of Waterbury, for the Defendants.\", \"word_count\": \"1246\", \"char_count\": \"7209\", \"text\": \"House, J.\\nThis is an action against the town of Winchester and The Connecticut Light and Power Company, hereinafter referred to as the defendant, in which the plaintiff seeks damages from both defendants as the result of a fall alleged to have occurred on the public sidewalk \\\"in front of the property belonging to the defendant, The Connecticut Light and Power Company.\\\" The complaint claims that the fall was due to a defective and dangerous condition of broken concrete in the sidewalk \\\"adjacent to\\\" the property of the defendant and that the surface of the sidewalk was covered with snow and ice.\\nThe first count alleges that the defendant town of Winchester is charged with the duty of proper care and maintenance of the streets in the town, had notice of the defective condition, and neglected to remedy it, as a result of which the plaintiff was injured. The second count alleges the same structural defects and ice and snow condition, that the defendant company owned the abutting property and the ordinances of the town of Winchester and city of Winsted require abutting owners to remove ice and snow from public sidewalks, which the defendant neglected to do, resulting in plaintiff's fall and injuries. The third count alleges that the defendant so maintained its abutting property that it caused a public nuisance on the sidewalk. The fourth count repeats the alleged structural defects and ice and snow accumulation and that the defendant company was negligent \\\"in that it allowed said sidewalk to remain in said defective condition.\\\"\\nThe defendant company has demurred to both the second and fourth counts on the grounds, as to each count, that there is no allegation that any duty owing to the plaintiff has been breached by the defendant.\\nIt is essential to a cause of action based on negligence that the breach of some legal duty to the plaintiff be alleged, for negligence is, by definition, the breach of a duty. Collins v. City National Bank & Trust Co., 131 Conn. 167, 170. Negligence occurs where one under a duty to exercise a certain degree of care to avoid injury to others fails to do so. Dean v. Hershowits, 119 Conn. 398, 407; Earley v. Hall, 89 Conn. 606, 613. Negligence cannot be predicated upon a state of facts which does not impose a legal duty. Swentusky v. Prudential Ins. Co., 116 Conn. 526, 532. It is essential that the complaint allege facts showing wherein the defendant failed to perform a duty. O'Keefe v. National Folding Box & Paper Co., 66 Conn. 38, 44. Furthermore, the duty which must be alleged must be a duty owed to the plaintiff. Actionable negligence cannot be based on a breach of duty unless the injured person is within the class of persons to whom the duty is owed. McDowell v. Federal Tea Co., 128 Conn. 437, 440. \\\" 'The rule which is applicable to actions for negligence based upon the violation of a statutory duty is to all intents and purposes the same as the rale applicable to actions for negligence based upon a violation of a common-law duty. Where there is no duty, there can be no negligence. The statutory duty must be owing to the person injured, and not to some one else, in order that a violation thereof shall constitute actionable negligence.' Anthony v. Connecticut Co., 88 Conn. 700, 707, 92 Atl. 672; see also Longstean v. McCaffrey's Sons, 95 Conn. 486, 494, 111 Atl. 836; Black v. Hunt, 96 Conn. 663, 666, 115 Atl. 429; Gonchar v. Kelson, 114 Conn. 262, 264, 158 Atl. 545.\\\" Hassett v. Palmer, 126 Conn. 468, 472.\\nIn the second count the alleged negligence of the defendant company is failure to remove snow and ice from a public sidewalk as required by a local ordinance, and in the fourth count the alleged negligence is neglect to remedy a defective condition on the public sidewalk.\\nIt is not without significance that in the first paragraph of the first count the plaintiff alleges that the defendant town of Winchester \\\"is charged with the proper care and maintenance of the streets within the limits of said town.\\\" The law as to the relative duties of municipalities and owners of property abutting a public sidewalk is well summarized in the headnote to Willoughby v. New Haven, 123 Conn. 446: \\\"At common law there is no liability upon an abutting property owner for injuries resulting from the effects of natural causes upon streets or sidewalks, such as the accumulation of snow or ice. Primarily it is the sole duty of the municipality to keep its streets in reasonably safe condition for travel, and not the duty of private persons. Therefore if the liability is or can be shifted from the municipality to the individual it must be accomplished by statutory or charter provision or by ordinance adequately authorized by such provision, and, being the creature of statute or such ordinance it can be no greater than that specifically imposed thereby. Imposition upon abutting owners of a duty to clear walks of snow and ice, with a provision of a penalty by fine and costs for failure to do so or for clearing the same by municipality and collection of the cost from the abutting owner, is not sufficient to render the individual, instead of the city, liable for injuries sustained by reason of snow or ice thereon.\\\"\\nThe mere allegation that the defendant is the owner of premises abutting a public sidewalk and that a local ordinance provides that the abutting owner shall remove snow and ice, or that the sidewalk was defective and the abutting owner did not repair it, is not sufficient against a demurrer which properly claims that the complaint sets forth no breach of a legal duty owed to the plaintiff.\\nThe plaintiff particularly asserts that these demurrers are general and not special, as is required by \\u00a7 7814. The fine line between what is special and general in a particular ease may be a difficult one to draw.\\n\\\"A demurrer is not a mere procedural nicety, but is a precise instrument for the final determination on the merits of justiciability under pertinent rules of law of an asserted cause of action or defense. It is the formal mode of disputing the sufficiency in law of the pleading to which it pertains.\\\" 71 C.J.S. 426. A demurrer is general when no particular ground for the demurrer is alleged and an attack is made on the sufficiency of the pleading as a whole. It is special when the particular imperfection is pointed out. Id., 419, 421. It is basic that a complaint in such an action as this must state facts showing the jurisdiction of the court, a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty and injury to the plaintiff caused thereby. The absence of any one of these makes the complaint defective. The demurrer is sufficiently special when it points out the particular defect in the complaint attacked, in this case the absence of any allegation that any duty owing to the plaintiff has been breached by the defendant.\\nDefendant's demurrer to both the second and fourth counts are therefore sustained.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1336598\", \"name\": \"FINTON MORTON, ADMR. vs. BERNARD WEST, ET AL.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Morton v. West\", \"decision_date\": \"1936-01-23\", \"docket_number\": \"File #11530\", \"first_page\": \"251\", \"last_page\": \"252\", \"citations\": \"3 Conn. Supp. 251\", \"volume\": \"3\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Supplement\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:47:40.681232+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"FINTON MORTON, ADMR. vs. BERNARD WEST, ET AL.\", \"head_matter\": \"FINTON MORTON, ADMR. vs. BERNARD WEST, ET AL.\\nSuperior Court New Haven County (At Waterbury)\\nFile #11530\\nPresent: Hon. FREDERICK M. PEASLEY, Judge.\\nMartin L. Caine, Attorney for the Plaintiff.\\nWoodhouse 6? Scofield, D. L. O\\u2019Neill, Attorneys for the Defendants.\\nMEMORANDUM FILED JANUARY 23, 1936.\", \"word_count\": \"443\", \"char_count\": \"2547\", \"text\": \"PEASLEY, J.\\nThis is an action for recovery, under the statute, for the death of the plaintiff's decedent as a result of the defendant's negligence. The acts complained of are alleged to have occurred on August 25, 1934 and the writ in this action is dated August 26, 1935. The reason alleged in support of the demurrer is that the action was not commenced within the year limited by the statute.\\nThe plaintiff relies upon Blackman vs. Nearing, 43 Conn. 56 and Austin Nichols & Co., Inc. vs. Gilman, 100 Conn. 81 to exclude, in determining the last day upon which an action could be started, the day on which the acts complained of were committed. By doing this, which is entirely proper, the last day of the time limited by statute fell upon August 25, 1935, which was Sunday. Again relying upon Austin Nichols & Co., Inc. vs. Gilman, supra, the plaintiff claimed that he had all of the following day\\u2014August 26th, the day on which the writ was served to bring his action. But it was there held that when the last day of a period within which an act may be done (in the instant case the commencement of a civil action) falls on Sunday, the act, unless lawful on Sunday, may be performed on the following day. But under our statute it was not unlawful on Sunday, either before sunrise m the morning, or after sunset at night, to serve the writ.\\nThe plaintiff further claims that even if it were permissible to serve the process on Sunday, the fact that administration was not taken out 'till Monday, August 26, 1935 excused him from bringing his action within the year limited by the statute. But in Radesky, et al., Admrs. vs. Sargent & Co., 77 Conn. 110, it was held that the fact that no administrator upon the estate of the decedent was appointed until after the time prescribed for suit had expired does not extend the statutory period, nor validate a suit thereafter begun.\\nWith these defenses of the plaintiff against this defendant's demurrer thus disposed of, the action of this Court on the demurrer is governed by DeMartino, Admrx. vs. Siemon, which held that it must be alleged in the complaint that the injury which resulted in death occurred within one year next before the commencement of the action.\\nThe demurrer is therefore sustained.\"}"
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diff --git a/conn/1336634.json b/conn/1336634.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..93e1f4361c60f4718915fdbc4a047500be9c0b5c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/conn/1336634.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1336634\", \"name\": \"JOHN F. HARDING vs. W. NORMAN SCRANTON\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Harding v. Scranton\", \"decision_date\": \"1935-12-09\", \"docket_number\": \"File #47984\", \"first_page\": \"173\", \"last_page\": \"174\", \"citations\": \"3 Conn. Supp. 173\", \"volume\": \"3\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Supplement\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:47:40.681232+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"JOHN F. HARDING vs. W. NORMAN SCRANTON\", \"head_matter\": \"JOHN F. HARDING vs. W. NORMAN SCRANTON\\nSuperior Court New Haven County\\nFile #47984\\nPresent: Hon. JOHN A. CORNELL, Judge.\\nL. H. Stapleton, Attorney for the Plaintiff.\\nS. H. Platcow, Joseph T. Shrebnik, Attorneys for the Defendant.\\nMEMORANDUM FILED DECEMBER 9, 1935.\", \"word_count\": \"462\", \"char_count\": \"2726\", \"text\": \"CORNELL, J.\\nIt is found that when defendant came upon the plaintiff, the latter, who weighs about two hundred ninety pounds was bending over the former's son who at the time was less than nine years old and weighed sixty pounds and was then prone upon the ground\\u2014and had hold of his wrist or arm.\\nUnder these and the other attending circymstances, defendant was justified in entertaining an apprehension that his son was in danger of bodily injury and to use such force to rescue him from such conceived peril as was reasonably necessary for the purpose.\\nThis he did by grabbing plaintiff and pushing him so hard that the latter fell to the ground. While the defendant was generous in the expenditure of muscular energy used in the operation, it cannot be said that he exceeded his right or that his action was such as to make him from that point the aggressor.\\nPlaintiff, himself, however, on arising from the ground where he had reclined but an instant when interrupted in his assumed task of \\\"arresting\\\" the boy became the aggressor when he pursued defendant and punched him on the side of the face.\\nDefendant was thereupon justified in using sufficient force to repel this assault upon his countenance and others which he might then have reasonably apprehended to impend. The blow which he struck plaintiff must be .found to have collided with the latter in the exercise of that right.\\nAs to the issues formed on the complaint and answer, judgment may be entered for defendant.\\nOn the issues formed by the allegations of the counterclaim and \\\"reply\\\", these, also, are found for the defendant.\\nThe blow struck defendant by plaintiff produced no injury other than that purely theoretical one that the law conceives under such circumstances. As to the boy, the lens fell out of his glasses the next day, but whether from anything that happened while he was at grips with his two hundred ninety pound opponent or from some other cause does not appear. Neither is the cost of repair in evidence.\\nThe boy suffered no actual injury physically. Judging from his attitude on the witness stand, he rather enjoyed getting his father at fisticuffs with his neighbor, although apparently unimpressed with the cold aftermath of judicial inquiry following the more hectic scene ensuing upon his \\\"misdirected\\\" sling shot \\\"pebbles\\\".\\nOnly nominal damages may be allowed.\\nJudgment may enter for the defendant on his counter-claim to recover of the plaintiff the sum of $2.00.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/conn/1341616.json b/conn/1341616.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..143e4296da40f17b5ebf38a748e17d4cd9463d6e
--- /dev/null
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+"{\"id\": \"1341616\", \"name\": \"MILDRED ALLER, EXTRX. ET AL. (Estate of Samuel M. Aller) vs. MARY ISABEL ALJOE ET AL.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Aller v. Aljoe\", \"decision_date\": \"1940-12-19\", \"docket_number\": \"File No. 60704\", \"first_page\": \"39\", \"last_page\": \"40\", \"citations\": \"9 Conn. Supp. 39\", \"volume\": \"9\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Supplement\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:49:33.455987+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"MILDRED ALLER, EXTRX. ET AL. (Estate of Samuel M. Aller) vs. MARY ISABEL ALJOE ET AL.\", \"head_matter\": \"MILDRED ALLER, EXTRX. ET AL. (Estate of Samuel M. Aller) vs. MARY ISABEL ALJOE ET AL.\\nSuperior Court Fairfield County\\nFile No. 60704\\nMEMORANDUM FILED DECEMBER 19, 1940.\\nLeslie Davis, of Norwalk, for the Plaintiffs.\\nFrederick, W. Lovejoy, Jr., of South Norwalk, pro se as guardian ad litem.\\nLeo Davis, of Norwalk, for the Defendants.\", \"word_count\": \"341\", \"char_count\": \"1978\", \"text\": \"WYNNE, J.\\nIt seems clear to the court that the testator intended nothing other than the not uncommon indication that his property was to go to his own flesh and blood. It is a strained construction that he was creating technical estates and setting up trusts. Interpreting the will as a whole, it is only reasonable to conclude that paragraph six was the expression of his idea of future contingencies rather than an attempt, even a clumsy one, to place legal restrictions upon provisions made for his own daughters. He had in mind, undoubtedly, that informal notion that is so frequently expressed in what the law terms precatory words rather than any intent to tie up his estate in any way. The very words he made use of, \\\"the part remaining\\\", indicate as strongly as words can in their common connotation that he was thinking in terms of what he would like to have done in the future rather than of a present intention to create trusts. Crediting him with the latter intent, it is a simple conclusion, it seems to the court, that his mind would work in a different way than to set forth a completed purpose in paragraph four. It is reasonable only to conclude that paragraph six is a layman's notion of informal remote control rather than a continuing supervision of testamentary trusts with their uncertainties, vexations and expense. He did not retain control in the will he drew. To say he did would do violence to the fatherly instincts which seem so apparent in this simple instrument.\\nThe court therefore holds that the said Mildred Aller and Mary Isabel Aljoe take absolute estates under paragraph four of the will under construction.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/conn/1366818.json b/conn/1366818.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..877350ef6f472e794f4dde895f021f747f331a65
--- /dev/null
+++ b/conn/1366818.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1366818\", \"name\": \"BEST FRIENDS PET CARE, INC. v. DESIGN LEARNED, INC., ET AL.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Best Friends Pet Care, Inc. v. Design Learned, Inc.\", \"decision_date\": \"2003-06-03\", \"docket_number\": \"AC 23330\", \"first_page\": \"167\", \"last_page\": \"185\", \"citations\": \"77 Conn. App. 167\", \"volume\": \"77\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Appellate Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Appellate Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:45:58.082764+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"BEST FRIENDS PET CARE, INC. v. DESIGN LEARNED, INC., ET AL.\", \"head_matter\": \"BEST FRIENDS PET CARE, INC. v. DESIGN LEARNED, INC., ET AL.\\n(AC 23330)\\nLavery, C. J., and Bishop and Peters, Js.\\nArgued February 24\\nofficially released June 3, 2003\\nStuart G. Blackburn, with whom, on the brief, was Margaret Ralphs, for the appellant (plaintiff).\\nBarbara A. Frederick, with whom, on the brief, were Donald W. Doeg and John B. Kennedy, for the appellee (named defendant).\", \"word_count\": \"5164\", \"char_count\": \"32709\", \"text\": \"Opinion\\nBISHOP, J.\\nThis is an appeal from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant Design Learned, Inc. (Design Learned), in an action for negligence. The plaintiff, Best Friends Pet Care, Inc. (Best Friends), raises several claims on appeal, all of which concern the applicability of a waiver of subrogation clause in a construction contract. We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.\\nFrom the pleadings and materials filed in conjunction with the motion for summary judgment, the following undisputed facts emerge. Best Friends was the owner and operator of a chain of pet care facilities, including one that was under construction in Rocky Hill. The project in Rocky Hill was undertaken pursuant to a construction management agreement (contract) between Best Friends and the construction manager, Highland Management Associates, Inc. (Highland). The contract, which was a standard American Institute of Architects (AIA) contract, contained a waiver of subrogation clause stating in relevant part that Best Friends and Highland \\\"waive all rights against each other and against the Contractors, Architect, consultants, agents and employees of any of them, for damages, but only to the extent covered by property insurance . . . .\\\" Design Learned had been retained by Highland as a consultant pursuant to an agreement between itself and Highland, whereby Design Learned would provide design consulting services for the Best Friends project.\\nOn January 12, 1998, while still under construction, the Rocky Hill facility was consumed by fire and destroyed. Best Friends alleges that the fire started because the boiler was not installed with the proper clearance from the flooring, which ignited. The Hartford Insurance Company (the Hartford), which was the insurer of Best Friends, reimbursed Best Friends for the loss, which included $1,049,000 for damage to the building, $446,739 for loss of income resulting from loss of use of the building and $77,714.30 for damage to personal property.\\nBest Friends brought this subrogation action against several of Highland's contractors and consultants, including the defendants American Standard Companies, Inc., a contractor, and Design Learned. Those defendants filed motions for summary judgment on the theory that the contract between Best Friends and Highland contained a valid waiver of subrogation clause that foreclosed the possibility of Best Friends' instituting a subrogation action against either contractors or consultants. Best Friends argued that General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) \\u00a7 52-572k made void waiver of subrogation provisions in construction contracts. It also argued that the waiver would be inapplicable to Design Learned in any event because, inter alia, Highland had failed to obtain a similar waiver from Design Learned in their agreement.\\nThe court granted the motions for summary judgment in favor of both defendants. Best Friends challenges only the granting of the motion in favor of Design Learned. It makes the following claims: (1) that the waiver of subrogation clause is void pursuant to \\u00a7 52-572k; (2) that the allegedly negligent conduct by Design Learned predated and was outside the scope of the contract; (3) that Design Learned forfeited the protection of the contract by not including a waiver of subrogation provision in its own agreement with Highland; and (4) that neither personal property loss nor loss of use are within the scope of the waiver. We affirm the judgment of the trial court on all but the last claim.\\nI\\nThe threshold question and a question of first impression for this court concerns the effect of \\u00a7 52-572k (statute) on the waiver of subrogation provision in this standard AIA contract. We note that \\\"[i]n general, whether conduct falls within a statute's province is a matter of statutory construction, and presents a question of law warranting plenary review.\\\" Sandella v. Dick Corp., 53 Conn. App. 213, 226, 729 A.2d 813, cert. denied, 249 Conn. 926, 733 A.2d 849 (1999).\\nIn essence, the question we must answer to dispose of the first claim is whether the waiver of subrogation clause is, effectively, a hold harmless or indemnification provision, as those terms are used by the statute. A closer examination of the AIA contract and the statute is required for that discussion.\\nWe begin with a look at the AIA contract, AIA Document B801/CMa, which explicitly incorporates AIA Document A201/CMa. Section 10.4 of B801/CMa, entitled \\\"Waivers of Subrogation,\\\" states in relevant part that \\\"[t]he Owner and Construction Manager waive all rights against each other and against the Contractors, Architect, consultants, agents and employees of any of them, for damages, but only to the extent covered by property insurance during construction, except such rights as they may have to the proceeds of such insurance as set forth in the edition of AIA Document A201/ CMa . . . .\\\" The property insurance provision, \\u00a7 11.3, of A201/CMa requires that the owner purchase property insurance \\\"for the entire Work at the site on a replacement cost basis . . . .\\\" Section 11.1.1 of B801/CMa requires the construction manager to purchase insurance, inter alia, to cover all workers compensation and other claims for personal injury at the site.\\nGeneral Statutes (Rev. to 1997) \\u00a7 52-572k (a) provides in relevant part: \\\"Any . . . agreement . . . entered into in connection with or collateral to a contract or agreement relative to the construction . of any building, structure or appurtenances thereto . . . that purports to indemnify or hold harmless the promisee against liability for . . . damage to property caused by or resulting from the sole negligence of such promisee, his agents or employees, is against public policy and void, provided this section shall not affect the validity of any insurance contract, workers' compensation agreement or other agreement issued by a licensed insurer.\\\"\\nThe first question for our consideration is whether the previously described provisions of the contract fall within the contours of the statute. In interpreting the statute, \\\"we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter. . . . Thus, this process requires us to consider all relevant sources of the meaning of the language at issue, without having to cross any threshold or thresholds of ambiguity.\\\" (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Courchesne, 262 Conn. 537, 577, 816 A.2d 562 (2003) (en banc).\\nFrom the language of the statute, it is unclear whether the waiver of subrogation in the AIA contract reasonably can be viewed as a provision to hold harmless or to indemnify, as those terms are used in the statute. Similarly, our review of the legislative history of the statute provides us with no guidance on whether waivers such as the type just described are within the scope of the statute.\\nAlthough this court has never addressed the question of the applicability of the statute to an AIA contract waiver of subrogation clause, because the AIA contract is used nationally, and other states have enacted statutes (or follow common law) similar to \\u00a7 52-572k, the question has been addressed elsewhere. In the absence of a pointed legislative history, we find useful a review of those decisions from other jurisdictions construing similar statutes and assessing their applicability to the standard AIA waiver of subrogation provision.\\nOf particular note is Ralph Korte Construction Co. v. Springfield Mechanical Co., 54 Ill. App. 3d 445, 369 N.E.2d 561 (1977), in which the Illinois Appellate Court interpreted an Illinois statute that was nearly identical to \\u00a7 52-572k as it related to a waiver of subrogation clause in a construction contract. There, the court found that the purpose of the statute was to protect workers and the public from injury, and to keep \\\" 'persons having charge of the work' id., 446; from avoiding liability or shunting it onto contractors or subcontractors. The court concluded that \\\"the parties had agreed, in effect, to assume the risk of loss as between themselves due to fire or other perils, to the extent each party was covered by insurance. . . . Both sides benefit from the arrangement and such benefit . . . does not come at the expense of a third party.\\\" Id., 447.\\nNew York courts, interpreting a sindlarly worded statute, also have held that waiver of subrogation provisions are not within its purview. In Board of Education v. Valden Associates, Inc., 46 N.Y.2d 653, 389 N.E.2d 798, 416 N.Y.S.2d 202 (1979), the New York Court of Appeals weighed the effect of \\u00a7 5-323 of New York's General Obligations Law, which proscribed contractual exemptions for liability in construction contracts, on contractual provisions that waived all rights to recovery to the extent of insurance coverage. The court found that \\\"[a] distinction must be drawn between contractual provisions which seek to exempt a party from liability to persons who have been injured . . . and contractual provisions . . . which in effect simply require one of the parties to the contract to provide insurance for all of the parties.\\\" Id., 657; see also Trump-Equitable Fifth Avenue Co. v. H.R.H. Construction Corp., 106 App. Div. 2d 242, 485 N.Y.S.2d 65, aff'd, 66 N.Y.2d 779, 488 N.E.2d 115, 497 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1985).\\nUltimately, we find persuasive, as did the trial court, the distinction made by the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Chadwick v. CSI, Ltd., 137 N.H. 515, 629 A.2d 820 (1993). In Chadwick, the court distinguished between exculpatory provisions, which were forbidden by New Hampshire common law, and allocation of risk provisions, such as the kind found in the AIA contract. Id., 523. \\\"These [AIA provisions] do not present the same concerns as naked exculpatory provisions. As opposed to exculpatory provisions . . . the insurance provisions of the standard AIA contract are not designed to unilaterally relieve one party from the effects of its future negligence, thereby foreclosing another party's avenue of recovery. Instead, they work to ensure that injuries or damage incurred during the construction project are covered by the appropriate types and limits of insurance, and that the costs of that coverage are appropriately allocated among the parties.\\\" (Citations omitted.) Id.; see also Behr v. Hook, 173 Vt. 122, 128, 787 A.2d 499 (2001) (upholding waiver of subrogation provision in AIA contract).\\nWe agree that this arrangement embedded in the AIA contract to share the risks and the obligation of insuring the persons and property at the site does not fit the description of an agreement to hold harmless or to indemnify. Having concluded that the statute does not render as void a waiver of subrogation provision when coupled with agreements to allocate the cost and responsibility of insurance, as is the case with this stan dard AIA contract, we further conclude that the plaintiffs first claim is without merit.\\nII\\nThe resolution of the remainder of the claims depends on a closer examination of the contract. We note the standard of review. If contract language is definitive of the parties' intent, then the interpretation of the language becomes a question of law for the court. B & D Associates, Inc. v. Russell, 73 Conn. App. 66, 71, 807 A.2d 1001 (2002). Additionally, a presumption that the language is definitive arises when, as here, the contract is between sophisticated parties and commercial in nature. Id. Our review, in such a case, is plenary. Id.\\nIf, however, the language is not clear, then the intention of the parties as represented in the contract becomes a question of fact. Id. If the fact in question is genuinely material to the resolution of the issue, then it is not the proper subject of summary judgment. In considering a motion for summary judgment, the function of the court is to determine whether any material fact is in dispute, not to make factual findings. See Golden v. Johnson Memorial Hospital, Inc., 66 Conn. App. 518, 522-23, 785 A.2d 234, cert. denied, 259 Conn. 902, 789 A.2d 990 (2001). \\\"On appeal, we must determine whether the legal conclusions reached by the trial court are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision of the trial court.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tarnowsky v. Socci, 75 Conn. App. 560, 564, 816 A.2d 728 (2003). In the determination of whether summary judgment was properly granted, our review is, again, plenary. Id.\\nA\\nBest Friends claims that the allegedly negligent conduct by Design Learned predated the signing of the contract between Highland and Best Friends, was outside the scope of the contract and, therefore, should not receive the benefit of the waiver of subrogation clause found in the contract. Unfortunately for Best Friends, the waiver of subrogation provision on which Design Learned relies, and that we have found to be applicable, makes no reference to the timing of the work, or the timing of the hiring, or anything but the status of Design Learned as consultant. Specifically, the contract states that \\\"[t]he Owner and Construction Manager waive all rights against each other and against . . . consultants . for damages . . . .\\\"\\nDesign Learned was hired by Highland prior to the signing of the contract between Highland and Best Friends, and engaged in work as a consultant for Highland from that time on. The only agreement that Design Learned had, relative to the project, was with Highland. The court determined that the dispositive question in that regard, therefore, was whether the contract between Highland and Best Friends engaged Highland to do the work for which Best Friends was claiming Design Learned was negligent. Best Friends claims that some of the services that Design Learned provided for Highland, in particular the consultation on prototype facilities, should be severable from those services for which the contract, with its waiver of subrogation provision, constituted the agreement.\\nThe plain language of the agreement, however, provides little room for that result: The contract is broadly inclusive of the labor for which Highland was hired. \\\"The Contract represents the entire and integrated agreement between the parties hereto and supercedes prior negotiations, representations or agreements, either written or oral.\\\" As defined by the contract, \\\" '[w]ork' means the construction and services required by the [c]ontract . . . whether completed or partially completed, and includes all other labor, materials, equipment and services provided by the Contractor to fulfill the Contractor's obligations. The Work may constitute the whole or part of the Project.\\\" Further, \\\"[t]he Project is the total construction of which the Work performed under the [c]ontract . . . may be the whole or apart . . . .\\\" Finally, \\\"drawings\\\" are defined as \\\"the graphic and pictorial portions of the Contract Documents, wherever located and whenever issued . . . .\\\" (Emphasis added.)\\n\\\"In determining whether a contract is ambiguous, the words of the contract must be given their natural and ordinary meaning. . A contract is unambiguous when its language is clear and conveys a definite and precise intent. . . . The court will not torture words to impart ambiguity where ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity. . . . Moreover, the mere fact that the parties advance different interpretations of the language in question does not necessitate a conclusion that the language is ambiguous.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) B & D Associates, Inc. v. Russell, supra, 73 Conn. App. 71.\\nWe agree with the court that the work provided by Design Learned for Highland, which is the subject of this action, was \\\"clearly within the construction manager's obligations under the [contract].\\\" We conclude, there fore, that the court properly found from the unambiguous language of the contract that Design Learned was a consultant, subject to the waiver of subrogation provision.\\nB\\nBest Friends next claims that Design Learned cannot enjoy the benefits of the waiver of subrogation provision because no waiver of subrogation provision was included in the agreement between itself and Highland, as required by the contract. It is uncontested that the agreement between Design Learned and Highland contained no such waiver.\\nThe disposition of Best Friends' claim revolves around a determination of the parties' intent as to the purpose of the waiver of subrogation provision. The waiver of subrogation provision in the contract is comprised of two sentences. The first provides in relevant part that \\\"[t]he Owner and Construction Manager waive all rights against each other and against the Contractors, Architect, consultants, agents and employees of any of them, for damages, but only to the extent covered by property insurance during construction, except such rights as they may have to the proceeds of such insurance as set forth in [the contract documents] . . . .\\\" The second sentence provides, in relevant part, that \\\"[t]he Owner and Construction Manager shall each require similar waivers from their Contractors, Architect, consultants, agents, and persons or entities awarded separate contracts . . . .\\\"\\nAs previously discussed, the court determined, and we agree, that the purpose of the waiver of subrogation provision was, in conjunction with the other contractual provisions, to allocate risks and costs among the parties to the contract. The first sentence of the waiver evinces the clear intent that the parties waive all rights against each other and their consultants, but only to the extent covered by property insurance, except such rights as they may have to the proceeds of the insurance. Here, the principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius is of some assistance. Had the parties wanted to make the waiver referenced in the first sentence contingent on the parties' obtaining waivers from their consultants, then the proper place for that requirement would have been alongside the conditionals in the first sentence.\\nExamining the purpose of the waiver of subrogation, we further note that the failure of Highland to obtain a waiver of subrogation provision from Design Learned does not thwart the intent of the parties to the contract. The court found that the clearly expressed intent of the contract was that parties to the contract waive all subrogation claims against each other and their consultants. Additionally, it found that the absence of a similar agreement between Highland and Design Learned does not obscure that clarity, nor does its absence \\\"affect the validity of the waiver provision in the [contract] between Best Friends and Highland.\\\" We agree with the court.\\nC\\nBest Friends' final claim is, essentially, that the definition of property insurance, as used in the waiver of subrogation provision, does not include insurance either for personal property or for loss of use. After the fire that destroyed the facility, the Hartford paid Best Friends for the loss pursuant to its insurance policy. Specifically, the Hartford paid $1,049,000 for damage to the building, $446,739 for loss of income resulting from damage to the building and $77,714.30 for damage to personal property.\\nAgain, we turn to the language of the contract. The relevant language in the waiver of subrogation clause provides that \\\"[t]he Owner and Construction Manager waive all rights against each other and against the Contractors, Architect, consultants, agents and employees of any of them, for damages, but only to the extent covered by property insurance during construction, except such rights as they may have to the proceeds of such insurance as set forth in the edition of ALA. Document A201/Cma . . . .\\\" (Emphasis added.) Although property insurance is not explicitly defined in B801/CMa, reference to A201/CMa is helpful. Indeed, A210/CMa dedicates an entire section to the topic of property insurance.\\nSection 11.3.1 of A201/CMa requires the owner to purchase property insurance \\\"for the entire [w]ork at the site on a replacement cost basis . . . .\\\" Section 11.3.1.1 states in relevantpart: \\\"Property insurance shall be on an 'all-risk' policy form and shall insure against the perils of fire and extended coverage and physical loss or damage including, without duplication of coverage, theft, vandalism, malicious mischief, collapse, falsework, temporary buildings and debris removal including demolition . . . .\\\" Section 11.3.1.4 states that \\\"this property insurance shall cover portions of the [w]ork stored off the site . . . and also portions of the [work] in transit.\\\"\\nThe term property insurance, then, is meant to protect property that can be moved, stored off-site and stolen. Those mobile attributes axe most typically the features of tangible, personal property. In \\u00a7 11.3.1.5, an exception is made for personal property such as machinery, tools and equipment owned or rented by the contractor: Such personal property is not to be covered by the property insurance as it is defined in the contract. If the parties intended that no personal property was to be covered by the property insurance, then that provision would be redundant.\\nOur policy is to interpret contract language in accordance with a fair and reasonable construction of the written words given their common, natural and ordinary meaning when we can sensibly do so. Southington v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 71 Conn. App. 715, 725-26, 805 A.2d 76 (2002). Here, we can do so, and we conclude, as did the court, that the term property insurance, as used in the contract, embraces insurance for both real and personal property.\\nOur final inquiry is whether the same language described previously also is meant to include insurance for loss of use of the personal and real property. We believe that it does not. By the same lights that we have concluded that the term property insurance includes tangible personal property, we find no indication that it is meant to include intangible property such as reimbursement for loss of use. That distinction was drawn in B & D Associates, Inc. v. Russell, supra, 73 Conn. App. 74, in which this court concluded that property that could be \\\" 'stored, used, maintained or kept on the . . . premises' \\\" necessarily was tangible property. \\\"Economic loss, including lost business profits, is intangible, speculative in nature and certainly cannot be stored, used, maintained or kept on any premises.\\\" Id. We find no indication that the term property insurance was intended to encompass intangibles; to the contrary, the contract language refers specifically to \\\"physical loss.\\\"\\nFurthermore, the contract expressly addresses the matter of loss of use insurance. Section 11.3.3 of A210/ CMa, entitled Loss of Use Insurance, states in relevant part that \\\"[t]he owner, at the [o]wner's option, may purchase and maintain such insurance as will insure the Owner against loss of use of the Owner's property due to fire or other hazards, however caused. The Owner waives all rights of action against the Contractor for loss of use of the Owner's property, including consequential losses due to fire or other hazards however caused.\\\" (Emphasis added.)\\nIn contrast to the waiver of subrogation provision \\u00a7 10.4 in B801/CMa, in which the parties to the contract waive all rights against each other and the \\\"Contractors, Architect, consultants, agents and employees of any of them\\\" to the extent covered by property insurance, the loss of use provision is far more restrictive. Here, solely for rights of action for loss of use, the owner waives its rights only against \\\"the Contractor.\\\"\\nWe find it instructive to our analysis that the term \\\"contractor\\\" is used differentially within the contract. The contractor, in the singular, is defined as the contractor identified as such in the contract. As the contract in question is between the owner and construction manager, no specific contractor is identified. Contractors, in the plural, are defined in A201/CMa as \\\"persons or entities who perform construction under Conditions of the Contract.\\\" (Emphasis added.) Significantly, subcontractors are defined differently as persons or entities that have \\\"a direct contract with the Contractor to perform a portion of the work at the site.\\\" (Emphasis added.) Sub-subcontractors also are separately defined. No definition is provided for consultants.\\nPlainly, the terms consultant and contractor are not used interchangeably in the contract. Given the broad reach of language of the principal waiver of subrogation clause, if the parties had intended the provision regarding loss of use to pertain to an equally broad spectrum of actors, the parties readily could have formulated language to accomplish that goal.\\nWe note, also, that in the complaint, Best Friends alleged that Design Learned \\\"was engaged in the business of . . . engineering consulting and design consulting.\\\" In Design Learned's memorandum of law in support of its motion for summary judgment, it asserts that it \\\"provided consulting services to Highland on the [Best Friends] project pursuant to the agreement between [Design Learned] and Highland. . . .''It appears undisputed, therefore, that the parties herein and the contracting entities considered Design Learned to be a consultant and not a contractor.\\nThe court found that the waiver of subrogation in the contract precluded Best Friends from maintaining its action against Design Learned as a matter of law. While we agree that the action is foreclosed as to recovery for lost property to the extent covered by property insurance, we disagree that, as a matter of law, an action for recovery for loss of use of the property similarly is foreclosed.\\nThe judgment is reversed only as it relates to the claim that Design Learned negligently caused Best Friends to lose business profits and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\\nThe trial court also rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant American Standard Companies, Inc. The plaintiff does not appeal from that portion of the judgment.\\nWe note that Best Friends, as the plaintiff, is acting on behalf of the real party in interest, the Hartford Insurance Company, who is the subrogee in this action.\\nGeneral Statutes (Rev. to 1997) \\u00a7 52-572k (a) provides: \\\"Any covenant, promise, agreement or understanding entered into in connection with or collateral to a contract or agreement relative to the construction, alteration, repair or maintenance of any building, structure or appurtenances thereto including moving, demolition and excavating connected therewith, that purports to indemnify or hold harmless the promisee against liability for damage arising out of bodily injury to persons or damage to property caused by or resulting from the sole negligence of such promisee, his agents or employees, is against public policy and void, provided this section shall not affect the validity of any insurance contract, workers' compensation agreement or other agreement issued by a licensed insurer.\\\"\\nThe full title of the main contract is \\\"AIA Document B801/CMa Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Construction Manager, 1992 Edition.\\\" It incorporates on page one the 1992 editions of AIA Documents B141/ CMa, A101/CMa and A201/CMa.\\nThe entire clause states: \\\"Waivers of Subrogation. The Owner and Construction Manager waive all rights against each other and against the Contractors, Architect, consultants, agents and employees of any of them, for damages, but only to the extent covered by properly insurance during construction, except such rights as they may have to the proceeds of such insurance as set forth in the edition of AIA Document A201/CMa, General Conditions of the Contract for Construction, Construction Manager-Adviser Edition, current as of the date of this Agreement. The Owner and Construction Manager each shall require similar waivers from their Contractors, Architect, consultants, agents, and persons or entities awarded separate contracts administered under the Owner's own forces.\\\"\\nBut see Maryland Casualty Co. v. Trane Co., 46 Conn. Sup. 172, 742 A.2d 444 (1999), in which the court found a waiver of subrogation provision in a construction contract to be valid against the insurance company subrogee. The court did not address the impact of General Statutes \\u00a7 52-572k on the waiver provision.\\nThe Illinois statute provides in relevant part: \\\"With respect to contracts or agreements, either public or private, for the construction . of a building . . every covenant, promise or agreement to indemnify or hold harmless another person from that person's own negligence is void against public policy and wholly unenforceable.\\\" Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, c. 29, para. 61, now 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 35/1, \\u00a7 1 (West 2001).\\nTo the extent that Design Learned's allegedly negligently prepared drawings could be used (or have been used) in the construction of other facilities, Best Friends has made no such showing, nor has it made any showing of a secondary agreement between Best Friends and Highland that might encompass Design Learned's work. As Design Learned points out in its brief, the complaint \\\"is explicitly predicated on the proposition that the design work that [Design Learned] performed for Highland not only was incorporated into the facility, but also was the cause of the fire that destroyed the facility.\\\" Any other work that Design Learned might have done for Highland, in short, is irrelevant.\\nAs this court has stated: \\\"There cannot be any broader classification than the word all.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burkle v. Car & Truck Leasing Co., 1 Conn. App. 54, 56, 467 A.2d 1255 (1983).\\nWe note that Design Learned is not a party to the contract.\\nThe expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.\\nThe court in Behr v. Hook, supra, 173 Vt. 130, came to the same conclusion in interpreting the AIA waiver of subrogation provision. \\\"[T]he contract does not make obtaining the waivers from subcontractors a condition precedent to application of the waiver of subrogation provision.\\\" Id.\\nIn the hypothetical situation that it could have bearing, the proper action would be for breach of contract, and, as noted, Design Learned is not a party to the contract in question. See Behr v. Hook, supra, 173 Vt. 130.\\nBest Friends, as subrogor, also claims that because the waiver of subrogation applies only \\\"to the extent covered by property insurance,\\\" Best Friends can recover the $5000 deductible it was not paid. We note that recovery for the deductible was not specifically pleaded, nor is there any evidence in the record why the Hartford should recover for the deductible paid by Best Friends, i.e., ostensibly more than the Hartford itself actually paid. Accordingly, we decline to address that claim. \\\"[W]e are not required to review claims that are inadequately briefed. . We consistently have held that [a]nalysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . Where the parties cite no law and provide no analysis of their claims, we do not review such claims.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Davila, 75 Conn. App. 432, 441 n.6, 816 A.2d 673 (2003).\\nAs we already have stated, B801/CMa explicitly incorporates A201/CMa. Additionally, \\u00a7 10.2 of B801/CMa provides that the \\\"[t]erms in this [agreement shall have the same meaning as those in . . . A201/CMa . . .\\nIn fact, personal property is defined as \\\"[m]oney, goods, and movable chattels.\\\" BaHentine's Law Dictionary (3d Ed. 1969).\\nIn the waiver of subrogation provision of \\u00a7 11.3.7 in A210/CMa, the list additionally includes the construction manager, the owner's other contractors, subcont ractors and sub-subcontractors.\\nBy those definitions, Design Learned could not be considered a contractor, as it has not performed construction. Although, arguably, it could be considered a subcontractor, we need not reach that question.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1531460\", \"name\": \"Margaurite Fry vs. Michael Taylor et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Fry v. Taylor\", \"decision_date\": \"1927-06-28\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"387\", \"last_page\": \"390\", \"citations\": \"106 Conn. 387\", \"volume\": \"106\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:54:18.747714+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Margaurite Fry vs. Michael Taylor et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Margaurite Fry vs. Michael Taylor et al.\\nThird Judicial District, New Haven,\\nJune Term, 1927.\\nWheeler, C. J., Maltbie, Haines, Hinman and Banks, Js.\\nArgued June 7th\\n\\u2014decided June 28th, 1927.\\nDominic A. Roina, for the appellant (plaintiff).\\nCarl Foster, with whom was James R. Mead, for the appellees (defendants).\", \"word_count\": \"701\", \"char_count\": \"4075\", \"text\": \"Wheeler, C. J.\\nThe trial court has found these facts: Mrs. Fannie Taylor, wife of the defendant Michael Taylor, owned and leased to plaintiff a dwelling-house in Greenwich. By reason of the breach of the lease by the plaintiff, Mrs. Taylor procured a judgment in an action of summary process against the plaintiff in the Borough Court of Greenwich, and that court issued an execution upon the judgment to the sheriff of the county of Fairfield, or his deputy, commanding them, without delay, to cause Mrs. Taylor to have possession of the leased premises by putting Mrs. Fry and all persons holding under her out of possession thereof. The execution was placed in the hands of defendant Bitch for service and execution; he was at the time a deputy sheriff of the county of Fairfield. Sheriff Bitch called at the residence of the plaintiff, but she denied him admission to the house; he then attempted to talk with her on several occasions, but she would not talk to him. Thereupon Bitch called to his aid defendant Michael Taylor, the husband of Mrs. Taylor. They went to the premises, knocked for admission and, receiving no answer, Taylor, under instruction of Bitch, forced open a locked door of the house, using no more force than was necessary, and they entered the house. Bitch then called in suitable and skilled furniture movers whom he had employed, to enter the house and remove the personal property of the plaintiff. This they did, packing and loading it on furniture vans with reasonable care, and then took it to, and carefully stored it in, a suitable warehouse in the name of the plaintiff. All of the personal property was moved carefully and properly. The bonds and money which plaintiff claimed upon the trial were in the house did not come into the custody or possession of either defendant and were not taken by them. They did not lose any of the personal property which was in the house at the time defendants entered it, nor were they negligent or careless in handling the personal property, but all they did was done with care.\\nAll of the acts of Ritch were done in pursuance of his authority as a deputy sheriff of the county of Fair-field and under the execution in his hand. All of the acts of Taylor were done as the assistant and agent of Sheriff Ritch.\\nThese are the facts which the trial court has found, although the plaintiff offered evidence tending to prove the loss of two $1,000 bonds, with coupons attached, $600 in money, and certain articles of personal property, and also that defendants damaged and ruined sundry articles of furniture.\\nThere can be no difference of opinion as to the rule of law. A deputy sheriff is liable for all damages one may sustain by reason of his neglect or wrongdoing. General Statutes, \\u00a7 217; Jordan v. Gallup, 16 Conn. 536; Baker v. Baldwin, 48 Conn. 131; 1 Swift's Digest (Rev. Ed.) p. 551. If Sheriff Ritch and his aid had done the acts the plaintiff charges them with having done, their liability would inevitably follow. The difficulty with the plaintiff's position is that the trial court has found the facts contrary to her claims. Since that finding was made on conflicting evidence and is reasonable, it cannot be held to have been made without evidence to support it. Concededly, the plaintiff sought to maintain possession of the dwelling, from which the judgment of a competent court had dispossessed her, in defiance of that judgment. In that course of conduct she was a wrongdoer. The record indicates that the sheriff and his aid not only kept within the bounds of their legal duty, but conducted their unpleasant duty with commendable restraint and a very considerable degree of consideration for the plaintiff.\\nThere is no error.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1531504\", \"name\": \"Bert Lebas vs. The Patriotic Assurance Company\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Lebas v. Patriotic Assurance Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1927-05-07\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"119\", \"last_page\": \"127\", \"citations\": \"106 Conn. 119\", \"volume\": \"106\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:54:18.747714+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Bert Lebas vs. The Patriotic Assurance Company.\", \"head_matter\": \"Bert Lebas vs. The Patriotic Assurance Company.\\nThird Judicial District, New Haven,\\nJanuary Term, 1927.\\nWheeler, C. J., Curtis, Maltbie, Haines and Hinman, Js.\\nArgued January 18th\\n\\u2014decided May 7th, 1927.\\nPhilo C. Calhoun, for the appellant (defendant).\\nJames C. Shannon, with whom was Henry E. Shannon, for the appellee (plaintiff).\", \"word_count\": \"2234\", \"char_count\": \"12473\", \"text\": \"Haines, J.\\nEvidence was offered for the plaintiff that Lebas, on February 20th, 1922, sold an automo bile to Frank G. Howe by conditional bill of sale, for $2,800; that $1,500 was paid at the time and the balance by thirteen notes of $100 each with interest, the first due March 20th, 1922, and the others in successive monthly periods thereafter; that the bill of sale provided the title to the car should remain in Lebas till all the notes were paid; that February 25th, 1922, the defendant issued a policy of insurance to \\\"Frank G. Howe or Bert Lebas as their interest may appear,\\\" covering the theft of this1 car; that the interest which Lebas then had in the car was the title, and the amount of the interest was the total of the unpaid notes with interest; that about April 5th, 1922, in anticipation of payment of the notes, Lebas indorsed twelve of them \\\"Paid April 5, 1922. Bert Lebas,\\\" and the other note, being in the hands of a third party as security for a loan, was not indorsed; that the notes were not in fact then or thereafter paid as anticipated; that the car was stolen April 28th, 1922, at which time it was worth $2,500 to $3,000; that Charles G. Kirby, Incorporated, was the duly-authorized agent of the defendant to adjust all losses under the policy, and was also the agent for fourteen other companies, and had been engaged in that kind of work for more than twenty years; that a few days before June 28th, 1922, Lebas, at the request of Kirby, the agent and representative of Charles G. Kirby, Jr., Incorporated, and in his presence, executed and delivered a proof of loss which had been prepared for him by the Kirby company; and further, that an unconditional bill of sale, dated July-1st, 1922, to which the name of Lebas was attached, and which was put in evidence by the defendant, was not in fact signed by Lebas. It was conceded that defendant paid Lebas nothing, under the policy.\\nThe appeal rests upon five general grounds, all re lating to claimed insufficiencies and inaccuracies in the charge, touching (1) improper remarks of Lebas' counsel before the jury, (2) the proof of loss, (3) the credibility of Howe, (4) the insurable interest of Lebas, and (5) the title to the car. The seventh reason of appeal claims error in the charge as a whole. We have repeatedly pointed out that an assignment in that form is improper and does not merit consideration by this court.\\nCounsel for Lebas referred to Howe in argument as \\\"a low perjurer\\\" and \\\"a low scoundrel.\\\" No objection was interposed at the time by counsel for the defendant, and no motion was made to declare a mistrial. On the motion to set aside the verdict, defendant claimed these statements were improper and unwarranted by the evidence and calculated to unduly excite the prejudice, passion and bias of the jury against the defendant and thereby to influence the verdict. Such matters are to be weighed and decided by the trial judge. He has the \\\"means of discerning the wiser course, which cannot well be spread upon a record,\\\" and he has a large discretion in that regard. \\\"We should hesitate in any case to review his decision, without strong reason.\\\" Cunningham v. Fair Haven & W. R. Co., 72 Conn. 244, 252, 43 Atl. 1047. We do not discover such reason in this case. It is the general rule, moreover, that objection must be made during the trial, so the court may have an opportunity to prevent or correct any wrong impression. State v. Laudano, 74 Conn. 638, 644, 645, 51 Atl. 860; State v. Washelsky, 81 Conn. 22, 28, 70 Atl. 62; Hennessy v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 74 Conn. 699, 710, 52 Atl. 490; State v. Cabaudo, 83 Conn. 160, 166, 76 Atl. 42.\\nCounsel further said to the jury that there were good and bad companies and that the latter hire adjusters to minimize their losses, and these adjusters, by trickery and the use of technicalities, try to get the companies out of paying their just obligations as cheaply as possible, and added, \\\"that the defendant company fits in the latter class of insurance companies, I must leave to you.\\\" This, too, was improper argument. It was seasonably objected to and the court at once said it recalled no evidence of such practice among insurance companies. Thereafter the court apparently felt that no serious harm could have been done to the defendant's cause, under the circumstances; we cannot hold as a matter of law that the court's discretion was abused. An assertion of this character, however, without any evidence to support it, was improper and indefensible, and merited a rebuke by the court. Such methods of argument are not to be sanctioned, but we do not disturb the conclusions of the trial court unless it is apparent to us that harm has been done. Worden v. Gore-Meenam Co., 83 Conn. 642, 652, 78 Atl. 422.\\nIn referring to the proof of loss which Lebas claimed he had seasonably filed, the court recalled to the jury the testimony of Lebas to the effect that he visited the defendant's adjuster, Kirby, and executed a paper prepared and put before him for that purpose by Kirby who claimed it was a proof of loss and so spoke of it, and told him that sixty days more must elapse before the loss could be paid. The court then said: \\\"Of course, if that story of Mr. Lebas is true, why it would warrant the jury, probably, in finding that the proof of claim was duly filed.\\\" It was the duty of the court to definitely instruct the jury as to the legal result of their findings, and we construe the statement that the jury might \\\"probably\\\" find a fact as equivalent to saying that they might find it. Defendant claims error in the court's statement and in the failure of the court . to tell the jury that there was no evidence that the .proof of loss was sworn to by Lebas, and in not calling their attention to the terms of the policy requiring the \\u2022 oath.\\n. ; The jury had the policy before them as Exhibit \\u2022A, and the requirement of an oath is- there plainly stated.\\nIf they believed the statement of Lebas, as they apparently did, that the paper was prepared by the au.thorized representative of the defendant and executed at his request and in his presence and that Kirby said it was the proof of loss, they were entitled to assume it was properly prepared, and properly executed under the agent's direction, especially when, as appears from the record, no question was asked of Lebas upon the stand as to whether he made oath to it as a necessary part \\\" of the execution, and no direct evidence upon this point was produced by the defendant. Further, ,the defendant did not request a charge concerning the requirement of the policy that the proof of loss should be sworn to. Under these circumstances we could not hold it error that the court failed to say whether or not there was evidence on this point or to charge that if the jury found the proof of loss had not been sworn to, they must find in favor of the defendant. Not only so, but if the statement of Lebas was true, the defendant was estopped to claim the proof of loss was not duly .filed because not sworn to.\\n\\\" In Cupo v. Royal Ins. Co., 101 Conn. 586, 126 Atl. 844, the defendant denied that the plaintiff had complied with the requirements of the policy in rendering a proof, of loss \\\"signed and sworn to by the assured -.; within sixty days after such loss.\\\" The plaintiff testified that a man claiming to act as agent, asked him to fill out a proof of loss, and upon plaintiff giving him the necessary facts, this man filled out a paper which he said was a proof of loss, and plaintiff signed it and delivered it to the agent. Upon the trial, and after proper evidence of the fact that this man was an agent of the defendant, the question was presented of the effect of.the failure of the plaintiff to swear to the paper which he signed. We there said (p. 593): \\\"The plaintiffs, reasonably believing that an authorized agent of the defendant had procured from Salvatore [one of the plaintiffs] such a proof of loss as was satisfactory to it, rested content under such belief and made no further proof of loss signed and sworn to by them within the specified period. The jury found that the claimed agent was in fact the agent of the defendant, and that the defendant received such proof of loss as it required. The fact that its agent did not require Salvatore to swear to the proof of loss that it prepared, could not be urged by it in good conscience as a fatal defect in such proof of loss. By its conduct as found proved by the jury, it was estopped from making such claim. Such conduct creates an estoppel in pais. Such an estoppel can be proved without being pleaded.\\\"\\nWhen the action was begun, Lebas and Howe were joint plaintiffs, and all the pleadings were so entitled on both sides. Sometime after issue joined, Howe was dropped as a plaintiff, and he appeared at the trial as a witness for the defendant. One of the vital issues of fact was whether Lebas had received payment of the notes from Howe, and given the latter an unconditional bill of sale, Howe asserting and Lebas denying these claims upon the stand. Thus the question of credibility was brought sharply to the front.\\nThe plaintiff offered evidence of the conviction of Howe for concealing an automobile sold on a conditional bill of sale, and the serving of sixty days in jail as a penalty; of the divorce obtained from him by Mrs. Howe on the ground of adultery, and of his conviction for nonsupport of his children, followed by his escape from the State. The defendant made no objection to this evidence, but now, for the first time, attempts to deny its admissibility to affect the credibility of Howe; nor does it appear that any motion was made to strike it out or any request made to charge the jury upon the point. If the defendant felt the evidence was improper, it should, by appropriate and timely action, have given the trial court an opportunity to pass upon the question. The court told the jury Howe's record could be considered by them in making up their minds as to how far his word could be trusted. Under the circumstances, this was permissible. The evidence \\\"came before the jury without objection, limitation or criticism, and, consequently, for any and all purposes; . . . Having come in without objection, it was available for whatever it was worth upon its face.\\\" State v. Segar, 96 Conn. 428, 437, 114 Atl. 389; Poliner v. Fazzino, 105 Conn. 350, 353, 135 Atl. 289; 4 Chamberlayne on Evidence, \\u00a7 2701.\\nThe defendant now claims Lebas did not have an insurable interest in the car, and in any event did not have an unconditional title within the meaning of that term as used in the policy. It is too late for the defendant to contest its liability on these grounds. These claims are not directly pleaded, they did not appear in the issues put before the jury, and the attention of the trial court was not brought to them by requests to charge or otherwise. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Palmer, 91 Conn. 410, 418, 99 Atl. 1052.\\nA careful reading of the entire evidence satisfies us we would not be justified in finding error in the refusal of the trial court to set aside the verdict. There were two vital issues of fact before the jury\\u2014whether the notes were paid and the unconditional bill of sale given by Lebas, and whether the latter seasonably executed a proper proof of loss. The evidence on these issues was contradictory, but the jury found for Lebas upon both of them. It was their right to do so, and upon the record before us we cannot say they acted unreasonably. The action of the trial court in denying the motion to set aside the verdict was not erroneous.\\nSome of the testimony was obviously untrue. Without attempting to fix the responsibility for this, we may add that the outcome of the case does not appear, in any event, to be unjust to the defendant.\\nDefendant, by paying $200 to Howe, tacitly admitted a liability caused by theft of the car, which was worth $2,500 to $3,000. The amount of the present verdict, added to what has already been paid Howe, is nearly $675 less than the apparent minimum value of the car.\\nThere is no error.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1536919\", \"name\": \"Murray Reich, Administrator, vs. George Fatool\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Reich v. Fatool\", \"decision_date\": \"1929-06-13\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"734\", \"last_page\": \"735\", \"citations\": \"109 Conn. 734\", \"volume\": \"109\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:46:51.731736+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Wheeler, C. J., Maltbie, Haines, Hinman and- Banks, Js.\", \"parties\": \"Murray Reich, Administrator, vs. George Fatool.\", \"head_matter\": \"Murray Reich, Administrator, vs. George Fatool.\\nThird Judicial District, Bridgeport,\\nApril Term, 1929.\\nWheeler, C. J., Maltbie, Haines, Hinman and- Banks, Js.\\nArgued April 17th\\ndecided June 13th, 1929.\\nPhilip Reich, with whom, on the brief, was Samuel Reich, for the appellant (plaintiff).\\nHenry C. Wilson, for the appellee (defendant).\", \"word_count\": \"114\", \"char_count\": \"720\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nAn examination and comparison of the evidence has satisfied us that the trial court was correct in its conclusion that there was no sufficient evidence before the jury from which the plaintiff's freedom from contributory negligence could have been found and that we cannot hold that the ruling setting aside the verdict was erroneous as matter of law.\\nThere is no error.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/conn/1545481.json b/conn/1545481.json
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--- /dev/null
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+"{\"id\": \"1545481\", \"name\": \"The Riverside Coal Company vs. The Elman Coal Company\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Riverside Coal Co. v. Elman Coal Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1932-03-08\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"492\", \"last_page\": \"496\", \"citations\": \"114 Conn. 492\", \"volume\": \"114\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Errors of the State of Connecticut\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:22:24.791242+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"The Riverside Coal Company vs. The Elman Coal Company.\", \"head_matter\": \"The Riverside Coal Company vs. The Elman Coal Company.\\nMaltbie, C. J., Haines, Hinman, Banks and Avery, Js.\\nSubmitted on briefs January 8th\\ndecided March 8th, 1932.\\nNathan A. Schatz and Louis M. Schatz, for the appellant (defendant).\\nTheodore V. Meyer, for the appellee (plaintiff).\", \"word_count\": \"1047\", \"char_count\": \"6143\", \"text\": \"Avert, J.\\nFrom the finding, it appears that the plaintiff is a wholesale dealer and importer of coal and other fuels, with its principal place of business in Worcester, Massachusetts; the defendant a retail dealer in coal, with a place of business in Hartford, Connecticut. January 29th, 1926, the plaintiff's salesman called on the defendant at Hartford, and took from the defendant an oral order for two cars of Scotch coke. At that time, a strike in the anthracite coal fields of national proportions was in force, and it was not then known when the strike would be settled. It did, in fact, terminate about February 15th of that year.\\n. The salesman entered the order on a slip, and immediately transmitted it to the plaintiff at Worcester. The order slip stated that two cars of Scotch coke from boat New Haven were to be shipped to defendant at Hartford; price $12 a net ton, f.o.b. ears Belle Dock. No time of delivery was stated. At the time of receiving the order, the salesman represented that the coke would arrive at New Haven about February 15th, 1926. January 30th, 1926, plaintiff sent the defendant by mail a confirmation of the order, which was received in due course by the defendant. The confirmation stated that the order was subject to no cancellation by either party, and that the coke was to be \\\"shipped from boat to be named later due about Feb. 20th\\\" and that the shipment was subject to car supply, labor trouble, embargo and conditions beyond the control of the seller. Thereafter, there was no communication between the parties in regard to the transaction until February 18th, 1926, after the strike had terminated, when defendant telephoned and wrote the plaintiff that unless the coke was delivered by February 25th, he would consider the order canceled. Defendant's order was to be filled by delivery of coke by the Steamship Graigwen, the charter party for which was dated February 1st, 1926. Four days were spent in loading the steamship, and it sailed from Scotland February 12th, 1926. The running time in normal weather from Glasgow to New Haven for the vessel was about twelve days. Due to exceptionally stormy weather, the voyage consumed twenty-two days and seventeen hours, and the Graigwen arrived at New Haven March 7th, 1926. March 8th, the unloading of the vessel was started, and March 11th, two cars of coke were loaded and shipped to the defendant. They reached the defendant at Hartford March 16th, and were rejected by him. The delay in the arrival of the vessel at New Haven was due wholly to causes beyond the plaintiff's control.\\nUpon these facts, the trial court concluded that the contract between the parties was stated in the confirmation, and that the plaintiff had fully performed its obligations under the contract with all reasonable dispatch, and was entitled to recover the contract price for the coke.\\nThe appellant claims that the court erred in reaching these conclusions and also claims certain corrections of the finding. An examination of the evidence, however, satisfies us that the defendant is entitled to no correction of the finding by which his position will be advantaged. The order in this case was verbal and was taken by the plaintiff's salesman. It nowhere appears in the finding that the authority of the salesman was otherwise than to receive orders. Unless his authority to make contracts is shown, no contract came into existence until the order was accepted by the principal. 1 Williston, Contracts, \\u00a790, p. 155; Bauman v. McManus, 75 Kan. 106, 89 Pac. 15, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1138, 1140. The confirmation contained provisions not embodied in the order and was, in effect, a counter-proposal. Lloyd & Elliott, Inc. v. Parke, 114 Conn. 12, 13, 157 Atl. 272. That this confirmation was accepted by the buyer as stating the terms of the contract appears from the defendant's letters of February 24th and March 1st, 1926, respectively, in the first of which the defendant stated that when the order was given to the plaintiff's salesman, the latter stated that the coke would arrive at New Haven about February 15th, but when the plaintiff \\\"confirmed this order, the arrival date was about February 20th. We have allowed you five days and if this shipment arrives by then, we will accept same;\\\" and from the letter of March 1st, it appears that the five days additional allowed by the defendant meant that they would accept it if delivered by the 25th.\\nIt is admitted in the pleadings that at the time the contract was made, both parties understood that the coke was to be shipped by steamer from Scotland, to arrive via Belle Dock, New Haven. By the terms of the confirmation, the coke was to be loaded on cars at New Haven about February 20th, the sale being \\\"subject to conditions beyond our control.\\\" The arrival date of the vessel at New Haven, stated in the confirmation \\\"about February 20th,\\\" cannot be construed as requiring that it should arrive on or before that date, but would be met if it arrived within a time after that date reasonable in view of all the circumstances. Loomis v. Norman Printers Supply Co., 81 Conn. 343, 346, 71 Atl. 358. And in determining what would be a reasonable time thereafter, the ordinary delays and uncertainties of transportation of a vessel at that time of the year would be proper considerations. Sanders v. Munson, 74 Fed. 649, 651; The Alert, 61 Fed. 504, 505; Bowman & Bull Co. v. Linn, 279 Ill. 397, 117 N. E. 61, 62. The further provision, that the sale was \\\"subject to conditions beyond our control,\\\" must be construed as intended to include the unusual conditions which were encountered by the vessel transporting the coal, the exceptionally stormy weather that prolonged the voyage from one usually taking twelve days to one which took almost twenty-three days.\\nThere is no error.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1568943\", \"name\": \"Orlando Gionfriddo et al. v. Town of Windsor et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Gionfriddo v. Town of Windsor\", \"decision_date\": \"1951-05-22\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"701\", \"last_page\": \"707\", \"citations\": \"137 Conn. 701\", \"volume\": \"137\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:25:19.888655+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Orlando Gionfriddo et al. v. Town of Windsor et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Orlando Gionfriddo et al. v. Town of Windsor et al.\\nBrown, C. J., Jennings, Baldwin, Inglis and Troland, Js.\\nArgued April 4\\ndecided May 22, 1951\\nFrank A. Francis, with whom were John J. Devine and Edward J. Turbert, Jr., for the plaintiff.\\nHenry P. Bakewell, with whom, on the brief, was Hugh M. Alcorn, Jr., for the defendant.\", \"word_count\": \"1761\", \"char_count\": \"10159\", \"text\": \"Jennings, J.\\nThe stipulated facts determinative of the issue stated above are as follows: The plaintiff Michelina Gionfriddo is the owner of premises in a business zone in Windsor which are used by the plaintiff Orlando Gionfriddo, lessee, for the sale and display of used cars. The defendants are the town of Windsor and its zoning commission. Building zone regulations were adopted by the commission on July 3, 1931, pursuant to the authority of a special act. 21 Spec. Laws 275, No. 305. Under \\u00a7 15(7) of the regulations, the board of zoning appeals may in a specific case, after public notice and hearing and subject to appropriate conditions and safeguards, \\\"Permit in a Business Zone the construction, extension, alteration or conversion of a building intended for the storage or repair of motor vehicles, or for a motor vehicle or gas filling station, but no new garage, motor vehicle repair station, shall be permitted within a distance of 200 feet of an entrance or exit of a public or private school, playground, public library, hospital, children's home or church.\\\" On September 15, 1939, the commission duly adopted an amendment to \\u00a7 6 of the regulations as follows: \\\"Under no circumstances shall a permit be issued for the sale or display of new or used motor vehicles in any open lot or portion thereof, or for the business of a motor vehicle junk yard, in any zone.\\\" In 1946, Orlando applied for and was granted permission to erect a gasoline station and store. In 1947 he applied for permission to convert and use the filling station for the sale and repair of motor vehicles. This application was granted subject to the condition of the amendment to \\u00a7 6 quoted above. No appeal was taken. As a result of the restriction so imposed, the plaintiffs have, since August 24, 1948, been prohibited from displaying on their premises new or used cars for sale, under the penalties set forth in the special act. 21 Spec. Laws 279, \\u00a7 10.\\nThe advice of this court is asked on eight questions. They may be summarized as follows: (1) Is the amendment unconstitutional as violative of the due process provisions of \\u00a7 1 and 12 of article first of the constitution of Connecticut and \\u00a7 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution? (2) Are the plaintiffs proper parties under the circumstances disclosed by the stipulated facts?\\nThe plaintiffs are proper parties. The fact that Orlando sought a permit under the ordinance does not preclude his attack thereon in an independent proceeding. Strain v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 137 Conn. 36, 40, 74 A. 2d 462; National Transportation Co. v. Toquet, 123 Conn. 468, 478, 196 A. 344. Michelinas interest is obvious. If a violation of the ordinance occurred on her property, she was liable to a fine and possibly to imprisonment. Windsor Building Zone Regs. \\u00a7 18; 21 Spec. Laws 279, \\u00a7 10. In declaratory judgment actions, all persons who have an interest in the subject matter should be made parties. Practice Book 8 250(d). The answer to the second question is \\\"Yes.\\\"\\nThere probably was a time when the statement, found in many cases, that any citizen has the right to engage in any ordinary lawful business was true. State v. Conlon, 65 Conn. 478, 486, 33 A. 519; State v. Feingold, 77 Conn. 326, 330, 59 A. 211; Perdue v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 118 Conn. 174, 179, 171 A. 26. Recent decisions reflect the increasing interference by the state with private rights under the guise of regulation in the public interest. Be that as it may, it is to be noted that the ordinance under examination is not regulatory but prohibitory.\\nLaws which prohibit activities obviously dangerous or detrimental to public welfare, safety, health or morals are universally sustained. State v. Heller, 123 Conn. 492, 495, 196 A. 337; Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. North Carolina, 245 U. S. 298, 304, 38 S. Ct. 96, 62 L. Ed. 299. Activities which may reasonably be expected to have that effect may also be prohibited. Murphy, Inc. v. Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A. 2d 177. The case last cited is very similar to that at bar. An ordinance of Westport prohibited billboards in its business districts unless the billboards referred to business conducted on the property on which they stood. The trial court found tire ordinance unconstitutional. The subject was examined exhaustively in this court, and the conclusion was reached that since billboards might prove dangerous to travelers through insecure construction or obstruction to view and might increase fire hazards or serve as places of concealment for criminals the ordinance prohibiting them could not be held unconstitutional on the stipulated facts. The case was sent back for a new trial to develop further findings.\\nThe case at bar also suffers from a lack of facts. If the ordinance merely forbade automobile junk yards, it could probably not be found unconstitutional on the stipulated facts, because the detrimental effects of such installations are so well known as to be the subject of judicial notice. See State v. Kievman, 116 Conn. 458, 465, 165 A. 601. Judicial notice was the basis of the decision in Murphy, Inc. v. Westport, supra, 295. The ordinance in question prohibited the display for sale of even one new car on the lot. It is not apparent how such an act could affect property values or the health, safety, morals or even the esthetic sensibilities of the people of Windsor. If the last statement is questioned, the answer is that in Connecticut esthetic conditions alone are insufficient to support the invocation of the police power. Murphy, Inc. v. Westport, supra, 296, 300.\\nIt is true that it is our duty, \\\"in the exercise of great care and caution, to make every presumption and intendment in favor of the validity of the statute, and to sustain it unless its invalidity is beyond a reasonable doubt.\\\" State v. Heller, 123 Conn. 492, 498, 196 A. 337. The state and federal constitutional provisions involved have been held to be substantially synonymous. New Haven Metal & Heating Supply Co. v. Danaher, 128 Conn. 213, 219, 21 A. 2d 383. They require that regulations such as that in question must bear \\\"a rational relation to the subjects which fall fairly within the police power.\\\" State v. Hillman, 110 Conn. 92, 105, 147 A. 294. The application of this principle to various states of fact has been fully discussed in many recent Connecticut cases, most of which are reviewed in Murphy, Inc. v. Westport, supra.\\nThe law under which the Windsor zoning commission acted in passing the amendment to \\u00a7 6 is very broad. It authorizes the commission to specify \\\"the uses that shall be excluded\\\" in the several zones and provides that in imposing such restrictions the commissioner's \\\"regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration as to the character of the district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout such town.\\\" 21 Spec. Laws 276. Very similar provisions were considered in State v. Hillman, supra. It is apparent from the discussion in the latter case that the only possible claim which could be made for the constitutionality of the ordinance in question would be under that feature of the police power which permits restrictions on the use of property for the purpose of promoting the economic welfare of the community by stabilizing real estate values. It is not reasonable to assume that the absolute prohibition of the display of any new or used automobiles in an open lot in any zone is necessary to protect these values. It follows that such an all-inclusive prohibition is not reasonably related to the exercise of that factor of the police power under which it alone could be justified.\\nIn accordance with the cogent reasoning of Judge Beach in State v. Porter, 94 Conn. 639, 642, 110 A. 59, we are constrained to hold that the ordinance in question in its present form is an \\\"unwarranted and arbitary interference with the constitutional rights to carry on a lawful business.\\\" Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223, 236, 25 S. Ct. 18, 49 L. Ed. 169. The last is a comparatively early case but has been cited with approval in Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U. S. 504, 513, 44 S. Ct. 412, 68 L. Ed. 813, and Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Walters, 294 U. S. 405, 415, 55 S. Ct. 486, 79 L. Ed. 949, and has not been overruled. The burden of proof was on the plaintiffs; Murphy, Inc. v. Westport, supra, 302; but the terms of this ordinance itself are sufficient to sustain that burden. The ordinance is too broad.\\nThe defendants claim that, even if the amendment to \\u00a7 6 is unconstitutional, the order issued by the board was valid under \\u00a7 15(7) of the building zone regulations, quoted above. The plaintiffs were not seeking a permit to store and sell automobiles in the open when they applied under \\u00a7 15(7). They were asking for a permit to convert a building for the sale and repair of motor vehicles. This section had nothing to do with the storage or sale of cars in the open. It did not in itself authorize the imposition of any restrictions on storage or sale outside of the building. The only authority which the board could possibly have had for the imposition of the restriction lay in \\u00a7 6. This is evident from the terms of the notice sent Orlando. Our decision is confined to the issues made by the stipulation for reservation.\\nNo sufficient purpose would be served by giving specific answers to the questions in the reservation. We advise that the plaintiffs are proper parties, that they are entitled to relief by declaratory judgment and that the amendment of September 15, 1939, to \\u00a7 6 of the Windsor building zone regulations is unconstitutional and void.\\nNo costs will be taxed in this court to any party.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1578181\", \"name\": \"J. Stewart Thorne et al. v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Stamford et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Thorne v. Zoning Board of Appeals\", \"decision_date\": \"1967-02-21\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"745\", \"last_page\": \"745\", \"citations\": \"154 Conn. 745\", \"volume\": \"154\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:25:19.886357+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"J. Stewart Thorne et al. v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Stamford et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"J. Stewart Thorne et al. v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Stamford et al.\\nFrancis J. McNamara, Jr., on the motion.\\nSubmitted January 28\\ndecided February 21, 1967\", \"word_count\": \"64\", \"char_count\": \"357\", \"text\": \"The motion by the plaintiffs for a review of the decision concerning the correction of the record in the appeal from the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County at Stamford is denied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/conn/1581799.json b/conn/1581799.json
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+"{\"id\": \"1581799\", \"name\": \"National Folding Box Company, Inc. v. City of New Haven (two cases)\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"National Folding Box Co. v. City of New Haven\", \"decision_date\": \"1959-06-30\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"578\", \"last_page\": \"588\", \"citations\": \"146 Conn. 578\", \"volume\": \"146\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:25:17.274377+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"National Folding Box Company, Inc. v. City of New Haven (two cases)\", \"head_matter\": \"National Folding Box Company, Inc. v. City of New Haven (two cases)\\nDaly, C. J., Baldwin, King, Murphy and Mellitz, Js.\\nArgued June 2\\ndecided June 30, 1959\\nGeorge W. Crawford, with whom, on the brief, was Harold M. Mulvey, for the appellant (defendant) in each case.\\nFrank E. Callahan, with whom was John E. Ecklund, for the appellee (plaintiff) in each ease.\", \"word_count\": \"2903\", \"char_count\": \"16829\", \"text\": \"Baldwin, J.\\nThese are appeals by the defendant from judgments entered on a report of a committee appointed on appeal to the Court of Common Pleas from the action of the board of tax review of the defendant in fixing the valuation for the purpose of levying real estate taxes on the lists of 1954 and 1955 on the land and buildings of the plaintiff's manufacturing plant. The appeals, one for each of the two years, have been combined under Practice Book \\u00a7 382.\\nThe assessment date in New Haven is June 1 in each year. As of June 1, 1954, the city assessors valued the plaintiff's lands, of which there were eleven parcels, at $327,195, and the buildings, of which there were twenty-four, at $3,527,410, a total of $3,854,605. As of June 1, 1955, they valued the land as in 1954, and the buildings at $3,134,050, a total of $3,461,245. The change in the valuation of the buildings was due in part to a reduction in the value of one and the listing of a new office and warehouse. On the appeals to the board of tax review, it reduced the valuation on the buildings on the list of 1954 to $2,997,970 but otherwise made no change.\\nA committee of three appointed by the court conducted an extensive hearing and viewed the plaintiff's premises. The report of the committee, as corrected in response to the defendant's motion to correct, discloses the following facts: The plaintiff's property is in the northeastern section of New Haven. The eleven parcels of land are irregular in shape and size and are traversed by several streets. On the west, some of the land borders the Mill River, a nonnavigable stream. Portions of the land are low and subject to flooding. Most of the buildings are constructed on piles which are not holding up well. The buildings are of varying size, shape and construction. While they are in a fair state of repair, as a whole, they present an antiquated and inefficient manufacturing plant and one which would not be reproduced. Six of the buildings were constructed in 1906 and one in 1915. Five of these are multistoried, old and outmoded. These seven buildings contain 406,236 square feet of floor space out of a total of 673,108 in all of the buildings. There is a great deal of waste space in them. The valuation made by the assessors on the list of 1953 was $88,955 on the land and $1,138,800 on the buildings, a total of $1,227,755. In 1954 the assessors were engaged in the revaluation of real estate required every ten years. Rev. 1958, \\u00a7 12-62. There had been no revaluation of the plaintiff's properties since 1938 because of the war and an extension of the statutory requirement. Cum. Sup. 1955, \\u00a7 1046d. The values on the lists of 1954 and 1955 were the result of the 1954 revaluation.\\nThe committee report contains a valuation for each of the plaintiff's twenty-five buildings and for each of the eleven parcels of land. The committee found that the fair market value of the land, on the list of 1954, was $190,000, and of the buildings, $975,000, a total of $1,165,000; on the list of 1955, $190,000 for the land, and $1,050,000 for the buildings, a total of $1,240,000. The difference between the values placed on the buildings on the two lists is due to the addition on the 1955 list of the new office and warehouse building. The committee specifically found: \\\"[T]he highest and best use of the subject property [is] for lease or sale to investors who are attracted by the possibility of renting as separate buildings or spaces in buildings to manufacturers requiring relatively smaller areas. The fair market value is principally determined by sales of other industrial plants. These sale prices are regulated largely by the potential net income which an investor expects to realize from multitenant operation.\\\"\\nThe defendant by motion sought extensive corrections in the finding, some of which were made by the committee. Those made included additional facts which have been incorporated in the summary above, a statement of the defendant's claims before the committee, and rulings on evidence which were challenged by the defendant. As the defendant in its brief in this court has abandoned its challenge to the rulings on evidence, they need not be considered further. After the committee had ruled upon the motion to correct, the defendant filed exceptions to the acceptance of the report as corrected and a motion that the report be rejected. The court overruled the exceptions, denied the motion and accepted the report. It is unnecessary to detail the exceptions taken to the report and passed upon by the court because they are fully comprehended in the claims which were made before us and which we discuss below.\\nThe defendant now claims that the report of the committee does not conform to the statutes and rules of procedure because the subordinate facts contained in it are not sufficient to support the ultimate facts found by the committee or to enable the trial court properly to adjudicate the legal issues involved. Rev. 1958, \\u00a7 52-425; Practice Book \\u00a7 174-177. Section 168 of the Practice Book provides that the report of a committee should ordinarily state only the ultimate facts found and the conclusions reached. See Cohn v. Hartford, 130 Conn. 699, 706, 37 A.2d 237; Hollister v. Cox, 131 Conn. 523, 525, 41 A.2d 93; Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc. p. 271. A party may, however, request a finding of subordinate facts and the rulings made by the committee. Practice Book \\u00a7 168; State v. Giant's Neck Land & Improvement Co., 118 Conn. 350, 355, 172 A. 861. Obviously, the facts found and the conclusions reached in the report must be adequate to support the judgment rendered. Rice v. Rice, 134 Conn. 440, 445, 58 A.2d 523. The crucial question on a motion to correct and on exceptions to a committee's report is whether the facts found and the conclusions reached are adequate for the consideration of the claims of law made by the parties. The report of the present committee meets this test. Furthermore, we have examined with care the extensive excerpts from the evidence contained in the appendices to the briefs of the parties, as well as the exhibits referred to, in order to gain a complete comprehension of the legal issues raised. See Independent Methodist Episcopal Church v. Davis, 137 Conn. 1, 11, 74 A.2d 203.\\nAfter the defendant had filed its motion to correct, the plaintiff filed a memorandum on that motion. The defendant claims that the memorandum was improperly filed and was improperly considered by the committee. It is true that the rules do not require the filing of any such document. They do, however, permit both parties to ask for corrections in the report. Practice Book \\u00a7 171. If a party desires to assist the committee in considering a motion to correct filed by the opposing party, there seems no logical reason why he should be denied the opportunity to do so. It is within his right to support a report in his favor, as well as to suggest, by way of a motion to correct, amendments which he believes would improve it. There is no merit in this claim.\\nThe defendant claims further that an expert witness who was produced by the plaintiff and who testified at length concerning the replacement cost of the plaintiff's buildings omitted from his calculations fixtures worth many thousands of dollars. These fixtures, such as humidifying systems, fans, cranes, boilers, stokers, water tanks, and artesian wells, were not listed or described by the assessors as items which entered into any of the values fixed by them. The committee viewed the premises, as had the chairman of the board of assessors, and it is fair to assume that the fixtures, as integral parts of the buildings, entered into the estimates of value which were made. If it is conceded that the failure of the witness to include these items was improper, it was harmless because the committee did not adopt the method of valuation advanced by him.\\nThe defendant's motion to correct and the exceptions to the report challenge facts contained in it. These facts are supported by competent evidence, and the conclusions are logically drawn from the facts. The court did not err in accepting the report and ordering judgment entered upon it, unless the committee made some error of law. Morgan v. Hill, 139 Conn. 159, 161, 90 A.2d 641; Hartford-Con necticut Trust Co. v. Putnam Phalanx, 138 Conn. 695, 698, 88 A.2d 393; Housing Authority v. Pezenik, 137 Conn. 442, 445, 78 A.2d 546.\\nThe liability of real property in this state to taxation is fixed by statute \\\"at a uniform percentage of its present true and actual valuation, not exceeding one hundred percent of such valuation, to be determined by the assessors.\\\" Rev. 1958, \\u00a7 12-64. The \\\"present true and actual value\\\" of taxable property is defined by statute to be \\\"the fair market value thereof and not its value at a forced or auction sale.\\\" Rev. 1958, \\u00a7 12-63. \\\"The expressions 'actual valuation,' 'actual value,' 'market value,' 'market price' and . . . 'fair value' are synonymous.\\\" Sibley v. Middlefield, 143 Conn. 100, 106, 120 A.2d 77, citing Sanford v. Peck, 63 Conn. 486, 493, 27 A. 1057. \\\"Usually, these expressions mean the figure fixed by sales in ordinary business transactions, and they are established when other property of the same kind in the same or a comparable location has been bought and sold in so many instances that a value may reasonably be inferred. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Hartford, 99 Conn. 329, 334, 122 A. 91. In other words, the best test is ordinarily that of market sales. Campbell v. New Haven, 101 Conn. 173, 185, 125 A. 650; New Haven Trust Co. v. Doherty, 74 Conn. 468, 472, 51 A. 130.\\\" Sibley v. Middlefield, supra.\\nStressing this statement, the defendant claims that prices realized from sales of comparable property in a normal market furnish the primary test of fair market value and that this test is exclusive when it is applicable, as it was in the instant case. If we assume it to be true, as claimed by the defendant, that the assessors arrived at their valuation by the method of comparable sales, the plaintiff has, never theless, by its appeals from the board of tax review, raised the question whether the valuations so arrived at represent the fair market value of its property or, instead, are excessive, disproportionate and unlawful. The statute provides for such an appeal and for reference to a committee, and gives the court the power \\\"to grant such relief as to justice and equity appertains, upon such terms and in such manner and form as appear equitable.\\\" Rev. 1958, \\u00a7 12-118. The court must determine judicially whether the appellant has been aggrieved by such action on the part of the board as would result in the imposition of an unjust tax. If it determines that he has, it must proceed to exercise a broad discretionary power to grant relief. Sibley v. Middlefield, supra, 105, and cases cited. That we did not mean to imply in Sibley v. Middlefield that any particular method of valuation, including the method stressed by the present defendant, must be followed, even where it is applicable, is apparent from a further reading of that opinion. After discussing other means of ascertaining present true and actual value, we said (p. 107): \\\"No one method is controlling; consideration should be given to them all, if they have been utilized, in arriving at the value of the property. [Citing Lomas & Nettleton Co. v. Waterbury, 122 Conn. 228, 231, 188 A. 433.] All of the evidence, both that of sales and that of experts testifying on other methods of fixing valuation, is to aid the trier in arriving at a conclusion . . . .\\\" That conclusion, from the very nature of the problem, must of necessity be a matter of opinion, based, as in the instant case, on all the evidence, including the testimony of experts and a view of the premises, and on the knowledge and experience of the members of the committee. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co. v. Strat ford, 139 Conn. 388, 397, 94 A.2d 1; Cohn v. Hartford, 130 Conn. 699, 705, 37 A.2d 237; Lomas & Nettleton Co. v. Waterbury, supra, 233; Appeal of Cohen, 117 Conn. 75, 85, 166 A. 747. The process, at best, is one of approximation. Bridgeport Brass Co. v. Drew, 102 Conn. 206, 212, 128 A. 413. Furthermore, whether sales of other property are in fact comparable is a matter of judicial discretion. Cohn v. Hartford, supra, 704, and cases cited.\\nThe defendant argues that the committee relied upon the plaintiff's experts, who rejected the test of fair market value and adopted the approach of reproduction cost less depreciation, and capitalization of income. The defendant, further, challenges the qualifications of these experts and urges the superior qualifications of its own. As to the latter claim, the acceptance or rejection of an opinion of a qualified expert is a matter for the trier of fact unless the opinion is so unreasonable as to be unacceptable to a rational mind. Sibley v. Middlefield, supra, 108; Greenberg v. Electric Boat Co., 142 Conn. 404, 408, 114 A.2d 850; Ball v. Branford, 142 Conn. 13, 17, 110 A.2d 459; Thaw v. Fairfield, 132 Conn. 173, 179, 43 A.2d 65; Burdick v. United States Finishing Co., 130 Conn. 455, 458, 35 A.2d 405. Then too, a trier may accept part of the testimony of an expert and reject other parts; Northeastern Gas Transmission Co. v. Tersana Acres, Inc., 144 Conn. 509, 512, 134 A.2d 253; at least if the part accepted is not dependent on the parts rejected. Snyder v. Pantaleo, 143 Conn. 290, 295, 122 A.2d 21. The trier can accept the testimony of the experts offered by one party and reject that of the experts offered by the other. Morgan v. Hill, 139 Conn. 159, 161, 90 A.2d 641. The committee found that the plaintiff was aggrieved by action of the board of tax review which would result in the levy of an excessive, and therefore an illegal, tax. The committee then proceeded, as the law requires, to determine the value of the plaintiff's property, and reported it to the court. The committee stated in the report the method employed to determine value. The committee found that the highest and best use of the plaintiff's property would be its use as separate buildings or spaces in buildings by manufacturers who required relatively small areas; that fair market value is determined principally by sales of other industrial plants; and that sale prices are regulated largely by the net income which an investor would expect to realize \\u2014 in the present case, net income from a multitenant operation. This finding is based upon competent evidence. It appeals to reason. From all the testimony in the case as well as from common experience, it would appear that the possibility of selling the plaintiff's property to a purchaser who proposed to use it as a single manufacturing plant would be extremely remote, while a sale for the purposes stated presents a logical probability.\\nIn Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Hartford, 99 Conn. 329, 122 A. 91, we said (p. 336) that the words \\\"market value\\\" meant \\\"a value in a market, in a place or in conditions in which there are . . . willing sellers and able and ready buyers of property like that to be assessed, and in which sales are or have been made, or may fairly be expected, in the usual and natural way of business.\\\" In the case at bar, the committee could reasonably conclude that the prospect of a sale, in such a market, of the plaintiff's manufacturing plant as a whole, for a single manufacturing operation, was extremely remote and that there were no comparable sales to use as a measuring stick. Therefore the committee had to resort to some other method of determining value. See Somers v. Meriden, 119 Conn. 5, 8, 174 A. 184; 51 Am. Jur. 654, \\u00a7 703. The method chosen, which was in effect the determination of what the market value of the property would be if it were occupied by several tenants who, engaged in manufacturing, required relatively small spaces for their operations, is a justifiable one. It is altogether reasonable to believe that there would be a demand for such use and occupancy. Fixing the value of real property for taxation purposes cannot be accomplished by any single method applicable in all situations. It is largely a question of fact for the trier, using such means as are suggested by the evidence, if those means in reason and logic appear to accomplish a just result and one consonant with the trier's own unbiased judgment.\\nThere is no error in either case.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/conn/1604195.json b/conn/1604195.json
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--- /dev/null
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+"{\"id\": \"1604195\", \"name\": \"Walter J. Kosinski vs. Genevieve Kosinski\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Kosinski v. Kosinski\", \"decision_date\": \"1934-06-05\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"701\", \"last_page\": \"702\", \"citations\": \"118 Conn. 701\", \"volume\": \"118\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:36:41.422808+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Walter J. Kosinski vs. Genevieve Kosinski.\", \"head_matter\": \"Walter J. Kosinski vs. Genevieve Kosinski.\\nMaltbie, C. J., Haines, Hinman, Banks and Avery, Js.\\nArgued May 2d\\ndecided June 5th, 1934.\\nThomas C. Flood, for the appellant (defendant).\\nLeonard O. Ryan, for the appellee (plaintiff).\", \"word_count\": \"440\", \"char_count\": \"2426\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nThe jury might reasonably have found the following facts: The plaintiff on the morning of November 29th, 1932, went with the defendant, his daughter, to the garage to help her start her car. He told her to put it in high gear and then while she sat in it he pushed it out of the garage. After he had succeeded in pushing it to a point where the rear end was six or seven feet outside of the garage, the engine caught and he stepped back. Then suddenly the car backed and pinned him between the right rear corner of the car and the door of the garage. The defendant did not testify, and no evidence was in any way produced to dispute the plaintiff's testimony. From the fact that the plaintiff had been able unaided to push the car out of the garage while in gear, the jury might reasonably have inferred that the surface of the ground in front of the garage did not slope markedly toward it. With that in mind, taken together with the fact that, when the car backed, it did so suddenly, the jury were entitled to infer that the cause of the backing was that the defendant put the car in reverse and did not have it under proper control. They might reasonably have concluded that the defendant was guilty of negligence. The plaintiff testified that when the car started to back, he was only five or six feet behind it and it came so quickly that he could not get out of the way. Confronted as he was by an emergency, the jury might well have found that he was not guilty of contributory negligence.\\nThe plaintiff was a storekeeper and he testified that he was compelled on account of his injuries to hire his son, who was about twenty-one years old, to carry on the business for him for seven weeks, agreeing to pay him $25 a week, and also to perform certain services for eight weeks thereafter, for which he agreed to pay $4 or $5 a week. The jury might reasonably have accepted this testimony. Taking into consideration the expenses thereby incurred by the plaintiff, certain other special damages he proved and the personal injuries he suffered, the trial court might reasonably conclude that the jury was justified in returning a verdict in the amount they did.\\nThere is no error.\"}"
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diff --git a/conn/1604239.json b/conn/1604239.json
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+"{\"id\": \"1604239\", \"name\": \"Willard H. Eldredge, Administrator (Estate of Louis Eldredge) et al. vs. F. Wells Geer et als.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Eldredge v. Geer\", \"decision_date\": \"1934-06-05\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"458\", \"last_page\": \"462\", \"citations\": \"118 Conn. 458\", \"volume\": \"118\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:36:41.422808+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Willard H. Eldredge, Administrator (Estate of Louis Eldredge) et al. vs. F. Wells Geer et als.\", \"head_matter\": \"Willard H. Eldredge, Administrator (Estate of Louis Eldredge) et al. vs. F. Wells Geer et als.\\nMaltbie, C. J., Haines, Hinman, Banks and Avert, Js.\\nArgued May 1st\\ndecided June 5th, 1934.\\nArthur T. Keefe, for the appellants (defendants).\\nPerry J. Hollandersky, with whom was Charles V. James, and, on the brief, Foster K. Sistare, for the appellees (plaintiffs).\", \"word_count\": \"1286\", \"char_count\": \"7426\", \"text\": \"Banks, J.\\nPlaintiff's decedent was struck and killed on December 22d, 1930, by a truck operated by the named defendant. This action was brought to recover damages for his death, in which also it was sought to have set aside a transfer of certain personal property from the named defendant to the defendant The Southern New England Contractors' Supply Company, hereinafter referred to as the Supply Company, alleged to have been made with intent to defraud the plaintiff of his right to recover such damages. Upon motion of the Supply Company it was granted a separate trial of the issues involving the transfer to it. The plaintiff recovered a verdict and judgment of $10,000 against Geer, and, upon a subsequent trial, the court entered a decree setting aside the transfer, from which judgment this appeal was taken. The parties filed stipulations as to facts which the court might find proven, and also stipulated that the court might consider the evidence given by certain witnesses in the jury trial in which the award of damages was made to the plaintiff.\\nFrom the stipulations, without the necessity of considering the requested corrections in the finding, the following facts, sufficient for the decision of the case, appear: For several years prior to January 1st, 1931, Geer was engaged in the business of excavating and selling sand and gravel obtained from a bank on property leased by hjm from Charles B. Palmer, which lease expired on January 1st, 1931. L. E. McLaughlin, Inc., was engaged in the contracting business and purchased sand and gravel from Geer. On November 29th, 1930, Geer was indebted to Palmer in the sum of $3000 for sand and gravel excavated from the latter's land, which debt he was unable to pay. Palmer agreed to accept $2000 in satisfaction of the debt, a note for $1000 of which was given Palmer by Geer, and the other $1000 was paid to Palmer by L. E. McLaughlin, Inc., in return for which Geer gave the latter his demand note for $1500. As security for this note, Geer gave L. E. McLaughlin, Inc., a bill of sale of two Mack trucks and at the same time took from it a conditional bill of sale of the same. The delivery of the trucks to L. E. McLaughlin, Inc., was colorable merely and they were shortly redelivered to Geer and remained in his possession until January 2d, 1931. The bill of sale of the trucks was recorded December 23d, 1930 (the day after plaintiff's decedent received his injuries); the conditional bill of sale was never recorded. On December 1st, 1930, L. E. McLaughlin, Inc., loaned Geer $600 to enable him to pay certain bills which he owed, and took his note for that amount, to secure which it took a bill of sale of a third Mack truck, giving back to Geer a conditional bill of sale of the same. The delivery of this truck was also colorable merely, the bill of sale was also recorded on December 23d, 1930, and the conditional bill of sale was never recorded.\\nOn December 23d, 1930, a certificate of incorporation of The Southern New England Contractors' Supply Company was executed, and on January 2d, 1931, the certificate of organization of that company was filed. Eleven thousand dollars was paid in in cash, and one hundred and ten shares issued, of which one hundred and eight shares were issued to L. E. McLaughlin, who is president, treasurer and general manager of the company. On January 2d, 1931, Geer transferred to the Supply Company the three Mack trucks, together with all the machinery, tools and equipment constituting his sand and gravel plant. In return for this transfer, the Supply Company issued to Geer seventy shares of its capital stock of the par value of $100 each, the certificate for which was immediately delivered by him to L. E. McLaughlin as collateral security for his note for $2100 given to McLaughlin, personally, in substitution for his obliga tions totalling that amount to L. E. McLaughlin, Inc. This stock had no market value, Geer's only other asset was an automobile valued at $100, and after the plaintiff obtained the $10,000 judgment against him he was and still is insolvent. The fair market value of the trucks conveyed by Geer to the Supply Company was $4000, and that of the other property so conveyed was in excess of $3000. The trial court found that these transactions were all in pursuance of an intention and design on the part of Geer and of L. E. McLaughlin as an officer of the Supply Company to remove all of Geer's property from availability to satisfy any judgment that might be obtained by the plaintiff, and that they constituted a fraud upon him, and, as against him, were null and void.\\nThe defendants strenuously contend that the subordinate facts found, which for the most part were stipulated by the parties, do not justify a finding of intent to defraud, but that the acts of the defendants detailed in the finding were motivated solely by the intention to give McLaughlin security for the loans which he or his company had made to Geer. These loans aggregated $2100, and, prior to December 22d, 1930, the three trucks valued at $4000 had apparently been considered ample security for this indebtedness. On that day occurred the accident in which plaintiff's decedent lost his life. The three trucks were then in Geer's possession and subject to attachment by his creditors as well as the equipment constituting his sand and gravel plant. On the following day the transactions detailed in the finding were initiated, the result of which was to place these assets beyond the reach of process in the cause of action which had then arisen in favor of the estate of plaintiff's decedent. The sequence of events and all the circumstances are strongly indicative of an intention on the part of Geer and McLaughlin to produce that result rather than that their sole object was to furnish to McLaughlin security for Geer's debt to him beyond that which had been accepted as satisfactory prior to the date of the accident. At any rate, the question of the intention of the parties was one of fact to be determined by the trial court upon such inferences as it was justified in drawing from the conduct of the parties and all the circumstances of the transaction.\\nThe trial court has found that these transactions were had with the knowledge and active participation of McLaughlin, the managing executive and principal stockholder of the Supply Company. Since the Supply Company thus participated in the fraudulent transfer of his property by Geer, the transfer may be held void as against it even though it paid full value for the property transferred. Trumbull v. Hewitt, 65 Conn. 60, 73, 31 Atl. 492; Mathews v. Converse, 83 Conn. 511, 513, 77 Atl. 961. The plaintiff, who, at the time of the transfer, had a cause of action in tort against Geer, may avoid the transfer if made to defeat a recovery in such action. White v. Amenta, 110 Conn. 314, 318, 148 Atl. 345. The court did not err in setting aside the transfer, and holding it null and void as against the plaintiff.\\nThere is no error.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\"}"
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diff --git a/conn/1614833.json b/conn/1614833.json
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+"{\"id\": \"1614833\", \"name\": \"Anna Marley v. The New England Transportation Company\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Marley v. New England Transportation Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1947-05-01\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"586\", \"last_page\": \"592\", \"citations\": \"133 Conn. 586\", \"volume\": \"133\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:44:43.868412+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Anna Marley v. The New England Transportation Company\", \"head_matter\": \"Anna Marley v. The New England Transportation Company\\nMaltbie, C. J., Bbown, Jennings, Ells and Dickenson, Js.\\nArgued April 9\\u2014\\ndecided May 1, 1947\\nEdwin H. Hall, with whom was Thomas J. O\\u2019Sullivan, for the appellant (defendant).\\nMorton E. Cole and George C. Lessner, with whom, on the brief, was Cyril Cole, for the appellee (plaintiff).\", \"word_count\": \"1439\", \"char_count\": \"8091\", \"text\": \"Ells, J.\\nThe defendant, a common carrier of passengers, operates a bus line between Torrington and Hartford. As the plaintiff, a passenger, attempted to get off at a terminal she slipped and fell on an icy bus step and was injured. Tbe jury returned a verdict for her, and the defendant has appealed from the court's refusal to set it aside and from the judgment.\\nThe defendant does not contend that it was not negligent but claims principally that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in attempting to get off the bus by means of a step which she knew was in a dangerous condition from snow and ice. She testified that when she changed busses at Canton she observed that the step of the one that she was about to enter was three-quarters covered with ice and snow and was slippery and dangerous, but that she was careful and had no trouble boarding the bus. \\\"When the vehicle stopped at her destination in Hartford she looked at the step and saw that it was still slippery and in a dangerous condition. In attempting to alight she held onto the door casing or framework with her left hand to safeguard herself. She carried a purse in her right hand. While her left foot was on the floor of the bus her right foot slipped on the icy step and she fell to the highway.\\nAdditional facts which the jury reasonably could have found are these: The exit step used by the plaintiff was the only one available to her and to the other passengers; there were no handrails or other adequate safeguards alongside or reasonably near the step; she was following directly behind about twelve other passengers who had alighted in safety; she wore rubbers; the accident occurred after dark, and the bus was lighted; the bus came to a stop in the roadway, about eight feet from the curb, to discharge passengers, and the highway at that point was dark and was icy and slippery.\\nThe defendant claims that there were courses of safe conduct open to the plaintiff: she could have stepped on that part of the step which was not slippery, or she could have asked the driver or another passenger to assist her. To these choices we add another: she could have refused to get off the bus until the dangerous condition had been remedied. The applicable law is that \\\"One who is put in a perilous position by the negligence of another, cannot be regarded as gnilty of contributory negligence if he takes such steps to protect himself as a reasonably prudent person would take, even though he might have avoided the injury by the use of better judgment and by taking a course other than the one he adopted.\\\" Burk v. Corrado, 116 Conn. 511, 515, 165 A. 682, and cases cited; Ballou v. Jewett City Savings Bank, 128 Conn. 527, 532, 24 A. 2d 260. It was for the jury to find what the present plaintiff's conduct was and then decide whether she took such steps to protect herself as a reasonably prudent person would have taken in view of the known danger. Congdon v. Norwich, 37 Conn. 414, 420. We cannot hold that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.\\nThe defendant assigns various alleged errors in the charge. A principal claim relates to the instructions as to the burden of proof on the issue of contributory negligence. The court began its charge on the subject by reading the applicable statute, General Statutes, Sup. 1939, \\u00a7 1399e, the first sentence of which provides that \\\"In any action to recover damages for negligently causing the death of a person, or for negligently causing personal injury or property damage, it shall be presumed that such person . . . who was injured . . . was, at the time of the commission of the alleged negligent act or acts, in the exercise of reasonable care.\\\" The contention is that by reading this sentence the court told the jury that the plaintiff was presumed to be in the exercise of due care and thus gave probative effect to the presumption; that the jury could only get the idea that there is something in addition to the evidence from which they should decide the question of contributory negligence. The defendant overlooks the fact that the court went on to explain the meaning of the statute, at length, and to state the applicable law exactly as the defendant claims it to be. It is not contended that the court stated the law incorrectly. The reading of the sentence in question, followed as it was by an adequate explanation of our law, could not have misled the jury. We point out, however, that every purpose of the statute is served if, in a case where it applies, the court does not read it to the jury but merely charges them that the burden of proving contributory negligence is upon the defendant and that, if the defendant offers no evidence upon that issue or if the evidence he does offer fails to prove that the plaintiff was negligent by a fair preponderance of the evidence, the plaintiff is entitled to prevail upon the issue. LeCount v. Farrand, 118 Conn. 210, 212, 171 A. 623; Voronelis v. White Line Bus Corporation, 123 Conn. 25, 28, 192 A. 265; and see Balchunas v. Palmer, 151 F. 2d 842, 844. It would make for simplicity in the charge and remove any possibility of confusing the jury if this practice were followed.\\nThe defendant requested the trial court to charge that the plaintiff's conduct in attempting to get off the bus when she knew that it was slippery and dangerous, without asking the bus driver to assist her or to correct the condition of the step, constituted contributory negligence. The court correctly refused so to charge, for the reasons we have already given. We test the motion to set aside the verdict by the evidence and the charge by the finding, but in this case there is no essential difference between them.\\nThe defendant claims that the plaintiff did not offer evidence to prove that the exit-way had no railings or other adequate safeguards for the use of passengers. There was a pole inside the exit-way running from the floor of the bus to the roof which the defendant claimed was for the use and assistance of passengers who were about to get off. The jury could have found that it was too far inside the bus to be of use for this purpose.\\nOne of the claims of proof of the plaintiff was that she was exercising due care while attempting to alight. The defendant claims that this was a conclusion of law and has no proper place in the finding. Strictly speaking, a conclusion of negligence is ordinarily one of mixed law and fact, involving the determination of the standard of care required and its application to the facts of the particular case. Davis v. Margolis, 107 Conn. 417, 420, 140 A. 823. It becomes a conclusion of law only when the mind of a fair and reasonable man could reach only one conclusion; if there is room for a reasonable disagreement the question is one to be determined by the trier as matter of fact. Johnson v. Pulidy, 116 Conn. 443, 445, 165 A. 355. The present case falls within the last category, and the inclusion in the plaintiff's claims of proof of the statement attacked was proper.\\nThe defendant claims error in a statement in the charge that in determining whether the plaintiff was negligent the jury should bear in mind that everyone is entitled to assume that another will exercise reasonable care. The ground of attack is that as the plaintiff knew the step to be slippery and dangerous there could be in her case no such assumption. Granted that this be so, we cannot, in view of the substantially undisputed fact that the plaintiff did know the step to be slippery, see how the defendant suffered harm from the trial court's inadvertent statement. Kulinski v. Savin, 125 Conn. 512, 514, 7 A. 2d 436.\\nThere is no error.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/conn/1614957.json b/conn/1614957.json
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3b78a25d8af000f49647e8dce9d15983c1f93226
--- /dev/null
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1614957\", \"name\": \"Walter P. Smith v. The L. & S. Corporation\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Smith v. L. & S. Corp.\", \"decision_date\": \"1946-07-09\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"105\", \"last_page\": \"108\", \"citations\": \"133 Conn. 105\", \"volume\": \"133\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:44:43.868412+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Walter P. Smith v. The L. & S. Corporation\", \"head_matter\": \"Walter P. Smith v. The L. & S. Corporation\\nMaltbie, C. J., Bkown, Jennings, Ells and Dickenson, Js.\\nArgued June 7\\u2014\\ndecided July 9, 1946\\nM. J. Blumenfeld, for the appellant (defendant).\\nDennis P. O\\u2019Connor, with whom were John W. Joy and, on the brief, James N. Egan, for the appellee (plaintiff).\", \"word_count\": \"719\", \"char_count\": \"3962\", \"text\": \"Jennings, J.\\nThe plaintiff fell over a dolly in a garage and was injured. The defendant appeals from the denial of its motion to set aside the verdict on the grounds that the plaintiff was not an invitee and that he was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter.of law.\\nThe jury reasonably could have found the following facts: The plaintiff's car was not running right and he took it to the defendant's garage for repairs. The job took some time and after standing around for about three-quarters of an hour the plaintiff, wishing to find out how long it would be before his car was ready, started to walk between two parked cars towards a workbench at which there was a light and toward which he had seen the mechanic who was working on his car go. The evidence discloses no other means by which he could have obtained that information. The space between the cars was about six feet wide. The garage was rather dark and the cars cast shadows. As he passed the first car he stumbled over a dolly which projected about ten inches beyond its side, fell and was injured. A dolly or creeper is a carrier on rollers two or three feet long and eighteen inches wide, used by mechanics to slide under cars when it is necessary to work on the underbody. Dollies are customarily used by mechanics in garages and this fact was known to the plaintiff. The dolly in question was of light maple and the plaintiff would have seen it had he been alert.\\nThe plaintiff was clearly entitled to drive his car into the garage and in so doing was an invitee as a matter of law. The question on this phase of the case is: Did he exceed his rights as such ? The answer is \\\"No,\\\" if his use of the premises was such as might reasonably have been contemplated by the defendant. Guilford v. Yale University, 128 Conn. 449, 454, 23 A.2d 917. The jury could have found that he was expecting to wait until repairs were made, that no other place was provided and that there was nothing to indicate that he could not move around while he was waiting. The charge is not printed and is presumed to have been correct. Schroeder v. Hartford, 104 Conn. 334, 336, 132 A. 901. The issue was one of fact. Guilford v. Yale University, supra; Girard v. Kabatznick, 128 Conn. 520, 525, 24 A.2d 257. The defendant was under a duty to use reasonable care to keep its premises reasonably safe for the plaintiff, provided the jury found, as they must have, that he had not exceeded the limits of his invitation. Id., p. 524. The same case (p. 525) is authority for the familiar proposition that contributory negligence is ordinarily a question of fact. See also Flynn v. West Hartford, 98 Conn. 83, 86, 118 A. 517; Zoccali v. Carfi, 128 Conn. 168, 20 A.2d 728. In the few recent Connecticut cases where the plaintiff has been held guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, the cir cumstances were very different. See, for example, Seabridge v. Poli, 98 Conn. 297, 301, 119 A. 214, where the plaintiff stumbled over a large weighing machine, and Martin v. Stamford Gas & Electric Co., 118 Conn. 319, 321, 172 A. 218, where the plaintiff fell into an open, guarded manhole in plain sight. \\\"While the plaintiff testified that he could have seen the dolly had he been alert, there was no evidence that the floor of the garage was in a condition that required him to be alert, i.e., \\\"vigilant.\\\" Webster's New International Dictionary (2d Ed.); Smith v. Kresge Co., 116 Conn. 706, 707, 164 A. 206. It cannot be held as a matter of law that the plaintiff was negligent in not seeing the dolly, in view of its position and the lack of light.\\nThere is no error.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/conn/1616862.json b/conn/1616862.json
