diff --git a/ri/11077925.json b/ri/11077925.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c78220a6fcc1b92525e94caada57a625ec89b4ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/11077925.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11077925\", \"name\": \"William B. GALLOWAY v. ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Galloway v. Roger Williams University\", \"decision_date\": \"2001-05-25\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2000-25-Appeal\", \"first_page\": \"148\", \"last_page\": \"150\", \"citations\": \"777 A.2d 148\", \"volume\": \"777\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:29:43.115312+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present WILLIAMS, C.J., BOURCIER, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"William B. GALLOWAY v. ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY.\", \"head_matter\": \"William B. GALLOWAY v. ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY.\\nNo. 2000-25-Appeal.\\nSupreme Court of Rhode Island.\\nMay 25, 2001.\\nAnthony F. Muri, Providence, For Plaintiff.\\nMark Nugent, Moira E. Reynolds, Providence, Paul V. Sullivan, For Defendant.\\nPresent WILLIAMS, C.J., BOURCIER, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"1212\", \"char_count\": \"7738\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nPER CURIAM.\\nThis case came before the Supreme Court on April 3, 2001, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. The plaintiff, William B. Galloway (plaintiff or Galloway), has appealed the entry of summary judgment with respect to negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of contract and promissory estoppel against the defendant, Roger Williams University (defendant or university). After hearing the arguments of counsel and reviewing the record and memoranda submitted by the parties, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown. We shall therefore decide the issues raised on appeal at this time.\\nIn June 1991, plaintiff was hired initially as director of admissions for the university. Later that year he was named dean of admissions. In 1994, plaintiff was present ed with the university's personnel policy manual and signed an acknowledgment of its receipt. The manual provides in part:\\n\\\"The contents of this Manual are not to be construed as a part of any employment agreement with an employee and do not alter labor agreement provisions. Any employee [sic] employment and compensation can be terminated by the University or the employee at any time with or without notice and cause. Additionally, the policies and practices described herein are subject to change unilaterally without notice to employees by the University as deemed advisable and/or necessary.\\\"\\nIn a separate section entitled \\\"Employee Discipline and Termination,\\\" the manual states that, notwithstanding any other provision of the personnel policy, \\\"the University reserves the right to terminate any individual's employment and compensation at any time, for any cause, with or without notice.\\\"\\nIn 1993, Anthony Santoro (Santoro) became the president of the university. According to Galloway, his relationship with Santoro began harmoniously but became strained over time. The plaintiff maintained that this deterioration began in February 1995, when he and Santoro disagreed about admissions standards. The dispute arose because Santoro was against accepting students whose Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores fell below 750. Galloway did not agree with this litmus test, and maintained that each student should be evaluated individually and not exclusively on SAT scores. Galloway argued that the university also should consider other barometers of a student's potential, including teacher recommendations, learning disabilities and whether the candidate spoke and read English as a second language. Another dispute took place between plaintiff and Santoro at an admissions committee meeting in February 1996. At this meeting, plaintiff offered prospective students for admission and/or scholarships. Every student that Galloway presented was rejected by San-toro and the other committee members. Galloway maintained that he was then invited into Santoro's private office and asked why he was pushing so hard for these prospective candidates. The plaintiff maintained that he subsequently was advised by the vice president of finance at the university to stop disagreeing with Santoro.\\nThe plaintiff maintained that in March 1996, he met with Michael Schipper (Schipper), vice president of human resources, to inquire whether he was in danger of being terminated. Schipper, according to Galloway, assured him that his job was secure. During this same time frame, plaintiff was approached by a search firm engaged in filling the position of dean of admissions at Newbury College in Brookline, MA. Galloway informed the firm that he was not interested in pursuing a new position because he was happy with his present employment at the university. The plaintiff further alleged that at a meeting on June 1, 1996, Santoro informed him that he would be reappointed to his position as dean of admissions for the next academic year. However, on July 1, 1996, plaintiff's employment with the university came to an abrupt end.\\nIn September 1996, plaintiff filed an action in Superior Court alleging negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of contract and promissory estoppel. On November 2, 1999, a justice of the Superior Court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on all claims in the complaint on the ground that plaintiff was an at-will employee and, therefore, the action could not be sustained. Final judgment was entered on November 17, 1999. Galloway has appealed.\\nDiscussion\\nOn appeal, plaintiff contended that the motion justice impermissibly engaged in issue resolution in granting the university's motion for summary judgment. Additionally, Galloway asserted that his arguments with respect to the tort, estoppel and contract claims were sustainable notwithstanding the fact that he was an at-will employee of the university. We deem these claims to be without merit.\\nThe law in Rhode Island is well settled that this Court will review a grant of summary judgment on a de novo basis. Marr Scaffolding Co. v. Fairground Forms, Inc., 682 A.2d 455, 457 (R.I.1996). \\\"In conducting such a review, we are bound by the same rules and standards as those employed by the trial justice.\\\" M & B Realty, Inc. v. Duval, 767 A.2d 60, 63 (R.I.2001) (citing Rotelli v. Catanzaro, 686 A.2d 91, 93 (R.I.1996)). The party opposing summary judgment bears the burden of proving, by competent evidence, the existence of a factual dispute. See Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d 1223, 1225 (R.I.1996). This Court has held that we will affirm a grant of summary judgment if, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists and plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Woodland Manor III Associates v. Keeney, 713 A.2d 806, 810 (R.I.1998).\\nThe law in Rhode Island is clear that employees such as plaintiff \\\"who are hired for an indefinite period with no contractual right to continued employment are [considered] at-will employees [who are] subject to discharge at any time for any permissible reason or for no reason at all.\\\" DelSignore v. Providence Journal Co., 691 A.2d 1050, 1051 n. 5 (R.I.1997); see also Pacheo v. Raytheon Co., 623 A.2d 464, 465 (R.I.1993) (stating that \\\"[i]t is not the role of the courts to create rights for persons whom the Legislature has not chosen to protect\\\"). Here, the record discloses that Galloway did not have a written contract with the university and was aware that he was an at-will employee who could be terminated without notice or cause. Further, Galloway acknowledged that he was aware that the university could unilaterally change its policies with respect to the hiring and retention of its employees. We are satisfied that were the facts of this case exactly as Galloway has contended, he nonetheless had actual notice, based on his receipt of the manual, that as an at-will employee he could be terminated at any time, with or without cause. Therefore, we conclude that the trial justice was correct in finding that Galloway's reliance on the so-called promises of Schipper and Santoro was neither reasonable nor actionable.\\nAccordingly, the plaintiffs appeal is denied and dismissed and the judgment appealed from is affirmed. The papers in this case are remanded to the Superior Court.\\nJustice LEDERBERG did not participate.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/11162431.json b/ri/11162431.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..dcc7062cc0f41b0461fb9c3cfa2b99e5a7c7cc7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/11162431.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11162431\", \"name\": \"Montee DEBAR et al. v. WOMEN AND INFANTS HOSPITAL et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Debar v. Women & Infants Hospital\", \"decision_date\": \"2000-11-29\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 99-91-Appeal\", \"first_page\": \"1182\", \"last_page\": \"1189\", \"citations\": \"762 A.2d 1182\", \"volume\": \"762\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:23:49.074101+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: WEISBERGER, C.J., and LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, and GOLDBERG, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Montee DEBAR et al. v. WOMEN AND INFANTS HOSPITAL et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Montee DEBAR et al. v. WOMEN AND INFANTS HOSPITAL et al.\\nNo. 99-91-Appeal.\\nSupreme Court of Rhode Island.\\nNov. 29, 2000.\\nMark H. Grimm, Providence, for Plaintiff.\\nDavid W. Carroll, Timothy P. Gallogly, Providence, for Defendant.\\nPresent: WEISBERGER, C.J., and LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, and GOLDBERG, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"4123\", \"char_count\": \"25924\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nBOURCIER, Justice.\\nThis case comes before us on appeal following entry of judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendants in a Superi- or Court medical malpractice and wrongful death action.\\nIn December 1991, Flexman Johnson and Montee Debar (plaintiffs) filed a civil action against Women and Infants Hospital and several of its physicians (defendants), alleging their negligence in failing to order a timely cesarean section to have caused the death of their infant. All the physicians named in the complaint specialized in obstetrics and gynecology and treated plaintiff Debar during the final stages of her pregnancy. In October 1998, a Superior Court justice granted the defendants' Super.R.Civ.P. 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law after excluding the testimony of one of the plaintiffs expert witnesses.\\nOn appeal, the plaintiffs assert that the trial justice abused his discretion in (1) excluding the testimony of their expert witness on causation, (2) denying their motion to reopen voir dire of the expert witness, (3) denying their motion to continue the case, (4) denying their motion to stay the decision excluding the expert testimony pending an appeal, and (5) denying their motion for a new trial. For the reasons hereinafter set out, we reverse, vacate the judgment and order a new trial.\\nI\\nFacts and Case Travel\\nOn the afternoon of June 5, 1989, plaintiff Debar, almost forty two weeks pregnant and suffering from gestational diabetes, went to the defendant Women and Infants Hospital for an ultrasound. The ultrasound revealed diminished amniotic fluid in the amniotic sac, which may lead to decelerations in the fetal heart rate and to a decrease in oxygen flow to the fetus. Such a decrease in oxygen may in turn cause asphyxia, leading the fetus to gasp for air. This gasping for air is said to cause aspiration of meconium into the fetus's lungs, which if not expelled can prevent breathing and ultimately lead to cardiac arrest. The plaintiff Debar subsequently was admitted to the hospital's emergency room.\\nFollowing a decision to induce labor, the plaintiff Debar's fetus in fact suffered from decelerations in its heart rate. From 4:30 p.m. on the day of her admission and into the following morning, a fetal heart rate monitor strip recorded decelerations in the fetal heart rate. By 3:50 a.m., the defendants observed thick meconium present in the fetus. From approximately 6:45 a.m. to 7 a.m., the fetus suffered more severe decelerations. Despite these decelerations and the presence of meconium, the defendants elected not to order a cesarean section. Instead, a blood sample was ordered taken from the fetus's scalp to determine whether the fetus remained at risk for meconium aspiration. The blood sample revealed the fetus's pH level to be within normal range. The defendants subsequently ordered an amnioinfusion to reduce the risk of further decelerations. .\\nDespite the efforts of the defendants, at approximately 7:40 a.m. and 8 a.m., the fetus suffered severe decelerations. After this last series of decelerations, the defendants finally ordered a cesarean section at 8:15 a.m. On delivery by cesarean section at 8:38 a.m., the baby was found to have aspirated meconium into her lungs. The baby was pronounced dead approximately thirty-seven minutes after \\u2022 delivery. An autopsy determined that the cause of death was cardiac arrest as a result of meconium aspiration syndrome and bilateral pneumothoraces.\\nDuring trial, the plaintiffs had introduced the testimony of Dr. Thomas Bar-den, who testified that the defendants had deviated from the accepted standard of medical care in fading to perform a cesarean section at or about the time of the 6:45 a.m. decelerations. He testified that he believed that if a cesarean section had been performed at that time the baby would have survived this episode \\\"long enough that at least it would be sustainable.\\\" Nevertheless, he opined that \\\"whether [the infant] may have eventually died as a result of the consequences of the disease is not something that I should try to answer, because I'm not a pediatrician.\\\"\\nTo supplement the testimony of Dr. Barden and prove causation, the plaintiffs intended to rely exclusively upon the testimony of Dr. Daniel Adler, a board-certified pediatrician and pediatric neurologist. Doctor Adler was prepared to testify that had a cesarean section been ordered and performed at or about the same time of the 6:45 a.m. decelerations, the Debar fetus would have survived. He proposed to testify that after the 6:45 a.m. decelerations, the fetus aspirated substantial amounts of meconium into her lungs, particularly between 8 a.m. to 8:15 a.m.\\nAt,trial, Dr. Adler testified before the jury. He related that he was a graduate of the Albert Einstein College of Medicine (AECM) and had completed a pediatric residency at the Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center, during which he treated newborns stricken with meconium aspiration syndrome. He also testified that he later completed a fellowship in pediatric neurology, during which he treated newborns in AECM's intensive care unit. Later, as 'a faculty member at AECM, Dr. Adler focused primarily on pathology. Subsequently, he was retained by a community hospital, doing the bulk of his work in pediatric epilepsy and in the community hospital's newborn intensive care unit. He testified that he had been retained as a consultant in numerous cases involving children with neurological problems arising from birth complications, usually caused by asphyxia.\\nDoctor Adler further testified that in the course of his experience, he had frequently reviewed \\\"every piece of data\\\" from pathology reports to obstetrical records in treating newborns with birth defects. As part of this analysis, Dr. Adler often interpreted fetal heart monitor strips, pathology slides, and fetal scalp pH levels. When plaintiffs' counsel sought to elicit the doctor's opinion about whether the defendants' failure to undertake an earlier cesarean delivery was a proximate cause of infant Debar's death, the defendants objected to Dr. Adler's proffered testimony on the ground that he lacked the requisite qualifications to offer an opinion on causa tion, and requested to voir dire the doctor. During the voir dire, Dr. Adler acknowledged that he did not consider himself an expert in the specialty of fetal monitoring or obstetrics.