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..137a768abc22eec8aaa5866d1e449e683831bb75
--- /dev/null
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+"{\"id\": \"1616862\", \"name\": \"Michael W. Delaney et al. v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Hartford et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Delaney v. Zoning Board of Appeals\", \"decision_date\": \"1947-12-03\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"240\", \"last_page\": \"245\", \"citations\": \"134 Conn. 240\", \"volume\": \"134\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:17:48.541834+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Michael W. Delaney et al. v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Hartford et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Michael W. Delaney et al. v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Hartford et al.\\nMaltbie, C. J., Brown, Jennings, Ells and Dickenson, Js.\\nArgued November 13\\ndecided December 3, 1947\\nJulius B. Schats said Joseph P. Kenny, with whom, on the brief, was Arthur D. Weinstein, for the appellant (defendant Triton Restaurant, Inc.); and, on the same brief, Samuel II. Aron and Thomas J. Hag-arty, for the appellant (named defendant).\\nA. A. Bibicoff, for the appellee (named plaintiff), with whom, on the brief, was Harry Schwolsky, for the appellees (plaintiffs Schultz).\", \"word_count\": \"1424\", \"char_count\": \"8586\", \"text\": \"Brown, J.\\nOn July 23,1946, the defendant zoning board of appeals granted the application of the defendant Triton Restaurant, Inc., for a permit to use its premises for the sale of all kinds of alcoholic liquor, in connection with a restaurant it operates, at variance with a provision of the zoning ordinance requiring an interval of 1500 feet between liquor outlets of the nature specified. The plaintiffs, neighboring property owners, appealed to the Court of Common Pleas, which sustained their appeal. From that judgment the restaurant corporation and the board have appealed to this court. The trial court decided the appeal upon the record of the hearings before the board and its action thereon, and accordingly made no additional finding of facts. Biz v. Liquor Control Commission, 133 Conn. 556, 557, 53 A. 2d 655. The question now is whether upon that record the court was warranted in concluding that the board \\\"exceeded its powers, acted unlawfully, arbitrarily and in abuse of its legal discretion,\\\" and therefore in sustaining the plaintiffs' appeal.\\nThe undisputed facts material to the determinative issue may be summarized as follows: The defendant restaurant corporation at 306 Farmington Avenue, Hartford, is within a business zone, under the zoning ordinance which is chapter 20 of the Municipal Code of Hartford, amended by an ordinance approved October 8,1945, and which contains the following applicable provisions. Article II, \\u00a7 7, subsection 5, provides: \\\"A. No building or premises shall be used, . . . which is arranged, intended or designed to be used: (a) for a restaurant . . . serving alcoholic liquor . if any part of said building or premises is situated on any part of a lot within fifteen hundred feet radius in any direction of any lot upon which is located a building or premises used for the purpose of a restaurant, grill or tavern, serving alcoholic liquor.\\\" Within 1500 feet of the defendant restaurant are three such establishments dispensing alcoholic liquor\\u2014a restaurant at 450 feet, a grill at 300 feet and another restaurant at 1490 feet. Article V, \\u00a7 5, subsection 5, provides: \\\"The Board of Appeals may . . . determine and vary the application of the regulations . in harmony with their general purpose and intent, and grant permits in the specific cases hereinafter listed. Said power shall be exercised only if there shall be difficulty or unreasonable hardship in carrying out the strict letter of the ordinance and so that the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed, public welfare and safety secured and substantial justice done.\\\" One of the \\\"specific cases . . . listed\\\" is thus designated by subparagraph (n): \\\"In business . . . zones the requirements of Article II, Section 7, Subsection 5, may be waived and permits given to restaurants . . . which sell or serve alcoholic liquors.\\\" The memorandum of decision of the court indicates that in the hearing before it the defendants relied upon subparagraph (n) as giving the defendant board a broad discretion to vary which was not subject to the limitations prescribed by the provisions of subsection 5. This contention is patently untenable and the defendants make no such claim before us. Whether the trial court's conclusion was justified depends upon whether the board's action constituted an abuse of the discretion conferred upon it by subparagraph (n), construed in connection with the first and second sentences of subsection 5.\\nThe only evidence of \\\"difficulty or unreasonable hardship\\\" upon the restaurant corporation from \\\"carrying out the strict letter of the ordinance\\\" was restricted to the effect upon its financial situation, the gist of which was that an operating loss could be changed to an operating profit if the variance was granted. This of itself constituted no sufficient reason for granting' the application. The board was \\\" 'bound to take a broader view than the apparent monetary distress of the owner. Otherwise, there would be no occasion for any zoning law.' \\\" Thayer v. Board of Appeals, 114 Conn. 15, 22, 157 A. 273; Devaney v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 132 Conn. 537, 542, 45 A. 2d 828; Benson v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 129 Conn. 280, 283, 27 A. 2d 389. The only basis for the action of the board which the record even suggests is the statement of one member in moving that the variation be granted. In addition to a reference to unreasonable hardship on the ground just discussed, he said that granting the variance would relieve traffic in more congested areas and meet an essential need for the type of restaurant proposed. As the court well observed, \\\"the evidence on these questions was so speculative and indefinite that it could not reasonably support such a conclusion.\\\"\\nWe have recently declared the test determinative of the right of a zoning board of appeals to grant such a variance as here requested, by this statement: \\\"In Devaney v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 132 Conn. 537, 541, 45 A. 2d 828, we pointed out that the words 'practical difficulties' in the phrase 'practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships' are in themselves insufficient to afford a guide to determine whether a variation should be granted, and that the phrase is to be construed as a whole; that the requirement that any variation shall be in harmony with the general purpose and intent of the ordinance is of prime significance; and that 'unnecessary' qualifying the word 'hardships' means hardships which would not follow as the ordinary results of the adoption of the zoning plan as a whole. To justify a variation under such a provision in a zoning ordinance, it must appear that the change will not substantially affect the comprehensive plan of zoning in the municipality and that adherence to the strict letter of the ordinance will cause difficulties and hardships the imposition of which upon the petitioner is unnecessary in order to carry out the general purpose of the plan.\\\" Stavola v. Bulkeley, 134 Conn. 188, 190, 56 A. 2d 645. Not only is resort to this test requisite to the application of the provisions of the zoning ordinance but it is essential under \\u00a7 428 of the General Statutes and \\u00a7 128 and 129 of chapter 12 of the revised charter of the city of Hartford. 23 Spec. Laws 1243, 1244; see Kamerman v. LeRoy, 133 Conn. 232, 235, 50 A. 2d 175.\\nThe requirement of the zoning ordinance that places for the sale of alcoholic liquor shall not be closer than 1500 feet to each other represents a definite policy on the part of the city as represented by its common council. Existing places at closer intervals will continue as nonconforming uses, but as such uses cease, for any reason, the restriction will be more closely approximated. To grant a permit for the use of a restaurant for the sale of liquor where there are already three such places within 1500 feet flies directly in the face of the declared policy embodied in the ordinance. The facts disclose no basis upon which it could reasonably be held that such action would be in harmony with the general purpose and intent of the zoning regulations or would accord with the spirit of the ordinance. Indeed, it would be a rare ease where the facts would permit a variation in this particular regulation.\\nWhen the statement of the member of the board that to grant the variance would best serve the general welfare of the community and be in conformity with the spirit and intent of the zoning ordinance is considered in the light of this test, it suffices to say that upon the evidence before the board it could not reasonably reach such a conclusion. In granting the defendant restaurant's application, the board indulged in an attempt at \\\"spot zoning,\\\" so-called, a course which, if permitted, must often involve unfair and unreasonable discrimination and necessarily defeat, in large measure, the beneficial results of zoning regulation. The trial court could not do other than grant the plaintiffs relief from the board's unwarranted action.\\nThere is no error.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1616906\", \"name\": \"Charles E. Moore et al. v. Town of Stamford et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Moore v. Town of Stamford\", \"decision_date\": \"1947-07-16\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"65\", \"last_page\": \"71\", \"citations\": \"134 Conn. 65\", \"volume\": \"134\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:17:48.541834+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Charles E. Moore et al. v. Town of Stamford et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Charles E. Moore et al. v. Town of Stamford et al.\\nMaltbie, C. J., Brown, Jennings, Ells and Dickenson, Js.\\nArgued June 10\\ndecided July 16, 1947\\nFrank Rick, for the appellants (plaintiffs).\\nGeorge Wise, for the appellees (defendants).\", \"word_count\": \"1886\", \"char_count\": \"11019\", \"text\": \"Jennings, J.\\nThe question to be determined is whether property located within the limits of the city of Stamford, a municipal corporation contained within the territorial limits of the town of Stamford but not coterminous therewith, is subject to town taxes levied to meet the expense of services performed in the town outside of the territorial limits of the city. The plaintiffs do not pursue in their brief assignments of error attacking findings of fact. They rely on their claim that the facts found do not support the conclusions reached and set forth both among the findings of fact and specifically as conclusions.\\nIn 1830 an area in the southerly part of the town of Stamford was incorporated as a borough. The charter of the borough has been amended from time to time by adding territory to be included within its limits and by increasing its corporate powers. This process culminated in the incorporation of the city of Stamford in 1893. 11 Spec. Laws 797. It and the town function as independent political entities. The charter of the city grants to it exclusive jurisdiction over various activities within its territorial limits. The town continues to perform the following functions within the city limits: education; care of poor and incompetent persons; conduct of town elections and making of voters; fence disputes and other town duties prescribed by statute; appropriation of funds recommended by the board of finance of the town. It shares the cost of the city court with the city and pays six ten-thousandths of its total grand list to the city for the care and maintenance of roads and bridges within the city. The assessment and collection of taxes are also a joint affair and are described in detail in State ex rel. Schenck v. Barrett, 121 Conn. 237, 244, 184 A. 379.\\nIn addition to the functions of the town performed within the city limits it conducts certain activities which serve only that portion of its territory outside of the eity limits and which do not benefit taxpayers like the plaintiffs who own property within those limits. These activities are as follows: The town appoints and pays or maintains a tree warden, health officer, zoning commission and zoning board of appeals, planning commission, public works department and police department; it maintains and pays for highways and a public dump and contributes substantial funds to a number of volunteer fire departments. The inconsistent finding that the city benefits from some of these activities is disregarded.\\nThe town grand list is $162,648,508; of this amount, properties assessed at $112,315,136 are within the city limits. The net city budget for 1945-1946 was $1,705,369.09 and that of the town $2,867,-056.14; $255,970.50 was appropriated by the town to pay for its activities carried on outside the city limits as described above. All residents of the town, including those within the city limits, pay a town tax which includes a levy to cover the expenses last mentioned, and have done so ever since the city existed. Property located in the town outside of the city limits is not charged wdth a city tax.\\nThe right of voters residing within the city limits to vote in town meetings is equal in all respects to the right of voters residing outside of those limits but within the town.\\nThe trial court concluded that the town was required by law to levy taxes on all of the property within its limits, including property within the city limits, sufficient to pay its estimated expenditures, and that it had no power to separate any item from its budget and levy separate taxes for it.\\nThe grand list of a town is made up in accordance with the directions contained in General Statutes, chapter 62, as amended. When completed, it covers all of the property subject to taxation by the town. A tax is laid \\\"on such list\\\" sufficient to cover the expenditures as estimated for the ensuing year. Cum. Sup. 1935, \\u00a7 87c. The property of the plain tiffs is in the town of Stamford, is included in the grand list of the town and, in accordance with the foregoing statutes, must be taxed by the town. Cornstock v. Waterford, 85 Conn. 6, 9, 81 A. 1059. The conclusion of the trial court must stand unless the plaintiffs can establish that their particular situation brings them within a recognized exception to this general principle.\\nThe underlying basis of the plaintiffs' principal claim is that property not benefited should not be taxed. The plaintiffs state this as follows: \\\"Property within the city limits should not be taxed for those matters which are for the sole and exclusive' benefit of the town outside of the city, and from which the taxpayers in the city derive no benefit.\\\" This claim, that property not benefited cannot be taxed, has been frequently made and almost uniformly denied. It is true that most of the cases involve complaints by owners of outlying property that they have no benefit from city improvements rather than the reverse, as here. The principle remains the same. Absence of special benefit does not prevent taxation for public purposes authorized by law. Bailey v. Manasquan, 53 N.J.L. 162, 20 A. 772; Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 85 Pa. 170, aff'd, 104 U. S. 78, 26 L. Ed. 658; Atherton v. Essex Junction, 83 Vt. 218, 223, 74 A. 1118, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 695. The rule was formerly otherwise in Kentucky, Utah and Nebraska, but those states have now joined the majority. Hughes v. Carl, 106 Ky. 533, 50 S.W. 852; Kimball v. Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368, 386, 57 P. 1; Turner v. Althaus, 6 Neb. 54. Iowa only stands out. Durant v. Kauffman, 34 Iowa 194; Taylor v. Waverly, 94 Iowa 661, 63 N.W. 347; McKeon v. Council Bluffs, 206 Iowa 556, 560, 221 N.W. 351. Courts cannot properly inquire into the \\\"expediency, wisdom or justice of [such] legislation.\\\" Kimball v. Grantsville City, supra. It is not unconstitutional. Ferguson v. Snohomish, 8 Wash. 668, 673, 36 P. 969. Unless the General Assembly has violated constitutional limitations, recourse must be had to it rather than to the courts. McLaughlin v. Estate of Cooper, 128 Conn. 557, 562, 24 A. 2d 502.\\nThe two cases relied on by the plaintiffs are not controlling. In Chamberlain v. Bridgeport, 88 Conn. 480, 490, 91 A. 380, two taxing districts, each with limited taxing authority, were consolidated. The decision turned on the wording of the consolidating act. It was held that that act continued the limitations on the power to tax to which the districts, before consolidation, were subject. The question in the case at bar was specifically excluded from the discussion. Id., 493. The Stamford charter contains no such limitation. In Williams Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Naubuc Fire District, 92 Conn. 672, 677, 104 A. 245, there is a statement that a construction which imposes taxes with no possibility of benefits should be avoided. The statement was made to support the construction of the charter then under consideration and falls far short of saying that the fact that no benefits can be received from specific services is a ground in law for holding taxes laid to pay for those services invalid.\\nNo case has been cited or found which holds that a smaller municipal unit may not be taxed for services properly performed by a larger unit in which it is included on the ground that the services do not directly benefit the smaller unit. See State ex rel. Brush v. Sixth Taxing District. 104 Conn. 192, 203, 132 A. 561.\\nA portion of the plaintiffs' brief discusses certain activities of the town, including the appointment of a tree warden and a health officer and making contributions to volunteer fire departments, as unauthorized by statute. The complaint raises no such issue but is restricted to the underlying claim just discussed. The memorandum of decision makes it clear that the case was tried and decided on that issue. It is unnecessary to decide whether a taxpayer could have an injunction against an unauthorized estimate or appropriation. As has been stated above, when the estimates are complete and the appropriations made, it is the duty of the board of finance to fix a tax rate sufficient to cover the appropriation. The complaint states no case for relief against \\\"levying and collecting a tax for the purposes above mentioned\\\" on the ground that the activities were not authorized by statute.\\nThe plaintiffs' final contention relates to the town police department and zoning commission. Their basic claim appears to be the proposition stated in the preceding paragraph. As regards zoning, their specific claim is that two zoning authorities cannot operate in the same territory. The city charter, 21 Spec. Laws 1239, provides for a zoning commission with jurisdiction in the city only. The town zoning commission has jurisdiction only in that portion of the town outside the limits of the city. 23 Spec. Laws 316. There is no conflict here. The fact that police officers of the town can serve warrants in any part of the town (23 Spec. Laws 367, \\u00a7 8), including the city, does not present an unusual situation or one which sustains the plaintiffs' claim. Their own police officers, that is those of the city, are given jurisdiction throughout the town in criminal matters with all the powers of constables. 21 Spec. Laws 1205, \\u00a7 52. Such mutual co-operation serves a useful and, perhaps, necessary purpose. Compare, for example, the right of the state police to make arrests in any municipality in the state. General Statutes \\u00a7 2295.\\nThis opinion follows the briefs, but practical considerations lead to the same result. The organization of subsidiary taxing districts, by whatever name called, for the purpose of securing additional revenue from those specially benefited by special services is complicated but customary and seems to work out fairly well. The Stamford solution has been in effect for over one hundred years. In order to accomplish the result sought by the plaintiffs, such a special district consisting of town property outside of the city limits would be necessary. This might be done but only by specific legislative authority. No such authority has been granted. The judgment was correct.\\nThere is no error.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\\nSee also State ex rel. Kellett v. Johnson, 330 Mo. 452, 455, 50 S.W. 2d 121; Frace v. Tacoma, 16 Wash. 69, 47 P. 219; Morgan's L. & T. R. R. & S. S. Co. v. White, 136 La. 1074, 1077, 68 So. 130; St. Louis & S. W. R. Co. v. Nattin, 277 U.S. 157, 159, 48 S. Ct. 438, 72 L. Ed. 830; Dixon v. Mayes, 72 Cal. 166, 168, 13 P. 471; Carey v. Pekin, 88 Ill. 154; Mendenhall v. Burton, 42 Kan. 570, 576, 22 P. 558; Mitchell v. Negaunee, 113 Mich. 359, 361, 71 N.W. 646; Norris v. Waco, 57 Tex. 635, 640; Davis v. Pt. Pleasant, 32 W. Va. 289, 295, 9 S.E. 228; 6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2d Ed. Rev.) \\u00a7 2549, 2558.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1636769\", \"name\": \"Jennie Winestine et al. vs. The Rose Cloak and Suit Company et als.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Winestine v. Rose Cloak & Suit Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1919-07-16\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"633\", \"last_page\": \"639\", \"citations\": \"93 Conn. 633\", \"volume\": \"93\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:00:59.220987+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Prentice, C. J., Roraback, Wheeler, Beach and Gager, Js.\", \"parties\": \"Jennie Winestine et al. vs. The Rose Cloak and Suit Company et als.\", \"head_matter\": \"Jennie Winestine et al. vs. The Rose Cloak and Suit Company et als.\\nThird Judicial District, New Haven,\\nJune Term, 1919.\\nPrentice, C. J., Roraback, Wheeler, Beach and Gager, Js.\\nA correction of the finding, which, if made, would not affect the judgment rendered, will be refused.\\nThe motive with which an act is done may often be inferred from proof of facts and circumstances connected with the transaction.\\nIn the present case it appeared that the plaintiffs were sublessees of the defendant corporation in a part of a building leased by it, and that if the corporation renewed its lease for five years, as it had the right to do, the plaintiffs would be entitled to a sublease of their portion of the building for the renewal period, if they so elected. The original lease was renewed, but in the name of the president of the corporation instead of in the corporate name, and the plaintiffs elected to renew their sublease, which the corporation and its president refused to grant. The trial court found that the renewal of the principal lease in the individual name of the president of the corporation instead of in its own name, was for the fraudulent purpose of having it appear not to be a renewal, and so, if possible, to deprive the sublessees of the continuation of their lease; and that such renewal was, in effect, a renewal of the corporate lease and was so intended by the parties. Held that the evidence in the case warranted these conclusions of the-trial court.\\nThat rents have greatly increased within a few years is, it seems, a matter of which courts may take judicial notice.\\nThe legal remedy must be complete and adequate, in order to preclude a litigant from resorting to a court of equity.\\nArgued June 4th\\ndecided July 16th, 1919.\\nSuit to secure the continuance .of a sublease pursuant to an alleged agreement between the parties, for an injunction, and for other equitable relief, brought to and tried by the District Court of Waterbury, Peasely, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff Jennie Winestine, and appeal by the defendant Pauline Rosengarten.\\nNo error.\\nIt is conceded that in September, 1915, the defendants Levys leased to the Rose Cloak and Suit Company two entire buildings, located on South Main Street in Waterbury, for a monthly rental of $300 payable in advance. The term of the lease extended to March 1st, 1918. This lease was renewable for the further term of five years, provided the lessee gave the lessors six months\\u2019 notice of its desire to exercise the privilege of renewal. The lessee gave this notice and thereby became entitled to a renewal of the lease in case it desired such renewal.\\nIn August, 1916, the Rose Cloak and Suit Company leased a portion of these premises to the plaintiff Jennie Winestine for $85 a month, the lease to expire on March 1st, 1918. This lease provides that \\u201cprivilege is hereby given to continue this lease for a further period of five years under the same terms as herein mentioned, in the event the said The Rose Cloak and Suit Company exercises its privilege of renewing its lease made with David E. and Herman H. Levy with reference to said premises.\\u201d\\nIt also appears that Pauline Rosengarten has commenced summary process proceedings to gain possession of the premises, which proceedings have not terminnated in a judgment owing to the commencement of the present action and the issuance of an injunction in connection therewith.\\nThe plaintiffs have alleged, as the trial court has found, that the defendant Rose Cloak and Suit Company did in fact exercise its privilege of renewing this lease with David E. and Herman H. Levy for the further term of five years from March 1st, 1918; that the name of Pauline Rosengarten as lessee, instead of the name of the Rose Cloak and Suit Company, was used in the renewal lease with David E. and Herman Levy, for the purpose of making it appear that it was not a renewal of the lease and, if possible, to deprive the plaintiff Jennie Winestine of the continuation of her lease for five years from March 1st, 1918; that this lease was made for and in behalf of the Rose Cloak and Suit Company, and was intended to be and was a renewal of its lease of the premises described therein, being the same premises described in the lease of the Levys to the Rose Cloak and Suit Company.\\nWilliam E. Thoms, for the appellant (defendant Pauline Rosengarten).\\nCharles G. Root, for the appellees (plaintiffs).\", \"word_count\": \"1799\", \"char_count\": \"10352\", \"text\": \"Roraback, J.\\nThe defendant Rosengarten claims that the court erred in finding as it did in respect to a large number of matters, and in failing to find as re quested as to other matters, and we are asked to correct the finding in those particulars. It is unnecessary to pursue these assignments of error, as it appears from the evidence that no correction of, or addition to, the finding, could properly be made which would affect the judgment that was rendered in the plaintiffs' behalf.\\nThis case turns upon the question whether the evidence was sufficient to warrant the conclusion of the trial court as to the purpose and effect of the renewal of the lease originally made to the Rose'Cloak and'Suit Company by the defendants Levys.\\nThe motive with which an act is done may be, and often is, ascertained and determined by inference from the proof of facts and circumstances connected with the transaction and the parties to it. Sallies v. Johnson, 85 Conn. 77, 81, 81 Atl. 974. So in this case, it appears that the new lease of the premises in question, made by the Levys to Pauline Rosengarten, is like the old one made to the Rose Cloak and Suit Company, except that the - name Pauline Rosengarten is substituted in the place of the Rose Cloak and Suit Company; that Pauline Rosengarten was the president of the Suit Company; that she owned twenty-seven of the thirty shares of the capital stock of the Suit Company; that of the three remaining shares two were owned by members of Pauline Rosengarten's family; that the rent to be paid under the new lease was the same that was paid under the old lease made with the Suit Company; and that the management and control of the business of the Suit Company was not changed after the defendant Rosengarten claims that she obtained a lease in her own name from the Levys. The motive for the defendant Rosengarten's attempt to get rid of the plaintiff's privilege to renew, can be found in the fact that prices for rents had greatly increased during the term of the Suit Company's original lease. Of this fact undoubtedly the trial court took judicial notice.\\nThese facts, in the absence of any satisfactory explanation, which was not given, warranted the court below in reaching the conclusions just referred to. It heard the parties, had the benefit of their presence and appearance, and after considering all the circumstances reached the conclusion that the lease from the Levys to Pauline Rosengarten was not made in good faith. An examination of the record does not disclose that this conclusion is without sufficient evidence to support it.\\nThe defendant Rosengarten now contends that the finding does not show that the Suit Company was entitled to renew its lease with the Levys. A complete answer to this proposition is to be found in the fact that it appears that the defendant Rosengarten in her brief concedes that the Suit Company gave the notice required by its lease with the Levys and \\\" thereby became entitled to a renewal of the lease in case it desired such renewal.\\\"\\nAs we have just stated, it appears that the defendant Rosengarten conceded that the Suit Company gave notice to the Levys of its intention to renew, and that it had the right to renewal if it wished to exercise that right. The trial court has found that such right was exercised by the Suit Company; that such renewal was made with the intention that it should be a renewal of the original lease of the Suit Company with the Levys. The fact that Pauline Rosengarten took the lease in her name did not relieve the Suit Company from its obligation to fulfil its contract with the plaintiff Jennie Winestine. The only way the Suit Company could avoid this obligation was by the abandonment of its right to renew. Cunningham v. Pattee, 99 Mass. 248, 253; Nutmeg Park Driving Corporation v. Fisk, 81 Conn. 463, 465, 466, 71 Atl. 499.\\nThe record discloses that the only objection properly made by the defendant Rosengarten in the court below as to the relief claimed by the plaintiffs in their complaint, and the relief granted by the trial court in its judgment rendered, was that the defendant Rosengarten should not be enjoined from proceeding with her action of summary process, \\u2014 for, if the lease from the corporation has been actually renewed, that is a good legal defense.\\nUndoubtedly it is the rule that when a party has a remedy at law, he cannot come into equity, unless from circumstances not within his control he could not avail himself of his legal remedy. Before refusing its aid upon this ground, however, it must appear to the court that the legal remedy is complete and adequate to afford the complainant full redress.\\nIn this case the evidence shows, as the court has found, that the plaintiff Jennie Winestine, acting under the privilege given by her lease from the Suit Company, after taking possession of the premises, expended more than $1,000 in making permanent improvements of the store which she had leased. There is a class of cases holding that one having the right to declare a forfeiture, who does not declare it when he is entitled to do so, waives his right. This proposition rests upon the ground of estoppel. In such cases the lessee has usually made large expenditures or made valuable improvements believing that the right of forfeiture would not be asserted. O'Connor v. Timmermann, 85 Neb. 422-425, 123 N. W. 443, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1062-1066.\\nThis is such a case, and, further than this, it also appears that the plaintiff Jennie Winestine has faithfully kept and is faithfully keeping all the terms and conditions of the lease, and that she has taken the necessary steps to exercise her privilege of continuing the lease fer five years, as provided therein. Under these circumstances, it is apparent that the plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction to protect their rights. There is no error.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1664914\", \"name\": \"State of Connecticut v. Anonymous (1980-5)\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Anonymous (1980-5)\", \"decision_date\": \"1979\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"527\", \"last_page\": \"532\", \"citations\": \"36 Conn. Supp. 527\", \"volume\": \"36\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Supplement\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:01:31.454437+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"State of Connecticut v. Anonymous (1980-5)\", \"head_matter\": \"State of Connecticut v. Anonymous (1980-5)\\nAppellate Session of the Superior Court\\nThus entitled, in view of General Statutes \\u00a7 54-142a.\", \"word_count\": \"1427\", \"char_count\": \"8818\", \"text\": \"David M. Shea, J.\\nAfter entering a plea of nolo contendere the defendant was found guilty of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of General Statutes \\u00a7 14-227a and the penalty of a fine was imposed. He has appealed from that judgment, claiming error in the denial, for lack of jurisdiction, of his motion for pretrial accelerated rehabilitation under General Statutes \\u00a7 54-76p.\\nThe record indicates that the trial court denied the defendant's motion upon the ground that the offense of operating a motor vehicle under the influence does not constitute a \\\"crime\\\" and, therefore, that the defendant did not qualify for accelerated rehabilitation which is available under \\u00a7 54-76p only to \\\"persons accused of a crime, not of a serious nature.\\\" The validity of this conclusion is the only issue raised in this appeal.\\nOperating under the influence of liquor, or \\\"drunken driving\\\" in ordinary parlance, has been commonly regarded as a \\\"crime\\\" in the general sense of that term. It is punishable under \\u00a7 14-227a (e) by a fine or imprisonment or both for a first offense, and subsequent convictions carry mandatory jail terms. In our cases it has been consistently referred to as a crime. State v. Englehart, 158 Conn. 117, 119, 256 A.2d 231 (1969); State v. DeCoster, 147 Conn. 502, 503, 162 A.2d 704 (1960); State v. McDonough, 129 Conn. 483, 484, 29 A.2d 582 (1942).\\nThe state contends that operating under the influence is not a crime because it falls within the exception to the definition of \\\"offense\\\" in General Stat utes \\u00a7 53a-24, a provision of the penal code. The word \\\"offense\\\" is defined there to mean \\\"any crime or violation which constitutes a breach of any law of this state . . . for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment or to a fine, or both, may be imposed, except one that defines a motor vehicle violation or is deemed tobe an infraction(Emphasis added.) The term \\\"motor vehicle violation\\\" is not defined by any statute. The argument of the state necessarily assumes that any breach of law involving the use of a motor vehicle constitutes a \\\"motor vehicle violation\\\" and would therefore fall within the exception. The thrust of this argument would seem to apply to a number of other statutes prohibiting certain acts with a motor vehicle which have usually been regarded as criminal, such as misconduct with a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes \\u00a7 53a-57 or negligent homicide with a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes \\u00a7 53a-58a. Section 14-227a, which prohibits operating under the influence, is found in chapter 248 of the statutes, entitled \\\"Vehicle Highway Use,\\\" rather than in chapter 952, entitled \\\"Penal Code: Offenses.\\\" We hesitate to attribute much signifi canee to this circumstance, however, since it is expressly provided that the felony, misdemeanor, and violation classifications of the penal code apply also to charges based upon sections of the General Statutes not included in the code. General Statutes \\u00a753a~25 (c), 53a-26 (c), 53a-27 (b). The broad exclusion of all breaches of law involving motor vehicles is also contrary to the intention of the draftsmen of the penal code, who apparently intended that only motor vehicle infractions should be excepted from the definition of \\\"offense.\\\"\\nAlthough the phrase \\\"motor vehicle violation\\\" is undefined, a \\\"violation\\\" is defined as \\\"[a]n offense, for which the only sentence authorized is a fine . . . unless expressly designated an infraction.\\\" General Statutes \\u00a7 53a-27 (a). Operating under the influence would not qualify as a violation under this definition because it is punishable by imprisonment as well as by a fine. It would be an unclassified misdemeanor because the punishment provided falls within the parameters of General Statutes \\u00a7 53a-26 (a). If it comes within that classification it is a \\\"crime\\\" because that term, as used in the penal code, \\\"comprises felonies and misdemeanors.\\\" General Statutes \\u00a7 53a-24 (a).\\nWe have concluded that the term \\\"motor vehicle violations,\\\" not being otherwise defined, incorporates the definition of \\\"violation\\\" contained in \\u00a7 53a-27 (a) as an offense punishable only by a fine. The comment of the draftsmen of the penal code upon \\u00a7 53a-24 (a) states that \\\" '[violation,' which must be read in connection with section 53a-27, means an offense calling only for a fine for breach thereof.\\\" 27A Connecticut General Statutes, Annotated (West Ed.), commission comment (1971). Our view is consistent with this comment. The exception of \\\"motor vehicle violations\\\" from the definition of \\\"offense\\\" is limited to breaches of statutes involving motor vehicles when the only penalty which can be imposed is a fine. Operating under the influence as prohibited by \\u00a7 14-227a does not fall within the exception because it is not punishable as a \\\"violation\\\" defined by \\u00a7 53a-27, but as an \\\"unclassified misdemeanor\\\" under \\u00a7 53a-26 (c). Since it is a misdemeanor, it is also a \\\"crime\\\" as defined by \\u00a7 53a-24 (a).\\nBecause we have concluded that operating under the influence falls within the definition of \\\"crime\\\" contained in the penal code, we have no occasion to consider whether in the accelerated rehabilitation statute, \\u00a7 54-76p, the word may have a broader import. We leave this question to another time.\\nWe find error in the conclusion of the trial court that accelerated rehabilitation is jurisdictionally unavailable to persons charged with operating under the influence in violation of \\u00a7 14-227a. It is clear from \\u00a7 54-76p, however, that the invocation of a program of accelerated rehabilitation is discretionary with the court and that such discretion must be exercised not only in reviewing the qualifications of the offender but also in considering the nature of the particular offense and the circumstances of its commission. In order to enable the trial court to exercise such discretion the judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings.\\nParskey and Bieluch, Js., concurred in this opinion.\\nInvocation of the accelerated rehabilitation program is in the discretion of the trial court. On successful completion of the program, and on application by the defendant, the trial court \\\"shall dismiss\\\" the charges against him. General Statutes \\u00a7 54-76p.\\n\\\"[General Statutes] Sec. 53a-24. offense defined, application OF SENTENCING PROVISIONS TO MOTOR VEHICLE AND DRUG SELLING violators. (a) The term 'offense' means any crime or violation which constitutes a breach of any law of this state or of any other state or of federal law or local law or ordinance of a political subdivision of this state, for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment or to a fine, or both, may be imposed, except one that defines a motor vehicle violation or is deemed to be an infraction. The term 'crime' comprises felonies and misdemeanors. Every offense which is not a 'crime' is a 'violation.' Conviction of a violation shall not give rise to any disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction of a criminal offense.\\n\\\"(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a), the provisions of sections 53a-28 to 53a-44, inclusive, shall apply to motor vehicle violations. Said provisions shall apply to convictions under section 19-480a except that the execution of any mandatory minimum sentence imposed under the provisions of said section may not be suspended.\\\"\\nThe comment of the commission, to revise the penal code upon General Statutes \\u00a7 53a-24(b) is partly as follows: \\\"The definition of 'offense' in subsection (a) makes clear that it does not include motor vehicle infractions. The purpose of this provision is to except from the operation of the Code, except as provided in subsection (b), motor vehicle infractions.\\\" 27A Connecticut General Statutes, Annotated (West Ed.), commission comment (1971).\\nSince we are dealing with a question of legislative interpretation, we have not considered the effect of Practice Book, 1978, \\u00a7 1021 which defines the terms \\\"offense,\\\" \\\"crime,\\\" \\\"felony,\\\" \\\"misdemeanor,\\\" \\\"violation,\\\" and \\\"infraction.\\\" Our analysis of the statutes, however, is consistent with these definitions. Practice Book, 1978, $ 1021(5) defines \\\"offense\\\" to include trafile offenses; subsection (6) defines \\\"crime\\\" to be a felony or a misdemeanor; subsections (8) and (9) define \\\"felony\\\" and \\\"misdemeanor\\\" to be \\\"offenses\\\" for which a person may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment; and subsection (7) defines \\\"violation\\\" to bo an \\\"offense\\\" for which the only sentence authorized is a fine. Because a breach of General Statutes \\u00a7 14-227a may result in a penalty of imprisonment, it would fall within the definition of \\\"crime\\\" in Practice Book, 1978, \\u00a7 1021.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1757854\", \"name\": \"Pamela Korn v. Marion R. Rennison\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Korn v. Rennison\", \"decision_date\": \"1959-11-12\", \"docket_number\": \"File No. 90257\", \"first_page\": \"400\", \"last_page\": \"404\", \"citations\": \"21 Conn. Supp. 400\", \"volume\": \"21\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Supplement\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:01:37.768038+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Pamela Korn v. Marion R. Rennison\", \"head_matter\": \"Pamela Korn v. Marion R. Rennison\\nSuperior Court New Haven County\\nFile No. 90257\\nMemorandum filed November 12, 1959\\nBenjamin M. Chapnick, of New Haven, for the plaintiff.\\nFrancis R. Danaher, of Meriden, for defendant Marion E. Eennison.\\nWiggin & Dana, of New Haven, for defendant Eegister Publishing Co.\\nEmanuelson & Wynne, of New Haven, for defendant E. W. Malley Co.\", \"word_count\": \"1136\", \"char_count\": \"6808\", \"text\": \"Alcorn, J.\\nThe plaintiff, a minor, brings this action by her mother to recover damages. The substance of the complaint is that, through an arrangement and agreement between the three defendants, a photograph of the plaintiff was published for advertising purposes in the defendant newspaper with out the knowledge, consent or permission of the plaintiff and in violation of her personal liberties and private rights, as a result of which the defendants received pecuniary and monetary benefits and advantages while the plaintiff received none and was subjected to ridicule, embarrassment, vexation and humiliation.\\nThe defendants demur upon three grounds: that the complaint fails to state a cause of action recognized in Connecticut; that the facts alleged do not constitute a cause of action; and that reference to the publication, which is made a part of the complaint, demonstrates that the plaintiff suffered no damage.\\nThe first ground of demurrer presents the question as to whether or not, in this state, a tort action will lie for an invasion of the right of privacy. The question has never been decided. The subject was referred to in Urban v. Hartford Gas Co., 139 Conn. 301, where the court said (p. 309), \\\"Even if we were to hold that the right of privacy exists in Connecticut, the facts alleged in the complaint are inadequate to establish a violation of that right.\\\" In O'Connell v. Hartford Times, Inc., 15 Conn. Sup. 85, 86, an action for violation of the right of privacy was discussed but there again the decision turned upon the fact that even if such a right of action existed the complaint was insufficient to allege it.\\nThe defendants argue that such a right of action was not recognized at common law and therefore, in the absence of statute, it cannot exist in Connecticut today. When Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brand\\u00e9is first gave form and substance to the right to privacy in 1890, it was one objective of their discussion in 4 Harvard Law Review 193 to demonstrate that the right found support in common-law principles. Underlying their reasoning is the prem ise that the common law is not static and its protecting arm does not become immobilized from lack of precedent.\\nIn the years intervening since the right was thus defined, a constantly increasing number of jurisdictions have recognized its independent existence. Press, photography, radio and television represent elements in constantly changing conditions which impinge upon individual privacy. With the environmental changes of modem living has grown the need that man's inner nature and feelings as well as his body and possessions receive the protection of the law. Hence, the right to privacy has become established in nearly half the states.\\nNice distinctions between the traditional fields of law and equity are not always made in the reported cases, and in a few states the problem has been met by statute. The line to be drawn between reasonable demands of individual privacy and the public interest in legitimate news is not always easy to define, but the boundary is more readily perceived in the case of commercial advertising. A leading case supporting the right as it relates to the use of a picture in advertising is Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 69 L.R.A. 101, 106. To set forth here a detailed discussion of the basis for and limitations upon the right would amount only to repetition of fully developed reasoning in decisions readily at hand. An able and full analysis with which this court finds no ground for disagreement, again relating to the -unauthorized publication of a photograph in advertising, is found in Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 293. The decision in that case defines the nature and limitations of the right and catalogues authorities in detail. Decisions and legal articles are also abundantly cited in Pallas v. Crowley, Milner & Co., 322 Mich. 411, and in the footnote to Hazlitt v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 116 F. Sup. 538, 542. No case decided within the last fifteen years has been found in which the existence of a right of privacy has been denied. Decisions which originally denied the right have, with apparently a single exception, since been overruled, modified or altered by statute. Rhode Island appears to stand alone as an unqualified precedent for denying a recovery in damages for an invasion of the right of privacy. Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 30 R.I. 13, 43.\\nThe right of privacy, as developed, finds expression in the Restatement, 4 Torts \\u00a7 867, as follows: \\\"A person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's interest in not having his affairs known to others or his likeness exhibited to the public is liable to the other.\\\" The statement of the rule emphasizes the importance of the facts of the individual case presented. The recognition of the right as a basis for a tort action in jurisdictions faced with the question unaided by statute, and the practical unanimity of recent opinion, place the right within the purview of the common law. The first ground of demurrer is overruled.\\nThe second ground of demurrer is that the facts alleged do not state a cause of action. From the facts alleged, including the advertisement in issue filed as an exhibit and made part of the complaint by reference, the pitfalls ahead for the plaintiff are readily apparent. Those obstacles, however, lie in the proof which must be offered. The issue now is whether or not the allegations made are adequate to permit the offer of the essential proof. Liability for a violation of the right of privacy exists if the defendant's conduct was such that he should have realized that it would be offensive to persons of ordinary sensibilities. Eestatement, 4 Torts \\u00a7 867, comment d. The complaint, in addition to alleging publication without the plaintiff's consent, states that by reason of it she was \\\"subjected to ridicule, embarrassment, vexation, and humiliation.\\\" This is a sufficient statement of a cause of action, and the second ground of demurrer is overruled.\\nThe third ground of demurrer in substance would have the court as a matter of law exercise the province of the jury. In addition to other allegations of damage the plaintiff alleges that her \\\"private life and property was invaded, trespassed and encroached upon.\\\" Any evaluation of damages for trespass to property rights, at least, must await proof.\\nThe demurrer is overruled on all grounds.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1958828\", \"name\": \"Deborah LaPila v. Louis LaPila\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"LaPila v. LaPila\", \"decision_date\": \"1986-04-15\", \"docket_number\": \"3916\", \"first_page\": \"26\", \"last_page\": \"27\", \"citations\": \"7 Conn. App. 26\", \"volume\": \"7\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Appellate Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Appellate Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:12:20.769380+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Deborah LaPila v. Louis LaPila\", \"head_matter\": \"Deborah LaPila v. Louis LaPila\\n(3916)\\nDupont, C. J., Daly and Bieluch, Js.\\nArgued March 18 \\u2014\\ndecision released April 15, 1986\\nJohn J. Bunce, Jr., for the appellant (defendant).\\nEric Onore, with whom, on the brief, was Albert J. McGrail, for the appellee (plaintiff).\", \"word_count\": \"50\", \"char_count\": \"298\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nThere is no error.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
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+"{\"id\": \"1971934\", \"name\": \"Shirley B. Everett v. James L. Pabilonia et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Everett v. Pabilonia\", \"decision_date\": \"1987-06-02\", \"docket_number\": \"3623\", \"first_page\": \"171\", \"last_page\": \"179\", \"citations\": \"11 Conn. App. 171\", \"volume\": \"11\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Appellate Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Appellate Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:27:13.823901+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Shirley B. Everett v. James L. Pabilonia et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Shirley B. Everett v. James L. Pabilonia et al.\\n(3623)\\nSpallone, Bieluch and Berdon, Js.\\nArgued March 10\\ndecision released June 2, 1987\\nMary E. Holzworth, with whom, on the brief, was Allyn L. Brown, Jr., for the appellant (plaintiff).\\nJames J. Murphy, Jr., with whom, on the brief, was Dawn E. Currier, for the appellees (defendants).\", \"word_count\": \"2462\", \"char_count\": \"14583\", \"text\": \"Spallone, J.\\nThe plaintiff is appealing from the judgment of the trial court denying her a right-of-way by deed and granting her a more limited right-of-way by prescription.\\nThe following facts are not in dispute. In 1948, Francis and Josephine Czainski, the plaintiffs predecessors in title, purchased property in the town of Windham at a foreclosure sale. At the time of purchase, the lot contained a house and a garage that were three-quarters finished. The Czainskis completed work on those structures and added a second garage in 1962. On November 25, 1968, the Czainskis conveyed the property to the plaintiff by deed, which deed, in addition to a metes and bounds description, described the property as \\\"[b]eing Lot #101 as shown on a plan entitled 'Modern Life Homes Corporation, Hitchcock Park, Willimantic, Conn., Partial Layout of Plots, drawn by F.H. Hamilton August 1946 Scale 1\\\" = 3',' which plan is on file in the office of the Town Clerk of the Town of Windham.\\\" A road depicted as Cod Colony Road is clearly shown on the aforementioned plan as abutting the plaintiffs property. Neither Cod Colony Road nor any of the other residences shown on the aforementioned map, however, was ever completed. Both the plaintiff and the Czainskis, however, had used a dirt path to reach the two garages on the plaintiffs property, and this path was located in the general area where Cod Colony Road was to have been located. The defendants are the present owners of the land adjoining the plaintiff's property, including the dirt path by which the plaintiffs reached their garages.\\nIn 1981, the defendants began to interfere with the plaintiff's use of the dirt path. Thereafter, the plaintiff brought the present action in two counts, the first count claiming a right-of-way by deed and the second count claiming an easement by prescription. After a trial, the court found that the plaintiff had failed to offer evidence to establish a right-of-way by deed, but that the plaintiff had established a prescriptive easement. The court also found that the plaintiff had not established that she was entitled to exemplary damages. The court therefore rendered judgment granting the plaintiff a right-of-way \\\"extending from the southerly boundary of the plaintiff's property to the southerly tire path of the dirt road as it presently exists.\\\" The plaintiff appealed from this judgment on October 12, 1984.\\nOn October 29, 1984, the plaintiff filed a motion to open and modify the judgment and a motion seeking further articulation of the court's judgment. These motions were argued on November 11, 1985. On December 24, 1985, the court rendered its decision articulating its decision and denying the motion to open and modify. The plaintiff thereafter amended her appeal to include the denial of her motion to open and modify the judgment.\\nThe plaintiff claims the trial court erred (1) in denying the plaintiff's motion to open and modify the judgment, when, as a matter of law, she had a right-of-way by deed because the deed made reference to a recorded plan depicting Cod Colony Road, (2) in limiting the plaintiff's right-of-way acquired by prescription, (3) in refusing to award exemplary damages, and (4) in refusing to grant injunctive relief restraining the defendants from interfering with her right-of-way. We find no error.\\nIn her first claim of error, the plaintiff asserts that the court erred in denying her motion to open and modify because, as a matter of law, her deed established that she had a right-of-way over Cod Colony Road. The plaintiff relies on Whitton v. Clark, 112 Conn. 28, 151 A. 305 (1930), and later related cases. See Lake Garda Co. v. D'Arche, 135 Conn. 449, 66 A.2d 120 (1949) (right-of-way can be created even where roadways are not developed); Merino v. Fish, Inc., 112 Conn. 557, 153 A. 301 (1931); Tuccio v. Lincoln Development Corporation, 27 Conn. Sup. 373, 239 A.2d 69 (1967); Hackert v. Edwards, 22 Conn. Sup 499, 175 A.2d 381 (1961). In Whitton v. Clark, supra, 32, our Supreme Court stated: \\\"[T]he law is well settled that where an owner of land causes a map to be made of it upon which are delineated separate lots and streets and highways by which access may be had to them, and then sells the lots, referring in his conveyances to the map, the lot owners acquire the right to have the streets and highways thereafter kept open for use in connection with their lands.\\\" (Citations omitted.) The plaintiff claims that because her deed clearly makes reference to a recorded map that shows Cod Colony Road as abutting her property, and because she would benefit from the use of at least part of Cod Colony Road, the court erred by failing to hold that she had established a right-of-way over the proposed Cod Colony Road.\\nInitially, we note that the plaintiff raised this argument for the first time in a memorandum of law submitted on November 5, 1985, in connection with her motion to open and modify and her motion for articu lation. This claim was never made at trial; nor was it made in either the motion to open and modify or the motion for further articulation, both of which were filed on October 29,1984, over a year before the issue was raised in the memorandum. If it is assumed arguendo that the court had jurisdiction to consider this claim, our review of the trial court's decision is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. Acheson v. White, 195 Conn. 211, 215, 487 A.2d 197 (1985). In making this determination, we must make every reasonable presumption in favor of its action. Id.\\nWe find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to open the judgment in order to hold that the plaintiff had established an easement over the proposed Cod Colony Road. The authority relied on by the plaintiff, Whitton v. Clark, supra, and its progeny, were recently clarified by our Supreme Court in Stankiewicz v. Miami Beach Assn., Inc., 191 Conn. 165, 464 A.2d 26 (1983). In Stankiewicz, the court held that while a grantor may convey an implied easement for the use of streets by making reference in a deed to a map that delineates such streets, an easement over these streets will be created only if the conveyor in fact owns the streets. Id., 170. The court reasoned that since a grantor cannot convey a greater title than he possesses, a grantor cannot create an easement, express or implied, over land in which he has no interest. If this reasoning is applied to the present case, the plaintiff would be able to establish an implied easement over Cod Colony Road only if she demonstrated that at the time the deed in her chain of title first referred to the map delineating Cod Colony Road, the grantor conveying this deed in fact owned the street. The plaintiff, however, has failed to demonstrate that she established, or even raised, this point at trial. Thus, even if we assume that the trial court had jurisdiction to consider this claim, we would be unable to find that the court abused its discretion in failing to open the judgment in order to hold that the plaintiff had established an implied easement over Cod Colony Road.\\nIn her second claim of error, the plaintiff claims that the trial court erred by defining too narrowly the scope of her prescriptive easement. The trial court found that the plaintiff had established a prescriptive easement over the dirt path located adjacent to the southern border of her property. The plaintiff claims that, in addition to an easement over the dirt path, the court should have found that she had established an easement over a grass portion along the path because this portion was necessary for her to be able to back her vehicles out of her driveway.\\nThe determination of the scope of a prescriptive easement is a question of fact. See Reynolds v. Soffer, 190 Conn. 184, 190, 459 A.2d 1027 (1980). Our review of the factual findings of the trial court is limited to the determination of whether, in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record, these findings are clearly erroneous. Practice Book \\u00a7 4061. A factual finding of the trial court is clearly erroneous if it is unsupported by the evidence or if, in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record, this court is left \\\" 'with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.' \\\" Doyle v. Kulesza, 197 Conn. 101, 105, 495 A.2d 1074 (1985); Pandolphe's Auto Parts, Inc. v. Manchester, 181 Conn. 217, 221-22, 435 A.2d 24 (1980); Buddenhagen v. Luque, 10 Conn. App. 41, 44-45, 521 A.2d 221 (1987). In the present case, while the testimony was uncontradicted that the plaintiff and her predecessor had customarily backed out of the driveway and traveled over the dirt path to reach the main street, the testimony was unclear as to whether the plaintiff and her predecessor used the grassy area next to the path when backing her vehicle from her driveway. While there was testimony that the grassy area was used for other purposes, the testimony did not clearly establish that it was used as part of the right-of-way. Without such evidence, we cannot find that the trial court's findings as to the scope of the easement were clearly erroneous.\\nIn her third claim of error, the plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in refusing to award her exemplary damages. The court concluded that although the defendants had inconvenienced the plaintiff by blocking access to the proposed Cod Colony Road, the defendants had not caused the plaintiff any real dam age. In addition, the court found that the defendants could not be charged with reckless indifference or malicious intent toward the plaintiff since the defendants had made a good faith effort to satisfy the plaintiffs claim. The plaintiff claims that the court ignored certain evidence she introduced concerning her damages and that there was sufficient evidence to find that the defendant acted with reckless disregard of her rights.\\n\\\" '[PJunitive damages' and 'exemplary damages' are merely alternate labels for the same remedy, a remedy awarded only when the evidence shows reckless, intentional or wanton violation of the rights of others.\\\" Gionfriddo v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 192 Conn. 280, 289 n.7, 472 A.2d 306 (1984); see also Alaimo v. Royer, 188 Conn. 36, 42-43, 448 A.2d 207 (1982). The trial court's findings regarding the alleged reckless indifference or malicious intent of the plaintiff are factual findings subject to review under the clearly erroneous standard. Practice Book \\u00a7 4061; see Leabo v. Leninski, 2 Conn. App. 715, 724, 484 A.2d 239 (1984). After reviewing the record and briefs, we cannot say that the court's conclusion on this issue was clearly erroneous.\\nFinally, the plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in failing to grant her injunctive relief restraining the defendants from interfering with her use of the right-of-way. An injunction is a harsh remedy and our courts have consistently held that its issuance is only proper in order to prevent irreparable injury. Berin v. Olson, 183 Conn. 337, 340, 439 A.2d 357 (1981); Scoville v. Ronalter, 162 Conn. 67, 74, 291 A.2d 222 (1971); Bendell v. Johnson, 153 Conn. 48, 51, 212 A.2d 199 (1965). The granting of an injunction is not mandatory but is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Berin v. Olson, supra; Jones v. Foote, 165 Conn. 516, 521, 338 A.2d 467 (1973); Koepper v. Emanuele, 164 Conn. 175, 178, 319 A.2d 411 (1972); Lichteig v. Churinetz, 9 Conn. App. 406, 412, 519 A.2d 99 (1986). We note that the plaintiff did not establish a legally enforceable right-of-way over the gravel path until judgment was rendered in her favor in these proceedings. There is no reason to believe that the defendants will violate the judgment of the court. On the contrary, the court found that the defendants, after being advised by their attorney, agreed that the plaintiff had a right to use the right-of-way by prescription. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's failure to grant injunctive relief.\\nThere is no error.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\\nAlthough the plaintiff in the first count of her complaint claimed a right-of-way by deed over the defendant's land, the plaintiff did not claim that the right-of-way was established under the Whitton doctrine because of the map reference in her deed. Instead, the plaintiff claimed a right-of-way by deed in apparent reliance on language that appears to have been contained in the defendant's deed. In her complaint, the plaintiff claimed that the portion of the defendant's land subject to such right-of-way was as follows: \\\"A right-of-way from Cod Colony Road to the land of Pakorvich to be kept open adjacent to the southerly boundary of lot #101 Hitchcock Park (so-called). The above land and right-of-way shown on a plan entitled Modern-Life Homes Corporation, Hitchcock Park, Willimantic, Conn. Proposed lay out of Plats, Drawn by F.H. Hamilton August 1946 filed with City Clerk, Willimantic, Conn. Oct. 22,1946.\\\" In addition, in both her motion to open and modify and her motion for articulation, the plaintiff requested the court to describe the plaintiffs right-of-way in accordance with this language, and made no reference to her present claim. As the trial court later found and the plaintiff admitted in oral argument, however, this description referred to a wholly different location than the Cod Colony Road area that the plaintiff now claims was established by virtue of the map reference in her deed.\\nUnder General Statutes \\u00a7 52-212a and Practice Book \\u00a7 326, a motion to open judgment must be filed within four months from the date it was rendered. Celanese Fiber v. Pic Yarns, Inc., 184 Conn. 461, 465, 440 A.2d 159 (1981). Absent certain exceptions not relevant here, a trial court has no jurisdiction to hear a motion filed beyond this four month period. Id., 465-66. Although the plaintiff filed her motion to open and modify within four months of judgment, the motion specifically requested that the judgment be modified only in three respects, none of which were related to the present claim of implied easement under the Whitton doctrine. The present claim was not raised until over a year after the trial court rendered judgment.\"}"
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--- /dev/null
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+"{\"id\": \"237073\", \"name\": \"FJK ASSOCIATES v. MAIDA KARKOSKI\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"FJK Associates v. Karkoski\", \"decision_date\": \"1999-03-02\", \"docket_number\": \"AC 17794\", \"first_page\": \"66\", \"last_page\": \"69\", \"citations\": \"52 Conn. App. 66\", \"volume\": \"52\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Appellate Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Appellate Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:56:58.605962+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"FJK ASSOCIATES v. MAIDA KARKOSKI\", \"head_matter\": \"FJK ASSOCIATES v. MAIDA KARKOSKI\\n(AC 17794)\\nO\\u2019Connell, C. J., and Sullivan and Daly, Js.\\nArgued November 5, 1998\\nofficially released March 2, 1999\\nRaymond J. Lemley, for the appellant (defendant).\\nDavid E. Crow, Jr., for the appellee (plaintiff).\", \"word_count\": \"1011\", \"char_count\": \"5980\", \"text\": \"Opinion\\nSULLIVAN, J.\\nThe defendant tenant appeals from a judgment for the plaintiff landlord in a summary process action seeking possession of the subject premises for nonpayment of rent and lapse of time. The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the trial court improperly found that the plaintiff sustained its burden of proof on its lapse of time claim. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.\\nThe parties entered into a written lease agreement for one year on or about December 12,1994. The written lease terminated on December 31, 1995, by its terms. After January 1, 1996, the defendant paid rent monthly to the plaintiff until May and June, 1997. On June 19, 1997, the plaintiff served the defendant a notice to quit possession on or before June 30, 1997. Because the defendant remained in possession after June 30, 1997, the plaintiff brought a summary process action against her, alleging that the tenancy had terminated by lapse of time and because of nonpayment of rent for the months of May and June, 1997. The defendant denied the allegations and filed two special defenses. The first special defense was that the subject premises contained numerous housing code violations. That defense was abandoned by the defendant at oral argument before this court. The second special defense alleged that the subject premises lacked a certificate of occupancy.\\nThe trial court found that the plaintiff sustained its burden of proof on both lapse of time and nonpayment of rent. The trial court also found that the defendant did not sustain her burden of proof on either of her special defenses. This appeal followed.\\nThe defendant first claims that the trial court incorrectly held that lapse of time was a proper basis for termination of this tenancy. We find no merit to this claim. The trial court correctly held that lapse of time was an adequate ground for termination under the facts of this case.\\nAfter the written lease expired by its terms, the plaintiff continued to accept the defendant's monthly rent payment, creating a month-to-month tenancy. See General Statutes \\u00a7 47a-3b; Williams v. Apothecaries Hall Co., 80 Conn. 503, 507, 69 A. 12 (1908). A periodic tenancy may be terminated unilaterally by either landlord or tenant. Hour Publishing Co. v. Gorez, 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 419, 421, 254 A.2d 919 (1968). \\\"In the case of a rental on a month-to-month basis the tenancy is not regarded as a continuous one. The tenancy for each month is one separate from that of every other month.\\\" Welk v. Bidwell, 136 Conn. 603, 606-607, 73 A.2d 295 (1950). The renewal of a month-to-month tenancy requires the payment of rent by the tenant and the acceptance of payment by the landlord or \\\"other circumstances showing an agreement to continue the lease.\\\" Webb v. Ambler, 125 Conn. 543, 551, 7 A.2d 228 (1939). The mere act of holding over does not create a new tenancy. General Statutes \\u00a7 47a-3d; Webb v. Ambler, supra, 551. Instead, the holdover tenant becomes a tenant at sufferance with no legal right to possession. Corthouts v. Connecticut Fire Safety Services Corp., 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 34, 36-37, 193 A.2d 909 (1963). A landlord may properly remove such a tenant at sufferance through a summary process action for lapse of time. General Statutes \\u00a7 47a-23 (a); Webb v. Ambler, supra, 551.\\nThe defendant here did not pay rent after May, 1997, and the plaintiff did not accept rent after that date. Absent any other circumstances indicating an agreement to continue the lease after May, 1997, the lease terminated at that time. The defendant remained on the premises and continues to remain as of the hearing on this appeal. As we have noted, however, holding over by a lessee is not evidence of a new lease. The plaintiff provided the defendant with a notice to quit that gave the defendant more than ten days to quit possession of the premises. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court properly concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to possession because of lapse of time. Because this issue is dispositive, we need not consider the other issues raised on appeal.\\nThe judgment is affirmed.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 47a-23 (a) provides in pertinent part: \\\"When the owner or lessor, or his legal representative, or his attorney-at-law, or in-fact, desires to obtain possession or occupancy of any land or building, any apartment in any building, any dwelling unit, any trailer, or any land upon which a trailer is used or stands, and (1) when a rental agreement or lease of such property, whether in writing or by parol, terminates for any of the following reasons: (A) By lapse of time . . . (D) nonpayment of rent within the grace period provided for residential property in section 47a-15a. or 21-83 . . . such owner or lessor, or his legal representative, or his attorney-at-law, or in-fact, shall give notice to each lessee or occupant to quit possession or occupancy of such land, building, apartment or dwelling unit, at least five days before the termination of the rental agreement or lease, if any, or before the time specified in the notice for the lessee or occupant to quit possession or occupancy.\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 47a-3b provides: \\\"Unless the rental agreement fixes a definite term, the tenancy is month to month, except in the case of a tenant who pays weekly rent, then the tenancy is week to week.\\\"\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 47a-3d provides: \\\"Holding over by any lessee, after the expiration of the term of his lease, shall not be evidence of any agreement for a further lease. Parol leases of lands or tenements reserving a monthly rent and in which the time of their termination is not agreed upon shall be construed to be leases for one month only.\\\"\\nSee footnote 1.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/conn/247030.json b/conn/247030.json
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..aae8e1b00e0489d7d973c9012e8535df80700607
--- /dev/null
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+"{\"id\": \"247030\", \"name\": \"STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. BUCKLEY OTTO\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Otto\", \"decision_date\": \"1998-10-22\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"927\", \"last_page\": \"928\", \"citations\": \"247 Conn. 927\", \"volume\": \"247\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:50:55.890653+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. BUCKLEY OTTO\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. BUCKLEY OTTO\", \"word_count\": \"59\", \"char_count\": \"391\", \"text\": \"The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 50 Conn. App. 1 (AC 16180), is denied.\\nPALMER, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.\\nNeal Cone, assistant public defender, in support of the petition.\\nMichaelE. O'Hare, assistant state's attorney, in opposition.\\nDecided October 22, 1998\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/conn/300359.json b/conn/300359.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e27293c2bcfd3b8fe6ba2a456c14fdba52e3dd75
--- /dev/null
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"300359\", \"name\": \"RALPH ABED v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Abed v. Commissioner of Correction\", \"decision_date\": \"1996-10-29\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"937\", \"last_page\": \"938\", \"citations\": \"239 Conn. 937\", \"volume\": \"239\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:26:17.768946+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"RALPH ABED v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION\", \"head_matter\": \"RALPH ABED v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION\", \"word_count\": \"47\", \"char_count\": \"309\", \"text\": \"The petitioner Ralph Abed's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 43 Conn. App. 176 (AC 14782), is denied.\\nDecided October 29, 1996\\nWilliam Emmett Dwyer, in support of the petition.\\nSteven R. Strom, assistant attorney general, in opposition.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/conn/3145661.json b/conn/3145661.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9556139c855b066d079a5b74abac2884165a728f
--- /dev/null
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+"{\"id\": \"3145661\", \"name\": \"CHARLES COLEMAN v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction\", \"decision_date\": \"2005-07-12\", \"docket_number\": \"SC 17390\", \"first_page\": \"422\", \"last_page\": \"426\", \"citations\": \"274 Conn. 422\", \"volume\": \"274\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:27:39.908135+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"CHARLES COLEMAN v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION\", \"head_matter\": \"CHARLES COLEMAN v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION\\n(SC 17390)\\nSullivan, C. J., and Borden, Norcott, Palmer and VertefeuiUe, Js.\\nArgued May 18\\nofficially released July 12, 2005\\nLisa J. Steele, special public defender, for the appellant (petitioner).\\nJames A. Killen, senior assistant state\\u2019s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state\\u2019s attorney, and Linda N. Howe, senior assistant state\\u2019s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).\", \"word_count\": \"1078\", \"char_count\": \"6663\", \"text\": \"Opinion\\nPER CURIAM.\\nThe petitioner, Charles Coleman, appeals following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claims on appeal that the habeas court: (1) abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal; and (2) abused its discretion in granting the motion of the petitioner's counsel to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967). We dismiss the petitioner's appeal.\\nThe following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. The petitioner \\\"was convicted after a jury trial of burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes \\u00a7 53a-101 (a) (2), burglary in the second degree in violation of General Statutes \\u00a7 53a-102 (a), sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) \\u00a7 53a-70 (a), and unlawful restraint in the first degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) \\u00a7 53a-95 (a).\\\" State v. Coleman, 241 Conn. 784, 785, 699 A.2d 91 (1997). The convictions arose out of an incident that occurred on July 7, 1986, in which an assailant broke into a New Haven residence and sexually assaulted a woman. Id., 787. Upon investigation, the police \\\"found seven latent fingerprints on the windowsills of the window of entry and the victim's bedroom window. Fingerprint number seven, showing the right middle and right ring fingers of the defendant with the fingers pointing inward, was taken from the exterior of the bedroom windowsill, which was not the window of entiy. A positive identification of the defendant was made from fingerprint number seven.\\\" State v. Coleman, 42 Conn. App. 78, 81, 679 A.2d 950 (1996), rev'd, 241 Conn. 784, 699 A.2d 91 (1997).\\nThe petitioner appealed from the judgment of conviction to the Appellate Court, which reversed the judgment of conviction and ordered a new trial on the ground that the trial court improperly had admitted certain evidence at trial. State v. Coleman, supra, 241 Conn. 786-87. We granted the state's petition for certification to appeal, reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court and remanded the case to that court for consideration of the petitioner's remaining claims on appeal. Id., 792. On remand, the Appellate Court vacated the petitioner's conviction of burglary in the second degree after the state conceded that the conviction was improper and affirmed his other convictions. State v. Coleman, 48 Conn. App. 260, 274, 709 A.2d 590 (1998). This court then granted the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal and affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court. See State v. Coleman, 251 Conn. 249, 251, 741 A.2d 1 (1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1061, 120 S. Ct. 1570, 146 L. Ed. 2d 473 (2000).\\nOn December 15, 1997, while these direct appeals were pending, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court for the judicial district of Tolland. In support of the petition, the petitioner argued, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he argued that his trial counsel, Thomas E. Farver and Mark Rademacher, inadequately had investigated the fingerprint evidence presented at trial. The habeas court appointed Kathleen O'Reilly Berry as the petitioner's special public defender in the habeas proceeding. Thereafter, Berry filed a motion to withdraw from the case pursuant to Anders v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 744, on the ground that there were no nonfrivolous grounds for the petition. In support of her motion, Berry represented to the court that she believed that Farver and Rademacher had investigated the fingerprint evidence adequately and had represented the petitioner effectively at trial. The habeas court, Levine, J., granted the motion to withdraw but did not dismiss the habeas petition. Thereafter, the petitioner filed two written motions for appointed counsel and made one oral motion for appointed counsel, all of which were denied. After a two day evidentiary hearing, the habeas court, White, J., dismissed the petition for writ of habeas corpus. The court determined that the petitioner's trial counsel had investigated adequately the fingerprint evidence introduced at trial and had provided competent and effective representation. The court subsequently denied the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal. This appeal followed.\\nThe petitioner claims on appeal that the habeas court, White, J., abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal from the dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus because he was denied his constitutional right to counsel at the habeas proceeding when Berry was allowed to withdraw. He further claims that the habeas court, Levine, J., abused its discretion in granting the motion to withdraw.\\nAfter a careful review of the record and briefs, we conclude that the petitioner has not demonstrated that the issues he has raised are debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve the issues in a different manner or that the questions raised deserve encouragement to proceed further. See Lozada v. Deeds, 498 U.S. 430, 431-32, 111 S. Ct. 860, 112 L. Ed. 2d 956 (1991); Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608, 616, 646 A.2d 126 (1994). Accordingly, the appeal should be dismissed as frivolous. Simms v. Warden, supra, 616.\\nThe appeal is dismissed.\\nThe petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes \\u00a7 51-199 (c) and Practice Book \\u00a7 65-1.\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 52-470 (b) provides: \\\"No appeal from the judgment rendered in a habeas corpus proceeding brought by or on behalf of a person who has been convicted of a crime in order to obtain such person's release may be taken unless the appellant, within ten days after the case is decided, petitions the judge before whom the case was tried or, if such judge is unavailable, a judge of the Superior Court designated by the Chief Court Administrator, to certify that a question is involved in the decision which ought to be reviewed by the court having jurisdiction and the judge so certifies.\\\"\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/conn/3593681.json b/conn/3593681.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..48fe60c6e6dd976f86e8d826acd2265c705d99c1
--- /dev/null
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+"{\"id\": \"3593681\", \"name\": \"CHIJIAN ZHANG ET AL. v. OMNIPOINT COMMUNICATIONS ENTERPRISES, INC., ET AL.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Chijian Zhang v. Omnipoint Communications Enterprises, Inc.\", \"decision_date\": \"2005-02-01\", \"docket_number\": \"SC 16959\", \"first_page\": \"627\", \"last_page\": \"646\", \"citations\": \"272 Conn. 627\", \"volume\": \"272\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:42:14.580595+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"CHIJIAN ZHANG ET AL. v. OMNIPOINT COMMUNICATIONS ENTERPRISES, INC., ET AL.\", \"head_matter\": \"CHIJIAN ZHANG ET AL. v. OMNIPOINT COMMUNICATIONS ENTERPRISES, INC., ET AL.\\n(SC 16959)\\nNorcott, Katz, Palmer, Zarella and Levine, Js.\\nArgued October 21, 2004\\n\\u2014officially released February 1, 2005\\nNathalie Feola-Guerrieri, with whom, on the brief, was Daniel Shepro, for the appellants (plaintiffs).\\nStephen J. Humes, with whom were Charles D. Ray and, on the brief, Dennis F. Kerrigan, Jr., and Michael Menapace, for the appellee (defendant Omnipoint Communications, Inc.).\\nRobert J. Bourne and Vincent P. Pace filed a brief for the Connecticut Light and Power Company as amicus curiae.\", \"word_count\": \"6120\", \"char_count\": \"38823\", \"text\": \"Opinion\\nKATZ, J.\\nThe plaintiffs, Chijian Zhang and Yuzhi Hu, brought this action alleging that the defendant, Omnipoint Communications, Inc., also known as Voice-stream Wireless, had trespassed on their property by placing wireless telecommunications equipment on and near a tower installed by the Connecticut Light and Power Company (power company), which has easement rights over the plaintiffs' property. The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the grounds that the power company's easement rights for \\\"telephone purposes\\\" encompass use for wireless telecommunications and that the power company could partially assign its easement rights to the defendant. The plaintiffs now appeal from the trial court's judgment, claiming that the court improperly: (1) construed the easement to include wireless telecommunications; (2) concluded that the defendant had obtained a valid partial assignment of the power com pany's rights under the easement; and (3) declined to consider whether the defendant's use had overburdened the easement. We conclude that the easement encompasses the use of the property for wireless telecommunications, but that the trial court improperly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant because there were material issues of fact as to whether the defendant had obtained easement rights from the power company and whether the defendant's use had overburdened the easement. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.\\nThe record reveals the following facts and procedural history. The plaintiffs own real property located at 280 Morehouse Drive in Fairfield. In 1923, the plaintiffs' predecessor in title conveyed by deed to the power company, \\\"an easement . for poles, towers and wires for the transmission of electric current . . . .\\\" The deed conveyed, inter alia, the right to \\\"enter upon said land and erect, inspect, operate, replace, repair and patrol, and permanently maintain on said right of way, poles and towers, with necessary conductors, wires . . . and other usual fixtures and appurtenances used or adapted for the transmission of electric current for light, heat, power or any other purpose, and used or adapted for telephone purposes . . . .\\\" The deed was duly recorded. On March 1, 2000, the plaintiffs acquired title to the subject property by quitclaim deed.\\nPrior to the plaintiffs acquiring title, certain equipment had been installed in the area subject to the easement. The power company had installed a steel lattice tower structure, which rested on a cement pad, to support electric wires. A wood stockade fence surrounded the structure. Sprint, another wireless telecommunications company, had installed a monopole that supported telecommunications antennas, which ran through the middle of the power company's lattice tower, and an equipment cabinet on the cement pad.\\nThe defendant is licensed by the Federal Communications Commission to hold a \\\"Wideband PCS\\\" license for personal communication services covering an area that includes the entire state of Connecticut. The defendant provides wireless service in the form of voice-data telephone systems, offering its customers \\\"state-of-the-art communications service with privacy to users, and the convenience of a pager, answering machine, and modem in one phone.\\\" The defendant determined that it needed an antenna on the tower situated on the plaintiffs' property to allow it to achieve cellular coverage on the Merritt Parkway and thereby establish a link to other sites for more contiguous coverage. Pursuant to a request by the defendant, on June 28, 2000, the power company issued a letter regarding \\\"[s]ite [p] emitting [a]uthorization\\\" (authorization letter), granting the defendant permission to obtain any permits necessary to construct and maintain a wireless communications system and antenna site on the plaintiffs' property over which the power company had easement rights. On September 1,2000, the Connecticut siting council issued a letter to the defendant notifying it that the siting council had approved the defendant's petition to modify the power company's existing electric transmission facility. In December, 2000, the defendant entered onto the plaintiffs' property and installed its antenna under the existing antennas on the monopole.\\nBy way of a complaint dated February 2, 2001, the plaintiffs commenced this trespass action, seeking damages and injunctive relief. On March 7, 2001, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the deed granting the easement authorizes it to undertake the actions challenged by the plaintiffs. Specifically, the defendant contended that the power company has easement rights for \\\"telephone purposes,\\\" which includes wireless telephone equipment, and the deed permits the power company to assign to the defendant the authority to install such equipment. The plaintiffs opposed the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that: (1) the deed does not grant easement rights for wireless telecommunications, but, rather, only for the transmission of electric current; (2) the defendant did not obtain a valid assignment of the power company's easement rights because the deed does not permit a partial assignment and there was no evidence of an assignment; and (3) in the alternative, that the defendant's use overburdened the easement. With respect to their overburdening claim, the plaintiffs attested that the defendant recently had expanded a gravel driveway to reach a stone wall on the plaintiffs' property and had installed, inter alia, a wood utility pole with a transformer and electrical cabinets both inside and outside the wood fence surrounding the lattice tower structure. On May 17, 2001, the plaintiffs filed a cross motion for summary judgment.\\nAfter hearing argument on the motions, the trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant. In its memorandum of decision, the trial court rejected the plaintiffs' construction of the deed limiting the power company's easement rights solely for the transmission of electric current. The trial court concluded that the deed had granted easement rights for both \\\"the transmission of electric current\\\" and \\\"telephone purposes.\\\" The court further concluded that, under this court's decision in Abington Ltd. Partnership v. Heublein, 246 Conn. 815, 717 A.2d 1232 (1998), courts should construe easements to allow beneficiaries to incorporate technological advances into their use. It therefore construed \\\"telephone purposes\\\" to encompass wireless telecommunications. With respect to the validity of the defendant's assignment of rights from the power company, the trial court noted that the claim raised an issue of first impression and turned to case law from other jurisdictions, under which the dispositive issue is whether the deed grants an exclusive or nonexclusive easement. The trial court found that the power company had obtained an exclusive easement and, accordingly, it was entitled to make a partial assignment of its rights to the defendant. Finally, the trial court refused to address the plaintiffs' overburdening claim on the ground that they had not pleaded overburdening, which the court concluded was a separate cause of action from the plaintiffs' trespass action. Accordingly, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.\\nBefore turning to the merits of the plaintiffs' claims, we note the well established standards that guide our inquiry. \\\"Practice Book [\\u00a7 17-49] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Craig v. Stafford Construction, Inc., 271 Conn. 78, 83, 856 A.2d 372 (2004). \\\"Our review of the trial court's decision to grant [a] motion for summary judgment is plenary.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omit ted.) Allstate Ins. Co. v. Barron, 269 Conn. 394, 406, 848 A.2d 1165 (2004).\\nIn addition, to determine whether the trial court properly concluded that the defendant had the right, pursuant to the power company's easement, to use the plaintiffs' property for wireless telecommunications, our paramount consideration is the intent of the parties to the deed creating the interest. Abington Ltd. Partnership v. Heublein, supra, 246 Conn. 831. We look to the intent as expressed in the deed, considering all of its relevant provisions and reading it in the light of the surrounding circumstances. Lago v. Guerrette, 219 Conn. 262, 267-68, 592 A.2d 939 (1991). We give the language of the easement its ordinary import when nothing in the situation or surrounding circumstances indicates a contrary intent. Id., 268; American Brass Co. v. Serra, 104 Conn. 139, 142, 132 A. 565 (1926). Although in most contexts the issue of intent is a factual question over which our scope of review is limited, the construction of a deed, considered in the light of all the surrounding circumstances, presents a question of law over which we exercise plenary review. Carbone v. Vigliotti, 222 Conn. 216, 222, 610 A.2d 565 (1992); Kelly v. Ivler, 187 Conn. 31, 39, 450 A.2d 817 (1982). With these principles in mind, we turn to the plaintiffs' claims.\\nI\\nThe plaintiffs first claim that the trial court improperly construed the deed to grant easement rights for wireless telecommunications. The plaintiffs contend that the deed grants easement rights only for the transmission of electric current, which can be used for several \\\"purposes\\\"\\u2014heating, light, power and telephone. Because wireless telecommunications provide telephone service through the transmission of radio waves, not electric current, the plaintiffs assert that such use is not permitted under the easement. Therefore, they contend that the trial court improperly applied this court's decision in Abington Ltd. Partnership v. Heublein, supra, 246 Conn. 815, to construe \\\"telephone purposes\\\" to include wireless telecommunications because the deed evinces a clear intent to the contrary. The plaintiffs further contend that the defendant cannot prevail under Heublein because they presented sufficient evidence that the defendant's use of the easement for wireless telecommunications had caused unreasonable damage to their property.\\nThe defendant disagrees that the deed evinces a clear intent to preclude wireless telecommunications. It contends, therefore, that the trial court properly concluded that wireless telephone is merely an advance in telephone technology, and thus the easement for \\\"telephone purposes\\\" should be construed to include wireless telecommunications. We agree generally with the defendant, but conclude that the trial court improperly applied Heublein in part because it had failed to consider whether the defendant's use of the easement for wireless telephone purposes would cause unreasonable damage to the plaintiffs' property.\\nOur analysis is guided by our decision in Heublein. In Heublein, the substantive issue on appeal was whether an easement of access could extend to adjacent property acquired by the easement holder after the easement had been conveyed. Id., 817. Although we reversed the trial court's judgment on procedural grounds, we provided guidance to the trial court for the remand on the substantive issue. Id., 827. Significantly, we adopted the position set forth in certain provisions of the Restatement (Third) of Property that recently had been approved. Id., 829-32; see 1 Restatement (Third), Property, Servitudes \\u00a7 4.1 and 4.10 (2000). We noted that \\\"\\u00a7 4.1 of the Restatement (Third) [supra] makes the intentions or the reasonable expectations of the parties the overarching consideration in the construction of a servitude. Only if the rules of \\u00a7 4.1 are not fully applicable do supplemental principles, set forth in [\\u00a7 4.10 of the Restatement (Third), supra], provide additional guidance. Subject to the proviso that the servitude beneficiary is not entitled to cause unreasonable damages to the servient estate, or interfere unreasonably with its enjoyment, \\u00a7 4.10 permits the beneficiary of an easement to make any use of the servient estate that is reasonably necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the servitude for its intended purpose. The manner, frequency, and intensity of the beneficiary's use of the servient estate may change over time to take advantage of developments in technology and to accommodate normal development of the dominant estate or enterprise benefited by the servitude.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Abington Ltd. Partnership v. Heublein, supra, 246 Conn. 831.\\nAlthough the factual context in Heublein differed substantively from that in the present case, because it did not involve technological developments affecting the manner and use of the easement, one of the Restatement (Third) provisions we adopted therein does address the situation here. Notably, one illustration given in the Restatement (Third) is directly on point. \\\"Telephone Company holds easements acquired in the 1940s to maintain poles and lines for telephone purposes. In the absence of other facts or circumstances, it would be proper to conclude that Telephone Company may mount transmitters on its poles for cellular telephone transmissions unless the transmitters or transmissions would unreasonably interfere with enjoyment of the servient estate.\\\" 1 Restatement (Third), supra, \\u00a7 4.10, illustration 13, p. 598. This illustration demonstrates that an easement holder can take advantage of developments in technology unless the parties creating the interest evinced a contrary intent or the proposed use would interfere unduly with the rights of the owner of the servient estate.\\nApplying the principles set forth in Heublein and the Restatement (Third) to the present case, the threshold issue is whether, at the time the easement was created, the parties intended for the easement to be used solely for the transmission of electric current, as the plaintiffs claim, or whether they also intended for the easement to be used for telephone purposes irrespective of whether those services were provided by the transmission of electric current. The sole evidence proffered by the plaintiffs on this issue was the deed itself. Accordingly, we turn to that instrument.\\nThe deed provides for the right to operate and maintain various equipment \\\"used or adapted for the transmission of electric current for light, heat, power or any other purpose, and used or adapted for telephone purposes . . . .\\\" (Emphasis added.) The fact that the phrase \\\"used or adapted for\\\" is used twice, preceding both \\\"the transmission of electric current\\\" and \\\"telephone purposes,\\\" strongly suggests that the parties intended for the easement to extend to both uses. Compare Edgcomb v. Lower Valley Power & Light, Inc., 922 P.2d 850, 853-858 (Wyo. 1996) (easement granting right to operate and maintain \\\"electric transmission and/or distribution line or system\\\" and to permit use of line by third parties \\\"for electrification or telephone purposes\\\" construed to permit defendant utility company to replace static telephone line with fiber optic cable). Had the parties necessarily intended for the easement to be used for telephone purposes only if provided by the transmission of electric current, there would have been no need for the catch-all phrase \\\"or any other purpose . . . .\\\" See United Illuminating Co. v. Wisvest-Connecticut, LLC, 259 Conn. 665, 674, 791 A.2d 546 (2002) (\\\"[t]he law of contract inteipretation militates against interpreting a contract in a way that renders a provision superfluous\\\"). Although we recognize that the introductory paragraph of the deed references only an easement for the transmission of electric current, that fact does not overcome strong evidence of a contrary intent in the more specific provision setting forth the permissible uses of the easement. Cf. Galvin v. Freedom of Information Commission, 201 Conn. 448, 456, 518 A.2d 64 (1986) (\\\"[wjhere statutes contain specific and general references covering the same subject matter, the specific references prevail over the general\\\"). Therefore, we conclude, on the basis of the language of the deed, that the trial court properly construed the deed to grant an easement both for \\\"telephone purposes\\\" and for the transmission of electric current.\\nTurning to the application of Heublein to an easement for telephone purposes, we note that the plaintiffs do not contend that Heublein cannot be applied to permit the use of the easement in the present case for wireless telephone because it is not an advancement in 1923 telephone technology. Rather, they claim that Heublein does not permit such use because the intent of the original parties to the deed was to limit telephone purposes to that provided by electric current. This claim, however, is founded on the same premise that we already have rejected. Accordingly, the trial court's determination that the parties to the deed did not intend to limit use of the easement for telephone purposes necessarily triggered the presumption under Heublein that wireless telecommunications was a permissible use of the easement as a development in telephone technology.\\nHeublein recognized, however, a limitation on the easement holder's right to take advantage of developments in technology. The easement holder may not, in the course of using new technologies, \\\"cause unreasonable damages to the servient estate, or interfere unreasonably with its enjoyment . . . .\\\" Abington Ltd. Partnership v. Heublein, supra, 246 Conn. 831; 1 Restatement (Third), supra, \\u00a7 4.10. In other words, the new technology cannot overburden the servient estate. The defendant proffered no evidence on this issue, but the plaintiffs attested to several facts in opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment evidencing that the defendant's use may have caused unreasonable harm and unreasonably interfered with their enjoyment of the property. Because the trial court failed to examine this issue, it improperly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant.\\nII\\nThe plaintiffs' second claim is that the trial court improperly concluded that the defendant had obtained a valid easement. Although our conclusion in part I of this opinion requires that we reverse the judgment of the trial court, we reach this claim because it raises both legal and factual issues likely to arise on remand and some guidance to the trial court may be helpful. See State v. Ceballos, 266 Conn. 364, 367, 832 A.2d 14 (2003).\\nThe plaintiffs concede that the power company was entitled, under the deed, to assign its easement rights in their entirety, but contend that it could not partially assign the easement rights to a third party. They further contend that there was no evidence before the trial court to prove that the power company had conveyed to the defendant any legal rights with respect to the easement. We disagree that the power company could not assign in part its easement rights, but we agree that there was no evidence before the trial court that the power company in fact had conferred such rights on the defendant.\\nA\\nThe issue of whether the power company could partially assign its easement rights raises, as the trial court recognized, an issue of first impression in this court.\\n\\\"Courts have generally concluded [however] that an easement in gross is capable of division when the instrument of creation so indicates or when the existence of an 'exclusive' easement gives rise to an inference that the servitude is apportionable.\\\" J. Bruce & J. Ely, Jr., The Law of Easements and Licenses in Land (2001) \\u00a7 9:9, pp. 9-15 through 9-16; accord 4 R. Powell, Real Property (2000) \\u00a7 34.16. In this context, \\\"exclusive\\\" means that the \\\"easement holder has the sole right to engage in the type of use authorized by the servitude.\\\" J. Bruce & J. Ely, Jr., supra, p. 9-16. In other words, the grantor does not retain common rights with the easement holder to engage in the same activity for which the easement is granted. See Hoffman v. Capitol Cablevision Systems, Inc., 52 App. Div. 2d 313, 315, 383 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1976) (finding easement exclusive because grantor never had attempted to engage in distribution of electricity). This common versus exclusive rights distinction is predicated on the notion that \\\"one who grants to another the right to use the grantor's land in a particular manner for a specified purpose but who retains no interest in exercising a similar right himself, sustains no loss if, within the specifications expressed in the grant, the use is shared by the grantee with others. On the other hand, if the grantor intends to participate in the use or privilege granted, then his retained right may be diminished if the grantee shares his right with others.\\\" Henley v. Continental Cablevision of St. Louis County, Inc., 692 S.W.2d 825, 827-28 (Mo. App. 1985); accord 2 Restatement (Third), supra, \\u00a7 5.9, comment (b). We agree that the grant of an exclusive easement implicitly confers the authority to apportion those easement rights to third parties.\\nIn light of these principles, we turn to the case at hand. Following the deed provision setting forth the power company's easement rights, the grantor set forth only one limitation: \\\"Reserving, however, to myself and to my heirs and assigns, the right to cultivate the ground between said poles and towers and beneath said wires, provided that such use shall not interfere with or obstruct the rights herein granted.\\\" Although such a reservation is not construed as limiting the rights of the servient owner to only those rights expressly reserved, the reservation reasonably suggests the parties' intent to convey an exclusive easement to the power company for the purposes set forth in the deed. See Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Holson Co., 185 Conn. 436, 441-42, 440 A.2d 935 (1984) (\\\"By granting an easement, a grantor conveys to the grantee only that which is specifically expressed in the document, and retains all use of the land not inconsistent with the grantee's use and enjoyment of the easement. . A reservation clause does not operate to preclude other uses by the grantor not specifically reserved unless such intent is clearly expressed.\\\" [Citations omitted.]); cf. Centel Cable Television Co. of Ohio, Inc. v. Cook, 58 Ohio St. 3d 8,10, 567 N.E.2d 1010 (1991) (concluding that easement was exclusive and apportionable when granting instrument prohibited grantor from doing anything inconsistent with terms of easement or from constructing buildings or other structures within limits of easement). In addition to the fact that the grantor reserved the right to engage in an activity bearing no relationship to the purposes for which the easement was granted, there is no evidence that the servient owners ever have attempted to use their property since 1923 for the provision of heat, light, power or telephone services. The trial court, therefore, properly determined that the deed conveyed an exclusive easement to the power company and, accordingly, the power company had the right to authorize the defendant to use the easement to the extent that the defendant's use was consistent with the purpose for which the easement was granted.\\nB\\nThe fact that the power company could, as a matter of law, make a partial assignment does not, as the trial court implicitly seemed to conclude, inexorably lead to the conclusion that it in fact had made such an assignment. The plaintiffs contend that there was no evidence before the trial court that the power company had assigned easement rights to the defendant. The defendant expressly conceded at oral argument before the trial court that there was an issue of fact as to whether the power company had assigned its easement rights. Our review of the record before the trial court in deciding the motions for summary judgment clearly supports the plaintiffs' contention that there was no evidence of such an assignment or any other legal enti tlement for the defendant to use the easement. Moreover, it is clear that the defendant bore the burden of proving such an entitlement in order to prevail on summary judgment.\\n\\\"It is an elementary rule that whenever the existence of any fact is necessary in order that a party may make out his case or establish his defense, the burden is on such party to show the existence of such fact.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nikitiuk v. Pishtey, 153 Conn. 545,552,219 A.2d 225 (1966); see C. Tart, Connecticut Evidence (3d Ed. 2001) \\u00a7 3.3.1, p. 136 (\\\"[wjhoever asks the court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability has the burden of proving the existence of the facts essential to his or her claim or defense\\\"). Therefore, as the proponent of the defense that it was entitled to enter and use the plaintiffs' property pursuant to easement rights it had obtained from the power company, the defendant had the burden of proof as to that fact. See Branch v. Occhionero, 239 Conn. 199, 205, 681 A.2d 306 (1996) (defendant asserting right-of-way as special defense to plaintiffs quiet title action had burden of proving all facts necessary to prove defense).\\nIn the absence of such evidence, the trial court improperly found that the defendant had a valid assignment of easement rights from the power company. See Frillici v. Westport, 264 Conn. 266, 277, 823 A.2d 1172 (2003) (\\\"finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it . or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed\\\" [internal quotation marks omitted]). Accordingly, the trial court improperly concluded that there was no material issue of fact and that the defendant was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.\\nThe judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.\\nIn this opinion the other justices concurred.\\nThe plaintiffs originally brought this action against Omnipoint Communications Enterprises, Inc., and Omnipoint Communications, Inc. Prior to the trial court's ruling on the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs withdrew their complaint against Omnipoint Communications Enterprises, Inc. Therefore, we refer to Omnipoint Communications, Inc., as the defendant in this opinion.\\nThe plaintiffs appealed from the trial court's judgment to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book \\u00a7 65-1 and General Statutes \\u00a7 51-199 (c).\\nThe plaintiffs' statement of issues on appeal sets forth six claims. We conclude that the plaintiffs' first and second issues are subsumed under the broader question of whether the trial court properly construed the scope of the easement to include wireless telecommunications. The plaintiffs' third and fourth issues are subsumed under the broader question of whether the trial court properly concluded that the defendant had obtained a valid partial assignment of easement rights from the power company. The plaintiffs' fifth issue pertains to the overburdening claim. The sixth issue asserted by the plaintiffs\\u2014whether the trial court erred in interpreting public policy issues inconsistently with the unambiguous language of the easement\\u2014was not addressed by the trial court and therefore we need not address it.\\nOur rules of construction regarding reading ambiguities in favor of a particular party potentially are in conflict in the present case. One rule provides that \\\"[a]ny ambiguity in the instrument creating an easement, in a case of reasonable doubt, [is] construed in favor of the grantee.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lago v. Guerrette, supra, 219 Conn. 268. That rule would favor the power company and, hence, the defendant. Another fundamental rule provides, however, that an ambiguity is construed against the party that drafted the instrument. Goldberg v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 269 Conn. 550, 562, 849 A.2d 368 (2004). Although it is not clear which party drafted the deed of conveyance at issue here, we note its remarkable similarity to standard deed forms drafted by the power company that have been presented to this court previously. See Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Holson Co., 185 Conn. 436, 438-39 and n.1, 440 A.2d 935 (1981). Therefore, we decline to apply either default rule.\\nIn Heublein, we relied on the Tentative Draft of the Restatement (Third) of Servitudes that recently had been adopted by the American Law Institute. See Abington Ltd. Partnership v. Heublein, supra, 246 Conn. 830 n.20. In 2000, the official Restatement (Third) was published with editorial modifications. References and cites herein to the Restatement (Third) are to the 2000 edition.\\nSection 4.1 of the Restatement (Third), supra, provides: \\\"Interpretation of Servitudes\\n\\\"(1) A servitude should be interpreted to give effect to the intention of the parties ascertained from the language used in the instrument, or the circumstances surrounding creation of the servitude, and to carry out the purpose for which it was created.\\n\\\"(2) Unless the purpose for which the servitude is created violates public policy, and unless contrary to the intent of the parties, a servitude should be interpreted to avoid violating public policy. Among reasonable interpretations, that which is more consonant with public policy should be preferred.\\\"\\nSection 4.10 of the Restatement (Third), supra, provides: \\\"Use Rights Conferred by Easements and Profits\\n\\\"Except as limited by the terms of the servitude determined under \\u00a7 4.1, the holder of an easement or profit as defined in \\u00a7 1.2 is entitled to use the servient estate in a manner that is reasonably necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the servitude. The manner, frequency, and intensity of the use may change over time to take advantage of developments in technology and to accommodate normal development of the dominant estate or enterprise benefited by the servitude. Unless authorized by the terms of the servitude, the holder is not entitled to cause unreasonable damage to the servient estate or interfere unreasonably with its enjoyment.\\\"\\nAt oral argument in the trial court, the defendant conceded that, in 1923, the parties could not have envisioned the advent of wireless telephone and, therefore, did not offer any extrinsic evidence of the original parties' intent to create an easement specifically to include wireless telecommunications.\\nNeither the Restatement (Third), supra, nor case law addressing the use of easements through new technology indicates whether the easement holder or the owner of the servient estate has the burden of proof with respect to the reasonableness of the use. Typically, the owner of the servient estate has the burden of proving overburdening because the servient owner has asserted overburdening as a cause of action or as a reply to a special defense of an easement when the purpose of the easement is not in dispute. See, e.g., Abington Ltd. Partnership v. Heublein, 257 Conn. 570, 577, 778 A.2d 885 (2001) (asserting overburdening as cause of action). When the easement holder is seeking to take advantage o\\u00ed Heublein and extend easement rights to a different technology, however, the easement holder knows best how it will implement this new technology, especially when these facts may be unknown to the servient owner until well after the easement is altered to accommodate the new technology. Therefore, we conclude that, under such circumstances, the party seeking to extend the easement should bear the burden of producing some evidence to demonstrate that its intended use of the easement will not unreasonably burden the servient estate. Cf. Somers v. LeVasseur, 230 Conn. 560, 567, 645 A.2d 993 (1994) (concluding that defendant seeking to extend right-of-way obtained by prescriptive easement beyond prior use had \\\"burden to persuade the court that installation of the electrical utility lines [1] was reasonably necessary for the continued epjoyment of the right-of-way, and [2] would not unreasonably burden the plaintiffs' property\\\"). The servient owner is, of course, free to proffer evidence on that issue as well, as it may view the nature of the burden or what is reasonable through a very different lens than that of the easement holder.\\nIn light of this conclusion, we need not reach the plaintiffs' claim that the trial court improperly failed to consider independently their claim of overburdening, as the trial court will need to consider the plaintiffs' evidence on that issue on remand.\\nThe plaintiffs rely on our decision in Mellon v. Century Cable Management Corp., 247 Conn. 790, 725 A.2d 943 (1999). That case is inapposite. In Mellon, the defendant installed cable lines on the plaintiffs property, claiming that it had obtained a license to do so pursuant to the power company's easement over the plaintiffs property. Id., 793-94. Significantly, the defendant conceded that the power company had not obtained easement rights pursuant to a written instrument, and this court rejected the defendant's only other easement theory\\u2014easement by estoppel. Id., 794-97. Accordingly, the power company lacked authority to convey a license. Id., 793. Here, as the plaintiffs concede, the power company obtained an easement pursuant to a deed, and that deed grants the power company the authority to assign in full its rights.\\nIn light of this conclusion, we need not reach the argument asserted in the amicus brief that a partial assignment is permitted per se under General Statutes \\u00a7 47-42, even in the absence of a grant of such rights pursuant to the instrument creating the interest. This statute was amended in 1995 to permit partial assignments by pubhc utility companies, weh after the deed in the present case was executed in 1923. Pubhc Acts 1995, No. 95-217, \\u00a7 5. Accordingly, we decline to address unnecessarily an issue that implicates the constitutional question of impairment of contractual obligations. We note, however, that our conclusion with respect to exclusive easements and the concomitant right to partially assign is consistent with \\u00a7 47-42.\\nMany courts, after addressing whether the particular easement rights may be apportioned, have proceeded to analyze whether the apportionment will overburden the servitude. See J. Bruce & J. Ely, Jr., supra, \\u00a7 9:9, pp. 9-16 through 9-17. We conclude that such a factual inquiry is unnecessary in the present case, however, in light of our conclusion in part I of this opinion that overburdening must be considered on remand and in light of our conclusion in part n B of this opinion that the defendant failed to prove that the power company had conveyed any legal rights to the defendant.\\nIn response to the plaintiffs' argument to the trial court, inter alia, that there was no evidence of an assignment, counsel for the defendant stated: \\\"The question of the assignment, I think, is not before you today. I would . . . also ask the court to note that there is no information about that in the plaintiffs' pleadings. There are no affidavits to that point. [The power company] has obviously not challenged the assignment, and I question whether the plaintiffs [have] standing to raise that issue at all. But in any event, it is not before the court today. It would be an issue of fact.\\\"\\nThe only evidence before the trial court on this issue was the authorization letter sent by the power company to the defendant. In that letter, however, the power company merely authorized the defendant to apply for permits necessary for the defendant to operate and maintain a wireless telecommunications system on its easement over the plaintiffs' property. Most significantly, the authorization letter clearly provides in relevant part: \\\"This authorization shall not be deemed or construed to grant or transfer to [the defendant] any interest in the property, whatsoever, and shall not in any respect obligate or require [the power company] to sell, lease or license the [pjroperty to [the defendant] or otherwise allow [the defendant] to use or occupy the property for any purpose, regardless of whether any licenses, permits and approvals applied for by [the defendant] for the property are granted. . . .\\\"\\nThe defendant initially asserted a general denial to the plaintiffs' claim that it had trespassed by entering onto the plaintiffs' property without their permission. The defendant then asserted for the first time in its motion for summary judgment that the plaintiffs could not prevail on their trespass action because it had obtained an easement. As a fact that was consistent with the plaintiffs' allegation of lack of permission, but that nonetheless showed that the plaintiffs had no cause of action, the defendant should have pleaded its claim of easement as a special defense. See Coughlin v. Anderson, 270 Conn. 487, 502, 853 A.2d 460 (2004) (\\\"[U]nder a denial, a party generally may introduce affirmative evidence tending to establish a set of facts inconsistent with the existence of the disputed fact. . If, however, a party seeks the admission of evidence which is consistent with a prima facie case, but nevertheless would tend to destroy the cause of action, the new matter must be affirmatively pleaded as a special defense.\\\" [Internal quotation marks omitted.]); see also Practice Book \\u00a7 10-50. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs may be deemed to have waived their right to contest that procedural defect by failing to object to the introduction of evidence on the issue. Damora, v. Christ-Janer, 184 Conn. 109, 112, 441 A.2d 61 (1981); Mountaindale Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Zappone, 59 Conn. App. 311, 318, 757 A.2d 608 (noting that this principle is equally applicable in context of summary judgment as it is in context of trial), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 947, 762 A.2d 903 (2000).\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"3594428\", \"name\": \"AFSCME, COUNCIL 4, LOCAL 704 v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"AFSCME, Council 4, Local 704 v. Department of Public Health\", \"decision_date\": \"2005-02-01\", \"docket_number\": \"SC 17120\", \"first_page\": \"617\", \"last_page\": \"626\", \"citations\": \"272 Conn. 617\", \"volume\": \"272\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:42:14.580595+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"AFSCME, COUNCIL 4, LOCAL 704 v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH\", \"head_matter\": \"AFSCME, COUNCIL 4, LOCAL 704 v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH\\n(SC 17120)\\nBorden, Norcott, Katz, Verlefeuille and Zarella, Js.\\nArgued November 29, 2004\\n\\u2014officially released February 1, 2005\\nThomas P. Clifford III, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and William J. McCullough, assistant attorney general, for the appellant (defendant).\\nJ. William Gagne, Jr., with whom, on the brief, was P. Jo Anne Burgh, for the appellee (plaintiff).\", \"word_count\": \"2923\", \"char_count\": \"18411\", \"text\": \"Opinion\\nKATZ, J.\\nThe principal issue in this certified appeal is whether the plaintiff, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 4, Local 704, waived the right to challenge an unfavorable arbitration award as untimely when it expressly granted the arbitrator's request for a time extension to render his decision, while the defendant, the department of public health, remained silent with respect to the arbitrator's request. The defendant appeals from the Appellate Court's reversal of the judgment of the trial court, which had denied the plaintiffs application to vacate the award and granted the defendant's cross application to confirm the award. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 704 v. Dept. of Public Health, 80 Conn. App. 1,14, 832 A.2d 106 (2003). Specifically, the defendant claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the plaintiffs unilateral grant of the time extension had been ineffective in the absence of the defendant's consent and, therefore, could not constitute a waiver of the right to challenge the untimeliness of the award. We agree with the defendant and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.\\nThe Appellate Court's opinion sets forth the following relevant facts and procedural history as provided in the trial court's memorandum of decision. \\\"The [plaintiff] requested arbitration of a grievance against the defendant . . . pursuant to \\u00a7 9 (c) of the collective bargaining agreement (agreement) between the [plaintiff] and the state of Connecticut. That section provides in relevant part: 'The Arbitrator shall render his/her decision in writing no later than thirty (30) calendar days after the conclusion of the hearing unless the parties mutually agree otherwise.'\\n\\\"The arbitrator conducted hearings from May 5 through August 29,2000, and the parties submitted post-hearing briefs on unspecified dates thereafter. . . . [T]he arbitrator was informed by a letter [dated January 3,2001, and] signed by both parties that the agreement's thirty day time restriction for an award had passed and that his services in the matter were therefore terminated. The arbitrator's January 5, 2001 letter of response addressed both parties and requested an extension from each, stating: T have never had the parties refuse to extend a deadline for an award to be due. [I will issue the award upon the request of either party.]'\\n\\\"On January 16, 2001, the [plaintiff] sent a letter to the arbitrator and granted his request for an extension. The arbitrator rendered his award on the same day, January 16, 2001, finding against the [plaintiffs] position. The [defendant] did not respond to the arbitrator's request for an extension before he rendered the award. The [plaintiff] then sought to vacate the award by application to the [trial] court dated February 7, 2001, pursuant to General Statutes \\u00a7 52-418, arguing that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority by issuing an award after the contractual deadline had passed in the absence of a mutual agreement for an extension from the parties. On November 6, 2001, the [defendant] filed a motion to confirm the arbitration award.\\n\\\"In its memorandum of decision, filed April 11, 2002, the [trial] court denied the [plaintiffs] application to vacate, concluding that the parties had waived the agreement's deadline by failing to inform the arbitrator of its existence. The court also determined that the [plaintiffs] January 16, 2001 letter operated as a waiver of its right to challenge the timeliness of the award. The [plaintiff] then asked the court to clarify whether the April 11, 2002 decision controlled with respect to the [defendant's] motion to confirm the arbitration award. On May 1, 2002, the [trial] court rendered judgment in accordance with the arbitration award pursuant to the April 11, 2002 decision.\\\" AFSCME, Council 4, Local 704 v. Dept. of Public Health, supra, 80 Conn. App. 3-4.\\nThe plaintiff subsequently appealed to the Appellate Court, which reversed the trial court's judgment. The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court's factual finding that the parties had waived the thirty day deadline by failing to notify the arbitrator of the deadline was clearly erroneous in light of their joint letter of January 3, 2001, terminating the arbitrator's services for failure to deliver a timely decision. Id., 6,11. Specifically, the Appellate Court stated that the plaintiffs subsequent grant of the arbitrator's request for a time extension \\\"did not change the fact that the deadline had passed or the fact that the arbitrator already had been discharged by both parties for that reason.\\\" Id., 10. The court further reasoned that the defendant's silence upon receipt of the plaintiffs letter did not amount to consent or mutual agreement. Id., 12-13. Finally, the court determined that, although the plaintiffs hands were \\\"not entirely clean in this matter\\\"; id., 14; its unilateral grant of the arbitrator's request could not constitute a waiver because the agreement required mutual consent for the extension to be effective. Id., 13-14. Accordingly, the Appellate Court concluded that, because the arbitrator had exceeded his powers by issuing a late award without mutual agreement by the parties to extend the deadline, the award must be vacated pursuant to \\u00a7 52-418. This certified appeal followed.\\nOn appeal, the defendant claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the plaintiffs grant of the arbitrator's request for a time extension did not constitute a waiver of the plaintiffs right to challenge the award as untimely. Specifically, the defendant contends that: (1) the Appellate Court's conclusion is in conflict with the established waiver doctrine; and (2) basic principles of equity and fairness should bar the plaintiff from contesting the award as untimely given its conduct preceding the issuance of the award. In response, the plaintiff contends that its conduct could not constitute a waiver of its right to challenge the award as untimely because its unilateral grant of a time extension was ineffective without the defendant's consent. We agree with the defendant.\\nBefore addressing the merits of the defendant's claim, we set forth the standard for our review. Waiver is a question of fact. New York Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church v. Fisher, 182 Conn. 272, 300, 438 A.2d 62 (1980). \\\"[W]here the factual basis of the court's decision is challenged we must determine whether the facts set out in the memorandum of decision are supported by the evidence or whether, in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the whole record, those facts are clearly erroneous.\\\" Pandolphe's Auto Parts, Inc. v. Manchester, 181 Conn. 217, 221-22, 435 A.2d 24 (1980). Therefore, the trial court's conclusions \\\"must stand unless they are legally or logically inconsistent with the facts found or unless they involve the application of some erroneous rule of law material to the case.\\\" Laske v. Hartford, 172 Conn. 515, 518, 375 A.2d 996 (1977).\\n\\\"Waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. . . . [V]arious statutory and contract rights may be waived. For example, statutory time limits may be waived.\\\" (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) New Haven v. Local 884, Council 4, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 237 Conn. 378, 385-86, 677 A.2d 1350 (1996). \\\"Waiver is based upon a species of the principle of estoppel and where applicable it will be enforced as the estoppel would be enforced.\\\" Coombs v. Larson, 112 Conn. 236, 247, 152 A. 297 (1930). \\\"Estoppel has its roots in equity and stems from the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which might perhaps have otherwise existed . . . .