\\nUpon completion of the voir dire, the defendants objected to the doctor's being permitted to testify about the cause of infant Debar's death. Of his own accord, the trial justice then offered the following commentary:\\n\\\"I'm concerned with the overlap of the specialty of obstetrics and GYN with pediatrics. I can understand the pediatrician saying that he would like very much to understand something about the fetal life of the baby, but in matters that relate to the discipline of obstetrics, the pediatrician will usually defer \\u2014 and I think this witness has indicated that he defers to the obstetrician.\\\"\\nThe trial justice later concluded:\\n\\\"I think there is going to be and is an issue in this case concerning meconium, when it was aspirated . This condition, it seems to the Court to be far afield of this doctor's expertise. I'm not concerned by the label of pediatric neurology, but I noticed in reviewing with the court reporter that the doctor answered that he's not really involved in the delivery of the babies, but he takes over after that.\\\"\\nThe trial justice then sustained the defendants' objection to the proposed causation opinion from the doctor. The plaintiffs' counsel then proceeded to make an extended offer of proof about Dr. Adler's proposed opinion testimony, which the trial justice rejected.\\nThe plaintiffs' counsel thereafter immediately moved (1) to reopen the voir dire concerning Dr. Adler's qualifications, (2) to continue the case, allowing the plaintiffs an opportunity to retain a new expert, and (3) to stay the case pending appeal of the trial justice's ruling, all of which were denied. The trial justice then entertained and granted the defendants' Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law. The plaintiffs then filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, citing as reason the error of the trial justice in excluding Dr. Adler's proposed testimony. The trial justice denied the motion for a new trial. In doing so, he noted that allowing Dr. Adler's opinion testimony would be tantamount to permitting a pediatric neurologist \\\"to make a determination which required a skillful interpretation of obstetrical data\\\" and \\\"to do nothing but speculate on the question of causation.\\\"\\nII\\nExclusion of Dr. Adler's Testimony\\nThe plaintiffs assert here on appeal that the trial justice abused his discretion by excluding Dr. Adler's testimony on an \\\"intractable assumption\\\" that Dr. Adler was not qualified to determine whether an earlier cesarean section would have saved the baby's life because such an opinion required an interpretation of obstetrical data and that Dr. Adler was not an obstetrician.\\nThe determination of whether to qualify and permit an expert witness to proffer an expert opinion relative to an issue in dispute is left to the discretion of the trial justice and this Court will not disturb that determination absent clear error or an abuse of that discretion. See Sheeley v. Memorial Hospital, 710 A.2d 161, 164 (R.I.1998); Richardson v. Fuchs, 523 A.2d 445, 447 (R.I.1987). Nevertheless, as this Court has also opined,\\n\\\"To say, however, that the question is addressed to the trial justice's discretion does not mean that his ruling is not reviewable. What it does mean is that the ruling will be sustained provided the discretion has been soundly and judicially exercised, that is, if it has been exercised in the light of reason applied to all the facts and with a view to the rights of all the parties to the action, and not arbitrarily or wilfully, but with just regard to what is right and equitable under the circumstances and the law.\\\" DeBartolo v. DiBattista, 117 R.I. 349, 353, 367 A.2d 701, 703 (1976).\\nThe state legislature, it must be noted, has enacted legislation purporting to curtail a trial justice's discretion in admitting expert testimony in medical malpractice actions. See G.L.1956 \\u00a7 9-19-41. Section 9-19-41 provides,\\n\\\"In any legal action based upon a cause of action arising on or after January 1, 1987, for personal injury or wrongful death filed against a licensed physician, hospital, clinic, health maintenance organization, professional service corporation providing health care services, dentists, or dental hygienist based on professional negligence, only those persons who by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education qualify as experts in the field of the alleged malpractice shall be permitted to give expert testimony as to the alleged malpractice.\\\"\\nIn interpreting \\u00a7 9-19-41, this Court has reasoned that the wording employed in the statute does not require that an expert must practice in the same specialty as the defendant to testify' about the requisite standard of care. Buja v. Morningstar, 688 A.2d 817, 819 (R.I.1997) (per curiam); Marshall v. Medical Associates of Rhode Island, Inc., 677 A.2d 425, 426 (R.I.1996) (per curiam). We had said earlier, in Buja, 688 A.2d at 819, that,\\n\\\"There is nothing in the plain and unambiguous language of \\u00a7 9-19-41 that requires that before an expert testifies in a medical malpractice case, he or she must not only be an expert in the field where the alleged malpractice occurred, but must also practice in the same specialty as the defendant. Such an additional requirement is unnecessary and is in contravention to the General Assembly's clear intentions, as expressed in \\u00a7 9-19-41.\\\"\\nIn Marshall, 677 A.2d at 426, we also had noted that the statute does not suggest that to qualify as an expert witness, the testifying doctor must be board certified or otherwise have training in the same medical specialty as the defendant-physician.\\nAccordingly, this Court has rejected the contention that \\u00a7 9-19^41 permits only an expert whose formal specialty is the same as that of a defendant-physician or whose specialty is precisely related to the medical issu\\u00e9 in the case to offer an opinion on the appropriate standard of care. See, e.g., Sheeley, 710 A.2d at 165; Buja, 688 A.2d at 819. Indeed, in Sheeley, 710 A.2d at 165, we held that a board-certified obstetrician and gynecologist was competent and qualified to proffer an opinion about the standard of care for performance of a delivery procedure by a family medical doctor. In Buja, 688 A.2d at 818-19, we likewise concluded that an obstetrician could testify and give expert opinion in litigation against a family practitioner whose patient had given birth to an infant with birth defects caused by oxygen deprivation. In Marshall, 677 A.2d at 426-27, we had earlier vacated a directed verdict precipitated by the trial justice's preclusion of an opinion by a pediatric and family medical doctor about the standard of care for an emergency room doctor and internist in treating an animal-bite wound.\\nRule 702 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence also repudiates the notion that an expert witness must have the exact formal certifications as the defendant to proffer opinion testimony. Rather, Rule 702 states, \\\"If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a -witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of fact or opinion.\\\" In Flanagan v. Wesselhoeft, 712 A.2d 365, 369 (R.I.1998), a trial justice granted the defendant's motion in limine to prevent the introduction of expert testimony based upon the alleged inability of the expert to testify in regard to his knowledge of the standard of care for pediatric surgeons practicing in Rhode Island. In reversing, we reasoned that an out-of-state board-certified pediatric surgeon should have been allowed to offer his opinion on the standard of care for a cervical node excision performed by an instate pediatric surgeon because both the doctor's board certifications and his \\\"extensive knowledge, skill, and experience\\\" in pediatric surgery should have presumptively permitted his testimony to be admitted at trial. Similarly, in Gallucci v. Humbyrd, 709 A.2d 1059, 1064-65 (R.I.1998), in the context of Rule 702, this Court determined that a board-certified orthopedic surgeon was competent and qualified to proffer an opinion about the standard of care for rehabilitative therapy performed by a physical therapist.\\nOther courts have likewise seen fit to reject the contention made here by the defendants that a medical professional must possess the same formal certifications as a defendant to give expert opinion in a medical malpractice case. See, e.g., Pool v. Bell, 209 Conn. 536, 551 A.2d 1254, 1258 (1989); Fitzmaurice v. Flynn, 167 Conn. 609, 356 A.2d 887, 892 (1975); Letch v. Daniels, 401 Mass. 65, 514 N.E.2d 675, 677 (1987). In Pool, 551 A.2d at 1258, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that a neurologist could testify and proffer an expert opinion on the duty of care required of a general surgeon in a medical malpractice action. In Fitzmaurice, 356 A.2d at 892, the Supreme Court of Connecticut also ruled that it was error for the trial court to exclude the proffered expert testimony of a surgeon specializing in breast cancer surgery about the standard of care for an obstetrician and gynecologist in diagnosing breast cancer. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Letch, 514 N.E.2d at 677, also held that an orthodontist could testify and proffer an opinion in a medical malpractice case involving a pe-dodontist.\\nAccordingly, we have construed the wording of \\u00a7 9-19-41 and Rule 702 both literally and liberally as intending to require only that the proffered expert possess adequate knowledge, skill, experience, or education in the same field as the alleged malpractice. See Flanagan, 712 A.2d at 369; Sheeley, 710 A.2d at 165. In defining what constitutes the \\\"field\\\" of alleged malpractice, this Court has looked largely to the nature of the patient's injury or to the nature of the procedure employed rather than to rigid classifications based solely on specialty certification. In Shee-ley, we explained:\\n\\\"The appropriate standard of care to be utilized in any given procedure should not be compartmentalized by a physician's area of professional specialization or certification. On the contrary, we believe the focus in any medical malpractice case should be the procedure performed and the question of whether it was executed in conformity with the recognized standard of care, the primary concern being whether the treatment was administered in a reasonable manner. Any doctor with knowledge of or familiarity with the procedure, acquired through experience, observation, association, or education, is competent to testify concerning the requisite standard of care and whether the care in any given case deviated from that standard.\\\" Sheeley, 710 A.2d at 166.\\nAccordingly, this Court has consistently held that an expert's testimony on the appropriate standard of care must be admitted when the witness possesses prerequisite prior experience in the field of the alleged malpractice, regardless of his or her formal specialty or certifications. See, e.g., Sheeley, 710 A.2d at 166; Buja, 688 A.2d at 819. We have reasoned that an expert's lack of formal certification may go to the weight to be given the expert's opinion by the fact finder rather than to its admissibility and a trial justice should not bar such testimony ah initio. See Buja, 688 A.2d at 819 (citing Marshall, 677 A.2d at 426-27).\\nIn so doing we of course continue to require that any proffered expert witness must still first demonstrate to the trial justice his or her particular knowledge acquired through education or experience in the field of alleged malpractice. See, e.g., Buja, 688 A.2d at 819. As we noted in Marshall, 677 A.2d at 427, this Court requires that the \\\"proponent of [expert testimony] must still show the trial court that the so-called expert-witness has knowledge, skill, training, or experience in the same field as the alleged malpractice so that the expert's testimony can be genuinely helpful to the jury.\\\" We believe, as aptly noted by the Supreme Court of Connecticut in Fitzmaurice, 356 A.2d at 892, that:\\n\\\"Recognizing the complexity of knowledge required in the various medical specialties, more than a casual familiarity with the specialty of the defendant physician is required. The witness must demonstrate a knowledge acquired from experience or study of the standards of the specialty of the defendant physician sufficient to enable him to give an expert opinion as to the conformity of the defendant's conduct to those particular standards, and not to the standards of the witness' particular specialty if it differs from that of the defendant.\\\"\\nAlthough this Court has primarily considered the question of whether a proposed expert witness formally trained in a different specialty other than that of the defendant may testify in the context of evaluating the appropriate standard of care in a given case, we discern no reason to adopt a different rule when that same expert is expected to testify regarding causation.\\nIn this case, we conclude that the trial justice erroneously evaluated the competency of Dr. Adler as an expert based solely on the doctor's formal certifications and- specialties. A review of Dr. Adler's otherwise knowledge, skill, experience, and education in the field of the alleged malpractice \\u2014 meconium aspiration syndrome in fetuses and infants \\u2014 clearly demonstrates that he was certainly qualified to give his opinion on the issue of causation. He had testified to having more than adequate qualifications to ascertain and proffer his opinion about whether an earlier performance of a cesarean section would have prevented or mitigated meconium aspiration, which might have saved the life of the plaintiffs' infant. That testimony revealed that the \\\"bulk\\\" of his current work involved treating newborns in the intensive care unit at a community hospital. He indicated that he had treated numbers of newborns stricken with meconium aspiration syndrome and that most of his consulting practice involved children born with birth injuries resulting from asphyxia. Although defense counsel argued persuasively that Dr. Adler could not ascertain precisely when the fetus's periods of asphyxia began or came to an end, the trial justice overlooked Dr. Adler's considerable past experience in reading and interpreting fetal heart monitoring strips and fetal pH readings in connection with determining the onset and nature of neurological injury. Such experience certainly should have permitted the doctor to determine and opine when, in his opinion, the decelerations generally occurred and when a change in the fetus's acid base status transpired and, consequently, to determine from that point in time when the fetus was at risk because of a decrease in oxygen flow.\\nAlthough the trial justice expressed his apparent concern that a pediatrician would be unable to understand the fetal life of a baby and would usually defer to an obstetrician on such matters, a board-certified pediatrician by definition most certainly would possess adequate general knowledge to comprehend the fetus's development in \\u00fatero in order to treat a newborn. Dr. Adler testified during the voir dire that there are occasions when a pediatrician is in fact called upon and required to assess the effects of asphyxia and meconium aspiration syndrome on a newborn, and that as a board-certified pediatrician he had been called upon to do so on numerous occasions. Not coincidentally, Dr. Barden, the plaintiffs' expert obstetrician, who earlier had testified for the plaintiffs, told the court and jury that he preferred to defer to a pediatrician to proffer the opinion whether an earlier cesarean section would have saved the plaintiffs' infant.\\nIn this case the trial justice appears to have arbitrarily concluded that a pediatric neurologist could not make a skillful interpretation of obstetrical data and only could speculate on matters related to causation. In doing so, he obviously overlooked Dr. Adler's particular and considerable experience in interpreting obstetrical data, including fetal heart monitoring strips and pH levels. In this case, the question of causation revolved around when meconium aspiration syndrome occurred and, consequently, the approximate time when it became necessary for the defendants to perform a cesarean section. Depending upon his or her training and experience, a board-certified pediatric neurologist might be more qualified than the average pediatrician or perhaps even the average obstetrician to answer questions of causation. A pediatric neurologist by definition deals with injuries to the central nervous system, including the brain, many of which result from oxygen deprivation. As Dr. Adler testified, many of his patients consisted of newborns with injuries resulting from birth asphyxia. That hands-on experience, when coupled with the doctor's qualifications as a board-certified pediatrician and especially as a board-certified pediatric neurologist, we conclude, would qualify him to testify about the cause of the infant's death in this case. We determine that the trial justice clearly abused his discretion and erred in refusing to permit Dr. Adler to proffer his expert opinion about what caused the death of infant Debar. We determine that error to have been so prejudicial to the plaintiffs' case as to constitute reversible error and to require a new trial.\\nIII\\nOther Allegations of Error\\nBecause we have concluded that the trial justice in this case erred, and that such error constituted reversible error necessitating a new trial, we need not address the plaintiffs' remaining appellate issues, except to allude briefly to the plaintiffs' contention regarding the denial of their motion for a trial continuance.\\nWhen, as in this case, the exclusion of expert testimony by a trial justice leaves a party fatally vulnerable to a defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law, the endangered party might reasonably be allowed a short continuance to engage another expert witness, or the trial justice should consider whether to treat a defendant's Rule 50 motion as a motion for an involuntary nonsuit pursuant to Rule 50(a)(3).\\nIV\\nConclusion\\nFor the foregoing reasons, we sustain the plaintiffs' appeal and vacate the judgment of the Superior Court. The papers of this case are remanded to the Superior Court for a new trial.\\nJustice FLANDERS did not participate.\\n. Doctor Marshall Carpenter, Dr. Cynthia Hanna, Dr. Marion Pandiscio, Dr. Mark Scott, and Dr. Martin Schoenmaker all were named in the original complaint. Doctor Scott and Dr. Schoenmaker settled prior to trial.\\n. \\\"Meconium\\\" is commonly described as a fetus's first bowel movement.\\n. A \\\"fetal scalp pH\\\" measures a fetus's acid base status, which may indicate whether asphyxia has occurred.\\n. An \\\"amnioinfusion\\\" is a procedure that replenishes amniotic fluid in the amniotic sac.\\n.\\\"Bilateral pneumothoraces\\\" is a condition in which the lungs collapse.\\n. At the time of the trial justice's decision in Flanagan v. Wesselhoeft, 712 A.2d 365 (R.I.1998), the same or similar community standard of care test applied in medical malpractice cases.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/11267996.json b/ri/11267996.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4eac4cf58f17fa751b7667a63e55e80f9546f93a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/11267996.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11267996\", \"name\": \"Charles H. Merriman et al., Assignees of the Ballou Manufacturing Company et als., vs. The Social Manufacturing Company et als.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Merriman v. Social Manufacturing Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1878-07-20\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"175\", \"last_page\": \"193\", \"citations\": \"12 R.I. 175\", \"volume\": \"12\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:06:28.280602+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Charles H. Merriman et al., Assignees of the Ballou Manufacturing Company et als., vs. The Social Manufacturing Company et als.\", \"head_matter\": \"Charles H. Merriman et al., Assignees of the Ballou Manufacturing Company et als., vs. The Social Manufacturing Company et als.\\nB. & S., manufacturers, were the sole stockholders and officers of the B. Companj--, a corporation. B., the chief owner of the property used by B. & S., transferred this property to the B. Company by a deed which contained the following provision : \\u201c In further consideration for the premises hereby conveyed, the said B. Company agree and are to pay and discharge all the indebtedness now existing against said B. and B. & S., now due, or to grow due: \\u201d\\nHeld, that under this provision the B. Company was liable for the outstanding notes of B. & S-, and for renewals of the same, also for the outstanding accommodation indorse-ments of B. & S., whether due or to become due, and for the renewals of such indorse-ments.\\nHeld, further, that the holders of these notes, original and indorsed, were either directly or by subrogation entitled to payment from the B. Company.\\nCertain outstanding notes with the accommodation indorsement of B. & S. were held by banks. At their maturity it appeared that other notes for the same amount, and with the same indorsements, were offered for discount and accepted; that the proceeds of the discount were placed to the credit of the makers, who thereupon drew their checks for such proceeds; and with these checks paid their former notes which were returned to them stamped \\u201c paid: \\u201d\\nJECeldf that this transaction made a new credit and a new loan, and that these latter notes were not renewals of the former.\\nHeld, further, that these latter notes were not protected by the provision in the deed from B. to the B. Company.\\nBill IN Equity. The facts involved and the prayer of the bill are stated in the opinion of the court.\\nJuly 20, 1878.\", \"word_count\": \"7827\", \"char_count\": \"43290\", \"text\": \"Dubeee, O. J.\\nThis is a bill for instructions in a case which may be stated as follows:\\nPrior to October 13, 1875, George C. Ballou and his son David Ballou were, and for many years had been, extensively engaged in manufacturing under the firm of George C. Ballou & Son, the property used in the business being chiefly owned by George C. Ballou. The Ballou Manufacturing Company organized as a corporation September 30, 1875, under a charter granted in 1872. October 13, 1875, George C. Ballou conveyed all the real estate, mills, and machinery used in the manufacturing business of George C. Ballou & Son to the corporation, the consideration named in the premises of the deed being one dollar. The deed contained the fpllowing clause, to wit:\\n\\\" And whereas, and in further consideration for the premises hereby conveyed, the said Ballou Manufacturing Company agree and are to pay and discharge all the indebtedness now existing against said George C. Ballou and George C. Ballou & Son, now due or to grow due.\\\"\\nThe corporation voted, November 2, 1875, to accept the deed, subject to all its conditions, and to take it in full payment for 850 shares of the capital stock subscribed for by George C. Ballou and for 150 shares subscribed for by David Ballou, who thereupon became the sole owners of the stock. On the same day George C. Ballou was elected president and David Ballou treasurer, and both were elected directors. The deed to the corporation was recorded November 23, 1875.\\nApril 17, 1876, the Ballou Manufacturing Company, and George C. Ballou & Son, respectively, assigned all their property to the complainants for the equal benefit of all their creditors.\\nAt the time of the assignment the Social Manufacturing Company held the note of George C. Ballou & Son for $5,000, payable in six months, dated November 27,1875, but being a renewal of a note for the same amount bearing date prior to October 13, 1875.\\nAt the time of the assignment George C. Ballou & Son were, and for many years had been, accommodation indorsers for Oren A. Ballou & Co., and as such had indorsed several notes, which did not mature until after October 13, 1875, and which, when they matured, were renewed by notes of the same description for the same or a less amount. Two of these notes, dated February 21, 1876, are held by the Social Manufacturing Company, and the others, five in number, by three different banks, the holders of the renewal having been holders of the original notes. The holders of all these several notes have presented them to the complainants, as assignees of the Ballou Manufacturing Company, as claims on which they are entitled to dividends under the assignment of the Ballou Manufacturing Company. The complainants question their right to dividends, and desire the instruction of the court.\\nThe dividends are claimed under the clause in the deed to the Ballou Manufacturing Company, above recited, which binds the company to pay and discharge all the existing indebtedness of George C. Ballou & Son, whether due or to grow due.\\nNo question is made in regard to the right of the holders of these notes to dividends on the ground that there is no privity between them and the Ballou Manufacturing Company ; but it is assumed on both sides that they cannot be excluded on any such ground. Counsel have, however, at our request, submitted authorities, in accordance with which we find that the holders of the notes are entitled, either directly or by subrogation, to dividends under the assignment of the corporation, unless excluded on other grounds. See Urquhart v. Brayton, ante, p. 169, and cases cited ; Klapworth v. Dressler, 13 N. J. Eq. 62; Crowell v. Currier, 27 N. J. Eq. 152; Curtis v. Tyler, 9 Paige, 432 ; Marsh v. Pike, 10 Paige, 595; Blyer v. Monholland, 2 Sandf. Ch. 478 ; Vrooman v. Turner, 8 Hun, 78 ; Thompson v. Bertram, 14 Iowa, 476 ; Crawford v. Edwards, 33 Mich. 354 ; Miller v. Thompson, 34 Mich. 10.\\nIt is contended that the holders of these notes are not entitled to dividends because the notes are not a part of the indebtedness existing against George C. Ballou & Son on October 13, 1875, but are an indebtedness subsequently contracted. The holders of the notes contend that, though the notes were given after October 13, 1875, they were given for debts previously contracted, and given not in payment, but simply to renew the promise and extend the time of payment.\\nThe doctrine of this court, established by repeated decisions, is that a negotiable promissory note, given by the debtor for a preexisting debt, does not pay the debt unless given and received as payment, the burden of proving that it was so given and received being on the party who maintains it. Under this rule we see no reason why the note first above-mentioned should not be regarded as representing a debt which existed prior to October 13, 1875; for there is not the slightest evidence that the note was either given or received as absolute payment of the debt then existing. It merely extended the time of payment, or, at the utmost, operated only as conditional payment. It does not appear that it was ever negotiated, which, in Sweet Carpenter v. James, 2 R. I. 270, is said to make the new note prim\\u00e9 facie payment. We think, therefore, the new note never having been paid, the prior indebtedness must be held to have remained unextinguished.\\nIt is urged that the indebtedness, if not extinguished, was at least extended, and that, for that reason, the Ballou Manufacturing Company cannot be held. The objection might have some force if the indebtedness had been extended without the consent of the corporation; but inasmuch as the copartnership and the corporation are composed of the same persons, it must be presumed that the indebtedness was extended with the consent of the corporation and for its benefit, as well as for the benefit of the copartnership.\\nWhat we have said in regard to the first-mentioned note is equally applicable to the two other notes held by the Social Manufacturing Company, unless, upon some other ground, they are not to be regarded as representing an indebtedness existing against George C. Ballou & Son prior to October 13, 1875. The note first above-mentioned was made by George C. Ballou & Son. The other two notes were not made by them. They were simply indorsed by them for the accommodation of Oren A. Ballou & Co., who were the makers. It is contended that an indorsement, before notice of dishonor, is not an \\\" indebtedness,\\\" but only a contingent liability ; and that it was tbe indebtedness existing against George 0. Ballou & Son prior to October 13, 1875, not their contingent liabilities, that the Ballou Manufacturing Company agreed to pay and discharge. On this ground, therefore, the right to dividends on account of notes so indorsed is denied.\\nIndebtedness is a word of large meaning. It is used to denote almost every kind of pecuniary obligation originating in contract. We see no reason for limiting its significance in the case at bar, whether we regard the language of the stipulation or the extrinsic circumstances. The language is \\\" all the indebtedness . now due or to grow due.\\\" The assumption was obviously meant to be comprehensive. We think it must be held to cover liabilities contracted by indorsement, whether then due or to grow due.\\nBut it is further urged that the liability or indebtedness never did grow due, because there was no notice to the indorsers when the notes matured. It is true there was no notice, but notice was not given because the indorsement was renewed. The in-dorsers thereby waived notice by promising to pay in case they were duly notified when the new notes matured, and it is conceded that they were then duly notified.\\nThese are the only grounds suggested at the hearing for the exclusion of the three notes first mentioned. We do not think that either of them can be sustained.\\nWe next come to consider the renewal notes held by the different banks. It appears that when these notes were given the former notes were surrendered. In Nightingale v. Chafee, 11 R. I. 609, we decided that such surrender or cancellation was not in itself proof of absolute payment, especially when payment in that manner was obviously not for the creditor's interest. We still adhere to that view. To keep the old note is to keep the evidence of the debt as it were in duplicate. This might not be desired by either party. It appears, however, in the case at bar, that the old notes when surrendered were stamped \\\" paid \\\" by the banks. This was certainly significant, but perhaps not decisive ; for it may be said they were paid sub modo, but not absolutely. Maillard v. Argyle, 6 M. & G. 40 ; Berry v. Griffin, 10 Md. 27 ; Wheeler v. Schroeder, 4 R. I. 388; 2 Amer. Lead. Cases, 5th ed. 267. But in the case at bar there was something beyond even this. It is admitted that the new notes were not simply exchanged for the old, but that the new notes being offered to the banks were discounted, and the proceeds placed to the credit of the makers on the books of the bank; that thereupon, the old notes having matured, the makers drew their checks upon the banks for the amount thereof, and that it was not until after these checks were received by the banks that the old notes were stamped \\\" paid,\\\" and surrendered. And in view of this complex operation were they not paid ? Of course the question is, What did the parties intend ? We have considered this question carefully, and the more carefully because we now learn what it may have been important for us to have known in deciding other cases, that the same practice prevails in all the banks ; and we cannot resist the conclusion that the parties intended to have the new notes represent new debts, the old being regarded as paid and extinguished. The new notes were given to create new credits, or, in- other words, to procure in effect new loans, the proceeds of which were applied, by the checks drawn for that purpose, to the payment of the notes, which were surrendered. This, and nothing short of this, is the real import of the acts which were done, and of the record which was made of them. Letcher v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 1 Dana, 82, 84; Slaymaker v. Gundacker's Executors, 10 S. & R. 75, 82; Sill v. Bostick, 10 Yerg. 410 ; 2 Parsons on Notes & Bills, 208.\\nOur conclusion is that the paper held by these banks does not represent any part of the indebtedness existing against George C. Ballou & Son prior to October. 13, 1875, but that it represents a new indebtedness subsequently contracted, and consequently that it does not entitle its holders to dividends under the assignment of the Ballou Manufacturing Company.