\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Boyce v. Allstate Ins. Co., 236 Conn. 375, 383-84, 673 A.2d 77 (1996). \\\"Waiver does not have to be express, but may consist of acts or conduct from which waiver may be implied. . In other words, waiver may be inferred from the circumstances if it is reasonable to do so.\\\" (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hensley v. Commissioner of Transportation, 211 Conn. 173, 179, 558 A.2d 971 (1989).\\nThis court previously has applied the principles of waiver and estoppel to an arbitration proceeding, concluding that a party to the proceeding implicitly waived its right to vacate an arbitration award under \\u00a7 52-418 (a) by its affirmative conduct. New Haven v. Local 884, Council 4, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, supra, 237 Conn. 384. In that case, the plaintiff city sought to vacate an arbitration award rendered in connection with a grievance filed by the defendant union on behalf of a city employee. Id., 380. The city claimed that the state mediation and arbitration board had committed misconduct in refusing to grant the city's attorney a continuance after he suddenly became ill. Id., 381. The trial court agreed with the city, but found that its attorney had waived the misconduct claim by continuing to negotiate after the request for a continuance was denied. Id., 381-82. The Appellate Court subsequently reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding that, once a finding of misconduct had been made, the trial court was required to vacate the award under \\u00a7 52-418. Id., 383. In reversing the Appellate Court's judgment; id., 390; we emphasized the importance of the conduct of the parties in determining whether a waiver had occurred. Id., 388. We noted that, although the city's attorney had not waived the misconduct expressly, the trial court explicitly had found that he continued the negotiations \\\"freely and voluntarily . . . .''Id., 389. After a thorough review of the record, we concluded that this finding was not clearly erroneous. Id.\\nSimilarly, in the present case, the trial court's finding that the plaintiff waived its right to challenge the timeliness of the award by virtue of its conduct expressly granting the arbitrator's request for a time extension is supported by the record. The plaintiff sent a letter to the arbitrator stating that, \\\"it is the [plaintiffs] position that you were not notified we were going to enforce the thirty day response time issue . Therefore, your request for an extension is granted.\\\" Moreover, although the language in the agreement requiring mutual consent to extend the deadline signifies that one party's unilateral consent to a time extension would be ineffective as a waiver of the nonconsenting party's right to challenge a subsequent award as untimely, this language does not similarly suggest that a party's unilateral consent cannot operate as a waiver with respect to its own right to challenge the award as untimely. Indeed, we have recognized such unilateral waivers in other contexts. See Waterman v. United Caribbean, Inc., 215 Conn. 688, 693,577 A.2d 1047 (1990) (recognizing that waiver may validate a court judgment otherwise voidable when \\\"the losing party has promptly sought to set aside an unfavorable judgment, only to be met by the winning party's claim of waiver by virtue of the losing party's prejudgment conduct\\\"); id., 692 (rejecting argument that statute providing that parties may waive time limitation \\\"invariably requires the prior consent of both parties in order to waive the time limits the statute imposes\\\"); Hurlbutt v. Hatheway, 139 Conn. 258, 263, 93 A.2d 161 (1952) (recognizing principle that party's conduct may waive tardiness of judgment but finding no waiver); Whitaker v. Cannon Mills Co., 132 Conn. 434,438-39,45 A.2d 120 (1945) (recognizing same principle and finding waiver). Thus, we conclude there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding with respect to the plaintiffs waiver of the time limitation.\\nIn reaching this conclusion, we are mindful of the strong public policy favoring arbitration and, therefore, the enforcement of arbitration awards. New Haven v. Local 884, Council 4, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, supra, 237 Conn. 386-87. It would not serve those interests to allow a party to an arbitration proceeding to grant expressly the arbitrator's request for a time extension, presumably with the expectation of a favorable award, and then permit that party to invoke that untimeliness as a basis for vacating an unfavorable award. See Krattenstein v. G. Fox & Co., 155 Conn. 609, 616, 236 A.2d 466 (1967) (waiver doctrine precludes parties from anticipating favorable decision while reserving right to impeach it or set it aside if it comes out against them for cause known well in advance of issuance of unfavorable decision). Fittingly, in the present case, the doctrine of waiver and estoppel should bar the plaintiff from contesting the untimeliness of an unfavorable award in light of its conduct. See Boyce v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra, 236 Conn. 384 (noting that equitable estoppel \\\" 'show[s] what equity and good conscience require, under the particular circumstances of the case' \\\"). Accordingly, we conclude that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the plaintiffs unilateral grant of the arbitrator's request for an extension was ineffective in the absence of the defendant's consent, and therefore could not amount to a waiver of the plaintiffs right to challenge the untimeliness of the award.\\nThe judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court with direction to affirm the judgment of the trial court.\\nIn this opinion the other justices concurred.\\nWe granted the defendant's petition for certification to appeal limited to the following issues: Did the Appellate Court properly reverse the judgment of the trial court, which found that (1) the parties to the arbitration jointly had waived, by conduct or agreement, the deadline for rendering a decision, and (2) the plaintiff had waived its right to claim the award was untimely? AFSCME, Council 4, Local 704 v. Dept. of Public Health, 267 Conn. 908, 840 A.2d 1170 (2003). Because our resolution of the second issue is dispositive, we need not decide the first issue.\\nThe joint letter signed by the parties provided in relevant part \\\"As you have failed to comply with the contractual requirement to render a decision within thirty (30) days, any decision you render will be void. You have failed to request an extension. Please be advised that since you have not completed the assignment, please do not invoice either party.\\\"\\nThe plaintiffs letter provided in relevant part: \\\"[I]t is [our] position that you were not notified we were going to enforce the thirty day response time issue. A review of [the] notes and the exhibits reflect that it was not brought to your attention either during the hearings or the subsequent briefs ofthe respective parties. Therefore, yourrequestforanextensionis granted. Please submit the award forthwith. We will forward payment for [our] portion of your bill upon receipt of the award.\\\" (Emphasis added.)\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 52-418 (a) provides in relevant part: \\\"[T]he superior court . . . shall make an order vacating the award . (4) if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.\\\"\\nIn its brief to this court, the defendant also claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the parties had not jointly waived the award deadline. As we previously noted; see footnote 1 of this opinion; we need not reach this issue. The defendant also contends that the plaintiff cannot assert that it was harmed by the arbitrator's untimely award because the plaintiff had waived its objection to the lapsed deadline and it cannot vicariously assert the defendant's lack of consent for its own benefit. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we need not address this assertion as an independent claim.\\nAs indicated by the first certified question, the plaintiffs letter to the arbitrator, dated January 16,2001, also raises the issue of whether the parties had an obligation under the agreement to notify the arbitrator of the deadline before either party may invoke it as a basis for terminating the award. See Middletown v. Police Local, No. 1361, 187 Conn. 228, 231-32, 445 A.2d 322 (1982) (concluding that when parties imposed no deadline for rendering award, decision is valid if rendered within reasonable time). If that were the case, the award may have been rendered timely irrespective of any extension by the parties. Indeed, the plaintiff essentially recognized the parties' obligation to inform the arbitrator of the deadline. In the present case, however, we need not decide whether such an admission also could preclude the plaintiff from thereafter asserting a contrary interpretation of the agreement.\\nAlthough the plaintiff cites Waterman v. United Caribbean, Inc., supra, 215 Conn. 688, in support of its position, that case is factually distinguishable. In Waterman, the parties concurrently asserted contrary positions in response to the trial court's request for a time extension to issue its decision, and thereafter the prevailing but previously objecting defendants attempted to consent retroactively to the time extension. Id., 690; see id., 694 (\\\"The defendants argue that because the consent of the parties may confer personal jurisdiction upon a court, their execution of a consent following the trial judge's issuance of the late, yet favorable, judgment was sufficient to cure any defect therein. That argument would be persuasive if the defendants had remained silent prior to the late rendering of the judgment. In such a situation, the court would have continued to have had personal jurisdiction to enter a voidable judgment, and the defendants' subsequent consent would have cured the defect in the judgment.\\\"). In the present case, however, the defendant remained silent as to the arbitrator's request for an extension of time.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"3885340\", \"name\": \"VICTORIA SQUARE, LLC, ET AL. v. THE GLASTONBURY CITIZEN ET AL.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Victoria Square, LLC v. Glastonbury Citizen\", \"decision_date\": \"2006-01-17\", \"docket_number\": \"Me No. CV-04-0100718S\", \"first_page\": \"452\", \"last_page\": \"456\", \"citations\": \"49 Conn. Supp. 452\", \"volume\": \"49\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Supplement\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:35:13.605063+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"VICTORIA SQUARE, LLC, ET AL. v. THE GLASTONBURY CITIZEN ET AL.\", \"head_matter\": \"VICTORIA SQUARE, LLC, ET AL. v. THE GLASTONBURY CITIZEN ET AL.\\nSuperior Court, Judicial District of Hartford\\nMe No. CV-04-0100718S\\nMemorandum filed January 17, 2006\\nTrendowski Law Offices, for the plaintiffs.\\nAlter & Sherwood, for the defendants.\", \"word_count\": \"1239\", \"char_count\": \"7667\", \"text\": \"MILLER, J.\\nPlaintiff John Alan Sakon is the owner of the plaintiff Victoria Square, LLC (Victoria Square), a company formed to acquire and develop commercial property in Glastonbury. The plaintiffs' planned development of a shopping center generated considerable controversy, notoriety and publicity in and around Glastonbury.\\nThe defendant The Glastonbury Citizen (Citizen) is a weekly newspaper published in Glastonbury. Defendant James Hallas is the owner and publisher of the Citizen, and defendant Kathleen Stack is its editor. On April 1, 2004, the newspaper published an \\\"April Fools' Day\\\" edition. This edition of the Citizen was clearly a parody of the newspaper's usual content. \\\"April Fools' \\\" is prominently displayed across the running head of the paper and the word \\\"NOT\\\" appears in large bold letters so that it partially obscures the name of the paper on its front page, the page on which the article in question is located.\\nThe article is entitled, \\\"Sakon to Build Hooters, WalMart,\\\" and states that the plaintiffs planned to build a 250,000 square foot Wal-Mart store and the state's largest Hooters restaurant. The complex to be built would also, supposedly, include a helicopter launching pad. The parties agree that the alleged facts set forth in the article are false. The article appeared on the same page as articles announcing that a Glastonbury student had won a Nobel prize, the discovery of a \\\"black hole\\\" at a local school and other improbable \\\"news\\\" stories.\\nThe plaintiffs demanded a retraction of the story and filed suit when none was published. Their operative complaint is the second revised complaint dated February 28, 2005. This complaint states claims in six counts sounding in defamation, invasion of privacy by false light and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Statutes \\u00a7 42-110a et seq. The defendants have moved for summary judgment on all six counts of the complaint.\\nIt is unnecessary, to decide this matter, to address all of the arguments advanced by the defendants in support of their motion because the court finds that the article in question was not defamatory. Our Supreme Court has held: \\\"To prevail on a common-law defamation claim . . . the statement in question must convey an objective fact, as generally, a defendant cannot be held liable for expressing a mere opinion.\\\" (Citation omitted.) Daley v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 249 Conn. 766, 795, 734 A.2d 112 (1999). \\\"This distinction between fact and opinion cannot be made in a vacuum, however, for although an opinion may appear to be in the form of a factual statement, it remains all opinion if it is clear from the context that the maker is not intending to assert another objective fact but only his personal comment on the facts which he has stated.\\\" (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., 188 Conn. 107, 111, 438 A.2d 1317 (1982).\\nIn Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48, 108 S. Ct. 876, 99 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1988), the magazine published a \\\"parody\\\" that \\\"portrays [the] respondent and his mother as drunk and immoral, and suggests that [the] respondent is a hypocrite who preaches only when he is drunk. In small print at the bottom of the page, the ad contains the disclaimer, 'ad parody \\u2014 not to be taken seriously.' The magazine's table of contents also lists the ad as 'Fiction; Ad and Personality Parody.' \\\" The Supreme Court found that the parody was not defamatory, noting: \\\"The sort of robust political debate encouraged by the First Amendment is bound to produce speech that is critical of . . . public figures who are 'intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large.' \\\" Id., 51. In a later decision, the court observed that the line of cases including Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, supra, 46, \\\"provides protection for statements that cannot 'reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts' about an individual. . . . This provides assurance that public debate will not suffer for lack of 'imaginative expression' or the 'rhetorical hyperbole' which has traditionally added much to the discourse of our Nation.\\\" (Citation omitted.) Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20, 110 S. Ct. 2695, 111 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1990).\\nDefamation is, by its nature, mutually exclusive of parody. By definition, defamation requires a false statement of fact; parody, to the degree that it is perceived as parody by its intended audience, conveys the message that it is not the original and, therefore, cannot constitute a false statement of fact. \\\"If a parody could be actionable because, while recognizable as a joke, it conveyed an unfavorable impression, very few journalistic parodies could survive.\\\" San Francisco Bay Guardian, Inc. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. App. 4th 655, 662, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, review denied, 1993 Cal. LEXIS 5847 (November 10, 1993). \\\"The butt of the parody is chosen for some recognizable characteristic or viewpoint which is then exaggerated. It is not for the court to evaluate the parody as to whether it went too far. As long as it is recognizable to the average reader as a joke, it must be protected or . . . parody . . . must cease to exist.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Buttons v. National Broadcasting Co., 858 F. Sup. 1025, 1028 (C.D. Ca. 1994). Parodies should be protected when they appear as such to the reasonable reader. Moreover, \\\"the hypothetical reasonable person . is no dullard. He or she does not represent the lowest common denominator, but reasonable intelligence and learning. He or she can tell the difference between satire and sincerity.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) New Times, Inc. v. Isaacks, 146 S.W.3d 144, 157 (Tex. 2004).\\nNo such reasonable reader could construe the article in question as anything other than a parody. The defendants took considerable care to make it clear that the page where this article appeared did \\\"NOT\\\" contain genuine news stories. The article is surrounded by other mock articles that any reasonable reader would quickly determine to be both false and humorous. Finally, the article itself described development plans that were so extreme as to be obviously preposterous. The plaintiffs were, supposedly, planning to build a 250,000 square foot Wal-Mart store on the property; this would have been substantially larger than the building the plaintiffs wanted to construct. A helicopter launching pad in a shopping center in Glastonbury is equally ridiculous to contemplate. If none of this put the readers on notice that they were reading a parody, the statement that the Hooters logo would be positioned so as to face a local church and an elementary school would almost certainly get the point across.\\nThe average reader of this article would, as a matter of law, find it to be a parody. A false statement that is published as a parody cannot be defamatory. The defendants' motion for summary judgment is, therefore, granted.\\nThe defendants have also moved for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' invasion of privacy and unfair trade practices claims. The plaintiffs, in their respective briefs, have asserted absolutely no opposition to summary judgment on any claims other than the defamation counts; the motion, therefore, is granted as to all six counts of the complaint.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"389466\", \"name\": \"Christopher Augat vs. Johanna Tetmeyer\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Augat v. Tetmeyer\", \"decision_date\": \"1919-12-22\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"256\", \"last_page\": \"257\", \"citations\": \"94 Conn. 256\", \"volume\": \"94\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:49:47.184391+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Christopher Augat vs. Johanna Tetmeyer.\", \"head_matter\": \"Christopher Augat vs. Johanna Tetmeyer.\\nThird Judicial District, Bridgeport,\\nOctober Term, 1919.\\nWheeler, Beach, Gager, Case and Curtis, Js.\\nThe maxim de minimis non curat lex is applicable to the alleged erroneous allowance of an item of interest of $4 or thereabouts in a judgment for $152, and an appeal to'this court solely upon such ground is not justified.\\nArgued November 5th\\ndecided December 22d, 1919.\\nAction by the payee against the maker of a promissory note for $150, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County, Booth, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for the amount of the note with interest, less the sum of $11.50 allowed the defendant upon her counterclaim, from which she appealed.\\nNo error.\\nAlbert McC. Mathewson, for the appellant (defendant).\\nJoseph G. Shapiro and Charles H. Shapiro, for the appellee (plaintiff).\", \"word_count\": \"229\", \"char_count\": \"1395\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nCertain items of the defendant's counterclaim were allowed in reduction of the amount claimed by the plaintiff; others were disallowed. The finding conclusively settled every matter in dispute, save an item of interest amounting to something over $4, which it is claimed the court erroneously allowed. This did not justify an appeal, and our disposition of the case is manifestly controlled by Neville v. Frary, 88 Conn. 50, 89 Atl. 882, and the earlier cases there referred to.\\nThere is no error.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"396324\", \"name\": \"The State of Connecticut vs. Tihon Sinchuk et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Sinchuk\", \"decision_date\": \"1921-08-04\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"605\", \"last_page\": \"626\", \"citations\": \"96 Conn. 605\", \"volume\": \"96\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:10:00.607844+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"The State of Connecticut vs. Tihon Sinchuk et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"The State of Connecticut vs. Tihon Sinchuk et al.\\nThird Judicial District, New Haven,\\nJune Term, 1921.\\nWheeler, C. J., Beach, Gager, Curtis and Burpee, Js.\\nChapter 312 of the Public Acts of 1919, entitled \\u201cAn Act concerning Sedition,\\u201d prescribes a fine and imprisonment for \\u201cany person, who shall speak, or write, print and publicly exhibit or distribute, or who shall publicly exhibit, post up or advertise any disloyal, scurrilous or abusive matter, concerning the form of government of the United States, its military forces, flag or uniforms, or any matter which is intended to bring them into contempt or which creates or fosters opposition to organized government.\\u201d In a prosecution under this Act the accused, who were aliens, attacked its constitutionality. Held:\\u2014\\n1. That the statute was not fairly open to the objection that it fixed no ascertainable standard of guilt, inasmuch as the principles of the common law governing the publication of defamatory matter, furnished all the analogies necessary to define the nature and cause of this branch of the accusation.\\n2. That the Act itself was a declaration by the legislature that the publication of the prohibited forms of expression did endanger the public peace and safety; and that this declaration was within the province of the General Assembly, unless the court could see that it was plainly unfounded \\u2014 a conclusion untenable in the present case.\\n3. That the accused, being aliens, clearly had no constitutional right to share in the privilege and responsibility of attempting to change our laws or forms of government (Constitution of Connecticut, Bill of Rights, \\u00a7\\u00a7 2, 5, 6, 16), and therefore no right, under the pretense of being so employed, to engage in scurrilous or anarchistic propaganda which the legislature had declared to be dangerous to the public welfare.\\nNo one can challenge a statute as unconstitutional, unless he can show that its enforcement against him has violated, or will violate, his constitutional rights; and the application of this rule or principle obviously cannot deprive one of the equal protection of the laws.\\nPrima facie, publications which have been forbidden by the legislature because dangerous to the public welfare, are abuses of the privilege of free speech.\\nArgued June 7th\\ndecided August 4th, 1921.\\nInformation charging the accused with violation of Chapter 312 of the Public Acts of 1919, entitled An Act concerning Sedition, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in Fairfield County (M\\u00e1ltbie, J.) for the advice of this court, on the issues of law raised by a demurrer to the information.\\nSuperior Court advised to overrule the demurrer and to enter judgment pursuant to the stipulation.\\nThe information charges \\u201cthat on the. 14th day of March, 1921, at Bridgeport in said County, Tihon Sinchuk and Alexander Yavsk, not being citizens of the United States or of the State of Connecticut, and residing in said Bridgeport, with force and arms did publicly exhibit or advertise certain disloyal, scurrilous or abusive matter concerning the form of government of the United States and of its flag and certain matter which was intended to bring them into contempt, or which creates or fosters opposition to organized government, against the peace and contrary to the statute in such case made and provided.\\u201d The offenses are charged in the exact language of the statute, but no excerpts from the matter complained of are included in the information, and no statement of the facts in the case is contained in the record.\\nTo this information the accused demurred: (1) because the information is insufficient in law; (2) because it does not state facts constituting an offense; and (3) because the statute is unconstitutional and void in that it violates \\u00a7\\u00a7 2, 5, 6, 9 and 16 of Article First of the Constitution of Connecticut, \\u00a7 9 of Article I of the Federal Constitution, and also the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments thereof. The stipulation reserving the issues of law, raised by the demurrer of the accused to the information, recites that the cause is ready for plea and final judgment, and it is further stipulated that no question shall be raised by the defendants based upon any informality in the information, or upon any defects therein, because of the failure to incorporate in the information specific quotations from the matter complained of. The only questions discussed in argument or on the briefs were those relating to the constitutionality of the statute.\\nWalter Nelles of New York City, with whom, on the brief, were Isaac Shoor of New York City, and Abe S. Geduldig, for the accused.\\nHomer S. Cummings, State\\u2019s Attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Galen A. Carter, Assistant State\\u2019s Attorney, and Warren F. Cressy, for the State.\", \"word_count\": \"6878\", \"char_count\": \"40520\", \"text\": \"Beach, J.\\nThe statute in question is entitled \\\"An Act concerning Sedition\\\"; and on its face it appears to penalize three classes of publications: (1) disloyal, scurrilous or abusive matter, concerning the form of .government of the United States, its military forces, flag or uniforms; (2) any matter intended to bring them into contempt; (3) or which creates or fosters opposition to organized government. The demurrer, and the stipulation accompanying the reservation, waive all defenses except the unconstitutionality of the statute.\\nThe brief for the accused presents this defense in three aspects, which are described as to some extent overlapping: first, because it fixes no ascertainable standard of guilt and amounts to delegation to courts and juries of the legislative function of defining statutory offenses; second, because it oversteps the police power and deprives of liberty without due process of law, in penalizing expression for its character regardless of relation to harmful consequence; third, because it contravenes specific limitations on the police power, namely, the free-speech sections, the right of the people to adapt their form of government in accordance with their opinion, and the right of remonstrance.\\nIn support of the first of these propositions the defendants rely mainly on United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81, 41 Sup. Ct. 298, holding that \\u00a7 4 of the Lever Act (41 U. S. Stat. at Large, 298), penalizing the making of \\\"any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge in handling or dealing in or with any necessaries,\\\" was unconstitutional because it did not fix any ascertainable standard of guilt, and did not inform persons accused of violation thereof of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. To the same effect are International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 216, 34 Sup. Ct. 853; Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 634, 34 Sup. Ct. 924; American Seeding Machine Co. v. Kentucky, 236 U. S. 660, 35 Sup. Ct. 456. These last cases arose under statutes forbidding combinations to fix a price greater or less than the \\\"real value \\\" of the article dealt in; and the attempt was to determine criminality by asking the court or jury to say what the real value of the article would have been had the combination not existed. On the other hand, a criminal statute is not unconstitutional merely because it throws upon men the risk of rightly estimating the effect of their conduct upon a condition of fact; e. g., what is \\\"undue restraint \\\" of trade, Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, 33 Sup. Ct. 780; whether their conduct is \\\"reasonably calculated\\\" to restrain trade, Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U. S. 86, 29 Sup. Ct. 220; whether their language tends to encourage or advocate an actual breach of the law, Fox v. Washington, 236 U. S. 273, 35 Sup. Ct. 383; or whether a newspaper is \\\"principally made up of criminal news \\\", State v. McKee, 73 Conn. 18, 46 Atl. 409. And coming closer to the point, we have upheld a statute which penalized the publication of \\\"any offensive, indecent, or abusive matter, concerning any person.\\\" State v. Pape, 90 Conn. 98, 96 Atl. 313. Of this statute, we said that it must be construed consistently with the principles of the common law governing the publication of all defamatory matter, and with the constitutional provision that in all actions of libel the truth shall be a defense.\\nApplying the principles underlying these authorities to the present case, we think the statute is not fairly open to the objection that it fixes no ascertainable standard of guilt. The phrase \\\"disloyal, scurrilous or abusive matter,\\\" is confined specifically to the form of government of the United States, its military forces, flag or uniforms, and the principles of the common law governing the publication of defamatory matter, in so far as they are applicable, furnish all the analogies necessary to define the nature and cause of this branch of the accusation. Whether the publication in question was with intent to bring the form of government of the United States and its flag into contempt, is an issue of fact such as is presented in most criminal prosecutions. Whether the publication creates or fosters opposition to organized government, is also an issue of fact no more uncertain than the question whether a publication is obscene.\\nThe second objection is that the Act penalizes expression for its character regardless of relation or harmful consequence. This objection, both in its form and in the mode in which it was presented in argument and on the brief, stands by itself and does not involve the third objection above stated. It deals not with the alleged violation of any specific limitation on the exercise of the police power, but with the reasonableness of the prohibition as measures for the public peace and safety. It may be admitted that the publication of matter concerning the form of the Federal\\nGovernment, which is merely scurrilous or abusive, is not necessarily a direct incitement of disobedience to any other law, but it is not necessary to look outside of the statute itself to find a legal basis for criminality, because the Act itself is the declaration of the General Assembly that the publication of the prohibited forms of expression does endanger the public peace and safety. This declaration it has power to make unless the court can see that it is plainly unfounded. State v. McKee, 73 Conn. 18, 24, 46 Atl. 409. We have no doubt that a sufficient probability of danger to the public peace and safety arises from publications concerning the government of the United States and of its flag, which would come within the common-law definition of defamatory matter, to justify the statute so far as its first two clauses are concerned. Defamatory publications seem as dangerous to the public welfare when addressed to the national government as when addressed to an individual. State v. Pape, 90 Conn. 98, 96 Atl. 313. As to the final clause of the statute, it is idle to say that anarchistic propaganda are harmless in the law.\\nWe come now to the question, which also underlies the objections already discussed, whether the statute contravenes any specific provision of the Bill of Rights, or of the Federal Constitution. Section 2 of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of this State, provides \\\"that all political power is inherent in the people and all free governments are founded on their authority, and instituted for their benefit; and that they have at all times an undeniable and indefeasible right to alter their form of government in such manner as they may think expedient.\\\" This section is plainly inapplicable to the defendants. The information alleges, and the demurrer admits, that the defendants are not \\\"citizens of the United States or of the State of Connecticut.\\\" The right affirmed by this section is the right of the people to alter \\\"their form of government.\\\" It is because it is their own, and instituted by themselves for their own benefit, that they have the right to alter it. The proposition that aliens have an undeniable and indefeasible right to alter our form of government will hardly bear statement.\\nSection 16 provides: \\\"The citizens have a right, in a peaceable manner, to assemble for their common good, and apply to those invested with the powers of government, for redress of grievances, or other proper purposes, by petition, address or remonstrance.\\\" This section is also inapplicable. No right of peaceable assembly is invaded by the statute, and there is nothing to show that the publications in question were addressed, for any purpose whatever, to those invested with the powers of government. The allegations of the information and the admissions of the demurrer do not indicate that such was the fact, and the inference to be drawn from the admission that the publications were of the character described in the statute, would lead to another conclusion.\\nSections 5 and 6 of the Bill of Rights are as follows:\\u2014 \\\"5. Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege. 6. No law shall ever be passed to curtail or restrain the liberty of speech or of the press.\\\" If we are right so far, the next question is whether matter of the kind described in the statute and information is of such a constitutionally privileged character that its publication by the defendants may not be punished, although dangerous to the public welfare. The defendants attempt to maintain that their publications are so privileged, and are a legitimate exercise of the right of free speech, by what is, in practical effect, an appeal to \\u00a7 2 of the Bill of Rights. They quote from State v. McKee, 73 Conn, 18, 28, 46 Atl. 409: \\\"The right to discuss public matters stands in part on the necessity of that right to the operation of a government by the people ' \\u2014 and they say: \\\"There is a public necessity, however, that public matters should be freely discussed. . Is it not the law that such discussion, even though potentially harmful, may not be punished \\u2014 is not an 'abuse' of free speech\\u2014 so long as it does not amount to direct and positive incitation of harm? \\\" The distinction thus attempted is in principle a familiar one between harmful utterances intended to incite resistance or disobedience to law, and the same harmful utterances intended only to secure a change in the law; the latter, though dangerous, being justified by the inalienable and indefeasible right of the people to alter their political institutions. 21 Columbia Law Review, 526. The question, then, recurs, whether the defendants, being aliens, possess that right. We discuss that question, and then the question whether the denial of that right to aliens violates the requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, that \\\"no State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.\\\"\\nThe defendants' brief does not argue the question whether \\u00a7 2 of the Bill of Rights applies to aliens. It simply assumes that aliens are included in the term \\\"the people,\\\" and then uses the assumption that the defendants are exercising the constitutional right of altering their form of goverment as a plea of privilege for the publication of matter which the legislature has declared to be dangerous to the public peace and safety. Prima facie, publications which have been forbidden by the legislature, because dangerous to the public welfare, are abuses of the privilege of free speech. Unless, the defendants can successfully claim the right of unlimited political discussion, they cannot say that the statute deprives them of any constitutional privilege.\\nThe question whether aliens are entitled to the benefit of the reservations of personal liberty guaranteed to citizens and to the people in our Bill of Rights, is not altogether a new question in this State. In Jackson v. Bulloch, 12 Conn. 38, the question arose, in a writ of habeas corpus, whether a slave could be held in servitude in Connecticut by her owner who had brought her here with a view to a temporary residence. The petitioner relied both upon the Constitution and upon the slavery statutes then in force. On the latter ground she prevailed, but in discussing the constitutional question we said, p. 42: \\\"The Bill of Rights, in its first section, declares that all men, when they form a social compact, are equal in rights; and that no man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community. The language is certainly broad; but not as broad as that of the Bill of Rights in Massachusetts, to which it has been compared. It seems evidently to be limited to those who are parties to the social compact thus formed. Slaves cannot be said to be parties to that compact, or to be represented in it.\\\" And of \\u00a7 8 of the Bill of Rights, we said: \\\"The eighth section of the Bill of Rights has also been pressed upon us: that 'the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches or seizures.' This is almost a transcript of the Fourth Article of the Amendments of the Constitution of the United States. And the fact that this Amendment was adopted at all, and that amidst all the conflict of opinions upon the subject of slavery, this clause has never been claimed to affect that subject, shows very strongly, that it was not intended to apply to that description of persons. When the preamble to the Constitution of the United States speaks of 'we, the people \\u2014 to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this constitution/ it cannot be seriously contended, that it included that class of people called slaves; and the term 'people ' in the Bill of Rights, must have been used in a similar sense.\\\"\\nThe principle underlying this portion of the decision applies to the present case with added force, for the second section of the Bill of Rights, declaring that all political power is inherent in the people, cannot refer to aliens, who have no political power; nor can the declaration that the people have at all times an undeniable and indefeasible right to alter their form of government, refer to aliens, who have no part nor lot in the government.\\nTurning back to the free-speech sections, \\u00a7 5 declares that \\\"every citizen \\\" may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty. This privilege is on its face confined to citizens. And \\u00a7 6, that no law shall ever be passed to curtail or restrain the liberty of speech or of the press, plainly refers to the liberty of speech and of the press conferred by \\u00a7 5 on citizens.\\nWe do not mean to say that aliens have no right of free speech. If the General Assembly should undertake to declare a comprehensive consorship of the press, and an alien newsdealer should be prosecuted for selling a book or a newspaper which had not been passed by the censor, the statute could not be enforced against him. And for the reason that the business of news-dealing is a matter of private concern, and is a business in which aliens, who are duly admitted to the United States under our immigration laws, have an inherent right to engage, and having that right, they are entitled to the equal protection of the laws in the conduct of that business. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 36 Sup. Ct. 7. We do, however, lay it down as a self- evident proposition, supported in principle by Jackson v. Bulloch, 12 Conn. 38, that aliens have no constitutional right to share in the privilege and responsibility of attempting to change our laws or forms of government, and hence that they have no right, under cover of being engaged in good faith to accomplish those ends, to engage in scurrilous or anarchistic propaganda which has been declared by the General Assembly to be dangerous to the public welfare. It follows that, so far as aliens are concerned, the General Assembly has a right to pass a statute forbidding or penalizing the publication of such propaganda. And as it is a principle of constitutional law that no one has a right to attack a statute as unconstitutional unless he can show that its enforcement against him has violated or will violate his constitutional rights, the defense of unconstitutionality is not open to the 'defendants in this action. Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 179 U. S. 405, 21 Sup. Ct. 206; 6 R. C. L. p. 89, and numerous cases cited in the note to \\u00a7 87.\\nThe remaining question is whether this conclusion deprives the defendants of the equal protection of the laws. Evidently not, for the question whether the statute is enforceable against citizens is not before us. We simply hold that the defendants, being aliens, do not possess the right of attempting to alter our form of government, and for that reason are not qualified to plead the privilege of unlimited political discussion, on which their defense, that the statute violates the second, fifth and sixth sections of the Bill of Rights, is founded.\\nWe may add that if this defense had been pleaded by a citizen, it would have been by no means clear that the statute might not be construed so as to avert most, if not all, of the criticism directed against it. State v. McKee, 73 Conn. 18, 46 Atl. 409; State v. Pape, 90 Conn. 98, 96 Atl. 313.\\nWe have already indicated that the first and second clauses of the statute are to be construed in the light of the principles of the common law governing the publication of defamatory matter. And while the construction of the statute as a whole is not required or permitted by this record, it is a fair question\\u2014 Professor Freund to the contrary notwithstanding\\u2014 whether the second section of the Bill of Rights justifies the publication of anarchistic propaganda.\\nThe Superior Court is advised to overrule the demurrer and to enter judgment pursuant to the stipulation.\\nIn this opinion Gager, Curtis and Burpee, Js., concurred.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"3963450\", \"name\": \"STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. YOMAR FANA\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Fana\", \"decision_date\": \"2008-10-03\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"936\", \"last_page\": \"936\", \"citations\": \"289 Conn. 936\", \"volume\": \"289\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:01:25.897118+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. YOMAR FANA\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. YOMAR FANA\\nDecided October 3, 2008\\nCharles F. Willson, special public defender, in support of the petition.\\nLeon F. Dalbec, Jr., senior assistant state\\u2019s attorney, in opposition.\", \"word_count\": \"50\", \"char_count\": \"325\", \"text\": \"The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 109 Conn. App. 797 (AC 27642), is denied.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"4003479\", \"name\": \"RUSSO ROOFING, INC. v. NAOMI ROTTMAN\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Russo Roofing, Inc. v. Rottman\", \"decision_date\": \"2005-01-11\", \"docket_number\": \"AC 24044\", \"first_page\": \"767\", \"last_page\": \"777\", \"citations\": \"86 Conn. App. 767\", \"volume\": \"86\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Appellate Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Appellate Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:03:54.488973+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"RUSSO ROOFING, INC. v. NAOMI ROTTMAN\", \"head_matter\": \"RUSSO ROOFING, INC. v. NAOMI ROTTMAN\\n(AC 24044)\\nLaveiy, C. J., and McLachlan and Berdon, Js.\\nArgued April 28, 2004\\nofficially released January 11, 2005\\nGregory P. Lynch, with whom, on the brief, was J. Kevin Golger, for the appellant-appellee (defendant).\\nBernard Pellegrino, for the appellee-appellant (plaintiff).\", \"word_count\": \"2795\", \"char_count\": \"17167\", \"text\": \"Opinion\\nBERDON, J.\\nThese appeals stem from the trial court's judgment of strict foreclosure of a mechanic's hen, which the plaintiff, Russo Roofing, Inc., filed on the property of the defendant, Naomi Rottman. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court failed to award her (1) compensation on her counterclaim for damage to the interior of her home and (2) attorney's fees. On cross appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly denied its claim for attorney's fees pursuant to General Statutes \\u00a7 52-249. We agree with the claims raised by both parties and reverse the judgment of the trial court in part.\\nThe court found the following facts. On September 11, 2000, the parties entered into a written contract in which the plaintiff agreed to replace the roofs on the defendant's house and garage for the sum of $18,000. While the work was in progress, the defendant orally agreed to pay the plaintiff an additional $1040 for the replacement of additional underlying plywood. When the work was completed, the defendant gave the plaintiff a check for $18,000. The defendant withheld $1040 to ensure payment to her neighbor for the ice and water shields the plaintiff borrowed to complete the work on her roofs. Rain fell the day after the roofs were completed. Due to the improper installation of the roof, a substantial amount of water entered the defendant's house. The defendant stopped payment on the check that she had given to the plaintiff.\\nThe plaintiff subsequently filed a mechanic's lien on the defendant's property, seeking the $19,040 it claims to be the value of the materials and labor it furnished. The plaintiff then brought this action, seeking to foreclose the mechanic's lien. The defendant filed an answer, special defenses and a two count counterclaim, alleging that she was harmed because (1) the plaintiffs work was improperly performed and (2) as a result of the faulty work, the interior of her house was damaged. The parties agreed to have the court first decide the issues of liability and damages. The court would then decide the issues of attorney's fees and foreclosure.\\nIn the first of two memoranda of decision, the court initially found that the contract price of $18,000, along with the oral agreement between the parties for an additional $1040, was the maximum that the plaintiff could recover under the mechanic's lien. The court then found that the repair work that needed to be done on the defendant's roofs was due to the \\\"unworkmanlike manner in which the plaintiff replaced the roof.\\\" On the basis of the testimony of the defendant's expert witness, the court found that the reasonable cost to repair or replace the roof was $15,974. The court awarded a net sum of $3066 to the plaintiff, which represented the difference between $19,040, the amount that the defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff for replacing the roof, and $15,974, the cost to repair the plaintiffs work. The court did not award the defendant any compensation for the damage to the interior of her house because it ruled that her claim was pleaded improperly in the counterclaim.\\nAt the bifurcated trial, the plaintiff claimed that it was entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to \\u00a7 52-249 and that if the defendant was awarded attorney's fees, such an award would be governed by General Statutes \\u00a7 42-150bb. The defendant agreed that the amount of her attorney's fees should be governed by \\u00a7 42-150bb. The defendant, however, claimed that \\u00a7 52-249 did not apply to the plaintiff and that an award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff should be governed by General Statutes \\u00a7 42-150aa.**\\nIn its second memorandum of decision, the court ruled that \\u00a7 42-150aa controlled the plaintiffs recovery of attorney's fees and awarded the plaintiff $459.90. The court then determined that \\u00a7 42-150bb controlled the defendant's recovery of attorney's fees, but because the defendant had failed to prosecute her counterclaim successfully, she was not entitled to any recovery. These appeals followed.\\nI\\nThe defendant first claims that the court improperly failed to award her compensation on her counterclaim for the damage to the interior of her house because such damage was not alleged in her counterclaim. We agree.\\nThe court, while acknowledging that the plaintiff did not object to the introduction of the evidence concerning the damage to the interior of the defendant's house, ruled that it was not awarding the defendant compensation for the damage because \\\"[n]owhere in the defendant's answer, special defenses or counterclaims has any interior damage to the structure been pleaded.\\\" Therefore, the court concluded that the plaintiff was not on notice that the defendant was claiming that the water that entered her house had damaged the interior of the house.\\nIt is clear that the defendant's counterclaim sought compensation for the damage to the interior of her house. Therefore, the court improperly found that the defendant's counterclaim did not put the plaintiff on notice that she was seeking compensation for the damage to the interior of her house.\\n\\\"[T]he inteipretation of pleadings is always a question of law for the court . . . .\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DiLieto v. County Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.C., 265 Conn. 79, 104, 828 A.2d 31 (2003). Therefore, our review of the trial court's inteipretation of the pleadings is plenary. Id.\\n\\\"The modem trend, which is followed in Connecticut, is to construe pleadings broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically. . . . Beaudoin v. Town Oil Co., 207 Conn. 575, 587-88, 542 A.2d 1124 (1988), and cases cited therein. Although essential allegations may not be supplied by conjecture or remote implication; Cahill v. Board of Education, [198 Conn. 229, 236, 502 A.2d 410 (1985)] the [counterclaim] must be read in its entirety in such a way as to give effect to the pleading with reference to the general theory upon which it proceeded, and do substantial justice between the parties. Price v. Bouteiller, 79 Conn. 255, 257, 64 A. 227 (1906). As long as the pleadings provide sufficient notice of the facts claimed and the issues to be tried and do not surprise or prejudice the opposing party, we will not conclude that the [counterclaim] is insufficient to allow recovery.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Travelers Ins. Co. v. Namerow, 261 Conn. 784, 795, 807 A.2d 467 (2002).\\nThe court found that although the defendant pleaded that water entered her house, \\\"the counterclaims only provide that [a]s a result of the aforesaid, the defendant has been required to procure the services of other workmen to temporarily repair the roof, and will be required in the future to further repair and/or replace the work performed by [the] plaintiff. As a result of the aforesaid, [the] defendant has been damaged.\\\" The court, therefore, found that the pleading did not allege damage to the interior of the defendant's house. That reading of the defendant's counterclaim is unduly narrow.\\nIn construing the allegations liberally, as we must, a broad and realistic interpretation of the defendant's counterclaim, read in its entirety, put the plaintiff on notice that the defendant was seeking compensation for the damage to the interior of her house. Paragraph six of the second count of the defendant's counterclaim states: \\\"At that time, [the] defendant discovered water cascading down the first floor center stairway (of a three-story house), and upon further inspection discovered other areas where water was flowing into the house.\\\" Paragraph seven states: \\\"The infiltration of water into the house would not have occurred if [the] plaintiff had properly installed the new roof.\\\" Finally, paragraph nine of the second count of the defendant's counterclaim states: \\\"As a result of the aforesaid, [the] defendant has been damaged.\\\" Reading paragraphs six, seven and nine of the second count of the counterclaim together, we conclude that the counterclaim clearly alleged that the defendant was seeking compensation for the damage to the interior of her house. Therefore, the plaintiff was on notice of the defendant's claim of compensation for the damage to the interior of her house. Accordingly, because the defendant's counterclaim, when read as a whole, cannot be said to have caused the plaintiff surprise or prejudice, the court's decision not to address the counterclaim was improper. On remand, the court should calculate the additional amount of damages owed to the defendant.\\nII\\nThe defendant next claims that the court failed to award her attorney's fees on her counterclaim. We agree.\\nThe defendant sought to recover attorney's fees pursuant to \\u00a7 42-150bb. The court found that the defendant was not entitled to any attorney's fees under \\u00a7 42-150bb because \\\"the defendant did not successfully prosecute her counterclaim or defend an action based upon the contract.\\\" The court's ruling was based on its earlier ruling that the defendant owed the plaintiff $3066 under the contract.\\n\\\"The common law rule in Connecticut, also known as the American Rule, is that attorney's fees and ordinary expenses and burdens of litigation are not allowed to the successful party absent a contractual or statutory exception.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ames v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 267 Conn. 524, 532, 839 A.2d 1250 (2004). Section 42-150bb, however, provides in relevant part that whenever a contract \\\"to which a consumer is a party, provides for the attorney's fee of the commercial party to be paid by the consumer, an attorney's fee shall be awarded as a matter of law to the consumer who successfully prosecutes or defends an action or a counterclaim . . . .\\\" (Emphasis added.) The defendant successfully prosecuted her counterclaim, and the court awarded her damages in the amount of $15,974. The court, therefore, improperly failed to award the defendant attorney's fees under \\u00a7 42-150bb based on her counterclaim.\\nIll\\nIn its cross appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly denied its claim for attorney's fees pursuant to \\u00a7 52-249. We agree.\\nThe court rejected the plaintiffs claim that it was entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to \\u00a7 52-249. The court stated that because the contract provided for the payment of attorney's fees, it did not have to address the applicability of \\u00a7 52-249. Thereafter, relying on our Supreme Court's decision in Rizzo Pool Co. v. Del Grosso, 240 Conn. 58, 689 A.2d 1097 (1997), the trial court awarded the plaintiff, pursuant to \\u00a7 42-150aa (b), $459.90 in attorney's fees, 15 percent of the amount the defendant owed the plaintiff.\\n\\\"The question of whether a particular statute . . . applies to a given state of facts is a question of statutory interpretation . Statutoiy interpretation presents a question of law for the court. . . . Our review is, therefore, plenary.\\\" (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Original Grasso Construction Co. v. Shepherd, 70 Conn. App. 404, 418, 799 A.2d 1083, cert. denied, 261 Conn. 932, 806 A.2d 1065 (2002).\\nSection 42-150aa (b), which applies to attorney's fees in actions based on consumer contracts, provides in relevant part: \\\"If a lawsuit in which money damages are claimed is commenced by an attorney who is not a salaried employee of the holder of a contract . . . such holder may receive or collect attorney's fees, if not otherwise prohibited by law, of not more than fifteen per cent of the amount of any judgment which is entered.\\\" (Emphasis added.) In this case, the plaintiffs attorney, who was not a salaried employee, initiated the underlying proceedings. Accordingly, under \\u00a7 42-150aa (b), the plaintiffs recovery of attorney's fees was limited to 15 percent of the amount of the judgment entered.\\nSection 52-249 (a), however, which applies to an action of foreclosure of a lien, \\\"mandates that the plaintiff in a foreclosure action shall be allowed reasonable attorney's fees when there has been a hearing as to the form of judgment during the foreclosure action.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 419. Accordingly, under \\u00a7 52-249 (a), the plaintiff was entitled to reasonable attorney's fees on the foreclosure action.\\nA literal interpretation of \\u00a7 42-150aa and 52-249 would award the plaintiff duplicate attorney's fees. That, however, is not this case. Attorney's fees under \\u00a7 42-150aa would be for the contract aspects of the action, and attorney's fees under \\u00a7 52-249 would be for the foreclosure aspects of the action. \\\"[A] foreclosure action constitutes an equitable proceeding. . In an equitable proceeding, the trial court may examine all relevant factors to ensure that complete justice is done.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Moasser v. Becker, 78 Conn. App. 305, 324, 828 A.2d 116, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 910, 832 A.2d 70 (2003). On remand, therefore, the court should take into account the attorney's fees that it awards the plaintiff under \\u00a7 42-150aa in fashioning its award of attorney's fees under \\u00a7 52-249.\\nThe judgment is reversed only as to the limitation on the defendant's damages and the award of attorney's fees, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\\nSee footnote 3.\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 49-36 (a) provides: \\\"No mechanic's lien may attach to any building or its appurtenances, or to the land on which the same stands, or any lot, or any plot of land, in favor of any person, to a greater amount in the whole than the price which the owner agreed to pay for the building and its appurtenances or the development of any such lot, or the development of any such plot of land.\\\"\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 52-249 (a) provides in relevant part: \\\"The plaintiff in any action of foreclosure of a mortgage or lien, upon obtaining judgment of foreclosure, when there has been a hearing as to the form of judgment or the limitation of time for redemption, shall be allowed the same costs, including a reasonable attorney's fee, as if there had been a hearing on an issue of fact. . . .\\\"\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 42-150bb provides in relevant part: \\\"Whenever any contract . . . entered into on or after October 1,1979, to which a consumer is a party, provides for the attorney's fee of the commercial party to be paid by the consumer, an attorney's fees shall be awarded as a matter of law to the consumer who successfully prosecutes or defends an action or a counterclaim based upon the contract . Except as herein provided, the size of the attorney's fee awarded to the consumer shall be based as far as practicable upon the terms governing the size of the fee for the commercial party. . . . The provisions of this section shall apply only to contracts . in which the money, property or service which is the subject of the transaction is primarily for personal, family or household purposes.\\\"\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 42-150aa (b) provides: \\\"If a lawsuit in which money damages are claimed is commenced by an attorney who is not a salaried employee of the holder of a contract or lease subject to the provisions of this section, such holder may receive or collect attorney's fees, if not otherwise prohibited by law, of not more than fifteen per cent of the amount of any judgment which is entered.\\\"\\nFurthermore, the plaintiffs failure to object to the offer of evidence by the defendant also would be dispositive of the defendant's claim. As the court noted in its memorandum of decision, the plaintiff never objected during the trial as to the adequacy of the defendant's counterclaim or the admissibility of the evidence regarding the damage to the interior of the defendant's house because it was not properly pleaded. \\\"[T]he proper way to attack a variance between pleadings and proof is by objection at the trial to the admissibility of that evidence which varies from the pleadings, and failure to do so at the trial constitutes a waiver of any objection to such variance.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tedesco v. Stamford, 215 Conn. 450, 461, 576 A.2d 1273 (1990), on remand, 24 Conn. App. 377, 588 A.2d 656 (1991), rev'd, 222 Conn. 233, 610 A.2d 574 (1992). Because the plaintiff never raised an objection as to a variance between the pleadings and the evidence, any insufficiency in the pleading was waived, and the court should have addressed the defendant's counterclaim.\\nUnder the terms of the contract, the defendant agreed to \\\"pay all accrued interest, collection costs and reasonable attorney fees in the event of nonpayment of this contract.\\\" (Emphasis added.)\\nIn Rizzo Pool Co. v. Del Grosso, supra, 240 Conn. 77 n.18, our Supreme Court stated: \\\"[WJhenever there is an attorney's fees clause in the commercial party's contract, that clause is subject to [General Statutes] \\u00a7 42-150aa, and the contract must be read as incorporating that provision's 15 percent limitation.\\\"\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"4035343\", \"name\": \"BERNHARD-THOMAS BUILDING SYSTEMS, LLC v. CHET DUNICAN ET AL.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Bernhard-Thomas Building Systems, LLC v. Dunican\", \"decision_date\": \"2007-03-20\", \"docket_number\": \"AC 27465\", \"first_page\": \"63\", \"last_page\": \"80\", \"citations\": \"100 Conn. App. 63\", \"volume\": \"100\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Appellate Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Appellate Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:37:12.002899+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"BERNHARD-THOMAS BUILDING SYSTEMS, LLC v. CHET DUNICAN ET AL.\", \"head_matter\": \"BERNHARD-THOMAS BUILDING SYSTEMS, LLC v. CHET DUNICAN ET AL.\\n(AC 27465)\\nSchaller, Gruendel and Mihalakos, Js.\\nArgued November 16, 2006\\nofficially released March 20, 2007\\nAlan R. Spirer, for the appellant (plaintiff).\\nRichard A. Roberts, with whom was Jennifer J. Cavalier, for the appellee (defendant Jacques J. Parenteau).\", \"word_count\": \"5613\", \"char_count\": \"34564\", \"text\": \"Opinion\\nSCHALLER, J.\\nThe plaintiff, Bemhard-Thomas Building Systems, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant Jacques J. Parenteau. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly struck four counts of its complaint. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.\\nIn its operative complaint, the plaintiff alleged the following facts that are relevant to the issues on appeal. The plaintiff employed Chet Dunican from April, 2002, until February, 2004, as an at-will employee. On December 19, 2003, the defendant, an attorney licensed to practice in Connecticut, filed an application for a prejudgment remedy on behalf of Dunican against the plaintiff in the amount of $3.5 million. The court, Leuba, J., held a hearing over the course of several days and on March 10, 2004, denied the application. Specifically, the court stated that it had applied the probable cause standard and concluded that Dunican had failed to sustain his burden with respect to any of his claims. Following the denial of the application for a prejudgment remedy, Dunican withdrew his claims against the plaintiff.\\nThe plaintiff commenced the present action and alleged that it had expended substantial attorney's fees in response to Dunican's application. The plaintiff filed a nine count complaint against both Dunican and the defendant. Counts five and six of the complaint alleged that the defendant had violated General Statutes \\u00a7 52-568 (1) and (2). Count seven set forth a cause of action for common-law vexatious litigation. Count eight alleged an abuse of process by the defendant. These counts were based on the defendant's filing of the application for a prejudgment remedy and sending a copy of the application to the Weitz Company, the plaintiffs largest client, in order \\\"to vex and trouble the [p]laintiff ' and \\\"to attempt to pressure the [p]laintiff to pay money\\\" to Dunican. The plaintiff further alleged that the defendant and Dunican indicated that if it refused to pay Dunican money, Dunican would reveal embarrassing information regarding \\\"members\\\" of the plaintiff and their families.\\nThe defendant moved to strike the counts against him by a motion filed August 24, 2005. On January 18, 2006, the court, Hon. David W. Skolnick, judge trial referee, granted the motion and struck the counts against the defendant. With respect to the claims of statutory and common-law vexatious litigation, the court concluded that an application for a prejudgment remedy did not constitute a civil action that terminated in favor of the plaintiff, a necessary element to the tort of vexatious litigation. With respect to the cause of action for abuse of process, the court stated that the allegations contained in the complaint failed to establish that the defendant's actions \\\"were in furtherance of a primary purpose other than to secure aprejudgment remedy. Rather, these allegations merely show that an ulterior motive existed.\\\"\\nPursuant to Practice Book \\u00a7 10-44, the defendant, on February 7, 2006, moved for judgment on the stricken counts against him. The court granted this motion, without objection, on February 27, 2006. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessaiy.\\nAs an initial matter, we identify the appropriate standard of review. \\\"Because a motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court, our review of the court's ruling on the [defendants' motion] is plenary. . . . We take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint that has been stricken and we construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency. . . . Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied. . . . Moreover, we note that [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged. . It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted. . . . Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Violano v. Fernandez, 88 Conn. App. 1, 4-5, 868 A.2d 69 (2005), aff'd, 280 Conn. 310, 907 A.2d 1188 (2006); see also Rizzuto v. Davidson Ladders, Inc., 280 Conn. 225, 229, 905 A.2d 1165 (2006); Heim v. California Federal Bank, 78 Conn. App. 351, 358-59, 828 A.2d 129, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 911, 832 A.2d 70 (2003). We will address each of the stricken counts in turn.\\nI\\nThe plaintiff first claims that the court improperly struck counts five, six and seven of its operative complaint. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the court improperly concluded that the application filed by the defendant on behalf of Dunican for a prejudgment remedy did not constitute a \\\"prior civil action,\\\" which is an element of vexatious litigation. We disagree.\\nWe begin our discussion by setting forth the elements of the common-law tort of vexatious litigation. Our Supreme Court has stated: \\\"In a malicious prosecution or vexatious litigation action, it is necessary to prove want of probable cause, malice and a termination of [the] suit in the plaintiffs' favor. . . . [.Establishing] a cause of action for vexatious suit requires proof that a civil action has been prosecuted not only without probable cause but also with malice. . It must also appear that the litigation claimed to be vexatious terminated in some way favorable to the defendant therein.\\\" (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) QSP, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 256 Conn. 343, 361, 773 A.2d 906 (2001); see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cole, 189 Conn. 518, 538, 457 A.2d 656 (1983); Vandersluis v. Weil, 176 Conn. 353, 356, 407 A.2d 982 (1978); D. Wright, J. Fitzgerald & W. Ankerman, Connecticut Law of Torts (3d Ed. 1991) \\u00a7 162, p. 432.\\nWe now identify the elements of statutory vexatious litigation. Section 52-568 provides: \\\"Any person who commences and prosecutes any civil action or complaint against another, in his own name or the name of others, or asserts a defense to any civil action or complaint commenced and prosecuted by another (1) without probable cause, shall pay such other person double damages, or (2) without probable cause, and with a malicious intent unjustly to vex and trouble such other person, shall pay him treble damages.\\\" This court has stated that \\\"[t]he elements of a common-law or statutory cause of action for vexatious litigation are identical.\\\" Norse Systems, Inc. v. Tingley Systems, Inc., 49 Conn. App. 582, 596, 715 A.2d 807 (1998); see also Frisbie v. Morris, 75 Conn. 637, 639, 55 A. 9 (1903); Hebrew Home & Hospital, Inc. v. Brewer, 92 Conn. App. 762, 766-67, 886 A.2d 1248 (2005); Falls Church Group, Ltd. v. Tyler, Cooper & Alcorn, LLP, 89 Conn. App. 459, 467, 874 A.2d 266 (2005), aff'd, 281 Conn. 84, 912 A.2d 1019 (2007); Shurman v. Duncan, 14 Conn. Sup. 293, 294 (1946). The question, therefore, is whether the court properly concluded that a prejudg ment remedy is not a civil action for purposes of vexatious litigation.\\nAt the outset of our analysis, we note that this appears to be a question of first impression for the appellate courts of our state. We note, however, that prior cases, although not precisely on point with the present issue, provide us with guidance. For example, in Howard v. Robertson, 27 Conn. App. 621, 623, 608 A.2d 711 (1992), the plaintiff had refused to pay a balance owed to the defendant, who had constructed a house for her. The defendant filed a counterclaim and was awarded damages on February 3, 1986. Id. On January 10, 1989, the plaintiff filed an application for a prejudgment remedy and intended to file a petition for a new trial on the basis of her discovery of previously undetectable defects in her home. Id. Following a hearing, the court denied the application for a prejudgment remedy. Id. The plaintiff did not file the petition for a new trial until April 17, 1989, more than three years after the conclusion of the original trial. Id., 124.\\nThe defendant successfully moved for summary judgment on the ground that the petition for a new trial was filed outside of the applicable three year statute of limitations. Id. We affirmed the judgment. \\\"[A] writ of summons is a statutory prerequisite to the commencement of a civil action. . . . [I\\\\t is an essential element to the validity of the jurisdiction of the court. . . . Although the writ of summons need not be technically perfect, and need not conform exactly to the form set out in the Practice Book . . . the plaintiffs complaint must contain the basic information and direction normally included in a writ of summons. . A writ must contain a direction to a proper officer for service and a command to summon the defendant to appear in court. . . .\\n\\\"[T]he writ accompanying the prejudgment remedy documents did not specify a return date by which the defendant would have to file an appearance. This is a necessary component of a writ by which a civil action is commenced. General Statutes \\u00a7 52-45a. Although the documents served on the defendant were sufficient to give notice of a prejudgment remedy hearing, they were insufficient to serve as the basis for a petition for new trial. Contrary to the plaintiff s assertions, the prejudgment remedy documents are not the equivalent of the writ necessary pursuant to General Statutes \\u00a7 52-45a, and does not satisfy the requirements of General Statutes \\u00a7 52-582. Further, the language of General Statutes [\\u00a7 52-278c] (b) that the plaintiff is about to commence an action plainly indicates that the application for prejudgment remedy, together with the documents that accompany it, do not commence an action.\\\" (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Howard v. Robertson, supra, 27 Conn. App. 626-27.\\nWe subsequently applied the reasoning of Howard in Raynor v. Hickock Realty Corp., 61 Conn. App. 234, 763 A.2d 54 (2000). In that case, the plaintiff alleged that she was injured when she fell on property owned by the defendant. Id., 235. She initially sought and obtained a prejudgment remedy attaching the defendant's property. Id., 235-36. The plaintiff, however, did not file her civil action until February, 1998, more than two years after sustaining her injuries. The defendant successfully moved for summary judgment on the basis of the plaintiffs failure to commence her action within the statute of limitations. Id., 236. In affirming the decision of the trial court, we rejected the plaintiffs claim that Howard, was distinguishable. Id., 237-38. We noted the importance of a signed summons and complaint and stated that \\\"[t]he writ in order to be 'due process of law' must be signed by . . . a . . . commissioner of the Superior Court . . . or a . . . clerk of the court to which it is returnable.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 240; see also General Statutes \\u00a7 52-45a; Practice Book \\u00a7 8-1. We further concluded: \\\"The prejudgment remedy documents lacked a signed writ of summons and complaint. Therefore, the action was not 'commenced' within the meaning of \\u00a7 52-45a . . . .\\\" Raynor v. Hickock Realty Corp., supra, 242.\\nWe are further guided by precedent from our Supreme Court. In Feldmann v. Sebastian, 261 Conn. 721, 805 A.2d 713 (2002), the plaintiffs estate sought to recover damages on its claim for wrongful death and loss of consortium from two defendants who were members of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation (tribe). Id., 723. The defendants received tribal incentive payments, which were discretionary payments from the tribe to its members. Id. The plaintiff sought to attach those payments and have them turned over to a receiver. Id., 723-24. Our Supreme Court concluded that the type of prejudgment remedy sought by the plaintiff was not authorized by General Statutes \\u00a7 52-278a (d). Feldmann v. Sebastian, supra, 727-28. The court also rejected the plaintiffs argument that such a remedy was authorized by General Statutes \\u00a7 52-504, which provides in relevant part: \\\"When any action is brought to or pending in the superior court in which an application is made for the appointment of a receiver, any judge of the superior court, when such court is not in session, after due notice given, may make such order in the action as the exigencies of the case may require, and may, from time to time, rescind and modify any such order. . . .\\\" Our Supreme Court concluded that applying for a prejudgment remedy did not commence an action, and therefore, \\u00a7 52-504 was inapplicable. Feldmann v. Sebastian, supra, 729-30. \\\"It is well settled that a civil action is brought on the date on which the writ of summons is served on the defendant. . . . An application for a prejudgment remedy, which is not equivalent to a writ of summons and complaint, does not commence an action. \\\" (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.; see also Hillman v. Greenwich, 217 Conn. 520, 524-25, 587 A.2d 99 (1991) (noting importance of signed writ of summons to commence civil action).\\nWe find further support for our conclusion in the text of the prejudgment remedy statutes, \\u00a7 52-278a et seq. For example, \\u00a7 52-278c (b), which sets forth the form that the application for a prejudgment remedy should take, provides in relevant part that the plaintiff \\\"is about to commence an action against\\\" the defendant. This language indicates that the prejudgment remedy application is something that precedes, and, therefore; is not the equivalent of, the commencement of a civil action. See, e.g., Cahaly v. Benislar Property Exchange Trust Co., 268 Conn. 264, 272-73, 842 A.2d 1113 (2004) (under clear language of \\u00a7 52-278c [b], application for prejudgment remedy is not stand-alone pleading); E. J. Hansen Elevator, Inc. v. Stoll, 167 Conn. 623, 628, 356 A.2d 893 (1975) (prejudgment remedy auxiliary to cause of action alleged); Howard v. Robertson, supra, 27 Conn. App. 626-27; see also 2 E. Stephenson, Connecticut Civil Procedure (3d Ed. 2002) \\u00a7 104, p. 2 (\\\"[pjrejudgment remedies are ancillary to the main action for damages and cannot exist without such action\\\").\\nMoreover, if a subsequent civil action is not commenced within thirty days of a successful application for a prejudgment remedy, then \\\"the court shall dismiss the prejudgment remedy.\\\" General Statutes \\u00a7 52-278j (a). This indicates that the failure to commence the civil action is a process separate and distinct from the initial step of obtaining a prejudgment remedy. Additionally, subsection (c) of \\u00a7 52-278j provides that \\\"[a]n application for a prejudgment remedy or a prejudgment remedy which is granted but not served may be withdrawn in the same manner as a civil cause of action.\\\" (Emphasis added.) We conclude, therefore, that the text of these statutory subsections indicate a difference between an application for a prejudgment remedy and a civil action.\\nApplying these principles to the present situation, we conclude that the defendant's application for a prejudgment remedy did not commence a civil action and, therefore, could not form the basis for the plaintiffs claim of vexatious litigation. In reviewing the application for a prejudgment remedy filed by the defendant on behalf of Dunican, we note that there was an affidavit in support of the application, an order of notice and hearing, a summons to appear in court regarding the prejudgment application, order, writ of garnishment and attachment, an unsigned three count complaint, an unsigned statement of the amount in demand, and a recognizance and motion for disclosure. These documents complied with \\u00a7 52-278c. Our examination reveals, however, that although the defendant's actions satisfy the requirements of a proper request for a prejudgment remedy, the necessary steps to commence a civil action are absent. Notably, there was no service of a signed writ of summons and complaint, and, therefore, a civil action was not commenced in the underlying proceedings. Accordingly, the court properly struck counts five through seven of the plaintiffs complaint because they failed to allege an element of the tort of vexatious litigation.\\nII\\nThe plaintiff next claims that the court improperly struck the eighth count of its amended complaint. Specifically, it argues that the court improperly concluded that the claims for abuse of process were not predicated on \\\"specific misconduct intended to cause specific injuiy outside the normal contemplation of private litigation.\\\" We disagree.\\nIn its complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant and Dunican sent a copy of the prejudgment remedy application to the Weitz Company, the plaintiffs largest client, and threatened to disclose publicly embarrassing information about the members of the plaintiff and their families. The plaintiff further claimed that these actions were done to induce the plaintiff to pay money to both Dunican and the defendant.\\n\\\"An action for abuse of process lies against any person using a legal process against another in an improper manner or to accomplish a purpose for which it was not designed. . . . Because the tort arises out of the accomplishment of a result that could not be achieved by the proper and successful use of process, the Restatement Second (1977) of Torts, \\u00a7 682, emphasizes that the gravamen of the action for abuse of process is the use of a legal process . . . against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed . Comment b to \\u00a7 682 explains that the addition of [the word] primarily is meant to exclude liability when the process is used for the purpose for which it is intended, but there is an incidental motive of spite or an ulterior purpose of benefit to the defendant. See also 1 F. Harper, F. James & O. Gray, Torts (2d Ed. 1986) \\u00a7 4.9; R. Mallen & V. Levit, Legal Malpractice (2d Ed. 1981) \\u00a7 61; W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Torts (5th Ed. 1984) \\u00a7 121.\\\" (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wilson v. Jefferson, 98 Conn. App. 147, 164-65, 908 A.2d 13 (2006); see also Larobina v. McDonald, 274 Conn. 394, 403-404, 876 A.2d 522 (2005); Mozzochi v. Beck, 204 Conn. 490, 494, 529 A.2d 171 (1987).\\nIn Mozzochi, our Supreme Court established a specific test to determine the scope of potential liability of an attorney for abuse of process arising out of his or her professional representation of the interest of his or her clients. The court noted that this cause of action competed against the policy of ensuring unfettered access to the courts. Mozzochi v. Beck, supra, 204 Conn. 494-95. In an effort to avoid adoption of \\\"rules which will have a chilling and inhibitory effect on would-be litigants of justiciable issues\\\"; (internal quotation marks omitted) id., 495; our Supreme Court concluded that \\\"although attorneys have a duty to their clients and to the judicial system not to pursue litigation that is utterly groundless, that duty does not give rise to a third party action for abuse of process unless the third party can point to specific misconduct intended to cause specific injury outside of the normal contemplation of private litigation. Any other rule would ineluctably interfere with the attorney's primary duty of robust representation of the interests of his or her client.\\\" Id., 497. The court concluded that the plaintiffs general allegation to \\\"inflict injury on the plaintiff and to enrich themselves and their said client\\\" failed to \\\"satisfy the requirement of showing the use of legal process primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed . . . .\\\" (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.\\nThe operative complaint filed in the present case failed to allege that the defendant used legal process, the application for a prejudgment remedy, primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed. \\\"The purpose of the prejudgment remedy of attachment is security for the satisfaction of the plaintiffs judgment, should he obtain one. . It is primarily designed to forestall any dissipation of assets by the defendant and to bring [those assets] into the custody of the law to be held as security for the satisfaction of such judgment as the plaintiff may recover . . . .\\\" (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Morris v. Cee Dee, LLC, 90 Conn. App. 403, 412, 877 A.2d 899, cert. granted on other grounds, 275 Conn. 929, 883 A.2d 1245 (2005) (appeal withdrawn March 13, 2006); see also Gagne v. Vaccaro, 80 Conn. App. 436, 452, 835 A.2d 491 (2003), cert. denied, 268 Conn. 920, 846 A. 2d 881 (2004). The complaint contains no allegation that the application for a prejudgment remedy was used to alert the Weitz Company to the plaintiffs conduct with respect to Dunican or Dunican's potential claims against the plaintiff. Moreover, the complaint does not allege that the prejudgment remedy was used so that Dunican would be able to reveal embarrassing information. See Lewis Truck & Trailer, Inc. v. Jandreau, 11 Conn. App. 168, 170-71, 526 A.2d 532 (1987). These allegations, if proven, might show an ulterior, perhaps even malicious, motive associated with an application for a prejudgment remedy. The complaint, however, failed to allege that the primary or ultimate purpose of filing the application was to effectuate these actions. We agree with the trial court's conclusion that the allegations that the defendant \\\"sent notice of the prejudgment remedy application to the Weitz Company and threatened to disclose embarrassing information, when viewed in [their] most favorable light, do not establish that [the defendant's] actions were in furtherance of a primary purpose other than to secure a prejudgment remedy. Rather, these allegations merely show that an ulterior motive existed [and therefore were insufficient] to constitute a cause of action for abuse of process.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Accordingly, we conclude that the court properly struck count eight of the plaintiff's amended complaint.\\nThe judgment is affirmed.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\\nThe named defendant in this action, Chet Dunican, is not a party to this appeal. We therefore refer to Parenteau as the defendant in this opinion.\\nThe plaintiff commenced this action on November 23, 2004. In response to a request to revise, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint on February 8, 2005, and a \\\"partial revision of complaint\\\" on August 11, 2005.\\nThe operative complaint contained nine counts. The first four counts were directed against Dunican, and the last five counts were directed against the defendant. The ninth count of the operative complaint alleged that the defendant had violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Statutes \\u00a7 42-110a et seq. The court struck that count, and the plaintiff has not challenged that decision on appeal.\\n\\\"A judgment that disposes of only a part of a complaint is not a final judgment. . . . Our rules of practice, however, set forth certain circumstances under which a party may appeal from a judgment disposing of less than all of the counts of a complaint. Thus, a party may appeal if the partial judgment disposes of all causes of action against a particular party or parties; see Practice Book \\u00a7 61-3 . . . .\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rino Gnesi Co. v. Sbriglio, 98 Conn. App. 1, 7-8, 908 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 945, 912 A.2d 480 (2006); see also McCoy v. New Haven, 92 Conn. App. 558, 560 n.1, 886 A.2d 489 (2005). Here, there is a final judgment because all of the causes of action against the defendant were disposed of.\\n\\\"Practice Book \\u00a7 10-44 provides in relevant part that [w]ithin fifteen days after the granting of any motion to strike, the party whose pleading has been stricken may file a new pleading . As a general rule, [t]he filing of an amended pleading operates as a waiver of the right to claim that there was error in the sustaining of the [motion to strike] the original pleading. . . . Accordingly, a party has two mutually exclusive options: A party may file either an amended pleading, thereby waiving the right to challenge the striking of the initial complaint; or a party may appeal from the judgment rendered regarding the initial stricken complaint.....The choice is left to the plaintiff, but once he files an amended pleading the ruling on the [original motion to strike] ceases to be an issue. The rule is a sound one, as it serves to prevent the prolongation of litigation.\\\" (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Parker v. Ginsburg Development CT, LLC, 85 Conn. App. 777, 780, 859 A.2d 46 (2004); see also Bross v. Hillside Acres, Inc., 92 Conn. App. 773, 777-78, 887 A.2d 420 (2006).\\nThe plaintiff argues that even if we were to conclude that an application for a prejudgment remedy is not a civil action in the context of the tort of common-law vexatious litigation, the language of General Statutes \\u00a7 52-568 requires a different result for statutory vexatious litigation. Section 52-568 is applicable to \\\"[a]ny person who commences and prosecutes any civil action or complaint against another . . . .\\\" (Emphasis added.) The plaintiff contends that the inclusion of the phrase \\\"or complaint against another\\\" evidences a legislative intent to enlarge the scope of the statutory cause of action when compared to the common-law action. In support, the plaintiff refers to the tenet of statutory construction that the legislature does not enact meaningless provisions. See Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 279 Conn. 207, 216-17, 901 A.2d 673 (2006); Blasko v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 98 Conn. App. 439, 453, 910 A.2d 219 (2006).\\nThe plaintiff, however, has failed to demonstrate why the phrase \\\"or complaint, against another\\\" applies to an application for a prejudgment remedy. As this court recently noted, \\\"[i]t is not enough merely to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel's work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Diaz, 94 Conn. App. 582, 593, 893 A.2d 495, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 901, 907 A.2d 91 (2006). In other words, the plaintiff has not included the necessary analysis connecting the general legal principle, that every word in a statute has some meaning, to its conclusion that a prejudgment remedy hearing \\\"should, at the very least, be characterized as a 'complaint against another' within the meaning of \\u00a7 52-568.\\\" This missing analysis, therefore, constitutes inadequate briefing. As a result, we decline to review this claim. \\\"[W]e are not required to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . Where a claim is asserted in the statement of issues but thereafter receives only cursory attention in the brief without substantive discussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Valentine v. LaBow, 95 Conn. App. 436, 452, 897 A.2d 624, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 933, 909 A.2d 963 (2006); see also Ward v. Greene, 267 Conn. 539, 546, 839 A.2d 1259 (2004).\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 52-278a (d) defines a prejudgment remedy as \\\"any remedy or combination of remedies that enables a person by way of attachment, foreign attachment, garnishment or replevin to deprive the defendant in a civil action of, or affect the use, possession or enjoyment by such defendant of, his property prior to final judgment but shall not include a temporary restraining order.\\\" See also Feldmann v. Sebastian, 261 Conn. 721, 726-27, 805 A.2d 713 (2002); Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v. Trust, 25 Conn. App. 28, 30-31, 592 A.2d 417, cert. granted on other grounds, 220 Conn. 904, 593 A.2d 970 (1991) (appeal withdrawn July 10, 1992).\\nWe have stated that the \\\"adjudication made by the court on the application for a prejudgment remedy is not part of the proceedings ultimately to decide the validity and merits of the plaintiffs cause of action. It is independent of and collateral thereto and primarily designed to forestall any dissipation of assets by the defendant. . . . [Pjrejudgment remedy proceedings . . . are not involved with the adjudication of the merits of the action brought by the plaintiff or with the progress or result of that adjudication.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Orsini v. Tarro, 80 Conn. App. 268, 272-73, 834 A.2d 776 (2003); see also Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Ace American Reinsurance Co., 279 Conn. 220, 230, 901 A.2d 1164 (2006); Tyler v. Schnabel, 34 Conn. App. 216, 219, 641 A.2d 388 (1994); Cahaly v. Benistar Property Exchange Trust Co., 73 Conn. App. 267, 274, 812 A.2d 1 (2002) (\\\"purpose of the prejudgment remedy of attachment is security for the satisfaction of the plaintiffs judgment, should he obtain one\\\" [emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted]), rev'd on other grounds, 268 Conn. 264, 842 A.2d 1113 (2004).\\nIn Board of Education v. Tavares Pediatric Center, 276 Conn. 544, 888 A.2d 65 (2006), our Supreme Court explained that \\\"the term civil action . . . has been defined in the broader . . . context of title 52 of the General Statutes. General Statutes \\u00a7 52-91 provides in relevant part that [t]here shall be one form of civil action. The first pleading on the part of the plaintiff shall be known as the complaint and shall contain a statement of the facts constituting the cause of action and, on a separate page of the complaint, a demand for the relief, which shall be a statement of the remedy or remedies sought. . . . Another provision of title 52 correspondingly defines a civil action, without equivocation, as 'be[ing] commenced by legal process . . . .' General Statutes \\u00a7 52-45a. . We correspondingly have concluded that a proceeding is not a civil action when it is neither commenced by service of process nor controlled by rules of pleading.\\\" (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 557-58.\\nThe Superior Court has held on several occasions that the denial of a prejudgment remedy application does not constitute the termination of a prior civil action upon which a lawsuit for vexatious litigation may be based. See Savitt v. Condon & Olderman Realty, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. CV-01-073254-S (October 31,2002) (33 Conn. L. Rptr. 325); Wisnioski v. Ladizki, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-00-0597336-S (October 4, 2001) (30 Conn. L. Rptr. 474); Delugan v. Allen, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV-96-0563950-S (April 3, 1997); Knickerbocker v. Village Apartments Properties, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV-92-0058389 (September 23,1992) (7 Conn. L. Rptr. 414); Dinnis v. Roberts, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-90-296974-S (January 3, 1991) (3 Conn. L. Rptr. 638); see also Boyko v. UST Bank/Connecticut, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-95-327711-S (March 11, 1996) (court struck offer of judgment served with application for prejudgment remedy because such application does not commence action nor is considered civil action for purposes of General Statutes \\u00a7 52-192a [a]); see 52 Am. Jur. 2d 153, Malicious Prosecution \\u00a7 20 (2000).\\nOur Supreme Court has recognized the significance of the signing of a complaint. \\\"The subject of signing and issuing process in civil actions is one of consequence. Such signing is one of the processes of law by which a man may be deprived of his liberty and property. It is carefully guarded. It is not to be done indiscriminately. . . . The signing of a writ by a person as a commissioner of the Superior Court is not a mere ministerial act. . . . The canons of professional ethics require that a lawyer decline to institute an action if he is convinced that it is intended to harass or ipjure the opposite party or work an oppression or wrong.\\\" (Citations omitted.) Sharkiewicz v. Smith, 142 Conn. 410, 412-13, 114 A.2d 691 (1955); see Practice Book \\u00a7 4-2 (b).\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 52-45a provides that \\\"[c]ivii actions shall be commenced by legal process consisting of a writ of summons or attachment, describing the parties, the court to which it is returnable, the return day, the date and place for the filing of an appearance and information required by the Office of the Chief Court Administrator. The writ shall be accompanied by the plaintiffs complaint. The writ may run into any judicial district and shall be signed by a commissioner of the Superior Court or a judge or clerk of the court to which it is returnable.\\\" (Emphasis added.)\\nPractice Book \\u00a7 8-1 (a) provides in relevant part: \\\"Mesne process in civil actions shall be a writ of summons or attachment, describing the parties, the court to which it is returnable and the time and place of appearance, and shall be accompanied by the plaintiffs complaint. Such writ may run into any judicial district or geographical area and shall be signed by a commissioner of the superior court or a judge or clerk of the court to which it is returnable. . . .\\\"\\nIt appears unclear whether the acts alleged in the complaint, i.e., sending a copy of the complaint to the Weitz Company and Dunican's threats to reveal embarrassing information even constitute the use of a legal process. See, e.g., Larobina v. McDonald, supra, 274 Conn. 404-407. Although the defendant discussed this issue at oral argument, he failed to brief this claim. We therefore decline to afford it consideration. See Legnos v. Legnos, 70 Conn. App. 349, 350 n.1, 797 A.2d 1184, cert. denied, 261 Conn. 911, 806 A.2d 48 (2002); see also State v. Webb, 238 Conn. 389, 468 n.56, 680 A.2d 147 (1996), aff'd after remand, 252 Conn. 128, 750 A.2d 448, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 835, 121 S. Ct. 93, 148 L. Ed. 2d 53 (2000).\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"4057527\", \"name\": \"STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ANTWON W.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Antwon W.\", \"decision_date\": \"2009-12-01\", \"docket_number\": \"AC 28150\", \"first_page\": \"180\", \"last_page\": \"202\", \"citations\": \"118 Conn. App. 180\", \"volume\": \"118\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Appellate Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Appellate Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:00:20.859908+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ANTWON W.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ANTWON W.\\n(AC 28150)\\nFlynn, C. J., and Harper and Hennessy, Js.\\nArgued September 10\\nofficially released December 1, 2009\\nNeal Cone, senior assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).\\nMichele C. Lukban, senior assistant state\\u2019s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John A. Connelly, state\\u2019s attorney, and Patrick J. Griffin, senior assistant state\\u2019s attorney, for the appellee (state).\\nIn accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of sexual abuse and the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline to identify the victim or others through whom the victim\\u2019s identify may be ascertained. See General Statutes \\u00a7 54-86e.\", \"word_count\": \"7060\", \"char_count\": \"42054\", \"text\": \"Opinion\\nFLYNN, C. J.\\nThe defendant, Antwon W., appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of one count of sexual assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes \\u00a7 53a-72a (a) (1) (A), three counts of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes \\u00a7 53a-70 (a) (1), three counts of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes \\u00a7 53a-70 (a) (2) and one count of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2001) \\u00a7 53-21 (a) (2), as amended by Public Acts 2002, No. 02-138, \\u00a7 4. On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) his conviction of sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child constituted double jeopardy, (2) the trial court improperly allowed to be admitted constancy of accusation testimony, (3) the court improperly charged the jury with regard to constancy of accusation testimony, (4) the court improperly allowed to be admitted expert testimony and (5) the court improperly charged the jury with respect to the testimony of the state's expert witness in child sexual abuse. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.\\nThe jury reasonably could have found the following facts. In December, 2002, the victim, who was twelve years old, and her mother moved into a house occupied by the victim's uncle, aunt and cousins. At this time, the defendant, an eighteen year old son of the victim's uncle and aunt, did not reside at the house, but he visited frequently and spent time in the basement, where he played video games. About two weeks after the victim and her mother moved in, the victim was doing laundry in the basement when the defendant came downstairs (first incident). The defendant said to the victim: \\\"Do you do things like this?\\\" Subsequently, he pulled down his sweatpants, revealing his penis. The defendant, who stood between the victim and the stairway, then told the victim that he would not let her leave until she touched his penis. Scared and wanting to leave the area, the victim touched the defendant's penis briefly and then ran upstairs. The victim did not report the incident to anyone else immediately because she was scared and in shock.\\nApproximately one week later, the victim went downstairs to the basement and again encountered the defendant (second incident). The defendant grabbed the victim's collar and ordered her to bend over, indicating that he would not allow her to leave until she complied. The victim bent over, and the defendant pulled her pants down and penetrated her vagina with his penis, causing the victim to feel \\\"shocking pain\\\" and pressure. Although the victim did not scream or fight the defendant because she was scared, she did try \\\"tightening\\\" herself up to prevent the defendant's penetration. When the defendant had finished, the victim felt wetness and coldness on her vagina. The victim left the basement and proceeded upstairs to her bedroom. She did not reveal the incident to anyone light away because she was scared about what people might think of her and worried that the assault somehow was her fault.\\nBy the summer of 2003, the victim and her mother had moved out of the house belonging to the victim's uncle and aunt. However, the victim and her mother periodically returned to visit. On one of these visits in the summer of 2003, the victim was playing with her cousins in the swimming pool in the backyard. The victim became ill with a headache, and one of her cousins told her to go lie down in another cousin's room, which was located in the basement (third incident). The defendant entered the room and asked the victim: \\\"Which one?\\\" The victim asked what the defendant meant, and the defendant repeated the statement, pointing to the victim's vagina, anus and mouth. The victim understood the defendant to be asking either for her to \\\"touch him\\\" or to have the defendant \\\"put his penis inside\\\" her. Attempting to avoid the pain of penetration, the victim chose to touch the defendant, and the defendant lowered his pants. After the victim had touched the defendant's penis, the defendant turned the victim over onto her stomach and penetrated her vagina. The victim tensed up in an attempt to prevent the penetration, but she felt the same pain and pressure as she had experienced during the previous incident. When the defendant had finished, the victim felt the same wet feeling in her vaginal area. Following the assault, the defendant left the room, and the victim went to sleep. The victim again did not report the assault immediately, as she felt scared and thought no one would believe that the defendant, her cousin, would do such a thing.\\nOn another occasion during the summer of 2003, the victim was in an upstairs bedroom playing a game with one of her cousins (fourth incident). When the cousin left to go downstairs, the defendant entered the room and said to the victim, \\\"I'll pay you $13 if you suck my dick,\\\" and he showed the victim the money. The victim refused and said she would scream. The defendant replied that he would break her jaw. This threat scared the victim, and she placed her mouth on the defendant's penis. The defendant stood before the victim, who was seated on the bed, and placed his hands on her head, applying pressure and pushing her head up and down. The incident ended when the defendant heard someone coming up the stairs, and he put his penis back in his pants and sat down as if nothing had happened. Following the incident, the victim was scared and did not report it to anyone immediately.\\nIn January, 2004, the victim revealed the defendant's abuse to her cousin, T, her aunt, B, and her mother, S. S took the victim to the police department where she spoke with police officers and provided a statement. Thereafter, by way of a substitute long form information, the state charged the defendant with one count of sexual assault in the third degree in violation of \\u00a7 53a-72a (a) (1) (A), three counts of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of \\u00a7 53a-70 (a) (l), three counts of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of \\u00a7 53a-70 (a) (2) and one count of risk of injuiy to a child in violation of \\u00a7 53-21 (a) (2). Following trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of all counts. The court subsequently rendered a judgment of conviction and sentenced the defendant to an effective term of fifteen years incarceration and fifteen years of special parole. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be supplied where necessary.\\nI\\nDOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAIM\\nThe defendant first claims that his conviction of three counts of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of \\u00a7 53a-70 (a) (2) and one count of risk of injuiy to a child in violation of \\u00a7 53-21 (a) (2) constituted a violation of his constitutional right not to be placed in double jeopardy. Specifically, he argues that both statutes require that the defendant be more than two years older than the victim and that both statutes require proof that the defendant committed an act \\\"in a sexual and indecent manner likely to impair the morals\\\" of the victim.\\nThe defendant did not raise this claim before the trial court. He seeks review, therefore, pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989). Although the record is adequate for our review and the claim is of constitutional magnitude, the defendant cannot demonstrate that a constitutional violation clearly exists, and so his claim must fail. See id.\\nAs a preliminary matter, we set forth the standard of review and principles of law underlying the defendant's claim. A defendant's claim that a conviction violated his constitutional right against double jeopardy raises an issue of law; our review of such a claim is plenary. State v. Burnell, 290 Conn. 634, 642, 966 A.2d 168 (2009). The United States constitution contains the guarantee that \\\"[n]o person shall be . . . subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .\\\" U.S. Const., amend. V. The fifth amendment's prohibition of double jeopardy applies to state prosecutions through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794, 89 S. Ct. 2056, 23 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1969). The double jeopardy clause protects against a second prosecution for the same offense following acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction and multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. Bletsch, 281 Conn. 5, 27, 912 A.2d 992 (2007). It is the final protection that is implicated in the present case.\\nIn determining whether two offenses are the same offense for double jeopardy purposes, we apply a two part test. First, we must determine whether the offenses arose out of the same act or transaction. See State v. Alvaro F., 291 Conn. 1, 6, 966 A.2d 712, cert. denied, 558 U.S. 882, 130 S. Ct. 200, 175 L. Ed. 2d 140 (2009). Second, we must determine whether the charged crimes constitute the same offense. See id. Multiple punishments are a constitutional violation only where both conditions are met. Id.\\nTo determine whether the offenses in question arose out of the same acts or transactions, we examine the language of the information. See State v. Edwards, 100 Conn. App. 565, 593, 918 A.2d 1008, cert. denied, 282 Conn. 928, 929, 926 A.2d 666, 667 (2007). The substitute long form information charged the defendant in counts three, five and seven with sexual assault in the first degree in violation of \\u00a7 53a-70 (a) (2). In count three, the information alleged that \\\"between the dates of approximately December 2002 and February 2003, at or near the basement\\\" of the house of the victim's uncle and aunt, the defendant engaged in vaginal intercourse with the victim, who was under the age of thirteen, and the defendant was more than two years older than the victim at the time. Count three thus pertained to the second incident. Count five contained the same allegation as count three but specified that the act charged occurred \\\"on or about the summer of 2003, at or near the basement\\\" of the house of the victim's uncle and aunt. The act described by count five, therefore, was the third incident. The information alleged in count seven that the defendant, \\\"on or about the summer of 2003,\\\" engaged in sexual intercourse, namely, fellatio, at the house of the victim's uncle and aunt. Count seven also charged that the victim at the time was under thirteen and that the defendant was more than two years older than the victim. That count described the fourth incident between the victim and the defendant.\\nCount eight of the information alleged a violation of \\u00a7 53-21 (a) (2), specifying that \\\"on or about dates between approximately December 2002 and the summer of 2003, at or near [the house of the victim's uncle and aunt], the [defendant] did an act likely to impair the morals of a child, [the victim]: he had contact with the intimate parts of a child under the age of sixteen years of age and subjected a child under sixteen years of age to contact with his intimate parts, in a sexual and indecent manner likely to impair the morals of such child.\\\" Count eight thus pertained to the second, third and fourth incidents. The acts underlying the charges of sexual assault in the first degree in counts three, five and seven are the same acts underlying the charge of risk of injury to a child contained in count eight. The offenses in counts three, five, seven and eight, therefore, arose out of the same acts or transactions.\\nWe move thus to the second step in our double jeopardy analysis in which we must determine whether the charged crimes constitute the same offense. To make this determination, we apply the test enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932). Under Blockburger, \\\"where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.\\\" Id., 304. This technical test requires the court to examine only the statutes, charging instruments and bill of particulars rather than any of the evidence presented at trial. State v. Bletsch, supra, 281 Conn. 27-28.\\nTo convict the defendant of sexual assault in the first degree under \\u00a7 53a-70 (a) (2), the state must prove that (1) the defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim, (2) the victim was under thirteen years old, and (3) the defendant was more than two years older than the victim. To convict the defendant of risk of injury to a child under \\u00a7 53-21 (a) (2), the state must prove that (1) the defendant had contact with the intimate parts of, or subjected to contact with his intimate parts, (2) a child under the age of sixteen, (3) in a sexual and indecent manner likely to impair the health or morals of the child. Our review of these statutes leads us to conclude that each statute requires proof of a fact that the other does not.\\nSection 53a-70 (a) (2) requires proof that the defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim. Section 53-21 (a) (2) does not require such proof. See State v. Rivera, 84 Conn. App. 245, 249-50, 853 A.2d 554 (sexual assault in second degree in violation of General Statutes \\u00a7 53a-71 [a] [1] requires proof of sexual intercourse while risk of injury to child under \\u00a7 53-21 does not), cert. denied, 271 Conn. 934, 861 A.2d 511 (2004). Although the crime of risk of injury to a child requires that the defendant have contact with the victim's intimate parts, or subject the victim to contact with his intimate parts, it does not require the defendant to have sexual intercourse with the victim.\\nThe statutory crimes also contain different elements with regard to the age of the victim. Section 53a-70 (a) (2) requires proof that the victim was under age thirteen; \\u00a7 53-21 (a) (2) requires proof that the victim was under age sixteen. See State v. Morris, 49 Conn. App. 409, 419-20, 716 A.2d 897 (concluding victim age requirements of \\u00a7 53-21 and General Statutes \\u00a7 53a-73a [a] [1] [A] [under fifteen years of age] require proof of different facts for purposes of Blockburger), cert. denied, 247 Conn. 904, 720 A.2d 516 (1998).\\nFurthermore, a conviction of risk of injury to a child under \\u00a7 53-21 (a) (2) requires proof that the contact be \\\"in a sexual and indecent manner likely to impair the health or morals\\\" of the victim. The state need not prove such an element to obtain a conviction of sexual assault in the first degree under \\u00a7 53a-70 (a) (2). See State v. Ellison, 79 Conn. App. 591, 601-602, 830 A.2d 812 (comparing \\u00a7 53-21 with \\u00a7 53a-71), cert. denied, 267 Conn. 901, 838 A.2d 211 (2003).\\nThe defendant's arguments that sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child constitute the same offense are unavailing. Contrary to the defendant's assertion, \\u00a7 53-21 (a) (2) does not contain a requirement that the defendant be two years older than the victim. In State v. Jason B., 248 Conn. 543, 565, 729 A.2d 760, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 967, 120 S. Ct. 406, 145 L. Ed. 2d 316 (1999), our Supreme Court addressed this issue, concluding that \\\"[t]he express language of \\u00a7 53-21 . . . does not require any consideration of the age of the defendant for the purposes of determining criminal liability.\\\" The court further noted it could discern no legislative intention to include such an age requirement for the defendant. Id. The defendant's argument that \\u00a7 53a-70 (a) (2) contains a requirement that the act in question be committed in a manner likely to impair the health or morals of the victim also is without merit. A plain reading of the statutory language reveals no such provision in the statute. Furthermore, our Supreme Court has stated that the requirement of \\u00a7 53-21 of a \\\"likelihood of impairment of the morals or health of a child, is not a necessary corollary of sexual intercourse.\\\" State v. McCall, 187 Conn. 73, 91, 444 A.2d 896 (1982). This court has also determined that sexual assault in the second degree in violation of \\u00a7 53a-71 (a) (I) does not require proof that the contact was made in a sexual and indecent manner likely to impair the health or morals of the child. State v. Rivera, supra, 84 Conn. App. 249. Although the statute in question is different here, the analysis of Rivera applies to sexual assault in the first degree under \\u00a7 53a-70 (a) (2). On the basis of the foregoing analysis, we conclude that sexual assault in the first degree under \\u00a7 53a-70 (a) (2) and risk of injury to a child under \\u00a7 53-21 (a) (2) do not constitute the same offense, as each crime requires proof of a fact not required by the other. See Blockburger v. United States, supra, 284 U.S. 304.\\nFinally, our double jeopardy analysis concludes not with a comparison of the offenses but, instead, with consideration of legislative intent. Because the Blockburger test is a rule of statutory construction, it cannot control in the face of a clear indication of contrary legislative intent. State v. Alvaro F., supra, 291 Conn. 12. However, \\\"[w]hen the conclusion reached under Blockburger is that the two crimes do not constitute the same offense, the burden remains on the defendant to demonstrate a clear legislative intent to the contrary.\\\" Id., 12-13. The defendant has not met this burden, as his brief contains no analysis to demonstrate that the legislature did not intend the crimes described by \\u00a7 53a-70 (a) (2) and 53-21 (a) (2) to be separate offenses.\\nWe conclude that the defendant's claim fails under the third prong of Golding because the constitutional violation he alleges does not clearly exist. See State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 240.\\nII\\nEVIDENTIARY CLAIMS\\nThe defendant next claims that the court improperly allowed to be admitted constancy of accusation and expert witness testimony. He argues that the admission of such testimony violated his right to a fair trial under the due process provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, \\u00a7 8, of the constitution of Connecticut. We disagree.\\nA\\nThe following additional facts and procedural history are required for our review of the defendant's claim pertaining to constancy of accusation testimony. In January, 2004, the victim was speaking with her cousin, T, on the telephone. The victim told T, without providing further details, that the defendant had sexually assaulted her and told T that the information must remain a secret. T initiated a three way telephone conversation with the victim's aunt, B, and told the victim to tell her aunt what had happened. The victim complied, telling B what she had told T. The following day, the victim told her mother, S, about the assaults, explaining that the defendant had raped her. S took the victim to the police department, where the victim spoke with police officers and gave a statement.\\nPrior to trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude any evidence of constancy of accusation, and defense counsel argued the motion prior to the state's offer of constancy of accusation witnesses. Defense counsel maintained that, in light of our Supreme Court's decisions in State v. Troupe, 237 Conn. 284, 677 A.2d 917 (1996), and State v. Samuels, 273 Conn. 541, 871 A.2d 1005 (2005), the theory behind the constancy of accusation doctrine was one that \\\"no longer really bears any weight as far as the real world is concerned.\\\" Defense counsel argued that allowing constancy of accusation testimony under the circumstances of the case would deny the defendant his right to a fair trial by placing an unfair burden on him because the lack of physical evidence rendered the trial a classic case of \\\" 'he said, she said' . . . .\\\" He asked the court, therefore, to prohibit all such testimony whatsoever.\\nThe court denied the defendant's motion, holding that the evidence was proper pursuant to State v. Troupe, supra, 237 Conn. 284, and \\u00a7 6-11 (c) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. The court asked the prosecutor to identify beforehand any witness who was to provide constancy of accusation testimony and detailed the limiting instruction that it would give to the jury prior to any such testimony.\\nT, the victim's cousin, testified that she had a telephone conversation with the victim in either January, 2004, or 2005 during which the victim revealed that the defendant had raped her in the house belonging to the victim's uncle. T stated that the victim seemed reluctant and scared to tell T what had happened to her. T testified further that after the victim told her of the abuse, T called B, their aunt, thereby initiating a three way telephone conversation. B testified that she had spoken by telephone with the victim and T in a three way conversation in which the victim related that she had something to tell B, but that she was hesitant to do so. B testified that the victim eventually said that \\\"something had happened between her and [the defendant]\\\" and that she had been holding the information inside for a couple of months. B testified further that the victim told her that the defendant had \\\"taken her down [to] the basement and made her do some things to him\\\" that were sexual in nature and that this had occurred approximately four times. The victim's mother, S, testified that in January, 2004, the victim had told her that the defendant sexually assaulted her on three or four occasions in the house of the victim's uncle and aunt. Prior to each of these witnesses, the court instructed the jury as to the manner in which it could use the constancy of accusation testimony. Following S's testimony, the court again reviewed its limiting instruction with the jury.\\nThe defendant claims that the court improperly allowed to be admitted the testimony of the constancy of accusation witnesses. Adopting and reasserting the argument of trial defense counsel, the defendant maintains that admission of this testimony violated his right to a fair trial under both the federal and state constitutions. The introduction of constancy of accusation testimony for the purposes of corroborating the fact of a victim's complaint does not violate the constitutional fair trial rights of defendants in sexual assault cases. State v. Troupe, supra, 237 Conn. 305. The defendant's claim, therefore, is evidentiary in nature.\\nThe defendant preserved this claim for appeal by way of his motion in limine, argued outside the presence of the jury prior to the testimony of the first constancy of accusation witness, in which he distinctly raised the issue. See Practice Book \\u00a7 60-5. Our standard of review of an evidentiary claim depends on the function that the trial court is performing in issuing the challenged ruling. State v. Saucier, 283 Conn. 207, 219, 926 A.2d 633 (2007). When the admission of evidence is based on the court's interpretation of a rule of evidence, the question raised is a legal one and our review is plenary. Id., 218. \\\"For example, whether a challenged statement properly may be classified as hearsay and whether a hearsay exception properly is identified are legal questions demanding plenary review.\\\" Id. A court's decision to admit evidence premised on an accurate view of the law, however, we review for an abuse of discretion. Id., 218-19. The defendant here does not challenge the court's characterization of the testimony of T, B and S as constancy of accusation testimony. Rather, the defendant in effect argues that under the facts and circumstances of the present case, the court improperly allowed constancy of accusation testimony to be admitted. The claim, therefore, implicates the discretion of the court, and we review the defendant's claim to determine whether the court abused that discretion.\\nThe constancy of accusation doctrine traces its roots to the common-law concept of \\\"hue and cry\\\" whereby victims of violent crime were \\\"expected to cry out immediately and alert their neighbors that they had been violently assaulted.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Troupe, supra, 237 Conn. 294. In the context of sexual assault, evidence of a victim's \\\"hue and ciy\\\" was \\\"a necessary prerequisite for a court to hear a rape case\\\" such that a woman who had not so complained could not have her case prosecuted. Id. Until 1974 in Connecticut, the state was required to offer evidence corroborating a victim's claims to obtain a conviction for sexual assault. See, e.g., General Statutes (Rev. to 1969) \\u00a7 53a-68, which concerned certain sexual offenses and provided in relevant part: \\\"A person shall not be convicted of any offense under this part, or of an attempt to commit such offense, solely on the uncorroborated testimony of the alleged victim, except as hereinafter provided. Corroboration may be circumstantial. . . .\\\" The General Assembly repealed this requirement of corroboration in Public Acts 1974, No. 74-131. Despite the repeal of the corroboration requirement, in cases such as the present one, the state often seeks to offer evidence corroborating the victim's complaint of sexual abuse.\\nIn State v. Troupe, supra, 237 Conn. 293-306, our Supreme Court reviewed the state of the constancy of accusation doctrine from the common law to the present, reaffirming its basic elements. The court acknowledged that the necessity of the doctrine is to counter the \\\"unwarranted, but nonetheless persistent, view that a sexual assault victim who does not report the crime cannot be trusted to testify truthfully about the incident.\\\" Id., 303. The court detailed the rule, concluding that \\\"a person to whom a sexual assault victim has reported the assault may testify only with respect to the fact and timing of the victim's complaint; any testimony by the witness regarding the details surrounding the assault must be strictly limited to those necessary to associate the victim's complaint with the pending charge, including, for example, the time and place of the attack or the identity of the alleged perpetrator. . . . Thus, such evidence is admissible only to corroborate the victim's testimony and not for substantive purposes. Before the evidence may be admitted, therefore, the victim must first have testified concerning the facts of the sexual assault and the identity of the person or persons to whom the incident was reported.\\\" Id., 304-305; see also Conn. Code Evid. \\u00a7 6-11 (c).\\nTurning now to the facts of the present case, we do not conclude that the court abused its discretion in allowing the constancy of accusation testimony to be admitted. The testimony of T, B and S was preceded by the victim's testimony covering the facts of the assaults and the persons to whom she had reported them. The constancy witnesses' testimony regarding the victim's out-of-court statements properly was limited to the fact that the victim had complained, the timing of each complaint and necessary details connecting the complaints to the assaults. Importantly, the testimony contained no extraneous details of the assaults, and it pertained only to the approximate time and place the assaults had occurred and the defendant's identity as the perpetrator. Such testimony is squarely within the parameters set forth in Troupe.\\nThe defendant's arguments at trial and in his appellate brief contain considerable discussion attacking the constancy of accusation doctrine. At oral argument before this court, however, the defendant clarified that his claim was directed at the doctrine only as applied. Our Supreme Court has upheld the constancy of accusation doctrine as stated in Troupe in a number of recent cases. See, e.g., State v. Burney, 288 Conn. 548, 954 A.2d 793 (2008); State v. Arroyo, 284 Conn. 597, 935 A.2d 975 (2007); State v. McKenzie-Adams, 281 Conn. 486, 915 A.2d 822, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 888, 128 S. Ct. 248, 169 L. Ed. 2d 148 (2007). Our review of the present case leads us to conclude that the challenged testimony did not exceed the limits of the doctrine as it presently exists. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing it to be admitted.\\nB\\nThe defendant also challenges the court's decision to allow expert testimony. The state called to testify Diane Edell, a licensed clinical social worker experienced in forensic interviewing of victims of sexual abuse. Edell testified as to factors common in cases of sexual abuse, including delayed disclosure of the abuse by the victim.\\nThe defendant offered no objection at trial to Edell's testimony, which renders this claim unpreserved. He seeks review pursuant to State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239-40, or to prevail pursuant to the plain error doctrine. See Practice Book \\u00a7 60-5. Our Supreme Court has stated that \\\"[a] claim that the trial court improperly admitted the testimony of an expert is an evidentiary impropriety [and] not constitutional in nature . . . .\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Iban C., 275 Conn. 624, 640, 881 A.2d 1005 (2005). The defendant's claim fails to satisfy Golding's second prong, therefore, as it is not of constitutional magnitude.\\nFurthermore, we do not consider the court to have committed plain error in allowing the testimony to be admitted. The plain error doctrine, which provides a rule of reversibility, rather than reviewability, \\\"is reserved for truly extraordinary situations where the existence of the error is so obvious that it affects the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial proceedings.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cutler, 293 Conn. 303, 326, 977 A.2d 209 (2009). Our review of the record does not convince us that admission of Edell's testimony either compromised the fairness or integrity of the defendant's trial or that it would diminish public confidence in our judicial proceedings.\\nIll\\nINSTRUCTIONAL CLAIMS\\nThe defendant also raises claims regarding the court's jury instructions. He argues specifically that the court improperly instructed the jury concerning constancy of accusation and expert witness testimony. We address the defendant's claims in turn.\\nA\\nPrior to the testimony of each constancy of accusation witness, the court provided the jury a limiting instruction describing the purpose for which the jury could consider the testimony. Following the close of evidence, the court charged the jury as follows: \\\"Constancy of accusation. The complainant testified here in court before you. Her testimony in court you may use as evidence and proof of the facts asserted in that testimony and give it the weight you find is reasonable. The state offered evidence of out-of-court statements made by the complainant to other persons that the defendant sexually assaulted her. This court's recollection of those persons to whom the alleged victim made such statements are [T], [B] and [S], Each of these people testified as to the statements the complainant made to each of them regarding the defendant's alleged sexual assaulting of her. This evidence by each of these witnesses is admitted solely to corroborate or not corroborate the complainant's testimony in court. It is to be considered by you only in determining the weight and credibility you will give to the complainant's testimony given here in court.\\n\\\"This evidence of out-of-court statements by the complainant of a sexual assault against her by the defendant is not to be considered by you to prove the truth of the matter asserted, the truth of what is said, in those out-of-court statements, but it is presented for you to consider in assessing the credibility you will give to the complainant's in-court testimony.\\n\\\"In determining whether these out-of-court statements are corroborative or not corroborative of the complainant's testimony in court, you should consider all the circumstances under which these out-of-court statements were made and to whom and whether the statements made to those persons were or were not consistent with the complainant's testimony in court.\\n\\\"To the extent you find what she said outside the courtroom is consistent with her testimony in court, you may find the complainant's testimony in court to be corroborated or supported. To the extent you find what the complainant has said outside the courtroom is inconsistent with her testimony in court, you may consider the degree of inconsistency which you may find, and you may consider the reasons you may find for the inconsistency in evaluating her testimony given here in court.\\\"\\nThe defendant argues on appeal that the foregoing instruction encouraged the jury to use the constancy of accusation testimony improperly, thereby compromising his right to a fair trial. He specifically objects to the language stating that the constancy of accusation witnesses' testimony \\\"is admitted solely to corroborate or not corroborate the complainant's testimony in court. It is to be considered by you only in determining the weight and credibility you will give to the complainant's testimony given here in court.\\\" The defendant also takes issue with the instruction that \\\"[t]o the extent you find what she said outside the courtroom is consistent with her testimony in court, you may find the complainant's testimony in court to be corroborated or supported.\\\" He maintains that these portions of the charge led the jury to consider the testimony as bolstering the victim's substantive testimony regarding the assaults, rather than in the proper, limited manner of corroborating only the fact and timing of the victim's complaint. The state, in opposition, argues first that the defendant's claim, being unpreserved, is unreviewable. It further contends that the language of the instruction properly stated the law with regard to the constancy of accusation doctrine as set forth in Troupe.\\nAlthough the defendant raises a substantial question with this claim, review of the issue must wait for another day. The defendant failed to preserve this claim at trial, as he neither submitted a request to charge the jury on the issue, nor objected to the court's instructions. See Practice Book \\u00a7 16-20 (\\\"[a]n appellate court shall not be bound to consider error as to the giving of, or the failure to give, an instruction unless the matter is covered by a written request to charge or exception has been taken by the party appealing immediately after the charge is delivered\\\"). Review pursuant to Golding is inappropriate. Not every claim of instructional error is constitutional in nature. State v. LaBrec, 270 Conn. 548, 557, 854 A.2d 1 (2004). Our Supreme Court repeatedly has noted that it has recognized instructional claims as raising constitutional issues only in matters relating to the elements of an offense, burden of proof and the presumption of innocence. Id.; see also State v. Schiappa, 248 Conn. 132, 165, 728 A.2d 466, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 862, 120 S. Ct. 152, 145 L. Ed. 2d 129 (1999); State v. Dash, 242 Conn. 143, 151-52, 698 A.2d 297 (1997); State v. Walton, 227 Conn. 32, 64-65, 630 A.2d 990 (1993). The defendant's claim does not pertain to the elements of the offenses in question, the state's burden of proof or the presumption of innocence, nor does the defendant make such an argument. Accordingly, it does not merit Golding review. See State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239-40.\\nThe defendant also cannot prevail on his claim pursuant to the plain error doctrine. Although the issue raised is important, upon our review of the entire record, we cannot conclude that the present case presents one of the truly extraordinary situations in which the existence of the claimed error is so obvious that it affects the fairness and integrity of, and public confidence in, the judicial proceedings. See State v. Cutler, supra, 293 Conn. 326.\\nB\\nThe defendant also challenges the court's instruction regarding expert witness testimony. He argues that the charge improperly failed to include an instruction that Edell's testimony was not intended to address the ultimate question of whether the victim's allegations were true. Having failed to submit a request to charge the jury or to object to the court's instruction, the defendant did not preserve this claim for review. We will not review the claim under Golding, as it is not of constitutional magnitude. See State v. LaBrec, supra, 270 Conn. 557. We further find nothing in the record to convince us that the issue merits reversal for plain error.\\nThe judgment is affirmed.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 53a-72a (a) provides in relevant part: \\\"A person is guilty of sexual assault in the third degree when such person (1) compels another person to submit to sexual contact (A) by the use of force against such other person or a third person . . . .\\\"\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 53a-70 provides in relevant part: \\\"(a) A person is guilty of sexual assault in the first degree when such person (1) compels another person to engage in sexual intercourse by the use of force against such other person or a third person, or by the threat of use of force against such other person or against a third person which reasonably causes such person to fear physical injury to such person or a third person . . .\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 53a-70 (a) provides in relevant part: \\\"A person is guilty of sexual assault in the first degree when such person . (2) engages in sexual intercourse with another person and such other person is under thirteen years of age and the actor is more than two years older than such person . . . .\\\"\\nGeneral Statutes (Rev. to 2001) \\u00a7 53-21 (a), as amended by Public Acts 2002, No. 02-138, \\u00a7 4, provides in relevant part: \\\"Any person who . (2) has contact wilh the intimate parts, as defined in section 53a-65, of a child under the age of sixteen years or subjects' a child under sixteen years of age to contact with the intimate parts of such person, in a sexual and indecent manner likely to impair the health or morals of such child . . . shall be guilty of . a class B felony for a violation of subdivision (2) of this subsection.\\\"\\nPursuant to State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239-40, a defendant may prevail on an unpreserved claim of error only if: \\\"(1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt.\\\"\\nThe defendant in Jason B. had argued that in amending General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) \\u00a7 53a-71 (a) (1) to include \\\"an exemption from criminal liability for those persons engaging in consensual sexual intercourse with persons not more than two years their junior,\\\" the legislature also implicitly modified \\u00a7 53-21 to include a similar age requirement for the defendant charged under the latter statute. State v. Jason B., supra, 248 Conn. 564.\\nA conviction of sexual assault in the second degree under \\u00a7 53a-71 (a) (1) requires proof that (1) the defendant engaged in sexual intercourse (2) with another person who was thirteen years of age or older but under sixteen years of age and (3) the defendant was more than two years older than such person.\\nSection 6-11 (c) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence provides: \\\"Constancy of accusation by a sexual assault victim. A person to whom a sexual assault victim has reported the alleged assault may testify that the allegation was made and when it was made, provided the victim has testified to the facts of the alleged assault and to the identity of the person or persons to whom the assault was reported. Any testimony by the witness about details of the assault shall be limited to those details necessary to associate the victim's allegations with the pending charge. The testimony of the witness is admissible only to corroborate the victim's testimony and not for substantive purposes.\\\"\\nFor example, before the prosecutor began his examination of T, the court instructed the jury: \\\"Ladies and gentlemen, before this testimony begins, I want to explain a couple of things to you. There are times when evidence is admitted for a limited purpose. You can use it for one purpose, but you can't use it for another purpose. The testimony here is going to be one of those situations. So, I want to tell you at this point the purpose for which you can use the testimony that [T] is about to give. The evidence by this witness is admitted solely to corroborate or not corroborate the complainant's testimony in court. It is to be considered by you only in determining the weight and credibility you will give to the complainant's testimony given here in court. This evidence of out-of-court statement by the complainant of an alleged sexual assault against her, that is, the complainant, by the defendant, is not to be considered by you to prove the truth of the matter asserted, that is, the proof of what is said in those out-of-court statements, but it is to be presented for you to consider in assessing the credibility for you to give to the complainant's in-court testimony.\\\" The court gave substantially the same instruction prior to the testimony of B and S and also repeated a similar instruction following S's testimony.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"4058413\", \"name\": \"IN RE PATRICIA I\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re Patricia I.\", \"decision_date\": \"2008-10-14\", \"docket_number\": \"AC 29038\", \"first_page\": \"901\", \"last_page\": \"901\", \"citations\": \"110 Conn. App. 901\", \"volume\": \"110\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Appellate Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Appellate Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:59:46.897934+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"IN RE PATRICIA I.\", \"head_matter\": \"IN RE PATRICIA I.\\n(AC 29038)\\nDiPentima, Harper and Lavery, Js.\\nArgued September 10\\nofficially released October 14, 2008\", \"word_count\": \"42\", \"char_count\": \"276\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nThe judgment is affirmed. Glastonbury Volunteer Ambulance Assn., Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 227 Conn. 848, 633 A.2d 305 (1993).\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