\\nIt is suggested that the notes may be provable, even if paid, because they may be regarded as paid by George C. Ballou & Son. We think, however, that if they can be regarded as paid by George C. Ballou & Son, rather than by Oren A. Ballou & Co., it will not make them provable specially for the benefit of the banks holding the new notes ; but only in favor of George C. Ballou & Son, or their assignees, for the copartnership creditors generally. But whether they are to be regarded as paid by George C. Ballou & Son is not a question presented by this bill.\\nThe bill asks for instructions in regard to two other notes held by the Jackson Bank. But if the notes last above considered are not entitled under the assignment of the corporation, the other notes are still less so. We instruct the assignees accordingly.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/11301951.json b/ri/11301951.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..06a3db85745e592ba31579de2704119b01f900c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/11301951.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11301951\", \"name\": \"Anita CIPOLLA v. PICARD PORSCHE AUDI, INC., et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Cipolla v. Picard Porsche Audi, Inc.\", \"decision_date\": \"1985-07-16\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 83-201-Appeal\", \"first_page\": \"130\", \"last_page\": \"132\", \"citations\": \"496 A.2d 130\", \"volume\": \"496\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:39:07.025658+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Anita CIPOLLA v. PICARD PORSCHE AUDI, INC., et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Anita CIPOLLA v. PICARD PORSCHE AUDI, INC., et al.\\nNo. 83-201-Appeal.\\nSupreme Court of Rhode Island.\\nJuly 16, 1985.\\nAnthony J. Gianfrancesco, Dennis S. Ba-luch, Providence, for plaintiff.\\nGerald C. DeMaria, Higgins Cavanagh & Cooney, Providence, for defendant.\", \"word_count\": \"1258\", \"char_count\": \"7914\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nKELLEHER, Justice.\\nThe plaintiff (Anita) in this international controversy appeals the dismissal of her product liability action by a Superior Court judge for her failure to properly effectuate service on a West German defendant, Yolkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft (VWAG). A brief recital of the facts leading to this litigation is in order.\\nIn September 1978 Anita, a resident of the Pawtuxet Valley, purchased a 1978 Volkswagen Rabbit from Picard Porsche Audi, Inc. (Picard), a licensed retail automobile dealership doing business in Warwick. Volkswagens were distributed in the United States by Volkswagen of America, Inc. (VWOA), a New Jersey corporation. On June 24, 1981, Anita sustained personal injuries and the total loss of her vehicle when the accelerator on the Rabbit \\\"stuck\\\" as she was backing out of a driveway. The Rabbit crossed Warwick's West Shore Road and struck a house on the opposite side of the roadway. It is safe to say that as Anita \\\"barreled rapidly in reverse across the road,\\\" the supremacy clause of Article VI of the United States Constitution never crossed her mind.\\nSuit was initially brought against Picard and VWOA on October 28, 1981. Later, on April 12, 1982, Anita was permitted to file an amended complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, in which she included as an additional defendant the Rabbit's manufacturer, VWAG. She then sought to effect service of process upon VWAG by serving, on November 18, 1982, a copy of the summons and amended complaint upon the Secretary of State for the State of Rhode Island. Subsequently, on December 8, 1982, Anita's counsel sent a letter by certified mail to VWOA and enclosed a copy of the summons and amended complaint.\\nIn taking this route, Anita's counsel relied upon Rule 4(e)(2) and G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) \\u00a7 7-1.1-108, as amended by P.L.1970, ch. 136, \\u00a7 15, which, in pertinent part, provides that whenever a \\\"foreign corporation authorized to transact business in this state\\\" fails to appoint a registered agent in the state for service of process, the Rhode Island Secretary of State shall be deemed to be the agent of the corporation for purposes of receiving process. Anita's counsel has also maintained that VWAG is subject to the jurisdiction of the state of Rhode Island because it has the necessary \\\"minimum contacts\\\" as set forth in G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) \\u00a7 9-5-33.\\nVWAG has consistently contended that Anita's action should be dismissed since the Superior Court never obtained personal jurisdiction over the West German corporation because her purported service of process was a nullity. The motion to dismiss was based upon noneompliance with the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague Convention). Entered into Force for the United States, February 10, 1969, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163.\\nThe United States and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) are signatories of the convention. The convention was drafted to simplify and to expedite the service of judicial and extrajudicial documents between signatory nations and to ensure that recipients are served in sufficient time to allow them to act. It applies in all cases concerning civil or commercial matters wherein documents are transmitted abroad between those in signatory countries.\\nThe convention provides that each state is to designate a central authority to receive requests for service of documents. Requests for service, which must conform to a model form annexed to the convention, should be sent, along with the documents in. question, by the judicial officer or authority of the state in which the documents originate to the designated central authority of the country in which the recipient is located. When it receives a request, the central authority itself serves the documents or arranges service according to its internal laws. Once service is perfected, the central authority must forward a certificate to that effect to the applicant. If the request is insufficient for some reason, the applicant receives from the central authority a certificate setting forth the reasons which have prevented service.\\nThe convention also prescribes several alternative methods of service, including service by postal channels directly to the recipient, but allows signatory countries to object to the alternative methods. West Germany has made such an objection and has specified that all documents must be served through the central authority and must be translated into German. For cases discussing the Hague Convention, see Vorhees v. Fischer & Krecke, 697 F.2d 574 (4th Cir.1983); Harris v. Browning-Ferris Industries Chemical Services, Inc., 100 F.R.D. 775 (M.D.La.1984); Rivers v. Stihl, Inc., 434 So.2d 766 (Ala.1983). The United States became bound by the provisions of the multilateral international convention on February 10, 1969.\\nIn Vorhees, 697 F.2d at 575, the Fourth Circuit noted that the Hague Convention was a self-executing treaty because it establishes affirmative and judicially enforceable obligations without requiring any implementing legislation. See Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 119, 53 S.Ct. 305, 311, 77 L.Ed. 641, 650 (1933); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194, 8 S.Ct. 456, 458, 31 L.Ed. 386, 388 (1888). Article VI of the United States Constitution, in pertinent part, reads, \\\"[A]ll treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.\\\" Consequently, in this controversy service on VWAG must be perfected according to the terms of the Hague Convention even though Rhode Island's statutes and rules may provide several other methods for effectuating the service of process.\\nAnita's appellate counsel has cited a plethora of eases to buttress her contention that VWAG's multiple contacts with Rhode Island make it subject to suit without any infringement on VWAG's due-process rights. Some of those cases predate the effective date of the Hague Convention, and others, for reasons not readily apparent, make no mention whatsoever of the 1965 treaty.\\nOne final word: The trial justice, in dismissing Anita's claim against'VWAG, observed, \\\"It is obvious that under the Hague Convention and supremacy clause of the United States Constitution that no effective service of process can be made against Volks wagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft in any civil action.\\\" The trial justice's remark is not a precise portrayal of Anita's status. She could have followed the dictates of the convention. We also believe that Anita, having in mind the unique circumstances of this case, should be given a reasonable opportunity to effectuate the service of process on VWAG in a manner that complies with the Hague Convention. See Harris, 100 F.R.D. at 778, and cases cited therein. Consequently, the case is remanded to the Superior Court where Anita, if she so desires, will be given the opportunity to seek out a German translator and comply with the terms of the convention.\\nThe plaintiff's appeal is denied and dismissed pro forma, the judgment appealed from as modified by this opinion is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings.\\n. There is nothing in the record that would support the view that VWAG was ever authorized to do business in Rhode Island.\\n. The terms of the Hague Convention can be found in Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 4, 28 U.S.C.A. at 87-92 (West Supp.1985).\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/11714518.json b/ri/11714518.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a6efcfdd8205725cd11304aa8c9d63b1b5c9295b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/11714518.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11714518\", \"name\": \"In the Matter of Zvi Hershel SMITH\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re Smith\", \"decision_date\": \"1998-05-15\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 95-297 M.P.\", \"first_page\": \"622\", \"last_page\": \"622\", \"citations\": \"714 A.2d 622\", \"volume\": \"714\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:33:01.622793+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"LEDERBERG and GOLDBERG, JJ., did not participate.\", \"parties\": \"In the Matter of Zvi Hershel SMITH.\", \"head_matter\": \"In the Matter of Zvi Hershel SMITH.\\nNo. 95-297 M.P.\\nSupreme Court of Rhode Island.\\nMay 15, 1998.\", \"word_count\": \"194\", \"char_count\": \"1163\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nOn March 25, 1998, this Court's Disciplinary Counsel filed a petition pursuant to Article III, Rule 24 of the Supreme Court Rules to revoke the license to practice law of the Respondent, Zvi Hershel Smith. On March 2, 1998, the Respondent was found guilty of two (2) counts of embezzlement over five hundred ($500) dollars, in violation of R.I.G.L. \\u00a7 11-41-5, and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment on both counts for ten (10) years, sentence suspended, and placed on probation for ten (10) years.\\nOn May 15, 1997, the Respondent appeared before this Court pursuant to an order which directed him to show cause, if any, why the petition should not be granted. After hearing the representations of Respondent and Disciplinary Counsel, we deem that an order granting the Petition to Revoke Respondent's License to Practice Law is appropriate.\\nAccordingly, it is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that the Respondent, Zvi Hershel Smith, be and he is hereby disbarred from engaging in the practice of law.\\nLEDERBERG and GOLDBERG, JJ., did not participate.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/11982935.json b/ri/11982935.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0d3663e8668ce1ef7c4a26e62918d6100b3f5884
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/11982935.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"11982935\", \"name\": \"STATE v. Brian E. TURNBAUGH\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Turnbaugh\", \"decision_date\": \"1997-06-02\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 95-625-C.A.\", \"first_page\": \"756\", \"last_page\": \"757\", \"citations\": \"694 A.2d 756\", \"volume\": \"694\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:29:55.288806+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"McKENNA-GOLDBERG, J., did not participate.\", \"parties\": \"STATE v. Brian E. TURNBAUGH.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE v. Brian E. TURNBAUGH.\\nNo. 95-625-C.A.\\nSupreme Court of Rhode Island.\\nJune 2, 1997.\\nMichael L. Rubin, Aaron L. Weisman, Providence.\\nLeonard Bergersen, Peacedale.\", \"word_count\": \"334\", \"char_count\": \"2034\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nThis case came before us on the state's appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for the County of Washington holding that G.L. 1956 \\u00a7 46-22-4 was invalid by reason of the fact that it was preempted by federal legislation and is in violation of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, that it constituted an undue burden on interstate commerce, and that it violated the tonnage tax prohibition of Article 1, section 10, of the Constitution of the United States. This holding was rendered in response to a motion by defendant, Brian Turnbaugh, to dismiss a criminal complaint for failure to register his federally documented vessel in violation of \\u00a7 46-22-4(b) and \\u00a7 46-22-6(a). The defendant had also prayed for a declaratory judgment and for an injunction against enforcement of the Rhode Island registration statute. In response to this prayer, a justice of the Superior Court held that the statute charging the offense was invalid.\\nFollowing oral argument in the case, this court has carefully examined the briefs filed by the parties as well as the written decision of the trial justice. Having done so, the court is of the opinion that further briefing and argument is required in order to illuminate the issues of preemption and the tonnage tax. The current briefing is adequate on the issue of violation of the interstate commerce clause.\\nConsequently, this ease is assigned for further argument to the regular November calendar. Meanwhile, the parties are directed to file additional briefs on the issues of preemption and the constitutional prohibition of a tonnage tax.\\nThe defendant may file his additional brief within forty days of the date of this order. Thereafter, the state is directed to file a responsive brief within thirty days of the date of the filing of defendant's brief.\\nMcKENNA-GOLDBERG, J., did not participate.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/12494973.json b/ri/12494973.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2e1fb665a4af4931afd13704139f1834f570e570
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/12494973.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"12494973\", \"name\": \"STATE v. Eugene DANIS.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Danis\", \"decision_date\": \"2018-04-19\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2017\\u2013159\\u2013C.A.(K1/14\\u2013679A)\", \"first_page\": \"36\", \"last_page\": \"46\", \"citations\": \"182 A.3d 36\", \"volume\": \"182\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Rhode Island Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-27T20:57:30.522817+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"Fastcase\", \"judges\": \"Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"STATE\\nv.\\nEugene DANIS.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE\\nv.\\nEugene DANIS.\\nNo. 2017-159-C.A.(K1/14-679A)\\nSupreme Court of Rhode Island.\\nApril 19, 2018\\nFor State: Lauren S. Zurier, Department of Attorney General\\nFor Defendant: Kara J. Maguire, Office of the Public Defender\\nPresent: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"4936\", \"char_count\": \"30620\", \"text\": \"Justice Indeglia, for the Court.\\nOn November 19, 2014, a grand jury indicted Eugene Danis (Danis or defendant) on charges of one count of first-degree child molestation sexual assault, in violation of G.L. 1956 \\u00a7 11-37-8.1 and 11-37-8.2, and one count of the sale or distribution of photographs of a minor suggesting that the minor engaged in, or is about to engage in, a sexual act, in violation of G.L. 1956 \\u00a7 11-9-1(b). A Kent County Superior Court jury convicted the defendant on both counts on February 9, 2016. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial justice deprived him of his constitutional rights to confront and cross-examine the complaining witness. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.\\nI\\nFacts and Travel\\nThe defendant was charged with sexually abusing his stepdaughter, Veronica. At trial, Veronica testified that her mother began dating defendant when Veronica was about seven years old, and he moved in with Veronica and her mother some time before they were married. Once they were married in 2009, Veronica testified that she began calling defendant \\\"dad.\\\"\\nIn 2012, Veronica moved with her mother and defendant to defendant's aunt's house in West Warwick. The defendant's aunt passed away that same year. Because defendant was not working at that time, Veronica recalled, he would watch her after school when her mother was at work.\\nAlthough Veronica had a positive relationship with defendant prior to his aunt's passing, she testified that, once she was twelve years old, her relationship with him began to change. Specifically, Veronica remembered defendant speaking about topics that \\\"a normal father wouldn't really talk about,\\\" such as \\\"sexual\\\" topics. For example, Veronica testified that defendant would enter the bathroom while she was showering and speak to her through the curtain, even opening the curtain one time while he was shirtless, pretending as though he planned to get in the shower with her.\\nVeronica testified that, on a number of occasions, defendant showed her some pornographic pamphlets that arrived in the mail and told her that the women in the pictures made money from posing nude. Eventually, Veronica stated, defendant had a few conversations with her about making money if she posed for such pictures. After those conversations, Veronica agreed to take such pictures, explaining that she did so because \\\"in [her] twelve-year[-]old mind\\\" she thought she would \\\"get money\\\" if she did so-money that she could use to purchase \\\"an I-pad, electronics, and stuff like that.\\\"\\nAccording to Veronica, she posed for defendant about five times-once on defendant and her mother's bed, and the other times in the basement. The first time she posed on the bed was in the fall of 2012. She wore no clothes and had on only high-heeled shoes, and defendant instructed her on how to position herself to expose her breasts and vagina to the camera. After defendant took the pictures with the camera on Veronica's cell phone, Veronica removed the SD card and put it in the printer because she was \\\"pretty sure\\\" defendant \\\"couldn't figure out how to work the printer .\\\" Then, defendant told her to delete the photographs from the phone and the SD card. On cross-examination, Veronica explained that defendant told her that he was sending the printed pictures to the owner of Playboy, who he said was a friend of his.\\nVeronica said defendant used a disposable camera to take the downstairs photographs. She recollected that defendant told her to use lubricant and a vibrator so they could get more money for the pictures; Veronica remembered being \\\"reluctant\\\" to use the vibrator because she had \\\"never been penetrated before.\\\" Nevertheless, Veronica testified, defendant \\\"put it in\\\" her, but she held it while he took the pictures. The entirety of the photo shoot lasted about one hour.\\nVeronica recalled telling defendant around her thirteenth birthday that she did not want to take pictures any longer. After that, Veronica testified that defendant asked her to wear a \\\"strap-on\\\" that her mom had \\\"tried on[,]\\\" but Veronica declined.\\nAt this point, Veronica testified, she did not tell her mom what was happening because she believed her mother was happy with defendant and if she said anything, they would break up, and defendant told Veronica that she would be taken away from her mother. She also testified that he told her he would be put in jail and \\\"wouldn't be [her] dad\\\" anymore.\\nAfter Veronica decided she no longer wanted to take the pictures, defendant became more strict with her, which caused tension between them, culminating in a fight over Veronica's failure to clean out her guinea pig's cage. During that fight, Veronica recalled that defendant accused her of not keeping her promises. In response, she showed him a camera she owned at the time, to indicate that she had kept her promise regarding the pictures, but defendant responded that that was in the past and did not matter anymore.\\nVeronica's friend, Nadia, was present at the time of the fight, and both girls went for a walk, during which time Veronica explained to Nadia what defendant had done to her. Nadia expressed to Veronica that she did not know what to do, but that Nadia could explain the situation to Nadia's grandmother. After Nadia did so, her grandmother called Veronica's mother and told her to come to Nadia's house. When Veronica's mother learned what had happened, she returned home to confront defendant about Veronica's allegations.\\nDuring the course of the trial, the trial justice held a voir dire hearing on the issue of permitting defense counsel to question Veronica regarding prior sexual-abuse allegations she purportedly made against her biological father when she was five years old. The state attempted to keep this evidence out at trial, while the defense argued that it was relevant to Veronica's motive to lie about sexual assault by father figures in her life. The trial justice ultimately precluded defense counsel from pursuing this line of questioning, and this decision is at issue in this appeal.\\nVeronica's mother also testified at trial. She testified that Veronica's biological father had \\\"sporadic\\\" visitation with Veronica from 2000 to 2005. She testified that, in 2007, defendant moved in with her and Veronica at their Coventry residence. At that time, Veronica's grandmother lived with them and was primarily responsible for the care of Veronica while Veronica's mother was at work. Eventually, Veronica's mother and defendant moved with Veronica to the West Warwick house, at which time defendant was unemployed and took over watching Veronica in the mornings and afternoons.\\nVeronica's mother recalled that, in April 2014, her daughter wanted to go to a birthday party, but defendant said that she could not go because she had not cleaned her guinea pig's cage. After the argument between Veronica and defendant ended, Veronica's mother took Veronica and her friend, Nadia, to a store, after which the girls went to Nadia's house. Soon after, Veronica's mother remembered receiving a phone call from Nadia, asking her to come to Nadia's house because Nadia's grandmother wanted to speak to her. When Veronica's mother arrived at the house, she discovered Veronica crying, sitting in the passenger's seat of Nadia's grandmother's car. When Veronica calmed down, Veronica told her that defendant had taken nude photographs of her and that she did not want to return home.\\nWhen Veronica's mother first confronted defendant, he initially denied the allegations, and he stated, \\\" 'I knew this was coming. Get [Veronica] so we can talk.' \\\" Veronica's mother met Veronica at another store, where Nadia's grandmother had taken the two girls, and, in the car, Veronica shared details with her mother regarding the sexual assaults-including that defendant used a vibrator on her.\\nAfter Veronica's mother went back to her house for a second time, she again spoke with defendant; she testified that he said, \\\" 'It was all her idea.' \\\" Veronica's mother told defendant to move out of the house, and he complied. The next day, Veronica's mother called the police to give a statement, and the police confiscated two laptops and Veronica's old cell phone; at some point later, she gave police defendant's old cell phone as well.\\nNadia also testified at trial. She recalled the day of Veronica's argument with defendant over failing to clean her pet's cage and not attending a birthday party; she also recalled Veronica telling her that defendant had taken nude pictures of her. Nadia testified that the girls took a walk together, during which Veronica told her that defendant had taken the pictures of her and touched her.\\nOfficer Trenna Beltrami of the West Warwick Police Department testified on behalf of the state. She recalled being dispatched to a West Warwick address because Veronica's mother had requested to speak with a female police officer to report her husband having taken nude photographs of her daughter. Officer Beltrami stated that Veronica's mother told her that her daughter had explained that, in the photographs, a vibrator was used as well as a \\\"strap-on sex toy,\\\" which had been thrown in the trash. When she spoke with Veronica, Officer Beltrami remembered that she was told that the photographs were taken upstairs at first, and the rest were taken in the basement of the house. During that house call, Officer Beltrami also retrieved a \\\"strap-on\\\" and a bottle of lubricant from the trash can.\\nDetective Jonathan Izzi of the West Warwick Police Department testified that he had reviewed the statements that Veronica and her mother had given to Officer Beltrami, and he visited their house to follow up on the case. Veronica's mother gave Det. Izzi two laptop computers and defendant's old cell phone, which Det. Izzi turned over to the Rhode Island State Police Forensic Computer Unit, along with Veronica's cell phone. However, Brittnee Morgan, a digital forensic analyst for the Rhode Island State Police, testified that, when she conducted the analysis on the devices on June 2, 2014, she did not recover any pictures of a young, nude female.\\nAt the end of the trial, the jury convicted defendant on both counts, and defendant moved for a new trial. The trial justice denied the motion for a new trial and sentenced defendant to fifty years' imprisonment, with thirty-five years to serve and the balance suspended with probation on the first count, and five years' imprisonment with three to serve and the balance suspended with probation on the second count, both to run concurrently. The defendant timely appealed to this Court.\\nII\\nStandard of Review\\nUpon review of a trial justice's evidentiary ruling, we only overturn that decision where it \\\"constitutes an abuse of [his or her] discretion that prejudices the complaining party.\\\" State v. Manning , 973 A.2d 524, 530 (R.I. 2009) (quoting State v. Hallenbeck , 878 A.2d 992, 1015 (R.I. 2005) ). \\\"[T]he exercise of discretion by the trial justice in limiting the scope of cross-examination will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of that discretion.\\\" State v. Ogoffa , 159 A.3d 1043, 1049 (R.I. 2017) (quoting State v. Walsh , 731 A.2d 696, 698 (R.I. 1999) ). While criminal defendants possess the constitutional right \\\"to cross-examine prosecution witnesses,\\\" such a right \\\"is far from absolute.\\\" Manning , 973 A.2d at 530 (quoting State v. Merida , 960 A.2d 228, 234 (R.I. 2008) ). This constitutional right \\\"is tempered by the dictates of practicality and judicial economy; trial justices are authorized to exercise sound discretion in limiting the scope of cross-examination.\\\" Id. (quoting Merida , 960 A.2d at 234 ).\\nIII\\nDiscussion\\nOn appeal, defendant appears to limit his argument to what he alleges is the trial justice's violation of his Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine the complaining witness regarding her allegations against her biological father. He argues that it precluded him from exposing Veronica's bias and motive to lie.\\nThe Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 10 of the Rhode Island Constitution\\\"guarantee individuals accused of criminal charges the right to confront and cross-examine any adverse witnesses who testify against them.\\\" Manning , 973 A.2d at 530 (quoting State v. Dorsey , 783 A.2d 947, 950 (R.I. 2001) ). Through cross-examination of a witness, an attorney has the ability \\\"to test a witness's veracity and credibility and to discredit [his or her] testimony as is necessary.\\\" State v. Pettiway , 657 A.2d 161, 163 (R.I. 1995). However, this is not an unfettered right, and \\\"it may be circumscribed within reasonable parameters of relevance in the exercise of the trial justice's discretion.\\\" Dorsey , 783 A.2d at 950. As long as there is an opportunity for \\\" 'sufficient cross-examination to satisfy a defendant's constitutional confrontation rights,' the trial justice may exercise his sound discretion in limiting further cross-examination.\\\" Manning , 973 A.2d at 531 (quoting State v. Brown , 709 A.2d 465, 473 (R.I. 1998) ).\\nThe United States Supreme Court has recognized that \\\"establishing the witness's motives or bias in testifying is a key part of the constitutionally protected right to cross-examination,\\\" Dorsey , 783 A.2d at 951 (citing Davis v. Alaska , 415 U.S. 308, 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974) ), but \\\"the evidence offered to prove motivation or bias must be related to the charge the defendant is facing.\\\" Dorsey , 783 A.2d at 951. Accordingly, \\\"evidence of a complaining witness's similar accusations of wrongdoing against others may be used to challenge a witness's credibility with respect to the pending charges, regardless of whether those prior accusations ever were proved false.\\\" Id. ; see also State v. Oliveira , 576 A.2d 111, 113 (R.I. 1990) (\\\"The defendant's inability to prove that prior accusations were in fact false does not make the fact that prior accusations were made irrelevant.\\\"). In fact, \\\"a trial justice lacks the discretion 'to completely (or virtually so) prohibit defense counsel from attempting to elicit testimony regarding bias on the part of the witness[.]' \\\" State v. Clark , 974 A.2d 558, 575 (R.I. 2009) (quoting State v. Tiernan , 941 A.2d 129, 134 (R.I. 2008) ). \\\"[T]his includes relevant testimony that might be substantially outweighed by the evidentiary factors set forth in Rule 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.\\\" Id.\\nHere, defendant argues that he should have been permitted to inquire as to Veronica's former sexual-abuse allegations against her biological father. See Pettiway , 657 A.2d at 163 (acknowledging the defendant's argument that his constitutional rights were violated when he was not allowed to show that the complaining witness \\\"lodged sexual-abuse allegations against other men\\\"). In Pettiway , we held that the defendant's right to confrontation was limited where he was foreclosed from inquiring into the complaining witness's pattern of alleging sexual abuse by her mother's boyfriends. Id. at 163-64. We acknowledged that it was \\\"sheer speculation that the jury would have accepted this line of reasoning[,]\\\" but we concluded that the jury was \\\"entitled to consider the defense theory so that [it] could make an informed judgment about the weight to place on [the witness's] testimony.\\\" Id. at 164.\\nHowever, in a number of sexual-abuse cases decided since Pettiway , we have determined that a defendant's right to confrontation was not violated where prior allegations were \\\"fundamentally different\\\" from the ones faced by that defendant. See Dorsey , 783 A.2d at 951, 953 (determining that a twenty-seven-year-old complaining witness's sexual-assault allegations against an unnamed boy were not similar to her allegations that her husband, the defendant, raped her because they were made when the witness was a young teenager regarding events that occurred when she was only seven years old); see also State v. Botelho , 753 A.2d 343, 345, 347 (R.I. 2000) (concluding that precluding cross-examination of a complaining witness was not abuse of discretion where the complaining witness's DCYF complaint against her father related to physical abuse, not sexual abuse like the complaints against the defendant, who was her mother's boyfriend).\\nBefore ruling on the admissibility of the evidence at issue, the trial justice first heard argument from counsel, including defense counsel's Sixth Amendment argument. Initially, the trial justice decided that, despite the fact that he had some concerns as to whether Veronica was competent to make such allegations because she was very young at the time, \\\"the [Sixth] [A]mendment rights of defendant\\\" required that defense counsel be permitted to ask about such events \\\"in a very limited way.