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+"{\"id\": \"4059999\", \"name\": \"JOSEPH EREMITA v. SALVATORE MORELLO\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Eremita v. Morello\", \"decision_date\": \"2008-11-04\", \"docket_number\": \"AC 29341\", \"first_page\": \"103\", \"last_page\": \"108\", \"citations\": \"111 Conn. App. 103\", \"volume\": \"111\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Appellate Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Appellate Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:52:06.335225+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"JOSEPH EREMITA v. SALVATORE MORELLO\", \"head_matter\": \"JOSEPH EREMITA v. SALVATORE MORELLO\\n(AC 29341)\\nFlynn, C. J., and DiPentima and Robinson, Js.\\nSubmitted on briefs September 12\\nofficially released November 4, 2008\\nC. Scott Schwefel filed a brief for the appellant (plaintiff).\\nMargaret Fogerty Rattigan filed a brief for the appellee (defendant).\", \"word_count\": \"1313\", \"char_count\": \"7728\", \"text\": \"Opinion\\nROBINSON, J.\\nThe plaintiff, Joseph Eremita, appeals following the denial of his motion to open the judgment dismissing his breach of contract claim against the defendant, Salvatore Morello. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to open the judgment on the basis of mistake or accident. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.\\nThe following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the plaintiff's appeal. On May 20, 2004, the plaintiff filed a complaint alleging breach of contract by the defendant. The dispute pertained to an unpaid sum on a promissory note executed by the defendant on July 30, 1998. The court rendered a judgment of dismissal against the plaintiff for failure to make a prima facie case on September 11, 2007, after the plaintiff, who was the only witness scheduled to testify on his behalf, failed to appear at the trial. The plaintiff later filed a motion to open the judgment of dismissal on October 1, 2007, which was denied by the court on November 6, 2007. From that judgment, the plaintiff appeals.\\nThe plaintiff claims that the court abused its discretion in refusing to open the judgment of dismissal because his absence at trial was the result of inadvertence. We decline to reach the merits of the plaintiffs claim due to an inadequate record.\\nThe plaintiff represented in his motion to open the judgment that a trial management conference was held on September 7, 2007, four days before the court trial was scheduled to begin. At that time, the plaintiffs counsel informed the court that he had been unable to contact the plaintiff \\\"despite diligent efforts . . . .\\\" When counsel still was unable to contact the plaintiff on September 10, 2007, he sent a motion for a continuance by facsimile, which was date stamped the next day, September 11, the day of the trial. On that day, the court, Graham, J., denied the motion, and counsel appeared before the court, Tanzer, J., for trial. The plaintiffs counsel informed the court that he still had not been able to contact the plaintiff. As the plaintiff was expected to be the sole testimonial witness to prove his cause of action, there were no witnesses to testify on his behalf in the plaintiffs absence, and the plaintiff s attorney presented no evidence before resting his case. The defendant's attorney immediately moved for dismissal, pursuant to Practice Book \\u00a7 15-8, for failure of the plaintiff to make out a prima facie case, and the court rendered a judgment of dismissal. The plaintiff filed a motion to open the judgment under General Statutes \\u00a7 52-212a and Practice Book \\u00a7 17-4, which motion was denied by the court.\\n\\\"Our review of a court's denial of a motion to open . is well settled. We do not undertake a plenary review of the merits of a decision of the trial court . . . to deny a motion to open a judgment. . In an appeal from a denial of a motion to open a judgment, our review is limited to the issue of whether the trial court has acted unreasonably and in clear abuse of its discretion. . In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, this court must make every reasonable presumption in favor of its action.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ilyssa G., 105 Conn. App. 41, 45, 936 A.2d 674 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 918, 943 A.2d 475 (2008).\\nIn determining whether a judgment should be opened, this court has stated clearly that \\\"the [negligence of a party or his counsel is insufficient for purposes of \\u00a7 52-212 to set aside a default judgment.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rino Gnesi Co. v. Sbriglio, 83 Conn. App. 707, 712, 850 A.2d 1118 (2004); see also Woodruff v. Riley, 78 Conn. App. 466, 469-70, 827 A.2d 743, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 922, 835 A.2d 474 (2003). In particular, where a party negligently failed to attend trial, this court, as well as our Supreme Court, has held repeatedly that this was not sufficient grounds for opening the judgment. See Munch v. Willametz, 156 Conn. 6, 11, 238 A.2d 424 (1968); In re Ilyssa G., supra, 105 Conn. App. 49 (\\\"[r]egardless of whether it was intentional or the result of negligence, the respondent's failure to keep the court, the department [of children and famihes] and his attorney informed of his whereabouts does not qualify for purposes of opening a default judgment as a mistake, accident or other reasonable cause that prevented the respondent from presenting a defense\\\"); Moore v. Brancard, 89 Conn. App. 129, 133, 872 A.2d 909 (2005) (\\\"the court reasonably could have concluded that the plaintiffs failure to appear was due to mere inattention\\\"). Indeed, \\\"[w]hile it is true that a judgment may be opened on the grounds of lack of notice or accidental failure to appear . it does not follow that such circumstances mandate the opening of a judgment.\\\" (Citations omitted.) Steve Viglione Sheet Metal Co. v. Sakonchick, 190 Conn. 707, 711, 462 A.2d 1037 (1983).\\nThe record in this matter is inadequate for this court to review the plaintiffs claim. It does not contain a memorandum of decision regarding the motion to open the judgment of dismissal. The court's reason for denying the motion to open is not a part of the record. The record merely contains a copy of the plaintiffs motion, on which the court indicated that the motion was denied. Additionally, there was no hearing on the motion. Furthermore, the plaintiff did not file a motion for articulation to ascertain the basis for the court's decision. \\\"Appellants bear the burden of affording this court an adequate record for review.\\\" American Honda Finance Corp. v. Johnson, 80 Conn. App. 164, 168, 834 A.2d 59 (2003). In view of the inadequate record, we cannot ascertain why the court denied the motion to open the judgment, and, therefore, we decline to review this claim. See State v. Ritz Realty Corp., 63 Conn. App. 544, 549, 776 A.2d 1195 (2001).\\nThe judgment is affirmed.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\\nThe plaintiffs attorney sent a motion for a continuance by facsimile on September 10, 2007, one day before the trial was to begin, which the court denied. The stated reason for the request for a continuance was that the plaintiff was not available.\\nThe plaintiff states in his motion to open the judgment that on the date of trial, he was out of state and was inaccessible by telephone or facsimile. The September 11, 2007 trial date had been scheduled on November 30, 2006, nearly ten months prior.\\nPractice Book \\u00a7 15-8 provides in part: \\\"If . . . the plaintiff has produced evidence and rested his or her cause, the defendant may move for judgment of dismissal, and the judicial authority may grant such motion, if in its opinion the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case. . . .\\\"\\nThe plaintiff in fact attempts to use the lack of a written memorandum of decision as the basis of his argument, noting in his brief that because the court did not draft a memorandum of decision it is unknown whether the court analyzed the question of whether the plaintiff had been prevented by mistake, accident or other reasonable cause from prosecuting the action. This argument ignores the fact that \\\"[a]n appellant may seek to remedy any ambiguities or deficiencies in a trial court's decision by filing a motion for articulation as provided in Practice Book \\u00a7 66-5.\\\" American Honda Finance Corp. v. Johnson, 80 Conn. App. 164, 168, 834 A.2d 59 (2003).\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
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+"{\"id\": \"4071817\", \"name\": \"STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MATTHEW BOUTILIER\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Boutilier\", \"decision_date\": \"2012-02-14\", \"docket_number\": \"AC 32207\", \"first_page\": \"493\", \"last_page\": \"514\", \"citations\": \"133 Conn. App. 493\", \"volume\": \"133\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Appellate Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Appellate Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:47:45.801000+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Robinson, Bear and Dupont, Js.\", \"parties\": \"STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MATTHEW BOUTILIER\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MATTHEW BOUTILIER\\n(AC 32207)\\nRobinson, Bear and Dupont, Js.\\nArgued October 20, 2011\\nofficially released February 14, 2012\\nJodi Zils Gagne, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).\\nRaheem L. Mullins, assistant state\\u2019s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state\\u2019s attorney, and Anne Mahoney, senior assistant state\\u2019s attorney, for the appellee (state).\", \"word_count\": \"6619\", \"char_count\": \"40126\", \"text\": \"Opinion\\nDUPONT, J.\\nThe defendant, Matthew Boutilier, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes \\u00a7 53a-59 (a) (5) and criminal possession of a firearm in violation of General Statutes \\u00a7 53a-217 (a) (1). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court's denial of two motions, which requested the court to \\\"direct the [commissioner of the department of correction] to deliver the defendant into the supervised custody of his attorney,\\\" violated the defendant's constitutional rights, (2) the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to allow the jury to view the crime scene and (3) prosecutorial impropriety deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.\\nThe following evidence was elicited at trial. In January, 2008, the defendant and his girlfriend, Katie Krantz, lived together in a house in Hartford. On the evening of January 11, 2008, Krantz and her friends, Becky Ramos and Yajaira Aponte, went to the home of a neighbor where the women drank alcohol. Ramos and Krantz also smoked marijuana and took ecstasy pills. At approximately 1 a.m., after returning home from a bar, the defendant went to the neighbor's house to retrieve Krantz. Krantz invited Ramos and Aponte to come to the house she shared with the defendant and their three children, who were not at home that night. Ramos and Aponte arrived at the house, and, subsequently, the three women decided to go out to purchase snacks and cigars. Krantz and Ramos intended to hollow out the cigars and fill them with marijuana so that they could continue to smoke marijuana. Krantz told the defendant of their plans to go out to purchase the cigars, and the defendant became angry, telling Krantz that he did not want her to leave the house. The defendant yelled at Krantz and said that, if she left the house, she should not come back. Krantz left with Ramos and Aponte, leaving her keys to the house on a table.\\nAs the three women walked away from the house, the defendant threw some of Krantz' clothes outside onto the driveway. Ramos returned to the house to confront the defendant for his behavior. The defendant, who had gone inside and locked the door, unlocked the door and let Ramos into the house. Ramos and the defendant began arguing. Krantz and Aponte returned to the house and went inside. The argument between Ramos and the defendant became physical, and the two struggled in the kitchen in front of a door that led to a basement staircase. The defendant retrieved a .357 caliber revolver from a nearby shelf and shot Ramos in the head, killing her. Aponte ran across the kitchen, toward a telephone on the wall, and the defendant shot her in the chest. Aponte tried to escape through the back door of the house but, finding it locked, ran back toward the kitchen. The defendant met Aponte in the hallway and shot her a second time, at close range. Aponte survived her injuries. At trial, the defendant admitted to shooting Ramos and Aponte, but claimed that he believed they were going to harm him and that he had acted in self-defense.\\nThe defendant was found guilty by a jury of one count of assault in the first degree in violation of \\u00a7 53a-59 (a) (5) and one count of criminal possession of a firearm in violation of \\u00a7 53a-217 (a) (1), and was sentenced to a total effective term of twenty-seven years of incarceration. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as they become necessary.\\nI\\nMOTIONS FOR RELEASE FROM CUSTODY\\nThe first portion of the defendant's appeal concerns the court's denial of two motions requesting the defendant's temporary release from the custody of the department of correction so that he could (1) visit the crime scene with his attorney and (2) participate in a mock jury preparation session. The defendant claims that the court's denial of these motions violated his constitutional rights. We affirm the judgment of the court.\\nThe following additional facts are relevant to our resolution of the defendant's claim. The defendant was held on a $2 million bond following his arrest. Thereafter, he remained in the custody of the department of correction. On August 31, 2009, the defendant made two oral motions to the court. The first motion sought permission for his temporary release from the custody of the department of correction into the supervised custody of defense counsel so that the defendant could visit the crime scene with his attorney. The second motion sought the defendant's temporary release for the purpose of attending a mock jury preparation session to be arranged and orchestrated by his attorney. The court reserved judgment on the motions, instructing the defendant to submit them in writing. On September 9, 2009, prior to the start of trial, the defendant filed a \\\"Motion for Nontestimonial Evidence\\\" wherein he moved the court to \\\"direct the [commissioner of the department of correction] to deliver the defendant into the supervised custody of his attorney\\\" so that he could \\\"assist his attorney in his defense by inspecting and photographing the premises of the alleged crime . . . .\\\" On September 10, 2009, the court denied both of the defendant's motions. The court noted that defense counsel, \\\"by way of oral amendment,\\\" had incorporated the defendant's request to attend the mock jury preparation session into the defendant's written \\\"Motion for Nontestimonial Evidence.\\\"\\nOn appeal, the defendant claims that the court's ruling violated his sixth amendment rights to the effective assistance of counsel, to present a defense and to confront witnesses against him. The defendant argues that his claim presents a mixed question of law and fact and that our review should therefore be plenary. The state urges us to review the trial court's decision under the abuse of discretion standard.\\nIt is axiomatic that, as an appellate court, the function performed by the trial court in issuing its ruling will dictate the scope of our review. State v. Saucier, 283 Conn. 207, 219, 926 A.2d 633 (2007) (en banc). The scope of appellate review depends on a proper characterization of rulings made by the trial court. If the court has made findings of fact, appellate review concerns whether those findings were clearly erroneous. If the court has made conclusions of law, our review is plenary, and we must decide whether those conclusions are legally and logically correct and supported by the facts in the record. Beneduci v. Valadares, 73 Conn. App. 795, 801, 812 A.2d 41 (2002). The trial court in the present case never reached the question of whether a denial of the defendant's motions would effectuate a violation of his constitutional rights, but based its denial on security concerns attendant to his release from custody.\\nThe \\\"Motion for Nontestimonial Evidence\\\" at issue is not the usual motion for evidence made by a party to litigation to view premises involved therein. Rather, it is a motion made by an incarcerated defendant to temporarily be released from the custody of the department of correction in order to view a crime scene with his attorney and participate in a mock jury preparation session while in the supervised custody of his attorney, without the existence of any pertinent rule or regulation of the department of correction governing the situation.\\nThe defendant argues that the court's denial of his motions effectuated a violation of his constitutional rights. However, he has failed to identify any constitutionally protected right directly implicated by the court's ruling. In its oral decision, the court did not discuss or conclude that any constitutional right or rights of the defendant were involved in its denial of his motions. Furthermore, the defendant has not challenged any regulation of the department of correction as being unconstitutional. The defendant argues that his claim on appeal raises an issue of first impression before the appellate courts of Connecticut. He maintains that his claim is analogous \\\"to the arguments made in many habeas cases . . . that prison officials are impeding on prisoners' constitutional rights under the guise of safety concerns\\\" and cites Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1987), in support of his argument. Turner is not analogous to the present case, nor does it control our resolution of the defendant's claim. In contrast to Turner, the defendant's appeal does not involve a challenge to any rulings, regulations or procedure set forth by the department of correction. Indeed, the department of correction's view, if any, on the defendant's motions for temporary release from its custody was not made known to the court.\\nThe court did not review any regulation or statute in denying the defendant's motions, and no argument was made to the court citing any regulation or statute. The court did not draw any conclusions of law requiring a plenary review; see Doe v. Roe, 246 Conn. 652, 660, 717 A.2d 706 (1998); and we do not conclude that the denial of the defendant's motions interfered with a basic constitutional right. There is no legal conclusion of the court at issue. Accordingly, there exists no \\\"mixed question of law and fact\\\" to be reviewed on appeal. If an incarcerated individual had been accused of committing a crime in subzero weather, his inability to replicate the condition of temperature, via a desired visit to the North Pole in January, could not change a motion for such a visit into a constitutional claim. Without a direct link to a constitutional right, a defendant's claim is not transformed into a right of constitutional magnitude. In re Lukas K., 120 Conn. App. 465, 472, 992 A.2d 1142 (2010), aff'd, 300 Conn. 463, 14 A.3d 990 (2011); see also State v. Claudio C., 125 Conn. App. 588, 598, 11 A.3d 1086 (2010) (\\\"[t]he defendant can not raise a constitutional claim by attaching a constitutional label to a purely evidentiary claim or by asserting merely that a strained connection exists between the evidentiary claim and a fundamental constitutional right\\\" [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 910, 12 A.3d 1005 (2011).\\nThe function of the trial court in this case was to determine whether the defendant's temporary release from the custody of the department of correction was warranted, absent any rule or regulation of the department of correction, or statute or Practice Book section governing release for the purpose of allowing an incarcerated defendant to prepare a defense with the help of a mock jury or a visit to the crime scene. The trial court in this case made no ultimate constitutional conclusion, basing its denial of the defendant's motions on security, rather than an analysis of any rule, regulation or statute. We conclude that the function performed by the court was a discretionary matter and should, therefore, be reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. State v. Saucier, supra, 283 Conn. 219.\\n\\\"In general, abuse of discretion exists when a court could have chosen different alternatives but has decided the matter so arbitrarily as to vitiate logic, or has decided it based on improper or irrelevant factors.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ortiz, 280 Conn. 686, 703, 911 A.2d 1055 (2006). \\\"In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the correctness of the court's ruling. . . . Reversal is required only where an abuse of discretion is manifest or where injustice appears to have been done.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Faraday, 268 Conn. 174, 186, 842 A.2d 567 (2004).\\nIn the present case, the court heard argument that addressed the severity of the crimes charged against the defendant, the risk of flight by the defendant and the logistical difficulties attendant to transporting and supervising the defendant if he were temporarily released from custody. The court also considered the fact that the defendant grew up in the home where the shootings took place, lived there at the time of the shootings, and was intimately familiar with the physical characteristics of the crime scene and the neighborhood, and that the defendant's attorney had ongoing access to the crime scene.\\nThe court explained that its decision to deny the defendant's motions was made on the basis of numerous security concerns, stating: \\\"[T]his boils down . . . to an issue of security. . . . Based on defense counsel's own rendition of the allegations, the defense does not contest that the defendant was armed with a deadly weapon and caused the death of Ms. Ramos and caused injury to Ms. Aponte by the discharge of a firearm, and it's notable that the defendant was a convicted felon at the time. . . . The nature of the charges are such, combined with the defendant's criminal history, that the primary concern of this court is one of security. The court can contemplate a number of scenarios that would amount to a breach of security that are reasonably foreseeable in the event the court accedes [to] the defense request.\\\" We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motions requesting temporary release from the custody of the department of correction.\\nn\\nMOTION FOR JURY TO VIEW THE CRIME SCENE\\nThe defendant's next claim on appeal is that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to allow the jury to view the crime scene. The defendant argues that it was necessary for the jury to view the crime scene to understand his claim of self-defense; specifically, that he feared for his life as he was attacked by Ramos and Aponte in the small kitchen. We are not persuaded.\\n\\\"Pursuant to Practice Book [\\u00a7 42-6] , a trial court may permit a viewing of the scene of the crime if it is of the opinion that a viewing would be helpful to the jury in determining some material factual issue in the case. . . . The determination as to whether to permit the jury to view the scene of a crime is within the sound discretion of the trial court. . . . Thus, unless the action of the trial court in denying the motion constitutes an abuse of discretion, the decision of the trial court must stand. . In deciding a motion to view the scene [t]he court should consider whether viewing the scene is necessary or important so that the jury may clearly understand the issues and properly apply the evidence. . . . Although discretionary, the power to authorize a view of the scene should be invoked only after the court is satisfied that the present conditions at the site are the same as those that existed on the date of the underlying incident, and that such a personal inspection is fair to both parties and reasonably necessary to do justice.\\\" (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cintron, 39 Conn. App. 110, 116, 665 A.2d 95 (1995).\\nIn the present case, the jury had access to photographs of the crime scene and a dimensional drawing of the kitchen where the first two shootings took place. The jury heard testimony by the defendant, Krantz and Aponte, during which they described the physical characteristics of the kitchen. The court found that there was nothing \\\"so unique about the premises that it would require a viewing.\\\" Given the instructional exhibits and witness testimony on the size and layout of the kitchen, we cannot conclude that a view of the crime scene was necessary for the jury to understand the defendant's claim of self-defense or for it to properly apply the evidence. Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the defendant's motion to allow the jury to view the crime scene.\\nIll\\nPROSECUTORIAL IMPROPRIETY\\nThe defendant's final claim on appeal is that the court improperly denied his motions for a mistrial on the ground of prosecutorial impropriety. The defendant claims that the prosecutor improperly made statements that (1) undermined the defendant's credibility and were prejudicial to his defense, (2) appealed to the emotions of the jury and (3) expressed her personal opinion, thereby prejudicing his ability to receive a fair trial. We disagree.\\n\\\"The standard for review of an action upon a motion for a mistrial is well established. While the remedy of a mistrial is permitted under the rules of practice, it is not favored. [A] mistrial should be granted only as a result of some occurrence upon the trial of such a character that it is apparent to the court that because of it a party cannot have a fair trial . . . and the whole proceedings are vitiated. . If curative action can obviate the prejudice, the drastic remedy of a mistrial should be avoided. . On appeal, we hesitate to disturb a decision not to declare a mistrial. The trial judge is the arbiter of the many circumstances which may arise during the trial in which his function is to assure a fair and just outcome. . . . The trial court is better positioned than we are to evaluate in the first instance whether a certain occurrence is prejudicial to the defendant and, if so, what remedy is necessary to cure that prejudice. . . . The decision whether to grant a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial court.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ortiz, supra, 280 Conn. 702. \\\"In analyzing claims of prosecutorial impropriety, we engage in a two step process. . . . First, we must determine whether any impropriety in fact occurred; second, we must examine whether that impropriety, or the cumulative effect of multiple improprieties, deprived the defendant of his due process right to a fair trial.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gibson, 302 Conn. 653, 659, 31 A.3d 346 (2011).\\nIn the interest of adjudicating the defendant's claim with facility, we rearticulate and divide the defendant's arguments into two categories: statements that are alleged to be improper because they (1) expressed the prosecutor's personal opinion and (2) appealed unreasonably to the emotions, passions and prejudices of the jury. \\\"We . . . address each [of the defendant's claims] in turn to determine whether the particular conduct was improper before determining whether the impropriety, if any, deprived the defendant of a fair trial.\\\" State v. Singh, 259 Conn. 693, 702, 793 A.2d 226 (2002).\\nA\\nPersonal Opinion\\n\\\"It is well established that [a] prosecutor may not express his own opinion, directly or indirectly, as to the credibility of the witnesses. . . . Nor should a prosecutor express his opinion, directly or indirectly, as to the guilt of the defendant. . It is not, however, improper for the prosecutor to comment upon the evidence presented at trial and to argue the inferences that the jurors might draw therefrom . . . .\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gibson, supra, 302 Conn. 660. \\\"While a prosecutor cannot express his opinion as to the credibility of witnesses, he is permitted to explain that a witness either has or does not have a motive to lie. . . . We must give the jury the credit of being able to differentiate between argument on the evidence and attempts to persuade them to draw inferences in the state's favor, on one hand, and improper unsworn testimony, with the suggestion of secret knowledge, on the other hand. The state's attorney should not be put in the rhetorical straitjacket of always using the passive voice, or continually emphasizing that he is simply saying I submit to you that this is what the evidence shows, or the like. . . . [C]ounsel is entitled to considerable leeway in deciding how best to highlight or to underscore the facts, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, for which there is adequate support in the record. We therefore never have categorically barred counsel's use of such rhetorical devices . as long as there is no reasonable likelihood that the particular device employed will confuse the jury or otherwise prejudice the opposing party.\\\" (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bermudez, 274 Conn. 581, 590-91, 876 A.2d 1162 (2005); see also State v. Gibson, supra, 660-61.\\nThe defendant challenges the following statements, made by the prosecutor during her closing argument: \\\"In order for you to find the defendant guilty, you have to find proven beyond a reasonable doubt with regard to the murder of Becky Ramos that the defendant intended to kill her and that he caused her death. You have the witnesses, both Yajaira Aponte and Katie [Krantz], who told you that the defendant shot [Ramos] in the head. You have the medical examiner's autopsy report [saying] that [Ramos] was shot by a gunshot wound and [that this was] the cause of her death, and you have the testimony of the defendant, himself, that he shot her in the head. Now, [the defendant] says he didn't intend to kill her. You ask yourselves whether or not it's reasonable to shoot somebody in the head at close range with a gun and ask me to believe that. The state submits that the evidence shows you should not and that you should find the defendant guilty of this [charge] based upon the evidence before you.\\\" (Emphasis added.)\\nThe defendant argues that the prosecutor thereby expressed her personal opinion that the defendant was not to be believed. We disagree. The challenged statements were made during the prosecutor's initial comments to the jury concerning the standard of proof and the elements of the crimes charged. They are couched in terms of the jurors' obligation to determine, on the basis of the evidence presented at trial, whether they believed the defendant's claims that he had shot Ramos in self-defense and that he did not intend to kill her. It was not improper for the prosecutor to comment on the evidence presented at trial and to argue the inferences that the jurors may, or may not, have drawn therefrom. See State v. Gibson, supra, 302 Conn. 659.\\nThe defendant next challenges the prosecutor's statement, \\\"[tjhat's what you want this jury to believe,\\\" made during her cross-examination of the defendant. The defendant argues that this statement was akin to the prosecutor's vouching to the jury that the defendant was not being truthful. We disagree. A statement identifying the fact that the defendant was testifying to an alternate theory of events does not rise to the level of prosecutorial impropriety.\\nThe defendant next challenges the propriety of the prosecutor's argument that, because the defendant had played pickup basketball games without a referee, he should have been able to defend himself against Ramos and Aponte. During her closing argument, the prosecutor stated: \\\"So, you're going to be asked to look first at what the defendant subjectively believed and then at what an objective or reasonable person would have believed under the circumstances and that's why all the basketball questions because the state submits to you that a guy who plays pickup basketball all the time against bigger and heavier guys wasn't really afraid of either [Ramos] or [Aponte] that night, and he was more capable of avoiding them and not having to use deadly physical force. The defendant did not believe either one of these women was going to injure him or cause great bodily injury or use deadly force against him.\\\"\\nThe prosecutor references her cross-examination of the defendant, wherein she questioned his claimed belief that he had to defend himself against Ramos and Aponte by using deadly force. We find no impropriety in this argument, which was made during the prosecutor's discussion of the elements of self-defense and relates directly to the state's challenge of the defendant's claims that he had feared for his life and had acted in self-defense when he shot Ramos and Aponte.\\nFinally, the defendant challenges the propriety of remarks made by the prosecutor during her rebuttal argument. The prosecutor stated: \\\"The defendant never tells [Aponte] to leave [the house] because she's not involved in the argument. There was much made by the defense attorney about [Aponte's] movements after [Ramos] gets shot. [Aponte's] not involved in the argument, she's not asked to leave, she's simply standing by because she's waiting for [Ramos] so that they can all go. Women sometimes travel in groups. We travel in groups to the bathroom, we travel in groups when we're going someplace, we wait for each other. That's how women behave, isn't it? Isn't that what your common sense and your life experience tells you? So, [Aponte is] simply waiting for [Ramos]. . . . [Aponte's] saying nothing to the defendant. She's got nothing in her hands. She's not involved at all. [Ramos] gets shot. She reaches toward the phone. She's not going toward the defendant. She's going toward the phone . . . .\\\" (Emphasis added.)\\nThe defendant argues that the prosecutor thereby \\\"vouched for the conduct of the women who were attacking the defendant on the night of the incident, explaining to the jury why they did what they did even though she was not there and has no knowledge of their actions.\\\" The defendant argues that the prosecutor \\\"basically told [the jury] that the defendant should not be trusted and explained to [the jury] why the women acted the way they did,\\\" which precluded the defendant from succeeding in his claim of self-defense. We disagree.\\n\\\"In determining whether [prosecutorial impropriety] has occurred [in the course of closing arguments], the reviewing court must give due deference to the fact that [cjounsel must be allowed a generous latitude in argument, as the limits of legitimate argument and fair comment cannot be determined precisely by rule and line, and something must be allowed for the zeal of counsel in the heat of argument. . . . Thus, as the state's advocate, a prosecutor may argue the state's case forcefully, [provided the argument is] fair and based upon the facts in evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. . . . Moreover, [i]t does not follow . . . that every use of rhetorical language or device [by the prosecutor] is improper. . . . The occasional use of rhetorical devices is simply fair argument. . . . Nevertheless, the prosecutor has a heightened duty to avoid argument that strays from the evidence or diverts the jury's attention from the facts of the case.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gibson, supra, 302 Conn. 659.\\nIn the present case, the challenged statements were made as the prosecutor set forth the state's theory of the case, which questioned the defendant's version of events. The prosecutor's argument, which included an explanation of where Ramos, Aponte and Krantz were located prior to and at the time of the shootings, was based on the facts in evidence and inferences fairly drawn therefrom. We conclude that there was no reasonable likelihood that these statements confused the jury or otherwise prejudiced the defendant.\\nB\\nAppeal to Jury's Emotions\\n\\\"A prosecutor may not appeal to the emotions, passions and prejudices of the [jury]. . . . When the prosecutor appeals to emotions, he invites the jury to decide the case, not according to a rational appraisal of the evidence, but on the basis of powerful and irrelevant facts [that] are likely to skew that appraisal.\\\" (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Singh, supra, 259 Conn. 719. Accordingly, \\\"a prosecutor should avoid arguments which are calculated to influence the passions or prejudices of the jury, or which would have the effect of diverting the jury's attention from [its] duty to decide the case on the evidence.\\\" State v. Carr, 172 Conn. 458, 470, 374 A.2d 1107 (1977). \\\"An appeal to emotions may arise directly, or indirectly from the use of personal and degrading epithets to describe the defendant.\\\" State v. Williams, 204 Conn. 523, 545, 529 A.2d 653 (1987).\\nThe defendant claims that, during closing argument, the prosecutor improperly \\\"tried to argue that the defendant was a jealous control freak who did not want Krantz to leave the house . . . .\\\" The prosecutor stated: \\\"The defendant unlocks that door [to the house] because he wants this argument to come on. He knows where the gun is in the house, and he's luring [Ramos] in because he knows if [Ramos] comes in, [Krantz is] coming in. He'll be able to control [Krantz] once again because he's going to win this argument because he has the ultimate power. He's an individual who feels devalued by the fact that [Krantz] is leaving with other people again and instead of finding some way to up his own personal value he reaches for a weapon, a power tool to control [Krantz].\\\"\\nWe disagree with the defendant's claim of impropriety. The prosecutor was entitled to argue the state's case forcefully, provided that her argument was fair. See State v. Gibson, supra, 302 Conn. 659. We conclude that the prosecutor permissibly \\\"was attempting to persuade the jury to draw [an] inference from the circumstantial evidence of intent that [the prosecutor] had just recited, and was not giving improper unsworn testimony or attempting to insinuate that [she] had secret knowledge of the defendant's guilt.\\\" Id., 661.\\nThe defendant next challenges the propriety of the prosecutor's statements and tone of voice during her cross-examination of the defendant, and an incident wherein the defendant alleges that the prosecutor \\\"threw down her notebook in disgust at the defendant's answer.\\\" The defendant claims that the prosecutor's actions were unduly argumentative and were designed improperly to appeal to the jury's emotions. We disagree.\\nAt trial, the court overruled the defendant's objection to the prosecutor's statements and tone of voice, stating: \\\"I don't see a problem with the ['you claim'] questions or comments [made by the prosecutor], but it's not just the word because I don't disagree with you that any testimony a person gives from the witness stand they want the jury to believe that, but I think there's a tone. I'm going to agree with \\u2014 it may not be inappropriate under certain circumstances. It may be inappropriate under others, and I think the tone with what was given at least on the one occasion that I picked up on it, was kind of a disbelief that wants to be communicated to the jury. That's my sense. I'm not saying that's your intent. So, I am going to make a comment that, as far as ['that's what you want the jury to believe'], it's the manner in which it was delivered, I think, that conveys a message that the questioner finds that difficult to believe. And that's the sense that I got\\u2014 I received from it.\\\"\\nWith respect to the incident wherein the prosecutor is claimed to have thrown her notebook down \\\"in disgust at [the defendant's] answers,\\\" the court denied the defendant's motion for a mistrial. Apart from the defendant's own argument, there exists nothing in the record to support his claims that the prosecutor threw her notebook, that it made \\\"a thud audible throughout the courtroom\\\" or that the jury saw, heard or was aware that the event alleged had taken place.\\nWe conclude that the record does not support a finding of the claimed improprieties. In so doing, we note that \\\"the trial court was in the best position to assess the possible prejudice, if any, that may have resulted from counsel's comments, and to fashion an appropriate remedy from a range of possible alternatives.\\\" Rizzo Pool Co. v. Del Grosso, 232 Conn. 666, 687, 657 A.2d 1087 (1995). We conclude that the defendant has failed to demonstrate that the court abused its discretion in denying his motions for a mistrial.\\nIV\\nCONCLUSION\\nWe conclude that the court properly denied the defendant's motions (1) for temporary release from the custody of the department of correction, (2) to allow the jury to view the crime scene and (3) for a mistrial on the ground of prosecutorial impropriety.\\nThe judgment is affirmed.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\\nThe defendant also was charged with one count of murder in violation of General Statutes \\u00a7 53a-54a (a) and one count of attempt to commit murder in violation of General Statutes \\u00a7 53a-54a (a) and 53a-49 (a) (2). The jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to the murder and attempted murder charges, and the court declared a mistrial as to those charges. The defendant's subsequent conviction of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes \\u00a7 53a-55, following a retrial for the shooting death of Ramos, has been appealed by the defendant to our Supreme Court. At oral argument, the defendant stated that the present appeal concerns only the assault and criminal possession of a firearm conviction.\\nThe defendant brought his motions before the trial court in the form of a \\\"Motion for Nontestimonial Evidence,\\\" which requested the defendant's temporary release from the custody of the department of correction \\\"pursuant to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Article First, \\u00a7 8 of the Connecticut Constitution, and Practice Book \\u00a7 40-32 [through 40-38].\\\" On appeal, the defendant makes no argument with respect to the state constitution.\\nWe note that the defendant's written motion for temporary release from the custody of the department of correction made pursuant to Practice Book \\u00a7 40-32 through 40-38, is labeled by him as a motion for \\\"Nontestimonial Evidence.\\\" Section 40-38 states, in relevant part: \\\"Upon motion of a defendant who has been arrested . . . the judicial authority by order may direct the prosecuting authority to arrange for the defendant's participation in one or more of the procedures specified in Sections 40-32 through 40-39, if the judicial authority finds that the evidence sought could contribute to an adequate defense. . . .\\\" The forms of participation requested by the defendant \\u2014 to visit the crime scene with his attorney and to participate in a mock jury preparation session \\u2014 do not, however, comport with any of the procedures for obtaining nontestimonial evidence set forth in \\u00a7 40-32 through 40-39, nor does the defendant direct our attention to any particular procedure therein.\\nThe defendant claims that the court's ruling impliedly violated his rights to effective assistance of counsel, to present a defense and to confront witnesses against him. However, he has failed to articulate the manner in which the court's denial of his motions for a temporary release from the custody of the department of correction violated those rights as guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the United States constitution. When the court denied the defendant's motions, the defendant was incarcerated due to his failure or inability to post bail. A defendant's lawful incarceration necessarily results in the restriction of liberty and \\\"the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights . . . .\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979); see also id., 533-34; id., 546 (\\\"This principle applies equally to pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners. A [pretrial] detainee simply does not possess the full range of freedoms of an unincarcerated individual.\\\"). The defendant made no challenge to the amount or conditions of his bail, nor did he move for a modification. The defendant's claim is not, therefore, reviewable by a petition for review pursuant to General Statutes \\u00a7 54-63g. The court's decision to deny the defendant's motions for temporary release from custody imposed no new or additional restrictions on him. Furthermore, the denial of his motions cannot convert the defendant's appellate arguments into a claim that the amount or conditions of his bail were unconstitutional. See State v. Payne, 121 Conn. App. 308, 31-4-15 and 315 n.3, 996 A.2d 302, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 919, 996 A.2d 1193 (2010).\\nAs noted in part K of this opinion, the defendant resided in the home in which the crimes took place, and the defendant and his lawyer had access to drawings and photographs of the crime scene, obviating the need to actually go to the scene together in order to prepare a defense.\\nDuring trial, the defendant made an oral motion for the jury to be allowed to view the crime scene, which was denied by the court.\\nPractice Book \\u00a7 42-6, \\\"View by Jury of Place or Thing Involved in Case,\\\" provides in relevant part: \\\"When the judicial authority is of the opinion that a viewing by the jury of the place where the offense being tried was committed . . . will be helpful to the jury in determining any material factual issue, it may in its discretion . . . order that the jury be conducted to such place . . . .\\\"\\nThe jury did not find the defendant guilty of murder or attempted murder; see footnote 1 of this opinion; it is therefore unlikely that the jury was unduly influenced by the prosecutor's statements.\\nThe challenged statement was made during the following colloquy:\\n\\\"[The Prosecutor]: You wanted [Krantz] to come back in the house. Right?\\n\\\"[The Defendant]: No. . . .\\n\\\"[The Prosecutor]: No. You told her you wanted her to stay. Right?\\n\\\"[The Defendant]: Yes. That was prior to her leaving.\\n\\\"[The Prosecutor]: Uh-huh. But once she left, you threw her clothes out onto the driveway not to get her attention to come back?\\n\\\"[The Defendant]: No.\\n\\\"[The Prosecutor]: That's what you want this jury to believe. Now, you were asked . . . .\\\" (Emphasis added.)\\nThe defendant does not provide a citation to the transcript in support of his claim. We assume that his argument is made in reference to the portion of the transcript quoted in this opinion.\\nThe defendant does not provide a citation to the transcript in support of his claim. We assume that his argument is made in reference to the portion of the transcript quoted in this opinion.\\nDefense counsel argued: \\\"I would ask that the court . . . admonish the state that questions are questions, not opportunities to inject extraneous comments such as, that's what you want this jury to believe, or sneering asides, you claim, you claim, you claim. The state's here to ask questions. . . . She is lacing her questions with, you claim, you claim, you claim. . . . Those are argumentative. They're not questions. . . . You know, when she says, you claim, in a sneering tone of voice . . . .\\\" Defense counsel did not request that any curative instruction be given to the jury, and we note that none was given.\\nThe following colloquy took place out of the jury's presence and after the prosecutor had concluded her cross-examination of the defendant:\\n\\\"[Defense Counsel]: I'll raise, Judge, my second motion for a mistrial. This based on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. We just endured something. Okay. Cross-examination of sorts that ended with an exclamation point in the form of the state's attorney dramatically throwing her notebook to the table creating athud audible throughout the courtroom. This combined with her castaway remarks like, that's what you want this jury to believe, may have a place in a bad production of 'Perry Mason,' but it has no place in this courtroom. So, I would move for a mistrial. In the alternative, I would ask that the state . be admonished and that the jury be instructed to disregard such stunts.\\\"\\n\\\"The Court: Do you want to be heard?\\n\\\"[The Prosecutor]: No.\\n\\\"The Court: All right. I don't think this certainly arises to the level to declaring a mistrial. I have no reason to believe that this gentleman can't get a fair trial, and the court made every effort to guarantee that he's accorded a fair trial. So, the motion is denied. Under the circumstances, I don't think it's necessary for any kind of admonition.\\\"\\nThe defendant's allegation is not made nor is it addressed in any other portion of the trial transcript.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"4143615\", \"name\": \"CHRISTOPHER COLEMAN v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction\", \"decision_date\": \"2009-01-07\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"905\", \"last_page\": \"906\", \"citations\": \"290 Conn. 905\", \"volume\": \"290\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:38:18.484109+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"CHRISTOPHER COLEMAN v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION\", \"head_matter\": \"CHRISTOPHER COLEMAN v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION\", \"word_count\": \"40\", \"char_count\": \"274\", \"text\": \"The petitioner Christopher Coleman's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 111 Conn. App. 138 (AC 28720), is denied.\\nDecided January 7, 2009\\nChristopher Coleman, pro se, in support of the petition.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"4146741\", \"name\": \"IN RE INVESTIGATORY GRAND JURY NUMBER 2007-04\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re Investigatory Grand Jury No. 2007-04\", \"decision_date\": \"2009-09-02\", \"docket_number\": \"SC 2007-04\", \"first_page\": \"464\", \"last_page\": \"489\", \"citations\": \"293 Conn. 464\", \"volume\": \"293\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:04:50.495062+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"IN RE INVESTIGATORY GRAND JURY NUMBER 2007-04\", \"head_matter\": \"IN RE INVESTIGATORY GRAND JURY NUMBER 2007-04\\n(SC 2007-04)\\nRogers, C. J., and Vertefeuille, McLachlan, Flynn and Robinson, Js.\\nArgued July 29\\nofficially released September 2, 2009\\nWilliam, S. Fish, Jr., with whom were William, H. Champlin III and, on the brief, Amy E. Drega, for the petitioner (intervenor Hartford Courant Company).\\nJudith Rossi, special assistant state\\u2019s attorney, with whom were Kevin T. Kane, chief state\\u2019s attorney, and, on the brief, Michael A. Gailor, executive assistant state\\u2019s attorney, and Susan C. Marks, supervisory assistant state\\u2019s attorney, for the respondent (state).\", \"word_count\": \"8114\", \"char_count\": \"48998\", \"text\": \"Opinion\\nROGERS, C. J.\\nPursuant to General Statutes \\u00a7 54-47g (d), the intervening petitioner, the Hartford Courant Company, filed this petition for review of the order of the investigatory grand jury (grand jury) granting in part the motion of the respondent, the state of Connecticut, requesting that the grand jury's final report of finding (final report), which incorporated by reference its interim report of finding (interim report), not be open to public inspection and copying. The petitioner claims that the grand jury improperly granted the state's motion because both the final report and the interim report are presumptively open to the public pursuant to \\u00a7 54-47g (b) and do not fall within any of the exceptions set forth in \\u00a7 54-47g (c). We affirm the order of the grand jury with respect to the final report and reverse the order of the grand jury with respect to the interim report.\\nThe record discloses the following undisputed facts. On October 24, 2007, an investigatory grand jury panel, consisting of three Superior Court judges, ordered an investigation to determine whether there was probable cause to believe that crimes had been committed by certain persons within the government of the city of Hartford (city). On November 6, 2007, the chief court administrator of the state of Connecticut appointed Judge Dennis Eveleigh as an investigatory grand jury pursuant to General Statutes \\u00a7 54-47d for the purpose of investigating \\\"corruption and the misuse of public funds in the government of the [c]ity . in its activities and dealings with persons or firms doing business with the city.\\\" On January 13,2009, the grand jury issued under seal an interim report. On June 29, 2009, the grand jury issued its final report, which incorporated the interim report by reference. On the same day, the state filed a motion to seal the record of the investigation and the final report pursuant to \\u00a7 54-47g (a) and (b) and requested a hearing pursuant to \\u00a7 54-47g (c).\\nThe hearing on the state's motion to seal the record and final report commenced on July 13, 2009. At the hearing, several persons who were referred to in the final report and who had been deemed to be interested parties under \\u00a7 54-47g (c) requested through their counsel permission to view the final report before arguing on the issue of whether the report should be sealed. The grand jury ordered that each interested party could review the portion of the final report that related to that party and continued the hearing to July 20, 2009. On July 13, 2009, the petitioner filed a motion to intervene in the proceeding for the prapose of arguing that the final report should be disclosed to the public. At the July 20, 2009 hearing on the state's motion to seal, the grand jury granted the petitioner's motion to intervene and designated the petitioner as an interested party.\\nThereafter, the grand jury granted in part the state's motion to seal the final report. In its memorandum of decision, the grand jury observed that \\u00a7 54-47g (b) expressly prohibits the disclosure of any part of the record that \\\"contains allegations of the commission of a crime by an individual if the investigatory grand jury failed to find probable cause that such individual committed such crime unless such individual requests the release of such part of the record. . . .\\\" The grand jury concluded that, under this provision, it could not disclose the portion of the final report relating to persons for whom the jury had found no probable cause to believe that they had committed crimes. With respect to persons for whom the grand jury had found probable cause in the final report, the grand jury observed that none of them had yet been arrested and there was a possibility that they never would be. With respect to those persons, the grand jury found that \\\"[i]f the information is made public, prospective jurors may be reading about aspects of the case that will never be disclosed in a trial.\\\" It also observed that three persons had been arrested as the result of the grand jury's findings of probable cause in the interim report and that the release of the final report could jeopardize the rights of those persons to a fair trial \\\"due to pretrial publicity of unrelated matters.\\\" In addition, the grand jury concluded that, because none of the persons named in the final report had yet been convicted, the presumption of innocence applied and, therefore, they were \\\"innocent persons\\\" under \\u00a7 54-47g (c) (4). It further found that some of the allegations of criminal activity in the final report were \\\"uncorroborated or inferred . . . .\\\" The grand jury concluded, therefore, that the release of the final report could significantly damage the lives and reputations of innocent persons. Accordingly, the grand jury granted the state's motion to seal part III of the final report, which contained the discussion section. It denied the motion with respect to parts I and II of the final report, which set forth the procedural background and the scope of the investigation. Finally, the grand jury noted that \\\"the interim report and its findings were incorporated in the final report. The interim report has previously been ordered sealed, and that order shall remain in effect.\\\" This petition for review followed.\\nThe petitioner claims that the grand jury improperly determined that part III of the final report should not be disclosed under \\u00a7 54-47g (c) (1) because disclosure would result in pretrial publicity that would jeopardize the fair trial rights of the persons who were arrested as the result of the probable cause findings in the interim report. The petitioner also claims that the grand jury failed to consider whether there were reasonable alternatives to nondisclosure. The petitioner further contends that the grand jury improperly granted the motion to seal with respect to the portion of the final report related to persons for whom the grand jury did not find probable cause because the grand jury did not limit its order to the portions of the final report that were related to persons who were alleged to have committed a crime. See General Statutes \\u00a7 54-47g (b) (\\\"no part of the record shall be disclosed which contains allegations of the commission of a crime by an individual if the investigatory grand jury failed to find probable cause that such individual committed such crime\\\" [emphasis added]). In addition, the petitioner claims that, in determining that the release of the final report would damage the reputations of innocent persons, the grand jury improperly interpreted the phrase \\\"innocent persons,\\\" as used in \\u00a7 54-47g (c) (4), to include persons for whom the grand jury had found probable cause to believe that they had committed crimes. Finally, the petitioner claims that the grand jury improperly sealed the interim report without making any specific findings of fact on the record regarding the reasons for sealing the report, as required by \\u00a7 54-47g (c). The state and a number of persons who have been deemed interested parties pursuant to \\u00a7 54-47g (c) dispute these claims. We conclude that the grand jury properly granted the state's motion to seal the final report, but we do so on the grounds that: (1) nondisclosure of certain portions of the report was required to protect the fair trial rights of one or more of the three persons who have been arrested as the result of the findings of probable cause in the interim report; and (2) nondisclosure of the remainder of the sealed portion of the report was required to protect the reputation of an innocent person. We further conclude that the grand jury improperly ordered that the interim report should remain sealed.\\nAt the outset, we set forth the appropriate standard of review. To the extent that the grand jury's order preventing disclosure of its final report and interim report was based on its interpretation of \\u00a7 54-47g, our standard of review is plenary. See Dept. of Transportation v. White Oak Corp., 287 Conn. 1, 7, 946 A.2d 1219 (2008). \\\"General Statutes \\u00a7 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. . . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter . . . .\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 8.\\nWe begin our analysis with a review of the relevant statutory scheme. Section 54-47g (a) provides in relevant part that \\\"[w]ithin sixty days of the conclusion of the investigation, the investigatory grand jury conducting such investigation shall file its finding with the court of the judicial district designated by the Chief Court Administrator pursuant to subsection (a) of section 54-47d, and shall file a copy of its finding with the panel and with the Chief State's Attorney or a state's attorney if such Chief State's Attorney or state's attorney made application for the investigation. . . .\\\" Section 54-47g (b) provides in relevant part that \\\"[t]he finding of the investigation shall be open to public inspection and copying at the court where it has been filed seven calendar days after it has been filed, unless within that period the Chief State's Attorney or a state's attorney with whom the finding was filed files a motion with the investigatory grand jury requesting that a part or all of such finding not be so disclosed. The finding may include all or such part of the record as the investigatory grand jury may determine, except that no part of the record shall be disclosed which contains allegations of the commission of a crime by an individual if the investigatory grand jury failed to find probable cause that such individual committed such crime unless such individual requests the release of such part of the record. . . .\\\"\\nSection 54-47g (c) provides that \\\"[w]ithin fifteen calendar days of the filing of such motion, the investigatory grand jury shall conduct a hearing. The investigatory grand jury shall give written notice of such hearing to the person filing such motion and any other person the investigatory grand jury deems to be an interested party to the proceedings, which may include, but not be lim ited to, persons who testified or were the subject of testimony before the investigatory grand jury. Within five calendar days of the conclusion of the hearing, the investigatory grand jury shall render its decision, and shall send copies thereof to all those to whom it gave notice of the hearing. It shall deny any such motion unless it makes specific findings of fact on the record that there is a substantial probability that one of the following interests will be prejudiced by publicity that nondisclosure would prevent, and that reasonable alternatives to nondisclosure cannot adequately protect that interest: (1) The right of a person to a fair trial; (2) the prevention of potential defendants from fleeing; (3) the prevention of subornation of perjury or tampering with witnesses; or (4) the protection of the lives and reputations of innocent persons which would be significantly damaged by the release of uncorroborated information. Any order of nondisclosure shall be drawn to protect the interest so found.\\\"\\nUnder the common law, grand jury proceedings were presumptively secret, even after the conclusion of the investigation. See In re Final Grand Jury Report Concerning the Torrington Police Dept., 197 Conn. 698, 707, 501 A.2d 377 (1985); id., 711 (interests in grand jury secrecy are not eliminated merely because grand jury has ended activities). In order to obtain access to the grand jury's report and related documents, the burden was on the person seeking disclosure to show that \\\"in the particular circumstances [of the case], the benefits of disclosure outweigh the benefits of continued secrecy.\\\" Id., 714. In State v. Rivera, 250 Conn. 188, 205, 736 A.2d 790 (1999), this court held that, when the legislature enacted \\u00a7 54-47g (b) in 1988; see Public Acts 1988, No. 88-345; it abrogated this common-law rule with respect to the finding of the grand jury and \\\"established a rebuttable presumption of disclosure . . . .\\\" State v. Rivera, supra, 205. Although \\u00a7 54-47g (c) continues to recognize \\\"the purposes behind the common-law presumption regarding the confidentiality and secrecy of grand jury proceedings, the statute favors disclosure after the grand jury has completed its investigation.\\\" Id., 206; see also In re Final Grand Jury Report Concerning the Torrington Police Dept., supra, 710 (purposes of common-law presumption of grand jury secrecy were to encourage witnesses to come forward without risk of retribution or inducement, to eliminate risk that subjects of investigation would flee or try to influence grand jury and to ensure that persons who are accused but exonerated will not be held up to public ridicule). Thus, the effect of \\u00a7 54-47g (b) was to place the burden on the person seeking confidentiality to establish that there is a substantial probability that one of the interests enumerated in \\u00a7 54-47g (c) (1) through (4) will be prejudiced by disclosure.\\nWith this background in mind, we address in turn each of the petitioner's claims in the present case. We begin with the petitioner's claim that the grand jury improperly determined that the disclosure of certain portions of the final report would prejudice the rights to a fair trial of one or more of the three persons who have been arrested as the result of the grand jury's findings of probable cause in the interim report, referred to hereafter as A, B and C. We disagree.\\nSection 54-47g (c) provides that, in order to grant the state's motion to seal, the grand jury must find \\\"that there is a substantial probability that one of the following interests will be prejudiced by publicity that nondisclosure would prevent . (1) The right of a person to a fair trial . . . .\\\" In support of its claim that the grand jury improperly determined that the disclosure of the final report would be prejudicial to the fair trial rights of one or more of the persons who have been arrested, the petitioner relies primarily on this court's decision in State v. Pelletier, 209 Conn. 564, 552 A. 2d 805 (1989). In that case, the defendant claimed that the trial court improperly had denied his pretrial motion to transfer the prosecution because pervasive pretrial publicity had deprived him of his right to a fair trial. Id., 568. This court stated m Pelletier that \\\"[t]he determination of whether a transfer of prosecution is necessary is a matter ordinarily entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court. Nevertheless, due to the grave constitutional implications attending such pretrial rulings, appellate tribunals have the duty to make an independent evaluation of the circumstances.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. We then observed that this court previously had held that, \\\" [a]bsent inherently prejudicial publicity which has so saturated the community as to have a probable impact upon the prospective jurors, there must be some showing of a connection between the publicity . . . and the existence of actual jury prejudice in order to transfer a prosecution.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 569.\\nWe recognized in Pelletier that the pretrial publicity had been extensive, but concluded that, because the publicity had been neither inflammatory nor inaccurate, and because it had not \\\"created a trial atmosphere that had been utterly corrupted\\\"; (internal quotation marks omitted) id., 570; the pretrial publicity was not so inherently prejudicial as to deprive the defendant of his right to a fair trial. Id. We further observed that the defendant could not show prejudice because all of the jurors had been thoroughly examined during voir dire and those who had substantial knowledge of the case had been excused. Id., 570-71. Accordingly, we concluded that the trial court \\\"did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to transfer the prosecution.\\\" Id., 571.\\nIn the present case, the petitioner contends that, under Pelletier, the grand jury improperly granted the motion to seal the final report because there was \\\"no evidence . on the likely quantity, pervasiveness, or persuasiveness of pretrial publicity\\\" and \\\"no evidence that pretrial publicity would be inaccurate.\\\" We conclude that the standards governing the transfer of cases to avoid the prejudicial effects of pretrial publicity are ill suited to guide the grand juiy in determining whether it should release prejudicial information. Courts necessarily are more constrained in their attempts to ameliorate the effects of past press coverage, which they cannot change, than the grand jury is in considering the future effects of the publication of the facts contained in its finding and report. It does not follow from the fact that courts must tolerate some degree of prejudice as the result of pretrial publicity, over which they have little control, that grand juries are required to disclose information that would cause such prejudice. Indeed, contrary to the petitioner's argument, the plain language of \\u00a7 54-47g (c) (1) sets no minimum degree of prejudice to the persons' right to a fair trial that the grand jury must find in order to grant the state's motion to seal.\\nAccordingly, we conclude that Pelletier provides little guidance in the present case and we reject the petitioner's claim that, in order to seal its report on the ground that it will deny a person of his right to a fair trial, the grand jury was required to find that there was a substantial probability that the publicity would be inflammatory and inaccurate and would \\\"utterly cor- rapt\\\" the trial atmosphere. Rather, it is reasonable to conclude that the legislature intended that it would be within the grand jury's discretion to grant a motion to seal its report if it found that there was a substantial probability that the information in the report, even if reported accurately and dispassionately, would prejudice a person's right to a fair trial to a degree that is more than de minimis and that prejudice could be prevented by nondisclosure. In making this determination, the grand jury may consider the extent to which its report contains prejudicial information about the person and whether the information is probative of factual issues that are likely to be raised at trial.\\nIn the present case, our review of the grand jury's final report satisfies us that the grand jury did not abuse its discretion in sealing the portions of the report that relate to one or more of the persons who have been arrested as the result of the findings of probable cause in the interim report. The information in two portions of the report is prejudicial to A and the information in another portion of the report is prejudicial both to A and to B. Moreover, because the information in those portions of the final report is unrelated to the findings in the interim report, it is unlikely to be revealed during trial. Accordingly, we conclude that the grand jury reasonably found that there is a substantial probability that the disclosure of those portions of the final report would prejudice the right of those persons to a fair trial under \\u00a7 54-47g (c) (1).\\nThe petitioner claims, however, that even if the information in the final report was prejudicial to the rights to a fair trial of one or more of the persons who have been arrested, the grand jury abused its discretion in granting the state's motion to seal because there were reasonable alternatives to nondisclosure. See General Statutes \\u00a7 54-47g (c) (grand jury must deny motion to seal unless it finds that \\\"reasonable alternatives to nondisclosure cannot adequately protect\\\" interest in fair trial). Specifically, the petitioner claims that the grand jury failed to consider that the fair trial rights of the persons who have been arrested could be protected through voir dire of potential jurors or a change in trial venue instead of nondisclosure. We disagree. The \\\"reasonable alternatives\\\" portion of \\u00a7 54-47g (c) requires the grand jury to consider alternatives to nondisclosure when the alternatives would protect the enumerated interests in the first instance. It does not require the grand jury to injure an enumerated interest, such as the right to a fair trial, by disclosure, and then craft remedies to cure that injury.\\nThe portions of the final report that relate to one or more of the persons who have been arrested as the result of the probable cause findings in the interim report also relate to persons who were not accused of any crime and for whom no probable cause was found. Because we have concluded that the grand jury properly sealed those portions of the report in order to protect the fair trial rights of the arrested persons, we need not address the petitioner's claim that the grand jury improperly applied \\u00a7 54-47g (b) to persons who were not accused of any crime.\\nOne portion of the final report, however, relates solely to a person, referred to hereafter as D, who has not been arrested even though the grand jury found probable cause to believe that D had committed a crime. Because our analysis under \\u00a7 54-47g (c) (1) applies only to the portion of the final report relating to persons who have been arrested pursuant to the findings of probable cause in the interim report, we must address the petitioner's claim that, in determining that the release of the final report would damage the reputations of innocent persons, the grand jury improperly interpreted the phrase \\\"innocent persons,\\\" as used in \\u00a7 54-47g (c) (4), to apply to D despite a finding of probable cause. We disagree.\\nThe meaning of the phrase \\\"innocent persons\\\" as used in \\u00a7 54-47g (c) (4) is a question of statutory interpretation and our review is, therefore, plenary. See Dept. of Transportation v. White Oak Corp., supra, 287 Conn. 7. The phrase is not statutorily defined and the parties make no claim that its meaning is plain and unambiguous. Accordingly, we may \\\"look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter . . . .\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 8. As we have indicated, this court has held that \\u00a7 54-47g (c) enumerates \\\"the purposes behind the common-law presumption regarding the confidentiality and secrecy of grand jury proceedings . . . .\\\" State v. Rivera, supra, 250 Conn. 206. Thus, the intent of the legislature in enacting \\u00a7 54-47g (c) was not to disavow the importance of the common-law justifications for secrecy, but merely to shift the burden of establishing that secrecy is justified to the person seeking nondisclosure. Accordingly, to determine the meaning of \\\"innocent persons\\\" under the statute, it is appropriate to look to the purposes of grand jury secrecy under the common law.\\nThis court has recognized that, under the common law, grand jury secrecy was intended to \\\"assure that persons who are accused but exonerated by the grand jury will not be held up to public ridicule.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Final Grand Jury Report Concerning the Torrington Police Dept., supra, 197 Conn. 710, quoting Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 219, 99 S. Ct. 1667, 60 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1979); see also Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, supra, 219 n.10 (one purpose of grand jury secrecy is \\\"to protect innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation, and from the expense of standing trial where there was no probability of guilt\\\" [internal quotation marks omitted]); In re American Historical Assn., 62 F. Sup. 2d 1100, 1103 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (\\\"the rule of secrecy seeks to protect . . . unindicted individuals from the anxiety, embarrassment and public castigation that may result from disclosure\\\").\\nUnlike the federal indicting grand jury, an investigatory grand jury's proceeding does not culminate in an indictment, but culminates either in a finding of proba ble cause or in an exoneration of the investigated persons. See In re Final Grand Jury Report Concerning the Torrington Police Dept., supra, 197 Conn. 707 (discussing distinction between indicting grand jury and investigating grand jury). As the grand jury in the present case recognized, however, if the grand jury makes a finding of probable cause as to a person, that does not necessarily mean that that person will be subsequently charged and tried. At oral argument before this court, the state pointed out that there are many reasons why a person for whom the grand jury has found probable cause may never be charged, including the state's determination that it cannot prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, the state's desire to call the person as a witness in the prosecution of another person, or the state's determination that, under the specific circumstances of the case, it would be unfair to charge the person. Numerous courts have recognized that the issuance of accusatory reports by nonindicting grand juries is disfavored because, when the grand jury does not indict, the accused person must stand mute and has no forum in which to vindicate his name. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 813 F. Sup. 1451, 1463 (D. Colo. 1992) (\\\"A presentment [unaccompanied by an indictment] is a foul blow. It wins the importance of a judicial document; yet it lacks its principal attributes\\u2014 the right to answer and to appeal. It accuses, but furnishes no forum for denial. No one knows upon what evidence the findings are based. An indictment may be challenged\\u2014even defeated. The presentment is immune.\\\" [Internal quotation marks omitted.]); Republican Properties Corp. v. Grand Jury Presentment, 971 So. 2d 289, 292 (Fla. App. 2008) (same); People v. McCabe, 148 Misc. 330, 333, 266 N.Y.S. 363 (1933) (same); see also In re North, 16 F.3d 1234, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (\\\"various courts have struck down with strong language efforts by grand juries to accuse per sons of crime while affording them no forum in which to vindicate themselves\\\" [internal quotation marks omitted]); United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794, 802 (5th Cir. 1975) (\\\"a man should not be subject to a quasi-official accusation of misconduct which he cannot answer in an authoritative forum\\\" [internal quotation marks omitted]); In re State Grand Jury, 148 P.3d 440, 443 (Colo. App. 2006) (\\\"[s]ecrecy serves to check the power of the grand jury by protecting citizens against unfound accusations of criminal misconduct that cannot be answered in an authoritative forum\\\"). We conclude, therefore, that although a person for whom the grand jury has found probable cause has not been exonerated, the same concerns that apply to exonerated persons may be implicated and he may be deemed an innocent person under \\u00a7 54-47g (c) (4) if the grand jury has cause to believe that it is reasonably possible that the person will never be charged with the crime. In making this discretionary determination, the grand jury may consider the strength of the evidence against the person, the probability that the state will call the person as a witness in the prosecution of another person, or any other factors that render it possible that the person will not be charged.\\nWe disagree, however, with the grand jury's conclusion that \\\"it may reasonably be argued that, prior to any conviction . all persons named in the report, of whom the . . . [g]rand [j]ury found probable cause existed that crimes had been committed, are certainly presumed to be 'innocent persons' [under \\u00a7 54-47g (c) (4)].\\\" The parties have provided, and our research has revealed, no authority for the proposition that a purpose of grand jury secrecy under the common law was to protect the reputations of persons who have been arrested for the conduct that was the subject of the grand jury's investigation. See State v. Rivera, supra, 250 Conn. 206 (\\u00a7 54-47g [c] enumerates \\\"the purposes behind the common-law presumption regarding the confidentiality and secrecy of grand jury proceedings\\\"). Rather, as we have indicated, the purpose of grand jury secrecy under the common law was to protect the reputations of persons who have not been charged and, therefore, have no forum in which to vindicate themselves. See, e.g., In re North, supra, 16 F.3d 1239. Moreover, if the phrase \\\"innocent persons\\\" included persons who have been arrested as the result of the grand jury's finding of probable cause, the sealing of the finding would be required pursuant to \\u00a7 54-47g (b) if no finding of probable cause has been made, and would be warranted under \\u00a7 54-47g (c) (4) both as to persons for whom a finding of probable cause had been found, but who have not been arrested, and to persons who have been arrested. This broad reading would be inconsistent with the presumption of openness. We conclude, therefore, that the grand jury in the present case improperly concluded that persons who have been arrested but not convicted are \\\"innocent persons\\\" under \\u00a7 54-47g (c) (4).\\nUpon our review of the portion of the grand jury's final report relating to D, who has not been arrested, we conclude that the grand jury did not abuse its discretion in determining that D was an innocent person under \\u00a7 54-47g (c) (4). The grand jury observed that all of its findings of probable cause were based solely on evidence presented by the state that might \\\"not survive the scrutiny of cross-examination\\\" and that some of the evidence \\\"may be uncorroborated or inferred . . . Moreover, D was not a central figure in the grand jury's investigation, the focus of which was on \\\"corruption and the misuse of public funds in the government of the [c]ity . in its activities and dealings with persons or firms doing business with the city.\\\" We conclude, therefore, that the grand jury reasonably could have concluded that it was reasonably possible that D would not be charged and, therefore, that he was an innocent person under \\u00a7 54-47g (c) (4).\\nThe petitioner claims, however, that the grand jury improperly granted the state's motion to seal part III of the final report in its entirety when it found that only \\\"some\\\" of the information in the final report \\\"may\\\" be uncorroborated. See General Statutes \\u00a7 54-47g (c) (4) (reputations of innocent persons must be \\\"significantly damaged by the release of uncorroborated information\\\"). We disagree. The common-law presumption of grand jury secrecy was premised in part on the fact that the grand jury proceeding is not adversarial and on concerns that persons investigated by the grand jury have no opportunity to explain or to rebut the evidence presented to the grand jury. See Fabiano v. Palos Hills, 336 Ill. App. 3d 635, 654, 784 N.E.2d 258 (\\\"[t]he absence of cross-examination and the nonadversarial nature of grand jury proceedings increase the risk that false testimony will go undetected\\\"), cert. denied, 204 Ill. 2d 658, 798 N.E.2d 306 (2003); see also United States v. Hasan, 526 F.3d 653, 660 n.5 (10th Cir. 2008) (\\\"[g]rand jury proceedings are not adversarial proceedings where parties may present competing evidence and . . . the presiding judicial officer at the grand jury . is hardly well suited to issue neutral factual findings\\\"); cf. General Statutes \\u00a7 54-47f (d) (witnesses before grand jury may be examined only by grand jury or by attorney appointed by grand jury for such purpose, although witness has right to have counsel present). It is reasonable to conclude that, when the legislature used the phrase \\\"uncorroborated information\\\" in \\u00a7 54-47g (c) (4), it intended to recognize these concerns. Accordingly, we conclude that the grand jury's observations in the present case that all of the evidence that it considered had been presented by the state and that none of it had been subject to cross-examination were equivalent to a finding that the evidence was uncorroborated for purposes of \\u00a7 54-47g (c) (4).\\nFinally, we address the petitioner's claim that the grand jury improperly sealed the interim report, which the trial court incorporated by reference into the final report. The state contends that this court should not review this claim because the petitioner did not adequately raise it during the July 20, 2009 hearing before the grand jury. The state further claims that the claim is time barred because the petitioner did not raise it within seventy-two hours from the time that the interim order was issued, as required by \\u00a7 54-47g (d). We conclude that the claim is not time barred, that it was preserved and that the grand jury improperly ordered that the interim report not be disclosed.\\nWe first consider whether the petitioner's claim regarding the interim report is time barred under \\u00a7 54-47g (d). As we have indicated, \\u00a7 54-47g (b) provides in relevant part that \\\" [t]he finding of the investigation shall be open to public inspection and copying at the court where it has been filed seven calendar days after it has been filed, unless within that period the Chief State's Attorney or a state's attorney with whom the finding was filed files a motion with the investigatory grand jury requesting that a part or all of such finding not be so disclosed. . . .\\\" The statute does not provide for the issuance of interim reports or authorize the grand jury to issue any reports under seal. Subsections (c) and (d) of \\u00a7 54-47g govern proceedings on the motion to seal, and the timing requirements for those procedures relate back to the state's filing of the motion to seal. Because the state filed no motion to seal the interim order in the present case, and because the grand jury incorporated the interim report into its final report, which was the subject of the state's motion to seal, we conclude that the petitioner's petition for review, which was timely with respect to the final report, was also timely with respect to the interim report.\\nWe also conclude that the petitioner's claim that the grand jury improperly sealed the interim report was preserved. The petitioner raised the claim at the hearing before the grand jury, the record is adequate for review and the interested parties had an opportunity to respond to the petitioner's claim both at the hearing and in their responses to the petition for review to this court.\\nThe grand jury did not state its reasons for sealing the interim report. Because there is no suggestion in the present case that the interim report implicates the interests identified in \\u00a7 54-47g (c) (2) or (3), however, it is reasonable to conclude that the grand jury sealed the interim report because it found that there was a substantial probability that its disclosure would prejudice the rights of the persons named therein to a fair trial under \\u00a7 54-47g (c) (1), and that it would harm the reputations of innocent persons under \\u00a7 54-47g (c) (4). With respect to the grand juiy's conclusion that the disclosure of the interim report would harm the reputations of innocent persons, we have concluded that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the phrase \\\"innocent persons\\\" as used in \\u00a7 54-47g (c) (4) does not include persons who have been arrested as the result of the grand jury's finding of probable cause. Accordingly, we conclude that the grand jury improperly concluded that the interim report should be sealed to protect the reputations of A, B and C, all of whom have been arrested.\\nMoreover, even if we were to assume that the arrested persons are innocent persons under the statute, to the extent that the information in the interim report is already publicly known, nondisclosure of the report would not prevent harm to their reputations. See General Statutes \\u00a7 54-47g (c) (grand jury may grant motion to seal only if nondisclosure would prevent harm to enumerated interests); see also In re North, supra, 16 F.2d 1240 (fact that grand jury filings contain information that is already publicly known weighs \\\"most strongly\\\" in favor of release). Virtually all of the information in the interim report relating to A, B and C is contained in the arrest warrant affidavits for those persons, which are publicly available. Much of the information also is contained in a press release by the office of the chief state's attorney dated January 27, 2009. Accordingly, we conclude that the grand jury improperly ordered that the interim report be sealed pursuant to \\u00a7 54-47g (c) (4).\\nSimilarly, because the information in the interim report is publicly known and may be reported freely by the media, nondisclosure of that information would not protect the right of any person to a fair trial. As a result, we further conclude that it was not within the grand jury's discretion to order the nondisclosure of the interim report under \\u00a7 54-47g (c) (1).\\nThe order of the grand jury granting the state's motion to seal with respect to part III of its final report is affirmed; the order of the grand jury sealing the interim report is reversed and the matter is remanded to the grand jury with direction to order the disclosure of the interim report.\\nIn this opinion the other justices concurred.\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 54-47g provides in relevant part: \\\"(a) Within sixty days of the conclusion of the investigation, the investigatory grand jury conducting such investigation shall file its finding with the court of the judicial district designated by the Chief Court Administrator pursuant to subsection (a) of section 54-47d, and shall file a copy of its finding with the panel and with the Chief State's Attorney or a state's attorney if such Chief State's Attorney or state's attorney made application for the investigation. . . . Such finding shall state whether or not there is probable cause to believe that a crime or crimes have been committed. . . .\\n\\\"(b) The finding of the investigation shall be open to public inspection and copying at the court where it has been filed seven calendar days after it has been filed, unless within that period the Chief State's Attorney or a state's attorney with whom the finding was filed files a motion with the investigatory grand jury requesting that a part or all of such finding not be so disclosed. The finding may include all or such part of the record as the investigatory grand jury may determine, except that no part of the record shall be disclosed which contains allegations of the commission of a crime by an individual if the investigatory grand jury failed to find probable cause that such individual committed such crime unless such individual requests the release of such part of the record. In such event as much of the finding as has not been sought to be withheld from disclosure shall be disclosed promptly upon the expiration of said seven-calendar-day period.\\n\\\"(c) Within fifteen calendar days of the filing of such motion, the investigatory grand jury shall conduct a hearing. The investigatory grand jury shall give written notice of such hearing to the person filing such motion and any other person the investigatory grand jury deems to be an interested party to the proceedings, which may include, but not be limited to, persons who testified or were the subject of testimony before the investigatory grand jury. Within five calendar days of the conclusion of the hearing, the investigatory grand jury shall render its decision, and shall send copies thereof to all those to whom it gave notice of the hearing. It shall deny any such motion unless it makes specific findings of fact on the record that there is a substantial probability that one of the following interests will be prejudiced by publicity that nondisclosure would prevent, and that reasonable alternatives to nondisclosure cannot adequately protect that interest: (1) The right of a person to a fair trial; (2) the prevention of potential defendants from fleeing; (3) the prevention of subornation of perjury or tampering with witnesses; or (4) the protection of the lives and reputations of innocent persons which would be significantly damaged by the release of uncorroborated information. Any order of nondisclosure shall be drawn to protect the interest so found.\\n\\\"(d) Any person aggrieved by an order of the investigatory grand jury shall have the right to appeal such order by filing a petition for review with the Appellate Court within seventy-two hours from issuance of such order. . . .\\\"\\nThe petitioner filed the petition for review in the Appellate Court and we transferred the petition to this court pursuant to Practice Book \\u00a7 65-3 and 66-6.\\nThe record was sealed automatically pursuant to \\u00a7 54-47g (a), and the petitioner has not filed an application for its disclosure pursuant to that statute. The sole issue in this matter is whether the grand jury properly granted the state's motion to seal the final report.\\nThe petitioner concedes in its petition for review that the grand jury, pursuant to \\u00a7 54-47g (b), properly sealed the portion of the final report relating to \\\"the one individual who had been accused of a crime as to whom the [grand jury] did not find probable cause.\\\"\\nIn the interest of confidentiality, we decline to identify the persons who were deemed interested parties under \\u00a7 54-47g (c) and who participated in these proceedings on the petition for review. After the oral argument before this court on the petition for review, the grand jury panel consisting of three Superior Court judges who have been designated by the Chief Justice to receive applications for investigations into the commission of crime pursuant to General Statutes \\u00a7 54-47b (4) filed an application for leave to file an amicus curiae brief. Thereafter, this court granted the application.\\nThe presumption of secrecy continues to apply to the record of the grand jury's investigation. See General Statutes \\u00a7 54-47g (a) (\\\"any part of the record of the investigation not disclosed with the finding pursuant to subsection [b] of this section shall be sealed, provided any person may file an application with the panel for disclosure of any such part of the record\\\").\\nMoreover, the fact that a trial court's discretionary decision denying a motion to transfer the prosecution will be upheld in the absence of a finding of inflammatory, inaccurate and corrupting pretrial publicity does not necessarily mean that a decision granting a motion to transfer will be reversed in the absence of such a finding.\\nThe petitioner claims that, because the grand jury's determination that portions of the final report should not be disclosed under \\u00a7 54-47g (c) (1) involved a question of statutory interpretation, our review is plenary. As we have indicated, the determination regarding the extent to which pretrial publicity may have had a prejudicial effect on a person's fair trial rights ordinarily is subject to review for abuse of discretion. See State v. Pelletier, supra, 209 Conn. 568. This court in Pelletier also stated, however, that in light of the \\\"grave constitutional implications\\\" of rulings related to prejudicial pretrial publicity, \\\"appellate tribunals have the duty to make an independent evaluation of the circumstances.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. It is not entirely clear to us whether this language means that this court will review such rulings de novo or whether we simply afford a lesser degree of deference in such cases. We need not clarify the standard of review in the present case, however, because we conclude that the grand jury's determination that disclosure of the portions of the final report relating to A and B would prejudice their rights to a fair trial was proper under both standards. Similarly, because we conclude that the grand jury's determination that the disclosure of the interim report would prejudice the fair trial rights of A, B and C was a clear abuse of discretion, we need not consider whether that ruling would survive de novo review.\\nThe federal rules governing grand jury proceedings, which were at issue in Douglas Oil Co. codified the common law. See Illinois v. Abbott & Associates, Inc., 460 U.S. 557, 566 n.11, 103 S. Ct. 1356, 75 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1983); Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, supra, 441 U.S. 218 n.9. As we have indicated, \\u00a7 54-47g (c) enumerates \\\"the purposes behind the common-law presumption regarding the confidentiality and secrecy of grand jury proceedings . . . .\\\" State v. Rivera, supra, 250 Conn. 206. Accordingly, the federal cases are instructive in interpreting \\u00a7 54-47g (c). See id. (\\\"[w]e previously have been guided by federal law in construing our own investigatory grand jury statutes\\\").\\nThis conclusion is consistent with the legislative history of \\u00a7 54-47g (c). John Kelly, then the chief state's attorney, testified against the original version of the bill that was enacted as No. 88-345 of the 1988 Public Acts, a portion of which is now codified as \\u00a7 54-47g (c) (4), at hearings on the bill before the judiciary committee. See Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 5, 1988 Sess., pp. 1380-96; see also Proposed Senate Bill No. 584, 1988 Sess. The original version of the bill provided that both the record and the finding of the investigatory grand jury would be presumptively open, and it provided no mechanism to prevent disclosures that would harm the reputations of innocent parties. Kelly stated that he was \\\"adamantly opposed\\\" to the bill; Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, supra, p. 1380; partly because it would injure the reputations of persons who were targeted by the investigation but who were ultimately exonerated. Id., p. 1393 (\\\"[I]f you have a certain target area\\u2014that is inquired into and that person is what I will term exonerated\\u2014should that person be publicly identified as someone who was targeted, but exonerated? You know what the public perception would be\\u2014'Well, he was guilty\\u2014they just couldn't get enough evidence against him.' You're harming an awful lot of innocent people by doing this.\\\"). The bill was subsequently amended to include the language set forth in \\u00a7 54-47g (b) and (c) (4).\\nAlthough we conclude that the interim report should be disclosed, we decline to identify the persons named therein in recognition of the rights of interested parties to seek reconsideration of our decision.\\nThe interim report Is contained in an envelope that was sealed with a paper label carrying the following notation: \\\"ATTENTION! REVIEW THE CONTENTS OF THIS FILE PRIOR TO DISCLOSURE. THIS FILE IS SEALED OR CONTAINS SEALED INFORMATION.\\\" The label is signed by the grand jury's clerk and is dated January 13, 2009. The label also carries a handwritten note stating: \\\"[January 29, 2009]. Copy of report to be given to [counsel] for review only. Report not to be copied by anyone. Copies to be made through state. Report to remain sealed.\\\" The record before this court contains no motion by the state to seal the interim report and the state has made no claim that it filed such a motion.\\nAt the July 20, 2009 hearing, the state observed that the interim report had been incorporated into the final report and stated that \\\"one would argue then that the interim report, for which there was no motion to intervene filed, would then fall under this situation.\\\" Counsel for one of the interested parties then argued that the disclosure of the interim report would prejudice his client's right to a fair trial. At the conclusion of the hearing, counsel for the petitioner stated: \\\"Now, I don't know what the reference is on pages 1, 2 and 3 of [the final report to] the prior report and I'm not even sure if the prior report was made public. So it's very difficult to argue to those but unless they meet one of the four tests, and I haven't heard an argument that they do except possibly the speculation about a fair trial and the speculation about potential massive pretrial publicity which would affect the rights of these parties which there is no factual evidence of right now.\\\"\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"4184662\", \"name\": \"STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. OSIBISA HALL\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Hall\", \"decision_date\": \"2010-04-20\", \"docket_number\": \"AC 30816\", \"first_page\": \"489\", \"last_page\": \"497\", \"citations\": \"120 Conn. App. 489\", \"volume\": \"120\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Appellate Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Appellate Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:47:23.881189+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. OSIBISA HALL\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. OSIBISA HALL\\n(AC 30816)\\nBishop, DiPentima and Schaller, Js.\\nArgued January 6\\nofficially released April 20, 2010\\nErin M. Field, for the appellant (defendant).\\nLaurie N. Feldman, special deputy assistant state\\u2019s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state\\u2019s attorney, and Anthony J. Spinella, assistant state\\u2019s attorney, for the appellee (state).\\nThe listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.\", \"word_count\": \"2492\", \"char_count\": \"15333\", \"text\": \"Opinion\\nBISHOP, J.\\nThe defendant, OsibisaHall, appeals from the trial court's judgments of conviction, which were rendered following the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas to one count of possession of marijuana with intent to sell in violation of General Statutes \\u00a7 21a-277 (b) and two counts of violation of a protective order in violation of General Statutes \\u00a7 53a-223. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion because it failed to address him personally and determine that he fully understood the potential immigration consequences of his pleas pursuant to General Statutes \\u00a7 54-1j (a). We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgments of the trial court.\\nThe following factual and procedural history is relevant to our disposition of the defendant's appeal. On May 22, 2007, the defendant pleaded guilty, pursuant to the Alford doctrine, to one count of possession of marijuana with intent to sell and two counts of violation of a protective order. During the plea hearing, the court questioned the defendant as to his understanding of the rights he was waiving, the meaning of his Alford plea and the agreed upon sentence. The court then addressed defense counsel and the following colloquy ensued:\\n\\\"The Court: Any immigration issues here, [defense counsel]?\\n\\\"[Defense Counsel]: Yes, there are, Your Honor.\\n\\\"The Court: Have you talked to [the defendant]?\\n\\\"[Defense Counsel]: Yes, I have.\\n\\\"The Court: All right. And he understands the possible consequences of his pleas?\\n\\\"[Defense Counsel]: Yes.\\\"\\nThe court then accepted the defendant's pleas and found that they were made voluntarily. The court also made a finding that the defendant \\\"has been advised by his counsel of the immigration consequences of his acts.\\\" The discussion then turned to the start date of the defendant's sentence, and the court asked again about immigration, as follows:\\n\\\"The Court: Is there an immigration sticker on him?\\n\\\"[Defense Counsel]: There is no immigration sticker as I know of. But I know that\\u2014\\n\\\"[The Prosecutor]: He's going to be deported. I looked into it when we did the . . . [and] we talked and then when we did the [violation of probation] hearing that's what they told us.\\n\\\"The Court: All right.\\\"\\nAfter further discussion, the court sentenced the defendant to forty months incarceration.\\nOn January 13, 2009, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and vacate the judgments of conviction, claiming that the court did not fulfill its obligation pursuant to \\u00a7 54-lj (a) to address him personally and determine that he understood the immigration consequences of his pleas. On January 27, 2009, the court denied the defendant's motion, stating, \\\"In reading the transcript of the sentence, the issue of immigration was directly addressed to counsel for the defendant in which he indicates he discussed the immigration issues with his client and that the client understood the immigration consequence of his plea. Along in the canvass . . . the state brought up the fact that the defendant is going to be deported.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) This appeal followed.\\nThe defendant claims that the court did not comply with \\u00a7 54-1j (a) before accepting his pleas. Specifically, the defendant contends that the court failed to address him personally or to determine that he understood that his immigration status might be adversely affected by his guilty pleas. The state contends that the court substantially complied with the mandates of \\u00a7 54-1j (a) and that the defendant knew that his guilty pleas might subject him to deportation. We agree with the defendant.\\n\\\"The burden is always on the defendant to show a plausible reason for the withdrawal of a plea of guilty. . To warrant consideration, the defendant must allege and provide facts which justify permitting him to withdraw his plea . Whether such proof is made is a question for the court in its sound discretion, and a denial of permission to withdraw is reversible only if that discretion has been abused.\\\" (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Carmelo T., 110 Conn. App. 543, 549, 955 A.2d 687, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 950, 960 A.2d 1037 (2008).\\nGenerally, a guilty plea may not be withdrawn after the conclusion of the proceeding at which the sentence was imposed. See Practice Book \\u00a7 39-26. An exception to that rule, however, is if the legislature grants the defendant the right to withdraw his plea after the time of sentencing. Section 54-lj (c) specifically requires the court to permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea within three years after the acceptance of the plea \\\"[i]f the court fails to address the defendant personally and determine that the defendant fully understands the possible consequences of the defendant's plea, as required in subsection (a) of this section . . . .\\\"\\nSection 54-lj (a) requires the court to address the defendant personally and to instruct a defendant on possible immigration and naturalization consequences that may result from a guilty plea and to ensure that the defendant fully understands those potential consequences. Our Supreme Court has previously stated that the legislative intent behind \\u00a7 54-lj, \\\"rather than demanding that trial courts instruct defendants on the intricacies of immigration law, seeks only to put defendants on notice that their resident status could be implicated by the plea.\\\" State v. Malcolm, 257 Conn. 653, 663-64, 778 A.2d 134 (2001). The statute's purpose is simply to recognize that \\\"this collateral consequence is of such importance that the defendant should be informed of its possibility.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 663 n.12. The court held that, in canvassing the defendant, it is not necessary for the trial court to read the statute verbatim. Rather, \\\"only substantial compliance with the statute is required to validate a defendant's guilty plea.\\\" Id., 662.\\nHere, the court did not substantially comply with the mandates of \\u00a7 54-lj (a). At no time during the plea hearing did the court personally address the defendant regarding the potential immigration consequences of his pleas. Nor did the court recite those consequences as part of its canvass. The court's inquiry of defense counsel as to whether there were \\\"[a]ny immigration issues here\\\" and whether counsel \\\"talked to\\\" the defendant cannot be construed as compliance with the requirement that the court personally address the defendant or the statutory advisement that the defendant's conviction \\\"may have the consequences of deportation or removal from the United States, exclusion from readmission to the United Sates or denial of naturalization . . . .\\\" General Statutes \\u00a7 54-lj (a).\\nThe state argues that the court's lack of literal compliance with the mandates of \\u00a7 54-lj (a) is irrelevant because the defendant knew that his pleas might result in deportation. Acceptance of this argument would render the requirements of \\u00a7 54-lj (a) meaningless as applied to the facts of this case. Even if substantial compliance can be shown by the defendant's actual knowledge of the immigration consequences of his pleas, the record does not reflect that the defendant had such knowledge at the time of his pleas. The state's contention that the defendant was aware of the immigration consequences of his pleas is based on his testimony at a violation of probation hearing held several months earlier, on October 30, 2006, during which the defendant testified that he is not an American citizen and that he is \\\"deportable.\\\" The defendant's testimony in October that he is deportable does not demonstrate that he was aware that his convictions could result in deportation, removal, denial of readmission or denial of naturalization. In fact, the defendant's testimony indicates merely that the defendant was aware of his legal status as deportable apart from the potential consequences of a criminal conviction.\\nThe state also argues that the defendant knew of the immigration consequences of his pleas on the basis of the prosecutor's comment after the court accepted his pleas that the defendant was going to be deported. Because this comment was made after the court's acceptance of the defendant's guilty pleas, it cannot be construed as part of the plea canvass.\\nOn the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the court did not substantially comply with the requirements of \\u00a7 54-lj. Accordingly, the court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.\\nThe judgments are reversed and the case is remanded with direction to grant the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and for further proceedings according to law.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\\nSee North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 35, 91 S. Ct 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970).\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 54- lj provides: \\\"(a) The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere from any defendant in any criminal proceeding unless the court first addresses the defendant personally and determines that the defendant fully understands that if the defendant is not a citizen of the United States, conviction of the offense for which the defendant has been charged may have the consequences of deportation or removal from the United States, exclusion from readmission to the United States or denial of naturalization, pursuant to the laws of the United States. If the defendant has not discussed these possible consequences with the defendant's attorney, the court shall permit the defendant to do so prior to accepting the defendant's plea.\\n\\\"(b) The defendant shall not be required at the time of the plea to disclose the defendant's legal status in the United States to the court.\\n\\\"(c) If the court fails to address the defendant personally and determine that the defendant fully understands the possible consequences of the defendant's plea, as required in subsection (a) of this section, and the defendant not later than three years after the acceptance of the plea shows that the defendant's plea and conviction may have one of the enumerated consequences, the court, on the defendant's motion, shall vacate the judgment, and permit the defendant to withdraw the plea of guilty or nolo contendere, and enter a plea of not guilty.\\\"\\nSimilarly, our courts repeatedly have held that \\\"only substantial compliance is required when warning the defendant of the direct consequences of a . . . plea pursuant to Practice Book \\u00a7 39-19 in order to ensure that the plea is voluntary pursuant to Practice Book \\u00a7 39-20.\\\" State v. Malcolm, supra, 257 Conn. 662. \\\"[A]s determined in a case-by-case evaluation, only substantial compliance with those rules of practice is necessary to arrive at the conclusion that the defendant's pleas were made knowingly and voluntarily . . . .\\\" State v. Irala, 68 Conn. App. 499, 510-11, 792 A.2d 109, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 923, 797 A.2d 519, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 887, 123 S. Ct. 132, 154 L. Ed. 2d 148 (2002).\\nBy contrast, we note that in State v. Malcolm, supra, 257 Conn. 653, the defendant claimed that the trial court did not comply with \\u00a7 54-lj because it advised him only of the possibility of deportation and denial of readmission, but not of denial of naturalization. Our Supreme Court held that \\\"[b]y instructing the defendant that he could be deported or excluded from readmission to the United States, the trial court. . . substantially complied with \\u00a7 54-lj\\\" because the defendant \\\"was warned adequately that his immigration status could be implicated by his guilty plea.\\\" Id., 664.\\nIn State v. Irala, 68 Conn. App. 499, 792 A2d 109, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 923, 797 A.2d 519, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 887, 123 S. Ct. 132, 154 L. Ed. 2d 148 (2002), this court held that the trial court substantially complied with \\u00a7 54-lj and adequately warned the defendant of the immigration consequences of her pleas in instructing the defendant that \\\"her pleas could result in deportation if she was not a citizen of the United States.\\\" Id., 519.\\nIn State v. Webb, 62 Conn. App. 805, 772 A.2d 690 (2001), this court found that the trial court substantially complied with \\u00a7 54-1j when it advised the defendant, \\\"[i]f you're not a citizen of the United States, you are advised that a conviction of the offense for which you axe charged may have consequences of deportation, denial of naturalization or exclusion from the United States.\\\" (Thtemal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 808.\\nSection 54-lj (a) was amended in 2003 to increase the court's obligation at the time of the plea canvass. The amendment replaced the requirement that the court \\\"advise\\\" the defendant with the greater requirement that the court not accept a plea until it \\\"addresses the defendant personally and determines that the defendant fully understands\\\" that the plea might have immigration consequences. See Public Acts 2003, No. 03-81, \\u00a7 1. The amendment does not alter the applicability of the aforementioned cases to the case at hand where the court did not, in any meaningful way, comply with the mandates of \\u00a7 54-lj (a).\\nIn making this argument, the state relies on the tests regarding substantial compliance with Practice Book \\u00a7 39-19 and 39-20. In State v. James, 197 Conn. 358, 497 A.2d 402 (1985), our Supreme Court concluded that when determining whether there has been substantial compliance with Practice Book \\u00a7 39-19 (4), formerly Practice Book \\u00a7 711 (4), we must conduct a two part inquiry. Id., 361-66. Our first inquiry is to determine whether the court accepted the defendant's pleas without first determining whether he was aware of and understood the maximum possible sentence to which he was exposed. Id., 364. Next, if we conclude that the court failed to determine whether the defendant was aware of and understood the maximum possible sentence, we examine the record to determine whether, despite the court's failure, he nevertheless had actual knowledge of the maximum possible consequences of his pleas. See id.; see also State v. Bowden, 53 Conn. App. 243, 247-52, 729 A.2d 795 (1999). If either prong is satisfied, the pleas were accepted with substantial compliance with Practice Book \\u00a7 39-19 (4).\\nThe test for substantial compliance with Practice Book \\u00a7 39-20 \\\"is whether, in light of all of the circumstances, the trial court's literal compliance with [Practice Book] \\u00a7 39-20 would have made any difference in the trial court's determination that the plea was voluntary.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Carmelo T., supra, 110 Conn. App. 556.\\nIn the case at hand, there was neither literal nor substantial compliance.\\nThe defendant's attorney attempted to follow up on the defendant's answer by asking, \\\"So, does that mean\\u2014what does that mean, as far as you understand that?\\\" The state objected to that question, and the court sustained the objection.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"4235661\", \"name\": \"CECELIA LEBBY v. TORRINGTON POLICE DEPARTMENT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Lebby v. Torrington Police Department\", \"decision_date\": \"2010-12-28\", \"docket_number\": \"AC 32112\", \"first_page\": \"906\", \"last_page\": \"906\", \"citations\": \"125 Conn. App. 906\", \"volume\": \"125\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Appellate Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Appellate Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:38:12.344829+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"CECELIA LEBBY v. TORRINGTON POLICE DEPARTMENT\", \"head_matter\": \"CECELIA LEBBY v. TORRINGTON POLICE DEPARTMENT\\n(AC 32112)\\nHarper, Beach and Flynn, Js.\\nArgued December 9\\nofficially released December 28, 2010\", \"word_count\": \"27\", \"char_count\": \"180\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nThe judgment is affirmed.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"4242993\", \"name\": \"STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ALIKA MCFARLANE\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. McFarlane\", \"decision_date\": \"2011-05-17\", \"docket_number\": \"AC 31808\", \"first_page\": \"730\", \"last_page\": \"740\", \"citations\": \"128 Conn. App. 730\", \"volume\": \"128\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Appellate Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Appellate Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:30:52.088800+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ALIKA MCFARLANE\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ALIKA MCFARLANE\\n(AC 31808)\\nLavine, Alvord and Stoughton, Js.\\nArgued February 9 \\u2014\\nofficially released May 17, 2011\\nDavid J. Reich, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).\\nMelissa Patterson, assistant state\\u2019s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John A. Connelly, former state\\u2019s attorney, and Cynthia S. Serafini, senior assistant state\\u2019s attorney, for the appellee (state).\", \"word_count\": \"2987\", \"char_count\": \"18016\", \"text\": \"Opinion\\nSTOUGHTON, J.\\nThe defendant, Alika McFarlane, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes \\u00a7 53a-59 (a) (5), reckless endangerment in the first degree in violation of General Statutes \\u00a7 53a-63 (a) and carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes \\u00a7 29-35. On appeal, the defendant claims that: (1) the court's instructions permitted the jury to return legally inconsistent verdicts on the assault and reckless endangerment charges; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of carrying a pistol without a permit. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.\\nOn the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On May 20, 2008, as a result of a confrontation the prior day between Dennis Rolan and members of a gang known as the \\\"Triple Bs,\\\" the defendant, Rolan and five others went to Bronson Street in Waterbury, where the Triple Bs were known to be located, in order to fight the individuals who had confronted Rolan. When the defendant and his group arrived, they parked their vehicles and ran toward several members of the Triple Bs, including Glenn Jamison, who were located on Bronson Street in front of a convenience store. As the two groups converged, Jamison punched the defendant in the face. He and the defendant separated, and each began fighting other group members. The defendant then pulled a handgun from his waist and fired five shots into the crowd of participants in the fight, one of which struck Jamison in his left arm and abdomen. The crowd then dispersed, and the defendant fired another shot as he ran back toward his car.\\nThe state charged the defendant in a three count substitute information with assault in the first degree in violation of \\u00a7 53a-59 (a) (5), reckless endangermentin the first degree in violation of \\u00a7 53a-63 (a) and carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of \\u00a7 29-35. Following a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on each count, and the court rendered judgment accordingly. This appeal followed. Additional facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, will be set forth as necessary.\\nI\\nThe defendant first claims that the court's jury instructions allowed the jury to return legally inconsistent guilty verdicts on the assault and reckless endangerment charges. The defendant concedes on appeal that this claim was not preserved at trial but nevertheless seeks to prevail under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40,567 A.2d 823 (1989). Although we conclude that the record is adequate for review and the claim is of constitutional magnitude; see State v. Mooney, 61 Conn. App. 713, 719, 767 A.2d 770 (claim that guilty verdicts legally inconsistent constitutional in nature), cert. denied, 256 Conn. 905, 772 A.2d 598 (2001); the defendant has failed to demonstrate that a constitutional violation clearly exists.\\nThe following additional facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this claim. In the first count of the substitute information, in which the defendant was charged with assault in the first degree, the state alleged specifically that the defendant, \\\"with intent to cause physical injury to another person, caused such injury . by means of the discharge of a firearm, to wit: he shot Glenn Jamison in the arm and stomach.\\\" The court, in defining the elements of this crime, instructed the jury, inter aha, that the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant \\\"caused physical injury to . . . Jamison by means of the discharge of a firearm,\\\" and that \\\"when [he] did so he had the intent to cause physical injury to . . . Jamison or to a third person.\\\" In the second count, the state's attorney charged the defendant with reckless endangerment in the first degree, and alleged specifically that, \\\"with extreme indifference to human life,\\\" the defendant \\\"recklessly engaged in conduct which created a risk of serious physical injury to another person.\\\" After defining the elements of this crime to the jury, the court instructed as follows: \\\"The state claims that the defendant acted recklessly and with extreme indifference to human life by pulling out a handgun on Bronson Street and firing the gun six times. The state further claims that this conduct created a risk of serious physical injury to . . . Jamison and the other individuals on Bronson Street at the time the defendant fired the handgun.\\\" It also instructed the jury that the defendant, by pleading not guilty, placed all the essential elements of the crimes at issue.\\nThe defendant contends that the court's instructions permitted the jury to return a verdict of guilty on both the assault and reckless endangerment counts, which was improper because each crime contains a mutually exclusive mental state, namely, those of intentionality and recklessness. Specifically, he argues that it would be inconsistent for the jury to find that the defendant both intended to cause physical injury and simultaneously acted recklessly because an individual cannot act intentionally and recklessly with regard to the same act and the same result. See State v. Hinton, 227 Conn. 301, 315, 630 A.2d 593 (1993); State v. King, 216 Conn. 585, 593-94, 583 A.2d 896 (1990), on appeal after remand, 218 Conn. 747, 591 A.2d 813 (1991). We are not persuaded that the court's instructions permitted this result.\\n\\\"The issue of legal inconsistency typically arises when a defendant is convicted of two offenses that contain contradictory elements.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hazel, 106 Conn. App. 213, 222, 941 A.2d 378, cert. denied, 287 Conn. 903, 947 A.2d 343 (2008). \\\"To determine whether a jury verdict is legally inconsistent, we look carefully to determine whether the existence of the essential elements for one offense negates the existence of the essential elements for another offense of which the defendant also stands convicted. If that is the case, the verdicts are legally inconsistent and cannot withstand challenge. . . . Put more simply, we determine if there is a rational theory by which the jury could have found the defendant guilty of both crimes. . It is not inconsistent . to find that a criminal defendant possesses two different mental states, as long as [the] different mental states relate to different results.\\\" (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kuranko, 71 Conn. App. 703, 714, 803 A.2d 383 (2002). Because the resolution of a claim of inconsistent guilty verdicts presents a question of law, our review is plenaiy. State v. Hazel, supra, 223.\\nIt seems evident that one who deliberately shoots at another person acts intentionally, while one who shoots into a crowd acts recklessly. Indeed, the defendant does not suggest to the contrary. In order to establish his claim that the verdicts in this case were legally inconsistent, he asserts, in essence, that the court defined the reckless act to the jury as firing the handgun six times into the crowd. He argues that, on the basis of such instruction, the six shots constituted one unified physical act, with one such shot necessarily being the one that struck Jamison. According to the defendant, therefore, both the assault charge and the reckless endangerment charge, as defined by the court, involved the same unified act.\\nThe defendant's assertion fails, however, because the court never instructed the jury that the defendant's firing the handgun six times was a single act. Instead, after instructing the jury on the elements of the crime of reckless endangerment, the court remarked that it was the state's position that the defendant acted recklessly by firing the handgun six times into the crowd on Bronson Street. Contrary to the defendant's argument, our review of the instructions reveals that the court's recitation of the state's allegations did not instruct the jury in a manner that required it to find that the crimes were committed by the same physical act.\\nFurthermore, even if we assume, arguendo, that the defendant's firing of the handgun six times constituted the same physical act, rather than separate acts, the defendant cannot prevail on his claim. On the basis of the evidence presented in this case, the jury reasonably could have found that when the defendant fired the handgun into the crowd, it was his intent to strike and to injure Jamison physically, as evidenced by the fact that Jamison was the member of the Triple Bs who first punched the defendant. That is certainly a permissible and perhaps the most reasonable inference the jury could have drawn. At the same time, the jury reasonably could have found that it was reckless and extremely indifferent to human life to fire a gun several times into a nearby crowd. Under the circumstances of this case, it was not inconsistent to find that the defendant acted intentionally when he shot Jamison and at the same time acted recklessly when he fired several other shots into a crowd, as the jury reasonably could have concluded that the defendant's actions constituted different crimes that arose from the same continuum of events. See State v. Mooney, supra, 61 Conn. App. 722; see also State v. Bjorklund, 79 Conn. App. 535, 567-68, 830 A.2d 1141 (2003) (reasonable for jury to conclude that defendant's kicking victim in torso in attempt to steal wallet exhibited intent to cause serious injury while subsequent kicking of head after victim resisted was reckless), cert. denied, 268 Conn. 920, 846 A.2d 882 (2004); State v. Flynn, 14 Conn. App. 10, 27, 539 A.2d 1005 (single act of throwing beer bottle at police officers in crowded bar simultaneously demonstrated intent to assault peace officer and reckless endangerment toward bar patrons), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 891, 109 S. Ct. 226,102 L. Ed. 2d 217 (1988). We therefore conclude that this claim fails under the third prong of Golding because the defendant has not shown that a constitutional violation clearly exists. See footnote 4 of this opinion.\\nII\\nThe defendant next claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of \\u00a7 29-35. Specifically, the defendant contends that the state failed to prove that the handgun he fired had a barrel of less than twelve inches in length and met the statutory definition of a pistol. We disagree.\\nIn reviewing whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction, we apply a two part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether on the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, the finder of fact reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Ledbetter, 275 Conn. 534, 542, 881 A.2d 290 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1082, 126 S. Ct. 1798, 164 L. Ed. 2d 537 (2006). We do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the finder of fact's guilty verdict. Id., 543\\nThe following additional facts are relevant to the resolution of this claim. At trial, the handgun fired by the defendant was not introduced into evidence. The state, instead, presented certain forensic evidence and witness testimony to establish that the barrel length of the firearm was shorter than twelve inches. The state produced six .45 caliber cartridge casings recovered by the police at the crime scene and a .45 caliber bullet taken from Jamison's body that had been fired from a .45 caliber gun. The state's expert explained that such a gun generally has a barrel length of twelve inches or less, with most being between four and eight inches, and would not have a long barrel. In addition, Brian Greene, a witness called by the state, testified that he saw the defendant pull out the gun from his waist and that it was a handgun, not a long gun. When asked by the prosecutor how big the gun was, Greene demonstrated by holding up his hands. The prosecutor then requested that the record reflect that Greene indicated that the gun was approximately nine inches, to which defense counsel did not object but, instead, remarked that he could not \\\"say one way or the other.\\\" In its charge to the jury, the court instructed that in order to find the defendant guilty of carrying a pistol without a permit, the jury must find, inter alia, that the length of the barrel of the defendant's firearm was less than twelve inches.\\nAt the outset, we note that direct numerical evidence of barrel length is not required to obtain a conviction under \\u00a7 29-35. State v. Fleming, 111 Conn. App. 337, 347, 958 A.2d 1271 (2008), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 903, 962 A.2d 794 (2009). Furthermore, the evidence presented in this case is similar to what we concluded was sufficient in State v. Williams, 48 Conn. App. 361, 372, 709 A.2d 43, cert. denied, 245 Conn. 907, 718 A.2d 16 (1998). In Williams, the defendant appealed from his conviction of carrying a pistol without a permit on the ground that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish that the barrel length of the gun was less than twelve inches. Id., 370. The only evidence presented by the state with respect to the length of the gun barrel came from the state's chief witness, who testified that he saw the defendant brandish a \\\" 'long, big, thick gun' \\\" that was \\\"as much as a foot long.\\\" Id., 371. The witness also demonstrated to the jury the size of the gun by spreading his hands apart. Id. Although the record did not reflect exactly how far apart his hands were, this court concluded that the cumulative effect of the witness' testimony and demonstrative evi dence was sufficient to permit the jury to infer reasonably that the barrel of the gun used in that case was less than twelve inches. Id., 372.\\nThe jury in the present case saw the demonstration by Greene as to the size of the gun, and as the court observed in Williams, the jury reasonably could have inferred that the length of the barrel of the gun was less than the length of the entire gun. See id., 372. Greene also offered his testimony that the gun used by the defendant was a handgun rather than a long gun and was pulled from the defendant's waist. In addition, the jury heard testimony from the state's firearms expert that the barrel of a .45 caliber gun generally would be less than twelve inches and often between four and eight inches in length. We conclude that the state presented sufficient demonstrative and testimonial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, from which the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant's handgun had a barrel of less than twelve inches in length and therefore was within our statutory definition of a pistol. See State v. Fleming, supra, 111 Conn. App. 347-49 (expert testimony suggesting majority of firearms that fire caliber of bullets and casings found at crime scene less than twelve inches coupled with description of handgun as \\\" 'little bit big' \\\" and pulled from jacket sufficient to support inference that barrel less than twelve inches).\\nThe judgment is affirmed.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 53a-59 (a) provides in relevant part: \\\"A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when . (5) with intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of the discharge of a firearm.\\\"\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 53a-63 (a) provides: \\\"A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the first degree when, with extreme indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a risk of serious physical injury to another person.\\\"\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 29-35 (a) provides in relevant part: \\\"No person shall carry any pistol or revolver upon his or her person, except when such person is within the dwelling house or place of business of such person, without a permit to carry the same issued as provided in section 29-28. . . .\\\"\\nUnder Golding, \\\"a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of any one of these conditions, the defendant's claim will fail.\\\" (Emphasis omitted.) State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239-40.\\nAlthough the defendant did not preserve his claim, we afford review because \\\"any defendant found guilty on the basis of insufficient evidence has been deprived of a constitutional right, and would therefore necessarily meet the four prongs of Golding.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fagan, 280 Conn. 69, 76 n.7, 905 A.2d 1101 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1269, 127 S. Ct. 1491, 167 L. Ed. 2d 236 (2007).\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 29-27 provides that the terms \\\" 'pistol' \\\" and \\\" 'revolver,' \\\" as used in General Statutes \\u00a7 29-28 to 29-38, inclusive, mean \\\"any firearm having a barrel less than twelve inches in length.\\\"\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"4262948\", \"name\": \"WELLS FARGO BANK, NA v. FREDERICK CORNELIUS ET AL.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. Cornelius\", \"decision_date\": \"2011-09-06\", \"docket_number\": \"AC 32007\", \"first_page\": \"216\", \"last_page\": \"223\", \"citations\": \"131 Conn. App. 216\", \"volume\": \"131\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Appellate Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Appellate Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:44:07.913750+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"WELLS FARGO BANK, NA v. FREDERICK CORNELIUS ET AL.\", \"head_matter\": \"WELLS FARGO BANK, NA v. FREDERICK CORNELIUS ET AL.\\n(AC 32007)\\nDiPentima, C. J., and Lavine and Sullivan, Js.\\nArgued February 16\\nofficially released September 6, 2011\\nFrederick Cornelius, pro se, the appellant (named defendant).\\nCharles D. Ray, with whom was Matthew A. Weiner, for the appellee (plaintiff)-\", \"word_count\": \"1663\", \"char_count\": \"9920\", \"text\": \"Opinion\\nSULLIVAN, J.\\nThe defendant Frederick Cornelius appeals from the judgment of foreclosure by sale, rendered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, Wells Fargo Bank, NA. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) denied his motion to dismiss, (2) rejected his tender of payment as insufficient, (3) determined the amount of the debt, (4) considered the parties' motions in the wrong order and (5) imposed costs for filing the motion to open prior to placing it on the motion calendar. We disagree with all of the defendant's claims and, accordingly, affirm the judgment.\\nThe record reveals the following facts and procedural history. On May 30, 2008, the plaintiff filed a complaint for foreclosure of a mortgage against Cornelius, Margaret A. O'Brien and the tax collector of the town of Farmington, for real property located at 1507 Farmington Avenue in Farmington. Service was made by a marshal leaving a copy of the process at the subject property based on the determination that it was the defendant's usual place of abode. On June 27, 2008, the court rendered a default judgment against the defendant on a motion by the plaintiff for the defendant's failure to appear. On July 14,2008, the court rendered judgment of foreclosure by sale and set a sale date of October 18, 2008.\\nOn October 1, 2008, the defendant appeared in the action and filed a motion to dismiss alleging that he had not been properly served at his actual address. In response, the plaintiff filed an objection to the motion to dismiss, and later filed a motion to open and vacate the default judgment, which was granted. The plaintiff also filed a motion to cite in the defendant as a party. The court granted that motion and ordered that the defendant be properly served at the address he provided, which the plaintiff did. On February 9, 2009, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, noting in the order that the plaintiff had amended the summons and served the defendant at the address he provided.\\nOn October 13, 2009, the court granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment as to liability, and on February 5, 2010, the court rendered judgment of foreclosure by sale, finding the debt and fair market value of the property and ordering a sale date of May 8, 2010. On February 18, 2010, the plaintiff filed a satisfaction of judgment, indicating that the defendant had paid the plaintiff all amounts due as found by the court in the February 5, 2010 judgment. On February 24, 2010, the defendant filed the present appeal.\\nWe placed this appeal on the court's own motion calendar. Counsel and pro se parties were ordered to appear and to give reasons, if any, why the defendant's appeal from the judgment of foreclosure by sale should not be dismissed as moot due to the filing of the satisfaction of judgment. On July 15, 2010, the parties appeared to argue the issues, after which we marked off the motion and ordered the parties to address the mootness question in their briefs.\\n\\\"Mootness implicates [the] court's subject matter jurisdiction and is thus a threshold matter for us to resolve. . It is a well-settled general rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow. . An actual controversy must exist not only at the time the appeal is taken, but also throughout the pendency of the appeal. . . . When, during the pendency of an appeal, events have occurred that preclude an appellate court from granting any practical relief through its disposition of the merits, a case has become moot. . . . Because mootness implicates subject matter jurisdiction, it presents a question of law over which our review is plenary.\\\" (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) New Hartford v. Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority, 291 Conn. 502, 506-507, 970 A.2d 578 (2009).\\nThe defendant argues that because he challenges the service of process and the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over him, the appeal is not moot. The defendant also suggests that the court can order restitution as a remedy, and, therefore, practical relief may be granted. We agree.\\nOur case law, while infrequently addressing this issue, indicates that the filing of a satisfaction of judgment does not render appeals moot because of the possibility of restitution or reimbursement. In Bock v. Meriden Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 135 Conn. 94, 95 and n.l, 60 A.2d 918 (1948), our Supreme Court denied a motion to erase, holding that satisfaction of a judgment did not render an appeal of that judgment moot because if the judgment was erroneous, the defendant could secure reimbursement. In Preisner v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 203 Conn. 407, 414-15, 525 A.2d 83 (1987), our Supreme Court noted: \\\"[A]n order of execution, in the absence of a stay, does not moot the justiciability of a pending appeal. If a judgment has been satisfied before it is reversed . . . the law raises an obligation in the party to the record, who has received the benefit of the erroneous judgment, to make restitution to the other party for what he has lost; and the mode of proceeding to effect this object must be regulated according to circumstances.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) See also New Haven v. God's Corner Church, Inc., 108 Conn. App. 134, 948 A.2d 1035 (2008) (trial court had jurisdiction to rule on defendant's motion to determine debt owed under tax liens after defendant redeemed property and satisfaction of judgment filed). In the present case, title has fully vested in the defendant, but restitution remains an option were this court to conclude that his claims have merit. Although we are not persuaded by the defendant's claims, the case is not moot and we will address each claim herein.\\nI\\nThe defendant first claims that the court improperly denied his motion to dismiss for invalid service of process. The defendant argues that the court wrongly held that the motion to dismiss was not accompanied by a properly executed affidavit, notice was sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction, that the court abused its discretion in denying the defendant a \\\"trial like\\\" hearing on the merits of the motion, and that the plaintiffs motion to cite in did not cure the jurisdictional defect.\\nIn the present case, the court, Hon. Samuel Freed, judge trial referee, ordered the plaintiff to effect service of process, and then the court, Aurigemma, J., concluded that service had been made. Even if we agreed with the defendant's legal claims, his arguments do not address the conclusion by the court that service of process had been made at the address he provided. The defendant has raised no argument that the court's conclusion that he had been served at the address that he provided was incorrect.\\nII\\nThe defendant next claims that the court erred in concluding that the tender of payment made by the defendant in September, 2008, was insufficient. This claim has no merit. The court did not take any action to influence whether the plaintiff would accept or reject the tender of payment that the defendant offered, nor did the defendant ask the court to order the plaintiff to accept the tender. In its articulation, the court, Hon. Robert Satter, judge trial referee, noted that at the time of the tender, the outstanding judgment against the defendant exceeded the amount of the tender. We need not decide whether the court had the authority to require the plaintiff to accept a lesser amount because the court was not called upon to do so.\\nIII\\nThe defendant next claims that the court erred in determining the amount of the debt in the judgment. The defendant argues that following the rejection of the tender of payment by the plaintiff, he was no longer liable for any subsequent interest or costs. The defendant's argument depends on the conclusion that he tendered full payment to the plaintiff. As we have concluded already, the plaintiff was not required to accept any payment that was less than the full amount to which it was entitled, which, at the time of tender, had been determined by a judgment of the court. Thus, there is no basis for us to conclude that the subsequent fees should not have been included in the judgment.\\nIV\\nThe defendant next claims that the court improperly considered the plaintiffs motion to cite in before ruling on his motion to dismiss. Again, the claim lacks merit. The case law relied on by the defendant primarily concerns the question of subject matter jurisdiction, which indisputably must be resolved prior to the court ruling on other motions. By contrast, the very nature of a motion to cite in a new party means that the court will order a party summoned prior to obtaining personal jurisdiction. See Practice Book \\u00a7 9-18.\\nV\\nFinally, the defendant claims that the court improperly required him to pay fees to the clerk on the motion to open prior to placing it on the motion calendar. This claim has been briefed inadequately, and we therefore will not address it. See Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 266 Conn. 108, 120, 830 A.2d 1121 (2003).\\nThe judgment is affirmed.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\\nThe action was withdrawn as against the defendant Margaret A. O'Brien in June, 2008. The tax collector of the town of Farmington is not a party to this appeal. We therefore refer in this opinion only to Frederick Cornelius as the defendant.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"438372\", \"name\": \"Lord and another vs. Lord and others\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Lord v. Lord\", \"decision_date\": \"1852-07\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"595\", \"last_page\": \"603\", \"citations\": \"22 Conn. 595\", \"volume\": \"22\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:51:23.366746+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Lord and another vs. Lord and others.\", \"head_matter\": \"Lord and another vs. Lord and others.\\nA testator, by his will, directed all his just debts and personal expenses to be paid, out of such personal estate as he should not thereafter specifically dispose of; and, in case of a deficiency of such estate, appropriated certain real estate for that purpose. He then proceeded to dispose of all the remainder of his estate, making his nephew W, one of the devisees and legatees, and added to his will, the following clause : \\u201c I will and direct, that my nephew W, pay S, all the money which is due to her, upon the writing,\\u201d &e. The real and personal estate appropriated, being insufficient for the payment of all the testator\\u2019s debts ; it was held, that this was a direction to W, to pay S, individually, from his share of the estate, and on his own account, and not as executor.\\nThis was a case, submitted to the superior court for New London county, upon a statement of facts, agreed to by the parties, under the statute of 1848, (Slat. 1849, pp. 109, -110;) and was reserved for the advice of this court.\\nThe case embraced the following facts :\\nOn the 15th day of February, 1852, William Lord, of Lyme, died, having made his last will and testament, which was subsequently duly proved and approved.\\nThe first provision of said will is as follows:\\n\\u201c I will, order, and direct, that all my just debts and funeral expenses be paid, out of my'personal estate, as I shall not hereafter specifically dispose of; such as my neat stock, farming utensils, which, if not sufficient to pay the same, then the thirty-five shares of my Paterson railroad stock, I will direct sold, to pay.\\u201d\\nSaid will then contained a devise to Nancy, the testator\\u2019s wife, of the use and improvement, during her widowhood, of his dwelling-house, garden, a lot of land adjacent, and farm buildings; also, the privilege and right of using \\u201c as much fruit for herself as she may need, growing on the farm, and shall have convenient pasturing for one cow, and one horse, and sufficient English hay for the same, and stabling for the appropriate seasons, and shall have firewood sufficient for two fires, all cut and carted to her house, in proper season, and cut suitable for the fire, and piled in the wood-house; also, twenty bushels of Indian corn, twenty bushels of oats, ten bushels of rye, twenty bushels of potatoes, three hundred pounds of good fat beef, and half of the rent of the shad fishery of my half of Goose Island, (so called,) all to be delivered to her, at her house, of good quality and in good order, on or before the 25th day of December, of each and every year, during the time aforesaid, by my nephew, William M. Lord, as a condition of the devise of the adjoining farm to him, or by whomsoever shall be in possession of said farm for the time being ; it being made a special charge on said farm, and on every part of the same, for the time being, and to remain so, to all intents and purposes, so long as my said wife shall be entitled to receive the same.\\u201d\\nThe testator also bequeathed to said Nancy, the use, so long as she should remain his widow, of certain articles of personal property, and his household furniture, and the remainder thereof, to his adopted daughter, Sarah A. L. Holdridge.\\nHe then bequeathed to said William M. and his executors, one hundred shares of the capital stock of the Washington Bank, in trust, to pay the dividends thereon to said Sarah, for her sole and, separate use, during her life ; and, after her decease, to transfer the same to the heirs of her body, to be equally divided between them; and, in default of such heirs, to be transferred to, and equallyMivided between, the children of the said William M. He then devised and bequeathed to said William M. and his executors, forty-two shares of Stonington bank stock,\\u2014fifteen shares of New London bank stock, in trust, to pay the dividends thereon to the testator\\u2019s wife, during her widowhood, and thereafter to surrender one-half of said bank stock to the exclusive use and disposal of said Sarah, and one-half thereof to the children of said William M.; also, two farms and other real estate, subject to certain reservations and charges, in favor of his mother-in-law, Phoebe Lord, during her life, and of the sisters of the devisee, while sole and unmarried ; also, a small piece of land, absolutely, and in fee. He also devised to said Nancy, the use of a certain house, with the adjacent land, during her widowhood, and the remainder to the said Sarah A. and her heirs forever.\\nSaid will then proceeded as follows :\\n\\u201c I will further direct my nephew, William M. Lord, to sell my Starr house, and lot, if there is not sufficient property left of what I have directed to be sold, to pay all my debts and legacies against my estate, and funeral expenses; and, whereas I gave to my brother Enoch Lord, now deceased, an obligation, dated April 26th, 1834, promising to pay to him, during life, the interest that should arise, and the principal, which was one thousand dollars, which should be unpaid after his decease, to his surviving daughters, in such proportions to each, as my judgment might direct, I will, order, and direct, that my executors shall pay such balance as may be unpaid on said obligation, to Phoebe Lucas, Sarah Marvin, Nancy Lord, Betsey J. Lord, Esther Ann Lord, Eunice Peugh, all daughters of my brother, Enoch Lord, deceased, to each and every one alike, after deducting from the respective payments, such sums as I have advanced to them, and charged in account on my book.\\n\\u201c My will is, that my nephew, William M. Lord, erect a fence, provided it shall not be done before my decease, around the monument of my first wife, to enclose a yard, twelve by eight feet, the fence to be constructed of stone posts, six in number, with three round iron bolts, to go around the yard, holes to be drilled through the posts, to have the bolts pass through the same, with an iron ring enclosed on one end of each bolt, and a screw cut on the other end, with a cap nut to hold it fast; the bolts to be painted once in five years, with black varnish or black oil paint. My will further is, that my nephew, William M. Lord, shall continue, during his life, to keep the above fence in repair, and the monuments which may be enclosed within said fence, the monuments to be kept free from moss, and well lettered, by my said nephew, William M. Lord, and to all who may be in possession or own the same farms, after his decease, forever.\\n\\u201c I give and bequeath to our adopted daughter, Sarah Ann Lord Holdridge, all the printed books which I own, at my decease, to her, her heirs and assigns forever.\\n\\u201c My will is, that my executors pay to Eliza L. Parsons, Sally Wing, Georgianna Parsons, daughters of Eliza L. Parsons, and Mary H. Howe, fifty dollars each.\\n\\u201c I will, order, and direct, that my nephew, William M. Lord, pay Sarah L. Marshall, now residing in Nantes, in France, all the money which is due to her, upon the writing which she holds against me, deducting from the same, such sums as I have charged to her, upon my book. I will, order and direct, my executors, to pay Margaret Salter, two hun dred dollars. My will further is, that all the moneys which are in the possession of Walter Mead, Esq., now in New York, whenever the same shall be collected, shall be equally divided, betwixt my beloved wife, Nancy Lord, our adopted daughter, Sarah Ann Lord Holdridge, and my nephew, William M. Lord.\\n\\u201c I will, order and direct, that my houses which were in possession of Daniel Smith, and the lot of land on which they stand, and which were mortgaged to William W. Rod-man, and sold to me, by said Rodman, and which I foreclosed against said Smith, and have got possession of, by a foreclosure and decree of our court, and I have given to said Rodman, a writing for, to quitclaim to him the title to said property, whenever said Rodman shall pay to me the \\u25a0money for which the above property was pledged to me, or will consent to have the same sold at auction, or any other way, so that the money due me may be paid, so that my executors can have the same ; then I direct them to pay the same to the daughters of my brother Enoch Lord and brother Joseph Lord, deceased, equally between them, share and share alike. I will, order, and direct,.that my executors erect a marble monument near the monument which stands over my first wife, as their judgment may direct, after my decease and burial, within two years.\\n\\u201c I give and bequeath the residue of my estate to the daughters of my brothers, Joseph and Enoch Lord, both now deceased, if not already above disposed of, to them equally, share and share alike.\\n\\u201c I constitute and appoint my beloved wife, Nancy Lord, and William M. Lord, to be executors of this my last will and testament; hereby revoking all other and former wills, by me, at any time heretofore made.\\u201d\\nSaid William M. accepted the office of executor, but said Nancy declined said trust. Between the execution of said will, and the testator\\u2019s death, his personal property became considerably lessened, especially by the advancement of about $2,000, to Sarah A. L. Ploldridge, upon her marriage to Henry B. Noyes, and by a transfer to his wife, of the Paterson railroad stock, mentioned in the will, which was valued at about $1,700.\\nHis real and personal estate was inventoried at twenty-two thousand three hundred and five dollars and seventeen cents.\\nAt or about the time of executing his will, he executed a deed of gift, of certain real estate, in Stonington, of the value of about $17,000, in favor of William M. Lord, which deed was left with the will, to be delivered, at -the testator\\u2019s decease : it was so delivered, and took effect.\\nDuring the interval, between the execution of the will, and the death of the testator, his indebtedness was considerably increased, especially by the sum of $1,050, allowed by the commissioners upon the estate, to George W. Lord. The debts against the estate, allowed by the commissioners, amounted to $5,504.23.\\nThe debts, expenses and losses, were about four thousand dollars, over and above the amount of the real estate, appropriated to their payment, and the personal estate not specifically bequeathed.\\nIt was claimed by the said Nancy Lord, and the said Sarah A., that the debt due to Mrs. Marshall, should be paid by the said Wm. M., from his own property, and the balance of the deficiency, if any, from the real and personal estate bequeathed and devised, in ratable proportions. Said William M., and other ^devisees, claimed, that such deficiency should be paid by the sale of so much as might be necessary, of the bank stock and other personal property bequeathed as aforesaid, in rateable proportions.\\nMcCurdy and Chadwick, for Wm. M. Lord and others.\\nIngham, for Nancy Lord and another.\", \"word_count\": \"2864\", \"char_count\": \"15982\", \"text\": \"Ellsworth, J.\\nIn the settlement of this estate, a ques tion is raised between the devisees, how the balance of $4,000 shall be provided for,\\u2014as the executors have applied all the property, they were directed to apply, and nothing is left, but property which is specifically devised : one party contending it shall be paid exclusively out of the personal estate which is specifically devised, and the other, out of the personal and real, equally.\\nThere is no question, that, as a general principle of law, personal property must be taken for debts, before real, and that, where it is all specifically devised, the same rule applies to it, as a class, i. e., the personal before the real. Brainard v. Cowdrey, 16 Conn. R., 502. 2 Jarman, 546. 1 2 Eq. Ca. Ab., 459. If there was nothing more in the case than this, we should hold with those who contend, that all the personal bequests must be taken before the land ; but, we do not hold, that the personal property which is given to the widow, in lieu of dower, is subject to this rule of contribution, and to that extent we might make an .exception ; for it is said in the books, she takes as a purchaser, and, therefore, is not subject to a contribution; and we are not certain, but our statute, p. 277, gives strength to this idea. But, this point we do not mean, at this time, absolutely to settle ; for it was not much discussed at the bar, nor indeed, of necessity, is \\\" it presented in the question raised. Of course, we leave this point as the case leaves it, and will only refer the counsel, if the point hereafter becomes important, to the following cases. 6 Met., 54. 6 Paige, 305. 6 Gill, 120. Amb., 245. 1 Rop. on Leg., 297, and 1 Russ., 543.\\nThe chief dispute has been, whether the debt due from the testator, to Mrs. Marshall, of $1,996.50, as since ascertained, is to be paid by William M. Lord, on his own account, or as executor. If the former, then this debt is a lien on his specific share, and he must pay it and not charge the pay ment to the estate; if the latter, he is entitled to an order to sell, and may charge the payment to the estate.\\nThis is purely \\u00e1 question of construction, and must be decided upon an examination of the will, in all its parts. This we have done, as well as we are able. The will was drawn by the testator himself, and, as it would seem, from time to time, as he thought of the matter, very immethodically, and so confused, as that it can not easily and satisfactorily be interpreted, on the point in dispute : and we are not, by any means, certain, that, after all, we interpret the will, in conformity to the testator's intention.\\nIn the first part of the will, the testator directs, that all his debts and funeral expenses shall be paid. This duty was imposed upon his two executors, and as an expression of intention, it shows the testator supposed his executors would pay his debts: for this duty we should not naturally look to any subsequent part of the will, for further intention; nor do we, on examination, find- any further intention, except an order to his executors, to pay a debt, (if it be one,) to the heirs of his brother, Enoch Lord. But this is not an ordinary debt, but one which requires some specific directions. With this qualification, the first clause in the will is the only order to the executors, to pay debts.\\nNow, where this debt, due Mrs. Marshall, is spoken of, further on in the will, the language is peculiar and significant. \\\" I will, order and direct, that my nephew, William M. Lord, pay Sarah L. Marshall, all the money which is due to her upon the writing,\\\" &c. On its face, it is clearly a direction to his nephew William M. Lord, by name, not as executor, (and there were two executors, in the will,) to pay what remained of this debt. So we construe the will, following the language in its natural and obvious import. We do not feel authorized to do otherwise ; nor do we think the testator himself intended otherwise. He had, before this clause in the will, imposed private charges on his nephew, especially in relation to the annual support of the testator's widow, and the preservation of his grave-yard, and fence about it; and we must believe he intended to extend this personal duty to William M. Lord, who was a liberal participant in the bounty of his uncle.\\nWe find, too, in the paragraph next preceding the one in question, the executors are mentioned, and directed to pay certain legacies, as executors ; so, in the paragraph next following the one in question, the executors are, as such, directed to discharge a duty. Now, when, in this intermediate paragraph, he directs his nephew, William M. Lord, to pay a certain claim, we believe, he had in his mind, a distinction between executors and his nephew, William M. Lord. This is the result to which we have come, after much comparison of our views, and with some considerable confidence of the correctness of our decision.\\nWe answer, then, the questions put to us : first, that the personal property is first liable; and secondly, the debt due Mrs. Marshall, is to be paid by William M. Lord, on his own account, and not as executor.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"506233\", \"name\": \"The Town of Cromwell vs. The Connecticut Brown Stone Quarry Company\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Town of Cromwell v. Connecticut Brown Stone Quarry Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1883-01\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"470\", \"last_page\": \"472\", \"citations\": \"50 Conn. 470\", \"volume\": \"50\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:38:55.407722+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"The Town of Cromwell vs. The Connecticut Brown Stone Quarry Company.\", \"head_matter\": \"The Town of Cromwell vs. The Connecticut Brown Stone Quarry Company.\\nA town lias no power to agree, for a valuable consideration, to discontinue a highway. The mode of discontinuing highways is fixed by statute, with a provision for an appeal by any party aggrieved, and a town cannot, at its mere pleasure, discontinue them.\\nAnd a town cannot .enforce a promise of the other party of which its own' promise to destroy a public right was the consideration.\\nAction for breach of a contract to construct and open a highway; brought to the Superior Court in Middlesex County. The defendants demurred to the complaint, and the court (Hovey, 7) held it insufficient. The plaintiffs then amended the complaint, and the defendants again demurred, and at a later term the court (Sanford, 7.) sustained the demurrer and rendered judgment for the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed to this court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.\\nS. A. Robinson and A. W. Bacon, for the appellants.\\nS. L. Warner, for the appellees.\", \"word_count\": \"816\", \"char_count\": \"4597\", \"text\": \"Pardee, J.\\nIn 1869 Elisha Bloomer owned a tract of land in the town of Cromwell through which passed a highway which we will designate as highway Ho. 1. The town voted that if he would pay to it $3,000 and at his own expense construct, deed to it, and keep in repair for five years, another highway across the land, which we will designate as No. 2, in a course and manner to he approved by its selectmen, it would authorize and direct them to discontinue No. 1, and if he would execute a written agreement to construct at his own expense, and deed to it within five years thereafter, another highway across the land which we will designate as No. 3, in a course and manner to be approved by its selectmen or its committee, and would secure the performance of this last agreement by a mortgage of the land, he might close up No. 2. In the same year he deeded to the town the land necessary for highway No. 2, to be held until he should construct and convey No. 3, upon condition that No. 2 should then be discontinued and revert to himself, and agreed at his own cost to construct and keep in repair No. 2 for five years.\\nSubsequently the Cromwell Brown Stone Quarry Company became the owner of the land, and the town having extended for five years the time within which highway No. 3 should be completed, the company executed its bond to the town in the sum of $4,000, conditioned upon the performance of the agreement of Bloomer as to highways Nos. 2 and 3. Subsequently the defendant became, and now is, the owner of the land, and refuses to construct highway No. 3. The town claims a decree enforcing the immediate construction thereof and $4,000 damages. Upon demurrer the case is reserved for the advice of this court.\\nBloomer, in entering into the contract to construct and deed highwhy No. 3 to the town, took to himself five years in which to perform it; and in behalf of his successor in ownership the town added five years more; so that the consideration underlying his agreement is the promise of the town that at the end of.ten, possibly of more years, a highway existing thus long may be discontinued and be enclosed by him. This promise the town had no power to make or fulfil. The statute (Revision of 1875, p. 237, chap. 7, \\u00a7 35,) provides that \\\" the selectmen of any town may, with its approbation, by a writing signed by them, discontinue any highway or private way therein, except where laid out by a court or the General Assembly;, and any person aggrieved may be relieved by application to the Superior Court, to be made and proceeded with in the manner prescribed in the twenty-ninth section of this act.\\\" Therefore discontinuance is not at the pleasure of the town, but is the result ' of judicial investigation and determination over which it has no control. And notwithstanding the fact that Bloomer undertook to reserve the right at some indefinite day in the future to recall his dedication, it may well happen that long before that day the use of the way may have been such that the necessities and convenience of the unorganized public may require its continuance; and if such should be the case it must be continued regardless of votes or contracts.\\nThe right of the plaintiff to ask for a decree compelling the construction of way Ho. 8, rests upon its promise to destroy a public right. But the court will not sacrifice that right for the purpose of enforcing a private contract concerning it.\\nIt is not necessary to consider other questions raised.\\nThere is no error in the judgment complained of.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"507069\", \"name\": \"Marilyn R. Zimmerman v. Janet G. Graham et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Zimmerman v. Graham\", \"decision_date\": \"1977-03-01\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"719\", \"last_page\": \"719\", \"citations\": \"172 Conn. 719\", \"volume\": \"172\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:08:17.621458+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Marilyn R. Zimmerman v. Janet G. Graham et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Marilyn R. Zimmerman v. Janet G. Graham et al.\\nSubmitted February 16\\ndecided March 1, 1977\\nPhyllis Corneal and Ryszard S. Mrotek, in support of the motion.\", \"word_count\": \"72\", \"char_count\": \"422\", \"text\": \"The named defendant's motion to stay the proceedings of summary process in the Court of Common Pleas and to vacate any orders entered by that court until final determination by the Supreme Court in the appeal from the Superior Court in Hartford County is dismissed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
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+"{\"id\": \"513475\", \"name\": \"Edgar S. Tweedy vs. Alonzo M. Bogart and others\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Tweedy v. Bogart\", \"decision_date\": \"1888-06-26\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"419\", \"last_page\": \"423\", \"citations\": \"56 Conn. 419\", \"volume\": \"56\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:27:37.270710+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Edgar S. Tweedy vs. Alonzo M. Bogart and others.\", \"head_matter\": \"Edgar S. Tweedy vs. Alonzo M. Bogart and others.\\nFairfield Co., Oct. T., 1887. Park, C. J., Carpenter, Pardee, Loomis and Beardsley, Js.\\nRailroad bonds of a debtor, payable to bearer, are not attachable by process of foreign attachment in the hands of a third party holding the same.\\nAnd where certificates of stock of a foreign railroad corporation are so held, the stock cannot be reached by either foreign or domestic attachment.\\n[Argued November 9th, 1887\\u2014\\ndecided June 26th, 1888.]\\nAction for money had and received, with a garnishment of the Savings Bank of Danbury as having in its hands effects of the defendants; brought to the Superior Court in Fair-field County. The defendants filed a plea to the jurisdiction, which was sustained b}r the court (Andrews, \\u00ab71), and the complaint dismissed. The plaintiff appealed. The case is fully stated in the opinion.\\nS. Tweedy, for the appellant, cited\\n1 Swift\\u2019s Dig., 796; Drake on Attachment, \\u00a7 244; Upton v. Hubbard, 28 Conn., 286; Mower v. Stickney, 5 Minn., 397, 404; N. Eng. Marine Ins. Co. v. Chandler, 16 Mass., 275, 280; Sheldon v. Root, 16 Pick., 567; Mechanics\\u2019 Building Asso. v. Conover, 14 N. Jer. Eq., 219, 227; Srodes v. Caven, 3 Watts, 258; Carty v. Fenstemaker, 14 Ohio St., 457; Holmes v. Nuncaster, 12 Johns., 396; State v. Lawson, 7 Ark., 391; Sheets v. Culver, 14 Louis., 449; Turner v. Fendall, 1 Cranch, 117, 133.\\nF. S. White, for the appellees, cited\\nDrake on Attachment, \\u00a7\\u00a7 481, 539; Jones on Pledges, \\u00a7\\u00a7 372, 373; Fitch v. Waite, 5 Conn., 117; Crosvenor v. Farmers & Mechanics Bank, 13 id., 104; Winslow v. Fletcher, 53 id., 390, 396.; Badlam v. Tucker, 1 Pick., 389; Soule v. White, 14 Maine, 436; Hudson v. Hunt, 5 N. Hamp., 538; Briggs v. Walker, 21 id., 72, 77.\", \"word_count\": \"1370\", \"char_count\": \"7844\", \"text\": \"Pardee, J.\\nOn September 25th, 1882, the defendants, partners, residing in the state of New York, deposited with the Danbury Savings Bank in this state seventeen bonds of one thousand dollars each, issued by the East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia Railroad Company, payable to bearer, and five first mortgage bonds of one thousand dollars each, issued by the Pittsburgh & Western Railroad Company, all payable to bearer; also two certificates for fifty shares each, of the stock of the New York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad Company; all as security for the repayment of the sum of twenty thousand dollars loaned by the savings bank to the defendants.\\nOn the 14th day of May, 1884, the defendants, having become insolvent, made an assignment to a trustee inland in accordance with the laws of, the state of New York. Of this both the plaintiff and the savings bank had notice prior to June 20th, 1884.\\nOn the last 'named day the savings bank held, and still continues to hold, all of these bonds and shares as security for the unpaid portion of the loan; and. on that day the market value of these was, and to the present time has continued to be, in excess of the indebtedness for which they were pledged.\\nOn that day the plaintiff instituted this suit for the recovery of money and caused service of garnishment to be made upon the Danbury Savings Bank as having concealed in its possession the goods and estate of the defendants, and as being their trustee, agent and debtor.\\nOn the same day the officer making service left a true and attested copy of the writ and complaint, with his doings indorsed thereon, with the treasurer of the savings bank, the defendants not having any agent or attorney in this state. On that day all of the defendants were residents of the state of New York. No personal service of process was made on either of them.\\nThey appeared for the sole purpose of pleading to the jurisdiction. The court dismissed the cause for want of jurisdiction. The plaintiff appeals.\\nThere being no personal service of process, the court could acquire .jurisdiction only by the attachment of property. By our law this last can be effected, so far forth as personal property is concerned, in two ways. In one the officer making service takes the property into actual possession and holds it as the agent of the law for application upon a final judgment in favor of the plaintiff. In the other, when the effects of the defendant are concealed in the hands of his agent or trustee so that they cannot be found to be attached, or when a debt is due from any person to him, service of a copy upon such agent, trustee or debtor will effect the attachment of such property or debt.\\nThe first form may be denominated the direct attachment. In this it is essential that the officer should take the property into his possession and continue to hold it to respond to any judgment which the plaintiff may obtain. It is of no avail to give either written or verbal notice thereof to the person holding the property if he is permitted to continue in possession.\\nAs to the second, which may be called attachment by trustee process, it has been decided by this court that although a person may have in his possession a negotiable promissory note, not made by himself, indorsed in blank, the property of another, such evidence of indebtedness, such chose in action, cannot be attached by the trustee process as the property of that other, for the reason that the paper is not property, but only the evidence of a right to demand property, and that the money which' it represents can only be sequestered by serving the trustee process upon the maker of the note. Grosvenor v. Farmers & Mechanics Bank, 13 Conn., 104.\\nThe reasons there given for denying to a promissory note, even when payable to bearer, and therefore transferable by delivery, the quality of property within the meaning of our statutes of attachment, are as follows:\\u2014\\\" The serious, if not irreparable, injury which might result, either to the creditor or debtor, by adopting a rule which would subject negotiable paper, indorsed in blank, to the operation of the process of garnishment as being goods, and effects; the insuperable difficulties which would attend the sale of it on execution; the want of adequate means to ascertain its value, so that on a sale justice would be done to both parties in the execution; the inability to determine the equitable liens which may exist upon it, furnish sufficient reasons to withhold our sanction to the experiment now proposed to be made.\\\"\\nThese reasons were given many years since. During the lapse of time private pecuniary corporations have greatly increased in number. Their obligations, payable to bearer, transferable by delivery as freely as is a bank note, are in untold millions and burden the market. The obligations of many of them are sufficiently well known to have a settled market value. But there are countless others whose obligations are not capable of accurate valuations at all times and places; many of them not so at any time or place. Of course a legal rule must be general and applicable to all. And the mass of negotiable notes of individuals, and of corporations of limited reputation, is at all times so great as to give force still to the objections urged by this court against the compulsory sale of these at public auction.\\nIn the eye of the law that which is known in the market as a coupon bond of a railroad corporation, differs not from the promissory note of an individual payable to bearer. In each case the obligation of the maker and the rights of the holder are the same. The service of the trustee process upon the savings bank in this ease was of no legal effect; therefore the court did not acquire jurisdiction.\\nIt has been decided that the shares of the foreign railroad company which were pledged by the defendant to the savings bank could not be reached by either form of service. Winslow v. Fletcher, 53 Conn., 396.\\nThere is no error in the judgment complained of.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred; except CARPENTER, J., who dissented.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
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+"{\"id\": \"513511\", \"name\": \"Albert H. Walker vs. Joseph R. Hawley and others\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Walker v. Hawley\", \"decision_date\": \"1888-12-14\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"559\", \"last_page\": \"568\", \"citations\": \"56 Conn. 559\", \"volume\": \"56\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:27:37.270710+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Albert H. Walker vs. Joseph R. Hawley and others.\", \"head_matter\": \"Albert H. Walker vs. Joseph R. Hawley and others.\\nHartford Dist., Oct. T., 1888. Park, O. J., Carpenter, Pardee, Loomis and Beardsley, Js.\\nThe defendants published of the plaintiff in a political journal conducted by them, the following:\\u2014\\u201cThis part of the state was especially favored by the democratic state committee by the wholesale circulation of the remarkable letter of Albert H. Walker, giving his so-called reasons for falsely asserting that Mr. Lounsbury\\u2019s nomination was secured by corrupt means.\\u201d Held that the words \\u201cfalsely asserted\\u201d were to be construed in connection with the subject to which they relate, the published letter of W. giving his reasons for his conclusion, and not as an attack upon his personal veracity; and that they were therefore not libelous.\\n[Argued October 4th\\u2014\\ndecided December 14th, 1888.]\\nAction for a libel; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County. The defendants, under the name of Hawley, Goodrich & Company, owned and conducted a newspaper in the city of Hartford, in which the matter charged as libelous was published.\\nThe complaint was as follows:\\n1. That on the fourth day of November, 1886, the defendants published and caused to be published, in a newspaper called the Hartford Qourant, the following words concerning the plaintiff: \\u201cThe people of Fairfield County attested their appreciation of Mr. Lounsbury by their votes. This part of the state was especially favored by the Democratic state committee by the wholesale circulation of the remarkable letter of Albert H. Walker, giving his so-called reasons for falsely asserting that Mr. Lounsbury\\u2019s nomination was secured by corrupt means. As a result, the usual Democratic majority of the county was reversed: the Republicans elected three of the four senators from the county, and twenty-one of the thirty-two representatives. This is the verdict of Mr. Lounsbury\\u2019s county. The voters of his own town, with only 470 votes, gave him a majority of 266. If other parts of the state had been as liberally supplied with the same literature, it is possible the election for governor would have been by popular vote.\\u201d\\n2. That the defendants meant thereby that the plaintiff had falsely asserted that the nomination of Phineas C. Lounsbury for governor of Connecticut was secured by corrupt means; and the defendants also meant thereby that the returns of the election held-in Connecticut' for state officers on November 2d, 1886, showed that the plaintiff\\u2019s pamphlet of September 25th, 1886, on the nomination of Phineas C. Lounsbury, was disbelieved wherever it was read.\\n3. Such publication was false and malicious.\\nThe defendants demurred to the complaint on the ground that the matter was not libelous. \\u2022 The demurrer was overruled and the defendants answered over. Their answer and the plaintiff\\u2019s reply thereto are sufficiently stated in the opinion. On the issue of fact thus made the case was tried to the jury before Phelps, J. The plaintiff having introduced all his evidence, the defendants moved for a nonsuit, which was granted by the court; and a motion to set aside the nonsuit having been denied by the court, the plaintiff appealed to this court.\\nA. S. Walker, appellant, pro se.\\n1. The language complained of, namely, \\u201c the remarkable letter of Albert H. Walker, giving his so-called reasons for falsely asserting that Mr. Lounsbury\\u2019s nomination was secured by corrupt means,\\u201d is accurately interpreted in the-innuendo, namely: \\u201c The defendants meant thereby that the plaintiff had falsety asserted that the nomination of Phineas C. Lounsbury for governor of Connecticut was secured by corrupt means.\\u201d This accuracy results from the fact that every point expressed in the innuendo is also expressed in the language complained of, except the point that the Mr. Lounsbury referred to in the letter was Phineas C. Lounsbury, and except the point that his nomination was for governor of Connecticut; and from the fact that both of these points are substantially admitted in the defendants\\u2019 answer. This accuracy is not negatived by the fact that the innuendo ignores the phrase \\u201cgiving his so-called reasons.\\u201d , The phrase \\u201cfalsely asserting\\u201d is not modified by that phrase, because men give so-called reasons for positive assertions as well as for argumentative assertions; and because, therefore, the reference to \\u201cso-called reasons\\u201d does not show or indicate that the phrase \\u201cfalsely asserting\\u201d charged only an argumentative false assertion and not a positive false assertion. Therefore the phrase \\u201c falsely asserting \\u201d must be held to carry its common primary meaning of \\u201c deceitfully affirming positively,\\u201d and cannot logically be softened into any such phrase as \\u201cerroneously maintaining,\\u201d or \\u201cillogically arguing.\\u201d Nor can the accuracy of the innuendo be negatived by reference to the character of the plaintiff\\u2019s pamphlet, because that pamphlet was never published by the defendants, and was not known to' many of those to whom the defendants distributed the language complained of. It would be illogical to make the determination of the message which was conveyed by the document which the defendants published, depend upon the character of another document which they never published, and never explained to their readers in any way.\\n2. The statement which was published by the defendants, and which is thus accurate^ set forth in the innuendo, was libelous, because it expressly charged the plaintiff with falsely asserting that the nomination of Mr. Lounsbury was secured by corrupt means. The defendants\\u2019 answer does not plead that their charge was true, and they thereby legally admit that their charge was false. Swift v. Dickerman, 31 Conn., 291; Donaghue v. Gaffy, 53 id., 52. That a false accusation of falsehood is libelous per se, is a proposition of law which is as well founded as any part of the law of libel. Civilization is largely based on confidence, and confidence is based on reputation for veracity. Reputation for lack of veracity is fatal to confidence, and exiles him who has it from many of the principal benefits of civilization. It follows that whoever publishes a false accusation of falsehood in another, thereby delivers a blow which must be injurious to the reputation of that other for veracity, and must tend to deprive him of a considerable part of the value of living. To redress such injuries is the main reason for having any law of libel. Another reason for having a law of libel resides in the fact that libels are likely to produce breaches of the peace, and therefore require restraint. It is well known that false accusations of falsehood have an exceptionally strong tendency to produce breaches of the peace. If the law afforded no remedy for such an accusation, the number of such breaches of the peace'would be much increased, because many more men of spirit and honor, if denied protection by the law from such accusations, would endeavor to protect themselves. As a matter of reasoning from principle and from public policy, therefore, the libelous character per se of a false accusation of falsehood stops not short of demonstration. The authorities also abundantly establish the same proposition of law. Lindley v. Horton, 27 Conn., 58; Cooper v. Stone, 24 Wend., 441; Clark v. Binney, 2 Pick., 113; Shelton v. Nance, 7 B. Monr., 128; Woodburn v. Miller, Cheeves\\u2019s Law Cases, 194; Brooks v. Bemiss, 8 Johns., 356; Over v. Hildebrand, 92 Ind., 22; Hake v. Brames, 95 id., 161; Townshend on Slander & Libel, sec. 177.\\n3. The statement thus published, and thus libelous, was not privileged. This follows from the fact that the publication was not made in good faith, and was not made without malice; and because both these points are necessary elements in any defense of privilege. . That good faith is a necessary element of a privileged publication is undeniable. The reason of the law of privilege relevant to publications which would be libelous if not privileged, resides in the oc casional propriety of publishing statements which cannot be positively proved. But it is never proper to publish an injurious statement which the publisher does not himself, according to his lights, believe to be true. Therefore the reason for a privilege does not exist where the publication complained of cannot reasonably be believed to be true by the publisher when he puts it forth. Accordingly, all the known authorities upon the point hold that good faith is an indispensable element of a privileged communication or publication. Dawkins v. Lord Paulet, L. R., 5 Q. B., 102; Simmond's v. Dunne, 5 Irish R., C. L. Series, 362; Turnbull v. Bird, 2 Fost. & F., 524; Cooper v. Stone, 24 Wend., 442; Gassett v. Gilbert, 6 Gray, 94; Folkard\\u2019s Starkie on Slander, \\u00a7\\u00a7 673, 679; Odgers on Libel & Slander, 198, 199; Townshend on Slander & Libel, \\u00a7 288; and numerous cases cited in those precedents and text-books. That malice in fact is fatal to any claim of privilege, is also an undisputed rule of the law of libel. Clark v. Molyneux, L. R., 3 Q. B. Div., 246; Elam v. Badger, 23 Ill., 501; Austin v. Remington, 46 Conn., 118; 3 Greenl. Ev., \\u00a7 168; Odgers on Libel & Slander, 267. Want of good faith in publishing that \\u201cthe plaintiff had falsely asserted that the nomination of Phineas C. Lounsbury for governor of Connecticut was secured by corrupt means,\\u201d is shown in several ways in the record. Malice is proved in this case to have been entertained against the plaintiff, not only by the expressed threat of one of the defendants; but in four other legally recognized ways besides. The defense of privilege is not only negatived by proof of the presence of malice and the absence of good faith; but it is also inherently invalid because of the prima facie unsoundness of the grounds upon which it is apparently based. Those grounds are three in number: 1. The publication complained of was a literary criticism of a literary production. 2. It was a reply to a charge. 3. It was a \\u201c political \\u201d comment on a \\u201cpolitical \\u201d pamphlet and a \\u201c political \\u201d campaign. The first of these grounds is unsound, because the publication complained of had not the qualities of a literary criticism, or any criticism of a literary production. A criticism of a literary production must contain some account of the statements or opinions set forth therein, and of the assertions and reasonings by which the author attempts to maintain them. But the publication complained of did neither of these things. It merely ascribed to the author a particular statement of fact which he did not make, and then denounced that statement as false, and omitted to quote or otherwise represent any one of the statements of fact or lines of reasoning that were really contained in the production to which it referred. The second of these grounds is unsound, because, at the time of the publication complained of, the plaintiff had not charged either of the defendants with any wrong doing, and because the privilege of replying to charges of misconduct, without incurring responsibility for whatever error may be embodied in the reply, is the privilege of the person thus charged, given to him by the law, as an implement of self vindication. Steele v. Southwick, 9 Johns., 214; Colby v. Reynolds, 6 Verm., 495. And though in one English case, Regina v. Veley, 4 Fost. & F., 1117, this privilege was extended to an attorney who replied for his client to charges made against the latter, the privilege has probably never been awarded to one who voluntarily interfered in a controversy to which he was not a party. The third of these grounds of privilege is unsound, because it amounts to the proposition that defamatory falsehood about the political conduct of private citizens is privileged in law; though such falsehood about the business conduct of such citizens would undeniably be libelous. But politics is the largest and noblest of businesses. It is not degraded from that high estate because bribery and intrigue so permeate it at present; any more than life insurance is degraded from its essentially high position by the recent frauds and defalcations which have assailed it in Connecticut. It may not be possible for human power to estimate the comparative guilt of a variety of falsehoods; but human eyes are adequate to see that the practical evil of falsehoods, other elements being equal, is proportionate, to the importance of the subjects to which they respectively refer. Political falsehoods refer to exceptionally important subjects, and therefore they are exceptionally evil. He who is guilty of a political falsehood is therefore chargeable with an exceptionally evil and injurious sort of mendacity, and those, who falsely accuse a fellow-citizen of political falsehood, are chargeable with an exceptionally evil and injurous kind of libel. That i.s precisely the position of the defendants at the bar.\\nA. F. Eggleston, for the appellees.\", \"word_count\": \"3208\", \"char_count\": \"19387\", \"text\": \"Carpenter, J.\\nThis is an action for a libel. The complaint was demurred to in the Superior Court, and the demurrer was overruled. The defendants answered over, admitting the publication of the article alleged to be a libel, denied the innuendo, and alleged that they were the publishers of a newspaper which supported Mr. Lounsbury as a candidate for governor in 1886, that the plaintiff opposed his election and wrote and circulated a political pamphlet referred to as \\\" the remarkable letter of Albert H. Walker,\\\" that the article mentioned in the complaint was published by the defendants as editors of a public journal immediately after the result of the election was known, in good faith and without malice, for the purpose of calling attention to said pamphlet as a matter of public interest; also that said article was a criticism on a literary effort of the plaintiff, which had been publicly and freely circulated, and that the defendants did not intend to, and did not, refer to the plaintiff otherwise than as a political supporter of a political claim, and as being connected with said pamphlet as its author, and did not intend to, and did not, comment on or attack the plaintiff's personal veracity, his private character, or his private motives in publishing said pamphlet.\\nThe plaintiff's replication admitted that the defendants were publishers of a newspaper, that he opposed' the election of Mr. Lounsbury, wrote the pamphlet, etc.; and the rest of the answer was denied. On the issue thus closed the case went to a jury. After the plaintiff had presented his testimony lie was nonsuited. A motion was made to set aside the nonsuit, which was refused. The plaintiff- then appealed to this-court.\\nWas the article in question a libel, when considered in the light of the circumstances disclosed by the evidence ?\\nThe clause principally relied on as libelous is the following:\\u2014\\\"the remarkable letter of Albert H. Walker, giving his so-called reasons for falsely asserting that Mr. Lounsbury'snomination was secured by corrupt means.\\\" That clause must be interpreted with reference to the subject matter to which it relates\\u2014the letter or pamphlet of Mr. Walker. If that document had asserted as a fact that Mr. Lounsbury's nomination was secured by corrupt means, the language quoted might have been interpreted as imputing to Mr. Walker a wilful falsehood. But a false assertion, in logic, ordinarily has> a somewhat modified meaning. To say of a man that he reasons from false premises, or draws false conclusions from correct premises, is not libelous. In such cases the word' \\\" false \\\" means no more than that the premises were not true, or that the conclusion was erroneous. So also, to say of an advocate before a jury that he falsely asserted the guilt or innocence of the accused, that he falsely maintained the affirmative or negative of the issue, is not libelous, inasmuch as it means simply a mistaken view as to the effect of the evidence. Mr. Walker's position- in the case before us was like that of an advocate. He had before him certain evidence, from which he vigorously maintained the proposition, according to his belief, that \\\" the nomination of Phineas C. Lounsbury for governor of Connecticut was accomplished by payments and promises which were of the nature of bribery.\\\" He did not assert as a fact that his nomination was so accomplished, but that that was his belief\\u2014that the facts and circumstances convinced him that it was so. The plaintiff himself (for another purpose) takes the same view. In his brief he says,\\u2014\\\" Precisely what the plaintiff did was to publish a large number of facts, not one of which appears to ever have been contradicted anywhere by anybody, and to state that those facts had convinced him that the nomination of Phineas C. Lounsbury/ for governor of Connecticut was accomplished by payments and promises which were of the nature of bribery. The plaintiff does not appear to have stated in any way at any time that Mr. Lounsbury's nomination was thus accomplished. Whether or not he would have been justified in making that statement, he appears to have publicly printed that he did not know it to be the fact. His pamphlet on the nomination of Phineas C. Lounsbury consisted of a perfectly justifiable publication of undenied and undeniable facts, relevant to matters of great public importance, and a calm and careful statement of his opinion of the significance of those facts. Whether that opinion was logically drawn from those facts, is a question upon which every reader of that pamphlet was impliedly advised to judge for himself.\\\"\\nThis aptly and justly characterizes the pamphlet as an argument sustaining his proposition; and it is clearly referred to as such in the alleged libelous article,\\u2014\\\" giving his so-called reasons for falsely asserting that Mr. Lounsbury's nomination was secured by corrupt means.\\\"\\nThe words \\\"falsely asserting\\\" then, when taken in connection with the subject matter to which they relate, mean no more than that the proposition which he attempted to prove was a false one; that is, that the conclusion or inference whieh he drew was not justified by the facts.\\nThat use of the two words is allowable. The second definition given by Webster of the word \\\"assert\\\" is\\u2014\\\"to maintain or defend by words or measures; to vindicate.\\\" And the fifth meaning of the word \\\"false\\\" is\\u2014\\\"not well founded, not firm or trustworthy, erroneous ; as a false claim; a false conclusion; a false construction in grammar.\\\"\\nThat view of the case leads us to adopt the conclusion so well expressed in the concluding paragraph of the defendants' answer\\u2014that they \\\" did not intend to, and did not, refer to the plaintiff otherwise than as a political supporter of a political claim, and did not intend to, and did not, comment on or attack the plaintiff's personal veracity, his private character, or his private motives in publishing said pamphlet; but simply intended to, and did, in said article make a political comment upon the result of a political campaign, as connected with the declaration contained in said pamphlet.\\\"\\nThus considered, the questions of good faith and malice are eliminated from the case. It must not be understood however that we regard the evidence as eviucing any want of good faith, or as showing actual malice. We simply say that we have no occasion to consider those questions.\\nThere was no error in refusing to set aside the nonsuit.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"514414\", \"name\": \"Southern New England Telephone Company v. Leon M. Rosenberg et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Southern New England Telephone Co. v. Rosenberg\", \"decision_date\": \"1970-06-16\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"503\", \"last_page\": \"509\", \"citations\": \"159 Conn. 503\", \"volume\": \"159\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:12:14.545967+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Southern New England Telephone Company v. Leon M. Rosenberg et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Southern New England Telephone Company v. Leon M. Rosenberg et al.\\nAlcorn, C. J., Cotter, Ryan, Shea and Rubinow, Js.\\nArgued May 8\\ndecided June 16, 1970\\nWilliam B. Ramsey, for the appellant (named defendant et al.).\\nArthur H. Latimer, with, whom were Donald F. Keefe and James B. Curtin, for the appellee (plaintiff).\", \"word_count\": \"1528\", \"char_count\": \"8912\", \"text\": \"Cotter, J.\\nThe court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff for damage to personal property on three counts of negligence against three defendants \\u2014the city of New Haven, Leon M. Rosenberg, and Richard Hill. Those defendants have appealed. The facts found by the court, which are unchallenged, disclose the following.\\nIn the summer of 1965 the city and the plaintiff reached an agreement for the installation of certain telephone equipment. The parties agreed that the equipment would be housed in a special room to be constructed in a corridor between two annexes of the city hall. During that summer, city employees and private contractors hired by the city undertook construction of the new room. There was a large upright radiator which was to be removed and replaced by baseboard heating in the area in which the room was to be constructed. On August 16, 1965, a plumbing contractor hired by the city removed the radiator in the presence of the defendant Rosenberg, who was the city's superintendent of buildings. A pipe protruding through the floor had provided the radiator with live steam, the supply of which was controlled by a valve on the pipe. When the radiator was removed, the valve was left closed but Rosenberg told the employees of the plumbing contractor not to cap the pipe. The court also found that it is customary and good plumbing practice to cap such a supply pipe, or to cap the valve remaining connected to it, upon removal of a radiator.\\nPrior to September 26 certain equipment belonging to the telephone company was moved into the room, to be installed. On Sunday, September 26, Rosenberg was requested to activate the heating system to provide heat for an evening conference at the mayor's office. He initially protested because it was his custom, and good engineering practice, to inspect the heating system prior to activating it for the cold season, and he had not yet done so. His customary inspection would have included the pipe and valve in the room containing the plaintiff's equipment. Despite his initial reluctance, he started the boilers himself at 12:30 p.m. and then left while the defendant Hill, a boilerman newly employed by the city and not conversant with the heating plant, remained at the boilers. Hill found himself unable to keep up the boiler pressure and, at about 3 p.m., telephoned Hugh J. Riley, another city boilerman, who arrived at about 3:30 and observed steam billowing out of the room housing the plaintiff's equipment. Riley then shut down the boiler and turned off the valves controlling the steam supply to the area in which the equipment was located. The plaintiff's engineers subsequently determined that the equipment had been damaged beyond the point of repair by exposure to moisture and high temperature.\\nIn their first assignment of error, the defendants claim that the trial court should have found certain alleged facts which were set out in their draft finding. Several of the paragraphs' in dispute are in fact covered in the court's finding. The finding in any paragraph need not be in language identical with the draft finding. Aczas v. Stuart Heights, Inc., 154 Conn. 54, 56, 221 A.2d 589. Other paragraphs of the draft finding are abandoned, and some are not shown to be material. Still others are drawn so as to support the claim made in the defendants' brief that \\\"the valve was in proper working order and would stop the flow of steam if closed. The only logical conclusion that can be drawn from these facts is that someone working for the plaintiff . . . opened the valve.\\\" It must be noted that the defendants had never raised the issue of the plaintiff's contributory negligence in the pleadings. See General Statutes \\u00a7 52-114. The assertion that the valve would stop the flow of steam if closed is not supported by the unchallenged finding that it was customary and good plumbing practice to cap the supply pipe, or the valve connected to it, upon removal of a radiator. It is a reasonable inference from this finding that such a valve may deteriorate or accidentally become open or that for other reasons it may not be reliable in blocking off the steam. The finding that Rosenberg only a few days prior to the accident expressed concern that an old valve was still on the steam pipe belies the defendants' claim. The defendants have failed to show that the truth of their assertion was admitted or undisputed. Martin v. Kavanewsky, 157 Conn. 514, 515, 255 A.2d 619.\\nTwo paragraphs of the draft finding appear to be aimed at establishing a claim that the defendants had no duty to provide a safe heating system in the room in question. The finding, however, shows that the city undertook to construct the new room for the plaintiff's equipment, to remove the old heating system, and to replace it with a new one; that Rosenberg had a key to the equipment room; and that the room itself was a part of the New Haven city hall. Further, the court found that if Rosenberg had adhered to his usual practice and made his customary inspection prior to turning on the heating system, he would have visually inspected the pipe and valve in the telephone equipment room. It was a permissible inference under these circumstances to find that the city and its employees did have a duty owed to the plaintiff to provide a safe heating system; and it has been held that, where a party is obligated to provide steam heat to certain premises, he has a duty of continuing inspection and care. Axland v. Pacific Heating Co., 159 Wash. 401, 407, 293 P. 466; 26 Am. Jur. 2d, Electricity, Gras, and Steam, \\u00a7 269. We find no error in the court's refusal to find the claimed facts which were set out in the defendants' draft finding.\\nThe defendants' second assignment of error attacks all but two of the trial court's conclusions, which are tested by the finding of facts. Broderick v. Shea, 143 Conn. 590, 593, 124 A.2d 229. Since there is no claim of the application of erroneous rules of law, the conclusions must stand unless they are legally or logically inconsistent with the facts. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Veneri, 157 Conn. 20, 23, 244 A.2d 401. A conclusion of negligence requires the trier of facts to apply the applicable standard of care to the particular case. Such application ordinarily involves only a question of fact and will not be disturbed by this court unless a fair and reasonable person could not have reached such a conclusion. Smith v. Leuthner, 156 Conn. 422, 424, 242 A.2d 728.\\nThe first two conclusions in this case concern custom and good practice in the plumbing trade with regard to the capping of a steam supply pipe or valve when a radiator is disconnected. They are essentially factual in nature and rest on the unchallenged finding of fact that it is customary and good plumbing practice to cap the pipe or valve. They cannot be disturbed. The conclusion that Rosenberg was negligent in directing the steam supply pipe to be left uncapped, with only a valve on the pipe as the sole safeguard against the escape of live steam, follows ineluctably from the finding as to good plumbing practice and custom. The conclusion that Hill was negligent in failing to report for a prolonged period of time his inability to maintain pressure is warranted by the facts, which show that he failed to shut down or inspect the heating system when he observed the lack of pressure, with the result that no corrective measures were taken until Riley arrived at 3:30 in the afternoon. We cannot say that a reasonable mind could not have reached this conclusion under the circumstances of this case. The conclusion that these two instances of negligence were a proximate cause of the damage to the plaintiff's equipment is amply supported by the facts found.\\nThe defendant city has not pursued in brief and argument its assignment of error as to the conclusion that, pursuant to \\u00a7 7-465 of the G-eneral Statutes, the city is required to pay on behalf of Rosenberg and Hill all sums which they have become obligated to pay by reason of their negligence. It is therefore treated as abandoned. French v. Oberreuter, 157 Conn. 181, 184, 251 A.2d 67. It is unnecessary to review the remaining conclusions, because they cannot affect the final result. Nowicki v. Planning & Zoning Board, 148 Conn. 492, 495, 172 A.2d 386; Goldstein v. Hartford, 144 Conn. 739, 740, 131 A.2d 927.\\nThe defendants' final assignment of error rests on certain factual assumptions which were not admitted or undisputed and cannot aid the defendants.\\nThere is no error.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"5162667\", \"name\": \"STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MICHAEL JENKINS\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Jenkins\", \"decision_date\": \"2004-03-23\", \"docket_number\": \"AC 23437\", \"first_page\": \"111\", \"last_page\": \"126\", \"citations\": \"82 Conn. App. 111\", \"volume\": \"82\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Appellate Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Appellate Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:11:26.980925+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MICHAEL JENKINS\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MICHAEL JENKINS\\n(AC 23437)\\nBishop, McLachlan and Mihalakos\\nArgued October 29, 2003 \\u2014\\nofficially released March 23, 2004\\nClaudia A. Baio, with whom, on the brief, was Richard D. Tulisano, for the appellant (defendant).\\nMarjorie Allen Dauster, senior assistant state\\u2019s attorney, with whom were Tracy Cass, certified legal intern, and, on the brief, Scott J. Murphy, state\\u2019s attorney, and Mary Rose P\\u00e1lmese, supervisory assistant state\\u2019s attorney, for the appellee (state).\", \"word_count\": \"4468\", \"char_count\": \"27638\", \"text\": \"Opinion\\nMIHALAKOS, J.\\nThe defendant, Michael Jenkins, appeals from the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court subsequent to his plea of nolo contendere to the charge of possession of narcotics with intent to sell in violation of General Statutes \\u00a7 2 la-277 (a). On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Practice Book \\u00a7 41-12, General Statutes \\u00a7 54-33f, 54-33k and 54-331, article first, \\u00a7 7, of the constitution of Connecticut, and the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution in that the court improperly concluded that (1) there was probable cause to place him under arrest and that the ensuing search was, therefore, lawful as a search incident to an arrest, and (2) the purported strip search of him that was conducted by the police did not rise to the level of a fourth amendment violation. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.\\nThe following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the defendant's appeal. During the week of March 6,2000, Detective Jerry Chrostowski of the New Britain police department received information from a confidential informant that the defendant was involved with drug trafficking. The informant provided Chrostowski with the defendant's pager number. On March 11, 2000, Chrostowski called the pager number on a police department telephone equipped with caller identification technology.\\nChrostowski's page was returned within five minutes. Chrostowski then contacted the Southern New England Telephone Company, which traced the number to 41 Harvard Street in New Britain. Chrostowski was familiar with the defendant and had personal knowledge that he resided at that address. Chrostowski identified himself as \\\"Chris,\\\" and the caller referred to himself as \\\"Mike.\\\" Chrostowski ordered ten packets of heroin from the defendant for $80, and the men agreed to meet at East Side Pizza in New Britain to complete the sale. Chrostowski relayed that he would be wearing a baseball cap.\\nWhile Chrostowski waited outside of the restaurant, a New Britain police officer informed him that a black male was exiting his residence and going toward the restaurant. The defendant began to approach Chrostow-ski and came within seven feet of him when he suddenly stopped upon seeing the officer's face. The defendant was then placed under arrest by several New Britain police officers and charged with attempt to sell narcotics.\\nThe defendant was handcuffed and taken to the side of the restaurant to be searched. Chrostowski seized the defendant's beeper, which contained the number from which Chrostowski had paged him. Officer Christopher Brody searched the defendant and felt an object in the defendant's buttocks inconsistent with the male anatomy. Brody pulled the defendant's pants and underwear away from his body and discovered glassine packets. The packets were seized and tested positive for heroin and crack cocaine.\\nThe defendant later was charged in a substitute information with possession of narcotics with the intent to sell in violation of \\u00a7 21a-277 (a). On September 12, 2000, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from him, which was denied. The defendant then entered a plea of nolo contendere under General Statutes \\u00a7 54-94a. The defendant was sentenced to a three year term of imprisonment to run consecutively to a prior sentence. This appeal followed.\\nI\\nA\\nThe defendant first claims that the court improperly found that there was probable cause for the police to have placed him under arrest. He reasons that the subsequent search was, therefore, not lawful as a search incident to an arrest. Specifically, the defendant claims that probable cause to arrest could not have existed because a reasonable person, under the circumstances, would not have assumed that he was necessarily about to sell narcotics. We disagree.\\nThe defendant claims that simply the fact that Chros-towski paged him to order drugs and that he told Chros-towski to meet him at the restaurant does not reasonably lead to the conclusion that he was actually going to sell any drugs. He argues that it is not unreasonable to assume that he went to the restaurant solely to find out the identity of the potential buyer. He maintains that the police did not give him the opportunity to commit any crime.\\nWe first set forth the standard of review and legal principles that guide our analysis. \\\"Our standard of review of a trial court's findings and conclusions in connection with a motion to suppress is well defined. A finding of fact will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record . [W]here the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision . . . .\\\" State v. Bjorklund, 79 Conn. App. 535, 548, 830 A.2d 1141 (2003).\\n\\\"It is well established . . . that a warrant is not required when a search is conducted incident to a lawful custodial arrest. . . . New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1981).\\\" State v. Clark, 255 Conn. 268, 291, 764 A.2d 1251 (2001). \\\"When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for a police officer to search for, and seize, any weapons or evidence within the immediate control of the arrested person in order to ensure officer safety and prevent the destruction or concealment of evidence.\\\" State v. Clark, supra, 292.\\n\\\"General Statutes \\u00a7 54-lf (b) authorizes a police officer to conduct a warrantless arrest of any person who the officer has reasonable grounds to believe has committed or is committing a felony. The phrase reasonable grounds to believe is synonymous with probable cause. \\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cooper, 65 Conn. App. 551, 564-65, 783 A.2d 100, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 940, 786 A.2d 427 (2001).\\n\\\"In order for a warrantless felony arrest to be valid, it must be supported by probable cause. . . . The determination of whether probable cause exists under the fourth amendment to the federal constitution, and under article first, \\u00a7 7, of our state constitution, is made pursuant to a totality of circumstances test. . . . Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that a felony has been committed. . . . The probable cause test then is an objective one. . . . We consistently have held that [t]he quantum of evidence necessary to establish probable cause exceeds mere suspicion, but is substantially less than that required for conviction. . . . The existence of probable cause does not turn on whether the defendant could have been convicted on the same available evidence. . . . [P]roof of probable cause requires less than proof by a preponderance of the evidence.\\\" (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Clark, supra, 255 Conn. 292-93.\\nIn the present case, there was probable cause for the police to arrest the defendant under the totality of the circumstances. Chrostowski contacted the defendant on the basis of information from a confidential informant that the defendant was engaged in drug trafficking. The informant was reliable because information from him had led to several previous convictions. Chrostowski corroborated the information by calling the pager number that was given to him by the informant and confirming that the number from which his page was returned was that of the defendant's residence. In addition, Chrostowski had personal knowledge that the 41 Harvard Street the address from which the defendant called was in fact the defendant's residence.\\n\\\"In State v. Velasco [248 Conn. 183, 194-95, 728 A.2d 493 (1999)] . . . we held that information supplied by a reliable informant, by itself, may be sufficient to establish probable cause, and that the information need not be corroborated through independent investigation.\\\" (Emphasis in original.) State v. Respass, 256 Conn. 164, 178-79, 770 A.2d 471, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1002, 122 S. Ct. 478, 151 L. Ed. 2d 392 (2001). \\\"[Statements made by an informant are entitled to greater weight if corroborated by evidence independently gathered by the police.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mordowanec, 259 Conn. 94, 110, 788 A.2d 48, cert. denied, 536 U.S. 910, 122 S. Ct. 2369, 153 L. Ed. 2d 189 (2002).\\nMoreover, Chrostowski personally negotiated with the defendant for the sale of narcotics. The defendant verbally agreed to sell ten packets of heroin to Chros-towski for $80 and arranged to meet him at East Side Pizza. In addition, another officer observed the defendant leaving his residence and going toward the restaurant to meet Chrostowski.\\nThe defendant also argues that the police did not afford him the opportunity to actually commit a crime. The defendant was, however, arrested on a charge of attempt to sell narcotics by a person who is not drug-dependent in violation of General Statutes \\u00a7 21a-278 (b) and 53a-49 (a) (2). Pursuant to \\u00a7 53a-49 (a) (2), to be guilty of attempt, an individual must take a \\\"substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.\\\" The defendant arranged for the sale of heroin to Chrostowski, left his residence and was going in the direction of the restaurant to meet with Chrostowski. Such evidence was sufficient to constitute the requisite \\\"substantial step.\\\"\\nOn the basis of the previously discussed evidence, we conclude that the New Britain police could have reasonably believed that the defendant was committing a felony, as stated in \\u00a7 54-lf (b). We therefore conclude that the warrantless arrest of the defendant was lawful.\\nB\\nHaving determined that the warrantless arrest of the defendant was lawful, we now turn to the ensuing search and seizure of evidence. \\\"[I]f the defendant's arrest was lawful, the subsequent warrantless search . . . also was lawful.\\\" State v. Velasco, supra, 248 Conn. 189. It is well settled that \\\"[o]ne recognized exception to the warrant requirement applies when a search is conducted incident to a lawful custodial arrest. . . . This exception permits a police officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee and to seize evidence as well as weapons.\\\" (Citations omitted.) State v. Trine, 236 Conn. 216, 235-36, 673 A.2d 1098 (1996). In light of our determination that the arrest of the defendant was proper, we also conclude that the ensuing search was lawful as a search incident to a lawful arrest.\\nII\\nThe defendant's second claim is that the court improperly found that the purported strip search of the defendant did not rise to the level of a fourth amendment violation. The defendant reasserts his argument that the police did not have probable cause under the fourth amendment to arrest him and that the search was therefore necessarily improper. In the alternative, he claims that the search constituted a strip search under \\u00a7 54-33k because his pants and underwear were pulled away from his body for Brody to retrieve the glassine packets. He then argues that the officers who conducted that purported strip search did not follow the procedure outlined for strip searches in \\u00a7 54-33l.\\nThe defendant goes on to claim that there is necessarily a connection between the strip search statutes and the fourth amendment, and that the evidence obtained in violation of \\u00a7 54-33k warrants exclusion, insisting that the legislature would not have enacted a statute for which there were no consequences for its violation. He also maintains that because the legislature framed \\u00a7 54-33Z in such a way as to limit searches and seizures, it follows that it considered a search in violation of the statutes to be an unreasonable search under the fourth amendment. We disagree.\\nA\\nThis claim presents a question of statutory interpretation. \\\"The process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature. . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of this case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. In seeking to determine that meaning, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter.\\\" (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Courchesne, 262 Conn. 537, 544, 816 A.2d 562 (2003).\\nWe conclude that the search conducted in this case was not a strip search for the purposes of applying \\u00a7 54-33k and 54-33/. Sections 54-33k and 54-33/ do not address those strip searches that are conducted incident to a lawful arrest on a felony charge. The only reference to a search incident to an arrest is found in \\u00a7 54-33/ (a), which specifically involves motor vehicle violations and misdemeanors. The remaining subsections of the statute, which impose various procedural requirements necessary to conduct a strip search, make no mention of the type of sear ch conducted under the facts of this case.\\nThe legislative history of those provisions supports that reading of the statutory language. \\\"We will not impute to the legislature an intent that is not apparent from unambiguous statutory language in the absence of a compelling reason to do so.\\\" Home Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 235 Conn. 185, 195, 663 A.2d 1001 (1995). Rather, \\\"[w]e are bound to interpret legislative intent by referring to what the legislative text contains, not by what it might have contained. \\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Winchester v. Northwest Associates, 255 Conn. 379, 388, 767 A.2d 687 (2001).\\nThe legislative history of \\u00a7 54-33k and 54-33Z reveals that those provisions were an attempt by the legislature to protect Connecticut citizens from groundless strip searches and a response to a proliferation of lawsuits against police departments for such searches. See 23 S. Proc., Pt. 5, 1980 Sess., pp. 1589, 1593. Comments made by various legislators reflect that the statutes explicitly allow for such strip searches when the officer has a reasonable belief, after conducting a patdown, that there may be a weapon or controlled substance. \\\"This Bill would prohibit strip searches of any person arrested for a traffic or misdemeanor offense unless the case involves weapons or a controlled] substance or there is a reasonable belief such person is concealing a weapon or control [led] substance . . . .\\\" (Emphasis added.) 23 S. Proc., Pt. 5, 1980 Sess., p. 1588, remarks of Senator Salvatore C. DePiano. Those statutes are, therefore, inapplicable to the factual scenario presented in this appeal.\\nB\\nThe search conducted by Brody was akin to a strip search as those searches commonly are defined. It has been recognized that under the fourth amendment to the federal constitution, officers are permitted to strip-search an individual when, subsequent to a lawful arrest and patdown, they have a reasonable suspicion that the individual is carrying a weapon or contraband. See Cuesta v. School Board of Miami-Dade County, 285 F.3d 962, 969-70 (11th Cir. 2002); Kennedy v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 901 F.2d 702, 716 (9th Cir. 1989); Sarnicola v. County of Westchester, 229 F. Sup. 2d 259, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (\\\"[w]hile the [United States Court of Appeals for the] Second Circuit has not spoken directly to the appropriate test for the validity of a strip search incident to a felony arrest, this Court recently opined that the Court of Appeals would apply the particularized reasonable suspicion test to searches of felony arrestees as well\\\").\\nAccordingly, we adopt the reasonable suspicion standard for strip searches incident to a lawful felony arrest. \\\"Reasonable and articulable suspicion is an objective standard that focuses not on the actual state of mind of the police officer, but on whether a reasonable person, having the information available to and known by the police, would have had that level of suspicion.\\\" (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wilkins, 240 Conn. 489, 496, 692 A.2d 1233 (1997). \\\"Thus, [reasonable and articulable suspicion is . . . based not on the officer's inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch, but [on] the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.\\\" (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Clark, supra, 255 Conn. 285, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).\\nA strip search requires independent analysis under the fourth amendment to determine whether the requisite reasonable suspicion exists. See Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1997). Fourth amendment jurisprudence prohibits unreasonable searches incident to an arrest. See Amaechi v. West, 237 F.3d 356, 361 (4th Cir. 2001). In determining whether a search is reasonable under the fourth amendment, a court must consider \\\"the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.\\\" Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979). The test for reasonableness \\\"requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.\\\" Id.\\nThe search in this case was supported by reasonable suspicion because the officers involved reasonably could have believed that the defendant was concealing contraband on his person. Brody testified that he conducted a patdown of the defendant to search for both weapons and contraband. The defendant was going in the direction of the restaurant he and Chrostowski had designated as their meeting place. The defendant began to approach the officer and came within feet of him when he suddenly stopped upon seeing Chrostowski's face. It was reasonable to assume that the defendant was meeting Chrostowski specifically for the purpose of selling drugs to the officer and that, therefore, he would have drugs on his person. Moreover, Brody clearly felt a bulge in the defendant's buttocks inconsistent with the male anatomy during the patdown after the arrest. The existence of reasonable suspicion further was supported by the nature of the charge itself, namely, attempt to sell a narcotic substance. See Kennedy v. Los Angeles Police Dept., supra, 901 F.2d 716 (reasonable suspicion may be based on factors such as nature of the offense).\\nA custodial arrest gives rise to the authority to search, even if the arresting officer does not \\\"indicate any subjective fear of the [defendant] or . . . suspect that [the defendant] was armed.\\\" United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236, 94 S. Ct. 467, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1973). \\\"The justification or reason for the authority to search incident to a lawful arrest rests quite as much on the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody as it does on the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use at trial. . It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and . in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a reasonable search under that amendment.\\\" (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 234-35. It was, therefore, of no moment that Brody was searching for weapons or contraband.\\nWe must also consider the manner in which the search was conducted. See Bell v. Wolfish, supra, 441 U.S. 559. Strip searches have been described as \\\"demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant, embarrassing, repulsive, signifying degradation and submission.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Swain v. Spinney, supra, 117 F.3d 6-7. \\\"Indeed, a strip search, by its very nature, constitutes an extreme intrusion upon personal privacy, as well as an offense to the dignity of the individual.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wood v. Clemons, 89 F.3d 922, 928 (1st Cir. 1996).\\nIn this case, the manner in which the officers conducted the strip search struck the appropriate balance between \\\"the need for the particular search\\\" and \\\"the invasion of personal rights . . . .\\\" Bell v. Wolfish, supra, 441 U.S. 559. The officers took the defendant to the side of the restaurant, away from the street and out of public view. Brody did not require him to remove any of his clothing, but rather pulled his pants and underwear away from his body specifically to retrieve the glassine packets he discovered and suspected were there from the patdown of the defendant.\\nOn the basis of the foregoing analysis, we hold that the court correctly denied the defendant's motion to suppress.\\nThe judgment is affirmed.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\\nThe defendant also claims a violation of his rights under article first, \\u00a7 8, of the constitution of Connecticut. \\\"Because the defendant has not briefed his claim separately under the Connecticut constitution, we limit our review to the United States constitution. We have repeatedly apprised litigants that we will not entertain a state constitutional claim unless the defendant has provided an independent analysis under the particular provisions of the state constitution at issue. . . . Without a separately briefed and analyzed state constitutional claim, we deem abandoned the defendant's claim . . . .\\\" (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pepper, 79 Conn. App. 1, 5 n.4, 828 A.2d 1269, cert. granted on other grounds, 266 Conn. 919, 837 A.2d 801 (2003).\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 54-lf (b) provides: \\\"Members of the Division of State Police within the Department of Public Safety or of any local police department or any chief inspector or inspector in the Division of Criminal Justice shall arrest, without previous complaint and warrant, any person who the officer has reasonable grounds to believe has committed or is committing a felony.\\\"\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 53a-49 (a) provides: \\\"A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of mental state required for commission of the crime, he: (1) Intentionally engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be; or (2) intentionally does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.\\\"\\nIn making its determination of whether the defendant took the necessary \\\"substantial step,\\\" the court contemplated that that the defendant was carrying heroin on his person while walking toward the restaurant. We note that this evidence could not have been discovered until after the defendant was arrested and subsequently searched, and, therefore, that evidence properly was not considered as establishing probable cause for the arrest. We conclude that the consideration of that evidence by the court was harmless, as there was other evidence to support the court's conclusion that the defendant's actions constituted a \\\"substantial step\\\" pursuant to General Statutes \\u00a7 53a-49 (a) (2).\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 54-33k provides: \\\"For the purposes of this section and section 54-331, 'strip search' means having an arrested person remove or arrange some or all of his or her clothing or, if an arrested person refuses to remove or arrange his or her clothing, having a peace officer or employee of the police department remove or arrange the clothing of the arrested person so as to permit a visual inspection of the genitals, buttocks, anus, female breasts or undergarments used to clothe said anatomical parts of the body.\\\"\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 54-33\\u00cd provides: \\\"(a) No person arrested for a motor vehicle violation or a misdemeanor shall be strip searched unless there is reasonable belief that the individual is concealing a weapon, a controlled substance or contraband.\\n\\\"(b) No search of any body cavity other than the mouth shall be conducted without a search warrant. Any warrant authorizing a body cavity search shall specify that the search is required to be performed under sanitary conditions and conducted either by or under the supervision of a person licensed to practice medicine in accordance with chapter 370.\\n\\\"(c) All strip searches shall be performed by a person of the same sex as the arrested person and on premises where the search cannot be observed by persons not physically conducting the search or not absolutely necessary to conduct the search.\\n\\\"(d) Any peace officer or employee of a police department conducting a strip search shall (1) obtain the written permission of the police chief or an agent thereof designated for the purposes of authorizing a strip search in accordance with this section and section 54-33k and (2) prepare a report of the strip search. The report shall include the written authorization required by subdivision (1) of this subsection, the name of the person subjected to the search, the name of any person conducting the search and the time, date and place of the search. A copy of the report shall be provided to the person subjected to the search.\\n\\\"(e) Nothing in this section shall preclude prosecution of a peace officer or employee under any other provision of the general statutes.\\n\\\"(f) Nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting any statutory or common law rights of any person for purposes of civil action or injunc-tive relief.\\n\\\"(g) The provisions of this section and section 54-33k shall not apply when the person is remanded to a correctional institution pursuant to a court order.\\\"\\nSenator DePiano was one of two chairmen of the judiciary committee in 1980. The other chairman, Representative Richard D. Tulisano, echoed the statements of Senator DePiano. \\\"Mr. Speaker, what this bill will do [is] restrict the manner in which strip searches may be conducted in that no person arrested for a motor vehicle violation or a misdemeanor can be strip searched . . . unless the arrest involves a weapon or a controlled substance and . . . there would be reasonable belief for an arresting officer to believe that an individual might be concealing a weapon o[r] controlled substances.\\\" 23 H.R. Proc., Pt. 5, 1980 Sess., p. 1130, remarks of Representative Richard D. Tulisano.\\n\\\"A 'strip search,' though an umbrella term, generally refers to an inspection of a naked individual, without any scrutiny of the subject's body cavities. A Visual body cavity search' extends to visual inspection of the anal and genital areas. A 'manual body cavity search' includes some degree of touching or probing of body cavities.\\\" Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556, 561 n.3 (1st Cir. 1985).\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"516521\", \"name\": \"The Town of Hartford vs. Julia Champion\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Town of Hartford v. Champion\", \"decision_date\": \"1886-11-26\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"436\", \"last_page\": \"440\", \"citations\": \"54 Conn. 436\", \"volume\": \"54\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:11:26.405108+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"The Town of Hartford vs. Julia Champion.\", \"head_matter\": \"The Town of Hartford vs. Julia Champion.\\nHartford District,\\nOct. T., 1886.\\nPark, C. J., Carpenter, Pardee, Loomis and Granger, Js.\\nThe statute {Gen. Statutes, p. 153, see. 4,) provides that where any resident tax-payer fails to give in a sworn list of his taxable property the assessors \\u201c shall fill out a list for him, putting therein all property which they have reason to believe is owned by him liable to taxation, at the actual value thereof, from the best information they can obtain, and add thereto ten per cent, of such valuation.\\u201d Held not necessary that the assessors should get knowledge of specific property kept back from taxation, but that it is \\u00e9nough if they ascertain the fact that property is thus kept back, and use their best judgment as to the amount and value of it.\\nIt is sufficient if, from information obtained by inquiry, and from their own judgment upon the general facts of the case, they come to the honest belief that property is thus kept back.\\nAssessors inserted the following item in a list thus filled out by them, after specifying other property:\\u2014\\u201cAll taxable property not specifically mentioned,$25,000.\\u201d Held to be legal.\\n[Argued October 6th,\\ndecided November 26th, 1886.]\\nAction to recover taxes; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County, and tried to the court before Andrews, J. Facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed. The case is fully stated in the opinion.\\nT. M. Maltbie and P. C. Bryant, for the appellant.\\nS. O. Prentice and J. H. Brocklesby, for the appellee.\", \"word_count\": \"1429\", \"char_count\": \"8036\", \"text\": \"Granger, J.\\nThis action is brought for the recovery of taxes as a debt due from the defendant to the plaintiff town, under the statute of 1881, (Session Laws of that year, ch. 101, sec. 2,) which provides that \\\" all taxes properly assessed may be recovered by any proper complaint or proceeding at law for the recovery of money as in other cases.\\\" The only question in the case is whether the taxes were \\\" properly assessed.\\\"\\nThe complaint alleges that the defendant on the first day of October, 1881, was a resident of the town of Hartford and liable to pay taxes in said town; that on that day she was the owner of a large number of shares of the capital stock of several insurance companies named; that she neglected to give in to the assessors a sworn list on or' before the first day of November, 1881, of the taxable property owned by her on said first day of October; that the assessors thereupon filled out a list for her, putting the insurar ce stocks above named at $86,665, and other property owned by her and liable to taxation at the sum of $25,000, and added ten per cent, of said valuations thereto. The complaint then proceeds to allege that the assessment list was never appealed from or changed, that a certain tax was duly laid by the town on the assessment list of that year, which was payable July 15th, 1882, and that the amount of the defendant's tax was $1,044.07, that the collector had since that date demanded the tax of her, but that she had never paid it, and that the tax was now due, with 'the interest and additions provided by law.\\nThe case was tried to the court. On the trial it appeared that the item of $25,000 was entered upon the defendant's assessment list as follows: \\\" All taxable property not specifically mentioned, $25,000.\\\"\\nUpon the argument of the case the counsel for the defendant asked the court to decide that the assessment so made against her was not legal, for the reason that it did not appear from the evidence that the assessors had any knowledge whatever of any property belonging to her for which she is set in the list at the sum of $25,000, under the head of \\\" all other taxable property not specifically mentioned,\\\" nor that they had any reasonable ground to believe that she had such property. And they asked the court to hold that there must be such facts shown to have been brought to the knowledge of the assessors, and upon which they acted, as would enable the court to see that the assessors either knew that the defendant actually had such property, or that they could reasonably believe that she had it; and that unless such facts had been shown the court ought to hold the assessment illegal and void. The court found that in filling out and making the assessment list for the defendant, the assessors, acting from the best information they were able to obtain, had reason to believe and did verily believe that she owned all the property set therein, and that the same was of the value at which it was assessed, and that it was liable to taxation. The court also found that the defendant on the first day of October, 1881, was a resident of the town of Hartford, and that all the paragraphs of the complaint were proved and true, and found the issue for the plaintiff and rendered judgment in its favor for the whole amount of the tax claimed, with the ten per cent addition, and interest at the rate provided by law'.\\nThe defendant appeals from this judgment and assigns the following reasons of appeal:\\n\\\" The assessment and tax is illegal and void, because,\\n\\\" 1st. The list of property of the defendant for taxation was not made as required by law.\\n\\\" 2d. Said list contained a large amount of property which did not exist, and which the assessors did not have reason to believe was owned by the defendant and liable to taxation.\\n\\\" 3d. Said list was not a list of the property of the defendant, or intended as such, but was fraudulently made with intent to injure and punish the defendant.\\n\\\" 4th. Said judgment is erroneous because it includes a tax upon a large sum improperly and illegally placed by the assessors in the list of property for taxation of the defendant.\\\"\\nThe substance of the defendant's reasons of appeal and of the claim made by her counsel in the argument before us, is, that the assessors had no right under the statute to put any property in the defendant's list unless they had definite knowledge of specific property which she owned and had failed to put into her list, and that such property must have been actually valued by them.\\nThe statute (Gen. Statutes, p. 153, sec. 4) provides that where any resident tax-payer faffs to give in a sworn list of his taxable property \\\" the assessors shall fill out a list for him, putting therein all property which they have reason to believe is owned by him liable to taxation, at the actual value thereof, from the best information they can obtain, and add thereto ten per cent, of such valuation.\\\"\\nUnder this statute the assessors are not limited to any particular source or means of information, or evidence of ownership or value; they are only required to act upon \\\" the best information they can obtain.\\\" This information they may obtain by inquiring of those who would be likely to knoiv, and from their own judgment upon the general facts of the case. It is sufficient if they ascertain enough to found upon it an honest belief that the tax-payer has taxable property which he keeps back from taxation. It is not necessary that they learn of and specify particular property. The object of the tax-payer is to keep his property out of sight and from the knowledge of the assessors. By frankly stating what he owns he avoids all danger of an unjust impression on the part of the assessors. If' they get at the fact that property is thus concealed by using their best judgment in the matter, and by inquiries that bring them to an honest belief on the subject, the tax-payer is in the circumstances in no position to make a reasonable complaint if they misjudge in the matter.\\nIt is expressly found that the assessors, in making the list, \\\" acted from the best information they were able to obtain, and had reason to believe, and did believe, that the defendant owned all the property set therein, and that it was of the value at which it was assessed.\\\" This finding we must regard as decisive of the proper action of the assessors in the matter.\\nThere is no error in the judgment appealed from.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"522082\", \"name\": \"Hill and others vs. Meeker\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Hill v. Meeker\", \"decision_date\": \"1855-10\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"211\", \"last_page\": \"219\", \"citations\": \"24 Conn. 211\", \"volume\": \"24\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:43:02.255516+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Hill and others vs. Meeker.\", \"head_matter\": \"Hill and others vs. Meeker.\\nA deed of land,not recorded, until after the death of the grantor, is valid against a purchaser from his heir at law, although such purchaser has no knowledge of the existence of the deed.\\nIn the year 1794, M gave a deed of land to H, who in the year 1800, deeded the same land to E, the daughter of H, and the wife of M. M continued in possession until 1831, when he died, leaving A, his only son and heir at law. From the death of M, A occupied said land until 1840, when, to secure certain notes, he mortgaged the premises to the plaintiffs\\u2019 ancestor, who had no knowledge of the existence of said deeds, to H and to E. and which remained unrecorded until 1850, when they were put on record, and E executed the deed, under which the defendants claimed title to the premises. Held, that A took nothing by inheritance, which he could convey, and that a bonajide purchaser, from him, who had no knowledge of said deeds to H and E, in an action of ejectment against the grantees of E, was not entitled to recover.\\nThis was an action of ejectment, brought to the superior court for Fairfield county, by William H. Hill and others, against Francis Meeker, to which the defendants pleaded the general issue.\\nThe plaintiffs, who were the children and heirs at law of John L. Hill, deceased, claimed title to the demanded premises by virtue of a mortgage deed, from Arza Meeker to said John L., conditioned for the payment of two promissory notes, together amounting to $5,900.\\nBy agreement of the parties, the finding of the committee, appointed by the court in the case of Hill and others v. Meeker, 23 Conn. R., 592, which was between the same parties, was made part of the record in the present case, so far as the same was applicable th\\u00e9reto.\\nThe case was thereupon submitted to the superior court, and by that court was reserved for the advice of this court.\\nA statement of the material facts in the case is embraced ' in the report of the committee, appointed in the former case, and in the opinion of the court in the present case.\\nButler 8f Carter and Averill, for the plaintiffs.\\nW F. Taylor and Ferry, for the defendants.\", \"word_count\": \"2763\", \"char_count\": \"15348\", \"text\": \"Hinman, J.\\nIn this action, the plaintiffs seek to recover two tracts of land, situated in Reading, which were deeded to their ancestor, John L. Hill, by a mortgage deed, executed December 4th, 1840, by Arza Meeker, to secure the payment of two notes, then due to the grantee, and now held by the plaintiffs, and which have not been paid. There is no controversy in respect to the title to most of the land demanded. But the dispute is confined to twenty acres, parcel of one of the tracts, to which the defendant claims that Arza Meeker never had any title, and consequently conveyed none, by his mortgage deed. The facts, respecting the title to this twenty acres, appear in the finding of the committee, appointed to find the facts, on a bill to foreclose the defendant's title to the same premises, which are demanded in this action. This finding, though made in another case, by the agreement of the parties, has been made a part of this case, so far as the facts thus found are applicable to it.\\nFrom this it appears, that Arza Meeker was the son and only heir of Jonathan Meeker, who owned all the land mentioned in the declaration, and in 1794, conveyed the twenty acres to Richard Hawley, arid Hawley, in 1800, conveyed the same twenty acres to his daughter, who was the wife of said Jonathan, and the mother of Arza. These two deeds were not recorded till January, 1850; but had been kept in the exclusive possession of Mrs. Meeker, until her husband's death, in 1831, when she gave them to her son, Arza, to be recorded; but he, without her knowledge, kept them in his possession till 1850, when they were taken to record. When Hill took his mortgage, he had no knowledge of the existence of these two deeds.\\nIt is apparent from these facts, that the only question is,' whether the unrecorded deed from Jonathan Meeker to Hawley, and the deed from Hawley to his daughter, so devested Jonathan of his title to the twenty acres, that, at his death, his son Arza took nothing, by inheritance, that he could convey, or mortgage to a bona fide purchaser, who had no knowledge of the deeds. The court are of opinion that they did so devest him of his title. We come to this opinion, from the language of the statute, requiring deeds to be recorded. By that statute, \\\" all grants and de\\u00e9ds of bargain and sale, and mortgages of houses and lands, shall be recorded at length, by the register, or town clerk, of the town where such lands and houses are ; and no deed shall be accounted good and effectual to hold such houses and lands against any other person or persons, but the grantor or grantors, and their heirs, unless recorded as aforesaid.\\\" \\u00ab'\\nNow, as it is by force of the statute alone, that deeds for any purpose are required to be recorded, it follows that they are as effectual without recording, as they were at common law, except so far as the statute has made them ineffectual. But, by the statute, they shall not be accounted good against any person but the grantor, or grantors, and their heirs. Of course, they remain good against the grantor and his heirs. Would the language have been any clearer, if it had expressly said that unrecorded deeds shall be good and effectual against the grantor and his heirs, but void against all others ? We can not think it would. Jonathan's deed, then, was good against him, he being the grantor; and it was good against Arza, his only heir, by force of the statute. But as it was good against Jonathan, he, at his death, had no title to transmit to his heir; and Arza, taking nothing by inheritance, had nothing that he could mortgage to Hill.\\nIt is said, however, that Jonathan Meeker, during his life, and his son afterward, appeared to the world as the owners of the twenty acres; and that their attaching creditors could levy upon the land, and that bona fide purchasers, without notice, under our recording' system, might lawfully take a conveyance of it, and that they could hold it against Mrs. Meeker, who had neglected to cause her deeds to be recorded. So far as Jonathan Meeker's creditors, or bona fide purchasers, were concerned, this was true undoubtedly. He once had a good title, and the record did not show that he had, in any way, parted with it; and the statute says, expressly, that no deed shall be good against any other person than the grantor and his heirs, unless it is recorded. Creditors and bona fide purchasers of Jonathan, not being his heirs, would, therefore, hold the title which he once had, and which the record did not show that he had been devested of. But we think there is a clear distinction between a purchaser from him, and one from his heir, Arza. In relation to a purchaser from Arza, the difficulty is, that he never had any title. The statute does not. operate to cast any title upon him, because his father's deed was not recorded, but the reverse, making the deed good against him, as his father's heir; and we do not see how his purchaser can acquire a title from him, which he never had. The object of the statute was to protect creditors and purchasers of the owners of land, from the effect of their grantors' unrecorded deeds. But to give it the effect of creating a title in an heir, when he never had any in fact, is, we think, going further than the language, or the spirit, of the act will justify.\\nFor these reasons, we advise the superior court, that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover the twenty acres, claimed by him.\\nIn this opinion, Storrs, J., concurred,\\\"\\nWaite, C. J.\\nJonathan Meeker, being the owner in fee of a farm of about one hundred and eighty acres, in the year 1794, executed a deed of twenty acres, parcel of the same, to Richard Hawley, who, in the year 1800, gave a deed of the same parcel to his daughter, Esther Meeker, the wife of Jonathan.\\nMeeker continued in possession of the whole, until the year 1831, when he died, leaving Arza Meeker, his only son and heir at law. Arza Meeker continued to occupy the farm, including the twenty acre tract, which had never been fenced off from the residue of the farm, until the year 1840, when he mortgaged the whole property to John L. Hill, to secure the payment of two promissory notes, amounting to nearly six thousand dollars.\\nThe deeds to Hawley and Mrs. Meeker were never recorded, until the year 1850, when she executed a deed of the twenty acre tract to Frederick W. Meeker and the defendant, under which deed the defendant claims title. Hill had no knowledge of the existence of the two deeds to Hawley and Mrs. Meeker, when the mortgage to him was given. The plaintiffs derive their title from him, and the question submitted to us, is, which party has the better title to the twenty acre tract; the plaintiffs, by virtue of the mortgage to Hill, or the defendant, under the deed to Hawley.\\nThe statute provides, that \\\" all grants, and deeds of bargain and sale, and mortgages of houses and lands, shall be recorded at length, by the register or town clerk of the town, where such lands and houses are; and no deed shall be good and effectual to hold such houses and lands, against any other person or persons, but the grantor or grantors, and their heirs, unless recorded, as aforesaid.