\\\" The motive-to-lie argument that the defense first pursued at trial was that Veronica made allegations against father figures when she was not happy with their actions.\\nAfter Veronica's direct examination, the trial justice decided that, based on the issue raised regarding Veronica's allegations against her biological father in \\\"the oral motion in limine[,] it would be helpful for the [c]ourt to hear certain testimony of [Veronica] outside of the presence of the jury.\\\" During that voir dire hearing, defense counsel introduced records from St. Mary's Home for Children regarding behavior management services for Veronica when she was around five years old.\\nThe March 2006 record, written by a Children Intensive Services clinician, states the following:\\n\\\"In December 2004 [Veronica] told her mother 'daddy touched my froggie' (vagina) . [Veronica] also showed this worker a picture diary and explained the pictures to this worker. [Veronica] described one picture as her father touching her chest area and her private parts. [Veronica] also explained that one picture is her father burning in a fire and that she would not help him and was happy when he died.\\\"\\nWhen defense counsel inquired as to whether she recalled making such allegations about her biological father, Veronica vacillated between remembering making the allegations and not recollecting anything other than what her mother told her had happened.\\nShe first testified that she remembered only what she had been told:\\n\\\"Q: And do you have a memory of ever saying to anybody that your father touched you in an inappropriate way?\\n\\\"A: I don't have a memory of saying it, but I have the memory of being told I have said that.\\\"\\nThen, she acknowledged that she did recall some things:\\n\\\"Q: By reading the third paragraph does that refresh your memory today about something you said about your biological father?\\n\\\"A: I remember saying my father did do something, but I clearly don't remember the exact words I said when I was five.\\n\\\"\\n\\\"Q: So it was clear that you remember telling your mom that your father touched you, he touched your froggy? You have a memory of that?\\n\\\"A: Yeah.\\\"\\nWhen the prosecutor questioned Veronica, she testified, in part, as follows:\\n\\\"A. Like, I remember one day that I was drawing out on this little like marker board something that happened with my father and that's all I remember.\\n\\\"\\n\\\"Q: Do you remember having a conversation with your mom [when you were five years old] saying, Dad touched my chest or Dad touched my Froggy?\\n\\\"A: I think I do remember saying, 'Daddy touched my Froggy,' but also that's what my mom told me too.\\\"\\nHowever, she later appeared to waver on whether she recalled drawing the pictures, when she explained the following:\\n\\\"Q: The first exhibit is some stick figures. It appears to be a female and a male, some appear to be holding hands, some appear to be touching in other places, but you recall drawing that?\\n\\\"A: No.\\\"\\nAnd later,\\n\\\"Q: Do you remember your dad touching your breasts or vagina? Once again, when I say dad, I'm talking about your biological father. Do you have an independent recollection of him touching your vagina?\\n\\\"A: No.\\\"\\nAt the end of the voir dire hearing, before the trial justice ruled on the motion in limine , defense counsel submitted a variation on its first theory as to Veronica's bias-\\\"[W]henever somebody is coming into her life, another man, we sort of have the same pattern of making allegations.\\\" In ruling on the evidentiary motion, the trial justice principally relied on Rule 608(b) and Rule 403, as opposed to the Sixth Amendment, on which defendant now bases his appeal. The trial justice found that Veronica had no recollection of \\\"making any statement about recanting[,]\\\" and he also noted that the purported incident occurred when Veronica was five years old, quite a number of years before defendant's alleged actions in the case at bar.\\nFinally, the trial justice reasoned as follows:\\n\\\"[T]he only potential evidence or information of this is a hearsay report certainly extrinsic evidence, and the [c]ourt can't get beyond the fact listening to that that other than this new theory that maybe the father came back in her life when she was [thirteen] that the only possible reason for this testimony would be to impermissibly put in the jury's mind that she somehow lied before and somehow she is lying in this case and that clearly is impermissible.\\\"\\nThe trial justice concluded that, even assuming that the defense successfully got past a Rule 608 analysis, the trial justice would still keep the evidence out on Rule 403 grounds. In conclusion, the trial justice ruled that Veronica's testimony was not admissible pursuant to Rule 608, and furthermore, it was unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403, and defense counsel was not permitted to engage in that line of questioning in the presence of the jury.\\nThe purported motive defense counsel sought to elucidate was whether Veronica had a pattern of making sexual-abuse allegations against father figures whom she no longer wanted in her life. As was evidenced by her testimony during the voir dire hearing and highlighted by the trial justice, it is clear that Veronica wavered back and forth regarding whether she remembered making such allegations against her biological father, or whether she was simply recalling what her mother had told her. While we do acknowledge that both allegations were of sexual misconduct against father figures, the accusations defense counsel sought to introduce were different from the specific allegations against defendant of sexual penetration and the taking of nude photographs. Not only did the abuse by her biological father purportedly occur when Veronica was five years old or younger, she also made the allegations at that tender age. See Dorsey , 783 A.2d at 953 (highlighting the difference between sexual-assault allegations made when the complaining witness was twenty-seven years old and sexual-abuse allegations made against someone other than the defendant when she was thirteen years old regarding events that occurred when she was only seven years old). The trial justice found that defense counsel failed to lay a foundation for his requested line of questioning-to demonstrate that Veronica remembered making these allegations. Based upon the lack of reliable testimony on the matter, it was well within the trial justice's discretion to not permit such questioning at trial. See Cookson v. Schwartz , 556 F.3d 647, 655 (7th Cir. 2009) (upholding appellate court's affirmance of a trial justice's refusal to permit the defendant to inquire into victim's sexual-abuse allegations against another individual and reasoning that the trial justice had concluded that the victim \\\"was not clever enough to concoct false allegations of sexual abuse[,]\\\" which was a \\\"factual determination on a matter so quintessentially within the province of a trial judge who had the unique opportunity to observe the witness\\\"); but see Henry v. Speckard , 22 F.3d 1209, 1215 (2d Cir. 1994) (determining that the defendant's right to confrontation was violated where the trial justice precluded the defendant from inquiring into whether the victim had a motive to make false allegations of sexual abuse against the defendant because she resented having to babysit her siblings).\\nMost fatal to defendant's case, however, is the fact that defense counsel failed to attempt this line of questioning once the jury was brought back into the courtroom. After he ruled on the oral motion in limine , the trial justice explained to defense counsel that, if he wanted to pursue, in his words, whether Veronica \\\"had a memory of telling someone that her father had touched her froggy,\\\" he could \\\"ask for a sidebar and we'll address it .\\\" However, defense counsel never asked such questions, which constitutes a waiver of the issue. See State v. Tejeda , 171 A.3d 983, 1001 (R.I. 2017) (\\\"We repeatedly have expressed our view that a failure to object in the vital context of the trial itself (except where the in limine ruling was unequivocally definitive) [constitutes] a waiver of the evidentiary objection and [is] therefore an issue that may not be raised on appeal.\\\" (quoting State v. Andujar , 899 A.2d 1209, 1222 (R.I. 2006) ) ).\\nMoreover, \\\"[w]hat is required for a fair trial is 'that reasonable latitude be given the cross-examiner. This latitude should include an opportunity for a defendant to establish or reveal possible bias, prejudice, or ulterior motives as they may relate to the case being tried.' \\\" Ogoffa , 159 A.3d at 1052 (quoting Tiernan , 941 A.2d at 134 ). At trial, defense counsel did have the opportunity to thoroughly attack Veronica's credibility when he asked her about the defendant's role as a disciplinarian in her life, including how strict she perceived him to be. In other words, the defendant was afforded an opportunity to inquire into Veronica's purported motive to bring false accusations against the defendant. But see Oliveira , 576 A.2d at 113 (\\\"By not allowing [the] defendant the opportunity to challenge [the complaining witness's] credibility, the trial justice inappropriately infringed on [the] defendant's Sixth Amendment rights of confrontation and effective cross-examination.\\\"). As such, we conclude that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in precluding the admission of this evidence.\\nIV\\nConclusion\\nFor the foregoing reasons, the defendant's appeal is denied and dismissed, and the judgment appealed from is affirmed. The papers in the case are remanded to the Superior Court.\\nWe use pseudonyms to identify the complaining witness and other minors referenced in this opinion.\\nAt the time she responded to the call, Officer Beltrami's last name was Heemond.\\nWhile the state addresses both this argument and an argument under Rule 608 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, defendant states in his reply brief that he is focused only on the Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine to demonstrate motive to lie, rather than the general credibility of the witness implicated by Rule 608. See State v. Manning , 973 A.2d 524, 534, 535 (R.I. 2009) (recognizing the difference between evidentiary rulings based on impeachment of the general credibility of a witness and cross-examination related to a complaining witness's bias or motive).\\nThe trial justice also mentioned Rule 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence at this point, explaining that:\\n\\\"In terms of the 403 analysis, the [c]ourt is going to make that determination on a question-by-question basis through objections. The [c]ourt does not believe as a whole the topic is so prejudicial. However, as the [c]ourt mentioned during argument on this, we can ask the witness in terms of her recollection and other things. It may be possible to attempt to refresh her recollection based on an answer to a question, but the information used to refresh her recollection is not evidence and will not be read to the jury any more.\\\"\\nSimilarly, a Children Intensive Services record from November 2005 states:\\n\\\"[Veronica] disclosed to her mother on (12/29/04) that her father touched her 'frog' (vagina) and drew a picture of her father putting his hands on her chest area and privates. [Veronica's mother] appropriately called the DCYF hotline in December 2004 after [Veronica] disclosed to her. [Veronica] has not seen her father since the disclosure.\\\"\\nRule 608(b) provides:\\n\\\"Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness'[s] credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, or, in the discretion of the trial judge, evidence of prior similar false accusations, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness'[s] character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.\\\"\\nRule 403 provides that \\\"[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.\\\"\\nThe trial justice explained:\\n\\\"What the [c]ourt has heard in terms of balancing any evidence that may come in with the evidence to the jury as opposed to the prejudicial [e]ffect certainly with there being no memory and no admissible evidence, the [c]ourt finds that any questioning or testimony would be more prejudicial and certainly the [c]ourt can advise the jury that the questions themselves are not evidence only the answers. The [c]ourt believes based on their [sic ] being no foundation, we would ask the questions and have a sustained objection and we would never get there.\\\"\\nWhile it was not addressed below or asserted by the parties, we pause to note that Rule 602 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, in pertinent part, provides the following:\\n\\\"A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the testimony of the witness himself or herself.\\\"\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/1316805.json b/ri/1316805.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..94c97068e6ca045791e7fe6383f0be9a9a192d6f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/1316805.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1316805\", \"name\": \"Antone Enos vs. R. I. Suburban Railway Company\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Enos v. R. I. Suburban Railway Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1908-10-28\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"297\", \"last_page\": \"303\", \"citations\": \"29 R.I. 297\", \"volume\": \"29\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:27:38.270631+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Dubois, Blodgett, Johnson, and Parkhurst, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Antone Enos vs. R. I. Suburban Railway Company.\", \"head_matter\": \"Antone Enos vs. R. I. Suburban Railway Company.\\nOCTOBER 28, 1908.\\nPresent: Dubois, Blodgett, Johnson, and Parkhurst, JJ.\\n\\u25a0(1) Petition to Establish Truth of Exceptions.\\nUpon a petition to establish the truth of exceptions brought under C. P. A., \\u00a7 494 -, wherein the plaintiff prayed that certain of defendant\\u2019s exceptions be disallowed and stricken from the bill, after this remedy has been invoked by either party its scope can not be restricted by the form of the prayer of the petition, but the court will endeavor to ascertain the truth; and this can not always be done by excision.\\n\\u2022(2) Bills of Exceptions. Stating Exceptions Separately.\\nThe statutory requirement contained in C. P. A., \\u00a7 490, that the exceptions shall be stated separately and clearly, is intended for the benefit of the opposing party as well as for the court.\\n(3) Stating Exceptions Clearly and Separately.\\nAn exception to rulings upon the ground that the court erred in \\u201cadmitting or refusing to admit certain evidence \\u201d is not clear, within the meaning of the statute, when it appears that the rulings were confined to refusals to admit testimony. Neither is it stating clearly and separately to group in one exception eight rulings, contained on various pages of the transcript of testimony, but the defendant should have set out the eight exceptions to the refusal of the court to admit the testimony offered.\\n\\u2022(4) Establishing Truth of Exceptions.\\nAlthough it appears from the transcript that the grounds of the objections which were the foundation of the exceptions were only stated in four instances, the court, gathering from the context the probable ground of the other objections, and from an examination of the bill and transcript finding that the whole number of exceptions were saved, will establish the truth that such exceptions were in fact taken and will allow the same to be prop\\u2022erly set out in the bill by amendment.\\n(5) Exceptions.\\nA remark by counsel, to a statement made by opposing counsel, \\u201cI take-exception to that, \\u201d without more, where no exception was allowed by the-court, can not'be considered an exception within the meaning of the term,, as a foundation for a bill of exceptions.\\nTrespass on the Case for negligence. Heard on plaintiff\\u2019s-petition to establish truth of defendant\\u2019s bill of exceptions, under C. P. A., \\u00a7 494.\\nSome exceptions established, and bill allowed to be amended.