\\\" Rev. Stat., p. 33.\\nThis statute was very critically and carefully considered, nearly forty years ago, by the supreme court of errors of this state, in the case of French v. Gray, and the principles there established, have ever since been considered as settling the true construction of the statute, and the law applicable to unrecorded deeds. 2 Conn. R., 92.\\nA majority of the court there held, that a deed of land, unrecorded, is no evidence of title, and, as such, can not be produced in court, against any other person than the grantor and his heirs. \\\"And \\\" they say, that \\\" such are the express words, and such has been the universal construction of the statute.\\\"\\nThat, \\\" until the deed is recorded, the fee in the land remains in the grantor, notwithstanding his deed; and any suit for the recovery of the land, from any person, other than the grantee, and those claiming under him, must be brought in his name; and a subsequent conveyance by him to a bona fide purchaser, without notice of the prior deed, who causes his deed to be first recorded, will pass the fee to him.\\\"\\nThe reason why a subsequent purchaser, with notice, shall be postponed to the prior grantee, is founded upon his fraud in taking the conveyance. For that reason it is treated as void against the prior grantee.\\nIn the case under consideration, it becomes necessary to consider only the effect and operation of the deed to Hawley, while it remained unrecorded, as that is the foundation of all the defendant's title, and if that fails, the whole superstructure falls. Hawley could convey no greater interest in the property to his daughter, than he acquired by virtue of his deed from her husband, the original owner.\\nNow the case cited conclusively shows, that so long as their deeds remained unrecorded, no title passed to either of them, and' the fee of the land continued in Jonathan Meeker, during his whole life. He alone could sustain an action for disseisin by a stranger, and he could convey to a bona fide purchaser, having no knowledge of his prior deed, an absolute and perfect title in fee. And so are all the authorities. And this, say the court in the case referred to, shows that the fee remained in him.\\nBut if he owned the fee, so that he could convey a perfect title, what became of his. interest when he died ? It could not, upon any. principle, pass to Hawley, were he living. Meeker's death could give no greater effect to his deed, executed more than thirty years previously, than it had when originally delivered.\\nBut the answer to the question is obvious. All the right, title, interest and estate of Jonathan Meeker, upon his decease, by virtue of the law of inheritance, passed to his son, as his heir at law. The latter acquired that interest in, and power over, the property which belonged to the father.\\nHence it follows, that any conveyance made, or mortgage given by the son, while Hawley's deed remained unrecorded, would stand precisely upon the same ground,' as a conveyance, or mortgage, made by the father, in his lifetime. And according to all the authorities, had the mortgage to Hill been given by the father, it would have been perfectly good, as against Mrs. Meeker, and all persons claiming under her. And I am unable to see, why precisely the same effect is not to be given to the deed of the heir.\\nBut even admitting that, after the deed to Hawley, the fee, strictly speaking, did not remain in Meeker, yet it can not be denied, that he retained such an interest in the property, by whatever name it may be called, as that he could give a valid mortgage, or convey an absolute estate in fee simple. The authorities lip\\u00f3n this subject are all one way. What then became of that interest, upon his decease, unless it descended to his heir at law ?\\nThis court have repeatedly said, that it is the policy of our law, that all conveyances of real estate, shall be made to appear on record, for the benefit of the parties and all others interested. The object is to prevent fraud, and give security and stability to title. And says Williams, C. J., \\\" Our courts have ever considered it their duty to give such a construction to our statutes, as will continue this salutary protection.\\\" Pettibone v. Griswold,,, 4 Conn. R., 158. North v. Belden, 13 Conn. R., 380.\\nSo far as my researches have extended, this is the first case in the whole history of our jurisprudence, in which it has ever been holden, that an unrecorded deed shall defeat the title of a bona fide purchaser or mortgagee, having no knowledge of the existence of any such deed, unless it were recorded within a reasonable time.\\nThere is nothing in the present case, calling for any particular sympathy, in favor of either the defendant or Mrs. Meeker. She suffers the deed from her husband, under which she claims title, to be kept from the records, for more than half a century; its existence, so far as the case shows, unknown to the world, with the exception of the parties, herself, and her son. During all this time, the husband and son continue in possession, with nothing indicating any title in her, except her right of dower in her husband's estate.\\nIn the mean time, her son, being the heir of the person who had the record title, mortgages to Hill, a bona fide creditor to a large amount, having no knowledge of the existence of the deeds under which she claims title, and seeing nothing to awaken any suspicion upon that subject.\\nSome ten years after this mortgage was given, she causes her deeds to be recorded, and a conveyance to be made, to enable her son to carry out the fraud practiced upon Hill. In my opinion, neither she, nor the defendant, has any law or any equity upon their side. It is better, far better, that she should suffer by such gross \\u2022 negligence, than that, in the language of Chief Justice Williams, \\\" the valuable provis ions of our statute, relating to the recording of deeds, should be nullified, or its vitality impaired.\\\" Hart v. Chalker, 14 Conn. R., 81.\\nJudgment for the defendants.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"529070\", \"name\": \"State of Connecticut v. John Cimino\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Cimino\", \"decision_date\": \"1976-09-22\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"747\", \"last_page\": \"747\", \"citations\": \"171 Conn. 747\", \"volume\": \"171\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:46:14.187186+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"State of Connecticut v. John Cimino\", \"head_matter\": \"State of Connecticut v. John Cimino\\nGeorge Papasoglou, in support of the defendant\\u2019s petition.\\nGuy W. Wolf III, in support of the state\\u2019s petition.\\nSubmitted August 23\\ndecided September 22, 1976\", \"word_count\": \"65\", \"char_count\": \"419\", \"text\": \"The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Session of the Superior Court is denied.\\nThe state's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Session of the Superior Court is denied.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"529114\", \"name\": \"Rebecca Berman Falk et al. v. Bernard B. Schuster\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Falk v. Schuster\", \"decision_date\": \"1976-04-27\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"5\", \"last_page\": \"12\", \"citations\": \"171 Conn. 5\", \"volume\": \"171\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:46:14.187186+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Rebecca Berman Falk et al. v. Bernard B. Schuster\", \"head_matter\": \"Rebecca Berman Falk et al. v. Bernard B. Schuster\\nHouse, C. J., Cottee, Loiselle, Bogdan,ski and Barbee, Js.\\n(Two judges dissenting)\\nArgued February 11\\ndecision released April 27, 1976\\nJames R. Greenfield, with whom was James F. Cirillo, Jr., for the appellant (defendant).\\nRichard L. Goldblatt, with whom was Malcolm L. Rashba, for the appellees (plaintiffs).\", \"word_count\": \"1893\", \"char_count\": \"10885\", \"text\": \"Bogdanski, J.\\nThe plaintiffs, heirs-at-law of David R. Pogolofsky, deceased, appealed to the Superior Court from the admission of the decedent's will to probate. The will provided that the entire estate was to pass to Ida Schuster and her husband, the defendant Bernard B. Schuster, one of the owners of Schuster's Express which employed the testator for a period of twenty-six years prior to his death. The plaintiffs claimed that the testator lacked sufficient testamentary capacity to execute the will, and that the will was the product of undue influence exerted upon the testator by the defendant. A jury returned a general verdict finding the will to be invalid, and from the judgment rendered the defendant has appealed, assigning error in the court's refusal to strike the case from the jury docket, in its submission of the issue of testamentary capacity to the jury without sufficient evidence, and in its refusal to submit interrogatories to the jury.\\nThe defendant first claims that the trial court erred in permitting the case to be tried to a jury. The pleadings were closed on December 14, 1970. On March 30, 1973, a claim for a jury of six was filed by the plaintiffs, and the clerk's office entered the case on the jury docket. In August of 1973, and again at the start of trial, the defendant moved that the case be stricken from the jury docket because the claim for a jury had not been filed within the period prescribed by \\u00a7 52-215 of the General Statutes. Those motions were denied.\\nSection 52-215 of the General Statutes provides that certain cases shall be entered in the docket as jury cases upon the written request of either party made to the clerk within thirty days after the return day or within ten days after an issue is joined. Any time thereafter, a case may be entered on the jury docket by consent of all parties or by order of the court. The defendant contends that since the request for a jury was not filed within the statutory period, the clerk should not have entered the case as a jury case; that the court's refusal to strike the case from the jury docket constituted an abuse of discretion; and that, in any event, the court's denial of the motion to strike could not be considered the same as a court order to place the case on the docket as required by the statute.\\nIt is undisputed that this ease was erroneously entered on the jury docket in the first instance, and that the plaintiff's claim for a jury could have been granted only if the court, in the exercise of its discretion, so ordered. Rowell v. Ross, 91 Conn. 702, 708, 101 A. 333. The issue of whether the plaintiffs were to be afforded a jury trial, however, was raised by the defendant's motions to strike, and, after hearing the parties, the court determined in the exercise of its discretion that the ease should remain on the jury docket. That determination by the court had the same effect as the granting of a motion to place the case on the docket would have had in the first instance, and we are presented with no facts indicating that the court abused its discretion. For the court to have required a specific motion to place the case on the jury docket would have been inappropriate. The case was already there.\\nWe next consider the defendant's claim that the court erred in refusing to submit interrogatories to the jury. The record reveals that the subject of interrogatories had been discussed in chambers, and that none of the parties had indicated a desire to have interrogatories submitted. After the charge had been completed, however, the defendant, claiming that he was surprised by the court's extensive charge with respect to testamentary capacity, and particularly with respect to insane delusions, sought to have interrogatories submitted. The court refused the request.\\nThe trial court has wide discretion in allowing interrogatories. \\\"For obvious reasons, the request for interrogatories should be made before argument, and counsel should be given an opportunity to make proper comment thereon.\\\" Meglio v. Comeau, 137 Conn. 551, 555, 79 A.2d 187; see Keeler v. General Products, Inc., 137 Conn. 247, 252, 75 A.2d 486; Smith v. Waterbury & Milldale Tramway Co., 99 Conn. 446, 452, 121 A. 873. The court did not abuse its discretion in the present case.\\nThe defendant's final claim is that since there was no evidence from which the jury could have reasonably found that the decedent was suffering from insane delusions or that he otherwise lacked testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed, the court erred in submitting those issues to the jury. The defendant, as the proponent of the will, had the burden of proof with respect to testamentary capacity, and the evidence which he offered on that issue was not undisputed. See, e.g., Berkeley v. Berkeley, 152 Conn. 398, 402-403, 207 A.2d 579. The plaintiffs produced evidence from which the jury could have reasonably found that the testator was unaware of the natural objects of his bounty. The unusual nature of the disposition to the defendant and his wife in disregard of the natural objects of his bounty was itself some evidence tending to show that the testator lacked testamentary capacity. Maroncelli v. Starkweather, 104 Conn. 419, 426, 133 A. 209; Crandall's Appeal, 63 Conn. 365, 28 A. 531. Moreover, substantial evidence was presented from which the jury could have found that the decedent was suffering from insane delusions and that those delusions influenced the making of the will. The question of testamentary capacity, therefore, was appropriately submitted to the jury, and the court's charge on that issue was correct in law and well adapted to the facts of the case.\\nThere is no error.\\nIn this opinion Loiselle and Barber, Js., concurred.\\nThere was testimony that the testator believed that one of his closest and most intimate friends had gone through his belongings in search of bankbooks when he had been ill, and that another close friend had borrowed $6000 from him which had not been repaid. There was evidence that those beliefs were false, that a reasonable man could not have held them under the circumstances, and that they influenced the making of the will.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"530811\", \"name\": \"Nedra C. Baker v. Carleton B. Baker\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Baker v. Baker\", \"decision_date\": \"1974-06-25\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"476\", \"last_page\": \"490\", \"citations\": \"166 Conn. 476\", \"volume\": \"166\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:59:25.948277+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Nedra C. Baker v. Carleton B. Baker\", \"head_matter\": \"Nedra C. Baker v. Carleton B. Baker\\nHouse, O. J., Shapiro, Loiselle, MacDonald and Bogdanski, Js.\\nArgued May 8\\ndecision released June 25, 1974\\nWesley W. Horton, with whom, on the brief, was William R. Moiler, for the appellant (defendant).\\nPaul W. Orth, for the appellee (plaintiff).\", \"word_count\": \"4127\", \"char_count\": \"24407\", \"text\": \"MacDonald, J.\\nBy complaint dated July 23,1970, the plaintiff, Nedra C. Baker, sought a legal separation from her husband, the defendant, Carleton B. Baker, on the ground of intolerable cruelty. By an amendment to her complaint dated August 17, 1971, the plaintiff altered her prayer for relief insofar as it sought a legal separation, substituting therefor a prayer for a divorce. The defendant contested the action and, by way of a special defense, asserted that the court was without jurisdiction to decide the matter in that neither party was domiciled in Connecticut. The matter was referred to Hon. Raymond E. Baldwin, a state referee, who, acting as the court, denied the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, granted the plaintiff a divorce and ordered lump sum alimony in the amount of $239,746 and a conveyance to the plaintiff of the defendant's half interest in certain property in Maine. The defendant has appealed from that judgment and also has appealed from a contempt judgment rendered against him in June, 1973, for failure to make support payments to the plaintiff during the pend-ency of the appeal as ordered by the referee.\\nThe defendant has made one of those wholesale attacks upon the finding which this court repeatedly has criticized and, apparently in vain, has attempted, to discourage. Southern New England Contracting Co. v. State, 165 Conn. 644, 646, 345 A.2d 550; Pawlinski v. Allstate Ins. Co., 165 Conn. 1, 3, 327 A.2d 583. He has assigned as error the refusal of the referee to find the facts set forth in ten paragraphs of his draft finding, the inclusion in the finding of thirty-eight paragraphs claimed to have been found without evidence and the inclusion of six paragraphs apparently alleged to have been found in language of doubtful meaning. He also assigned error in the reaching of twelve conclusions claimed to be unsupported by the subordinate facts, the overruling of seven claims of law and a ruling on evidence. The defendant, however, to some extent has simplified and clarified the basis of his appeal by abandoning some of his claims and by focusing primarily upon the following three issues: (1) whether the court had jurisdiction to grant the divorce; (2) the amount of the alimony award; and (B) the propriety of the contempt judgment.\\nThe finding, which is not subject to material correction, reveals the following relevant facts: The plaintiff came to Connecticut from Maine in 1944 and in 1946 went to work for the defendant at the Simsbury Airport, which the defendant then owned. She was the only employee in the office, where she did bookkeeping and general clerical work. The plaintiff and the defendant worked long hours, including many weekends and evenings, and by the mid-1950s they had brought the airport from financial uncertainty to solidity. In March, 1957, just prior to their marriage, the defendant bought in his own name a residence on Willard Street in Simsbury, where the parties lived after the marriage. In 1962 they bought in their joint names a summer home on Chebeague Island in Maine where they spent long weekends. After their marriage the airport increased in size, activity and financial worth, a success to which the plaintiff's efforts contributed substantially. The defendant also acquired most of his other assets, including stocks, bonds and bank accounts, after the marriage. For her efforts at the airport the plaintiff was paid a weekly salary, which at the time of the separation in June, 1970, was $125. She used this money to buy clothing for herself and the defendant, food, and furnishings for the house in Simsbury, which she decorated largely from her own earnings.\\nIn the summer of 1969 the parties spent a considerable amount of time socializing with Mr. and Mrs. Norman Ross, who also vacationed on Chebeague Island. The defendant became enamored of Mrs. Ross, and, in the fall and winter of 1969-70 and the spring of 1970, they were often together, surreptitiously, in motels and elsewhere. In July, 1970, Mrs. Ross left her husband and children and later began to live secretly with the defendant.\\nThe defendant sold his airport business in May, 1970, for $450,000, accepting $100,000 in cash and a $350,000 mortgage payable in five annual instalments of $70,000 each. The plaintiff worked temporarily for the new owner of the Simsbury Airport from May to early July, 1970, in order to set up the records and break in a new girl for the office work. Upon leaving this work, the plaintiff told the new owner that she intended to come back from her summer home in Maine and would contact him and return to work. On or about July 10,1970, she went to Maine, intending to come back to Connecticut after some vacation. She had neither husband nor job in Simsbury to return to during the summer, so she stayed on the Maine island all summer. She did not intend to make her domicil in Maine, but only to spend a portion of the summer there after the defendant left her. In October, 1970, she returned to the Simsbury residence for a day or so and went there again in December, 1970, for about a week, hoping that a reconciliation might be possible. In May, 1971, she spent about two weeks in the Sims-bury house with her sister, and spent about a week there again in October, 1971, March, 1972, and May, 1972. Most of the rest of the time she stayed with and took care of her mother, who was not well, at the mother's home in Westbrook, Maine. Although the plaintiff did not like to live alone in the house in Simsbury because of certain needed repairs and water conditions on the premises, she did consider it her residence. Prior to the defendant's sale of the home in July, 1972, the plaintiff was there, packed up her things and had her furniture moved from there into storage in Hartford to await her final decision as to where to locate, knowing that the defendant intended to sell the house.\\nFor some years prior to bringing this action, and until the time of trial, the plaintiff had her car registered in Connecticut, maintained bank accounts in Simsbury and was a registered voter and actually voted there. Most of her friends are in the Sims-bury area and she is still considering returning there, depending on her mother's health. Until the divorce was granted, the plaintiff intended to remain in Connecticut. She was domiciled in Connecticut and had been for more than the statutory period at the time this action was begun and at no time prior to its institution had she abandoned her Connecticut domicil.\\nIn August, 1970, the defendant still had business affairs at the Simsbury Airport. He had four accounts in Connecticut banks which were garnished on July 24, 1970. Furthermore, the deed from and mortgage to him regarding the airport sale had not yet been recorded, so the plaintiff attached this real estate on July 24, 1970. The defendant found the writ, summons and complaint at the Simsbury premises a few days after the sheriff made abode service on July 28,1970, and gave the papers to his attorney, who entered a general appearance.\\nIn late August or early September, 1970, the defendant instituted a divorce action in Maine against the plaintiff and she obtained counsel in Maine. After a hearing on November 17, 1970, the Maine action was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, neither party having the requisite Maine residency, and the Maine court awarded the plaintiff $250 in attorney's fees. Prior to this hearing, the defendant sent mail to the plaintiff at the Simsbury house. Shortly after the hearing, the plaintiff's Maine attorneys rendered her a bill for services, some of which were of assistance to her Connecticut counsel. This hill was paid partly by the plaintiff, partly by the defendant, and partly by the plaintiff's Connecticut attorneys. The plaintiff's Maine attorneys continued to render assistance to her Connecticut attorneys, at their request, and submitted bills totaling $3081.13 for such services, which remain unpaid because of the plaintiff's lack of funds. These bills were reasonable and necessary in connection with the plaintiff's Connecticut action.\\nIt was at the defendant's request or insistence that the plaintiff amended her prayer for relief in this action from a legal separation to a divorce. The defendant did not file the financial affidavit required by \\u00a7 380 of the Practice Book at any time, nor did he testify fully under oath as to his total estate. He did not answer the plaintiff's lengthy disclosure motion concerning his finances and was found in contempt for failure so to comply. The defendant thus forced the plaintiff to prove his assets as best she could. In addition to the above facts, the referee also made numerous findings relating to the financial status of the parties which, for the sake of brevity, will not be reproduced herein.\\nFrom the foregoing the referee concluded that the plaintiff was a resident of Connecticut at the time of the commencement of her divorce action; that she did not abandon her Connecticut domicil at any time prior to the hearing; that all amendments to her complaint were proper, related back to the date of the original complaint and were within the discretion of the court to grant; that the defendant also was a resident of Connecticut, at lea.st until August, 1970, after he had received the divorce papers; and that the court had jurisdiction over the divorce action and the power to make all orders incident to a divorce. It was also concluded that the allegations of the complaint had been proved, that the plaintiff should be granted a divorce, and that the defendant should pay for the services of the plaintiff's Maine counsel and $239,746 in lump sum alimony and should convey to the plaintiff his one-half interest in the property on Chebeague Island. The defendant has assigned error in all of these conclusions.\\nThe referee's conclusions are tested by the finding; State v. Villafane, 164 Conn. 637, 638, 325 A.2d 251; Brauer v. Freccia, 159 Conn. 289, 293, 268 A.2d 645; and they must stand unless they are legally or logically inconsistent with the facts found or unless they involve the application of some erroneous rule of law material to the case. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Bovey, 162 Conn. 201, 205-6, 292 A.2d 899; Johnston Jewels, Ltd. v. Leonard, 156 Conn. 75, 79, 239 A.2d 500.\\nThe primary claim of the defendant is that the court lacked jurisdiction to grant a divorce to the plaintiff. In support of this proposition he advances three arguments: first, that since, at the institution of this action, there was abode service only, the plaintiff was required to prove that the defendant was domiciled in Connecticut at the commencement of the action, which, according to the defendant, she did not do; second, that whether or not there was an adequate jurisdictional basis at the institution of the action, the plaintiff's amendment to her prayer for relief constituted a new cause of action requiring a new jurisdictional determination, and neither party was domiciled in Connecticut at the time of the amendment; and, finally, that one of the parties must be domiciled in tbis state at the time of trial and at the time the decree is entered. We find no merit to these claims.\\nInsofar as the defendant's first argument is concerned, \\u00a746-15 of the General Statutes, in effect at the time of this action, controlled the residence requirement for jurisdiction over an action for either a divorce or a legal separation. See \\u00a7 46-29 Section 46-15, in the clearest possible terms, established the date of the complaint as the determinative date for jurisdictional purposes and merely required continuous residency by the plaintiff for one year next before that date as a basis for jurisdiction. The facts found by the referee clearly support his conclusion that the plaintiff had been domiciled in Connecticut for more than the required statutory period at the commencement of this action. Moreover, the defendant clearly waived any defects of jurisdiction at that point by filing a general appearance. Beards ley v. Beardsley, 144 Conn. 725, 729, 137 A.2d 752; Amato v. Campano, 141 Conn. 247, 250, 105 A.2d 185; Fine v. Wencke, 117 Conn. 683, 684, 169 A. 58.\\nThe defendant's second jurisdictional argument, that the amendment to the prayer for relief constituted a new cause of action and thus established a new jurisdictional date, also appears to us to be without merit. It is well settled that amendments, unless they allege a new cause of action, relate back to the date of the complaint. Kelsall v. Kelsall, 139 Conn. 163, 165, 90 A.2d 878; Motiejaitis v. Johnson, 117 Conn. 631, 638, 169 A. 606; Onofrio v. Cirusuolo, 109 Conn. 521, 524, 147 A. 36; Reilly v. Antonio Pepe Co., 108 Conn. 436, 445, 143 A. 568; World Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Alliance Sandblasting Co., 105 Conn. 640, 644, 136 A. 681; LaBarre v. Waterbury, 69 Conn. 554, 556, 37 A. 1068. While the plaintiff argues, with some justification, that the defendant should be estopped from asserting this claim in that it was at his request or insistence that the prayer for relief was amended so as to ask for a divorce rather than a legal separation, in light of the view we take of this claim it is unnecessary to decide that issue. The amendment, altering as it did only the prayer for relief, clearly did not change the factual bases or series of transactions upon which the complaint was based. Moreover, an examination of \\u00a7 46-29, which then governed legal separation, reveals that it was inextricably intertwined with the statutes governing divorces, referring repeatedly to divorce in terms of jurisdiction, grounds, effect and orders for alimony, custody, support and allowances. The statutes governing legal separations \\\"were intended to, and do, supplement the statutes governing divorces.\\\" Lee v. Lee, 145 Conn. 355, 359, 143 A.2d 154. \\\"The presumption is that the legislature, in adopting an act, does so in view of existing relevant enactments and with the intention that the act be read with them so as to make one consistent body of law.\\\" Wilson v. West Haven, 142 Conn. 646, 654, 116 A.2d 420. Thus, we are dealing with what, for all practical purposes, amounts to one statutory and factual action and not two disparate causes of action. See Grady v. Kennedy, 145 Conn. 579, 585, 145 A.2d 124; Reilly v. Antonio Pepe Co., supra, 444; Moran v. Bentley, 71 Conn. 623, 629, 42 A. 1013; Howland v. Couch, 43 Conn. 47, 52. Consequently, the amendment related back to the date of the complaint and that is the date determinative of the court's jurisdiction.\\nThe defendant, in his final attack on the court's jurisdiction, maintains that Litvaitis v. Litvaitis, 162 Conn. 540, 546, 295 A.2d 519, requires that one of the parties be domiciled in the state at the time of trial and at the time the decree is entered. Litvaitis concerned the recognition by this state of a foreign divorce, in that case one obtained in Mexico, with all the well-known difficulties attendant thereto, and it has nothing whatever to do with this case. As previously noted, \\u00a7 46-15 established the date of the complaint as the date when jurisdiction is to be determined and the court had jurisdiction at that time. We see nothing in the statutes pertaining to divorce that would support the defendant's novel assertion. In the absence of an express statutory provision to the contrary, it is well settled that if the plaintiff in a suit for a divorce satisfies the residency requirements at the time of commencing proceedings, the court's jurisdiction will survive the plaintiff's change of domicil. 24 Am. Jur. 2d, .Divorce and Separation, \\u00a7 256; note, 7 A.L.R.2d 1414-17; cf. note, 89 A.L.R. 1203.\\nThe defendant next challenges the referee's award of alimony. \\\"The primary basis for an award of alimony is the continuing duty of a divorced husband to support a wife whom, in legal contemplation, he has abandoned. Stoner v. Stoner, 163 Conn. 345, 354, 307 A.2d 146; Shrager v. Shrager, 144 Conn. 483, 487, 134 A.2d 69; Cary v. Cary, 112 Conn. 256, 260, 152 A. 302; Wright v. Wright, 93 Conn. 296, 300, 105 A. 684. The amount of alimony awarded under a decree of divorce is within the sound discretion of the trial court, taking into account the circumstances of the case such as the amount of the estate of the husband, his income, his age, health and earning capacity and the age, health, station and separate estate of the wife. Heard v. Heard, 116 Conn. 632, 636, 166 A. 67; see also Riccio v. Riccio, 153 Conn. 317, 319, 216 A.2d 431; Felton v. Felton, 123 Conn. 564, 567, 196 A. 791.\\\" Hotkowski v. Hotkowski, 165 Conn. 167, 170, 328 A.2d 674. \\\"An abuse of judicial discretion will be reviewed on appeal in this as in other cases, but trial courts have a distinct advantage over an appellate court in dealing with domestic relations, where all of the surrounding circumstances and the appearance and attitude of the parties are so significant.\\\" LaBella v. LaBella, 134 Conn. 312, 318, 57 A.2d 627.\\nAlthough the defendant appears to have briefed only his claim that the value of the Maine attorneys' bills should not have been considered as a factor in determining the amount of the award, we have reviewed the finding and the award as a whole in light of these well-settled principles. As noted, the referee found that the defendant never filed the financial affidavit required by \\u00a7 380 of the Practice Book nor did he testify fully as to his total estate. Moreover, he did not answer the plaintiff's disclosure motion concerning his finances. He thus left the plaintiff to prove his assets as best she could. Despite this burden, the evidence introduced by the plaintiff sufficiently supports the referee's finding that the defendant had assets of \\\"at least\\\" $733,595. \\\"Where a defendant has by his wrongful conduct made the calculation of damages difficult, he will not be heard to urge such difficulty as a reason for not assessing by approximation.\\\" Crowell v. Palmer, 134 Conn. 502, 510, 58 A.2d 729. Additionally, the defendant did admit, at trial, to assets totaling $510,078. When the efforts of the wife in building up the value of the airport, an asset worth, in and of itself, $450,000, are considered, an award to her of less than half of the admitted assets can hardly be held to be an abuse of the referee's discretion.\\nThe referee found that the bills of the plaintiff's Maine attorneys were for services which either were requested by the plaintiff's Connecticut attorneys or assisted them in the prosecution of this action. He also found that these services were incidental to and reasonable and necessary in connection with the present action. Moreover, the referee did not consider the bills as specific items of definite amounts, but only as a matter to be considered in fixing the final amount of alimony. The allowance of counsel fees is a matter which calls for the exercise of judicial discretion; Stoner v. Stoner, supra; and the fact that the court takes into account out-of-state counsel fees, reasonably related to the action within this state, cannot be considered an abuse of that discretion.\\nThe defendant, lastly, seeks to contest the contempt judgment rendered against him for failure to make support payments to the plaintiff during the pendency of this appeal. There is no assignment of error, however, directed toward this issue and we are not bound to consider any error not specifically assigned. Practice Book \\u00a7 652; Shakro v. Haddad, 149 Conn. 160, 163, 177 A.2d 221; Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc. \\u00a7 167.\\nThere is no error.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\\nThe defendant, in his brief, prefaces this \\\"shotgun attack\\\" on the finding with an \\\"argument\\\" which comes perilously close to- being an attack on the integrity and impartiality of the referee sitting as a court in preparing the finding. While we refrain from concluding that such was the implication intended to be drawn from the innuendoes contained therein, we do not hesitate to express our disfavor of the contents of this purported \\\"argument.\\\"\\nThe defendant concedes in his brief that the finding \\\"in large part complies technically with the Practice Book.\\\" He nonetheless proceeds to attack large portions of that finding. Several of these claims were not briefed and are considered abandoned. State v. Brown, 163 Conn. 52, 55, 301 A.2d 547; Holt-Look, Inc. v. Zoning & Planning Commission, 161 Conn. 182, 184, 286 A.2d 299.\\nInsofar as the defendant's requested additions to the finding are concerned, either they are not admitted or undisputed or they are implicit in the finding, immaterial, or would not directly affect the ultimate facts upon which the judgment depends, so that no additions are warranted. Salvatore v. Milicki, 163 Conn. 275, 277, 303 A.2d 734. To secure an addition to the finding the defendant must point to some part of the appendix, the pleadings or an exhibit properly before us which discloses that the plaintiff admitted the truth of the fact or that its validity was conceded to be undisputed. Randolph Construction Co. v. Kings East Corporation, 165 Conn. 269, 271 n.1, 334 A.2d 464; Stoner v. Stoner, 163 Conn. 345, 347, 307 A.2d 146. A fact is not admitted or undisputed merely because it has not been contradicted. Practice Book $ 628 (a); Malarney v. Peterson, 159 Conn. 342, 344, 269 A.2d 274.\\nA review of the remaining claims, that facts were found without evidence or in language of doubtful meaning, indicates that they amount \\\" 'to nothing more than a request that we accept . . . [his] version of the facts. . . .' Broderick v. Shea, . . . [143 Conn. 590, 592, 124 A.2d 229].\\\" Salvatore v. Milicki, 163 Conn. 275, 278, 303 A.2d 734. This is particularly true with regard to those paragraphs challenged as being in language of doubtful meaning. \\\"Such correction will rarely be made and never for the mere purpose of substituting language of counsel for that of the court.\\\" Practice Book $628 (b).\\n\\\"[General Statutes] See. 46-15. residence necessary for jurisdiction. If the plaintiff has not continuously resided in this state one year next before the date of the complaint, it shall be dismissed unless the cause of divorce has arisen subsequently to the removal into this state, or unless the defendant has continuously resided in this state one year next before the date of the complaint and actual service has been made upon him, or unless the plaintiff was domiciled in this state at the time of the marriage and before instituting the complaint returned to this state with the intention of permanently remaining. For the purpose of this section, any plaintiff who has served or is serving with the armed forces, as defined by section 27-103, or the merchant marine, and who was a resident of this state at the time of Ms entry shall be deemed to have continuously resided in this state during the time he has served or is serving with said armed forces or merchant marine.\\\"\\nThis section has since been repealed by Public Acts 1973, No. 73-373, \\u00a743.\\nSection 46-29 also was repealed by Public Acts 1973, No. 73-373,\\n\\\"[General Statutes] See. 46-29. legal separation. In any case in which a divorce might be decreed, the superior court, on petition of the party who would be entitled to a divorce, may decree a legal separation of the parties, which separation shall have in all respects the effects of a divorce, except that the parties shall not thereby be made free to marry any third person and except as hereinafter provided. Upon such petition the procedure shall be the same as in actions for divorce, and the court shall have the same power in all matters relating to temporary and permanent orders for alimony, custody and support of children, and to allowances, as in cases of divorce. The parties to such action may at any time resume marital relations, upon filing with the clerk of the superior court for the county in which the separation was decreed their written declaration of such resumption, signed, acknowledged and witnessed. Such declaration shall be entered upon the docket, under the entries relating to such petition.\\\"\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"530975\", \"name\": \"The City National Bank of Connecticut v. Gustaf T. Appelberg et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"City National Bank v. Appelberg\", \"decision_date\": \"1974-05-07\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"678\", \"last_page\": \"678\", \"citations\": \"166 Conn. 678\", \"volume\": \"166\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:59:25.948277+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"The City National Bank of Connecticut v. Gustaf T. Appelberg et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"The City National Bank of Connecticut v. Gustaf T. Appelberg et al.\\nRaymond F. Ross, pro se, on the motion.\\nNo appearance for the appellants (defendants Gustaf T. and Jean Appelberg).\\nArgued May 7\\ndecided May 7, 1974\", \"word_count\": \"60\", \"char_count\": \"342\", \"text\": \"The motion by Raymond F. Ross, Trustee, to dismiss the appeal from the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County is granted.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/conn/532924.json b/conn/532924.json
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+"{\"id\": \"532924\", \"name\": \"Raymond A. Plouffe v. New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Plouffe v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad\", \"decision_date\": \"1971-03-03\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"482\", \"last_page\": \"492\", \"citations\": \"160 Conn. 482\", \"volume\": \"160\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:36:46.111969+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Raymond A. Plouffe v. New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Raymond A. Plouffe v. New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company et al.\\nAlcorn, C. J., House, Thim, Ryan and Shapiro, Js.\\nArgued February 5\\ndecided March 3, 1971\\nJohn J. Mahon, for the appellant (plaintiff).\\nJackson T. King, Jr., for the appellant (intervening plaintiff Fred B. Clark Corporation).\\nJoseph P. Cooney, with whom, on the brief, was David T. Ryan, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).\", \"word_count\": \"2712\", \"char_count\": \"16315\", \"text\": \"House, J.\\nThis action was brought in five counts. The first two were directed against the town of East Hampton and we are not concerned with them on this appeal. The third and fourth counts were directed against the named railroad defendant and its trustees in reorganization. The fifth count was directed against The Penn Central Company which, it was alleged, had assumed the obligations and liabilities of the New Haven Railroad. The third count alleged that the New Haven Railroad trustees were charged with the duty of operating that railroad, that as trustees they \\\"owned, controlled, maintained and operated\\\" a railroad which passed under Flat Brook Road, a public highway in East Hampton, that some time prior to April 27, 1968, they caused a wooden bridge \\\"to be legally placed upon\\\" that road in order to maintain and operate the railroad and allow vehicles to cross the road, that on and for a long time prior to that date they were charged with the proper care, maintenance \\\"and/or\\\" repair of the bridge and that on April 27, 1968, the plaintiff was operating a truck across the bridge when it collapsed, causing injuries to him. It is also alleged that the bridge was then and, for a long time prior thereto had been, in a dangerous and defective condition and that the defendant trustees knew or should have known of the condition and neglected to remedy the defective condition. It is further alleged that the collapse of the bridge and the plaintiff's injuries were due to the negligence and carelessness of the defendant trustees, their agents, servants \\\"and/or\\\" employees in that they caused, allowed, \\\"and/or\\\" permitted the bridge to be constructed and maintained in a defective, unsafe and dangerous manner, in that they maintained it so that it was a trap and inherently dangerous to users, and in that they failed to inspect, repair and maintain the bridge in a safe condition and warn members of the public of the dangerous and hazardous conditions. The fourth count, directed against the New Haven Railroad only, incorporated the general allegations of the third count with respect to the condition of the bridge and the duties and actions of the trustees in constructing and maintaining the bridge and also alleged that the accident was due to the fault of the railroad in creating and maintaining the bridge as a nuisance. The fifth count, directed against The Penn Central Company, alleged that as it had assumed the obligations and liabilities of the New Haven Railroad, including those alleged in the third and fourth counts, the plaintiff would seek from it satisfaction for any judgment \\\"and/or\\\" settlement to which he might be entitled as a result of the claims alleged in those counts. The complaint, as amended, also alleged that on May 9,1968, the plaintiff had given to the New Haven Railroad notice of the accident and his intention to hold that railroad liable for his damages. A copy of the notice was annexed to the amended complaint as an exhibit.\\nThe plaintiff's employer, having paid workmen's compensation to the plaintiff, on June 6, 1969, filed an intervening complaint repeating all the allegations in the five counts of the plaintiff's complaint. See General Statutes \\u00a7 31-293. The writ, summons and complaint were dated April 16, 1969, and made returnable to the Superior Court on the first Tuesday of June, 1969. On June 10, 1969, the defendant trustees and the New Haven Railroad filed a joint answer to the third, fourth and fifth counts of the complaint and a similar answer to the intervening complaint. In brief, they admitted the corporate existence of the New Haven Railroad, the status of the trustees charged with the duty of operating it and that the trustees had been ordered to turn over all the assets of the New Haven Railroad to The Penn Central Company. They denied all the allegations regarding the bridge and pleaded no knowledge as to the plaintiff's alleged accident and injuries.\\nOn the same date on which they filed their answers, June 10, 1969, the defendant trustees and the New Haven Railroad filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that there was no genuine issue of any material fact with respect to the nonliability of these defendants. With the motion they filed two affidavits executed by former employees of the New Haven Railroad. The purport of the affidavits was that in 1966 the railroad tracks had been removed from beneath the Flat Brook Road bridge, that the railroad under the bridge had been abandoned upon removal of the tracks and that a letter to that effect dated January 19,1966, had been written to the first selectman of the town of East Hampton with a copy to the public utilities commission.\\nOn June 26, 1969, when the motion came on for hearing, the plaintiff filed a pleading entitled \\\"Objection Of The Plaintiff Raymond A. Plouffe To The Defendants' . . . Motion For Summary Judgment On The Complaint And Intervening Complaint.\\\" The pleading stated that the plaintiff \\\"claims that there is a genuine issue as to any material fact with respect to the liability of said defendants\\\", referred to an \\\"explanatory affidavit\\\" submitted with the motion and moved that the motion for summary judgment be denied or the court order a continuance in order to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had to ascertain the facts. The only affidavit submitted by the plaintiff was one executed by his attorney. The purport of the affidavit was that neither the plaintiff nor his counsel had any personal knowledge as to the facts stated in the defendants' affidavits, that those facts were within the exclusive knowledge of the defendant railroad and the plaintiff was still in the process of investigating the defendants' claims and the questions of law arising from the facts recited in those affidavits. It further asserted that the plaintiff's complaint alleged causes of action sounding in common-law negligence and nuisance as well as a cause of action based on statutory liability and that since the affidavits of the defendants contained no facts relative to the common-law causes of action the motion for summary judgment should be denied. The affidavit concluded with a request that the court deny the motion for summary judgment or order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained, motions for disclosure and production to be filed, \\\"and/ or\\\" depositions to be taken in order to ascertain the truth of the facts as set forth in the defendants' motion for summary judgment.\\nOn August 28, 1969, the court granted the motion for summary judgment for the defendant trustees and New Haven Railroad and, suo motu, directed the entry of summary judgment for The Penn Central Company on count five of the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs had no legal standing against that company in the absence of such standing against the New Haven Railroad and its trustees. While the court did not expressly deny the plaintiff's motion for a continuance, such a denial is implicit in the decision it reached and the memorandum of decision states: \\\"The plaintiff has had ample opportunity to put in issue and to question the veracity of the subject matter of the two affidavits submitted by the moving defendant railroad and its trustees.\\\" From the judgment rendered the plaintiffs have taken this appeal.\\nSummary judgment procedure is an attempt to dispose of cases involving sham or frivolous issues in a manner which is speedier and less expensive for all concerned than a full-dress trial. We have recently discussed the proper procedure in such cases as McColl v. Pataky, 160 Conn. 457, 280 A.2d 146; Dowling v. Kielak, 160 Conn. 14, 273 A.2d 716; United Oil Co. v. Urban Redevelopment Commission, 158 Conn. 364, 260 A.2d 596; and Dorazio v. M. B. Foster Electric Co., 157 Conn. 226, 228, 253 A.2d 22. Until 1963, summary judgment in Connecticut was very narrowly restricted but the 1963 Practice Book greatly expanded the scope of the procedure with the adoption of new rules substantially similar to the procedure provided in the federal rules. See Practice Book \\u00a7297-306 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. This accounts for the comparative lack of Connecticut cases dealing with the subject and the special precedential value of federal cases and authoritative comments thereon.\\nWithout attempting to summarize the general principles and rules which govern summary judgment procedure, it suffices for the purpose of deciding the merits of this appeal to note the basic errors in the trial court proceedings.\\nThe first mistake was made by the defendants. Although their motion for summary judgment recited that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact with respect to the nonliability of the defendants, their supporting affidavits were limited to proof of the single fact that the tracks under the bridge had been removed. These affidavits, even if sufficient to support a judgment on the statutory liability basis of the complaint in the light of such cases as Sawicki v. Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co., 129 Conn. 626, 30 A.2d 556; DeCapua v. New Haven, 126 Conn. 558, 13 A.2d 581; and Middletown v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 62 Conn. 492, 27 A. 119, a matter which we do not now decide, did not even purport to show the nonexistence of all the issues of fact raised by the pleadings relating to common-law negligence and nuisance. \\\"The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to judgment as a matter of law. The courts hold the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact.\\\" 6 Moore, Federal Practice (2d Ed.) 56.15 [3]. The defendants' affidavits did not attempt to show that there was no genuine issue of fact arising from the contested common-law negligence and nuisance allegations that the defendants caused the bridge to be improperly constructed and maintained in a defective, unsafe and dangerous manner, and failed to make reasonable inspections and maintain the bridge in a reasonably safe condition. Since these factual issues, contested in the pleadings and not even referred to in the defendants' affidavits, remained unresolved, the court was clearly in error in granting the motion for summary judgment. Also, even if the affidavits submitted by the defendants sufficed to support a partial judgment pursuant to the provisions of \\u00a7 305 of the Practice Book despite the defendants' improper piecemeal attack upon the causes of action alleged in the complaint, the court should not have decided the merits of the limited motion without affording the plaintiffs a reasonable opportunity to investigate the factual and legal questions raised by the defendants' affidavits and to submit counter affidavits if the result of their investigations warranted it.\\nAs we have already noted, after the filing of the defendants' motion for summary judgment with supporting affidavits the plaintiff filed a motion that either the defendants' motion be denied or that he be granted a continuance in order to permit counter affidavits to be obtained or discovery be had to ascertain the truth of the facts alleged in those affidavits. Such a motion is authorized by \\u00a7 301 of the Practice Book. The affidavit accompanying this motion recited that the facts set out in the defendants' affidavits relative to the removal of the tracks as well as to the construction, maintenance and control of the bridge were within the exclusive knowledge of the moving defendants, that the plaintiff was in the process of investigating the claims set forth in those affidavits and researching the issues of law raised by the facts therein recited. The affidavit properly set forth what steps were being taken to acquire the information desired. See Dorazio v. M. B. Foster Electric Co., supra, 230. Of course, the bare recital in the plaintiff's motion that a genuine issue of material fact did exist was of no aid to the plaintiff in contesting the merits of the defendants' motion. \\\"It is not enough that one opposing a motion for a summary judgment claims there is a genuine issue of material fact; some evidence showing the existence of such an issue must be presented in the counter affidavit.\\\" Hartmann v. Smith, 158 Conn. 613, 614, 259 A.2d 645; Kasowitz v. Mutual Construction Co., 154 Conn. 607, 613, 228 A.2d 149. The circumstances, however, disclosed in the plaintiff's affidavit and the complexity of the legal issues raised by the factual situation disclosed in the defendants' affidavits, limited though those facts were, warranted favorable action by the court on the plaintiff's motion for a reasonable continuance. The general principle is well stated in 6 Moore, Federal Practice (2d Ed.) ft 56.24, referring to federal rule 56(f), of which our Practice Book \\u00a7 301 is the counterpart: \\\"Where, however, the party opposing summary judgment timely presents his affidavit under Rule 56(f) stating reasons why he is presently unable to proffer evidentiary affidavits he directly and forthrightly invokes the trial court's discretion. Unless dilatory or lacking in merit, the motion should be liberally treated. Exercising a sound discretion the trial court then determines whether the stated reasons are adequate. And, absent abuse of discretion, the trial court's determination will not be interfered with by the appellate court.\\\" Both federal rule 56(f) and Practice Book \\u00a7301 indicate that considerations of equity should govern the decision of the trial court in deciding the merits of such motions for a continuance. Both authorize a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had and \\\"such other order as is just.\\\" Under the circumstances disclosed by the affidavit filed with the plaintiff's motion for a continuance we are impelled to conclude that the court abused its discretion in refusing a reasonable continuance to permit the plaintiffs to investigate the truth of the facts contained in the defendants' affidavits and research the legal issues raised thereby.\\nTwo other assignments of error require brief mention. Since the affidavits submitted by the defendants did not even attempt to contest the truth of all the material allegations of fact contained in the plaintiff's complaint and denied by the defendants' answer, the plaintiff was under no obligation to establish by counter affidavit the truth of the unattacked allegations. By contesting the existence of only one material fact, the existence of which is not conclusive on the merits of the entire case, a party moving for summary judgment cannot place on the other party the burden of submitting affidavits to establish the truth of other pleaded material facts which the moving party has not attacked. See Vale v. Bonnett, 191 F.2d 334, 336, 337 (D.C. Cir.). Nor, contrary to the claims of the defendants and the ruling of the trial court, does Practice Book \\u00a7 301 require that affidavits in support of a request for a continuance be affidavits \\\"by\\\" the party opposing the motion for summary judgment. The rule provides that such affidavits be those \\\"of a party\\\" opposing the motion. We do not construe this language as limiting permissible affidavits only to statements subscribed and sworn to by the party himself as distinguished from any sworn statement obtained by or for the party and submitted in his behalf. See Chung Wing Ping v. Kennedy, 294 F.2d 735, 736 (D.C. Cir.); Edward B. Marks Music Corporation v. Stasny Music Corporation, 1 F.R.D. 720, 721 (S.D. N.Y.).\\nThere is error, the judgment is set aside and the ease is remanded to be proceeded with according to law.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"535695\", \"name\": \"Pauline D'Agostino Cuccuro v. City of West Haven\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Cuccuro v. City of West Haven\", \"decision_date\": \"1986-03-26\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"804\", \"last_page\": \"804\", \"citations\": \"199 Conn. 804\", \"volume\": \"199\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:01:54.407611+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Pauline D\\u2019Agostino Cuccuro v. City of West Haven\", \"head_matter\": \"Pauline D\\u2019Agostino Cuccuro v. City of West Haven\\nPeter F. Culver, in support of the petition.\\nDecided March 26, 1986\", \"word_count\": \"37\", \"char_count\": \"226\", \"text\": \"The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 6 Conn. App. 265, is denied,\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"5487817\", \"name\": \"JOHNSON LEE v. WILLIAM M. DUNCAN ET AL.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Lee v. Duncan\", \"decision_date\": \"2005-04-05\", \"docket_number\": \"AC 24840\", \"first_page\": \"319\", \"last_page\": \"330\", \"citations\": \"88 Conn. App. 319\", \"volume\": \"88\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Appellate Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Appellate Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:58:00.716856+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"JOHNSON LEE v. WILLIAM M. DUNCAN ET AL.\", \"head_matter\": \"JOHNSON LEE v. WILLIAM M. DUNCAN ET AL.\\n(AC 24840)\\nBishop, DiPentima and McLachlan, Js.\\nArgued January 14\\nofficially released April 5, 2005\\nAlan R. Spirer, for the appellant (plaintiff).\\nJeffrey R. Babbin, with whom was Aaron Singer, for the appellees (defendants).\", \"word_count\": \"3322\", \"char_count\": \"20189\", \"text\": \"Opinion\\nDiPENTIMA, J.\\nThe plaintiff, Johnson Lee, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants, William M. Duncan and Patricia M. Duncan. Although the plaintiff raises several issues on appeal, the dispositive one is whether the defendants had notice of the plaintiffs interest in a condominium unit at the time they purchased it. We conclude that they did not and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.\\nThe background facts and procedural history are not in dispute. This appeal involves a condominium complex known as the Waterford of Greenwich. The plaintiff was a former developer of the complex. During foreclosure proceedings, the plaintiff and BSB Greenwich Mortgage Limited Partnership (BSB) entered into an agreement regarding the uncompleted complex, which was incorporated into an amended stipulated judgment of strict foreclosure entered in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut on April 28, 1995. Paragraph thirty of that judgment provided the plaintiff an option on the \\\"final unsold unit\\\" of the complex.\\nOn June 6,1995, a certificate of foreclosure was filed in the Greenwich land records indicating that BSB had acquired \\\"absolute\\\" title to the Waterford complex. It made no mention of the plaintiffs option. In addition, the plaintiff recorded an uncertified copy of the amended stipulated judgment of strict foreclosure in the land records on January 3, 1996. The copy was incorrectly indexed in both the grantor and grantee indices with the plaintiff as the grantor and BSB as the grantee. It also incorrectly identified the property as located on Valley Drive.\\nBSB subsequently developed, marketed and sold the complex units. In late January, 1998, the defendants entered into a purchase and sale agreement with BSB for the purchase of unit one for $1,275,000. At the time, two other units remained unsold. Those two units were later sold, the closings of which occurred on February 26, 1998. Thus, as of February 26, 1998, the last unsold unit in the complex was unit one.\\nThroughout March, 1998, the plaintiff and BSB exchanged correspondence regarding the plaintiffs right to unit one pursuant to paragraph thirty of the stipulated judgment. By letter dated March 27, 1998, the plaintiff informed BSB that \\\"I am entitled to a unit, as originally agreed. . . . [BSB] should deed me [unit one] to complete our agreement.\\\" Despite the plaintiffs claim, BSB proceeded with the sale of unit one to the defendants, never informing them of the plaintiffs option pursuant to the stipulated judgment or his March 27, 1998 claim to unit one.\\nPrior to closing, the defendants purchased a title insurance policy from the Chicago Title Insurance Company (title insurer). The title commitment attached to the policy made no reference to the stipulated judgment or to any interest that the plaintiff might claim in the unit. Likewise, the statutory warranty deed signed by Roderick O'Connor, vice president of BSB, was silent as to the plaintiffs interest. Moreover, on April 17,1998, O'Connor executed a unit owner's affidavit stating that \\\"there are no tenants or other persons who are in possession or have a right to possession of this unit\\\" and that there were no applicable rights of first refusal. O'Connor also completed an owner's special title and survey report, in which he represented that no person had \\\"claimed to have any interest in [the] property . . . which you dispute and do not recognize as being a valid claim.\\\" The defendants closed on the property on April 17, 1998.\\nAlmost one year later, by complaint dated March 30, 1999, the plaintiff filed an action in the Superior Court against the defendants, alleging rights to unit one superior to those of the defendants. The defendants, in turn, filed a third party complaint against BSB, claiming indemnification under the statutory warranty deed and alleging fraud concerning the affidavits provided by BSB at the closing. On March 31, 1999, the plaintiff initiated proceedings in the United States District Court against BSB, seeking an order in aid of enforcement of the stipulated judgment. The District Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff against BSB in the amount of $1,275,000 with interest of 10 percent per year from April 17, 1998, until payment.\\nIn his action against the defendants, the plaintiff sought an order requiring them to convey to him \\\"all of their right, title and interest to [u]nit [one],\\\" as well as compensatory damages. In response, the defendants raised seven special defenses. Both the defendants and the plaintiff filed motions for summary judgment. By memorandum of decision dated October 31, 2003, the court rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendants on three separate grounds. From that judgment the plaintiff appeals.\\nThe plaintiff claims that the court improperly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate when \\\"the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.\\\" (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Barrett v. Montesano, 269 Conn. 787, 791-92, 849 A.2d 839 (2004). \\\"Our review of the trial court's decision to grant [a] motion for summary judgment is plenary.\\\" LaFlamme v. Dallessio, 261 Conn. 247, 250, 802 A.2d 63 (2002).\\nIn its memorandum of decision, the court concluded that the defendants lacked either actual or constructive notice of the plaintiffs claimed right. We consider each in turn.\\nI\\n\\\"[OJne who has actual notice of equitable rights not of record is nevertheless bound to recognize them.\\\" Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 Conn. 232, 240, 193 A. 769 (1937). The plaintiff acknowledges that the defendants were not personally aware of the plaintiffs claimed right at the time of closing. Rather, the plaintiff posits that the title insurer was an agent of the defendants. Because the title insurer allegedly had knowledge of the plaintiffs claimed right, the plaintiff contends that that knowledge must be imputed to the defendants.\\nThe burden of proving agency is on the party asserting its existence. New England Whalers Hockey Club v. Nair, 1 Conn. App. 680, 683, 474 A.2d 810 (1984). \\\"An essential factor in an agency relationship is the right of the principal to direct and control the performance of the work by the agent. \\\" McLaughlin v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 164 Conn. 317, 322, 321 A.2d 456 (1973); see also Gateway Co. v. DiNoia, 232 Conn. 223, 240, 654 A.2d 342 (1995). Such control is lacking in the present case. The purchase and sale agreement between BSB and the defendants required the defendants to accept \\\"such title to the [u]nit as [the title insurer] would be willing to approve and insure . . . .\\\"\\nA title insurance policy is a contract of indemnity under which the insurer agrees to indemnify the insured in a specified amount against loss through defect of title to real estate. See Cohen v. Security Title & Guaranty Co., 212 Conn. 436, 439, 562 A.2d 510 (1989). Accordingly, the relationship between an insurance company and the insured is essentially contractual. See 11 L. Russ & T. Segalla, Couch on Insurance (3d Ed. 1998) \\u00a7 159:5; Walker Rogge, Inc. v. Chelsea Title & Guaranty Co., 116 N.J. 517, 540, 562 A.2d 208 (1989).\\n\\\"[A] policy of title insurance does not represent an agreement or assurance that a contingency insured against will not occur, but, generally, promises to pay damages, if any, caused by any defects to title that the title company should have discovered but did not . . . .\\\" 11 L. Russ & T. Segalla, supra, \\u00a7 159:8. Investigation of the title to a particular property prior to issuance of a policy is done not to protect the interests of the insured, but rather the insurer. As the Texas Court of Civil Appeals explained: \\\"[T]he company, before issuing a policy of title insurance, must necessarily take steps to inform itself of the status of the title to be insured. . In performing these activities, the company does not act in behalf of the party to be insured, but acts exclusively for itself. Therefore, up to the point where the insurance company commits itself to issue a policy upon certain conditions, the unilateral conduct of the insurance company or its agents in investigating the title does not create an agency relationship.\\\" Tamburine v. Center Savings Assn., 583 S.W.2d 942, 948-49 (Tex. Civ. App.) (writ refused, October 24, 1979). Likewise, the Arkansas Supreme Court has held that title searches are \\\"undertaken to allow [the insurance company] to determine the risk and liabilities against which they were insuring. Thus, any acts of negligence in the title search . . . should not have been imputed to [the policyholders] because no agency relationship was present.\\\" Newberry v. Scruggs, 336 Ark. 570, 575, 986 S.W.2d 853 (1999).\\nThis court has neither been presented with nor has it found any authority indicating that a title insurance company's activities in investigating the title to a particular property prior to the issuance of a policy necessarily creates an agency relationship. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that a title insurance company's activities in investigating the title to a particular property prior to issuance of a policy does not constitute an agency relationship between the insurance company and the insured. Accordingly, the plaintiffs claim must fail.\\nII\\nWe turn now to whether the defendants had constructive notice of the plaintiffs interest in the unit. \\\"[E]very person who takes a conveyance of an interest in real estate is conclusively presumed to know those facts which are apparent upon the land records concerning the chain of title of the property described in the conveyance . . . .\\\" Beach v. Osborne, 74 Conn. 405, 412, 50 A. 1019 (1902). \\\"The law implies notice on the ground that it is conclusively presumed that a person will not purchase an interest in a piece of land without examining the condition of the record. Such an act would be required by common prudence.\\\" Hunt v. Mansfield, 31 Conn. 488, 490-91 (1863).\\nThe plaintiff concedes that a certified copy of the stipulated judgment of strict foreclosure was never filed in the Greenwich land records. Thus, paragraph thirty of that judgment, from which originates the plaintiffs claimed right in unit one, is not contained in the land records.\\n\\\"It has always been the policy of our law that the land records should be the authentic oracle of title on which a bona fide purchaser . . . might safely rely.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Peckheiser v. Tarone, 186 Conn. 53, 57, 438 A.2d 1192 (1982). The plaintiff nevertheless asserts that the filing of a certified copy of the stipulated judgment of strict foreclosure was unnecessary because a certificate of foreclosure was filed in the land records. His argument is flawed for several reasons.\\nThe plaintiffs argument would require the defendants to look beyond the Greenwich land records. That proposition runs contrary to over a century of jurisprudence holding that one searching title to land is not bound to search the records at large, but is bound with only such facts as appear in the chain of title to the particular lot in question. Powers v. Olson, 252 Conn. 98, 108, 742 A.2d 799 (2000); Kulmacz v. Milas, 108 Conn. 538, 542, 144 A. 32 (1928); Wheeler v. Young, 76 Conn. 44, 51, 55 A. 670 (1903).\\nIn addition, the certificate of foreclosure filed on the land records stated that BSB had acquired \\\"absolute\\\" title to the Waterford complex. The plaintiffs argument would not only force the defendants to look beyond the land records, but further would have them disregard the express representations contained therein. Such a result undermines the integrity of our recording system. \\\"The maintenance of our system of registry of titles is of the greatest public importance, and he who acts in reliance upon the record has behind him not only the natural equities of his position, but also the especial equity arising from the protection afforded every one who trusts the record.\\\" Goldberg v. Parker, 87 Conn. 99, 108, 87 A. 555 (1913).\\nFinally, the filing of a certified copy of the stipulated judgment of strict foreclosure was required under Connecticut law. General Statutes \\u00a7 47-36 provides in relevant part that \\\"if any judgment, order or decree of any United States court . . . affects any title to or rights concerning land situated in this state, the instrument evidencing or describing that claim or a certified copy of that judgment, order or decree, or a lis pendens giving notice thereof as authorized by section 52-325 may be recorded in the land records of the town in which the land is situated and may be indexed and released in the same manner as other claims, judgments, orders or decrees. Until so recorded, that claim, judgment, order or lis pendens shall not be effective against the land or constitute constructive notice thereof.\\\"\\nIn its memorandum of decision, the court stated that \\\"[t]he language of the statute is clear that until a certified copy of such a judgment is recorded on the land records,\\\" no constructive notice may be found. It is undisputed that no certified copy of the stipulated judgment of strict foreclosure was filed. The plaintiff claims that failure to be of no moment. He reads \\u00a7 47-36 to require the filing of either a certified copy of the judgment or a notice of lis pendens. Because he filed a notice of lis pendens during the foreclosure proceedings, he claims to have complied with the statute. We disagree.\\nThe plaintiff misconstrues the purpose behind the notice of lis pendens. A lis pendens is a prejudgment remedy \\\"intended to preserve the property until the [court] had an opportunity to hear fully the case and render a final judgment.\\\" Ravitch v. Stollman Poultry Farms, Inc., 162 Conn. 26, 35, 291 A.2d 213 (1971). A notice of lis pendens warns all persons that certain property is the subject matter of litigation and that any interests acquired during the pendency of the action are subject to its outcome. See 5 H. Tiffany, Real Property (3d Ed. 1939) \\u00a7 1294; see also General Statutes \\u00a7 52-325 (a). Accordingly, \\\"any party whose interest in the property arose during the interim period is subject to the final judgment.\\\" 14 R. Powell, Real Property (2004) \\u00a7 82A.01 (1). \\\"Generally, the doctrine of lis pen-dens is not applicable to a sale after the proceeding in question has finally been passed upon, even if the litigation ends in a settlement agreement . . . .\\\" 51 Am. Jur. 2d, Lis Pendens \\u00a7 59 (2000). \\\"Lis pendens ends ordinarily with the entry of a final decree from which no appeal is taken.\\\" 5 H. Tiffany, supra, \\u00a7 1296; see also Hartford Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Stage Harbor Corp., 181 Conn. 141, 144-45, 434 A.2d 341 (1980); Ravitch v. Stollman Poultry Farms, Inc., supra, 34; Ghent v. Meadowhaven Condominium, Inc., 11 Conn. App. 276, 286, 823 A.2d 355 (2003); Vance v. Lomas Mortgage USA, Inc., 263 Ga. 33, 36, 426 S.E.2d 873 (1993); Eich v. Czervonko, 330 Ill. 455, 459, 161 N.E. 864, cert. denied, 278 U.S. 642, 49 S. Ct. 37, 73 L. Ed. 557 (1928); Aldrich v. Chase, 70 Minn. 243, 246, 73 N.W. 161 (1897); Arrington v. Arrington, 114 N.C. 151, 159, 19 S.E. 351 (1894); Gaugert v. Duve, 244 Wis. 2d 691, 707, 628 N.W.2d 861 (2001).\\nIn the present case, the defendants acquired no interest in the subject property during the pendency of the foreclosure proceedings. Rather, they acquired an interest three years after the stipulated judgment of strict foreclosure had entered. Although \\u00a7 47-36 permits the filing of a notice of lis pendens during the pendency of legal proceedings, it does not obviate the need for the filing of a certified copy of the judgment once those proceedings have concluded.\\nThe plaintiff in this case was required to file in the Greenwich land records a certified copy of the stipulated judgment of strict foreclosure. That he failed to do. Accordingly, the court properly concluded that the defendants possessed neither actual nor constructive notice of the plaintiffs claimed right to the condominium unit they purchased.\\nThe judgment is affirmed.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\\nParagraph thirty provides in relevant part: \\\"If the gross sales proceeds of 21 of the 22 Unsold Units . are less than $26,500,000.00, [the plaintiff] shall have the option to purchase the remaining completed Unsold Unit for the amount by which the gross sales proceeds are less than $26,500,000.00. [The plaintiff] shall have a period of 30 days after notice from BSB of the sale of 21 of the remaining 22 Unsold Units in which to exercise said option and close upon the purchase of said remaining unit, time being of the essence. If the gross sales proceeds are less than $26,500,000.00 as aforesaid and in the event that [the plaintiff] elects not to exercise said option or otherwise fails to exercise said option, BSB shall sell the final Unsold Unit and pay to [the plaintiff] the amount by which the gross sales proceeds of all units sold by BSB exceed $26,500,000.00 but in no event shall such payment to [the plaintiff] exceed $1,000,000.00. In the event that the gross sales proceeds of 21 of the 22 remaining Unsold Units within the Waterford Property equal or exceed $26,500,000.00, BSB shall convey the final completed Unsold Unit to [the plaintiff]. During the time that Unsold Units are being marketed, BSB will keep [the plaintiff] reasonably informed as to marketing and sales. Any conveyance to [the plaintiff] pursuant to this paragraph shall be by Quit-Claim Deed as is and where is, as to both its physical condition and state of title with no representations or warranties whatsoever.\\\"\\nThe special defenses were: (1) the doctrine of unclean hands; (2) the doctrine of laches; (3) the statute of limitations; (4) the doctrines of waiver and estoppel; (5) the stipulated judgment of strict foreclosure failed to comply with the statute of frauds; (6) the defendants lacked actual or constructive notice of the plaintiffs claimed interest in the unit and were bona fide purchasers for value; and (7) the stipulated judgment of strict foreclosure was improperly, erroneously and inaccurately recorded or indexed in the land records.\\nThe court found that (1) the \\\"imprecision and uncertainty\\\" concerning the final unsold unit rendered paragraph thirty of the stipulated judgment unenforceable, (2) the defendants lacked actual and constructive notice of the plaintiffs claimed right, and (3) by \\\"pursuing his claim for damages and obtaining a judgment against BSB, the plaintiff elected to abandon his claim to the unit's title.\\\"\\nThe plaintiff provided no evidentiary support for that allegation.\\nSeven months after the certificate of foreclosure was filed in the land records, the plaintiff attempted to file an uncertified copy of the stipulated judgment of strict foreclosure.\\nIn Hawley v. McCabe, 117 Conn. 558, 563, 169 A. 192 (1933), the plaintiff claimed \\\"that it is the duty of one searching a title to go beyond the records in the chain of title, and by historical research acquaint himself with the situation at the time each deed was made.\\\" Our Supreme Court rejected that proposition, noting that it was \\\"too broad a statement of the duty of the title searcher.\\\" Id.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"558269\", \"name\": \"State of Connecticut v. Robert Watson\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Watson\", \"decision_date\": \"1986-02-11\", \"docket_number\": \"11330\", \"first_page\": \"598\", \"last_page\": \"617\", \"citations\": \"198 Conn. 598\", \"volume\": \"198\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:08:31.173639+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"State of Connecticut v. Robert Watson\", \"head_matter\": \"State of Connecticut v. Robert Watson\\n(11330)\\nPeters, C. J., Healey, Shea, Dannehy and Callahan, Js.\\nArgued December 3, 1985\\ndecision released February 11, 1986\\nLouis S. Avitabile, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).\\nPatricia A. King, deputy assistant state\\u2019s attorney, with whom was John A. Connelly, state\\u2019s attorney, for the appellee (state).\", \"word_count\": \"5769\", \"char_count\": \"34984\", \"text\": \"Peters, C. J.\\nThe principal issue in this appeal is a determination of the circumstances under which a court must initiate an evidentiary inquiry into a defendant's competency before accepting his guilty plea or denying a motion to withdraw such a plea. The defendant, Robert Watson, a/k/a Ollie Ricketts, Jr., was charged, in a two count substitute information, with the crimes of unlawful restraint in the first degree in violation of General Statutes \\u00a7 53a-95 (a) and sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes \\u00a7 53a-70 (a). The trial court, after a canvass, accepted the defendant's plea of guilty to each count. On the date set for sentencing, the defendant moved to withdraw his pleas of guilty. The court denied the motion and imposed a total effective sentence of not less than eight nor more than sixteen years.\\nThe defendant, in his appeal to this court, raises four issues. The defendant claims that the trial court erred: (1) in finding that the defendant's pleas of guilty were voluntary without sufficiently inquiring into the defendant's mental capacity to enter into a plea; (2) in denying the defendant effective assistance of counsel on his motions to withdraw his guilty pleas by failing to allow the defendant to obtain substitute counsel; (3) in denying the defendant's motion that his request to withdraw his guilty pleas be heard by another judge; and (4) in denying the defendant's motions to withdraw his pleas for lack of mental capacity without an evidentiary hearing. We find no error.\\nI\\nThe pleas of guilty whose validity the defendant now challenges arose under the following circumstances. The defendant had originally been charged not only with sexual assault but also with kidnapping in the first degree. Motions relating to these charges were heard beginning November 20,1981, and jury selection was begun on November 25, 1981. On December 9, 1981, in the midst of the jury selection process, the defendant informed the court that he wished to plead guilty to a substitute information in accordance with a plea bargain. The state filed a substitute information reducing the charge of kidnapping, a class A felony, to one of unlawful restraint, a class D felony. The state also agreed to enter a nolle prosequi with respect to other pending charges against the defendant upon imposition of a recommended sentence to imprisonment for an effective term of not less than eight nor more than sixteen years.\\nAt the hearing at which the defendant entered his guilty pleas pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970), the state offered the following factual basis for the pleas. At about 12:30 a.m. on February 21, 1981, the victim was accosted by two black men as she was using a public telephone. The men forced her into their car and drove her to a wooded area where each of them sexually assaulted her. The victim escaped from the car and found a state trooper to assist her. The state trooper immediately reported the incident to the Waterbury police, including in his report the victim's description of the men, their car and the car's license number. Approximately twenty minutes later, the defendant and a male companion were stopped in Woodbridge not far from the scene of the assault. The car they were driving matched the victim's description. Medical evidence obtained at a hospital examination of the victim corroborated a sexual assault. The victim identified the defendant, in a photo array, as one of the men who had assaulted her. She also identified the car which the defendant had been driving when he was stopped as the car in which she had been sexually assaulted.\\nThe court conducted the canvass required by Practice Book \\u00a7 711 through 713 to determine whether the defendant's pleas were knowing, voluntary and intelligent. After it had made an inquiry into the defendant's educational history, the court asked the defendant about his medical history. In response to the court's questions, the defendant indicated that he was not presently under medication, that he had been treated for psychosis for the past eight months, that he had recently been taking one hundred fifty milligrams of Elavil and seventy-five grams of Mellaril, and that the last time he had received medication by prescription was two days earlier when he had taken fifty milligrams of Elavil. The defendant informed the court that his medication had been prescribed for him by an unidentified psychiatrist at the \\\"state jail.\\\" The court thereupon asked the defendant whether he felt that the medication in any way impaired his present ability to reason, to understand the proceeding against him, or to make decisions on the matters before the court. The defendant replied, \\\"No.\\\" The court further asked the defendant whether he felt he was able to think clearly, to weigh the various alternatives before him, and to make a responsible judgment on his own behalf. The defendant several times indicated that he had no doubt about his ability to participate fully in the plea.\\nThe court thereafter turned its attention to other aspects of the plea canvass. The defendant was represented throughout the trial and the plea canvass by a private attorney of his choice. The defendant affirmed that he had had a full opportunity to discuss his case with his attorney and that he was satisfied with the advice he had received. Although the defendant then manifested some emotional upset, he regained his composure after a minute or two. Toward the end of the canvass, having been advised by the court of the constitutional rights he was waiving, and that a guilty plea could not be withdrawn at the time of sentencing, the defendant asked to speak to his attorney. His attorney informed the court that the defendant had inquired whether his pleas of guilty would preclude his pursuit of a claimed constitutional infirmity in the grand jury proceedings and the search warrant in his case. Upon receipt of advice on that point, the defendant reiterated his wish to plead guilty to the charges. The court then made a finding that the defendant, with the effective assistance of counsel, had pled guilty knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently.\\nThe defendant now challenges the trial court's determination of voluntariness and intelligence on the ground that the court failed to make a sufficient inquiry into the defendant's mental capacity at the time of the entry of the pleas. Relying on the undisputed principle that a guilty plea violates constitutional requirements of due process if, because of incompetence, the plea is involuntary or unknowing; Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-75, 95 S. Ct. 896, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1975); State v. Torres, 182 Conn. 176, 184-86, 438 A.2d 46 (1980); the defendant argues that the circumstances at the plea hearing raised an unresolved doubt about the defendant's competence to plead guilty. Once such a doubt has been raised, the defendant maintains that a court becomes constitutionally obligated to determine whether a defendant is capable of making the reasoned choice essential to the validity of the guilty pleas. In making such a determination, the court is not entitled, according to the defendant, to rely on such factors as the defendant's subjective statement that his reasoning powers are unaffected by his psychiatric history, the court's own observations of the defendant's expressions, conduct and statements during the trial, or defense counsel's acquiescence in the proceedings, but must, sua sponte, order an evidentiary hearing into the defendant's medical condition. Under the circumstances revealed by the record in this case, we disagree.\\nIn Myers v. Manson, 192 Conn. 383, 389-91, 472 A.2d 759 (1984), this court recently reviewed the standard for competence to plead guilty that has been established by our statute; General Statutes \\u00a7 54-56d (a); and by the applicable constitutional case law. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S. Ct. 788, 4 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1960). Because every valid guilty plea must be demonstrably voluntary, knowing and intelligent, we require the record to disclose an act that represents a knowing choice among available alternative courses of action, an understanding of the law in relation to the facts, and sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences of the plea. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S. Ct. 1166, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1969); Myers v. Manson, supra, 389-90; State v. Deboben, 187 Conn. 469, 476, 446 A.2d 828 (1982); State v. Torres, supra, 184-85; Buckley v. Warden, 177 Conn. 538, 542, 418 A.2d 913 (1979); State v. Battle, 170 Conn. 469, 474-75, 365 A.2d 1100 (1976); Consiglio v. Warden, 160 Conn. 151, 166, 276 A.2d 773 (1970). A trial court's scrutiny of the voluntariness and the intelligence of a plea pursuant to Practice Book \\u00a7 711 through 713 and Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969), therefore necessarily implies that it has made an inquiry into the defendant's competence to plead. Myers v. Manson, supra, 390-91.\\nThe question in this case is whether Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S. Ct. 836, 15 L. Ed. 2d 815 (1966), required the court to make a further inquiry into competence once the defendant informed the court that he had been under psychiatric care for the previous eight months and had, as recently as forty-eight hours earlier, been taking prescription medicine relating thereto. As the state acknowledges, the rule of Pate v. Robinson imposes a constitutional obligation, under the due process clause, to undertake an independent judicial inquiry, in appropriate circumstances, into a defendant's competency to stand trial or to plead guilty. Id., 385. When a Pate inquiry is required, a court may not rely on the defendant's subjective appraisal of his own capacity or on the court's personal observations of the defendant but must hold an evidentiary hearing into the defendant's competence. Id., 385-86. The crucial issue, therefore, is what triggers a defendant's right to an evidentiary hearing.\\nA defendant who challenges the validity of his guilty plea for lack of an evidentiary inquiry into his competence must make a showing that, at the time of his plea, the court had before it specific factual allegations that, if true, would constitute substantial evidence of mental impairment. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 21, 83 S. Ct. 1068, 10 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1963). \\\" 'Substantial evidence' is a term of art. 'Evidence' encompasses all information properly before the court, whether it is in the form of testimony or exhibits formally admitted or it is in the form of medical reports or other kinds of reports that have been filed with the court. Evidence is 'substantial' if it raises a reasonable doubt about the defendant's competency . . . .\\\" Moore v. United States, 464 F.2d 663, 666 (9th Cir. 1972).\\nIn this case, the only evidence pointing to possible lack of competence was the defendant's brief and unsubstantiated reference to a history of psychiatric treatment and medication. The history given by the defendant indicated that, at the time of the pleas, he had taken no medication for the past forty-eight hours. Although he told the court what drug he had been taking, and what the prescribed dosage had been, he did not reveal the name of his psychiatrist and he offered no medical report concerning the nature of the mental condition for which he had received treatment. The disclosure of the defendant's psychiatric history came to light as the result of the court's own routine canvass. Neither the crimes of which the defendant stood accused nor his conduct during the trial or the canvass indicated inappropriate affect or irrational behavior. His counsel had never requested a competency hearing, nor had he filed a notice of defense putting the defendant's mental state into issue. See General Statutes \\u00a7 54-56d, 53a-13; Practice Book \\u00a7 758, 759. On this record, the defendant did not present such substantial evidence about possible lack of competence as to require the court sua sponte to undertake a specific evidentiary inquiry into his ability to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense.\\nAs in Myers v. Manson, supra, the record of the canvass undertaken by the court supports its implicit finding that the defendant was competent to plead guilty. The defendant responded appropriately to the court's questions testing his understanding of the plea agreement, the factual basis for the pleas, the meaning of the Alford plea, the constitutional rights which he was waiving, and the adequacy of the advice of counsel which he had received. Significantly, the defendant himself interrupted the canvass to receive clarification from his counsel about the effect that his guilty plea would have on alleged constitutional defects in the underlying criminal proceedings against him. When the defendant, toward the end of the canvass, exhibited a brief emotional upset, the court immediately took notice and afforded him an opportunity to calm himself. Once the defendant had regained his composure, the court took pains to make sure that the defendant had been attentive to the questions previously put to him and had no further questions to ask. Only thereafter did the court resume its own inquiry, reiterating its earlier questions concerning the defendant's satisfaction with the advice he had received from his attorney. The canvass, on its face, is entirely consistent with an implicit finding of competency at the time the pleas of guilty were accepted by the court.\\nII\\nThe defendant's remaining claims of error challenge not the original plea canvass but the trial court's refusal to permit the defendant to withdraw his guilty pleas before sentencing. The defendant acknowledges that he did not have an absolute right to withdraw his pleas of guilty; see Practice Book \\u00a7 720; but claims that the court nonetheless erred in this case because: (1) it refused to permit the defendant to obtain substitute counsel for the withdrawal hearing; (2) it did not recuse itself so that the withdrawal motions could be heard before a different judge of the Superior Court; and (3) it failed to hold an evidentiary hearing about the defendant's mental capacity at the time of the pleas. We disagree with the defendant's claims.\\nIn the trial court, the defendant's timely motions to withdraw his guilty pleas relied upon his allegation that the pleas had been involuntary. See Practice Book \\u00a7 721 (2). To prove that the pleas had been involuntary, he alleged in his pro se motions that his pleas resulted from judicial and prosecutorial coercion and bias, from impairment of his judgment due to the influence of \\\"a psychosis drug\\\" at the time of the plea, and from ineffective assistance of counsel. As a consequence of the filing of these motions on January 6, 9, and 11, 1982, defense counsel sought permission on January 15, 1982, to withdraw as attorney for the defendant. The record discloses no effort by the defendant to enlist the services of new counsel.\\nOn January 22,1982, the date for sentencing, when the motions for withdrawal of the guilty pleas were heard, defense counsel renewed his request to withdraw. The court denied the request, finding that the defendant's motions contained only conclusory allegations that did not constitute \\\"good cause\\\" as required by Practice Book \\u00a7 632. The court, however, permitted the defendant to file a supplementary pro se appearance, and indicated that the defendant could either be represented by privately retained counsel, if one could appear for the defendant after a brief recess, or could proceed pro se. Although the defendant expressed his preference for a private consultation, and although more than two weeks had elapsed since he had filed his withdrawal motions, he acknowledged that he did not then have a specific attorney available. The defendant then asked to consult with a special public defender who was representing him on another case which was to be nolled as part of the plea bargain. When the court noted that the special public defender had not filed an appearance in the case scheduled for sentencing, the defendant agreed to consult with his original defense counsel.\\nThereafter the trial court proceeded to hold a hearing on the motions for withdrawal of the guilty pleas, permitting the defendant either to have his original counsel address the court or to present his argument pro se. The defendant elected to go forward pro se. In support of the motions, the defendant reiterated that he had been unfairly pressured into plea bargaining against his better judgment, that he had been \\\"coerced psychologically and manipulated in the courtroom,\\\" that he had been ineffectively represented by his counsel, and that he had been and continued to be \\\"under . . . psychosis medication.\\\" After a contrary argument on behalf of the state, and brief rebuttal by the defendant, the court denied the defendant's motions. Having earlier observed that defense counsel had diligently and competently represented the defendant throughout the presentencing proceedings, the court ruled that the defendant had failed to establish any of the grounds for withdrawal of an accepted guilty plea set out in Practice Book \\u00a7 721.\\nThe defendant on this appeal does not directly contest the trial court's conclusion that he had failed to show good cause for the disqualification of his counsel. Any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel has been put to rest in habeas corpus proceedings that were concluded while this appeal was pending. Watson v. Manson, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain, Docket No. 269105 (1982). His argument appears to be that unsupported allegations of ineffective assistance and conflict of interest, regardless of their merits, automatically require the court to furnish the disgruntled client an unlimited opportunity to obtain alternate counsel. The defendant cites no Connecticut authority for this proposition, and we know of none. It is the province of the trial court to determine whether there is a factual basis for disqualification of counsel. In such a determination, the trial court is entitled to consider whether the defendant's effort to displace existing counsel has substantive merit and is being pursued in good faith. See State v. Dukes, 157 Conn. 498, 506, 255 A.2d 614 (1969). In the absence of a factual record showing an abuse of discretion, the trial court's failure to permit the withdrawal of counsel is not reversible error. See El Idrissi v. El Idrissi, 173 Conn. 295, 302-303, 377 A.2d 330 (1977). Furthermore, this court has only recently held that the inability to be represented by specific counsel, in the absence of demonstrated lack of effective representation, does not per se require a trial court to permit a continuance. State v. Beckenbach, 198 Conn. 43, 50, 501 A.2d 752 (1985); see State v. Stanley, 197 Conn. 309, 497 A.2d 46 (1985). The decision to grant or deny a continuance lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be upset on appeal only upon a showing of clear abuse of that discretion. State v. Beckenbach, supra, 47; State v. Stanley, supra, 311-12. On the present record, the defendant has not established that the trial court's decision to deny his request for a continuance constituted an abuse of its discretion.\\nFor similar reasons, we find no error in the trial court's failure to recuse itself from hearing the defendant's motions to withdraw his guilty pleas. The only possibly relevant fact before the court was that the defendant had alleged, in an entirely conclusory fashion, that he had been coerced into pleading guilty because of the collusion of the court with counsel for the state and for the defense. In the absence of a showing, on the record, that the trial court had been an active participant in negotiating the plea bargain, the trial court was entitled to reject such a conclusory allegation as warranting no further consideration. See State v. Lopez, 197 Conn. 337, 348-50, 497 A.2d 390 (1985); State v. Gradzik, 193 Conn. 35, 44-48, 475 A.2d 269 (1984); Hartford Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Tucker, 192 Conn. 1, 8, 469 A.2d 778 (1984). Indeed, the issue of disqualification was only raised by defense counsel, apparently as an afterthought, after the trial court had already ruled adversely on the motions for withdrawal of the guilty pleas.\\nThe defendant's final and more serious claim of error is that the trial court should not have denied his motions for withdrawal of his guilty pleas without then holding an evidentiary hearing into his mental competence at the time of the acceptance of his guilty pleas. This claim must be appraised in the context in which the issue was raised in the trial court.\\nAlthough the defendant made a claim, both in his written motions and in his arguments to the court at the withdrawal hearing, that he had been under the influence of \\\"psychosis medication,\\\" pursuit of that claim was not, in the trial court, the primary focus of his attack on his guilty pleas. The principal claim which he then addressed was that, because of ineffective assistance and advice from his counsel, he had been improperly persuaded to plead guilty. He repeatedly stated his desire to establish his innocence of the crimes with which he had been charged. Only once did he briefly advert to the claim that \\\"[a]t the time plea was made and canvass was taken, your Honor, as you do know, as the record indicates . I was and still am under medication, psychosis medication. And, at this time I am under medication.\\\" Notably, despite his allegation that he was continuing to take \\\"psychosis medication,\\\" he did not then claim, and does not claim now, that he was incompetent to participate in any proceedings other than those which occurred when his guilty pleas were accepted.\\nIn the light of this record, we are unpersuaded by the defendant's assertion that the trial court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of the defendant's mental state at the time of the guilty pleas. Procedurally, we note that the defendant did not himself request an evidentiary hearing at any time, and his counsel made no such request until after the court had ruled adversely on the defendant's motions to withdraw his guilty pleas, when the court had already announced its readiness to proceed with sentencing. Substantively, the defendant does not satisfy the test laid down in State v. Torres, supra, 185-86, where we held that \\\"[i]n considering whether to hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea the court may disregard any allegations of fact, whether contained in the motion or made in an offer of proof, which are either conclusory, vague or oblique. For the purpose of determining whether to hold an evidentiary hearing, the court should ordinarily assume any specific allegations of fact to be true. If such allegations furnish a basis for withdrawal of the plea under \\u00a7 721, and are not conclusively refuted by the record of the plea pro ceedings, and other information contained in the court file, then an evidentiary hearing is required.\\\" See State v. Lasher, 190 Conn. 259, 266, 460 A.2d 970 (1983).\\nIn this case, the defendant's only allegations of fact at the time of the plea canvass had been that he had recently been taking prescription medicine, namely Elavil and Mellaril, and that he had been under psychiatric treatment for eight months. These allegations were in no way further substantiated in the motions for withdrawal of the pleas or in the hearing held on those motions.\\nIn his motions for withdrawal of his guilty pleas, the defendant merely reiterated the name of the medications allegedly prescribed for him, but again failed to offer any specifics whatsoever about the nature or purpose of the medication or about the particular mental disease for which it had been prescribed, or the identity of the prescribing physician. This meager showing was insufficient to impose on the trial court an independent duty to search the pharmaceutical literature to discover the allegedly \\\"psychotie\\\" condition for which such medication is normally prescribed or to determine what effect the taking of such medication would have on competence to plead guilty. Compare State v. Smith, 185 Conn. 63, 86-87, 441 A.2d 84 (1981). Similarly, it was reasonable for the trial court to have assigned little or no significance, for evidentiary purposes, to the defendant's vague and conclusory allegation of psychiatric treatment for an unnamed psychotic condition of undisclosed etiology. In sum, we agree with the trial court that the defendant failed to sustain his burden of coming forward with sufficiently specific unrefuted factual allegations to require an evidentiary inquiry into his alleged incompetence at the time of the acceptance of his guilty pleas.\\nThere is no error.\\nIn this opinion Healey, Dannehy and Callahan, Js., concurred.\\n\\\"[General Statutes] See. 53a-95. unlawful restraint in the first degree: class d felony, (a) A person is guilty of unlawful restraint in the first degree when he restrains another person under circumstances which expose the latter to a substantial risk of physical injury.\\\"\\n\\\"[General Statutes] Sec. 53a-70. sexual assault in the first degree: class b felony: one year not suspendable. (a) A person is guilty of sexual assault in the first degree when such person compels another person to engage in sexual intercourse by the use of force against such other person or a third person, or by the threat of use of force against such other person or against a third person which reasonably causes such person to fear physical injury to such person or a third person.\\\"\\nAn Alford plea allows a defendant in a criminal case to consent to punishment as if he were guilty without his express acknowledgment of his guilt.\\n\\\"[Practice Book] Sec. 721. \\u2014grounds\\n\\\"The grounds for allowing the defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty after acceptance are as follows:\\n\\\"(1) The plea was accepted without substantial compliance with Sec. 711;\\n\\\"(2) The plea was involuntary, or it was entered without knowledge of the nature of the charge or without knowledge that the sentence actually imposed could be imposed;\\n\\\"(3) The sentence exceeds that specified in a plea agreement which had been previously accepted, or in a plea agreement on which the court had deferred its decision to accept or reject the agreement at the time the plea of guilty was entered;\\n\\\"(4) The plea resulted from the denial of effective assistance of counsel;\\n\\\"(5) There was no factual basis for the plea; or\\n\\\"(6) The plea either was not entered by a person authorized to act for a corporate defendant or was not subsequently ratified by a corporate defendant.\\\"\\n\\\"[Practice Book] Sec. 632. \\u2014withdrawal\\n\\\"A motion for withdrawal of appearance shall be served on the prosecuting authority and other attorneys of record, and filed with the clerk in the same manner as entering an appearance. No such motion for withdrawal shall be granted by the judicial authority, except for good cause shown.\\\"\\nThe court granted the defense counsel's motion to withdraw one month later.\\nAt the sentencing proceedings which immediately followed the denial of the defendant's motions, the court sentenced the defendant in accordance with the previously noted plea agreement. In each of the related files charging the defendant with possession of marijuana, failure to appear, and bribery, the court noted the state had terminated further prosecution by the entry of a nolle prosequi. On appeal, the defendant does not challenge the validity of the sentences he received.\\nIn his pro se motion to withdraw his pleas, the defendant misstated the names of the drugs in question. He claimed in his motion that he had been under the influence of \\\"Elivil\\\" and \\\"Benedrly\\\" when he pleaded guilty. During the plea canvass, he had identified the medication as \\\"Elevil\\\" and \\\"Mellaril.\\\"\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"568768\", \"name\": \"Jody El Idrissi v. Rachid El Idrissi\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"El Idrissi v. El Idrissi\", \"decision_date\": \"1975-06-18\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"679\", \"last_page\": \"679\", \"citations\": \"168 Conn. 679\", \"volume\": \"168\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:08:35.533111+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Jody El Idrissi v. Rachid El Idrissi\", \"head_matter\": \"Jody El Idrissi v. Rachid El Idrissi\\nEdward D. Cosden, Jr., in support of the motion.\\nMichael A. Meyers, in opposition.\\nSubmitted May 30\\ndecided June 18, 1975\", \"word_count\": \"68\", \"char_count\": \"395\", \"text\": \"The defendant's motion for a review of the trial referee's orders dated February 18, and April 4, 1975, in the appeal from the Superior Court for the judicial district of Waterbury is granted and the relief requested therein is denied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/conn/5729086.json b/conn/5729086.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8fa8f7d7f7fd1a28596285bec5eadcd6952c83d8
--- /dev/null
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5729086\", \"name\": \"STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RICHARD R. QUINT\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Quint\", \"decision_date\": \"2006-10-10\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"924\", \"last_page\": \"924\", \"citations\": \"280 Conn. 924\", \"volume\": \"280\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:23:57.933405+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RICHARD R. QUINT\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RICHARD R. QUINT\\nDecided October 10, 2006\\nApril E. Brodeur, special public defender, in support of the petition.\\nLeon F. Dalbec, Jr., senior assistant state\\u2019s attorney, in opposition.\", \"word_count\": \"51\", \"char_count\": \"328\", \"text\": \"The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 97 Conn. App. 72 (AC 24389), is denied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/conn/5733824.json b/conn/5733824.json
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f6d6020b240a51afc05f539f025328fe6941196a
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+"{\"id\": \"5733824\", \"name\": \"GERALD MARCIANO v. NEIL W. KRANER ET AL.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Marciano v. Kraner\", \"decision_date\": \"2011-01-18\", \"docket_number\": \"AC 31090\", \"first_page\": \"171\", \"last_page\": \"180\", \"citations\": \"126 Conn. App. 171\", \"volume\": \"126\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Appellate Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Appellate Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:00:20.839602+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"GERALD MARCIANO v. NEIL W. KRANER ET AL.\", \"head_matter\": \"GERALD MARCIANO v. NEIL W. KRANER ET AL.\\n(AC 31090)\\nGruendel, Beach and Sullivan, Js.\\nArgued November 19, 2010\\nofficially released January 18, 2011\\nZbigniew S. Rozbicki, for the appellant (plaintiff).\\nTimothy Brignole, with whom, on the brief, was Juri E. Taalman, for the appellees (defendants).\", \"word_count\": \"2767\", \"char_count\": \"17405\", \"text\": \"Opinion\\nGRUENDEL, J.\\nThe plaintiff, Gerald Marciano, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion filed by the defendants, Neil W. Kraner and the Law Offices of George B. Bickford, to set aside the verdict reached by the jury in favor of the plaintiff. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly determined that, in the absence of expert testimony, he could not prevail in his action for breach of fiduciary duty against the defendants. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.\\nThe jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On March 31,2000, the plaintiff contacted Kraner, who was an attorney practicing with the Law Offices of George B. Bickford in East Granby. The plaintiff explained to Kraner that his mother was in a nursing home, that his father, Francis Marciano, Sr. (Francis, Sr.), had recently developed serious mental health problems and had been admitted to the Institute of Living in Hartford and that he wanted to preserve his inheritance interest in his parents' estate assets in the event of their deaths. Notably, the plaintiff told Kraner that the home in which he and his family had been living since 1996 in Barkhamsted (Barkhamsted property) was owned by his father and that he wanted to obtain title to the Barkhamsted property prior to Francis, Sr.'s death. The plaintiff further informed Kraner that his parents' total estate assets consisted of the Barkhamsted property, with a value of $122,500, a second home in Torrington (Torrington property), worth $132,500, $130,000 in cash and cars worth $22,500, for a total estate value of approximately $407,500. Given this information, Kraner explained that pursuant to state and federal medicaid laws, his parents' assets would have to be used to pay for their nursing home care until their total assets had been depleted to $1600, at which point they would qualify for state medicaid assistance in paying their nursing home care expenses.\\nUnsatisfied with this result, the plaintiff retained Kraner to review various avenues for preserving the value of his parents' estate while also transferring ownership of the Barkhamsted property and qualifying for state medicaid assistance. Subsequently, Kraner advised the plaintiff that the only way to preserve the value of his parents' assets, including the Barkhamsted property, while also qualifying for medicaid, would be to transfer all of their real and personal property to a disabled child. This advice was memorialized in a letter from Kraner to the plaintiff, dated April 14, 2000, which stated in relevant part: \\\"[P]erhaps the best path for protecting some of your father's assets would be to transfer them to his disabled son. . . . [W]e would need to draft deeds to transfer the real property, and you had expressed [an] interest in having a closing with your brother wherein he could transfer ownership of [the Barkhamsted] property to you.\\\" The reference to the \\\"disabled son\\\" in Kraner's April 14, 2000 letter was to the plaintiffs brother, Francis Marciano, Jr. (Francis, Jr.), who was living in California at the time and receiving disability benefits. To complete the proposed transaction, Kraner contacted Francis, Jr., who agreed to accept a transfer of the assets from his parents and then in turn transfer the Barkhamsted property to the plaintiff. Kraner also handled all the legal work involved in appointing the plaintiff conservator of Francis, Sr.'s estate and obtaining approval from the Probate Court for the transfer of Francis, Sr.'s assets to Francis, Jr.\\nOn October 26, 2000, in Kraner's office, the plaintiff executed two fiduciary deeds for both the Barkhamsted and Torrington properties owned by Francis, Sr., to Francis, Jr. Francis, Jr., also executed a quitclaim deed of the Barkhamsted property to the plaintiff at this closing, and Kraner represented that all three deeds would be recorded shortly thereafter. Following the closing, Kraner began the preparation of Francis, Sr.'s application for medicaid benefits. Prior to completing the application, however, Kraner was contacted by the department of social services (department), which informed him that the quitclaim deed from Francis, Jr. to the plaintiff was illegal as an attempt to circumvent medicaid laws and that, if Kraner recorded the quitclaim deed, both he and the plaintiff may be subject to criminal prosecution. Additionally, the department advised Kraner that Francis, Sr.'s medicaid application would not be approved until the department received confirmation that the quitclaim deed had been destroyed. Kraner then advised the plaintiff of this information and destroyed the quitclaim deed for the Barkhamsted property. At the time of Francis, Sr.'s death in March, 2003, the plaintiff and Francis, Jr., had several disagreements regarding the distribution of their parents' estate assets. In November, 2004, the plaintiff again contacted Kraner, hoping to consummate a transfer of the ownership of the Barkhamsted property by executing and recording a new deed for the Barkhamsted property. To complete the transfer, Kraner advised the plaintiff that Francis, Jr., would need to execute the deed for the Barkhamsted property. Francis, Jr., however, was unwilling to execute the deed in favor of the plaintiff and, in fact, sold the Barkhamsted property to a third party.\\nOn March 1, 2005, the plaintiff filed a five count complaint against the defendants, alleging, inter alia, legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. A jury trial ensued and, following the plaintiffs case-in-chief, the defendants filed a motion for a directed verdict. The court granted the defendants' motion as to the count of legal malpractice but reserved decision with respect to the count of breach of fiduciary duty until after the jury returned its verdict. On December 19, 2008, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the count of breach of fiduciary duty and awarded the plaintiff $196,000 in damages. The defendants then moved to set aside the verdict, arguing that, because the plaintiff failed to present any expert testimony \\\"to establish the extent of the [defendants'] fiduciary duty and the terms and conditions of a fiduciary duty of a lawyer under the same or similar circumstances\\\" of the defendants, the plaintiff could not possibly prevail in his cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. On April 23, 2009, in a memorandum of decision, the court granted the defendants' motion to set aside the verdict, ruling that \\\"expert testimony was needed to establish whether . . . Kraner had a particular duty to the plaintiff and whether that duty was violated.\\\" As the court reasoned, the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff for breach of fiduciary duty had to be set aside because the plaintiff failed to present any \\\"expert testimony as to what conduct by the defendants constituted a breach of fiduciary duty.\\\" The court also explained that \\\"[t]here was no evidence that . . . Kraner could have taken any legal action to interfere with Francis, Jr.'s ability to dispose of his property as he saw fit.\\\" Therefore, \\\"there was no evidence that any conduct by . . . Kraner caused the plaintiff to sustain any damages . . . [and] [t]his lack of any evidence of a causal relationship between the defendants' alleged misconduct and the $196,000 awarded by the jury [was] an additional basis for setting aside the verdict.\\\" This appeal followed.\\nThe plaintiff now claims that the court improperly granted the defendants' motion to set aside the verdict. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the court incorrectly determined that, in the absence of expert testimony, he could not prevail in his cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against the defendants. Additionally, the plaintiff argues that the court improperly concluded that \\\"there was no evidence that any conduct by . . . Kraner caused the plaintiff to sustain any damages.\\\"\\nBefore addressing the merits of the plaintiffs claims, we begin by setting forth the applicable legal principles and standard of review governing our analysis. \\\"A motion to set aside the verdict should be granted if the jury reasonably and legally could not have reached the determination that they did in fact reach. . . . [Put differently], [i]f the jury, without conjecture, could not have found a required element of the cause of action, it cannot withstand a motion to set aside the verdict.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Carrano v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 279 Conn. 622, 646, 904 A.2d 149 (2006). \\\"Thus, the role of the trial court on a motion to set aside the jury's verdict is not to sit as [an added] juror, but, rather, to decide whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, the jury could reasonably have reached the verdict that it did.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hunt v. Prior, 236 Conn. 421, 429 n.21, 673 A.2d 514 (1996). As a corollary, \\\"it is the court's duty to set aside the verdict when it finds that it does manifest injustice, and is . . . palpably against the evidence.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Malmberg v. Lopez, 208 Conn. 675, 679-80,546 A.2d 264 (1988). \\\"The proper appellate standard of review when considering the action of a trial court in granting or denying a motion to set aside a verdict is the abuse of discretion standard. . In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the correctness of the court's ruling. . . . Reversal is required only where an abuse of discretion is manifest or where injustice appears to have been done.\\\" (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Label Systems Corp. v. Aghamohammadi, 270 Conn. 291, 303, 852 A.2d 703 (2004).\\nIt is important to note at the outset that our review of the record discloses that the plaintiffs count for breach of fiduciary duty is basically nothing more than a carbon copy of his count for legal malpractice. In fact, the only allegation contained in the breach of fiduciary duty count that is absent from the legal malpractice count is: \\\"[T]he defendants owed the plaintiff a fiduciary duty and were required to show a high degree of fidelity [to the plaintiff] and to deal with the plaintiff fairly and in good faith. Despite these obligations and duties, the defendants breached said duties as described herein and deceived the plaintiff.\\\" It bears repeating that the court granted the defendants' motion for a directed verdict as to the plaintiffs legal malpractice claim because \\\"[t]he plaintiff failed to introduce admissible expert testimony\\\" in support thereof. As the court correctly explained, \\\"[a] plaintiff cannot obviate the necessity for expert testimony by couching his claim in terms of contract rather than tort\\\"; see Celentano v. Grudberg, 76 Conn. App. 119, 125, 818 A.2d 841, cert. denied, 264 Conn. 904, 823 A.2d 1220 (2003); or, \\\"[b]y the same token . . . referring to the attorney's conduct as a breach of fiduciary duty.\\\" Because the plaintiff failed to introduce any expert testimony as to the preliminary issue of the attorney-client relationship, we cannot say, on the basis of the facts in the present case, that the court improperly granted the defendants' motion to set aside the verdict. Indeed, the jury's verdict awarding the plaintiff damages for breach of fiduciary duty was unsupported by any evidence as to what fiduciary duty was owed by the defendants to the plaintiff, other than inherent in the attorney-client relationship, and how that duty was violated in this case. Although every attorney-client relationship imposes a fiduciary duty on the attorney; see Matza v. Matza, 226 Conn. 166,183-84,627 A.2d 414 (1993); aplaintiff cannot avoid his burden to present expert testimony to articulate the contours of that relationship by styling his cause of action as one for breach of fiduciary duty. See St. Onge, Stewart, Johnson & Reens, LLC v. Media Group, Inc., 84 Conn. App. 88, 95, 851 A.2d 1242 (\\\"[t]he rationale underlying [the requirement of expert testimony] is that in most cases, the determination of an attorney's standard of care, which depends on the particular circumstances of the attorney's representation, is beyond the experience of the average layperson, including members of the jury and perhaps even the presiding judge\\\" [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 271 Conn. 918, 859 A.2d 570 (2004).\\nMoreover, assuming arguendo that the plaintiff adequately had established the nature of the fiduciary duty owed by the defendants, and how that duty was violated in the present case, we conclude that the court nonetheless properly set aside the verdict. As the plaintiffs counsel stated during oral argument in this appeal, the precise breach of fiduciary duty alleged was Kraner's failure to record the quitclaim deed for the Barkhamsted property following the closing on October 26, 2000. It is undisputed, however, that if Kraner recorded the quitclaim deed for the Barkhamsted property, Francis, Sr.'s medicaid application would have been denied by the department. Additionally, if Francis, Sr.'s medicaid application was denied, the estate assets of the plaintiffs parents, including the Barkhamsted property, would have to have been liquidated to satisfy the outstanding nursing home and medical expenses for both Francis, Sr., and the plaintiffs mother. Thus, if Kraner recorded the quitclaim deed, the Barkhamsted property would no longer be available for distribution as part of Francis, Sr.'s estate. Accordingly, we agree with the court that \\\"there was no evidence that any conduct by . . . Kraner caused the plaintiff to sustain any damages.\\\"\\nTo summarize, we conclude that the plaintiffs failure to present any expert testimony whatsoever as to the attorney-client relationship was fatal to his cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. Further, we conclude that, even if the plaintiff adequately established the nature of the applicable fiduciary duty, the verdict in his favor was properly set aside in light of the dearth of evidence that \\\"any conduct by . . . Kraner caused the plaintiff to sustain any damages.\\\"\\nThe judgment is affirmed.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\\nThroughout this opinion we refer to the defendants collectively as the defendants and to both defendants individually by name.\\n\\\"Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1396-1396s, commonly known as the Medicaid Act, is a federal-state cooperative program designed to provide medical assistance to persons whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of medical care.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sikand v. Wilson-Coker, 276 Conn. 618, 620, 888 A.2d 74 (2006). \\\"General Statutes \\u00a7 17b-2 (8) designates the department [of social services] as the state agency responsible for administering the state's medicaid program.\\\" Id., 621.\\nSee Department of Social Services, Uniform Policy Manual \\u00a7 4005.10.\\nSee Department of Social Services, Uniform Policy Manual \\u00a7 3028.10.\\nAlthough there was conflicting testimony at trial regarding Kraner's representation to record the deeds, we presume for purposes of this appeal that Kraner did indeed make this representation to the plaintiff, as this presumption does not affect our disposition of the case.\\nUncontroverted evidence presented to the court demonstrated that Francis, Sr.'s medicaid application would have been denied had the quitclaim deed been recorded by Kraner. Moreover, if the medicaid application had been denied, then the assets of the plaintiffs parents, including the Barkhamsted property, would have to have been liquidated to pay for their medical and nursing home care. There was evidence presented that the cost of the parents' medical and nursing home care was approximately $80,000 per year for each parent. Because the plaintiffs mother remained in a nursing home from the start of 2000 to her death in early 2002, and because Francis, Sr., remained in nursing home care from early 2000 until his death on March 30, 2003, the cost of both parents' medical and nursing home expenses would have exceeded the total value of their assets. Thus, if Francis, Sr.'s medicaid application had been denied, the Barkhamsted property would no longer have been available for distribution as part of the estate.\\nNonetheless, the plaintiff was able to purchase the Barkhamsted property from a third party on October 15, 2007, for $120,000.\\nIn support of this ruling, the court noted that \\\"[t]he plaintiff failed to introduce admissible expert testimony to support his legal malpractice claim,\\\" and, therefore, a directed verdict was warranted as to this count.\\nBecause we conclude that the plaintiff failed to introduce any expert testimony whatsoever as to the nature of the attorney-client relationship in this case, we need not address the broader question briefed by the parties of whether expert testimony is always necessary in a cause of action premised on a breach of fiduciary duty in the context of an attorney-client relationship.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"5748895\", \"name\": \"ANDREW OWENS v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Owens v. Commissioner of Correction\", \"decision_date\": \"2006-02-08\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"910\", \"last_page\": \"910\", \"citations\": \"277 Conn. 910\", \"volume\": \"277\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:04:30.775233+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"ANDREW OWENS v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION\", \"head_matter\": \"ANDREW OWENS v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION\\nDavid B. Rozwaski, special public defender, in support of the petition.\\nNancy L. Chupak, assistant state\\u2019s attorney, in opposition.\\nDecided February 8, 2006\", \"word_count\": \"50\", \"char_count\": \"334\", \"text\": \"The petitioner Andrew Owens' petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 92 Conn. App. 312 (AC 25378), is denied.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"653097\", \"name\": \"HELENE A. GORDON ET AL. v. ANDREW TOBIAS\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Gordon v. Tobias\", \"decision_date\": \"2003-03-25\", \"docket_number\": \"SC 16763\", \"first_page\": \"844\", \"last_page\": \"851\", \"citations\": \"262 Conn. 844\", \"volume\": \"262\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:03:54.509375+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"HELENE A. GORDON ET AL. v. ANDREW TOBIAS\", \"head_matter\": \"HELENE A. GORDON ET AL. v. ANDREW TOBIAS\\n(SC 16763)\\nNorcott, Katz, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js.\\nArgued January 7\\nofficially released March 25, 2003\\nBarbara F. Oreen, with whom, on the brief, was Bernard Oreen, for the appellant-appellee (defendant).\\nJonathan S. Bowman, with whom was Barbara M. Schellenberg, for the appellees-appellants (plaintiffs).\", \"word_count\": \"2243\", \"char_count\": \"13854\", \"text\": \"Opinion\\nNORCOTT, J.\\nThe dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly concluded that a now defunct mortgage loan brokerage corporation, Mutual Mortgage Services, Inc. (Mutual), had acted as an agent for the defendant, Andrew Tobias, for the purpose of receiving payments of the balance due on a mortgage held by the defendant on property owned by the plaintiffs, Helene A. Gordon and William J. Gordon. The defendant appeals from the judgment of the trial court settling title to the property in the plaintiffs. The defendant claims that there was no evidence to support the trial court's finding that Mutual had acted as his agent when it received payment on the mortgage at the time title to the property transferred to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs claim in response that the evidence produced at trial supports the trial court's finding of an agency relationship. We agree with the plaintiffs and, accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.\\nThe record reveals the following undisputed facts. Elixir Limited Partnership (Elixir), which is not a party to this appeal, was a condominium developer engaged in the development of a number of condominium units in Madison. In order to finance construction on various condominium units, Elixir borrowed money from Mutual, which, in turn, secured its loan by taking mortgages on the individual condominium units. Mutual used the defendant's money to fund the mortgage at issue in the present case. On February 16, 1994, Mutual assigned the mortgage at issue in the present case from Elixir to the defendant. Both the mortgage on the condominium and the assignment to the defendant were recorded in the Madison land records. Thereafter, payments on the mortgage were made by Elixir to Mutual, which then remitted the payments to the defendant. Early in 1995, the plaintiffs became interested in buying one of the condominium units constructed by Elixir and encumbered by the mortgage that had been assigned to the defendant. The plaintiffs hired a real estate attorney who completed a title search that revealed the mortgage on the property. After counsel for the plaintiffs contacted Elixir regarding the purchase of the property, Elixir agreed that, at the closing, it would pay off the amount due under the mortgage, $125,046.66, to Mutual. Subsequently, on February 2,1995, the plaintiffs closed on the condominium purchased from Elixir, which then gave Mutual a check for the amount due and conveyed the property to the plaintiffs by warranty deed.\\nAlthough Mutual received full payment on the mortgage at the closing, it neither remitted this sum to the defendant, nor informed him of the closing. Rather, Mutual continued to send periodic payments to the defendant until July, 1997, when the president of Mutual died and Mutual's scheme was revealed. After the defendant refused to release the mortgage, the plaintiffs filed an action, pursuant to General Statutes \\u00a7 47-31, in order to quiet title in the property in favor of themselves. After trial, the trial court concluded, inter alia, that Mutual was an agent of the defendant for the purpose of receiving payment of the outstanding amount due on the mortgage that was paid at the February, 1995 closing. Thus, the trial court concluded that payment to Mutual, as agent for the defendant, constituted payment to the defendant and, consequently, discharged the plaintiffs' obligation under the mortgage. Accordingly, pursuant to \\u00a7 47-31, the trial court quieted title in the property in favor of the plaintiffs. This appeal followed.\\nThe defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding that Mutual was an agent of the defendant for the purposes of collecting payments on the mortgage that he held on the plaintiffs' property. We disagree.\\nIt is well settled that, \\\"[t]he nature and extent of an agent's authority is a question of fact for the trier where the evidence is conflicting or where there are several reasonable inferences which can be drawn.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Maharishi School of Vedic Sciences, Inc. (Connecticut) v. Connecticut Constitution Associates Ltd. Partnership, 260 Conn. 598, 606, 799 A.2d 1027 (2002). \\\"To the extent that the trial court has made findings of fact, our review is limited to deciding whether such findings were clearly erroneous.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 605. \\\"A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it . or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. . In making this determination, every reasonable presumption must be given in favor of the trial court's ruling.\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.\\nTurning to the merits of the defendant's claim, \\\"[a]gency is defined as the fiduciary relationship which results from manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act . Restatement (Second), 1 Agency \\u00a7 1 [1958], . . . Thus, the three elements required to show the existence of an agency relationship include: (1) a manifestation by the principal that the agent will act for him; (2) acceptance by the agent of the undertaking; and (3) an understanding between the parties that the principal will be in control of the undertaking.\\\" (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Beckenstein v. Potter & Carrier, Inc., 191 Conn. 120, 132-33, 464 A.2d 6 (1983).\\nMoreover, \\\"it is a general rule of agency law that the principal in an agency relationship is bound by, and liable for, the acts in which his agent engages with authority from the principal, and within the scope of the [agency relationship].\\\" Maharishi School of Vedic Sciences, Inc. (Connecticut) v. Connecticut Constitution Associates Ltd. Partnership, supra, 260 Conn. 606. An agent's authority may be actual or apparent. Id., 606-607. \\\"Actual authority may be express or implied.\\\" Id., 607. Because the plaintiffs do not claim that Mutual had express actual authority, we must review whether the trial court properly found implied actual authority. \\\"Implied authority is actual authority circumstantially proved. It is the authority which the principal intended his agent to possess. . . . Implied authority is a fact to be proven by deductions or inferences from the manifestations of consent of the principal and from the acts of the principal and [the] agent.\\\" (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut National Bank v. Giacomi, 242 Conn. 17, 70, 699 A.2d 101 (1997).\\nAs the trial court's memorandum of decision reveals, the court found that the defendant had authorized Mutual to collect monthly payments on the note secured by the mortgage on the plaintiffs' property and remit those payments to him. This conclusion was based on the trial court's findings that the defendant was \\\"an investor living in Florida and had no interests in managing such details for himself.\\\" Moreover, the trial court concluded, \\\"the entity designated to collect payments on the note secured by the mortgage was plainly authorized to receive payment of the outstanding amount of the mortgage when the property was sold.\\\" On the basis of the trial court's well reasoned decision, we conclude that the court's determination that Mutual had actual implied authority to collect the amount due under the mortgage was not clearly erroneous.\\nThe trial court also concluded that Mutual had apparent authority to collect the amounts due under the mortgage held by the defendant. \\\"Apparent authority is that semblance of authority which a principal, through his own acts or inadvertences, causes or allows third persons to believe his agent possesses. . . . Consequently, apparent authority is to be determined, not by the agent's own acts, but by the acts of the agent's principal. . . . The issue of apparent authority is one of fact to be determined based on two criteria. . . . First, it must appear from the principal's conduct that the principal held the agent out as possessing sufficient authority to embrace the act in question, or knowingly permitted [the agent] to act as having such authority. . . . Second, the party dealing with the agent must have, acting in good faith, reasonably believed, under all the circumstances, that the agent had the necessary authority to bind the principal to the agent's action.\\\" (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tomlinson v. Board of Education, 226 Conn. 704, 734-35, 629 A.2d 333 (1993).\\nWe conclude that the trial court also properly found that Mutual had apparent authority to collect the mortgage payment due on the mortgage held by the defendant. The defendant collected mortgage payments from Mutual for more than two years knowing that the loan on the property had matured, yet he neither objected to nor demanded full payment of the amount due. Rather, the defendant demanded that Mutual invoke a higher interest rate in order to provide incentive for the borrowers to pay off the loan. Similarly, the defendant testified at trial that Mutual had serviced the mortgage loans for him, which included collecting the checks, arranging payment of the amount due under the mortgage, and obtaining mortgage releases. We conclude that the trial court properly concluded that Mutual had apparent authority to collect the amount due under the mortgage held by the defendant. Payment to an agent constitutes payment to the principal. Manchester v. Sullivan, 112 Conn. 223, 225, 152 A. 134 (1930). Thus, the trial court's conclusion that Elixir's payment to Mutual in 1995, of the total amount due discharged any obligation under the mortgage was not clearly erroneous.\\nThe judgment is affirmed.\\nIn this opinion the other justices concurred.\\nThe defendant raises five issues on appeal to this court. Specifically, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly: (1) granted relief to the plaintiffs pursuant to General Statutes \\u00a7 47-31 because General Statutes \\u00a7 49-13 provides an exclusive remedy for the discharge of a mortgage; (2) concluded that Mutual had acted as the defendant's agent in the collection of the payment due on the mortgage held by the defendant; (3) determined that where a mortgagor had actual and constructive notice of the assignment of a mortgage, that payment to the assignor was in satisfaction of the mortgage; (4) concluded that the plaintiffs had a common-law right to equitable relief compelling the mortgage holder to deliver a duly executed release of mortgage; and (5) granted the plaintiffs equitable relief where they had an adequate remedy at law. Our review of the record, however, reveals that the only claim that was raised in the trial court, and properly preserved for appeal, is the defendant's claim that the trial court improperly found that an agency relationship had existed between Mutual and the defendant.\\n\\\"We have stated repeatedly that we ordinarily will not review an issue that has not been properly raised before the trial court. See, e.g., Santopietro v. New Haven, 239 Conn. 207, 219-20, 682 A.2d 106 (1996) (court 'not required to consider any claim that was not properly preserved in the trial court'); Yale University v. Blumenthal, 225 Conn. 32, 36 n.4, 621 A.2d 1304 (1993) (court declined to consider issues briefed on appeal but not raised at trial); see also Practice Book \\u00a7 60-5 ('court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial').\\\" Bell Atlantic Mobile, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 253 Conn. 453, 485, 754 A.2d 128 (2000). Because the remaining issues raised by the defendant were not raised before the trial court, we decline to review those issues on appeal. Additionally, the plaintiffs claim on cross appeal that the trial court improperly determined that General Statutes \\u00a7 49-8a does not provide a private right of action in order to enforce its provisions. As counsel for the plaintiffs conceded at oral argument before this court, because the plaintiffs prevailed in the trial court and do not seek any additional relief other than what was granted, they are not aggrieved by the trial court's decision on that issue. We, therefore, also decline to review this claim.\\nThe defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book \\u00a7 65-1 and General Statutes \\u00a7 51-199 (c).\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 47-31 (a) provides: \\\"An action may be brought by any person claiming title to, or any interest in, real or personal property, or both, against any person who may claim to own the property, or any part of it, or to have any estate in it, either in fee, for years, for life or in reversion or remainder, or to have any interest in the properly, or any lien or encumbrance on it, adverse to the plaintiff, or against any person in whom the land records disclose any interest, lien, claim or title conflicting with the plaintiffs claim, title or interest, for the purpose of determining such adverse estate, interest or claim, and to clear up all doubts and disputes and to quiet and settle the title to the property. Such action may be brought whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to the immediate or exclusive possession of the property.\\\"\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"6752657\", \"name\": \"HELEN LAPIDES vs. J. J. JOHNSON & SONS\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Lapides v. Johnson\", \"decision_date\": \"1935-09-30\", \"docket_number\": \"File #46580\", \"first_page\": \"?\", \"last_page\": \"156\", \"citations\": \"2 Conn. Supp. 155\", \"volume\": \"2\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Supplement\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:35:13.392505+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Hon. EDWIN C. DICKENSON, Judge.\", \"parties\": \"HELEN LAPIDES vs. J. J. JOHNSON & SONS\", \"head_matter\": \"HELEN LAPIDES vs. J. J. JOHNSON & SONS\\nSuperior Court New Haven County\\nFile #46580\\nPresent: Hon. EDWIN C. DICKENSON, Judge.\\nSamuel H. Rosenthal, Attorney for the Plaintiff.\\nD. L. O\\u2019Neill, Attorney .for the Defendant.\\nMEMORANDUM FILED SEPTEMBER 30, 1935.\", \"word_count\": \"456\", \"char_count\": \"2584\", \"text\": \"DICKINSON, J.\\nThe plaintiff fell while walking across the floor of the defendant's store. She has testified the floor was heavily waxed, that her foot slipped upon it and she fell on her left side. She has produced no other witness as to the slipperiness of the floor. By the testimony of employees of the defendant called by the plaintiff it appears the condition of the floor was the same as it had been for several days- and that it had not been waxed for nearly a week, although it had been swept each night.\\nThe plaintiff it appears was walking in an ordinary manner and wore shoes with cuban heels, which, as exhibited in court, appear to be comparatively low heels.\\nBy the testimony of an employee of the defendant it appears there was a mark on the floor evidently made by the plaintiff's shoe and nothing else.\\nThe plaintiff was apparently an honest witness and stated the facts as she saw them. That she slipped and fell for no other apparent reason than the condition of the floor is some evidence of its slipperiness.\\nThe day was a clear day and nothing was observed upon the floor to cause the slipping other than the wax.\\nThe defendant had reasonable notice of its condition for by its own employees it appeared no change had been made in it for some days. Its duty was to use reasonable care to see that its floors were reasonably safe for invitees reasonably using them.\\nWhile it appears the plaintiff saw that the floor was heavily waxed it does not appear whether this was before or after her fall and in any event she had the right to assume that walking upon it in a. reasonable manner would not subject her to danger of falling.\\nNewell vs. K. & D. Jewelry Co., Inc., 119 Conn., 332.\\nThe case is a close case. The defendant rested without putting on any evidence. I am satisfied, however, that the plaintiff is telling the truth, that the floor was not reasonably safe for the public, that the defendant should reasonably have known and corrected its condition, and that the plaintiff used reasonable care under all the circumstances.\\nThe plaintiff in falling struck her side and head, strained her side and back, was unable to do her housework for a considerable length of time and still feels the effects of her fall at times.\\nJudgment is directed for her to recover twelve hundred dollars ($1200.) damages.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"6753871\", \"name\": \"Noyes against Ward\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Noyes v. Ward\", \"decision_date\": \"1848-07\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"250\", \"last_page\": \"272\", \"citations\": \"19 Conn. 250\", \"volume\": \"19\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:52:00.536469+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"In this opinion Waite, Hinman and Ellsworth, Js., concurred.\", \"parties\": \"Noyes against Ward.\", \"head_matter\": \"Noyes against Ward.\\nWhere a by-law of the city of Norvdch, after providing for the appointment of four highway surveyors, one of whom should reside in one o\\u00ed the four districts into which the city was divided, and that they should constitute a permanent board of commissioners, having the general direction of all matters relative to the highways, streets and side-walks in said city, declared, that each surveyor, in the district in which he resided, should have the particular care and superintendence of all highways, streets and side-walks in said city, and should execute all the directions of the board of commissioners, and of the court of common council respecting the same, and should have full power and authority, each in his district, as surveyors of highways, to make, maintain and keep in repair, all highways and streets in said city, subject to such directions as might be given, by the board of city commissioners, and under such regulations and directions as the court of common council might, from time to time, prescribe; it was held, 1. that the powerof thesesurveyors, was not derived from the board of commissioners, or the court of common council, but was conferred by the by-law ; 2. that though those boards had a controuling power, by direction or regulation, when they thought proper to interfere, yet no specific direction or regulation,.by either board, was necessary to enable the surveyors to perform their official duty of making and keeping in repair the highways and streets in their respective districts. [The Chief Justice dissenting,]\\nThe poweis and duties of such surveyors, in regard to highways and streets, extend to side-walks, the latter being embraced in the former.\\nWhere it appeared, in an action of assault and battery, that there had been a former trial of the cause, and by reason of the death of one of the jurors, no verdict was rendered; it was held, that the jury might properly take into consideration the expenses of such former trial, in estimating the damages.\\nA highway may be established, by a dedication of the land, by the owner, to \\u25a0 \\u00b0 tne public, for that purpose.\\nThe doctrine of such dedication rests on the principle of the common law, that where a person has made representations, or pursued a line of conduct, with a view to induce others to adopt a particular course of action, and such representations or conduct have produced that effect, they shall be held to be binding and conclusive against him; and he shall not afterwards be permitted to retract or repudiate them, to the injury of those who have been induced thus to act.\\nThe statute prescribing the mode in which highways may be laid out and established, was not designed to take away or abridge the right, which previously existed, of any person to grant or dedicate to the public, by his own act, a right of way over his land, but only to provide a mode by which the public may procure it to be appropriated for such a purpose, without, or even against, his consent.\\nIn order to establish in the public a right to the use of land as a highway, by dedication, it is not requisite that they should have used it as such, for the period of fifteen years, nor that the public use should have been adverse and uninterrupted.\\nWhere a party, having taken up and removed an ancient fence, put down a stone in one of the post-holes, where it remained ; and the next day, he declared, that he put it there as a bound; it was held, that this declaration was not so connected with the act done as to constitute a part of it; and was, therefore, inadmissible evidence for such party.\\nWhere a party offered in evidence a paper, purporting and appearing to be a map or plan, representing certain lots and highways, surveyed and laid out, by a committee of the proprietors of the land, in June 1770; which paper was recently found among the books, papers and records of such proprietors ; it was held, that such paper was admissible as evidence of a highway thereon laid down.\\nThis was an action of trespass vi el armis, alleging an assault upon the plaintiff, beating and wounding him ; to which the defendant pleaded the general issue, with notice of special matter in justification.\\nThe cause was tried at New-London, September term 1847, before Storrs, J.\\nOn the trial, the plaintiff claimed to have proved, that the defendant assaulted and beat him, in the manner alleged in the declaration. He also adduced in evidence the by-laws of the city of Norwich, which were admitted to have been approved and published as required by the charter, and to have been in full force at the time of the transaction in question. He then offered evidence to prove, and claimed that he Provec^ that before the commission of the acts com-of, he was duly appointed and sworn a commissioner of streets and highways in the city of Norwich, and surveyor of highways in the first district in that city, embracing the locus in quo ; that the plaintiff, in the discharge of his duties as such commissioner, and by the advice and direction of the mayor of the city, had constructed a side-walk on the North side of a highway running Easterly and Westerly, on each side of which the defendant was the owner of the land in fee; that the plaintiff had constructed such side-walk against the barn-yard, gates and fence of the defendant, making it of the same height and level as against the lands of the adjoining proprietors, and not higher than the public necessity and convenience required ; that after this side-walk was so made, the defendant, claiming that the land was his, and that the public had no right of way there, dug up and removed the earth of the side-walk in front of his gates, and thereby made a cavity therein of such depth as to endanger the persons of travellers thereon ; that in order to protect and save from injury the persons of travellers on such side-walk, the plaintiff was filling up the cavity to the height to wdiich he liad so built it, declaring that this was his object; and that he was acting in his capacity of commissioner, when the defendant committed the alleged assault and battery upon him.\\nThere was no proof that the plaintiff did such acts, under or by virtue of any order of the court of common council, or board of city commissioners of the city ; nor that the sidewalk had ever been designated or fixed, by the court of common council, either as to its width, course, height or level.\\nThe defendant claimed to have proved, that when the sidewalk was so constructed, and from that time until after the alleged assault and battery was committed, he was the owner in fee, not only of the land adjoining the side-walk on the North, but of the land on which the side-walk was made, and denied that it was a part, or within the limits, of any public highway. He also claimed to have proved, that the side-walk so built by the plaintiff, was made so high against the defendant\\u2019s gates as to prevent the opening of them, to enable him to pass in and out of his barn-yard, with his cattle or otherwise, and higher than the public convenience and necessity required ; and that in committing the assault and battery complained of, the defendant did no more injury to the plaintiff than was necessary to prevent him from filling - up said cavity.\\nThe defendant also claimed, that the plaintiff, by virtue of the office to which he had been appointed, had not, under the charter or by-laws of the city, any right or authority, either with or without the order or direction of the'mayor of the city, to construct said side-walk on the public highway, within his district, nor to repair it, by filling up said cavity, in the manner he claimed to have done.\\nThe plaintiff, on the other hand, claimed, that, by virtue of his office, he had a right and authority, under the charter and by-laws, to build, maintain and keep in repair such side-walks as the public convenience and necessity required in the public highway within said district, and to remove all nuisances from the highways and side-walks therein, without any order or direction so to do, either from the mayor or court of common council, or board of commissioners of the city; and that if the plaintiff, having been duly appointed to said office, had built said side-walk, within the limits of an open and public highway, within his district, and the side-walk so built by the plaintiff was required by public convenience and necessity, he had a right to build the same, and also to maintain it and keep it in repair, and to remove all nuisances therefrom; that if said cavity rendered the side-walk impassable, or dangerous to travellers thereon, he had a right to fill it up, and restore the side-walk to its former condition ; and that the defendant, consequently, would not be justified in resisting the plaintiff in so doing.\\nEach of the parties requested the court to charge the jury in conformity to their respective claims.\\nThe court charged the jury as requested by the plaintiff; and further instructed them, that if the side-walk, as built by the plaintiff, was not such as the public convenience and necessity required, he had no right to build or repair the same, as he claimed to have done; and that, in that case, the defendant would be justified in preventing him from so doing, by the use of as much force as would be necessary for that purpose.\\nIt appeared, that a previous trial of this cause had been had, at its term in March 1847 ; and that, after the taking in the evidence, and before the argument of the cause, one . \\u00b0 , the jurors died, in consequence of which, the trial proceeded no further ; and no verdict was rendered. The plain-pff now dafttued, that the expenses of that trial might be considered by the jury, in their estimate of the damages in this action, if the plaintiff should recover; to which the defendant objected: but the court instructed the jury, that they might, consider the expenses of such former trial, in their estimate of damages ; but no bill of the expenses, nor estimate of the amount thereof, was proved, or laid before the jury.\\nThe parties were at variance, on the question whether the land on which said side-walk was built, in front of the defendant\\u2019s gates, was public highway.\\nThe plaintiff claimed, that there was, over said land, an ancient public highway, which adjoined said side-walk on the South, and extended so far North as to embrace and cover the whole width of the side-walk at that place.\\nThe defendant claimed, that if theie was any ancient public highway, on the South of said side-walk, it did not extend over or embrace any part of said side-walk.\\nThere was no formal or legal laying-out of any highway adduced in evidence, on the trial; but the existence and extent of such highway were claimed by the plaintiff to be proved, by parol evidence adduced by him, showing a dedication thereof, for the purpose of such highway, by the owners of the land over which it was claimed to run.\\nThe defendant claimed to have proved, that in the year 1826, and before, there was an ancient fence, running on the North side, and constituting the North boundary of the highway, in which, as the plaintiff claimed, said side-walk was made, between such highway and the defendant\\u2019s land, and extending from the South- West corner of the defendant\\u2019s land on the North side of the highway, further Easterly than the side-walk against said gates where the alleged assault and battery was committed ; that in the spring of 1826, the defendant took down and removed said fence, and built a new fence, which is the one now existing, about three feet North of the line of such ancient fence, the whole of the distance aforesaid, leaving a strip of the defendant\\u2019s land between the line of such ancient fence and the new fence ; that this strip was so left by the defendant, not for public use, but for his own accommodation only ; and that he so declared, at the time when he built the new fence ; that he continued, to the time when said side-walk was built, to occupy said strip of land, with his carts, lumber, wood, stone and other things ; that the side-walk was constructed wholly upon said strip of land ; that when the defendant removed the ancient fence, he caused a stone to be buried in the ground in the post-hole, at the West end of the ancient fence, which was the South- West corner of his land; and that this stone has ever since been, and now is, where it was then placed.\\nThe plaintiff claimed to have proved, that the new fence was not put North of the line of the ancient fence, as claimed by the defendant; but that the ancient fence, before it was taken down, stood North of the line of the new fence ; and that when the defendant built the new fence, he drew in the line of it on the highway ; that from time immemorial, the highway, on the North side of it, where the defendant built the new fence, was broader than it has since been, and thus the defendant encroached on the highway ; that the land, adjoining and South of the new fence, on which said side-walk was built, against the defendant\\u2019s bam yard and gate, was never encumbered and occupied by him, as he claimed, but was always open, and used for public travel; or, if ever so encumbered or occupied, that the encumbrances thereon were removed therefrom, by the public officers of the city; and that if the new fence was placed, by the defendant, as he claimed, North of the line of the ancient fence, he had dedicated the land, between the new fence and the line of the ancient fence, to the public, for the purpose of a public highway.\\nThe defendant claimed, and requested the court to charge the jury, that under the evidence respecting said strip of land, the law was so, that if the defendant owned it, and it lay to the North of the ancient fence, he could not be deemed to have dedicated it, or intended to dedicate it, to the use of the public, as highway.\\nThe court did not so charge the jury, but instructed them, that they must find whether the place bn the side-walk where the assault was committed, was, or was not, public highway ; that it was not necessary, in order to constitute such a highway, that there should be a legal or formal laying-out thereof \\u2022 on record ; that it was competent for the proprietors of land, to dedicate it to the public, for their use as a highway; and that when this was done by them, it thereby became devoted to the use of the public, for that purpose, and was a legal and valid highway ; that whether a place is highway by dedication, is a question of intention, to be proved, by the facts and circumstances of the case ; that the continued and uninterrupted use of land, by the public, as and for the purpose of a highway, for the period of fifteen years, is sufficient evidence that, it has been dedicated to such use, by the owner thereof, and that it is a public highway; that the mere use, however, by the public, of land as highway, for any period short of fifteen years, would not be sufficient evidence of such a dedication ; but that if, in addition to the circumstance, that the public had used land as and for a public highway, there was unequivocal proof that the owner of it intended to dedicate it to the public, for that purpose, a less time than fifteen years would be sufficient ; that in case of such proof, no particular period of time, during which the land must be used by the public, for such purpose, is necessary or required ; and that in some cases, such use, for the period of six years, accompanied by such proof, had been held sufficient. And the court left it for the jury to find, on the evidence adduced by the parties, whether the place on said side-walk where the assault was committed, had been, and then was, public highway by dedication.\\nThe defendant offered to prove, by a witness introduced by him, that on the next day after he caused the aforesaid stone to be buried by him in the ground, he, the defendant, stated to the witness, that he caused it to be so placed there, as a bound of his land.\\nTo this testimony the plaintiff objected; and the court ruled it to be inadmissible, and excluded it.\\nIn the course of the trial, the plaintiff claimed, that said ancient highway extended Easterly from the locus in quo, the distance of several rods, to a ferry and landing-place, at a river there ; and that it was, for the whole distance from such ferry and landing-place to the locus in quo, and still further West, of the width of two rods ; and that it, therefore, embraced and extended over the whole of the side-walk against the defendant\\u2019s land. For the purpose of proving the existence of said highway, and the location, width and extent thereof, the plaintiff offered in evidence a paper, purporting and appearing tobe an ancient map or plan, representing a number of lots and highways on the flats, at said river, as surveyed and laid out, by the committee of the proprietors of said flats, on the 25th day of June 1770 ; (which flats, it was conceded by the parties, lay Easterly and North-Easterly from said ferry and landing-place, and the locus in quo,) on which paper was laid down as highway, on the Westerly side of said river, said ancient highway, claimed by the plaintiff to embrace and cover said side-walk, extending to said river. This paper was accompanied with the testimony of a witness offered by the plaintiff, that it was found by him recently, among the books, papers and records of the proprietors of said flats.\\nTo the admission of such paper in evidence, and of the testimony regarding it, the defendant objected ; but the court overruled the objection, and admitted the evidence.\\nThe jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff; and the defendant moved for a new trial.\\nHill and C. F. Cleveland, (with whom was Waite also,) in support of the motion,\\ncontended, 1. That the plaintiff, as surveyor of highways in the city of Norwich, had not, by virtue of his office, under the charter or by-laws of the city, either with or without the order of the mayor, any right, power or authority to construct or repair a side-walk, within the limits of his district. Amended charter of 1836. sec. 3. Even if such power is given to surveyors, by the by-law of IS 13. it is not given to them individually, but to them collectively, as a \\u201c permanent boardand they only have \\u201c the general direction of all matters relative to the highways, streets and side-walks,\\u201d when they act as a body. An individual surveyor can only execute \\u201c the directions of the board of city commissioners, and of the court of common council, respecting the same.\\u201d By-law of July 14th, 1843, sec. 2. 3. He has only authority, in this capacity, to repair highways, under the direction of the board of city commissioners, and subject to such regulations, as the court of common council shall prescribe. Sec. 3. Even if the cavity in question was a nuisance, it could only have been removed by the plaintiff, under the orders of'the board of city commis- , sioners. Sec. 2. If then, the plaintiff had not the right virtute -officii, to build the side-walk, or remove what was claimed to be a nuisance, in front of the defendant\\u2019s premises, the defendant would be justified in preventing him from so doing, by the use of all the force necessary to effect that purpose. 1 Sw. Dig. 642. Commonwealth v. Kennard, 8 Pick. 133. Commonwealth v. Clark, 2 Mete. 23. Weaver v. Bush, 8 Term R. 78.\\n2. That the charge of the judge to the jury, that in estimating damages, they might consider the expenses incurred by the plaintiff, in a former trial of the cause, without any estimate being made or items furnished of the amount of such expenses, was clearly erroneous. The jury having no means of ascertaining the amount of such expenses, were liable to do gross injustice to the defendant. If the plaintiff claimed any such instruction from the court, he should have furnished correct data; and it was improper for the judge so to charge, unless the data were furnished. Sterling v. Adams, 3 Day\\u2019s R. 111. Guild v. Guild, 2 Mete. 229.\\n3. That the declarations of the defendant in 1826, when he removed an old fence and erected a new one, thereby throwing out of his enclosure the strip of land where the side-walk in question was laid, that he threw out that strip of land, not for public use, but for his own accommodation ; and also his declaration, immediately after sinking a stone in a post-hole of the old fence, that he placed it there as a monument, to show that he meant to hold the land out to the original line \\u2014 -were declarations accompanying and explaining acts, and as such, constituted a part of the res gestee; and the court should have instructed the jury, that such declarations furnished proof that the defendant had never dedicated, or intended to dedicate, said strip of land to the public. I Sw. Dig. 763. 1 Stark. Evid. 57. 1 Phil. Evid. 202. Merrill v. Meacham, 5 Day\\u2019s R. 341. Phelps v. Foote, 1 Conn. R. 387. Cook v. Swan, 5 Conn. R. 140. Wooden v. Cowles\\u2019 exr. 11 Conn. R. 292. Deming v. Carrington, 12 Conn. R 1. Poole v. Bridges, 4 Pick. 378. New-England Marine Insurance Company v. DeWolf, 8 Pick. 56. Merrill v. Sawyer, Id. 397. Allen v. Duncan, 11 Pick. 308. Boyden v. Moore, Id. 362. Van Deusen v. Turner, 12 Pick. 532. Thorndike v. Boston, 1 Mete. 242. Kilburn v. Ben nett, 3 Mete. 199. Hoare v. Allen, 3 Esp. li. 276. Ave-son v. Kinnaird, 6 i?a.s\\u00a3 193. Fellowes v. Williamson, 1 Moo. Malk, 306. (22 E. C. L. 316.) Bennett v. Heathington, 16 Serg-. Sf R. 193. Tompkins v. Saltmarsh, 14 Serg. Sf R. 275. Little v. Libby, 2 Greenl. R. 242. lioso. Cr. Ev. 20. 21.\\n4. That to constitute this a public highway, it should have been legally and formally laid out, in the manner prescribed by the statute. Stat. 339. tit. 49. sec. 11, 12. Hinckly v. Hastings, 2 Pick. 162. Commonwealth v. Low, 3 Pick. 408. 412. Jones v. Andover, 9 Pick. 146.\\n5. That if a public highway can be had by dedication, yet the mere use of land, by the public, as a highway, for a less period than fifteen years, does not furnish evidence of a dedication of the land to the public, by the owner, for such highway ; but the use must be adverse, uninterrupted and unexplained, for the period of twenty years in England, and fifteen years in this state, by analogy to their and our statutes limiting the right of entry on land for that period. The same rule governs the acquisition, both of public and private ways. The principle is the same as that conferring a right to the use of water, and the enjoyment of ancient lights. 1 Sm. Dig. 105. 158, 9. 160, 1. Chalker v. Dickinson, 1 Conn. R. 382. Ingraham v. Hutchinson, 2 Conn. R. 584. Watrous v. Walrous, 3 Conn. R. 273. King v. Tiffany, 9 Conn. R. 162. B aldington v. Bradley, 10 Conn. R. 213. Tucker v. Jewett, 11 Conn. R. 312. Gayetty v. Bethune, 14 Mass. R. 49. First Parish in Gloucester v. Beach, 2 Pick. 60. Hinckley v. Hastings, Id. 162. Odi\\u00f3me v. Wade, 5 Pick. 421. Kent v. Waite, 10 Pick. 138. Reed v. Northfield, 13 Pick. 95. Williams v. Cunningham, 18 Pick. 312. Stetson v. Faxon, 19 Pick. 147. Valentine v. Benton, 22 Pick. 75. Livett v. Wilson, 3 Bing. 115. (11 E. C. L. 57.) Cincinnati v. White, 6 Peters, 631. Pomeroy v. Mills, 3 Verm. R. 279. Abbott v. Mills, Id. 521. State v. Catlin, Id. 530. Pritch-ard v. Atkinson, 4 N. Hamp. 1. Todd v, Rome, 2 Greenl. R. 55. Rowell v. Montville, 4 Greenl. R. 270. Estes v. Troy, 5 Greenl. R. 368. Jackson d. Parker v. Phillips, 9 Cowen, 94.\\n6. That the map or survey of certain lots and highways on the flats adjoining the premises where the side-walk was erected and the assault committed, was inadmissible to con- ^ koundfiries of the defendant\\u2019s premises, or in any other way to affect his rights. Jackson d. Ten Eyck v. Frost, 5 Cowen, 346\\nStrong and G. Perkins, contra,\\ncontended, 1. That a surveyor of highways in the city of Norwich, is competent, without advice from any source, to make, maintain and keep in repair all highways, streets and side-walks, within his district, and to remove nuisances therein. By-law of July 14th, 1843, sec. 2, 3. Such power results, necessarily, from the nature of his duties. It is substantially the same as that conferred on surveyors of highways in towns. St at. 344, (ed. 1838.)\\n2. That the jury had a right to consider the expenses of the former trial, in which a verdict failed to be rendered, in consequence of the death of a juror. This occurred by the providence of God, and not by any fault of the plaintiff. It is common, in actions of this kind, for the jury to consider the expense to which the injured party is subjected in obtaining redress. The circumstances of the case would justify, if not require, vindictive damages ; but all which the judge directed, with reference to the former trial, was only for compensatory damages. Linsley v. Bushnell, 15 Conn. R. 236, 7.\\n3. That the court was correct, in the charge respecting a highway by dedication. The jury were instructed, that whether a place is highway by dedication, is a question of intention, to be proved by the facts and circumstances of the case ; that continued and uninterrupted use, by the public, for fifteen years, was sufficient proof of dedication ; and that the intent being unequivocally proved, even a less period of time, was sufficient. Cincinnati v. White, 6 Peters, 439. 440. Hobbs v. Lowell, 19 Pick. 405. 409. 2 Greenl Ev. \\u00a7 662. and notes. State v. Catlin, 3 Verm. R. 530. Cleveland v. Cleveland, 12 Wend. 172.\\n4. That the declaration of the defendant to some one, that he placed a certain stone in the highway, to show the bound of his land, made the day after the stone was claimed to have been placed there, was not admissible. It was no part of the res gestee, as it did not accompany the alleged act. If admissible, any similar declaration made by him, at any time since, would be admissible. Merrill v Sawyer, $ Pick. 397. Haynes v. Rutter, 24 Pick. 242.\\n5. That the map or plan mentioned in the motion, being found in the records of the proprietors of the town of Norwich, bearing date June 25th, 1770, was properly admitted, as evidence by reputation of the existence of the highway in question, at that tiine. The antiquity of the plan, and the place where it was found, prove its genuineness. If the pa-rol declarations of individuals, at such a remote period, are admissible, much more are written statements and plans, regarding highways, placed in the records of public bodies, whose special province it was to keep such documents. 1 Sw. Dig. 764. Tolman v. Emerson, 4 Pick. 160. 163. 1 Stark. Ev. 66. 67. 3 Stark. Ev. 1207. 1 Greenl. Ev. sec. 128. 139. But even if the plan was not admissible, yet, as the existence of the highway in 1770, was clearly proved, by other testimony, a new trial will not be granted. Prince v, Shepard, 9 Pick. 176. 183. Hoyt v. Dimon, 5 Day\\u2019s R. 479.\\nAs such parts of these by-laws as are material in this case, appear in the opinion of the court, post, a particular statement of them is omitted here.\", \"word_count\": \"9382\", \"char_count\": \"53086\", \"text\": \"Storrs, J.\\nThe several questions in this case wall be considered in the order in which they are presented by the motion.\\n1. The defendant does not question the validity, either of the appointment of the plaintiff, as a surveyor of highways, or of the by-law under which the latter justified the making and repairing of the side-walk where the assault complained of was committed, and which was admitted to be within his district. That by-law, after providing, that there should be annually appointed, by the court of common council of the city of Norwich, four highway surveyors, who should be resident, one in each of the four districts into which said city had been in said by-law divided,and that they should constitute a board of city commissioners, whose duty it should be to examine and remove all nuisances, encroachments, and incumbrances, upon the streets and highways in said city, and cause to be executed all the provisions of the charter and by-laws of said city, relative to the prevention and removal of such nuisances, encroachments and incumbrances, further provides, that said commissioners shall constitute a permanent board, which shall have the general direction of all matters relative to the high-streets and side-walks in said city; and that the said \\u2022 \\u215c highway surveyors, each in the district in which he resides, sha.II have the particular care and superintendence of all highways, streets and side-walks, in said city, and shall execute all the directions of the board of commissioners and of the court of common council respecting the same; and that they shall have full power and authority, each in his district, as surveyors of highways, to make, maintain and keep in repair, all highways and streets in said city, subject to such direction as may be given, by the board of city commissioners, and under such regulations and directions as the court of common council may, from time to time, prescribe. It is insisted, that, under this by-law, the several surveyors of highways have no power to do any act whatever for the purpose of maintaining or keeping in repair the highways in their respective districts, without the direction of |he board of commissioners, or some regulation or direction of the court of common council, authorizing such act. We think that this is not its true construction. These highway surveyors are made subordinate to those bodies, in this respect, that they must execute all the directions that they deem it proper to give, in relation to the highways, streets and side-walks. Their power, however, as such officers, is not derived from those bodies, but is conferred by the by-law ; and that power is to make, maintain, and keep in repair, all highways and streets in their respective districts. The preceding clause, providing that they shall do this, subject to such directions and regulations as those boards may give or prescribe, is merely a restriction upon the powers which had been given to these officers, in the same sentence ; the effect of which is, not to make either of those boards the source of the power of such highway surveyors, or to require that there should be a direction from either of those boards before they should have any authority to act, but only to take from them their independent power of judging, in the execution of their duty, in those cases where either of those boards had deemed it proper to give directions. We do not think that it was intended, by this by-law, to constitute any difference between the surveyors of highways, who should be appointed under that by-law, and those appointed by towns under the general law of the state, as to their powers, except ing that the former were intended to be subject to be con-trouled by the boards of city officers mentioned in such bylaw, whereas the latter are subject to the controul of the town. The general law does not define the particular powers of the highway surveyors appointed by the towns, excepting as they are derived from their name, in connexion with the powers given to towns in relation to the making, maintaining, and repairing of highways ; but the powers of such highway surveyors are precisely the same as those expressly given in this by-law to the highway surveyors of this city, with the difference only, that they are respectively liable to be con-trouled by the bodies by whom they are appointed. Stat. tit. 49. sect. 17.\\nIt has never been understood, that the highway surveyors of towns have no authority to act in the duties of their office, without a particular direction or regulation of the towns ap-appointing them ; and the inconvenience and injury, which might result from requiring such officers, in every case, where a highway is out of repair, to seek and obtain the particular direction of the town or city by whom they are appointed, before it could be put in order, constitutes a conclusive reason against such a construction of their powers as the defendant claims. The acts of the plaintiff, therefore, in relation to the side-walk in question, were not unauthorized, in consequence of no directions having been given to him in regard to it, by the board of city commissioners, or the court of common council, unless, as the defendant further claims, his authority, as a surveyor of highways, extended only to the other parts of the road. The streets and highways, however, embrace the side-walks, no less than the other portions of the road ; and unless these officers are restrained from exercising their powers over the former, by some particular provision of the charter or by-laws, we cannot perceive why it does not equally extend over both. If public necessity and convenience require, that there should be side-walks for the accommodation or safety of foot passengers, the same reasons exist why they should be made and kept in repair, as apply to the more central parts of the highway. But it is to be observed, that, in the third section of the by-law which has been mentioned, it is provided expressly, that \\\"the said highway surveyors, each in the district in which he resides, shall have the particular and superintendence of all highways, streets and side-in said city ; and by that section, he is required to execute all the directions of the board of city commissioners, and of the court of common council, respecting the same. Then succeeds the provision that they shall have full power and authority, in their respective districts, as surveyors of highways, to make, maintain, and keep in repair, all highways and streets therein, subject to the direction and regulation of said boards ; thereby implying most strongly, that it was the design of that by-law, that the authority of these officers should extend equally to the side-walks and other parts of the highway. Nor do we think, as the defendant insists, that their general powers are abridged, by the third section of the amended charter of said city, which confers upon the court of common council \\\" power and authority, from time to time, as public convenience may require, to designate and fix the width, course, height, and level of all side-walks and gutters in and upon the streets and highways in said city.\\\" Tnat section authorizes that body to exercise the controul provided in that section over the surveyors of highways in regard to the construction of side-walks, but does not otherwise affect their general powers as such officers.\\nIf, therefore, the side-walkin question was such as the public convenience and necessity required, as the jury have found, a majority of the court are of opinion, that the plaintiff had a right to build and repair it, as he claimed to have done ; and that the charge on this point was correct.\\n2. The instruction to the jury, that they might consider the expenses of the former trial, in their estimate of the damages, is sanctioned by the case of Linsley v. Bushnell, 15 Conn. R, 236. where the rule on this subject was fully considered and settled.\\n3. The next point respects the charge of the court below, on the subject of the right of the public to the use of land as a highway, by what is termed a dedication of it, by the owner, for that purpose.\\nThe defendant has suggested, rather than argued, before us, that the public cannot acquire a right to use the land of an individual for that purpose, in that mode; but that they must take the steps prescribed by the statutes relating to the laying out of highways. This court has never had this point brought directly before it for adjudication; and therefore, has never formally decided it. This is explainable only on the ground that it was not susceptible of a question. Numerous cases have been tried at the circuit, which depended on the right of the public to acquire the use of land for that, as well as other, purposes, by dedication, in which such right was uniformly conceded ; and it is not credible that it would not have been questioned in this court, if it could have been, with the least expectation of success. That property may be effectually dedicated, by the owner, to public uses, and to this particular use, as well as any other, admits, in our opinion, of no doubt. We consider this principle as too long and too well settled, by the authorities in the English courts, in those of several of the states of this Union, and in the supreme court of the United States, to require us, at this time, particularly to examine them, or the reasoning on which they are founded. A refer* ence only to some of the adjudged cases on this subject, is deemed necessary. Lade v. Shepherd, 2 Stra. 1004. Rex v. Lloyd, 1 Campb. 260. Rugby Charity v. Meriwether, 11 East, 376. Stafford v, Coyney, 7 B. & C. 257. (14 E. C. L. 39.) Jarvis v. Dean, 3 Bing. 447. (13 E. C. L. 45.) Woodyer, v. Hadden, 5 Taunt. 137. Cincinnati v. White, 6 Peters, 431. Hobbs v. Lowell, 19 Pick. 405. Abbot v. Mills, 3 Verm. 519. State v. Catlin, Id. 530. State v. Trask, 6 Verm. 355. Bryant's lessee v. McCandless, 7 Ham.pt. 2. 135. New Orleans v. United States, 10 Peters, 662. Olcott v. Banfill, 4 N. Hamp. 537. Rung v. Sheenburger, 2 Watts,23. Commonwealth v. Alburger, 1 Whart, 469. Pomeroy v. Mills, 3 Verm. 279. Cleveland w Cleveland, 12 Wend. 172. Rector v. Hart, 3 Miss. 448.\\nThis doctrine rests on the intelligible, rational, and wholesome principle of the common law, that, wherever a person has made representations, or pursued a line of conduct, with a view to lead or induce others to adopt a particular course of action, and such representations or conduct have produced that effect, they shall be held to be binding and conclusive against him, and he shall not afterwards be permitted to retract or repudiate them, to the injury of those who have been induced thus to act. This is a principle of public policy and good faith \\u2014 of the greatest importance \\u2014 and of very general, if not of universal, application. This rule is thus clearly and broadly stated, by Mr. Greenleaf, in his treatise on Evidence, vol. 1. \\u00a7 207. \\\"Admissions, which have been acted upon by others, are conclusive against the party making them, in all cases between him and the person, whose conduct he has thus influenced. It is of no importance, whether they were made in express language to the person himself, or implied from the open and general conduct of the party. For, in the latter case, the implied declaration may be considered as addressed to every one in particular, who may have occasion to act upon it. In such cases, the party is estopped, on grounds of public policy and good faith, from repudiating his own representations.\\\" The almost universal extent of this rule may be seen from the cases cited by Mr. G., and also in note 192 of Cowen & Hill to 1 Phill. Evid. 107. This principle has often been recognized, by this court. Brown v. Wheeler, 17 Conn. R. 345. Kinney v. Farnsworth, Id. 355. Roe v. Jerome, 18 Conn. R. 138.\\nMr. Justice Thompson, in giving the opinion of the supreme court of the United States, in Cincinnati v. The lessee of White, 6 Peters, 431., where the subject of dedications to public uses is most thoroughly examined and clearly elucidated, speaking of the dedication there in question, which was that of a public common in the city of Cincinnati, after having shown, that all dedications of land to such uses, rest upon the same principle as the one which is applicable to dedications of public highways, says : \\\" After being thus set apart for public use and enjoyed as such,and private and individual rights acquired with reference to it, the law considers it in the nature of an estoppel in pais, which precludes the original owner from revoking such dedication. It is a violation of good faith to the public and to those who have acquired private property, with a view to the enjoyment of the use thus publicly granted.\\\" The courts have uniformly considered this as the ground on which the right by dedication rests. 2 Greenl. Ev. \\u00a7 662. Hobbs v. Lowell, 19 Pick. 405., and cases before cited.\\nThis being the principle on which dedications of land for public highways are sanctioned and enforced, it is obvious, that they are not affected, by the statutes which prescribe the mode in which such highways may be laid out and established. Those statutes -were not designed to take away or abridge the right which previously existed, of any person to grant or dedicate to the public, by his own act, a right of way over his land ; but only to provide a mode, by which the public may procure it to be appropriated for such a purpose, without or even against his consent.\\nThe defendant, however, further claims, that, in order to establish in the public a right to the use of land as a highway, by dedication, it is requisite that they should have used it as such, adversely and uninterruptedly, and also for the period of fifteen years. This claim proceeds on the supposition, that the title by dedication is founded on the presumption of a grant; and that such presumption arises, in this case, as in other cases of incorporeal rights growing out of long possession, only after an adverse and uninterrupted enjoyment, and that for the period, in this stale, of fifteen years, in analogy to the statute limiting the right of entry on lands of which the owner is disseised. This, however, is an entire misapprehension as to the nature of the title by dedication, as is obvious from the explanation already given of the ground on which it rests. A dedication, as such, is not held binding, because it is presumed that there was ever a formal grant, by the owner of the land ; nor because the enjoyment of it, by the public, is considered as evidence of such a grant. 2 Greenl. Ev. \\u00a7 662. Woodyer v. Hadden, 5 Taunt. 126. The enjoyment by the public, is not viewed as furnishing evidence of the acquisition by them of the right of such enjoyment, in any particular mode. Cincinnati v. White, 6 Peters 431. If that were the ground on which it is placed, there would perhaps be a serious difficulty in recognizing the acquisition of such a title, excepting by an enjoyment in the manner and for the time suggested by the defendant. But the acquisition, as be. fore stated, proceeds on a different principle, namely, that the owner, after having permitted the public to use his land for the purpose for which it is claimed to have been dedicated, under such circumstances that the public accommodation and private rights, supposed to be acquired in consequence of such permission, might be injuriously affected, by an interruption of such enjoyment, is held to be precluded from denying that the public have acquired a right to such use in whatever manner, on the ground that such denial would be, on his part, a violation of good faith. This doctrine, so far from proceeding on the ground that such enjoyment was adverse and in hostil-to the rights of the owner, supposes that it was with his assent. It has accordingly been uniformly held, that, where a title by dedication is set up, the use by the public must be shown to have been with the assent of the owner of the land. For, without evidence of such assent, it would not appear that it was the intention of the owner that his land should be devoted to that use ; and, independently of such an intention, he certainly should not be precluded, on principles of justice, from re-asserting his original rights in the land. Hence, the question in such cases, is, always, as to the intention of the owner in permitting the public to use his land for the purpose for which it is claimed to have been dedicated. 6 Peters, 431., and cases before cited.\\nIt is very evident, from these views, and the doctrine on which the title by dedication rests, that it does not depend upon the length of time for which the public has had the enjoyment of the land. The length of such enjoyment is a circumstance, which constitutes proper, and usually very important, evidence, from which the assent and intention of the owner may be inferred ; and it may also tend to show whether the accommodation of the public and the rights of individuals might be injuriously affected, by an interruption of the use ; but \\\"when it is shown, that the owner of the property has devoted it to the use of the public, by laying or leaving it out for that purpose, and that these consequences would result to the public and to individuals from such interruption, the question, whether he ought to be permitted to reclaim his original rights in the land, should not depend on whether he has permitted the public to use it for a longer or shorter period of time. Hence, it has also been uniformly decided, that the right of the public, in these cases, does not depend upon any particular length of possession. 2 Greenl. Ev. \\u00a7 662., and cases before cited. Denning v. Roome, 6 Wend. 551. State v. Marble, 4 Iredell, 318. 1 Hill, 189-191. 9 Wend. 128.\\nThis view of the subject furnishes an explanation of what is meant by the courts, when they speak of the length of time, during which it is necessary that land should be used by the public as a highway, in order to gain a right to it by dedication for that purpose ; and shows, that it was not intended to lay down an absolute rule of law,\\\" which required, in every case, a particular and invariable period of time, during which there must be such use, in order to acquire such right; but only, that it should be for such a length of time, that, under the circumstances, it should satisfy the minds of the triers, that it was with the assent of the owner of the land, and that the rights of the public and others would be injuriously affected, by permitting the owner to resume his original right to exclude the public therefrom. Each case, in this respect, depends on its own circumstances ; and it was only with reference to the particular cases before them, that the courts have spoken of the time during which the use of the public had been permitted to be continued. This explanation reconciles all the cases on this point, and shows that there is no ground for the impression, which has sometimes been entertained, that they are involved in confusion.\\nWe think, therefore, that none of the exceptions to the charge, on this subject, are valid.\\nWhether that part of the charge in which the court below, in deference to what had been before ruled on the circuit, stated, that the mere use by the public of land as a highway, for any period short of fifteen years, would not be sufficient evidence of a dedication of it for that purpose, was not too favourable to the defendant, we are not called on to decide, in this case; and therefore, we express no opinion upon it.\\n4. The declaration of the defendant, as to the intention with which he deposited the stone in the ground, at what he claimed to be the West end of his ancient fence, did not accompany, nor wrns it a part of, that act; nor was it so connected with it as to characterize or explain it. It was merely a narrative of the transaction, by the defendant, to the witness, the next day after it was finished. It was, therefore, properly excluded. 1 Greenl. Ev. \\u00a7 108.\\n5. Proof of genera] reputation was admissible, in this case, for the purpose of showing the existence and extent of the highway in question. 1 Greenl. Ev. \\u00a7 128. \\u00a7 139. And, in our opinion, the map or plan offered by the plaintiff, was properly received as evidence of that character. It was an ancient document, purporting to have been made by the committee, and therefore by the authority, of the ancient proprietors of the lands designated upon it, and was proved to have been found among the records of the town-elerk, which is the proper depository of the records and papers of those proprietors; and we think that the authorities justified its admission. Nichols v. Turney, 15 Conn. R. 101. Cowen & Hill's note 477. to 1 Phill. Ev. 249.\\nA new tria! is not advised.\\nIn this opinion Waite, Hinman and Ellsworth, Js., concurred.\\nChurch, Ch. J.\\nUpon one of the questions discussed in this case, I have not been able to concur with my brethren ; and if it was one of less importance, I should not, in this manner, record my views upon it; but I esteem it to be a question essentially connected with the interests of all our cities.\\nThat the city highway surveyors have power to repair side-walks in the city of Norwich, and to remove nuisances, encroachments and obstructions from them, I have no doubt. I find this power expressly given, by the by-laws of the city ; and perhaps this is incidental to their office, if it had not been directly conferred. But the question which I wish to examine, is, have they an authority, independent of the board of city commissioners and of the court of common council, to locate or lay out side-walks, to determine their width and elevation, and to construct them in such fashion as they may prefer? Upon a careful inspection of the charter of this city and its by-laws, I have not discovered this power.\\nIt will be recollected, that it was not the mere act of the plaintiff, as highway surveyor, in repairing the side-walk, which caused this affray: this was connected with his previous act in laying it out, which he had done in opposition to the defendant's will, and without any other guide than his own discretion, and had constructed it in just such a place and manner as he pleased. If he had no authority to do this, he had no right to repair it, to the injury of the defendant, and was a trespasser in doing so.\\nFor some purposes, side-walks may be deemed to be parts of a highway. They are within the surveyed limits of the highway, and are intended to accommodate the public travel; but they are not necessary appendages of it, even in cities, much less in country villages. There are highways in every city where side-walks are not considered necessary, and are not constructed. And it is important, in the consideration of this question, to observe, that in this charter and code of bylaws, side-walks are treated as entirely distinct from highways and streets, as much so, as the public squares, public greens, public commons and burying-grounds, over which the surveyors have a superintendence ; and when side-walks are intended to be the objects of city legislation, they are, I believe, in every instance, specially named. Therefore, the power given to surveyors to repair highways, does not include the power of laying out and constructing side-walks.\\nThe charter of the city is its constitution, and no by-law or regulation of the city can be valid, which is opposed to the provisions of the charter. The first allusion, which I find, to side-walks in the city of Norwich, is in the third and fourth sections of the amended charter of 1830, by which the whole power to lay out or designate side-walks, and fix their width, heighth, course and level, is conferred upon the court of common council. It is an important power, and one which cannot be delegated to individuals acting alone, as mere ministerial officers, as the surveyors of highways are; nor can it be taken away from the court of common council, by any vote or regulation of a city meeting.\\nThe surveyors of highways, by the by-laws of the city, have the power of general superintendence, direction and repair of side-walks; but this is essentially different from a power to lay them out and fix their width, heighth, course and level. They have the same superintending power over the public squares, greens, commons, and public burial-grounds in the city, which they have, by virtue of the by-laws, over the streets and side-walks ; but it will not be claimed, that they have power to lay out such streets and public grounds, independently of the board of city commissioners, and of the regulations and directions of the court of common council. See by-law of July 14, 1843, sections 2d and 3d.\\nNo by-law has authorized the city highway surveyors to lay out side-walks, or to determine their width, course, heighth and level, as this plaintiff has presumed to do, as I can learn, either from the import of the language used, or from any intention expressed. Such a power would subject every proprietor adjoining a street or highway within the limits of the city, to serious interruption in his communication with his buildings, grounds and fields, at the will of the surveyor alone, without a hearing, and without a remedy. And therefore it was, that the charter was careful to entrust this authority writh the court of common council, a deliberative body, elected by the citizens \\u2014 the same body which alone had the power to lay out and establish streets, burial-places and public grounds. The by-laws have, indeed, as was very proper, conferred upon the surveyors the authority to repair side-walks, remove nuisances and encroachments from these and all public grounds, and to exercise over them a general superintendence ; and this is all.\\nI think, therefore, that the plaintiff, in assuming to construct a side-walk in front of the defendant's grounds and buildings, which had not been established by the court of common council, and without their direction, was the aggressor.\\nNew trial not to be granted.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"6753915\", \"name\": \"Deming v. Taylor\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Deming v. Taylor\", \"decision_date\": \"1804\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"285\", \"last_page\": \"290\", \"citations\": \"1 Day 285\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Day's Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:28:57.322393+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Deming v. Taylor.\", \"head_matter\": \"Deming v. Taylor.\\nIn \\u215b\\u215c 'Court'below,\\n\\u25a0 JtrLru&\\u00a9BafiN.<5, and |@SsRitIuTj\\u00edAN'r.'executbrs olLynde \\u25a0 Lord, 'E\\u00e1q.: jPhiintiffiitt- RUyJ\\u00cd> \\u00b6\\u215b\\u215d\\u00be\\u215d\\u215cfJ\\u00edefdridanl.^\\nAn action on die ease, fbr expences incurred, in defending against a groundless suit, cannot be maintained by tiie executor of such defend ant.\\nTPHIS was an action cn the case, stating, drat Taylor , brought,his action against. Lord,', as sheriff,. declaring,.that one Gunn was committed to gaol, upon an execution in favor of Taylor, and that Lord suffered Gunn, freely and.voluntarily.to,,go. -at,Targe,,,and escape froto prison,, against the will of Taylor, Lord pleaded, and the. Court that Taylor consented, that Giran should denart from prison ; and judgment was rendered for Lord. The plaintiffs alleged, that Taylor secretly, and unknown to Lord, permitted, and procured Gunn to leave the prison, to compel Lord to pay the debt; and Lord, in employing counsel, and procuring evidence, necessarily expended a large sunt, above the costs he recovered.\\n1804.\\nTo this declaration, the defendant, in the County-Court, pleaded in abatement, that he had not been benefited, nor the assets of Lord injured, by said wrong, for the expences of the suit were borne by one Reuben Webster, and the right of action died with Lord. The plaintiffs traversed that the expences of the suit were borne by Websterto which there was a demurrer, The County Court rendered judgment that the replication was sufficient. That judgment was reversed in the Superior Court.\\nGould\\\\ for the plaintiffs in error.\\nThe statute de bonis asportatis has been construed liberally. It has been constnirdto extend to administrators, as well as executors ; to goods converted as well as to goods carried away. \\u25a0 An executor mat-' maintain an action of ejectment for a chattel real, or a suit against a sheriff, for a -false return, or for an escape, although the escape happened in the life of the testator, So he may maintain trover for goods converted in the life of the testator ; so for trespass upon property,\\nThe common law maxim, that actio personalis vioritur cum person\\u00e9, is not even generally true, says Lord Mansfield, in the celebrated case of Harnbhj v. Trotl. R\\u00bfcause an action fo: such an injury would not lie against an executor of a person deceased, it does not follow, that an action will not lie in favor of an executor, in the one ease, the only question is, lias the assets of the tie-ceased been benefited; in the other, has the property of the deceased been injured? And whether the injury was done, during the life of the testator, or not, is of no importance, so that the suit be against the original wrong doer, not. against his executor. Th - maxim, as applied to an executor plaintiff, is confined to injuries done to the person of the testator, as assaults, imprisonment, slander, adultery, &c.\\nIn this case, have not the assets of sheriff Lord been injured ? We complain only of the injury to his property. IIis personal liberte and security were not violated. We do not complain of the injury as vexatious merely, but as having occasioned expense; and expence has been considered as a good ground of action,\\nDaggett, ar.d Sterling, for the defendant in error.\\nThe rule of the common law, that personal actions die with the person, is admitted. The question now is as to the applicability of that rule, or as to the gist of an action for a malicious prosecution. The gist of such an action may be determined by the statement required in the declaration. It is necessary to state something besides a loss of property. The ground may be merely the danger of imprisonment; and the plaintiff may recover, though he has not paid a cent. As in actions of slander, or the Court will precuaie damage, so in this action ex-pence wjj] \\u215b,\\u215c presumed. It is no justification in an action. for a malicious prosecution, that the plaintiff had paid nothing, or that his reputation or person was not injured. But the Court would say, that it was, per sc, evidence of damage, and the expence might he taken into consideration to encreast the damages.\\nBecause Justice Blackstone remarks, that actions fqr slander, false imprisonment, &c. do not survive to the executor, it does not follow, that all others do survive. These are mentioned only byway of example.\\nThe injury here, if any, was merely to the person, and the expence is consequential to that injury. The action cannot;, therefore, survive.\\nThe cases cited by the Counsel for the plaintiff, are cases, where the person of the testator is not effected, but only the property, as for escape, &c. In Griswold v. Broxun, the action regarded property only, and a rule of damages was givem \\u2018 There, too, the deceased recovered judgment before his cleaA, and Ae case in this Court was upon a petition for a new trial. The right of executors extends only to property. If they had omitted to bring this suit, they would not have been liable on Aeir bond. They can recover only where a specific rule of damages is given, not where the jury may give vindictive damages:; for it is unjust, that they, who are accountable only for the personal property, should recover more than the damage done to that property.\\nIn such cases, out legislature have allowed threefold the damage sustained ; and can the court sever these damages, and say, part is given for the injury done to the person, and part for the injury to the property ? Wherever the damages are presumptive, the action dies with the person. Wherever the gravamen is an injury to the per non, the action dies with that person. If a declaration would have been good without stating the ex-pence incurred, the stating of that expence cannot vary the nature of the action. Besides, in this declaration, neb ther malice, nor want of probable cause is stated, which mast always be stated in suits c-f this kind.\\nGould in reply.\\nThe action for malicious prosecution may be brought for an injury to the reputation, to personal security, or personal liberty, or for experice only. The gist of the action is compounded of the wrong, and the subsequent injury. The gist of this action is the expence. In actions for slander of title, and for words not actionable in themselves, there must be a per quod, shewing how the party has been injured. There, the gravamen comes under the per quod. Here, the fraudulent design, followed by the expence, is the ground of action.\\nIt is said, that die cases cited are those where property only is concerned. Such, it is contended, is this ease.\\nIt is objected, that vindictive damages may be given. But such damages can no more he given in this case, than in an action of trover, or an action for fraud, where damages may be given to the amount of the property.\\nGriswold v. Broun: is said to be a petition lor a new trial. But after that petition was granted, the case was \\u00abgain tried on-.the merits.\\nIt is objected, that no malice is alleged. But any improper or wicked motives are considered malicious in our law ; and improper motives are surely alleged in this declaration.\\nIt is said, want of probable cause is not alleged. That is necessary in actions for malicious prosecutions, but not in those founded on civil suits. In actions for maliciously holding to bail, or for suing before a court, which had no jurisdiction, it would be ridiculous, as well as nugatory, to say, that the party had no probable cause.\\nIn this case, the declaration would not be good, without the per quod, stating the injury to the property.\\n4 Mod. 403, Williams v. Carey. 1 Salk. 12. s. c. Pop. 189* Lemmons and Dickson's case. 4 Perm Pep. 280, Cockcrillv. ISynaston.\\nPsp. Big, 578.\\nGriswold r. J3rcvms ante 180.\\nL'owp. SU.\\n3 Bla. Cam,. 302. - Co-mp. 372.\\nDig. 523. 1 Sal\\u00ed. 13, Savilte v. Roberts. 1 Stra, 631, C-gr.m S\\\\ks 379. \\u25a0 10 Med. 143:\", \"word_count\": \"1355\", \"char_count\": \"7837\", \"text\": \"By THE COURT,\\nThe judgment was affirmed.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"6775425\", \"name\": \"STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ANDRE CAMPBELL\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Campbell\", \"decision_date\": \"2011-03-08\", \"docket_number\": \"SC 18453\", \"first_page\": \"368\", \"last_page\": \"382\", \"citations\": \"300 Conn. 368\", \"volume\": \"300\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:24:08.033684+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan, Eveleigh and Vertefeuille, Js.\", \"parties\": \"STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ANDRE CAMPBELL\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ANDRE CAMPBELL\\n(SC 18453)\\nRogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan, Eveleigh and Vertefeuille, Js.\\nArgued November 30, 2010\\n\\u2014 officially released March 8, 2011\\nLisa J. Steele, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).\\nAdamE. Mattei, special deputy assistant state\\u2019s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John C. Smriga, state\\u2019s attorney, and Joseph T. Corradino, senior assistant state\\u2019s attorney, for the appellee (state).\", \"word_count\": \"4732\", \"char_count\": \"28222\", \"text\": \"Opinion\\nVERTEFEUILLE, J.\\nThe defendant, Andre Campbell, was charged with assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes \\u00a7 53a-59 (a) (1) and carrying a dangerous weapon, namely, a switchblade knife, in violation of General Statutes \\u00a7 53-206 (a), in connection with an incident that took place in a common hallway of the college dormitory where he resided. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty on the assault charge and guilty on the charge of carrying a dangerous weapon, and the trial court thereafter rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict. The defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court improperly denied his request to instruct the jury that his conduct would fall into an implied exception to \\u00a7 63-206 if the jury found that the conduct occurred in his place of abode. State v. Campbell, 116 Conn. App. 440, 441-42, 976 A.2d 757 (2009). The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment of conviction. Id., 449. We then granted the defendant's petition for certification to appeal limited to the following question of \\\"[w]hether the Appellate Court properly relied on State v. Sealy, 208 Conn. 689, 546 A.2d 271 (1988), to conclude that one's residence or place of abode cannot include common corridors and areas used to access a bathroom, kitchen and other areas necessary to life . . . .\\\" State v. Campbell, 293 Conn. 926, 927, 980 A.2d 913 (2009). Following oral argument in this court, we ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs on the question of whether subparagraphs (D) and (E) of \\u00a7 53-206 (b) (3) provide an implicit exception for the carrying of a weapon in an individual's residence or place of abode for any weapon other than a knife, the edged portion of the blade of which is four inches or more in length (long knife). We now answer that question in the negative, and, because it is undisputed that the defendant was carrying a switchblade knife, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court on this alternative ground.\\nThe Appellate Court opinion sets forth the following facts and procedural history. \\\"On the evening of January 31,2006, the defendant was a freshman at the University of Bridgeport. He lived on the sixth floor of Bodine Hall. In response to several violent incidents on campus, the defendant regularly carried a switchblade knife.\\n\\\"The defendant went to Kyle Boucher's room, where several friends were 'hanging out.' The defendant made a joke at Boucher's expense, and Boucher, angered by the comment, asked the defendant not to be disrespectful of him and to leave his room. The defendant did not think Boucher was serious and did not leave, but when Boucher asked him again, the defendant gathered his possessions and began to exit.\\n\\\"As the defendant was leaving the room, Boucher pushed him into the hallway. Boucher then threw a pretend punch at the defendant, and the defendant, concerned with Boucher's sudden change in demeanor, responded by drawing his switchblade knife. The two individuals argued, and a physical altercation ensued in the hallway. During the fight, the defendant stabbed Boucher four times. Eventually, other students entered the hallway and broke up the fight. The defendant was visibly upset after the fight and attempted to get help for Boucher. When the police arrived, the defendant cooperated with them, gave them his knife and later gave a statement of the events that took place.\\n\\\"The defendant subsequently was charged with assault in the first degree in violation of . \\u00a7 53a-59 (a) (1) and carrying a dangerous weapon in violation of \\u00a7 53-206 (a). Following a jury trial, the defendant was found not guilty of assault in the first degree and the lesser included offenses. The defendant was found guilty of carrying a dangerous weapon and was sentenced to three years imprisonment, execution suspended, and five years of probation with special conditions.\\\" State v. Campbell, supra, 116 Conn. App. 442-43.\\nThe defendant then appealed from the judgment of conviction to the Appellate Court, claiming \\\"that the court abused its discretion in refusing to give a requested jury instruction regarding the residence or place of abode exception to \\u00a7 53-206. Specifically, he claim[ed] that the jury should have had the opportunity to decide the parameters of the defendant's 'residence or place of abode.' By defining the terms 'residence or place of abode' in its instructions to the jury, the defendant claim[ed], the court usurped the jury's fact-finding function.\\\" Id., 443-44. The Appellate Court concluded that, pursuant to this court's decision in State v. Sealy, supra, 208 Conn. 692, the trial court properly had determined that the hallway of the defendant's dormitory was not his place of abode for purposes of \\u00a7 53-206, and had so instructed the jury. State v. Campbell, supra, 116 Conn. App. 448-49. Accordingly, the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id., 449. This certified appeal followed.\\nThe defendant initially claimed on appeal that the Appellate Court improperly determined that, under State v. Sealy, supra, 208 Conn. 692, the common hallway of a dormitory does not constitute part of an abode for purposes of the abode exception to \\u00a7 53-206. The state disputed this claim and claimed as alternative grounds for affirmance that, even if the trial court's instructions were incorrect, they were harmless because the defendant admitted to carrying the switchblade knife in areas that indisputably were outside his residence. Following oral argument on the certified question, this court ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs on the question of whether \\u00a7 53-206 (b) (3) (D) and (E) provide an implicit exception for the carrying of a weapon in an individual's residence or place of abode for any weapon other than a long knife. The defendant submitted a supplemental brief in which he contended that the exception was not limited to long knives. The state submitted a supplemental brief in which it contended that, to the contrary, because \\u00a7 53-206 (b) (3) expressly refers to \\\"the carrying of a knife, the edged portion of the blade of which is four inches or over in length,\\\" the exception plainly and unambiguously applies only to that weapon. We agree with the state and affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court on this alternative ground. Because this conclusion is dispositive of the question of whether the defendant was entitled to a jury instruction under \\u00a7 53-206 (b) (3) (D) and (E), we need not consider the question of whether the common hallway of a dormitory constitutes the abode of a dormitory residence for purposes of this statute.\\nTo provide context for our resolution of this issue, we begin with a review of the genealogy of \\u00a7 53-206. Before 1999, \\u00a7 53-206 provided in relevant part: \\\"(a) Any person who carries upon his person any slung shot, air rifle, BB. gun, blackjack, sand bag, metal or brass knuckles, or any dirk knife, or any switch knife, or any knife having an automatic spring release device by which a blade is released from the handle, having a blade of over one and one-half inches in length, or stiletto, or any knife the edged portion of the blade of which is four inches or over in length, or any martial arts weapon or electronic defense weapon, as defined in section 53a-3, or any other dangerous or deadly weapon or instrument . . . shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than three years or both. . . . The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to . . . any person who is found with any such weapon or implement concealed upon his person while lawfully removing his household goods or effects from one place to another, or from one residence to another, nor to any person while actually and peaceably engaged in carrying any such weapon or implement from his place of abode or business to a place or person where or by whom such weapon or implement is to be repaired, or while actually and peaceably returning to his place of abode or business with such weapon or implement after the same has been repaired. . . .\\\" General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) \\u00a7 53-206 (a). In State v. Sealy, supra, 208 Conn. 693, this court held that \\\"[i]mplicit in this provision is an exception for carrying a weapon in an individual's residence or abode, and a recognition of the protected zone of privacy in his or her dwelling.\\\" The defendant in the present case relies on this language in Sealy to support his claim that the trial court should have instructed the jury that it could not convict him of violating \\u00a7 53-206 if it found that the common corridor of the dormitory was part of his residence or place of abode.\\nIn 1999, the legislature amended \\u00a7 53-206 by more clearly dividing it into a prohibitory subsection; see Public Acts 1999, No. 99-212, \\u00a7 12 (a) (P.A. 99-212, \\u00a7 12), now codified as General Statutes \\u00a7 53-206 (a); and a subsection setting forth exceptions to the prohibition. See P.A. 99-212, \\u00a7 12 (b), now codified as General Statutes \\u00a7 53-206 (b). The prohibitory subsection deleted slung shots, air rifles and sand bags from the enumeration of dangerous weapons, and added police batons or nightsticks, but was otherwise substantially identical to the prohibitory clause of the previous version of the statute. Compare General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) \\u00a7 53-206 (a) with the current General Statutes \\u00a7 53-206 (a). In the exception subsection, however, the legislature eliminated the language providing that the provisions of the subsection did not apply to any person found with any such \\\"weapon or implement concealed upon his person\\\" while traveling to and from the person's place of abode for the specified purposes; (emphasis added) General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) \\u00a7 53-206 (a); and replaced it with the language now codified as \\u00a7 53-206 (b) (3) (D) and (E), which relates solely to long knives. See P.A. 99-212, \\u00a7 12 (b) (3) (D) and (E). In addition, the legislature clarified an existing exception and provided five new exceptions, each of which also related to specific weapons. See P.A. 99-212, \\u00a7 12 (b) (1) through (6), now codified as General Statutes \\u00a7 53-206 (b) (1) through (6).\\nWith this background in mind, we turn to the question of whether \\u00a7 63-206 (b) (3) applies to weapons other than long knives. This is a question of statutory interpretation over which our review is plenary. Hartford/Windsor Healthcare Properties, LLC v. Hartford, 298 Conn. 191, 197, 3 A.3d 56 (2010). \\\"In making such determinations, we are guided by fundamental principles of statutory construction. See General Statutes \\u00a7 l-2z; Testa v. Geressy, 286 Conn. 291, 308, 943 A.2d 1076 (2008) ([o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature . . .).\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Matthew F., 297 Conn. 673, 688, 4 A.3d 248 (2010).\\nSection 53-206 (a) provides in relevant part that \\\" [a]ny person who carries upon his or her person any BB. gun, blackjack, metal or brass knuckles, or any dirk knife, or any switch knife, or any knife having an automatic spring release device by which a blade is released from the handle, having a blade of over one and one-half inches in length, or stiletto, or any knife the edged portion of the blade of which is four inches or over in length, any police baton or nightstick, or any martial arts weapon or electronic defense weapon, as defined in section 53a-3, or any other dangerous or deadly weapon or instrument, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than three years or both. .\\\" Section 53-206 (b) provides in relevant part that \\\"[t]he provisions of this section shall not apply to . . . (3) the carrying of a knife, the edged portion of the blade of which is four inches or over in length, by . . . (D) any person who is found with any such knife concealed upon one's person while lawfully removing such person's household goods or effects from one place to another, or from one residence to another, [or] (E) any person while actually and peaceably engaged in carrying any such knife from such person's place of abode or business to a place or person where or by whom such knife is to be repaired, or while actually and peaceably returning to such person's place of abode or business with such knife after the same has been repaired . . . .\\\"\\nWe conclude that the exceptions set forth in subpara-graphs (D) and (E) of \\u00a7 53-206 (b) (3) plainly and unambiguously apply only to the carrying of long knives. Nothing in the language or structure of the statute suggests that the legislature intended to maintain the preexisting exception for \\\"any . . . weapon or implement\\\" listed in the prohibitory clause. General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) \\u00a7 53-206 (a). Accordingly, although we reaffirm our holding in State v. Sealy, supra, 208 Conn. 693, that the language of what is now \\u00a7 53-206 (b) (3) (D) and (E) implicitly provides an exception for carrying a long knife in one's residence or abode, the defendant would not be entitled to a jury instruction under the statute even if the common hallway of the dormitory constituted his abode because he was carrying a switchblade knife, which is prohibited irrespective of location. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court on this alternative ground.\\nIn support of his claim to the contrary, the defendant first claims that limiting the exceptions set forth in subparagraphs (D) and (E) of \\u00a7 53-206 (b) (3) to long knives would be unworkable. For example, he points out that \\u00a7 53-206 (b) (4) permits \\\"the carrying by any person enrolled in or currently attending, or an instructor at, a martial arts school of a martial arts weapon while in a class or at an authorized event or competition or while transporting such weapon to or from such class, event or competition,\\\" and contends that this exception would be meaningless if such a person could not carry a martial arts weapon at home. We are not persuaded. Section 53-206 (a) prohibits the carrying of a dangerous weapon \\\"upon his or her person . . . .\\\" Accordingly, a martial arts student who carried a martial arts weapon upon his or her person while transporting it to and from classes or other events, but kept the weapon stored at home, would not be violating the statute. To the extent that any exception set forth in \\u00a7 53-206 (b) would be unworkable if the person to whom it applied were not permitted to store the weapon in a convenient place or to transport the weapon so that it could be used for the permitted propose; see, e.g., General Statutes \\u00a7 53-206 (b) (1) (providing exception to prohibition on carrying dangerous weapons for \\\"any officer charged with the preservation of the public peace while engaged in the pursuit of such officer's official duties\\\"); we must conclude that permission to do so is implicit in the exception. See State v. Sealy, supra, 208 Conn. 693 and n.2 (permission to carry weapon in residence is implicit in exception allowing person to cany weapon while transporting weapon to and from residence); Williams v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 257 Conn. 258, 300, 777 A.2d 645 (2001) (this court will \\\"not presume that the legislature has enacted futile or meaningless legislation\\\" [internal quotation marks omitted]). Similarly, we conclude that an exception permitting an individual to carry a specific dangerous weapon for a particular purpose implicitly permits the individual to move the weapon with his or her household goods and to transport the weapon for purposes of repair. We conclude, therefore, that the exceptions set forth in \\u00a7 53-206 (b) are workable without the existence of an implicit exception permitting the carrying of any and all dangerous weapons in one's residence or place of abode.\\nThe defendant also points out that, under General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) \\u00a7 63-206 (a), a person could obtain a permit to carry any of the enumerated dangerous weapons, and asserts that \\\"[t]he abolition of the local permit system and its replacement with . . . presumed lawful reasons to carry certain weapons in public was intended to simplify ownership, not to create uncertainty and a risk of law-abiding citizens becoming felons for items owned in their own homes.\\\" Again, however, the defendant simply ignores the fact that the statute now recognizes no \\\"presumed lawful reason\\\" for car-lying a switchblade knife. If, in enacting \\u00a7 53-206 (b) (3) (D) and (E), the legislature had intended to provide that it was presumptively lawful to carry a dangerous weapon other than a long knife in one's residence or place of abode, it would not have deleted the language \\\"any such weapon or implement\\\"; General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) \\u00a7 63-206 (a); from that portion of the statute when it revised \\u00a7 63-206 in 1999. See P.A. 99-212, \\u00a7 12 (b).\\nFinally, the defendant appears to suggest that our holding in Sealy that the version of \\u00a7 63-206 then in effect contained an implicit exception for carrying dangerous weapons in the home was constitutionally based; see State v. Sealy, supra, 208 Conn. 693 (implicit abode exception is in \\\"recognition of the protected zone of privacy in [person's] dwelling\\\"); and, therefore, we should presume that the legislature did not intend to narrow the exception when it amended the statute in 1999. See Giaimo v. New Haven, 257 Conn. 481, 494, 778 A.2d 33 (2001) (\\\"the legislature is presumed to have intended a reasonable, just and constitutional result\\\" [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also State v. Delgado, 298 Or. 395, 397, 692 P.2d 610 (1984) (statute prohibiting possession and carrying of switchblade violated provision of Oregon constitution providing that \\\"[t]he people shall have the right to bear arms for the defence of themselves\\\" [internal quotation marks omitted]). We disagree. Although, in Sealy, this court relied on cases defining the scope of a tenant's \\\"constitutionally cognizable expectation of privacy\\\" to define by analogy the scope of the implicit abode exception to the applicable version of \\u00a7 53-206; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Sealy, supra, 693; the court did not hold that the existence of the exception was constitutionally mandated. In any event, even if an abode exception is constitutionally required for all dangerous weapons, the presumption that the legislature intends a constitutional result cannot overcome the plain and unambiguous language of \\u00a7 53-206 (b) (3) providing that the exception applies only to long knives. See footnote 6 of this opinion. To the extent that the defendant claims that \\u00a7 53-206 is unconstitutional as applied to persons who carry dangerous weapons in their residence or place of abode, the claim was not preserved before the trial court and the defendant has not sought review understate v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989). Accordingly, we decline to review it.\\nThe judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.\\nIn this opinion the other justices concurred.\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 53-206 provides in relevant part: \\\"(a) Any person who carries upon his or her person any BB. gun, blackjack, metal or brass knuckles, or any dirk knife, or any switch knife, or any knife having an automatic spring release device by which a blade is released from the handle, having a blade of over one and one-half inches in length, or stiletto, or any knife the edged portion of the blade of which is four inches or over in length, any police baton or nightstick, or any martial arts weapon or electronic defense weapon, as defined in section 53a-3, or any other dangerous or deadly weapon or instrument, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than three years or both. Whenever any person is found guilty of a violation of this section, any weapon or other instrument within the provisions of this section, found upon the body of such person, shall be forfeited to the municipality wherein such person was apprehended, notwithstanding any failure of the judgment of conviction to expressly impose such forfeiture.\\n\\\"(b) The provisions of this section shall not apply to . . . (3) the carrying of a knife, the edged portion of the blade of which is four inches or over in length, by . . . (D) any person who is found with any such knife concealed upon one's person while lawfully removing such person's household goods or effects from one place to another, or from one residence to another, [or] (E) any person while actually and peaceably engaged in carrying any such knife from such person's place of abode or business to a place or person where or by whom such knife is to be repaired, or while actually and peaceably returning to such person's place of abode or business with such knife after the same has been repaired . . .\\nTechnical changes, not relevant to this appeal, were made to \\u00a7 53-206 in 2010. See Public Acts 2010, No. 10-32, \\u00a7 148. For purposes of convenience, references herein to \\u00a7 53-206 are to the current revision unless otherwise noted.\\nThe defendant also claimed that the Appellate Court improperly determined that \\\"[t]he claim that a defendant is -within his residence or place of abode while possessing the weapon is a defense to the crime of carrying a dangerous weapon, not an element.\\\" State v. Campbell, supra, 116 Conn. App. 445 n.3. Because we conclude that the implicit abode exception does not apply to weapons other than long knives, we need not address this claim.\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 53-206 (b) currently provides: \\\"The provisions of this section shall not apply to (1) any officer charged with the preservation of the public peace while engaged in the pursuit of such officer's official duties; (2) the carrying of a baton or nightstick by a security guard while engaged in the pursuit of such guard's official duties; (3) the carrying of a knife, the edged portion of the blade of which is four inches or over in length, by (A) any member of the armed forces of the United States, as defined in section 27-103, or any reserve component thereof, or of the armed forces of this state, as defined in section 27-2, when on duty or going to or from duty, (B) any member of any military organization when on parade or when going to or from any place of assembly, (C) any person while transporting such knife as merchandise or for display at an authorized gun or knife show, (D) any person who is found with any such knife concealed upon one's person while lawfully removing such person's household goods or effects from one place to another, or from one residence to another, (E) any person while actually andpeaceably engaged in carrying any such knife from such person's place of abode or business to a place or person where or by whom such knife is to be repaired, or while actually and peaceably returning to such person's place of abode or business with such knife after the same has been repaired, (F) any person holding a valid hunting, fishing or trapping license issued pursuant to chapter 490 or any salt water fisherman carrying such knife for lawful hunting, fishing or trapping activities, or (G) any person while participating in an authorized historic reenactment; (4) the carrying by any person enrolled in or currently attending, or an instructor at, a martial arts school of a martial arts weapon while in a class or at an authorized event or competition or while transporting such weapon to or from such class, event or competition; (5) the carrying of a BB. gun by any person taking part in asupervised event or competition of the Boy Scouts of America or the Girl Scouts of America or in any other authorized event or competition while taking part in such event or competition or while transporting such weapon to or from such event or competition; and (6) the carrying of a BB. gun by any person upon such person's own property or the property of another person provided such other person has authorized the carrying of such weapon on such properly, and the transporting of such weapon to or from such property.\\\"\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 l-2z provides: \\\"The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.\\\"\\nWe acknowledge that our holding in Sealy that there is an implicit exception for carrying a dangerous weapon in one's residence, as distinct from storing it, does not strictly follow from the language of the applicable version of \\u00a7 53-206 permitting persons to carry dangerous weapons while transporting them to and from the residence for the specified purposes. We agree with the state, however, that, when the legislature amended \\u00a7 53-206 in 1999, it presumptively was aware of our decision in Sealy; see State v. Canady, 297 Conn. 322, 333, 998 A.2d 1135 (2010) (\\\"we . . . presume that the legislature is aware of [this court's] interpretation of a statute\\\" [internal quotation marks omitted]); and that it intended that the implicit exception for carrying a weapon in one's residence or place of abode that we recognized in Sealy would continue to apply to the carrying of long knives. We also agree with the state that it is reasonable to conclude that the reason that the legislature maintained this exception for long knives is that they generally are not used as weapons in the home, but are used as cooking and eating implements.\\nWe emphasize that this does not mean that an individual would be permitted to carry all of the dangerous weapons specified in \\u00a7 53-206 (b) on his or her person in the individual's residence or place of abode for other purposes. See footnote 5 of this opinion. For example, it does not follow from the fact that a martial arts student would be permitted to cany a martial arts weapon from his or her residence to a place of repair that the individual would be permitted as a general matter to carry the weapon in his or her residence. If that were the case, there would be no reason why an individual who was not a martial arts student should be prohibited from carrying a martial arts weapon in his or her residence. There is no indication, however, that the legislature was concerned with protecting a general sphere of privacy in the home, where individuals would be permitted to carry any dangerous weapon for any purpose they see fit. Rather, the clear purpose of the exceptions is to allow individuals to carry specific dangerous weapons for specific purposes and, to the extent that using the weapon for the permitted purpose requires the individual to carry it for ancillary purposes such as transportation to the place of use or repair, to permit carrying the weapon for those purposes.\\nGeneral Statutes (Rev. to 1997) \\u00a7 53-206 (a) provides that the carrying of a dangerous weapon by any person is prohibited \\\"unless such person has been granted a written permit issued and signed\\\" by one of several enumerated officials.\\nUnder State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239-40, \\\"a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim'is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt.\\\"\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"6777808\", \"name\": \"BUDDINGTON PARK CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION ET AL. v. PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF SHELTON ET AL.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Buddington Park Condominium Ass'n v. Planning & Zoning Commission\", \"decision_date\": \"2011-02-17\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"914\", \"last_page\": \"914\", \"citations\": \"300 Conn. 914\", \"volume\": \"300\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:24:08.033684+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"BUDDINGTON PARK CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION ET AL. v. PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF SHELTON ET AL.\", \"head_matter\": \"BUDDINGTON PARK CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION ET AL. v. PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF SHELTON ET AL.\\nIan Cole, in support of the petition.\\nTimothy J. Lee, in opposition.\\nDecided February 17, 2011\", \"word_count\": \"60\", \"char_count\": \"367\", \"text\": \"The petition by the defendants Carol Farrell and Robert Farrell for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 125 Conn. App. 724 (AC 31525), is denied.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"6778424\", \"name\": \"NORMAN GAINES v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Gaines v. Commissioner of Correction\", \"decision_date\": \"2011-03-16\", \"docket_number\": \"SC 18760\", \"first_page\": \"920\", \"last_page\": \"920\", \"citations\": \"300 Conn. 920\", \"volume\": \"300\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:24:08.033684+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"NORMAN GAINES v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION\", \"head_matter\": \"NORMAN GAINES v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION\\nThe Supreme Court docket number is SC 18760.\\nC. Robert Satti, Jr., supervisory assistant state\\u2019s attorney, and John C. Smriga, state\\u2019s attorney, in support of the petition.\\nJames B. Streeto, assistant public defender, in opposition.\\nDecided March 16, 2011\", \"word_count\": \"109\", \"char_count\": \"728\", \"text\": \"The respondent's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 125 Conn. App. 97 (AC 30699), is granted, limited to the following issue:\\n\\\"Did the Appellate Court properly affirm the judgment of the habeas court determining that the petitioner's trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel and was entitled to a new trial because said ineffective assistance was prejudicial to the petitioner?\\\"\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"6781190\", \"name\": \"DARLENE L. HOPSON v. DEREK S. HOPSON\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Hopson v. Hopson\", \"decision_date\": \"2012-05-22\", \"docket_number\": \"AC 33438\", \"first_page\": \"690\", \"last_page\": \"699\", \"citations\": \"135 Conn. App. 690\", \"volume\": \"135\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Appellate Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Appellate Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:09:49.109109+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Beach, Sheldon and Flynn, Js.\", \"parties\": \"DARLENE L. HOPSON v. DEREK S. HOPSON\", \"head_matter\": \"DARLENE L. HOPSON v. DEREK S. HOPSON\\n(AC 33438)\\nBeach, Sheldon and Flynn, Js.\\nArgued February 6 \\u2014\\nofficially released May 22, 2012\\nPamela M. Magnano, with whom, on the brief, was Sandi B. Girolamo, for the appellant (defendant).\\nDarlene L. Hopson, pro se, the appellee (plaintiff).\", \"word_count\": \"2430\", \"char_count\": \"14997\", \"text\": \"Opinion\\nBEACH, J.\\nThe defendant, Derek S. Hopson, appeals from the judgment of the trial court ordering him to reimburse his former wife, the plaintiff, Darlene L. Hop-son, for one half of their son's college expenses pursuant to their separation agreement, denying his motion for a credit toward these expenses in the amount of child support payments he made after the son entered college and denying his request for attorney's fees. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred in making these determinations. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.\\nThe following facts, as found by the court, and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. The parties married in 1985 and divorced in 2001. They had two children together during the marriage. The court incorporated the parties' 2001 separation agreement into its dissolution judgment. The agreement provided, under article III entitled \\\"SUPPORT OF THE MINOR CHILDREN,\\\" that the defendant was to pay weekly child support to the plaintiff and that the parties were to split the cost of the children's private school tuition and all school activities. The agreement further provided, under article XI entitled \\\"POST MAJORITY ORDERS\\\": \\\"The [p]laintiff and [defendant agree to set aside a joint college fund for the benefit of the two minor children. The parties further specifically obligate themselves to pay at least one-half of the tuition and room and board at a rate that would be required at a state college or university as of the date of when each of the two minor children are of sufficient age to enter such educational program.\\\" The parties' youngest child (son) matriculated at Hampton University (university), located in Virginia, in September, 2008, shortly before his sixteenth birthday, and reached the age of eighteen in September, 2010. The court found that the parties did not communicate with each other and their son did not communicate with the defendant. During the son's first year at the university, the plaintiff, who had temporarily moved to Virginia, served on the university's faculty, and thus the son received a tuition credit.\\nThe plaintiff filed a motion for contempt claiming that the defendant had breached article XI by failing to make payments toward their son's college expenses. The defendant filed a motion for an order declaring that his child support obligation had terminated when their son graduated from high school. Alternatively, the defendant requested that the child support payments that he made after the son's high school graduation be applied retroactively as a credit toward any liability the defendant may have for the son's college expenses. The defendant also requested reasonable attorney's fees in connection with the bringing of his motion for order and sanctions against the plaintiff for her failure to notify him of their son's high school graduation date.\\nOn April 14, 2011, the court denied the plaintiffs motion for contempt for failure to contribute to the son's college expenses because the court found that the defendant did not know that the son was attending college \\\"until quite recently.\\\" The court further found that the parties did not establish a college fund for their children pursuant to article XI of their agreement. The court found the \\\"defendant hable for one half [of] his son's cohege expenses, including tuition, room and board, after deductions for financial aid, but not loans, up to the cost of a [University of Connecticut] education during the applicable period, including credit to [the] plaintiff for the tuition that was reimbursed.\\\" The court also ordered the plaintiff to take all necessary steps in order to allow the university to provide the defendant with an official itemized bill outlining their son's college expenses, so that the appropriate amount of reimbursement could be calculated. The court denied the defendant's motion for an order awarding him credit toward unpaid college expenses in the amount of the child support payments he had made after the son began college and his request for attorney's fees. In response to the defendant's motion for articulation, the court found that \\\"all orders entered are subject to [the] defendant receiving credit for the $2288.66 he already paid.\\\" This appeal followed.\\nI\\nThe defendant first claims that the court erred in ordering him to reimburse the plaintiff for one half of their son's first year tuition, including any amount that was credited by the university because of her employment at the university. He argues that, because there were no actual costs incurred by the plaintiff, she would be unjustly enriched by his reimbursement to her. We disagree.\\nWe first set forth the applicable standard of review. \\\"An agreement between divorced parties regarding the postsecondary education of their children that is incorporated into a dissolution decree should be regarded as a contract. . In interpreting contract items, we have repeatedly stated that the intent of the parties is to be ascertained by a fair and reasonable construction of the written words and that the language used must be accorded its common, natural, and ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensibly applied to the subject matter of the contract. . . . Where the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect according to its terms. A court will not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity and words do not become ambiguous simply because lawyers or laymen contend for different meanings.\\\" (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bonhotel v. Bonhotel, 64 Conn. App. 561, 566, 781 A.2d 318, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 918, 782 A.2d 1241 (2001).\\nThe defendant argues that nothing in his agreement with the plaintiff \\\"provides that either party will reimburse the other party for any credits he/she receives as a result of employment and/or any other reason\\\" and that the court's order erroneously changes the unambiguous terms of the agreement. The agreement provides in article XI that \\\"[t]he parties . . . specifically obligate themselves to pay at least one-half of the tuition and room and board at a rate that would be required at a state college or university as of the date of when each of the two minor children are of sufficient age to enter such educational program.\\\" Nothing in these terms precludes the plaintiff from receiving a reimbursement from the defendant for one half of the son's first year tuition, where the tuition has been satisfied by the plaintiffs efforts. The express language of the agreement clearly states the obligation, and the defendant cannot now successfully claim such an exception. See Bonhotel v. Bonhotel, supra, 64 Conn. App. 566-68 (holding that, pursuant to stipulation that father would pay \\\"fully the room and board of any private schools or undergraduate colleges the parties' children choose to attend,\\\" father obligated to pay for child's off campus housing and noting that father could have included limitation in agreement); Legg v. Legg, 44 Conn. App. 303, 307, 688 A.2d 1354 (1997) (holding that, pursuant to stipulation by mother and father that father must pay one half of cost of room and board of their child while child attended college, father obligated to pay one half this cost while child lived at home with mother and noting that father could have included stipulation to contrary). The court specifically found that the university's tuition credit was a benefit of the plaintiffs employment and that the defendant should reimburse the plaintiff for one half of the tuition, even though it was subject to the credit provided by the university. In fight of the language of the agreement and the testimony of the parties, we do not conclude that the court made an unreasonable determination in this regard.\\nAdditionally, the defendant argues that ordering him to reimburse the plaintiff for one half of their son's first year tuition would result in unjust enrichment, and thus, as a matter of equity, the court erred. Specifically, the defendant argues that, because the plaintiff did not notify the defendant that their son was beginning college, she would be unjustly enriched by his reimbursement to her of one half of the first year tuition. The balancing of equities is a matter that falls within the discretion of the trial court. Kakalik v. Bernardo, 184 Conn. 386, 396, 439 A.2d 1016 (1981). The court concluded that serious communication issues existed between the parties and that these issues were not the fault of either party. The court weighed and balanced the equities, and we do not conclude that its determination was an abuse of discretion.\\nII\\nThe defendant next argues that the court erred in concluding that he is not entitled to receive a credit toward the son's college expenses for child support payments he made after the son entered college. Specifically, the defendant argues that because of the failure of the plaintiff to notify him of the change in circumstances, he was never given an opportunity to seek a modification to his child support obligation when the son enrolled in college. We disagree.\\nAs set forth in part I of this opinion, contract interpretation is subject to plenary review by this court, and a separation agreement that is incorporated into a dissolution judgment is regarded as a contract. See Bonhotel v. Bonhotel, supra, 64 Conn. App. 566.\\nThe court correctly determined that the agreement provides for both child support and college expenses. Article III governs support of the minor children and requires weekly child support payments by the defendant to the plaintiff and also includes an agreement between the parties \\\"that they will split the cost of the children's private school tuition and all school activities.\\\" Article XI explicitly provides that \\\"[t]he [pjlaintiff and [the] [defendant recognize the importance of their children experiencing a four-year college education program\\\" and obligates the parties to split the cost of tuition and room and board up to the cost of a University of Connecticut education. Pursuant to the agreement, child support and college expenses are separate obligations.\\nThe defendant advances the equitable argument that he was prejudiced by the court's conclusion in light of his inability to file a motion to modify child support when the son began college because he did not know that the son had enrolled in college. We ordinarily review decisions grounded in equity under the abuse of discretion standard. See Kakalik v. Bernardo, supra, 184 Conn. 395. Child support and college expenses are distinct obligations under the agreement, and the court correctly cited General Statutes \\u00a7 46b-215 (a) (1) as providing for support orders for \\\"a child under the age of eighteen.\\\" The court did not abuse its discretion in balancing the equities. In its memorandum of decision, the court quoted the following language from Sansonenko v. Sansonenko, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. FA-01-0075249-S (August 26, 2010): \\\" '[I]t is illogical to think that child support ends when college begins.' \\\" The court then stated: \\\"The fact that [the] defendant's son is in college does not mean that he is fully supported through tuition, room and board and the court denies [the] defendant's request that his child support payments be credited toward his unpaid obligation to pay a portion of his son's college expenses.\\\" As the court pointed out, its determination did not increase the defendant's obligation under the agreement and a ruling in his favor would have relieved him of the obligation to pay two years of child support, thus causing the son's academic advancement to result in a windfall to the defendant. Although the temporal combination of payments may have resulted in temporarily greater payments for the defendant, the total long-term payments are those contemplated by the agreement. Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion.\\nIll\\nThe defendant finally claims that the court erred in declining to award him attorney's fees because the court failed to consider the \\\"egregious conduct\\\" of the plaintiff in failing to communicate with him about their son's enrollment in college and failing to provide him with official documentation of their son's college expenses. We disagree.\\nIt is within the discretion of the court to award, irrespective of financial ability, attorney's fees when a party has engaged in egregious misconduct during litigation. LaBossiere v. Jones, 117 Conn. App. 211, 213, 979 A.2d 522 (2009). The defendant argues that the \\\"egregious actions by the [p]laintiff prevented the [defendant from seeking relief from [the] [c]ourt from his child support obligation, from making timely payments on his son's behalf and left him with no choice but to retain counsel to defend the [plaintiffs claims of contempt.\\\" The defendant claims that the present litigation could have been avoided had the plaintiff communicated with him. The court concluded, however, that serious communication issues existed between the parties and did not find fault on the part of either party. Further, in light of our previous conclusions, particularly that the court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for an order awarding him a credit for his child support payments toward the son's college expenses, we do not conclude that the court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's request for attorney's fees in connection with bringing his motion for order.\\nThe judgment is affirmed.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\\nThe court also ordered the defendant to pay one half of the college expenses other than tuition.\\nIt is not entirely clear from the record before us whether the university reimbursed or credited the entire amount of tuition for the first year. Because the actual figures are to be computed later, the present uncertainty is immaterial.\\nThe plaintiff suggested that she may have accepted less salary in return for the tuition benefit. The court made no finding in that regard. It is indisputable, however, that the plaintiff did move to Virginia for the purpose of looking after her son, who was young for a college student, and that she was able to secure employment at the university.\\nThe defendant did not argue on appeal that the son is not entitled to any payments for college expenses under article XI of the agreement.\\nThe defendant relies by analogy on various Superior Court cases, which are not binding on this court, in support of his position. We have carefully reviewed these decisions and conclude that they are either distinguishable or not persuasive.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"6781358\", \"name\": \"FIRST CONNECTICUT CAPITAL, LLC, ET AL. v. JOHN J. DORAN ET AL.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"First Connecticut Capital, LLC v. Doran\", \"decision_date\": \"2012-11-13\", \"docket_number\": \"AC 34327\", \"first_page\": \"903\", \"last_page\": \"903\", \"citations\": \"139 Conn. App. 903\", \"volume\": \"139\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Appellate Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Appellate Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:10:47.189324+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Lavine, Sheldon and Pellegrino, Js.\", \"parties\": \"FIRST CONNECTICUT CAPITAL, LLC, ET AL. v. JOHN J. DORAN ET AL.\", \"head_matter\": \"FIRST CONNECTICUT CAPITAL, LLC, ET AL. v. JOHN J. DORAN ET AL.\\n(AC 34327)\\nLavine, Sheldon and Pellegrino, Js.\\nArgued October 18\\nofficially released November 13, 2012\", \"word_count\": \"33\", \"char_count\": \"204\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nThe judgment is affirmed.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"69247\", \"name\": \"ALLAN BRUCE HEMMINGS v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION ET AL.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Hemmings v. Freedom of Information Commission\", \"decision_date\": \"1997-07-03\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"829\", \"last_page\": \"829\", \"citations\": \"242 Conn. 829\", \"volume\": \"242\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:58:52.380349+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"ALLAN BRUCE HEMMINGS v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION ET AL.\", \"head_matter\": \"ALLAN BRUCE HEMMINGS v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION ET AL.\\nDecided July 3, 1997\\nAllan Bruce Hemmings, pro se, in support of the petition.\\nRichard J. Lynch, assistant attorney general, in opposition.\", \"word_count\": \"60\", \"char_count\": \"390\", \"text\": \"The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court (AC 16806) is denied.\\nMCDONALD, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this petition.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"702907\", \"name\": \"Patricia Hopson et al. v. St. Mary's Hospital et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Hopson v. St. Mary's Hospital\", \"decision_date\": \"1979-01-23\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"485\", \"last_page\": \"496\", \"citations\": \"176 Conn. 485\", \"volume\": \"176\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:08:41.669730+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Patricia Hopson et al. v. St. Mary\\u2019s Hospital et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Patricia Hopson et al. v. St. Mary\\u2019s Hospital et al.\\nCotter, C. J., Loiselle, Bogdanski, Longo and Peters, Js.\\nArgued November 14, 1978\\ndecision released January 23, 1979\\nStephen I. Traub, with whom, on the brief, was Donald Snow, for the appellants (plaintiffs).\\nMargaret J. Berthold, with whom, on the brief, was Anthony M. Fitzgerald, for the appellee (named defendant).\\nFrederick W. Christie, for the appellee (defendant Charles Larkin, Jr.).\", \"word_count\": \"3065\", \"char_count\": \"18560\", \"text\": \"Bogdanski, J.\\nThe plaintiffs, Edward and Patricia Hopson, husband and wife, brought a malpractice action against the defendants, St. Mary's Hospital and Charles Larkin, Jr., a physician, wherein they sought to recover damages for injuries allegedly sustained by the wife during surgery. In the complaint Edward Hopson also claimed that because of the defendants' negligence he was deprived of the love, affection and consortium of his wife, Patricia Hopson. The defendants each demurred to that portion of the complaint, alleging that no action for loss of consortium is recognized in Connecticut. Prom the judgment of the court rendered on the demurrers sustained the plaintiffs have appealed to this court.\\nThe plaintiffs' appeal requires this court to decide whether the courts of this state will continue to adhere to the rule established in the case of Marri v. Stamford Street R. Co., 84 Conn. 9, 78 A. 582 (1911), to the effect that a married person whose spouse has been injured by the negligence of a third party has no cause of action for loss of consortium. As will appear, we have concluded that the reasoning which led to the decision in Marri is no longer applicable and that this decision should now be overruled.\\nI\\nThe term \\\"consortium\\\" is usually defined as encompassing the services of the wife, the financial support of the husband, and the variety of intangible relations which exist between spouses living together in marriage. Prosser, Torts (4th Ed. 1971) \\u00a7 124, pp. 881-82. These intangible elements are generally described in terms of \\\"affection, society, companionship and sexual relations.\\\" Comment, \\\"The Action for Loss of Consortium in New Mexico,\\\" 2 N. Mex. L. Rev. 107, 108 (1972). These intangibles have also been defined as the \\\"constellation of companionship, dependence, reliance, affection, sharing and aid which are legally recognizable, protected rights arising out of the civil contract of marriage.\\\" Brown v. Kistleman, 177 Ind. 692, 98 N.E. 631 (1912); Lippman, \\\"The Breakdown of Consortium,\\\" 30 Colum. L. Rev. 651 (1930); Pound, \\\"Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations,\\\" 14 Mich. L. Rev. 177 (1916); Holbrook, \\\"The Change in the Meaning of Consortium,\\\" 22 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1923).\\nThe action for loss of consortium developed at common law in the context of suits by the husband for damages stemming from interference with the marital relationship. See 3 Blackstone, Commentaries, pp. 138-40. Interference with the husband's rights to his wife's services or society, whether of an intentional or negligent nature, gave rise to a cause of action based on the husband's quasi-proprietary interest in his wife. Rosenberg, \\\"Negligently Caused Loss of Consortium \\u2014 A Case for Recognition as a Cause of Action in Connecticut,\\\" 2 Conn. L. Rev. 399, 400 (1969). Under the common law, a wife had no legal claim to the services or society of her husband, the sole duty of the husband being to support the wife. As a result it was generally thought that an injury to the husband could not cause the breach of any duty owing to the wife and the wife was therefore afforded no right of recovery for loss of consortium at common law.\\nBy the nineteenth century, the decisions began to emphasize the \\\"services\\\" aspect of the husband's consortium interest. The precise activities encompassed by the term \\\"services\\\" were, however, never uniformly defined. In Connecticut, the courts generally interpreted it to mean those services \\\"which found their expression at the domestic fireside, and in all manner of aid, assistance and helpfulness in all the relations of domestic life.\\\" Marri v. Stamford Street R. Co., supra, 12. During this era the \\\"sentimental\\\" aspects of consortium were either not considered or were held to be too subsidiary for their loss to be considered. See Brett, \\\"Consortium and Servitium, A History and Some Proposals,\\\" 29 Austl. L.J. 321, 394 (1955).\\nThe Married Women's Acts enacted in the mid-nineteenth century freed married women from the disabilities attaching to their status under the common law. Women, though married, were given the right to sue and. be sued in their own right and \\\"[t]he question naturally arose whether . . . the husband's actions . . . for loss of consortium should be ruled obsolete or whether . . . they should be held to survive in substantial dimension and be complemented by analogous remedies extended to the wife. . It was held very widely that husbands still retained their consortium rights . And it was generally held that the new status of married women implied at least some rights of consortium on their part.\\\" Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 Mass. 153, 155-56, 302 N.E.2d 555 (1973).\\nWhile married women generally gained the right to recover for loss of consortium in cases involving intentional torts, most courts continued to deny a wife's right to recover for loss of consortium when the injury which deprived the wife of her husband's society and companionship was negligently inflicted by a third party. Lockwood v. Wilson H. Lee Co., 144 Conn. 155, 128 A.2d 330 (1956); Feneff v. New York Central & Hudson River R. Co., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 436 (1909).\\nIt was not until a century after the Married Women's Acts that the landmark case of Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852, 71 S. Ct. 80, 95 L. Ed. 624 (1950), was decided. In Hitaffer, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia Circuit held that a wife has a cause of action for loss of consortium due to an injury negligently inflicted upon her spouse by a third party. In that opinion, consortium was defined as a \\\"coneeptualistic unity,\\\" which combines inseverably both \\\"sentimental\\\" and \\\"service\\\" elements. In the years since Hitaffer, many states have liberalized their views on consortium, and the weight of authority as to a wife's recovery for loss of consortium when her husband is injured by the negligent act of a third party has dramatically changed. Several states have reversed their earlier positions and have permitted recovery by a wife, even though prior decisions had held that neither party could bring a cause of action for loss of consortium. Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 525 P.2d 669, 675 (1974); Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 Mass. 153, 302 N.E.2d 555 (1973); Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1960).\\nn\\nConnecticut's law on consortium rests almost entirely on the 1911 decision in Marri v. Stamford Street R. Co., supra. In that case, the plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Emil Marri, were injured in a collision with a trolley car and brought suit seeking damages for the personal injuries sustained in the accident. The complaint also included a claim by the plaintiff husband for damages for loss of consortium. On appeal, this court denied the husband's claim for the loss of consortium and held that the recovery of the husband must be limited to the expenses which he had incurred as a result of the injuries to his wife.\\nThe decision in Marri was based largely upon the changes in the common law brought about by the enactment in Connecticut of the Married Women's Act (Public Acts 1877, chapter 114). The court in Marri, however, unlike the courts in most other jurisdictions, concluded that the effect of the Married Women's Act was not to extend to the wife a cause of action foy consortium, but rather to render obsolete the husband's cause of action in cases involving negligently inflicted injury to the wife. The court observed (p. 19) that in a consortium claim based on negligently inflicted physical injury to the wife, the predominant factor of damages was the \\\"loss of service and the capacity for service resulting from diminished or destroyed ability to serve,\\\" whereas in actions arising from intentional torts such as criminal conversation or alienation of affections, the destruction or impairment of conjugal affection, society or companionship would be the predominant elements of the husband's loss. The court concluded that, inasmuch as the real basis for recovery in cases involving negligent torts was the loss of services, and since the wife was now permitted to recover in her own name for any impairment of her capacity for service, her remedy should be exclusive, and that the husband should therefore be limited to recovering the expenses which he had incurred by reason of the negligent injury to his wife. The Marri court also expressed concern about the remote and indirect nature of the consortium injury and the possibility of double recovery. Examination of the reasoning in Marri reveals that the decision rested primarily upon distinctions then drawn between the sentimental and service aspects of claims for loss of consortium.\\nOver the years the Marri decision has been the subject of criticism by scholars and courts alike. See Hoekstra v. Helgeland, 78 S.D. 82, 98 N.W.2d 669 (1959); Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., supra; Rodriquez v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, supra. Marri has often been criticized for ignoring the possibility that a spouse might be more seriously deprived of the \\\"sentimental\\\" advantages of marriage as the result of a physical injury to the other spouse than as the result of intentional wrongdoing by a third party, as in alienation of affections. As the court in Hoekstra observed (p. 106): \\\"[T]ime may erase the mental aberration, but may not restore the physical ability to furnish the elements of consortium.\\\" The Marri decision has also been attacked for failing to consider loss of companionship and society as recoverable elements of damages. Harper & James, Torts (1956) \\u00a7 8.9, p. 638.\\nIn Hitaffer, the distinction between the sentimental and service aspects of consortium, relied on by the court in Marri, was rejected. The court in Hitaffer emphasized (p. 814) that consortium is a \\\"conceptualistic unity\\\" which inseparably combines both the sentimental and services elements of the marital relation. Hitaffer reasoned that there was no rational basis for holding that in eases of negligent injury to a spouse, recovery for loss of consortium should depend upon whether there was a loss of services. The court concluded that although the complaint in that case had alleged both loss of services and loss of conjugal affection \\\"no distinct functions were intended,\\\" and that what was significant was the injury to the unity of the marital relation. Courts and commentators alike have found the reasoning of Hitaffer persuasive and have agreed that courts commit error when they attempt to distinguish between the different elements of the \\\"conceptualistic unity\\\" which is consortium.\\nin\\nWith respect to the matters of the indirect or remote nature of the consortium injury; see Lockwood v. Wilson H. Lee Co., 144 Conn. 155, 128 A.2d 330 (1956); and the potential for double recovery, neither the authorities nor the courts have found these difficulties to be insurmountable. See Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., supra; Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, supra. The court in Hitaffer, for example, rejected a claim that the injury for loss of consortium is indirect, stating that \\\"[i]nvasion of the consortium is an independent wrong directly to the spouse so injured,\\\" and results from a natural and continual sequence of events unbroken by an intervening cause. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., supra, 815. Although disparagingly referred to as \\\"sentimental\\\" or \\\"parasitic\\\" damages, the mental and emotional anguish caused by seeing a healthy, loving, companionable mate turn into a shell of a person is undeniably a real injury. Moreover, an injury to one's spouse may turn a happily married man or woman into a lifelong nurse and deprive him or her of an opportunity of having children and of raising a family. To describe such a loss as \\\"indirect\\\" is only to evade the issue. Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 239 N.E.2d 897 (1968).\\nIn short, the effect of the Marri decision is to deny the existence of any harm where harm is most assuredly to be expected. It is a well-settled principle of law that a tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him. Should the victim be married, it follows that the spouse may suffer personal and compensable, though not physical, injuries as a direct result. of the defendant's negligence and that such injuries should not go uncompensated.\\nThe difficulty of assessing damages for loss of consortium is not a proper reason for denying the existence of such a cause of action inasmuch as the \\\"logic of [that reasoning] would also hold a jury incompetent to award damages for pain and suffering.\\\" Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., supra, 507. The subjective states such as grief, fright, anxiety, apprehension, humiliation and embarrassment have long been viewed as genuine and deemed compensable under the concept of pain and suffering. Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., supra, 165; Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., supra, 507. The task of computing damages for a loss of consortium is no more difficult for a judge or jury than arriving at an award for pain and suffering.\\nRecent decisions have recommended that claims by spouses, whether for physical injuries or consortium losses, be joined in one action and tried before a single trier of fact. Schreiner v. Fruit, 519 P.2d 462 (Alas. 1974); Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 284 Minn. 508, 170 N.W.2d 865 (1969). In that way, the danger of improper verdicts will be minimized. For example, while a claim for loss of consortium could include as elements of damages loss of companionship, society, affection, sexual relations and moral support, the recovery in a particular case could be limited to the elements established in that ease by means of instructions from the court describing to the jury those damages which are recoverable and those which are not. Novak v. Kansas City Transit, Inc., 365 S.W.2d 539, 544 (Mo. 1963).\\nMoreover, because a consortium action is derivative of the injured spouse's cause of action, the consortium claim would be barred when the suit brought by the injured spouse has been terminated by settlement or by an adverse judgment on the merits. Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., supra, 508. See also Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., supra, 167. Thus a joinder of claims, together with proper instructions to the jury and close scrutiny of the verdicts, will be sufficient to minimize the potential for improper verdicts.\\nIV\\nHaving thus reexamined the decision in Marri, we find its reasoning no longer persuasive and its result unsound. We are confirmed in this view by the movement of the law in other jurisdictions where, since 1950, a growing majority of courts have come to recognize a right of action for loss of consortium in either spouse. Without attempting a count of the decisions, we may summarize the situation roughly as follows: The right of a husband to bring an action for loss of consortium has long been acknowledged in a substantial majority of the jurisdictions. The right of the wife, first confirmed in Hitaffer v. Argonne Co. (1950), and most recently in Rodriquez v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation (1974), Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1973), and Hopkins v. Blanco, 457 Pa. 90, 320 A.2d 139 (1974), has now been recognized in many jurisdictions. In certain jurisdictions the wife's right has been denied although the husband's right is still affirmed \\u2014 a distinction of dubious validity and one which we will not accept. Only a few jurisdictions have followed our Marri ease or another route and denied the right to recovery to both husband and wife. The Restatement of Torts (1938) \\u00a7 693 recognized the husband's right. The Restatement (Second) of Torts will state that both the husband and wife have a right to recovery for loss of consortium on equal terms; the Restatement (Second) will also add the requirement that where possible the consortium claim must be joined with the claim for bodily injury.\\nOur decision today does not drastically or radically change existing law, for in no serious way will an existing interest be impaired or an expectation be disappointed or a reliance be defeated. See Fitzgerald v. Meissner & Hicks, Inc., 38 Wis. 2d 571, 578, 157 N.W.2d 595 (1968) (viewing any problem of insurance coverage as minimal); see also Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., supra. As a matter of sound administration and fairness, however, we hold that where a spouse's claim for physical injuries has been concluded by judgment or settlement or the running of limitations prior to the coming down of this opinion, no action for loss of consortium arising from the same incident will be allowed, even if that action would not be otherwise barred by limitations.\\nOur decision overruling Marri and holding that either spouse has a claim for loss of consortium shown to arise from a personal injury to the other spouse caused by the negligence of a third person requires us to find that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrers as to the claims for loss of consortium.\\nThere is error, the judgment is set aside and the case remanded with direction to overrule the demurrers and then proceed according to law.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\\nThe trial court, relying on the ease of Marri v. Stamford Street R. Co., 84 Conn. 9, 78 A. 582 (1911), ruled that in Connecticut damages for loss of consortium caused by injuries negligently inflicted by a third party cannot be recovered by the uninjured spouse.\\nOther than for the injuries to himself.\\nThe trend is described in Prosser, Torts (4th Ed. 1971) \\u00a7 125, pp. 894-96.\\nTentative draft No. 14, 1969, Restatement (Second) of Torts, pp. 13-21; see also Proceedings, 46th Annual Meeting, 1969, American Law Institute, pp. 148-58, 162-63.\\nThere should be greater readiness to abandon an untenable position when the rule to be discarded may not be reasonably supposed to have determined the eonduet of the litigants, and particularly when in its origin it was the product of institutions or conditions which have gained a new signfieanee or development with the progress of the years. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 151 (1901).\"}"