\", \"word_count\": \"2384\", \"char_count\": \"13762\", \"text\": \"Dubois, J.\\nThis case comes before this court upon the plaintiff's petition to establish the truth of the defendant's-bill of exceptions, under C. P. A., \\u00a7 494, which reads as-follows: \\\"If the justice who presided at the trial shall, for a period of twenty days after a bill of exceptions has been filed,, fail to act upon or return the same, or shall disallow, alter, or refuse to alter the same, and either party is aggrieved thereby, the truth of the exceptions may be established before the supreme court upon petition stating the facts, filed within thirty days after the filing of the bill of exceptions in the-superior court; and thereupon, the truth of the exceptions-being established in such manner as the court shall by rule-prescribe, they shall be heard and the same proceedings taken as if the exceptions had been duly allowed and filed. And upon such petition being filed, the supreme court may order the-clerk of the superior court to certify and transmit to the clerk of the supreme court the papers in the cause.\\\"\\nThe material portion of the plaintiff's petition is of the tenor-following :\\n\\\" Respectfully represents Antone Enos, that he is the plaintiff' in the above entitled case entered in the Superior Court in the County of Providence and Numbered 20465; that said case was tried before the Honorable George T. Brown, a Justice-of the Superior Court holden at Providence, within and for the County of Providence, on the 30th day of December, 1907,. and following days, and on the second day of January, 1908, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of Two Thousand Seven Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($2750);. that on the 11th day of March, the said Justice filed a decision granting the defendant's motion for a new trial unless the plaintiff remit One Thousand Dollars ($1000) from the amount of the said verdict within ten days; that on the 25th day of May, the defendant filed its Bill of Exceptions; that at a hearing fixed by said Justice, Counsel for the plaintiff objected to the allowance of said bill as the defendant's Bill of Exceptions, but the said Justice on the 28th day of May, allowed said bill and transcript.\\n\\\"And your petitioner says that he is aggrieved by the ruling of said Justice in allowing said Bill of Exceptions, and he is aggrieved by the refusal of said Justice to alter the same and to disallow the same as prayed for by the petitioner at said hearing, for the following reasons:\\n\\\"1. The defendant has not stated separately and clearly the exceptions relied upon.\\n\\\"2. The first group of rulings in said bill should have been stricken out for the reason that the' defendant has not stated separately and clearly the exceptions therein relied upon.\\n\\\"Wherefore your petitioner prays that the truth of the exceptions shall be established by this Court, and that the alleged exceptions to the first group of rulings be disallowed and be stricken from said bill.\\\"\\nThe defendant's bill of exceptions, the truth of which is sought to be established in this proceeding, reads as follows:\\n\\\"The defendant in the above entitled action comes and files its bill of exceptions and says that said case was tried before the Honorable George T. Brown, one of the justices of said court, and a jury, on the 30th day of December, 1907, and the 2nd day of January, 1908, and a verdict was rendered for the plaintiff in the sum of $2750,00; and that certain exceptions have been taken by said defendant in the proceedings in said case, as follows :\\n\\\"1. To certain rulings of said justice, at the trial of said action, admitting or refusing to admit certain evidence, as shown on pages 158, 182, 193, and 196 of the transcript of testimony, etc., filed herewith.\\n\\\"2. To the refusal of said justice, at said trial, to direct a verdict for the defendant, as shown on page 210 of said transcript.\\n\\\"3. To a certain statement made by plaintiff's attorney during the course of said trial, to which exception is noted on page 43 of said transcript.\\n\\\"4. To the decision of said court denying the defendant's motion for a new trial, which motion was based upon the following grounds :\\n\\\" (a) That said verdict is contrary to the evidence and the weight thereof.\\n\\\" (b) That said verdict is contrary to the law.\\n\\\" (c) That the amount of damages awarded by said verdict is excessive.\\n\\\"And the defendant insists that all of said rulings were erroneous, and that said errors entitle it either to a new trial or to a judgment entered in its behalf. Wherefore the defendant tenders this its bill of exceptions, and prays that the same may be allowed by the court in accordance with law.\\\"\\nThe evident purpose of C. P. A., \\u00a7 494, is to confer upon this court jurisdiction over exceptions, that their truth may be established.\\nAs we have heretofore said in Vester v. Rhode Island Co., 29 R. I. 214: \\\"Under C. P. A., \\u00a7 492, the justice who presided at the trial shall examine bills of exceptions and hear the parties, and if he shall find the exceptions, rulings, instructions, and findings correctly stated, he shall allow them. The burden of ascertaining whether the exceptions are stated clearly and separately is properly placed upon the trial justice to whose rulings the exceptions were taken; but no exception to his allowance is permitted by the statute.. The only remedy provided for either party aggrieved by the failure of the justice to act upon the bill of exceptions, or to return the same, or to his disallowance of, alteration of,- or refusal to alter the same, is to establish the truth of the exceptions before this court upon petition stating the facts under C. P. A., \\u00a7 494.\\\"\\nBut when this remedy has been invoked by either party, its scope can not be restricted by the form of the prayer of the petitioner. The court will endeavor to ascertain the truth of the exceptions, and this can not always be done by excision.\\nIn ascertaining whether the exceptions, rulings, etc.,were correctly stated the trial justice had not only the bill of exceptions and transcript of the evidence before him and the counsel for the respective parties to aid him, but he had also the assistance of his memory as to what transpired at the trial. Necessarily we can have no such recollection. In the case at bar we have been obliged to ascertain the truth of the exceptions from an examination of the bill of exceptions and the transcript of testimony. But in making the examination and in arriving at our conclusions we have not been hampered by technicalities. The statutory requirement contained in C. P. A.,\\u00a7 490, in the words \\\"shall state separately and clearly the exceptions relied upon,\\\" is intended for the benefit of the opposing party as well as for the benefit of the court upon its examination of the exceptions; so that it should be clearly apparent to such party upon what grounds exceptions will be urged before the court in order that he may be advised upon what questions he must prepare his brief for the argument of the case. If, as frequently happens, an examination of the case by the excepting party eliminates a large number of questions which are deemed to be immaterial upon final consideration, it is for the benefit of the court as well as of the opposing party that those questions be eliminated in the frame of the bill of exceptions so that the real questions intended to be litigated shall be presented upon bill of exceptions rather than that the bill of exceptions should be so general in its character as to be notice to the opposing party of the intention to litigate every possible question which appears to be reserved upon the transcript. This work of elimination has to be done sooner or later, and it might well be done upon the bill of exceptions in the first place rather than upon the briefs upon final argument, thereby relieving the opposing party of the apparent necessity of discussing questions which in the end are waived by the excepting party.\\nParagraph one of the defendant's bill of exceptions, herein-before set forth, does not comply with such statutory require ment. In the first place it is not clear to except to certain rulings upon the ground that the court erred in \\\"admitting or refusing to admit certain evidence,\\\" when in fact the rulings of the court were confined to refusals to admit testimony. Neither is it stating clearly and separately to group in one exception eight rulings whereof two are shown on one page, four upon another, and one each on other pages of the transcript \\u2022of testimony. The grounds of the objections which were the foundation of the exceptions are only stated in four instances, viz.: the first objection in which the ground was stated (immateriality) was made to Q. 25, on p. 158 of the transcript of testimony; the second (want of notice to plaintiff) appears to Q. 48, on p. 182 thereof; the third (want of materiality) to \\u2022Q. 200, on p. 192, exception saved on p. 193 thereof; and the fourth (\\\"same objection\\\") to Q. 101, on p. 193 aforesaid. While it is possible for the court to gather from the context the probable ground of the other objections, it is just as easy, or easier, for the counsel who were engaged in the trial of the cause to do this, and save the court this trouble.\\nThe defendant should have set out his eight exceptions to the refusal of the court to admit the testimony offered. This court, having examined the bill of exceptions and transcript, finds that the defendant did save eight exceptions, as aforesaid, and their truth, that is, the truth that such exceptions in fact were taken, is established, and the same may be properly set out in the bill of exceptions by amendment.\\nThe truth of the exception referred to in the second paragraph of the defendant's bill of exceptions is also established, and is allowed. It may be necessary, however, to renumber the same, and permission is granted for that purpose.\\nThe truth of the exception mentioned in the third paragraph of said bill is not established. No exception was taken to any ruling of the court. The incident appears in the transcript of the plaintiff's testimony as follows: \\\"Q. 354. Then \\u2014 \\u2022 didn't you say in direct examination that the passenger car that you took to go home that night was going about as fast as it could go? A. Well, I don't know; took my ticket to get .a ride to the conductor and \\u2014 (question repeated by stenographer). A. About quarter of or twenty minutes of one.\\nWaterman, Curran & Hunt, for plaintiff.\\nJoseph C. Sweeney and Clifford Whipple, for defendant.\\n\\\"Mr. Waterman: He is hard of hearing, and I think the accident affected his ears.\\n\\\" Mr. Rice : I take exception to that.\\n\\\" The Court : I think there is no such allegation.\\n\\\"Mr. Rice: I think it is very improper for counsel to say it before the jury.\\\" There the matter was allowed to rest. No exception was taken in the proper sense of the term, and none was allowed by the Superior Court at the time. The truth of this exception not having been established, the same is disallowed.\\nThe truth of the exception contained in the fourth paragraph of the bill is established; the same is not objectionable, because the grounds on which the motion was founded are set out, and the same is allowed.\\nThe truth of the exceptions having been established, as hereinbefore set forth, the bill of exceptions may be amended accordingly, and the cause will stand for further proceedings.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/1329007.json b/ri/1329007.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..70f5980fe015093ef932c110db963fd720176003
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/1329007.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1329007\", \"name\": \"Louis J. Doyle et ux. vs. William Harris\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Doyle v. Harris\", \"decision_date\": \"1877-03-27\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"539\", \"last_page\": \"542\", \"citations\": \"11 R.I. 539\", \"volume\": \"11\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:37:48.414453+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Louis J. Doyle et ux. vs. William Harris.\", \"head_matter\": \"PROVIDENCE COUNTY.\\nLouis J. Doyle et ux. vs. William Harris.\\nA complainant suing for specific performance must show that he has not been in default.\\nHence, when a contract for the sale of land provided for the payment of the \\u201cbalance of the purchase money \\u201d ata time certain, and the court, from evidence which was conflicting, found the time had been extended by agreement to a day certain, and'the vendee did not then pay, nor did he claim that he had ever tendered the price and demanded a deed ; the court dismissed the vendee\\u2019s bill for specific performance.\\nSemble, that in this country the tender of a deed by the vendee is unnecessary in order to put the vendor in default, as the deed is to be prepared by the vendor.\\nBill in equity for specific performance brought upon the following contract: \\u2014\\n\\u201c Received of Sarah E. H. Doyle, wife of Louis J. Doyle, one hundred dollars, on account of the purchase of lot 105, and part of another on the Dean estate. Said lot is 39.72 feet front on Bridgham Street, one hundred feet deep, and fifty-five feet on rear line. Price of same to be seventy-five cents per square foot. Balance of purchase money to be paid in two months, when a good and satisfactory deed to be given. Interest at 7 pr. ct. from this date. William Harris.\\n\\u201c PitoviDEJtfCE, October 4, 1871.\\u201d\\nThe facts are stated in the opinion of the court.\\nMarch 27, 1877.\", \"word_count\": \"1503\", \"char_count\": \"8288\", \"text\": \"Potter, J.\\nIt is essential to any contract that there should be parties on both sides competent to contract.; and the statute of frauds makes no difference in that respect.\\nThe complainant on this point relies on Ives v. Hazard, 4 R. I. 14, 28, as disposing of the question of mutuality. In that case both parties were competent to contract, and the question was whether they had contracted, and whether the agreement signed by only one party was sufficient. It is not therefore decisive of this case. Flight v. Bolland, 4 Russ. 298.\\nUpon the point that a feme covert having a separate statutory estate can make contracts to bind that estate, as she could in some cases her equitable separate estate, it is not necessary here to decide.\\nThe case comes before us upon bill, answer, and replication and the depositions of L. J. Doyle, the husband of the complainant, and of the respondent. The answer, therefore, is to be taken as conclusive so far as it is responsive to the bill, unless there is testimony to vary the effect of it.\\nThe bill, after alleging the agreement, proceeds to allege that the complainants have always been ready and willing to pay when the title was shown and a conveyance made free of incumbrances. It alleges no demand for a deed or tender of one, or tender or offer to pay.\\nThe answer, after denying any agreement with Louis J. Doyle, states that the only agreement was with Mrs. Doyle by an agent, and claims benefit of this as by demurrer. It then goes on to state, that, after the time expired, namely, December 4, Mr. Doyle said he could not pay then, and asked delay until December 15, which was verbally granted, but that although the respondent has always been ready to give a deed, the complainants never at any time demanded a deed, or paid or offered to pay the remainder of the money.\\nLouis J. Doyle, in his deposition, says that he called on the respondent on December 4, when the time expired, and asked for further time, and that nothing was said about extending it for any definite period.\\nThe respondent, in his deposition, says that Doyle called on him a few days after December 4th, and further states that the value of the land had materially risen between the middle of December, 1871, and the filing of this bill.\\nThe argument of the complainants proceeds on the ground that they were not bound to offer the money until the other party tendered them a deed.\\nIf the respondent was suing for performance, it would then be important for him to show that he had tendered a sufficient deed.\\nBut here the complainants claim performance as vendees.