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diff --git a/conn/704588.json b/conn/704588.json
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7c07ffc774001fba33322e2d66f966a19caf0799
--- /dev/null
+++ b/conn/704588.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"704588\", \"name\": \"Marcelino E. Lavin et al. v. Town of Wilton et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Lavin v. Town of Wilton\", \"decision_date\": \"1979-04-11\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"754\", \"last_page\": \"754\", \"citations\": \"177 Conn. 754\", \"volume\": \"177\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:23:53.199020+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Marcelino E. Lavin et al. v. Town of Wilton et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Marcelino E. Lavin et al. v. Town of Wilton et al.\\nRobert A. Gerlin, in support of the petition.\\nStanley P. Atwood, in opposition.\\nSubmitted April 3\\ndecided April 11, 1979\", \"word_count\": \"55\", \"char_count\": \"324\", \"text\": \"The plaintiffs' petition for certification for appeal from the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield at Stamford is denied by the court.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/conn/704624.json b/conn/704624.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5ec44082d22808218541729156cbf0ba83fe6447
--- /dev/null
+++ b/conn/704624.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"704624\", \"name\": \"Putnam Trust Company of Greenwich et al. v. Tax Commissioner of the State of Connecticut\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Putnam Trust Co. v. Tax Commissioner\", \"decision_date\": \"1979-04-10\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"326\", \"last_page\": \"327\", \"citations\": \"177 Conn. 326\", \"volume\": \"177\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:23:53.199020+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Cotter, C. J., Loiselle, Bogdanski, Longo and Peters, Js.\", \"parties\": \"Putnam Trust Company of Greenwich et al. v. Tax Commissioner of the State of Connecticut\", \"head_matter\": \"Putnam Trust Company of Greenwich et al. v. Tax Commissioner of the State of Connecticut\\nCotter, C. J., Loiselle, Bogdanski, Longo and Peters, Js.\\nArgued March 14\\ndecision released April 10, 1979\\nEdward J. Cooke, Jr., for the appellants (plaintiffs).\\nAlbert E. Sheary, chief inheritance attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Carl B. Ajello, attorney general, and Seymour M. Alpert, first assistant commissioner of revenue services, for the appellee (defendant).\", \"word_count\": \"269\", \"char_count\": \"1676\", \"text\": \"Per Cueiam.\\nAfter a will contest concerning a codicil to a will, the contesting parties entered into a compromise settlement which the Probate Court accepted. In subsequent proceedings, the Probate Court determined that the state succession tax, General Statutes \\u00a712-340 and 12-341, should be computed and assessed on the basis of the will and the codicil, without regard to the compromise agreement. This ruling was affirmed by the trial court in its dismissal of the plaintiffs' appeal. It is the only issue on the appeal before this court.\\nThis case is governed by Emanuelson v. Sullivan, 147 Conn. 406,161 A.2d 788 (1960). In Emanuelson, we held that the succession tax should be assessed on the basis of the identity of the distributees named in a purported will, despite a subsequent agreement compromising the contest of that will. Id., 410-11. The only distinction between this case and Emanuel-son is that in this case the compromise agreement antedated the probating of the contested codicil and the Probate Court admitted the will and the codicil to probate subject to the terms of the compromise agreement. As the trial court observed, this is a distinction without a difference.\\nThere is no error.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/conn/706675.json b/conn/706675.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d8d3da797c56e5db4d91b3b9842ab8f92e4bd838
--- /dev/null
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"706675\", \"name\": \"Norma Brainard v. Town of Westbrook\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Brainard v. Town of Westbrook\", \"decision_date\": \"1947-12-08\", \"docket_number\": \"File. No. 9795\", \"first_page\": \"254\", \"last_page\": \"255\", \"citations\": \"15 Conn. Supp. 254\", \"volume\": \"15\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Supplement\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:10:58.163521+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Norma Brainard v. Town of Westbrook\", \"head_matter\": \"Norma Brainard v. Town of Westbrook\\nSuperior Court Middlesex County\\nFile. No. 9795\\nMemorandum filed December 8, 1947.\\nPelgrift, Dodd, Blumenfield & Nair of Hartford, and Everett J. Peckham, of Deep River, for the Plaintiffs.\\nNathan A. Schatz, J. Ronald Regnier, Thomas W. Flood, for the Defendants.\", \"word_count\": \"369\", \"char_count\": \"2250\", \"text\": \"INGLIS, J.\\nThis is an action for personal injuries brought against a municipality. The demurrer is on the ground that 'there can be no cause of action because of the principle of governmental immunity. It runs to the complaint as a whole and, therefore, if the complaint in part states a cause of action the demurrer fails.\\nBriefly, the complaint alleges that the plaintiff, a child, was injured by reason of being struck by a bat which slipped from the hands of another child while they were playing in a school yard during a recreational period of the school. The school was maintained and operated by the defendant. The first count sounds in negligence and obviously the defense of governmental immunity is good as against that count.\\nThe second count, however, alleges in paragraph 9: \\\"The practice of the defendant in providing and furnishing for pupils of the age, experience and physical capacity of those participating in said recreation on said day, a dangerous and unreasonably heavy baseball bat, for use in a game which was improperly and inadequately supervised by competent personnel, constituted a condition, the natural tendency of which was to create danger and inflict injury upon person or property.\\\"\\nThis allegation sets forth all of the essentials of a claim of nuisance. It alleges a continuing condition created by a prac tice. It alleges that that condition was one of inherent danger to persons and property. It also alleges that the nuisance was created by positive act as distinguished from mere failure to act. It is now well established that the defense of governmental immunity does not avail as against a cause of action founded on a nuisance created by a municipality by positive act. Beckwith v. Stratford, 129 Conn. 506; Karnasiewicz v. New Britain, 131 Conn. 691, 694. Accordingly, governmental immunity is no defense against the second count of the complaint.\\nFor the foregoing reasons the demurrer is overruled.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/conn/731271.json b/conn/731271.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..66fd44957c0230f2b0561301712fcaa5a0351dd5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/conn/731271.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"731271\", \"name\": \"Mark Birney v. Richard Barretta, Jr.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Birney v. Barretta\", \"decision_date\": \"1994-11-29\", \"docket_number\": \"12746\", \"first_page\": \"928\", \"last_page\": \"928\", \"citations\": \"36 Conn. App. 928\", \"volume\": \"36\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Appellate Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Appellate Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:09:05.013193+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Mark Birney v. Richard Barretta, Jr.\", \"head_matter\": \"Mark Birney v. Richard Barretta, Jr.\\n(12746)\\nLavery, Schaller and Spear, Js.\\nArgued November 8\\ndecision released November 29, 1994\\nAlbert Carocci, for the appellant (defendant).\\nJoseph F. Mulvey, with whom, on the brief, was Melvin Silverman, for the appellee (plaintiff).\", \"word_count\": \"47\", \"char_count\": \"311\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nThe judgment is affirmed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/conn/742395.json b/conn/742395.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f7283887339cbf1fec2b79f1807fc19cdea0e001
--- /dev/null
+++ b/conn/742395.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"742395\", \"name\": \"William H. Congdon vs. The City of Norwich\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Congdon v. City of Norwich\", \"decision_date\": \"1870-10\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"414\", \"last_page\": \"421\", \"citations\": \"37 Conn. 414\", \"volume\": \"37\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:08:42.729835+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"William H. Congdon vs. The City of Norwich.\", \"head_matter\": \"William H. Congdon vs. The City of Norwich.\\nThe question whether a road is defective or not depends on a great variety of circumstances which cannot be embraced in a legal proposition, and the question must therefore generally be one of fact and not of law.\\nQuestions of law may however arise as to alleged defects, as whether a sidewalk is a part of the road which a city is bound to keep in repair, or whether a duty devolves upon towns in respect to snow and ice upon roads.\\nThe condition in which a town is bound to keep a road must depend in a meas, ure upon the season of the year, the extent of the public use, the means at command for making the repairs, and other varying circumstances.\\nAccumulations of snow and ice may produce such a condition of a road as to cause it to be dangerous and defective, and in each particular case of alleged defect from such cause the question will depend upon an inquiry of fact, whether under all the circumstances the road was in a reasonably safe condition, and whether those who were bound to keep it in repair are justly chargeable with n\\u00e9gligence in relation to it.\\nWhere the court below found the facts in detail with regard to the dangerous condition of a city sidewalk by reason of ice and snow upon it and upon such facts found that the highway was defective, it was held that inasmuch as the 1 evidence was relevant to show a defective condition of the sidewalk, this court could not review the conclusion of the court below.\\nWhere it appeared that the plaintiff knew of the' condition of the sidewalk, which was steep and covered with snow and ice, and that he might to some extent have avoided the danger by leaving the sidewalk and taking the car- \\u2019 riage path, and the court below found that unless the law imputed negligence to him upon these facts his own negligence did not contribute to the injury, it was held that the court could not as a matter of law hold the plaintiff chargeable with negligence.\\nAction on the statute concerning highways and bridges, for an injury sustained by the plaintiff through the alleged defective condition of a sidewalk in the city of Norwich; brought to the Superior Court in New London County, and tried on the general issue, closed to the court, before Carpenter, J. The court found the following facts:\\nIn the evening of the 13th of January, 1868, the plaintiff, walking down a steep descent upon the sidewalk on Main street, near its intersection with Thames street, in the city of Norwich, stepped upon ice, then being upon the sidewalk, and slipped and fell, and was seriously injured. The sidewalk, which at that point was about five and a half feet wide, was so constructed that there was a declivity of some three inches from the inner to the outer side of the walk to facilitate the escape of water into the gutter. -The ground between the sidewalk and the buildings descended towards the sidewalk. There was no structural defect in the walk. Whatever defect existed, if any, was in consequence of the accumulation of snow and ice upon the sidewalk. Main street at this point runs in an easterly and westerly direction, and the sidewalk upon which the plaintiff was walking was upon the north side. The melting of snow and ice upon the adjoining ground, and the roofs of the adjacent buildings, had caused the water to run upon and across the sidewalk diagonally, and freezing thereon, ice and snow had accumulated upon the sidewalk to the depth of three or -four inches in places, and had so formed as to cause the surface thereof to be irregular and uneven, but in places smooth and slippery. No sand, ashes, or other substance, had been placed on the walk to render it less dangerous. The weather for four days had been clear and cold, and during that time the sidewalk at the place of the accident had been substantially in the condition above described, and had been more or less slippery and dangerous for two weeks. Within one or two days after the accident the city authorities caused the ice at this place to be covered with sand. There was a good deal of ice at this time, of a similar character, in different places throughout the city, arising from the same or similar causes, but the streets and sidewalks were not uniformly covered with ice, as is sometimes the case during and after a cold rain. a Upon these facts the defendants claimed, and requested the court to rule, that there was no defect in the highway so as to render the defendants liable; but the court held otherwise, and found that upon these facts the highway was defective within the meaning of the statute.\\nAt the time of the accident the plaintiff was on his way home from a religious meeting by the most direct and usual route. He was familiar with the locality, and knew the condition of the sidewalk,' and was using all the care that could reasonably be required of him while walking 'over the ice. He 'might however have gone around the ice by passing over the carriage way of the street and thereby avoided the danger to some extent.\\nIf, as a matter of law, it was negligence in the plaintiff, under the circumstances, to attempt to pass over the ice in question, then the court found that he did not exercise due care, and that his own negligence contributed to the injury. But if the law would not impute negligence to him upon these facts, then it was found, as a fact, that his own negligence did not contribute to the happening of the injury.\\nUpon the facts thus found the court found the issue for the plaintiff and assessed the damages at $2,000. The defendants brought the record before this court by a motion in error, assigning as error that the court should have held, as matter of law, that the highway was not defective within the meaning of the statute, and that the law upon the facts found imported negligence in the plaintiff.\\nHalsey and Pratt, for the plaintiffs in error.\\n1. We contend that ice formed upon the sidewalk in the manner described in the finding of the court, does not cause the highway to become defective within the meaning of the statute. Stanton v. City of Springfield, 12 Allen, 566; Luther v. City of Worcester, 97 Mass., 268; Hutchins v. City of Boston, id., 272; Raymond v. City of Lowell, 6 Cush., 524, 535; Calkins v. City of Hartford, 33 Conn., 57. There is some apparent conflict in a part of these decisions, hut the rule seems to be finally settled in two cases which have been reported since this was tried in the court below. The decisive point in these two cases is, that in order to make a town or city .liable for a defect caused by ice or snow, there must be such a formation that it is an obstacle to travel. If there is nothing causing the injury but the slipperiness of the ice, then the city is not liable. This is all that appears in the case at bar, and therefore the judgment should be reversed. Stone v. Hubbardston, 100 Mass., 49; Gilbert v. City of Roxbury, id., 185.\\n2. Even if the sidewalk was defective, the plaintiff in passing over it, having full knowledge of its condition, \\u201c voluntarily assumed the risk and all the consequences of his indiscretion,\\u201d and was guilty of such negligence as to prevent his recovery. Fox v. Town of Glastonbury, 29 Conn., 204; Park v. O\\u2019Brien, 28 id., 339; Neal v. Gillett, id., 437.\\n3. The facts found by the court upon which judgment was rendered are insufficient to warrant the judgment. It is not found that the walk was defective, nor that the plaintiff was in the exercise of due care. Upon this finding if the case had been reserved it must have been sent back for a further finding. If the finding is insufficient to enable this court to determine what judgment should be r\\u00e9nd\\u00e9red, it is insufficient to sustain the judgment that has been rendered.\\nWait and Hovey, for the defendant in error.\\n1. Whether there was negligence in the plaintiff, was a question not of law, but of fact. Beers v. Housatonic R. R. Co., 19 Conn., 566; Park v. O\\u2019Brien, 23 id., 339; Williams v. Clinton, 28 id., 266.\\n2. The fact that the plaintiff was familiar with the locality and knew the condition of the sidewalk where he fell and sustained the injury complained of, and that he might have gone around the ice by passing over the carriage way of the street and thereby avoided the danger to some extent, was not conclusive evidence of negligence on his part in attempting to pass over the ice. Whittaker v. West Boylston, 97 Mass., 273; Reed v. Northfield, 13 Pick., 94; Bigelow v. Rutland, 4 Cush., 247; Smith v. City of Lowell, 6 Allen, 39; Snow v. Housatonic R. R. Co., 8 id., 441; Meesel v. Lynn & Boston R. R. Co., id., 234; Frost v. Waltham, 12 id., 85; Jacobs v. Bangor, 16 Maine, 187.\\n3. The ice and snow upon which the plaintiff slipped, fell and sustained the injury complained of, constituted a defect in the sidewalk within the meaning of the statute. Gen. Statutes, tit. 31, sec. 6; Calkins v. City of Hartford, 33 Conn., 57; Stone v. Hubbardston, 100 Mass., 49; Luther v. City of Worcester, 97 id., 268; Hutchins v. City of Boston, id., 272; Hall v. City of Lowell, 10 Cush., 260; Shea v. City of Lowell, 8 Allen, 136; Shearm. & Redf. on Negligence, \\u00a7 395.\\n4. The defendants were chargeable with negligence in suffering the ice to remain in the condition it was at the time of the injury, for the period stated in the finding. Calkins v. City of Hartford, 33 Conn., 57.\\n5. Thei\\u2019e was no negligence on the part of the plaintiff which contributed to produce the injury.\", \"word_count\": \"2789\", \"char_count\": \"15515\", \"text\": \"Seymoue, J.\\nThe question in this case is, whether the plaintiff suffered the injury complained of by means of a defective road. The issue was closed to the court and is found in favor of the plaintiff: The facts are stated in detail on which the judgment is-based. The defendants insist that the facts thus specially found do not in' law warrant the conclusion that the road was defective. In general the question whether a road is or is not defective must be one of fact and not of law. It depends on a great variety of circumstances, which it is impracticable to group together into a legal. proposition. A better and safer condition of roads may reasonably be expected and required in the summer than in spring and winter, in populous cities than in unfrequented districts. Much may depend upon the means at command, upon general usage, upon the question whether the defect is the result of a sudden accident or has been long neglected. . So many circumstances' are involved in the enquiry that courts have usually treated it as one of fact to be submitted to a jury; not however but that questions of law may arise as to alleged defects. Thus, in this case, the judge having found that there was no structural defect where the injury happened, and that whatever defect existed was in consequence of the accumulation of ice and snow upon the sidewalk, the court may properly be called on to decide as matters of law, whether, first, a sidewalk may be a part of the road which a city is bound to keep in repair, and, second, whether any duty devolves upon those who are bound to keep roads in repair in respect to snow and ice, and whether in point of law a road may be defective,without structural defects, by means of accumulations of snow and ice. It is conceded that in this rigorous climate the duty of cities and towns in respect to snow and ice is and must be very limited. When an ice storm covers the entire surface of the earth with ice the public authorities cannot be expected to scatter sand and ashes upon all the places of public travel within their limits; and when snow storms cover the ground with irregular heaps, liable to constant change by the force of changing winds, it cannot be expected that the public authorities will make paths as level and smooth and safe as summer roads are reasonably required to be; but it has become familiar law in Connecticut, and not controverted by counsel in this case, that some duty in regard to snow and ice devolves upon cities and towns. Accumulations of snow and ice may produce such a condition of the road as to cause it to be dangerous and defective, and in each particular case of alleged defect from such cause the question will depend upon an inquiry of fact, whether under all the circumstances of the case the road was in a reasonably safe condition, and whether those who were bound to keep the road in repair are justly chargeable with negligence and want of reasonable care in relation to it. As the country advances in wealth and resources and means of improvement many defects which are now properly tolerated may become actionable. A road which now would properly be regarded as reasonably safe might cease to be so regarded if in consequence of increased facilities and means and skill it could at trifling expense be made much safer. If therefore we should undertake to give a legal definition to a defect in a highway, such definition however just and appropriate to-day, might by change of circumstances become inappropriate by the lapse of a few years. Certain matters are necessarily left as matters of- fact in each particular case without'exact legal definition, as fraud, negligence, and the like ; and what are defects in highways must in general be so left. Hall v. City of Lowell, 10 Cush. R., 260.\\nIn the case under consideration we cannot pronounce as matter of law that the facts found do not warrant the conclusion to which the court below came. The place where the injury happened was quite steep in Main street; the peculiar construction of the ground and sidewalk' caused an irregular and uneven accumulation of ice and snow; the place had been more or less slippery and dangerous for two weeks. Here is evidence relevant to the case tending to show a defective condition of the sidewalk, and it might in law justify the finding of the issue in favor of the plaintiff. We have no cognizance of the question as a question of fact; the case is not before us for a verdict against evidence, but for conclusions alleged to be unwarranted by law.\\nThe defendant also claims that as matter of law it was negligence in the plaintiff under the circumstances found to attempt to pass over the ice in question. It is said, in the first place, that the plaintiff knew the condition of the sidewalk. Such knowledge is important evidence tending to show the plaintiff's negligence, but by no means conclusive. This precise point was so decided in Reed v. Northfield, 13 Pick., 94. If we should adopt the rule that a party cannot recover for injuries arising from defective roads and bridges merely because he knew of the defect, a town might allow a bridge to remain in a dangerous condition so long that its unsafe condition became known to all persons, and then claim exemption from liability by reason of the grossness of its own neglect. So too the fact, which is urged in the second place, that the plaintiff might to some extent have avoided the danger by leaving the sidewalk and taking the carriage path, is relevant evidence on the question whether he acted with ordinary care, but not conclusive. It was decided in the case of Williams v. Clinton, 28 Conn., 266, in a case similar to tlie present, that the question of the plaintiff's negligence was one of fact, and it was evidently so regarded by the judge who tried this cause at the circuit.\\nWe think there is no error in the judgment complained of.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred; except Foster, J., who dissented, and Carpenter, J., who having tried the case in the court below did not sit.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/conn/753415.json b/conn/753415.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8f6f3389a96c8d97048a302b54ced7bdc46c7b28
--- /dev/null
+++ b/conn/753415.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"753415\", \"name\": \"State of Connecticut v. Terry Evans\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Evans\", \"decision_date\": \"1991-07-02\", \"docket_number\": \"9311; 9312\", \"first_page\": \"808\", \"last_page\": \"809\", \"citations\": \"25 Conn. App. 808\", \"volume\": \"25\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Appellate Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Appellate Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:06:40.402034+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"State of Connecticut v. Terry Evans\", \"head_matter\": \"State of Connecticut v. Terry Evans\\n(9311)\\n(9312)\\nSpallone, O\\u2019Connell and Cretella, Js.\\nArgued June 7\\ndecision released July 2, 1991\\nTerry Evans, pro se, the appellant (defendant).\\nJames A. Killen, assistant state\\u2019s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were JohnM. Bailey, state\\u2019s attor ney, and Paul Murray, senior assistant state\\u2019s attorney, for the appellee (state).\", \"word_count\": \"62\", \"char_count\": \"406\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nThe judgment is affirmed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/conn/770569.json b/conn/770569.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..45936faf2c65ddd6afb201f8d03539668b922119
--- /dev/null
+++ b/conn/770569.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"770569\", \"name\": \"State of Connecticut v. Lake Spears\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Spears\", \"decision_date\": \"1995-07-04\", \"docket_number\": \"15117\", \"first_page\": \"78\", \"last_page\": \"97\", \"citations\": \"234 Conn. 78\", \"volume\": \"234\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:42:39.335094+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"State of Connecticut v. Lake Spears\", \"head_matter\": \"State of Connecticut v. Lake Spears\\n(15117)\\nCallahan, Borden, Berdon, Norcott and Katz, Js.\\nArgued April 21\\ndecision released July 4, 1995\\nC. Robert Satti, Sr., special assistant state\\u2019s attorney, with whom were Sarah E. Steere, legal intern, and, on the brief, Kevin T. Kane, state\\u2019s attorney, for the appellant (state).\\nRichard D. Haviland, for the appellee (defendant).\\nChristopher F. Droney, United States attorney, and Carl J. Schuman, assistant United States attorney, filed a brief for the United States of America as amicus curiae.\\nRichard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Susan Quinn Cobb, assistant attorney general, filed a brief for the attorney general as amicus curiae.\\nJackson T. King, Jr., Patrice H. Kunesh and Henry J. Sockbeson filed a brief for the Mashantucket Pequot Indian tribe as amicus curiae.\", \"word_count\": \"5801\", \"char_count\": \"35719\", \"text\": \"Callahan, J.\\nThe sole issue in this certified appeal is whether the state of Connecticut has jurisdiction, pursuant to \\u00a7 1755 of title 25 of the United States Code, over crimes committed on the Mashantucket Pequot Indian Reservation (reservation) in Ledyard. On November 29,1991, the defendant, Lake Spears, was arrested by a Connecticut state trooper who had responded to an anonymous telephone call alerting the police to a disturbance at the defendant's residence. The defendant resided at 8 Elizabeth George Drive, on the reservation. Subsequent to his arrest, the defendant was charged in an information in the Superior Court with two counts of assault of an officer in violation of General Statutes \\u00a7 53a-167c, and one count each of inciting injury to persons or property in violation of General Statutes \\u00a7 53a-179a, disorderly conduct in violation of General Statutes \\u00a7 53a-182 and interfering with an officer in violation of General Statutes s 53a-167a.\\nOn October 13,1992, the defendant moved to dismiss the information, claiming that the state lacked jurisdiction over crimes committed by or against Indians on the reservation. The parties agreed that the Mashantucket Pequot Indian tribe (tribe) is a federally recognized tribe that owns and occupies the reservation encompassing approximately 1800 acres in Led-yard. The defendant is a member of the Narrangansett Indian tribe, not the Mashantucket Pequot Indian tribe.\\nThe trial court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that the Connecticut Indian Land Claims Settlement Act of 1983 (Settlement Act); 25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1751 through 1760; conferred criminal jurisdiction over the reservation to the state. Thereafter, the defendant entered pleas of nolo contendere to all counts of a substitute information that charged him, in three counts, with: (1) interfering with an officer in violation of \\u00a7 53a-167a; (2) assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes \\u00a7 53a-61; and (3) disorderly conduct in violation of \\u00a7 53a-182. The defendant conditioned the entry of his pleas on his right to appeal from the court's denial of his motion to dismiss. See General Statutes \\u00a7 54-94a; Practice Book \\u00a7 4003. The trial court rendered a judgment of conviction on all three counts.\\nThereafter, the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court from the judgment of conviction, challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss. The Appellate Court reversed the judgment of conviction, concluding that the Settlement Act did not confer criminal jurisdiction over the reservation to the state in the absence of the express consent of the tribe. State v. Spears, 36 Conn. App. 106, 122-23, 647 A.2d 1054 (1994). The Appellate Court, accordingly, remanded the case to the trial court with direction to grant the defendant's motion to dismiss. We granted the state's petition for certification limited to the following issue: \\\"Under the circumstances of this case, did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the state of Connecticut does not have jurisdiction over crimes allegedly committed by the defendant on the Mashantucket Pequot Indian Reservation in Ledyard?\\\" State v. Spears, 231 Conn. 936, 650 A.2d 173 (1994). We reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.\\nOn appeal, the state claims that, although the Settlement Act granted federal recognition to the tribe, it also granted jurisdiction over crimes committed on the reservation to the state. See 25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1758 (a) and 1755. The state contends that \\u00a7 1755 constituted an express grant by Congress of criminal jurisdiction over the reservation to the state, and that jurisdiction was vested in the state upon the passage of the Settlement Act, without requiring any further consent by the tribe. We agree.\\nThe tribe is \\\"the sole successor in interest to the aboriginal entity known as the Western Pequot Tribe which years ago claimed aboriginal title to certain lands in the State of Connecticut.\\\" 25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1751 (e). In 1976, the tribe brought a civil action claiming title to certain public and private lands in Ledyard, claiming that the lands were the property of the tribe and had been appropriated wrongfully from the tribe in violation of the constitution and laws of the United States. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. McGuigan, 626 F. Sup. 245, 246 (D. Conn. 1986). The Settlement Act reflects an agreement reached by the parties to the litigation to resolve the tribe's claims and to eliminate the cloud on titles to land in Ledyard resulting from those claims. 25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1751; Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. McGuigan, supra, 246. The Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Council was represented in the action as well as in the hearings before Congress, and manifested its consent to the terms of the Settlement Act. 25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1751 (e).\\nSection 6 of the Settlement Act, which is codified at 25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1755, provides: \\\"state jurisdiction over reservation. Notwithstanding the provision relating to a special election in section 406 of the Act of April 11,1968 (82 Stat. 80; 25 U.S.C. 1326) . the reservation of the Tribe is declared to be Indian country subject to State jurisdiction to the maximum extent provided in title IY of such Act [25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1321].\\\" The issue of whether \\u00a7 6 of the Settlement Act conferred criminal jurisdiction to the state without requiring further consent of the tribe is one of first impression.\\nAt the outset, we note that criminal offenses committed by or against Indians in \\\"Indian country\\\" ordinarily \\\"have been subject only to federal or tribal laws, Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 96 S. Ct. 1634, 48 L. Ed. 2d 96 [1976], except where Congress in the exercise of its plenary and exclusive power over Indian affairs has 'expressly provided that State laws shall apply.' McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 170-71, 93 S. Ct. 1257, 36 L. Ed. 2d 129 [1973].\\\" Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470-71, 99 S. Ct. 740, 58 L. Ed. 2d 740 (1979); see Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 8 L. Ed. 483 (1832). We also recognize that \\\"ambiguities in legislation affecting retained tribal sovereignty are to be construed in favor of the [tribe].\\\" Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, supra, 484; see also Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392, 96 S. Ct. 2102, 48 L. Ed. 2d 710 (1976) (\\\" 'statutes passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes . . . are to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians' \\\"). We, however, must effectuate the expressed Congressional intent. See Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 104, 113 S. Ct. 1119, 122 L. Ed. 2d 457 (1993) (\\\" '[o]ur task is to give effect to the will of Congress' \\\"); Gonsalves v. West Haven, 232 Conn. 17, 21, 653 A.2d 156 (1995) (\\\" ' \\\"[o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature\\\" ' \\\").\\nOur analysis of the statutes reflecting that legislative intent is guided by well established principles of statutory construction. \\\"Statutory construction is a question of law and therefore our review is plenary. North Haven v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 220 Conn. 556, 561, 600 A.2d 1004 (1991).\\\" Davis v. Norwich, 232 Conn. 311, 317, 654 A.2d 1221 (1995). Ordinarily, if the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we need look no further than the words themselves because we assume that the language expresses the legislature's intent. United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680, 105 S. Ct. 2897, 86 L. Ed. 2d 536 (1985); Frillici v. Westport, 231 Conn. 418, 430, 650 A.2d 557 (1994); West Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc. v. Town Council, 228 Conn. 498, 508, 636 A.2d 1342 (1994); American Universal Ins. Co. v. DelGreco, 205 Conn. 178, 193, 530 A.2d 171 (1987). As a threshold matter, therefore, we consider whether \\u00a7 1755 is ambiguous. Although \\u00a7 1755 explicitly states that \\\"the reservation of the Tribe is declared to be Indian country subject to State jurisdiction,\\\" it also compels us to refer to \\u00a7 401 (25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1321) and to \\u00a7 406 (25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1326) of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 in order to ascertain the parameters and the true meaning of the jurisdictional grant. We conclude, therefore, that the reference in \\u00a7 1755 to certain provisions of the separate Indian Civil Rights Act renders resort solely to the language of \\u00a7 1755 inadequate to determine its clear meaning.\\nWhen we engage in statutory interpretation, \\\"[o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . Fleming v. Garnett, 231 Conn. 77, 91-92, 646 A.2d 1308 (1994); State v. Metz, 230 Conn. 400, 409, 645 A.2d 965 (1994); see also Carpenteri-Waddington, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 231 Conn. 355, 362, 650 A.2d 147 (1994).\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gonsalves v. West Haven, supra, 232 Conn. 21; see Negonsott v. Samuels, supra, 507 U.S. 104. \\\"In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter. . . . Ambroise v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., [226 Conn. 757, 764, 628 A.2d 1303 (1993)]; see Glastonbury Volunteer Ambulance Assn., Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 227 Conn. 848, 852-57, 633 A.2d 305 (1993). . . . State v. Metz, [supra, 409]; Fleming v. Garnett, [supra, 91].\\\" (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Frillici v. Westport, supra, 231 Conn. 431-32; Cheshire Mortgage Service, Inc. v. Montes, 223 Conn. 80, 96, 612 A.2d 1130 (1992); see Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221, 235 n.5, 111 S. Ct. 2281, 115 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1991) (\\\"we repeatedly have looked to legislative history and other extrinsic material when required to interpret a statute which is ambiguous\\\"); Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 511, 109 S. Ct. 1981, 104 L. Ed. 2d 557 (1989); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 564-65, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 101 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1988); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896, 104 S. Ct. 1541, 79 L. Ed. 2d 891 (1984).\\nSection 1321 (a) of title 25 of the United States Code provides: \\\"The consent of the United States is hereby given to any State not having jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed by or against Indians in the areas of Indian country situated within such State to assume, with the consent of the Indian tribe occupying the particular Indian country or part thereof which could be affected by such assumption, such measure of jurisdiction over any or all of such offenses committed within such Indian country or any part thereof as may be determined by such State to the same extent that such State has jurisdiction over any such offense committed elsewhere within the State, and the criminal laws of such State shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country or part thereof as they have elsewhere within that State.\\\" (Emphasis added.) Section 1326 of title 25 of the United States Code provides in relevant part: \\\"State jurisdiction acquired pursuant to this title . . . with respect to criminal offenses . . . shall be applicable in Indian country only where the enrolled Indians within the affected area of such Indian country accept such jurisdiction by a majority vote of the adult Indians voting at a special election held for that purpose. .\\\" (Emphasis added.)\\nThe issue in this appeal boils down to the question of whether, as the defendant argues, an abstract consent requirement expressed in \\u00a7 1321 survived even though Congress in \\u00a7 1755 expressly eliminated the mechanism of a special election, which is set forth in \\u00a7 1326, by which tribes must manifest their consent to state jurisdiction. Section 1755 provides for state jurisdiction over crimes committed on the reservation ' ' [notwithstanding the provision relating to a special election in section 406 of the Act of April 11, 1968 [\\u00a7 1326].\\\" In order to discern the intent of Congress in enacting \\u00a7 1755, we need comment upon the Indian Civil Rights Act of April 11,1968, which was preceded by Public Law 83-280. See Public Law 83-280, 67 Stat. 588-90 (1953), codified, as amended, at 18 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1162 and 28 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1360.\\nPublic Law 83-280, enacted in 1953, was the first federal jurisdictional statute of general applicability to Indian reservation lands; Bryan v. Itasca County, supra, 426 U.S. 379; and \\\"the primary expression of federal policy governing the assumption by States of civil and criminal jurisdiction over the Indian Nations.\\\" Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, 476 U.S. 877, 884, 106 S. Ct. 2305, 90 L. Ed. 2d 881 (1986). Public Law 83-280 granted criminal jurisdiction to five states, not including Connecticut, over Indian country in those five states. It also provided an option to the remaining states containing Indian country to assume jurisdiction over crimes committed in Indian country \\\"without consulting with or securing the consent of the tribes that would be affected.\\\" Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, supra, 439 U.S. 473-74. The primary purpose for enacting Public Law 83-280 was to address \\\"the 'problem of lawlessness on certain Indian reservations, and the absence of adequate tribal institutions for law enforcement.' \\\" Id., 471.\\nIn 1968, Congress enacted title IV of the Indian Civil Rights Act, which is codified at 25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1321 through 1326. Title IV requires that all subsequent assertions of jurisdiction by the states be preceded by the consent of the affected tribes. \\\"The impetus for the addition of a consent requirement in the 1968 amendments was congressional dissatisfaction with the involuntary extension of state jurisdiction over Indians who did not feel they were ready to accept such jurisdiction, or who felt threatened by it.\\\" Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, supra, 476 U.S. 892, citing S. Rep. No. 721, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1967).\\nThe United States Supreme Court has determined that the special election requirement in \\u00a7 1326 is the only procedure by which the tribal consent in \\u00a7 1321 may be manifested. \\\"We think the meaning of these provisions is clear: the tribal consent that is prerequisite to the assumption of state jurisdiction under the provisions of Title IV of the Act must be manifested by majority vote of the enrolled Indians within the affected area of Indian country.\\\" (Emphasis added.) Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U.S. 423, 429, 91 S. Ct. 480, 27 L. Ed. 2d 507 (1971), citing 114 Cong. Rec., S394 (1968) (\\\"[t]his title . . . authorizes States to assert civil and criminal jurisdiction in Indian country only after acquiring the consent of the tribes in the States by referendum of all reservated Indians\\\"). It follows, then, that the nullification by \\u00a7 1755 of the special election requirement, the sole means by which Indian tribes may consent to state jurisdiction, accompanied by an express grant of jurisdiction to the state, effectively nullifies the tribal consent requirement in \\u00a7 1321.\\n\\\"We presume that the legislature is aware of the judicial construction placed upon its enactments. Cappellino v. Cheshire, 226 Conn. 569, 576, 628 A.2d 595 (1993); Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Huntley, 223 Conn. 22, 30, 610 A.2d 1292 (1992).\\\" State v. Crowell, 228 Conn. 393, 401, 636 A.2d 804 (1994); see Fair Cadillac-Oldsmobile Isuzu Partnership v. Bailey, 229 Conn. 312, 321, 640 A.2d 101 (1994) (\\\"[W]e presume that the legislature has 'knowledge of this longstanding construction which this court has given to the objective and purpose of legislation in this field.' Klapproth v. Turner, 156 Conn. 276, 279, 240 A.2d 886 [1968].\\\"); see also Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525, 107 S. Ct. 1391, 94 L. Ed. 2d 533 (1987) (\\\"Congress acted\\u2014as it is presumed to act . . . with full awareness of the well-established judicial interpretation [of the statute]\\\" [citation omitted]). Section 1755, therefore, must be interpreted in light of the United State Supreme Court's interpretation of \\u00a7 1321 and 1326. Moreover, \\\"[a] statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section should be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole. Thus, it is not proper to confine interpretation to the one section to be construed,\\\" 2A J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (5th Ed. 1992) \\u00a7 46.05, p. 103; see also Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. , 114 S. Ct. 1992, 2002,128 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1994) (\\\"courts should construe statutes to foster harmony with other statutory and constitutional law\\\").\\nWe must interpret \\u00a7 1755 so that it, along with \\u00a7 1321 and 1326, constitutes one consistent body of law. Section 1321 provides that the affected tribe must indicate consent to state criminal jurisdiction. Section 1321, however, does not provide a procedure for the tribe to manifest that consent. Section 1326, on the other hand, provides the one method authorized by Congress by which the tribe may consent to state jurisdiction. The only way to harmonize these provisions with each other and with \\u00a7 1755 is to conclude that the abrogation of the only method of consent abrogated the necessity for consent.\\nThe defendant argues, however, that by abrogating the requirement for a special election, Congress in \\u00a7 1755 did not intend to confer criminal jurisdiction to the state without the necessity for tribal consent. Instead, the defendant argues that Congress intended to recognize the increasing sophistication of Indian tribes and to allow the Mashantucket Pequot tribe greater freedom by permitting it to manifest its consent to jurisdiction by some undelineated method or methods. This interpretation of congressional intent is flawed. It is illogical to place both the state and the tribe in the predicament of guessing at the proper manifestation of consent. See, e.g., Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Southbury, 231 Conn. 563, 651 A.2d 1246 (1995) (dispute between tribal chief and tribal council regarding authority to bring action on behalf of tribe resulting in dismissal). Such an interpretation would lead to the unlikely result that Congress intended that some undisclosed method of signaling consent should be utilized by the Mashantucket Pequot tribe, but not by other Indian tribes, even though there has been but a single recognized method since 1968 by which all Indian tribes may declare their consent to state jurisdiction.\\n\\\"[P]rinciples of statutory construction . . . require us to construe a statute in a manner that will not thwart its intended purpose or lead to absurd results. Turner v. Turner, 219 Conn. 703, 712, 595 A.2d 297 (1991). We must avoid a construction that fails to attain a rational and sensible result that bears directly on the purpose the legislature sought to achieve. Peck v. Jacquemin, 196 Conn. 53, 63-64, 491 A.2d 1043 (1985). [Turner v. Turner, supra,] 713. Scrapchansky v. Plainfield, 226 Conn. 446, 453, 627 A.2d 1329 (1993); see also State v. Johnson, [227 Conn. 534, 542, 630 A.2d 1059 (1993)]; Fairfield Plumbing & Heating Supply Corp. v. Kosa, 220 Conn. 643, 650-51, 600 A.2d 1 (1991).\\\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Concept Associates, Ltd. v. Board of Tax Review, 229 Conn. 618, 624, 642 A.2d 1186 (1994). \\\"It is also a rule of statutory construction that those who promulgate statutes or rules do not intend to promulgate statutes or rules that lead to absurd consequences or bizarre results. . . . State v. Siano, 216 Conn. 273, 278, 579 A.2d 79 (1990), and cases cited therein.\\\" State v. Harrison, 228 Conn. 758, 765, 638 A.2d 601 (1994); see United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 552, 99 S. Ct. 2470, 61 L. Ed. 2d 68 (1979). Without running afoul of the accepted rules of statutory construction, we cannot construe the immediate, definitive grant of state jurisdiction in \\u00a7 1755 to be subject to subsequent tribal consent, the method of declaring which is unknown to Congress, the state and the tribe.\\nThe defendant's proposed interpretation of \\u00a7 1755 also would render everything in the statute, except for the elimination of the special election requirement of \\u00a7 1326, superfluous. Section 1755 provides that \\\"the reservation . is declared to be Indian country subject to State jurisdiction . . . .\\\" If, as the defendant argues, the consent of the tribe was still necessary to confer criminal jurisdiction on the state after the passage of the Settlement Act, this language would amount to nothing more than a manifestation of Congress' consent to state jurisdiction with the consent of the tribe. In \\u00a7 1321, Congress, however, already had manifested its express consent to any state to assume jurisdiction over Indian country with tribal consent; consequently, no purpose would be served by doing so again in \\u00a7 1755. Our conclusion, therefore, that the state automatically assumed criminal jurisdiction over the reservation upon passage of the Settlement Act, is the only interpretation of the statutory scheme which is not redundant and which gives meaning to every clause of \\u00a7 1755.\\n\\\"It is a basic tenet of statutory construction that the legislature 'did not intend to enact meaningless provisions.' Turner v. Turner, [supra, 219 Conn. 713]. Accordingly, care must be taken to effectuate all provisions of the statute. See Pintavalle v. Valkanos, 216 Conn. 412, 418, 581 A.2d 1050 (1990) ('[a] statute should be read as a whole and interpreted so as to give effect to all of its provisions'); Hopkins v. Pac, 180 Conn. 474, 476, 429 A.2d 952 (1980) (it is a 'well established principle that statutes must be construed, if possible, such that no clause, sentence or word shall be superfluous, void or insignificant').\\\" Bridgeport Hospital v. Com mission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 232 Conn. 91, 100-101, 653 A.2d 782 (1995); see also Negonsott v. Samuels, supra, 507 U.S. 106 (\\\"[o]ur reading of the . . . Act is the only one which gives effect 'to every clause and word of [the] statute' \\\"); 2A J. Sutherland, supra, \\u00a7 46.06, pp. 119-20.\\nThe legislative history of the Settlement Act also persuades us that the intent of Congress in enacting \\u00a7 1755 was to confer criminal jurisdiction to the state without the requirement of tribal consent. As stated in both the Senate and the House of Representative Reports, \\\"[s]ection 6 [\\u00a7 1755] provides that the reservation . . . is subject to the full extent of State jurisdiction . . . as defined in title IV of the Act of April 11, 1968, the Indian Civil Rights Act. The Tribe's reservation has this status notwithstanding section 406 of the Indian Civil Rights Act [\\u00a7 1326] which requires a majority vote of the enrolled members of an Indian tribe before a state may assume jurisdiction over that tribe.\\\" (Emphasis added.) S. Rep. No. 222, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1983); see also H.R. Rep. No. 43, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1983). The reservation would not obtain the \\\"status\\\" of being under state jurisdiction upon the enactment of \\u00a7 1755 if Congress had intended that subsequent tribal consent was required to confer jurisdiction to the state.\\nInterestingly, the tribe's own ordinances, enacted subsequent to the Settlement Act, manifest the tribe's acceptance of state jurisdiction. The ordinances clearly indicate that the tribe acknowledged the state's acquisition of jurisdiction, pursuant to \\u00a7 1755, over crimes committed on the reservation. The Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Law and Order Code, enacted November 20,1991, only nine days before the defendant was arrested, provides several examples. Section 1, entitled \\\"Offenses against the Tribe,\\\" provides: \\\"(a) Violations of State criminal laws: Every offense against those criminal laws of the State of Connecticut which are made applicable to the Mashantucket Pequot Reservation by section 6 of the Mashantucket Pequot Indian Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. 98-134, 25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1755, and 25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1321, shall be an offense against the law of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe and the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe hereby adopts and incorporates by reference, as the law of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, all provisions of such criminal laws of the State of Connecticut which are made applicable to the Mashantucket Pequot Reservation by Section 6 of the Mashantucket Pequot Indian Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. 98-134, 25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1755, and 25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1321.\\\" (Emphasis added.) Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ordinance No. 112091-01.\\nSection 5 of the Mashantucket Tribal Law and Order Code provides in relevant part: \\\"Concurrent jurisdiction over State offenses. The Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Police Department shall exercise concurrent authority with law enforcement officers of the State of Connecticut to make arrests for violations of criminal laws of the State which are made applicable to the Mashantucket Pequot Reservation by Section 6 of the Mashantucket Pequot Indian Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. 98-134, 25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1755, and 25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1321; provided, however, that persons arrested by officers of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Police Department for such violations of criminal laws of the State of Connecticut shall be transferred as promptly as may be feasible to the jurisdiction of the State law enforcement officers and the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Police Department shall comply with all reasonable requirements of State law enforcement officers and agencies in order to assist in the prosecution of such offenders under the laws of the State of Connecticut.\\\" (Emphasis added.) Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ordinance No. 112091-01.\\nThese provisions not only reflect the tribe's acknowledgement that the state had acquired criminal jurisdiction over the reservation pursuant to \\u00a7 1755, but also evince the tribe's apparent willingness to cooperate with the state's law enforcement authorities. Because we conclude that tribal consent to state jurisdiction was not required pursuant to \\u00a7 1755, we need not consider whether these tribal ordinances act as subsequent ratification of state jurisdiction. They do, however, illustrate that the tribe understood the passage of \\u00a7 1755 to confer criminal jurisdiction on the state.\\nFinally, the Gaming Compact, ordered by the United States Secretary of the Interior as a result of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988; see Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 737 F. Sup. 169 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 913 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1990); 56 Fed. Reg. 24,996 (1991); provides that \\\"[t]he State of Connecticut shall also have jurisdiction to enforce all other criminal laws of the State which are consistent with the provisions of this Compact on the Reservation, including enforcement within the gaming facilities.\\\" (Emphasis added.) The compact assumes that the state had acquired criminal jurisdiction over the entire reservation and only emphasizes that the jurisdiction includes the gaming facilities. Additionally, the Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Commission stated: \\\"The State Law Enforcement Agency (Connecticut State Police) shall have jurisdiction to enforce all criminal laws on the reservation, including enforcement within the gaming facility.\\\" (Emphasis added.) Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Commission: Regulatory Responsibilities and Requirements of the Tribal Gaming Commission, State Gaming Agency and State Law Enforcement Agency (Novem ber 14, 1991). The term \\\"including\\\" presupposes the existence of state jurisdiction over the entire reservation.\\nWe conclude that the state of Connecticut acquired jurisdiction over crimes committed on the Mashantucket Pequot Indian Reservation by the enactment of \\u00a7 1755 of title 25 of the United States Code.\\nThe judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that court with direction to affirm the judgment of the trial court.\\nIn this opinion the other justices concurred.\\nThe trial court granted the Mashantucket Pequot Indian tribe's motion to file a brief as amicus curiae regarding the motion to dismiss. The tribe claimed that the issue in this case would have a lasting effect on its relationship with the state. The trial court also granted the United States amicus curiae status. Before this court, the tribe, the United States and the state attorney general filed briefs as amici curiae.\\nAll parties agree that the fact that the defendant is not a member of the Mashantucket Pequot Indian tribe has no legal significance in this appeal.\\nGeneral Statutes \\u00a7 54-94a provides: \\\"conditional nolo contendere PLEA. APPEAL OF DENIAL OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS OR DISMISS. When a defendant, prior to the commencement of trial, enters a plea of nolo contendere conditional on the right to take an appeal from the court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress evidence based on an unreasonable search or seizure, motion to suppress statements and evidence based on the involuntariness of a statement or motion to dismiss, the defendant after the imposition of sentence may file an appeal within the time prescribed by law. The issue to be considered in such an appeal shall be limited to whether it was proper for the court to have denied the motion to suppress or the motion to dismiss. A plea of nolo contendere by a defendant under this section shall not constitute a waiver by the defendant of nonjurisdictional defects in the criminal prosecution.\\\"\\nPractice Book \\u00a7 4003 provides: \\\"(a) When a defendant, prior to the commencement of trial, enters a plea of nolo contendere conditional on the right to take an appeal from the court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress evidence based on an unreasonable search or seizure or motion to dismiss, the defendant after the imposition of sentence may file an appeal within the time prescribed by law. The issue to be considered in such appeal shall be limited to whether it was proper for the court to have denied the motion to suppress or the motion to dismiss. A plea of nolo contendere by a defendant under this section shall not constitute a waiver by the defendant of nonjurisdictional defects in the criminal prosecution. The court shall not accept a nolo contendere plea pursuant to this subsection where the denial of the motion to suppress would not have a significant impact upon the disposition of the case in the trial court. The court shall also decline to accept such a nolo contendere plea where the record available for review of the denial of the motion to suppress or motion to dismiss is inadequate for appellate review of the court's determination thereof.\\n\\\"(b) With the approval of the court, after a hearing to consider any objections thereto, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, reserving in writing the right, on appeal from the judgment, to review of the adverse determination of any motion made prior to the close of evidence, which motion must be specified in such written reservation. If the defendant prevails on appeal, the judgment shall be set aside and the defendant shall be allowed to withdraw the conditional plea of nolo contendere after the case has been remanded to the trial court. The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere pursuant to this subsection where the adverse determination of the specified motion would not have a significant impact on the disposition of the case in the trial court. The court shall also decline to accept such a nolo contendere or guilty plea where the record available for review of the ruling upon the specified motion is inadequate for appellate review of the court's determination thereof.\\\"\\nIn Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. McGuigan, supra, 626 F. Sup. 245, the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut considered whether Connecticut's bingo laws were enforceable on the reservation. The court, in considering the effect of \\u00a7 1755, stated: \\\"While Public Law 98-134 eliminates the consent election provided in 25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1326, it may have created an anomaly by the fact that it does not eliminate the consent requirement of 25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1321.\\\" Id., 248. The court, however, expressly reserved the question of whether the state had acquired criminal jurisdiction over the reservation because it concluded that the bingo laws were not criminal laws, but rather were \\\"civil/regulatory.\\\" In Schaghticoke Indians of Kent, Connecticut, Inc. v. Potter, 217 Conn. 612, 615 n.3, 587 A.2d 139 (1991), this court misstated the holding of McGuigan in dicta.\\n\\\"Indian country\\\" is defined in \\u00a7 1151 of title 18 of the United States Code, which provides in relevant part: \\\"Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title, the term 'Indian country' . . . means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government . . . .''Asa threshold matter, we note that the tribe is a federally recognized Indian tribe; 25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1758; and occupies a reservation of land in Ledyard pursuant to General Statutes \\u00a7 47-63. The reservation is, therefore, Indian country. See also 25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1755.\\nCongress has conferred on the federal courts special criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed in Indian country. See Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 102-103, 113 S. Ct. 1119, 122 L. Ed. 2d 457 (1993). The Indian Country Crimes Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1152, applies to crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians and to crimes committed by Indians against non-Indians not encompassed by other statutes or prosecuted in a tribal court. See Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711, 714, 66 S. Ct. 778, 90 L. Ed. 962 (1946); F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law (1982 Ed.) pp. 287-300. The Indian Major Crimes Act establishes as federal crimes certain felonies committed by any Indian in Indian country \\\"against the person or property of another Indian or other person . . . .\\\" 18 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1153, 3242. In the absence of an express grant of state jurisdiction by Congress, state jurisdiction within Indian country \\\"is limited to crimes by non-Indians against non-Indians . . . and victimless crimes by non-Indians.\\\" Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 465 n.2, 104 S. Ct. 1161, 79 L. Ed. 2d 443, reh. denied, 466 U.S. 948, 104 S. Ct. 2148, 80 L. Ed. 2d 535 (1984).\\nAt the time that Public Law 83-280 was enacted, there were no federally recognized Indian tribes in Connecticut.\\nThe five states given immediate jurisdiction were California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon and Wisconsin. Alaska was added to this group in 1958. See 18 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1162; 28 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1360.\\nIndeed, from the time of the enactment of the Settlement Act in 1983, when the tribe gained federal recognition; see 25 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1758; until 1990, the tribe had neither a police force nor a court system.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"772820\", \"name\": \"Jane Preisner v. Gary W. Illman et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Preisner v. Illman\", \"decision_date\": \"1984-02-14\", \"docket_number\": \"2312\", \"first_page\": \"264\", \"last_page\": \"269\", \"citations\": \"1 Conn. App. 264\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Appellate Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Appellate Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:30:50.188966+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Jane Preisner v. Gary W. Illman et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Jane Preisner v. Gary W. Illman et al.\\n(2312)\\nDannehy, C.P.J., Testo and Hull, Js.\\nArgued December 7, 1983\\ndecision released February 14, 1984\\nDavid W. Skolnick, with whom was Michael Perzin, for the appellant (plaintiff).\\nKenneth J. Mulvey, Jr., with whom, on the brief, was Peter C. Dorsey, for the appellees (defendants).\", \"word_count\": \"1503\", \"char_count\": \"8865\", \"text\": \"Hull, J.\\nThe plaintiff, Jane Preisner, sued the defendants, the owner and the operator of an automobile, claiming that the named defendant negligently caused a rear end collision with another automobile which the plaintiff had stopped at a stop sign on an entrance ramp to the Wilbur Cross Parkway in New Haven on July 17, 1972. The jury returned a general verdict for the defendants. The plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict was denied by the court, Celotto, J. The plaintiff appeals from the judgment on the verdict.\\nThe plaintiff claims that she suffered back injuries for which she consulted an orthopedist three days after the accident. She further claims that she was treated by the orthopedist on a biweekly basis for the rest of the summer of 1972 and at least monthly for some time' thereafter. She alleges that she wore a corset and had to remain in bed for a month after the accident.\\nFrom 1973 to April, 1979, the plaintiff received no medical treatment for her back. The plaintiff further claims, however, that in April, 1979, she was playing kickball as a part of her teaching duties when she bent over and could not straighten up. She had also played tennis earlier that day. She consulted her family physician the next day and a neurosurgeon six weeks later. Back surgery followed in June, 1979, and again in late 1980.\\nThe defendants' answer denied the plaintiff's allegation that the named defendant's negligence caused the accident. The plaintiff relies, however, on the named defendant's testimony during cross-examination that he had acknowledged responsibility for the accident at the scene and that the plaintiff in no way contributed to the accident.\\nThe defendants' medical expert testified that in his opinion the plaintiff's chronic back pain and eventual surgery were not caused by the accident but more likely were brought about by some sort of degenerative process. The defendants argue that there was no property damage caused by the accident. They claim that the plaintiff's activities from 1972 to 1979 and her medical history as given to her doctors in 1979 about her current back problems raised serious questions as to her credibility.\\nThe plaintiff filed no request to charge as to liability and made no exception to the charge in this regard. Since the verdict was a general one, the jury could have found for the defendants on the plaintiff's claim for liability or damages or both. The plaintiff argues, in effect, that as a matter of law she is entitled to a verdict.\\n\\\"The trial judge can sense the atmosphere of a trial and has an excellent vantage point for evaluating the factors that may have brought the jury to its verdict.\\\" Hearl v. Waterbury YMCA, 187 Conn. 1, 3, 444 A.2d 211 (1982); Darling v. Burrone Bros., Inc., 162 Conn. 187, 200, 292 A.2d 912 (1972); see also Kukanskis v. Jasut, 169 Conn. 29, 32-33, 362 A.2d 898 (1975). The credibility and weight to be attributed to any evidence offered is solely within the province of the jury. Riccio v. Abate, 176 Conn. 415, 418, 407 A.2d 1005 (1979); State v. Penland, 174 Conn. 153, 157-58, 384 A.2d 356, cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906, 98 S. Ct. 2237, 56 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1978); see Gallo v. Gallo, 184 Conn. 36, 38, 440 A.2d 782 (1981). The plaintiff had the burden of proving her claims by a fair preponderance of the evidence. It is the privilege of the jury to believe or disbelieve any evidence and to attribute to any evidence whatever weight it feels is merited. Hyde v. Pizzuto, 151 Conn. 701, 195 A.2d 53 (1963); Prizio v. Penachio, 146 Conn. 452, 152 A.2d 507 (1959).\\n\\\"If the jury could reasonably have reached their conclusion the verdict must stand.\\\" Novella v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 163 Conn. 552, 555, 316 A.2d 394 (1972). \\\"The concurrence of the judgments of the judge and the jury, who saw the witnesses and heard the testimony, is a powerful argument for sustaining the action of the trial court. Giambartolomei v. Rocky DeCarlo & Sons, Inc., 143 Conn. 468, 474, 123 A.2d 760 [1956].\\\" Novella v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., supra, quoting Chanosky v. City Building Supply Co., 152 Conn. 642, 643, 211 A.2d 141 (1965). \\\"In reviewing the decision of the trial court, 'we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the sustaining of the verdict.' \\\" Novella v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., supra.\\nThe plaintiff relies principally on Pappaceno v. Picknelly, 135 Conn. 660, 663, 68 A.2d 117 (1949), wherein the Supreme Court, in a 3-2 decision finding error in the trial court's denial of a motion to set aside a verdict for the defendants, concluded that the jury could not reasonably have found that the defendant bus driver was not guilty of negligence which was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. There was no claim made in that case, however, concerning the plaintiff's credibility.\\nWe conclude that the Pappaceno case rests on its own facts and is not controlling here where the slight or negligible impact at the scene and the plaintiff's medical history over many years raised very substantial questions of her credibility. This case is more properly controlled by the dissenting opinion in that case which states that \\\"the jury may disbelieve any witness, leaving the plaintiff without the necessary preponderance of the evidence.\\\" Id., 666 {Jennings, J., dissenting).\\n\\\"In the last analysis, the defendants ask that this court retry the case on the evidence. We do not do this.\\\" Giambartolomei v. Rocky DeCarlo & Sons, Inc., supra, 474. \\\"We cannot retry the facts or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses.\\\" Johnson v. Flammia, 169 Conn. 491, 497, 363 A.2d 1048 (1975). \\\"We will not permit the plaintiffs herein a second bite of the apple regarding the factual determinations of the trial court.\\\" Jones v. Litchfield, 1 Conn. App. 40, 42, 467 A.2d 936 (1983).\\n\\\"A verdict cannot be disturbed unless it is against the evidence or its manifest injustice is so plain as to justify the belief that the jury or some of its members were influenced by ignorance, prejudice, corruption or partiality.\\\" Martino v. Palladino, 143 Conn. 547, 548, 123 A.2d 872 (1956). That court further stated: \\\"In Pappaceno v. Picknelly, 135 Conn. 660, 68 A.2d 117 [1949], a divided court held that the plaintiffs motion to set aside a verdict for the defendants should have been granted and remanded the case to the trial court with direction to grant the motion. Under the circumstances of that case it was stated (p. 662) that '[a] jury is not at liberty to disregard evidence unless they can reasonably conclude that it is not to be credited.' Our action in that case, as the dissenting opinion pointed out, represented 'a rare occurrence.' The case at bar does not present a parallel situation. The plaintiff had the burden of proof, and the appendices of the evidence filed by the parties show a conflict of testimony on the vital facts. It was within the province of the jury to accept or to disbelieve any or all of it.\\\" Id., 549.\\nThere is no evidence whatsoever of improper influence in this case. There was evidence before the jury that there had been a six year hiatus between the termination of medical care in 1973 and the claimed back problem in 1979, that the plaintiff was a proficient tennis player, and that the plaintiff filed for workmen's compensation benefits at the school where she worked in 1979. These are merely examples of types of evidence that could have affected the plaintiff's credibility and justified the verdict for the defendants.\\nFinally, the plaintiff claims that since the defendants' medical expert testified that as a result of the July 17, 1972 accident, the plaintiff's \\\"back was injured,\\\" damages must be awarded for her injuries. As stated previously, credibility of all the witnesses is for the jury to determine. Even were we to conclude that the jury could not reasonably have found for the defendants on the issue of liability, this court will not reverse and grant a new trial for the mere failure to grant nominal damages. Rubin v. Rios, 186 Conn. 754, 756, 443 A.2d 1273 (1982).\\nWe conclude that the jury reasonably could have found a verdict for the defendants.\\nThere is no error.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\\nThis appeal, originally filed in the Supreme Court, was transferred to this court. Public Acts, Spec. Sess., June, 1983, No. 83-29, \\u00a7 2 (c).\\nIn 1979, General Statutes c. 568 was entitled \\\"Workmen's Compensation Act.\\\" The title was subsequently changed to \\\"Workers' Compensation Act.\\\" Public Acts 1979, No. 79-376.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"774667\", \"name\": \"State vs. Charles H. Miller\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Miller\", \"decision_date\": \"1896-12-01\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"373\", \"last_page\": \"380\", \"citations\": \"68 Conn. 373\", \"volume\": \"68\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:48:16.378880+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"State vs. Charles H. Miller.\", \"head_matter\": \"State vs. Charles H. Miller.\\nThird Judicial District, Bridgeport,\\nOctober Term, 1896.\\nAndrews, O. J., Torrance, Eenn, Bai.dwin and Hamersi.ey, Js.\\nSection 3097 of the General Statutes provides, among other things, that every person who shall \\u201ckeep open\\u201d any place on Sunday, in which \\u201cany sports or games of chance are at any time carried on or allowed,\\u201d shall be fined or imprisoned. The defendant, who was charged with keeping open on Sunday a place in which \\u201c certain sports known as billiards and pool \\u201d had been and were carried on and allowed, filed a general demurrer to the complaint. On reservation it was held that the object of the statute was to compel the closing on Sunday of those places which were appropriated to the carrying on of sports or games of chance as a business; that the sport known as billiards was an ordinary subject of such a business, and that the complaint sufficiently charged an offense within the statute.\\nThe legislation concerning Sunday reviewed.\\n[Submitted on briefs October 27th\\ndecided December 1st, 1896.]\\nProsecution for keeping open on Sunday a place in which sports known as billiards and pool were carried on, brought originally to the town court of Orange and thence by the defendant\\u2019s appeal to the Criminal Court of Common Pleas for New Haven County, where the defendant demurred to the information and the court, Hotchkiss, J., reserved the questions of law arising thereon for the consideration and advice of this court.\\nJudgment overruling demurrer advised.\\nThe statute (General Statutes, \\u00a7 3097) in pursuance of which this prosecution was brought, is as follows: \\u201cEvery person who by himself, his servant, or his agent, between the hours of twelve o\\u2019clock on Saturday night and twelve o\\u2019clock on Sunday night next following, shall sell or expose for sale any spirituous or intoxicating liquors, or shall keep open any place of any kind or description in which spirituous and intoxicating liquors are at any time sold or exposed for sale, or are reputed to be sold or exposed for sale, or in which any sports or games of chance are at any time carried on or allowed, or are reputed to be so carried on or allowed, shall be fined not less than fifty nor more than one hundred dollars, or be imprisoned not more than six months, or both; but this section shall not apply to sales under a druggist\\u2019s license.\\u201d\\nThe complaint charged that \\u201c on the 31st day of May, A. D. 1896, at said town of Orange, Charles H. Miller, of said town of Orange, with' force and arms did by himself, his servant and agent, between the hours of twelve o\\u2019clock on Saturday night and twelve o\\u2019clock on Sunday night next following, keep open a certain place, building, apartment and room, known as Miller\\u2019s Pavilion, in which certain sports known as billiards and pool for a long time previous thereto and then were carried on and allowed, against the peace of the State, of evil example, and contrary to the statute in such case made and provided.\\u201d\\nThe defendant demurred upon the ground \\u201c.that the complaint and the matters therein alleged are insufficient in the law.\\u201d\\nH. P. Arvine, for the defendant.\\nBilliards is not a game of chance, nor in fact does the State claim it to be such. State v. Gufton, 8 Ired. (N. Car.) 271. The sole contention of the State is that to keep open a place on Sunday where sports are at any time carried on and. allowed, has been made a criminal offense by \\u00a7 3097 of the Gen. Stats. If this is the true construction, the Act is certainly very wide and sweeping in its effect. Almost everything that is practiced as a recreation may be called a \\u201c sport,\\u201d and is called such in the ordinary use of the word. The statute must be strictly construed in favor of the accused; the word \\u201csports\\u201d must mean either sports of all kinds, or of a particular class. If of a particular class, we must seek for that class in the language of the statute. Lee Bros. Furniture Co. v. Cram, 63 Conn. 434. The word \\u201c chance \\u201d furnishes the only suggestion that we have in that direction.\\nGeorge M. Gunn, Prosecuting Attorney, for the State.\\nSunday statutes are remedial and to be liberally construed in respect to the mischief to be remedied. Smith v. Wilcox, 24 N. Y. 355, 82 Amer. Dec. 302; Northrup v. Foot, 14 Wend. 248. Gaming and billiards and pool are the ordinary concomitants of a saloon for the sale of intoxicating liquors, and the purpose of \\u00a7 3097 was to close such places, that they might not serve as a cover or excuse for the violation of other statutes relating more specifically to sale of intoxicating liquors. Under no conditions was the keeping of a gaming house or a house reputed to be such, legal (Gen. Stats. \\u00a7 2559) ; and under no circumstances were any kind of sports on Sunday permitted, whether the element of chance entered in greater or less measure into their composition. See Gen. Stats. \\u00a7\\u00a7 1569, 1570. Whatever force marginal notes may have in determining the effect of statutes, they nowhere have effect of changing their clear and apparent meaning.\", \"word_count\": \"2470\", \"char_count\": \"14356\", \"text\": \"Hamersley, J.\\nThe partaking in sports or games of chance is not made an offense by \\u00a7 3097 of the General Statutes, nor is it an offense by virtue of any law now in force. Formerly all games of chance were illegal; and sports or games involving a combination of skill and luck to any degree seem to have been included under the ban. In 1650 the \\\" game of shuffle (shovel) board \\\" was specially prohibited, and \\\" any unlawful game\\\" was forbidden. In 1656 games \\\" altogether unlawful, in the very nature of them,\\\" were defined as \\\"cards, dice, tables, or any other game wherein that great and solemn ordinance of a Lott is expressly and directly abused and profaned; \\\" (1 Col. Rec. 527, 289) ; i. e., inasmuch as the Word of God authorized in certain cases the ascertainment of the Divine will and the settlement of controversies by the \\\" Lott,\\\" the profanation of this ordinance to the purposes of frivolous' amusement is forbidden by the Word of God, and is therefore unlawful. The use of the lot for purposes of gain was also unlawful, unless the object were one approved by the General Court; as when, in 1753, permission was given to the trustees of the College of New Jersey to raise money by way of lotteiy for building \\\"a public house for entertaining the students\\\" (permission therefor having been repeatedly refused by the General Assembly of that Province), the General Court found the object to be \\\" for the encouragement of religion and learning,\\\" and therefore lawful and not an abuse of the ordinance. 10 Col. Rec. 217. In 1750 \\\"An Act against Gaming\\\" (i. e., playing at games, the special prohibitions of gambling in its various forms came later) forbids dice, cards, tables, bowls, shuffle-board, billiards, coytes (quoits), lceils (kayle), loggets (loggats), \\\" or any other unlawful games or sport.\\\" Acts, Ed. 1754, p. 81. Common sense, however, eventually-asserted its supremacy in such matters, and legislation has ceased to stigmatize innocent amusements as criminal, and legislative discretion is no longer invoked to define those pious uses that may be potent to extract its inherent vice from gambling.\\nSection 3097 does not make partaking in \\\"sports or games of chance \\\" on Sunday an offense. Section 1569 retains a portion. of the early Sunday legislation, and forbids anyone to \\\"engage in any sport or recreation on Sunday.\\\" This early legislation was based not only on the duty of the State to protect its citizens from wanton insults to their religious faith, and observances, and in the enjoyment of. the peace and quiet to which they may be entitled on a legal holiday, but also upon the duty of the State to compel all citizens to conform to the religious tenets established by the State as binding on the conscience of all. The Sunday law was at first administered by the General Court, without special legislation, in conformity with the word of God, which was accepted as supplying, in analogy to the English common law, defects in express legislation; and the Code of 1650 only provided a special penalty for open contempt of God's Word or the ministers thereof, and neglect to attend the public ministry of the Word; directing the civil magistrates to deal with anyone who failed to observe the peace, ordinances and rules of Christ as established by law. Special provisions from time to time were enacted. The various special provisions appear in the Revision of 1750, in \\\"An Act for the due Observation and Keeping the Sabbath, or Lord's Day; and for Preventing and Punishing Disorders and Prophaneness on the same.\\\" This Act also is in part based on the duty of the State to enforce personal piety as by law established. It requires every person on that day privately \\\" to apply themselves to duties of religion and piety,\\\" punishes those who, neglecting the public worship according to law, worship God by themselves in private houses; punishes whoever travels on that day or leaves his place of abode except to attend the public worship allowed by law, or does any business, labor or work of any kind; and punishes the use of \\\"any game, sport, play or recreation.\\\" The first break in this legislation was in 1770, when conscientious dissenters from the worship and ministry established by law, were allowed to worship by themselves without incurring the penalty for non-attendance at the State church. Since that time various changes have been made, and \\u00a7 1569 contains the remnant of the original Act.\\nThe prohibition on Sunday of any sport or recreation which interferes with the preservation of public peace and order, or the enjoyment of appropriate quiet and religious observance on that day, is clearly within the power of the legislature; if, however, the language used must be-con strued as including an exercise of the power employed prior to the adoption of the Constitution, to control private action of individuals in a matter of personal conscience, serious questions would arise. But whatever may be the scope of this section, the engaging in any sport on Sunday is not an offense under \\u00a7 3097. That section is directed against the proprietor of a business who receives the public as customers in the place where he carries on a business of such a nature that its open transaction on Sunday is peculiarly liable to disturb the quiet and good order to which all citizens are by law entitled on that day; and to accomplish this object it punishes the keeping open of such a place of business more severely than the mere transaction of any secular business is punished.\\nSection 3097, so far as the offense under discussion is concerned, provides that \\\" every person who . . . between the hours of twelve o'clock on Saturday night and twelve o'clock on Sunday night next following, . . . shall keep open any place . in which any sports or games of chance are at any time carried on or allowed, shall be fined not less than fifty nor more than one hundred dollars, or be imprisoned not more than six months, or both.''\\nTo \\\" keep \\\" a place, as here used, means an appropriation of the place by the person in control for the conduct of his business therein. State v. Main, 31 Conn. 572, 574. This is quite evident from the language of the whole section. To \\\" keep open \\\" such a place, means providing some way of coming and going sufficient to enable any portion of the public to gather there and take part in the usual business of the place ; it does not mean opening the place solely for a proper purpose unconnected with that business. State v. Gregory, Jr., 47 Conn. 276. The business intended is described as that of carrying on or allowing any sports or games of chance. The statute does not punish keeping open any place, except one in which the business described is transacted and which is kept open on Sunday; and does not punish the subject-matter of the business there transacted, - i. e., sports and games of chance. It is apparent that the scope of the words \\\" sports and games of chance,\\\" is determined and made adequately definite by the provision that the sports and games of chance specified must be such as in fact are the subject of a business consisting in supplying the requisite facilities for the use of such amusements in a place kept for the transaction of that business, to which the public or some portion thereof are invited as customers. It is a matter of common knowledge that the sport of billiards is an ordinary subject of such business, and that a place kept for the transaction of that business, if kept open on Sunday, may be peculiarly liable to interfere with the lawful restrictions for securing the quiet required on that day; and, moreover, for a long period our legislation has expressly classed \\\" billiards \\\" under \\\" sports,\\\" when the word has been used in a similar connection. It is immaterial what motive induced the legislature to use this language in \\u00a7 3097. \\\" Sport \\\" is a very general term, covering field sports and other means of recreation necessarily not a subject of the business described in the statute ; possibly \\\" games of chance \\\" were added to exclude any doubt as to their being covered by the more general term, or to emphasize the fact of their inclusion,\\u2014 possibly because it has been an ancient legislative custom to describe amusements regulated by statute under similar circumstances, as sports or games. The language of the statute is in other respects intentionally broad, so as to provide against ingenious evasions. It is sufficient that the whole section expresses with adequate clearness the real meaning of the words used, and includes as one subject of the business specified, the sport of billiards.\\nThe complaint in this case in charging the defendant with keeping open on Sunday a certain place known as Miller's Pavilion, in which certain sports known as billiards were carried on and allowed, charges an offense within the statute. Whether the keeping open on Sunday of a place of business for this purpose, or some other purpose that may be covered by the broad language of the statute, is of such peculiar danger to the quiet of the day as to justify its selection for this exceptional and severe penalty, is a legislative and not a judicial question.\\nThe Court of Common Pleas is advised to overrule the demurrer and to render appropriate final judgment.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"778558\", \"name\": \"Wallace E. Johnson vs. Samuel Norton\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Johnson v. Norton\", \"decision_date\": \"1894-02-19\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"134\", \"last_page\": \"135\", \"citations\": \"64 Conn. 134\", \"volume\": \"64\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:12:29.817674+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Wallace E. Johnson vs. Samuel Norton.\", \"head_matter\": \"Wallace E. Johnson vs. Samuel Norton.\\nThird Judicial District, New'Haven, January Term, 1894 Andrews, C. J., Torrance, Fenn, Baldwin and Hamersley, Js.\\nChapter LI. of the Public Acts of 1893 permits any cause tried to the jury to be brought before the Supreme Court of Errors upon the ground of a verdict against evidence. But it has not changed the principles which determine under what conditions a verdict may be set aside as against evidence.\\nIt still remains true that a new trial will be granted only where manifest injustice has been done by the verdict, and the wrong is so plain and palpable as clearly to denote that some mistake was made by the jury in the application of legal principles, or as to justify the suspicion that they, or some of them, were influenced by corruption, prejudice, or partiality.\\nThe court in the present case, having reviewed the entire evidence, reached the conclusion that not only was the verdict not against the evidence, but that it expressed the only correct conclusion to which the jury could come.\\n[Argued January 25th\\ndecided February 19th, 1894.]\\nAction to recover damages, under \\u00a7 1344 of the General Statutes, for injuries caused to plaintiff\\u2019s land by a fire alleged to have been set by the defendant upon his land, whence it ran upon the plaintiff\\u2019s land ; brought before a justice of the peace and thence by defendant\\u2019s appeal to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County, where it was tried to the jury before Hotchkiss, J. ; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $20.00, and appeal by the defendant upon the ground that the verdict was against the evidence.\\nNew trial denied.\\nHenry F. Hall, for the appellant (defendant).\\nF. A. Merriman, for the appellee (plaintiff).\", \"word_count\": \"700\", \"char_count\": \"3913\", \"text\": \"Andrews, C. J.\\nThe complaint in this case alleges that the plaintiff was, on the 1st day of April, 1892, the owner of a certain piece of land in the town of Cheshire, and that the defendant was the owner of a certain other piece of land in the same town ; that on the 19th day of that month the defendant set a fire on his own land, which ran upon the land of the plaintiff and did damage. The action was first brought before a justice of the peace in the said town of Cheshire, where judgment was rendered for the plaintiff to recover the sum of \\u00a720.00. The defendant then appealed to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County.\\nIn the latter court- the cause was tried to a jury who returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for the same sum. The defendant thereupon moved for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the evidence, and the court certified the evidence to this court. After reading the whole evidence and duly considering the same, we are convinced not only that the verdict is not against the evidence, but that it is fully supported by the evidence, and expresses the only correct conclusion to which the jury could come.\\nIn dismissing the motion we think it necessary only to observe, that while Chapter LI. of the Public Acts of 1893, under the provisions of which this case comes before us, has made some changes in the mode of access to this court, it has made none in the principles which determine under what conditions a verdict may be set aside, as against evidence. It still remains true that this relief will be granted only when manifest injustice has been done by the verdict, and the wrong is so plain and palpable as clearly to denote that some mistake was made by the jury in the application of legal principles, or as to justify the suspicion that they, or some of them, were influenced by corruption, prejudice, or partiality. It could not have been the intent of the new statute to enable counsel to bring a case here, at the expense of the State, upon a motion of this character, which they did not think might fairly be claimed to fall within this rule.\\nA new trial is denied.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"784214\", \"name\": \"Anthony Malizia v. Kristen B. Anderson et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Malizia v. Anderson\", \"decision_date\": \"1991-09-27\", \"docket_number\": \"File No. 100034S\", \"first_page\": \"114\", \"last_page\": \"119\", \"citations\": \"42 Conn. Supp. 114\", \"volume\": \"42\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Supplement\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:52:44.013977+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Anthony Malizia v. Kristen B. Anderson et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Anthony Malizia v. Kristen B. Anderson et al.\\nSuperior Court Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk\\nFile No. 100034S\\nMemorandum filed September 27, 1991\\nFarrell & Barr, for the plaintiff.\\nCotter, Cotter & Sohon, for the named defendant.\\nFazzone, Nuzzo & Baillie, for the defendant Robert Anderson.\\nP.A. Scholder, for the defendant Buck Scientific, Inc.\", \"word_count\": \"1579\", \"char_count\": \"9415\", \"text\": \"Ryan, J.\\nThis action has been brought to recover damages for injuries sustained by the plaintiff, Anthony Malizia, when a bicycle he was riding allegedly was struck by an automobile driven by the named defendant Kristen B. Anderson. The case is presently before the court on the motion of the defendant Robert Anderson to strike the second count of the two count second amended complaint. The issue presented is whether the second count of the second amended complaint is subject to a motion to strike for failure to allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action under the \\\"family car\\\" doctrine. For the following reasons, this court concludes that the second count sufficiently alleges facts necessary to state such a claim and the motion to strike should be denied.\\nThe second count of the second amended complaint alleges the following facts. On or about October 23, 1988, at approximately 5 p.m., a car driven by Kristen Anderson collided with a bicycle being operated by the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleges that he suffered serious injuries in the collision as a result of the negligence of Kristen Anderson.\\nThe car Kristen Anderson was operating is owned by the defendant Buck Scientific, Inc., a Delaware corporation authorized to transact business in Connecticut. The plaintiff claims that the car, owned by Buck Scientific, was furnished to Kristen Anderson by her father, the defendant Robert Anderson, who is a principal stockholder in the defendant corporation. The plaintiff alleges further that Kristen Anderson resided in her father's household and at the time of the accident was operating the automobile as a \\\"family car\\\" and within the scope of general authority from her father and as his agent. The claim in the second count is based on the common law \\\"family car\\\" doctrine and on General Statutes \\u00a7 52-182.\\nPursuant to Practice Book \\u00a7 151, the defendant Robert Anderson now moves to strike the second count on the grounds that the family car doctrine does not extend to individual stockholders of a closely held corporation and that there is no justification for piercing the corporate veil of Buck Scientific to sue Robert Anderson personally as an officer of that closely held corporation.\\nThe defendant filed a memorandum of law in support of his motion in accordance with Practice Book \\u00a7 155. The plaintiff has objected to the motion and has filed a memorandum of law in opposition.\\nA motion to strike tests the legal sufficiency of a pleading. Practice Book \\u00a7 152; Ferryman v. Groton, 212 Conn. 138, 142, 561 A.2d 432 (1989). If a complaint contains the necessary elements of a cause of action, it will survive a motion to strike. D'Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Directors of Notre Dame High School, 202 Conn. 206, 218-19, 520 A.2d 217 (1987). A motion to strike admits all well pleaded facts; Ferryman v. Groton, supra; and the allegations are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Levenstein v. Yale University, 40 Conn. Sup. 123, 125, 482 A.2d 724 (1984). In ruling on a motion to strike the court may not look outside the pleadings for facts not alleged. Cavallo v. Derby Savings Bank, 188 Conn. 281, 286, 449 A.2d 986 (1982).\\nIn support of the first ground for his motion, Robert Anderson argues that if the family car doctrine is applicable to closely held corporations, it does not afford a legal basis for the imposition of liability on an individual officer of such a corporation when the corporation is already named as a defendant. He contends that the cases that have allowed suit against a corporation did not extend liability to the individual corporate officers. He argues, therefore, that he is not liable for the actions of his daughter under the family car doctrine.\\nAs to the second ground for the motion, Robert Anderson argues that the plaintiffs allegations are insufficient to support piercing the corporate veil under either the instrumentality or identity theory and those theories are factually and legally inapplicable to the present case.\\nThe plaintiff argues in opposition that legal title to the automobile is not required for the application of the family car doctrine. He contends that the \\\"sole issue to be decided is whether Mr. Anderson can escape liability under the 'family car' doctrine by having bare legal title in the name of the 'family corporation.' \\\" The plaintiff contends further that Robert Anderson's control of the use of the car is sufficient for liability to attach under the doctrine. The plaintiff claims that in the present case, the inquiries are whether the head of the family had control over the car or the ability to furnish it to his daughter, with whom he lived and to whom he gave general permission to use the car, and whether sufficient facts have been pleaded to support the plaintiff's claim.\\nRegarding the second ground for the motion to strike, the plaintiff contends that Robert Anderson has mischaracterized the claim and that it is unnecessary to pierce the corporate veil to find him liable because the plaintiff's claim is made on the basis that Robert Anderson furnished the car for general family purposes to his daughter. The plaintiff argues that he does not seek to hold Robert Anderson liable by virtue of his ownership of corporate shares or by virtue of the corporation's alleged liability to the defendant. The plaintiff argues that since the corporate defendant has denied that Kristen Anderson was in its employ or acting as its agent at the time of the accident, then Kristen Anderson was operating the car for family purposes, and thus the alternative theories have been properly pleaded. It is the opinion of the court that the plaintiff's statement of the corporation's denial of liability imparts facts outside the pleadings, and cannot be con sidered. Rowe v. Godou, 209 Conn. 273, 278, 550 A.2d 1073 (1988). \\\"It has long been settled in Connecticut that when a car is maintained by its owner for the 'general use, and convenience of his or her family,' the owner is jointly and severally liable for the negligence of a family member, who, having general authority to drive the car, uses it negligently while embarked on a family purpose, that is, for the pleasure or convenience of the family as a unit, or of an individual member of it. Thus, the right of the plaintiffs to recover rests on their ability to establish facts which render the family car doctrine applicable, and consequently, the defendant presumptively liable as the owner of such a family car.\\\" (Emphasis in original.) Cook v. Nye, 9 Conn. App. 221, 225, 518 A.2d 77 (1986). The court in Cook v. Nye, supra, 226, further stated: \\\"Applicability of the family car doctrine is dependent upon the connection that the member of the household has with the car. He or she must own, maintain, or furnish the car, and have or exercise some degree of control over its use. 60A C.J.S., Motor Vehicle \\u00a7 433 (3). Usually, liability under the doctrine is sought to be imposed on a member of a household who owns the car. It is not necessary to fit both these rules, however. Generally, control over the use of the car rather than legal title is dispositive; 2 F. Harper & F. James, Torts, p. 1421; although ownership is significant.\\\" (Emphasis in original.)\\nIn the present case, the plaintiff alleges his claim is based upon the previously stated common law family car doctrine and upon \\u00a7 52-182. This section provides: \\\"Proof that the operator of a motor vehicle or a motorboat, as defined in section 15-127, was the husband, wife, father, mother, son or daughter of the owner shall raise a presumption that such motor vehicle or motorboat was being operated as a family car or boat within the scope of a general authority from the owner, and shall impose upon the defendant the burden of rebut ting such presumption.\\\" Section 52-182 places upon the defendant the burden of introducing evidence to rebut the statutory presumption, once the plaintiff has introduced sufficient evidence to raise the presumption. Cook v. Nye, supra, 226-27.\\nThis court finds that although Robert Anderson argues that the plaintiff is attempting to impose liability upon him by virtue of his status as the principal stockholder of Buck Scientific, the allegations of the fourth paragraph of the second count actually seek to impose liability upon him as the person who furnished the car to Kristen Anderson and who exercised some degree of control over its use. The court finds further that, when these allegations are read in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a claim under the family car doctrine has been sufficiently pleaded, and that such a claim does not require an allegation that the defendant owned the car. See id., 226.\\nRegarding Robert Anderson's second ground for the motion to strike, that a claim for piercing the corporate veil has not been sufficiently pleaded, it is found that the second count makes no attempt to plead such a claim, and, therefore, this ground for the motion to strike is without merit.\\nFor the foregoing reasons, the motion to strike is denied.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"789215\", \"name\": \"Annie Jollimore, Administratrix, vs. The Connecticut Company\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Jollimore v. Connecticut Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1912-12-19\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"314\", \"last_page\": \"318\", \"citations\": \"86 Conn. 314\", \"volume\": \"86\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:51:34.292555+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Hail, C. J., Pbentice, Thayee, Robaback and Wheeleb, Js.\", \"parties\": \"Annie Jollimore, Administratrix, vs. The Connecticut Company.\", \"head_matter\": \"Annie Jollimore, Administratrix, vs. The Connecticut Company.\\nThird Judicial District, Bridgeport,\\nOctober Term, 1912.\\nHail, C. J., Pbentice, Thayee, Robaback and Wheeleb, Js.\\nIn an action against a street-railway company for damages for causing the death of the plaintiff\\u2019s intestate by negligence, the burden rests upon the plaintiff to prove the decedent\\u2019s freedom from contributory negligence; and therefore in the absence of any evidence upon that subject, judgment must necessarily be rendered for the defendant.\\nThere is no presumption of law that a boy eleven years old was incapable of contributory negligence. To determine whether he was or not it is necessary to take into consideration not only his age, but also his intelligence, experience, and capacity to understand and avoid the danger to which he was exposed.\\nThe evidence in the present case reviewed, and the negligent act of the decedent in running upon the track just in front of the approaching car, held to have been the proximate cause of his injury.\\nArgued October 22d\\ndecided December 19th, 1912.\\nAction to recover damages for personal injuries resulting in the death of the plaintiff\\u2019s intestate, and alleged to have been caused by the defendant\\u2019s negligence in operating a street-railway car, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Williams, J.; verdict for the plaintiff for $2,000, which the trial court set aside as against the evidence, from which action the plaintiff appealed.\\nNo error.\\nRobert J. Woodruff, for the appellant (plaintiff).\\nThomas M. Steele and Harrison T. Sheldon, for the appellee (defendant).\", \"word_count\": \"1383\", \"char_count\": \"7934\", \"text\": \"Roraback, J.\\nThe allegations of negligence relied upon by the plaintiff were that the car was going at a high rate of speed, that no warning was given of its approach, and that the motorman did not take proper steps to avoid the accident after he saw, or should have seen, the danger of the deceased.\\nThe accident occurred on October 30th, 1911, on Ferry Street, between Wolcott and Chambers streets, in the city of New Haven. Ferry Street runs north and south, and is fifty feet in width. There is a sidewalk on each side of the street. The distance from curb to curb is thirty feet. The distance from the curb to the track, where the accident occurred, is seven and one half feet. Ferry Street is practically straight for several blocks to the north of Wolcott Street. Neither Wolcott nor Chambers Street cross Ferry. Wolcott Street runs into Ferry Street from the west, and, a short distance to the south, Chambers- Street runs into it from the east. The defendant operates a double track trolley-line through Ferry Street, and the car concerned in the accident was running south on the westerly track and on a down grade. It was a double truck, closed car, about forty feet long, equipped with air brakes. It had just left the car barn, only a few blocks away, for its regular run, and had taken on no passengers up to the time of the accident.\\nThe plaintiff's intestate at the time of his death was eleven years and about two months old. He had attended school since he was seven years old, and was a bright boy. At the end of each year he had passed into a higher grade, and at the time of the accident was in the fifth grade. He had attended three different schools during this period, all so situated that in going to and from school he was required to cross trolley-tracks, and during the four years he had had no escort other than his sister, who was a year and a half older, except that on one occasion his mother had gone with him. He. also delivered newspapers, and had a route on several different streets through which the trolley-cars were operated. For a year and a half before the accident he had lived on Pierpont Street, a short block northerly of Wolcott, and had been accustomed during this year and a half to play around, with other boys of his age, in the streets at and near the place where the accident happened.\\nThe time of the accident was shortly after half past three in the afternoon. During all the earlier part of the afternoon the plaintiff's intestate had been playing with other boys about the streets in the vicinity, frequently crossing and recrossing the tracks on Ferry Street. The boys were engaged in a game which they called \\\"playing horse,\\\" or \\\"playing policeman.\\\" The testimony indicated that at the time the accident occurred part of the boys had run up Chambers Street, and that the plaintiff's intestate, who was acting the part of a horse and being driven by another boy, had gone up Wolcott Street to give the other boys a start, and that the game was for the plaintiff's intestate and the boy driving him to run after and try to catch the others. When the Jollimore boy and his companion started to run after the other boys, they ran along Wolcott Street to the corner, and immediately started to run across Ferry Street in the direction of Chambers Street. There was some conflict in the testimony whether the boys ran straight into Ferry Street from the corner of Wolcott Street, or whether they ran south and then turned onto the track. All the witnesses agree that the decedent was running across the track when he was hit, near the southerly cross-walk from Wolcott Street. It also appeared that he was struck immediately as he reached the defendant's track.\\nIn the present case it cannot be presumed that this boy, of the age of eleven years, was incapable of contributory negligence, and the burden was upon the plaintiff to show that the deceased was free from negligence contributing to his injury. If no evidence were offered upon this subject, the judgment would necessarily be against the plaintiff. Rohloff v. Fair Haven & W. R. Co., 76 Conn. 689, 693, 58 Atl. 5.\\nTo determine the question of contributory negligence, it was necessary to take into consideration the age of the boy, his experience, intelligence, and capacity to understand and avoid the danger to which he exposed himself. The evidence clearly refutes the claim of due care on the part of the deceased when he was injured. It appears that he voluntarily and thoughtlessly put himself in a position of great and obvious danger. His age, intelligence, and experience were such that he must have understood and appreciated the danger of being struck and injured by a trolley-car in crossing the tracks. His view of the street for a long distance in the direction of the approaching car was unobstructed. The distance from the curbstone to the nearest rail was only about seven and one half feet. There is no dispute that he ran from the curb to the track in front of the car, and that he was hit instantly upon reaching the track. He was engaged in a dangerous sport, and his injury was a natural result of his own carelessness. Whether there was sufficient evidence to justify the jury in finding that the defendant was negligent, it is unnecessary for us to decide. Assuming that the plaintiff established the alleged negligence of the defendant, the burden which lay on the plaintiff, of proving the absence of contributory negligence on the part of her intestate, was not satisfied. Elliott v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 84 Conn. 444, 447, 80 Atl. 283; Cottle v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 82 Conn. 142, 144, 145, 72 Atl. 727.\\nThe jury could not have reasonably found that the proximate cause of the accident was because the motorman might have avoided the injury by exercising reasonable care after the peril of the deceased should have been known to him.\\nThe evidence leaves no rational ground for any conclusion other than that the final act of negligence, which was the proximate cause of the accident, was that of the plaintiff's intestate in running upon the track in front of the car when it must have been within a very few feet of him, and when the motorman was helpless to avert the result.\\nThere is no error.\\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"789371\", \"name\": \"KEVIN MCCOMMIC v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"McCommic v. Commissioner of Correction\", \"decision_date\": \"1997-03-18\", \"docket_number\": \"16256\", \"first_page\": \"470\", \"last_page\": \"471\", \"citations\": \"44 Conn. App. 470\", \"volume\": \"44\", \"reporter\": \"Connecticut Appellate Reports\", \"court\": \"Connecticut Appellate Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Connecticut\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:11:49.876963+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"KEVIN MCCOMMIC v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION\", \"head_matter\": \"KEVIN MCCOMMIC v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION\\n(16256)\\nO\\u2019Connell, Hennessy and Stoughton, Js.\\nArgued January 13\\nofficially released March 18, 1997\\nKevin McCommic, pro se, the appellant (petitioner).\\nL. D. McCallum, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the appellee (respondent).\", \"word_count\": \"397\", \"char_count\": \"2519\", \"text\": \"PER CURIAM.\\nThe petitioner in this habeas corpus action appeals from the granting of summary judgment dismissing his petition. The petitioner, a sentenced prisoner in the respondent's custody, brought this habeas corpus petition alleging illegal confinement and claiming entitlement to sentence good conduct credits to reduce the amount of time until his parole eligibility date. The respondent filed a return to the petition and then moved for summary judgment.\\nFollowing briefing and argument, the habeas court granted the defendant's summary judgment motion and dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioner had no liberty interest in any particular potential release date of parole. The habeas court granted certification and the petitioner appealed to this court.\\nThe dispositive issue on appeal is whether the habeas court properly concluded that the petitioner had not raised a justiciable issue.\\nWe are persuaded by our consideration of the oral arguments and our examination of the record and the briefs of the parties that the judgment of the habeas court should be affirmed. In a thoughtful and comprehensive memorandum of decision, the trial court analyzed the law in a manner consistent with statutes and case precedents. McCommic v. Commissioner of Correction, 44 Conn. Sup. 417, 691 A.2d 47 (1997). Because that memorandum addresses the dispositive issue in this appeal, we adopt the trial court's well reasoned decision as a statement of the applicable law. It would serve no useful purpose for us to repeat the discussion contained therein. See Yantic Volunteer Fire Co. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 42 Conn. App. 519, 522, 679 A.2d 989 (1996); State v. Mobley, 33 Conn. App. 103, 105, 633 A.2d 726 (1993), cert. denied, 228 Conn. 917, 636 A.2d 849 (1994).\\nThe judgment is affirmed.\\nPractice Book \\u00a7 529P provides: \\\"At any time after the pleadings are closed, any party may move for summary judgment, which shall be rendered if the pleadings, affidavits and any other evidence submitted show that there is no genuine issue of material fact between the parties requiring a trial and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\\\"\"}"
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