\\nBy the English practice, in order to put the vendor in default, the vendee must not only tender the money, but must himself prepare and offer a deed to be executed by the vendor. And many of the English cases have turned on the difficulty of making a good. title, growing out of their intricate system of real estate law.\\nWhile there are conflicting cases in this country, we believe the weight of authority to be that the tender of a deed by the vendee is unnecessary, as it is generally prepared by and at the expense of the vendor. See notes to Sugden's Yendors & Purchasers, *263. And in the United States Supreme Court, in Taylor v. Longworth et al. 14 Pet. 172, Judge Story, delivering the opinion of the court, holds that the local practice should prevail ; and the general understanding here, we believe, has been that the vendor is to prepare the deed.\\nAt law the vendee suing must show either a strict performance on his part, or a tender and refusal.\\nAnd in equity the party suing is not discharged from performance anymore than at law, except in cases of accident or mistake on his part, or laches or default on the other side. He must show that he has not been in default himself. Walker v. Jeffreys, 1 Hare, 341, 348, 352; Voorhees v. De Meyer, 2 Barb. S. C. 37. Equity excuses actual performance in some cases where it would have been of no avail, as where a tender would have been refused. Fry on Specific Performance, \\u00a7 619 ; Hunter v. Daniel, 4 Hare, 420, 433. So in cases of accident or mistake, or justifiable excuse, where the other party suffers no injury. Longworth v. Taylor, 1 McLean, 395, 400, 402. He must perform or show a readiness to perform, or some default of the other party which excuses him. McNeil v. Magee, 5 Mason, 244, 256 ; Fry on Specific Performance, \\u00a7 608; 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 33; Wood v. Perry, 1 Barb. S. C. 114, 131. And the respondent's negligence cannot excuse the complainant. Fry on Specific Performance, \\u00a7 608. And if the court finds that there was a sufficient excuse, that delay of payment has not operated injuriously, that the condition of the parties and the value of the property remain unchanged, and the same justice can be done, it will grant relief. Longworth v. Taylor, 1 McLean, 395, 400, 402; Opinion of Story, J., in Taylor v. Longworth et al. 14 Pet. 172; Doloret v. Rothschild, 1 Sim. & Stu. 590 ; Crofton v. Ormsby, 2 Sch. & Lef. 583, 603; Benedict v. Lynch, 1 Johns. Ch. 370; Scott v. Fields et als. 7 Ohio, 2d part, 90, and cases there cited.\\nA. A. D. Payne and John C. Pegram, for complainants.\\nVincent Carpenter, for respondent.\\nIt is a matter for the sound discretion of the court whether to decree specific performance or leave the parties to their remedy at law. Simmons v. Hill et al. 4 Har. & McH. 252; Willard v. Tayloe, 8 Wall. 557 ; Marble Co. v. Ripley, 10 Wall. 339.\\nChancellor Kent, in Benedict v. Lynch, 1 Johns. Ch. 370, 376, thus comments on the mischief likely to arise from the lax indulgence of this discretion : \\\" The notion that seems too much to prevail, that a party may be utterly regardless of his stipulated payments, and that a Court of Chancery will almost at any time relieve him from the penalty of his gross negligence, is very injurious to public morals.\\\"\\nAnd it has even been held that the complainant must not only tender the money, but must follow it up by bringing it into court. Doyle et al. v. Teas et als. 5 Ill. 202, 265, 267.\\nWas the time ever extended, and if so how long? We have on this point only the conflicting evidence of the answer and the two depositions ; and considering the weight to which the answer is entitled, and that the burden of proof is on the complainants, we cannot hold that there was any extension but for a definite time.\\nThe respondent in his answer filed in May, 1872, swears that he was willing and ready to execute the deed. For some reason the depositions were not taken until 1875, and the respondent in his deposition swears that he was willing to give the deed not only up to the filing of the bill in May, 1872, but up to the time he sold the lot to another person in the autumn of 1874.\\nAnd the complainants do not offer any evidence, or even claim that they have ever tendered or demanded a deed; or tendered the money or offered to pay it.\\nBill dismissed, but without costs.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/2063149.json b/ri/2063149.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1c9723405b1b9e7b94591e2528d517ec967bdcc8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/2063149.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"2063149\", \"name\": \"Hulda Sherman, Admx., vs. Samuel J. Howes, Admr., d. b. n. c. t. a.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Sherman v. Howes\", \"decision_date\": \"1916-04-12\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"26\", \"last_page\": \"31\", \"citations\": \"39 R.I. 26\", \"volume\": \"39\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:20:25.764138+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Johnson, C. J., Parkhurst, Sweetland, Vincent, and Baker, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Hulda Sherman, Admx., vs. Samuel J. Howes, Admr., d. b. n. c. t. a.\", \"head_matter\": \"Hulda Sherman, Admx., vs. Samuel J. Howes, Admr., d. b. n. c. t. a.\\nAPRIL 12, 1916.\\nPresent: Johnson, C. J., Parkhurst, Sweetland, Vincent, and Baker, JJ.\\n(I) Life Insurance. Equitable Interests.\\nA policy of insurance was payable in the event of the death of insured during the life of either his wife or his son to the company as trustee, to make certain payments to the wife and son and the survivor of them, the balance after the death of both beneficiaries to be paid to the executors, administrators or assigns of insured.\\nInsured thereafter executed a will by which he gave to his wife the residue of his estate. Insured deceased, leaving his wife and son surviving, and the company thereafter made nine payments under the trust agreement, prior to the death of both the son and widow of insured.\\nHeld, that insured reserved an equitable reversionary interest in the proceeds of the policy as part of his estate, subject to the possibility of its being exhausted if his wife or child lived long enough and while contingent in character it was capable of passing and did pass to the widow, i. e., the equitable right, but not the present possession and enjoyment, and therefore the administrator of the widow was entitled to the proceeds.\\nProbate Appeal.\\nHeard on exceptions of appellee and overruled.\", \"word_count\": \"1739\", \"char_count\": \"9801\", \"text\": \"Baker, J.\\nThis is an appeal by Huida Sherman as administratrix upon the estate of Emma F. Sherman, deceased, from the decree of the probate court of the town of Cumberland, entered April 2, 1914, whereby said court ordered and decreed that the statement filed by Samuel J. Howes, administrator d. b. n. c. t. a. on the estate of Amos .Sherman, in the office of the clerk of said probate court, Betting out the names of the legatees, the amounts to be paid, and the property to be turned over to them respectively, or to be held by himself as trustee, be approved as filed.\\nThis action of the court was had under Sections 13 and 14 of Chapter 318 of the General Laws of 1909.\\nThe important part of the statement was as follows:\\n\\\" Names of legatees in will of Amos Sherman Roger Sherman Emma F. Sherman\\nAmount due and property to be turned over to them none none.\\\"\\nIn Sherman v. Howes, 38 R. I. 176, decided June 24, 1915, which was a case between the same parties, this court held that the money in said administrator's hands as portion of the balance of the proceeds of the policy of life insurance numbered 316183 paid to him by the New York Life Insurance Company on March 29, 1911, was part of the assets of the estate of Amos Sherman. As already shown the decree of the probate court appealed from in the present case approved the statement that no part of these assets belonged to the administratrix on the estate of Emma F. Sherman. Hence her appeal, which was heard before Mr. Justice Barrows, sitting without a jury, on August 20, 1915, who at the close of the hearing caused to be entered a decree sustaining her appeal, reversing the decree of the probate court and amending said statement so as to read as follows:\\n\\\"Names of legatees Amount to be paid over\\nRoger W. Sherman deceased\\nJanuary 5,1911 nothing\\nEstate of Emma F. Sherman\\nHuida Sherman Admx. $2,885.34.\\\"\\nThe decree further recites that said last mentioned sum includes interest at the rate of four per cent, per annum upon the balance shown by the final account of said administrator from the date of the decree allowing the same (May 2, 1912), and orders said administrator to pay forthwith said sum of $2,885.34 to said Huida Sherman as administratrix as aforesaid.\\nTo this decision Mr. Howes excepted and also to certain rulings of the court excluding testimony and he has duly brought his bill of exceptions to this court. It contains five exceptions.\\nWe think the four exceptions taken to the exclusion of testimony are without merit and they are overruled. The remaining exception is to the finding that the money now held by the administrator belongs to Huida Sherman as administratrix on the estate of Emma F. Sherman.\\nAs, in substance, this court in Sherman v. Howes, supra, held said money to be part of the assets of the estate of Amos Sherman for all legal purposes, the only question now presented is whether or not said money was disposed of by the will of Amos Sherman. In other words, as to such balance of proceeds did he die testate or intestate ?\\nAlthough the facts of the case are quite fully set out in Sherman v. Howes, supra, a brief statement of them in the. present case will be convenient.\\nInsurance policy No. 316183 issued on the life of Amos Sherman for the term of fifteen years, commencing May 2, 1889, was made payable upon his death before May 2, 1904, share and share alike, to Emma F. Sherman, his wife, and Roger W. Sherman, his son, or their executors, administrators or assigns. If the insured lived through the period of fifteen years, payment in amount as specified in the policy was to be made to him or his assigns. Under date of January 6, 1898, Emma F. Sherman and Roger W. Sherman assigned to Amos Sherman said policy \\\"and all dividend, benefit and advantage to be had or derived therefrom.\\\" By Memorandum A., dated January 11, 1898, Amos Sherman amended his application of April 19, 1889, for this policy of insurance, as well as his application for one other policy, by making in the event of his death \\\"during the lifetime of either Emma F. Sherman, wife, or Roger W. Sherman, son, the proceeds of the insurance\\\" then applied for payable to the New York Life Insurance Company as trustee with instructions to invest the same and to pay therefrom annually a certain sum to his said wife and son and to the survivor of them, with the further instruction that the balance of said proceeds remaining after the death of both beneficiaries should be paid to the executors, administrators or assigns of himself, the insured. He reserved the right to revoke the appointment of trustee, but never exercised it. Memorandum B., signed by the president and secretary of said life insurance company under date of February 10, 1898, states that \\\"It is agreed that in ease of the death of Amos Sherman during the lifetime\\\" of his wife or son the proceeds of said policy \\\"are to be paid to the New York Life Insurance Company as trustee\\\" upon the trusts as stated in Memorandum A. except that there was a change in the number of annual installments to be paid over. Whether each installment to be paid under this policy by Memorandum B. is the same as provided in Memorandum A. is not entirely clear as the former referred to two policies and gave a lump sum for both.\\nOn August 22, 1899, Amos Sherman executed his last will and testament by which after making certain specific devises and legacies to his son, including the proceeds of the two other insurance policies, he provided as follows: ' Third. I give and bequeath to my wife, Emma E. Sherman, all the rest and residue of estate, personal, real, or mixed, and wherever situate, including as well any that I may acquire subsequent to the date of this will as that of which I am now possessed to her, her heirs and assigns forever.\\\" She was appointed executrix of the will. Amos Sherman died September 7, 1902, leaving his wife and son surving him. Upon his death his wife and son surrendered said policy to said insurance company for cancellation and the proceeds of the policy were held by it as trustee. Under date of October 2, 1902, the company issued a certificate of trust in accordance with the provisions of Memorandum B., and thereafter in accordance therewith made nine annual payments of $250 each. The will of Amos Sherman was duly probated and his widow qualified as executrix. She died intestate January 17, 1905, and Roger W. Sherman died January 5, 1911, testate, leaving his widow, said Huida Sherman, as his sole devisee and legatee. Under the facts and conditions as stated did Amos Sherman have such interest in the proceeds of the policy as that at his death it passed under his will to his widow ? By the assignment to him from his wife and son the proceeds of the policy became part of his estate in the event of his death before May 2, 1904; if he survived that date, such amount as would then be due on the policy was payable to him by the original terms of the policy. With the consent of the company he, after the assignment, effected a new designation of beneficiaries, by maldng the proceeds payable to the insurance company as trustee charged with the payment of $250 annually therefrom to his wife and child and the survivor of them and upon the death of both with the payment of the balance then remaining, if any, to his estate. In other words, he reserved an equitable reversionary interest in the proceeds as part of his estate, subject to the possibility of its being exhausted, if his wife or child lived long enough. While contingent in character, it was, however, an interest which was capable of passing under his will and in our opinion did so pass on his death to his widow; that is, the equitable right passed, but not the present possession and enjoyment. See Bailey v. Hoppin, 12 R. I. 560, 567, 569; Loring v. Arnold, 15 R. I. 428.\\nWilliam G. Rich, Waterman & Greenlaw, for appellant.\\nJames F. Murphy, for appellee.\\nAccordingly Huida Sherman, as administratrix on the estate of Emma F. Sherman, is entitled to have the balance of said proceeds now in the hands of Samuel J. Howes, administrator as aforesaid, amounting on August 20, 1915, with interest, to $2,885.34 paid over to her by him. There was therefore no error in the decision of the Superior Court, as there is no dispute as to the correctness of the amount with which the administrator is chargeable.\\nThe exceptions of the administrator are overruled, and the case is remitted to the Superior Court for further proceedings.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/2406174.json b/ri/2406174.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b1f64975ab98c90f3e92e21bff4b5e8168f16847
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/2406174.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"2406174\", \"name\": \"Herbert M. Kimball, 2nd., Admr. vs. Anna M. McGowan\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Kimball v. McGowan\", \"decision_date\": \"1940-11-27\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"500\", \"last_page\": \"503\", \"citations\": \"65 R.I. 500\", \"volume\": \"65\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:31:32.101104+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present : Flynn, C. J., Moss, Capotosto, Baker and Condon, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Herbert M. Kimball, 2nd., Admr. vs. Anna M. McGowan.\", \"head_matter\": \"Herbert M. Kimball, 2nd., Admr. vs. Anna M. McGowan.\\nNOVEMBER 27, 1940.\\nPresent : Flynn, C. J., Moss, Capotosto, Baker and Condon, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"809\", \"char_count\": \"4613\", \"text\": \"Condon, J.\\nPlaintiff, as administrator of the estate of Emma K. Bushnell, deceased, brought this action to recover the sum of $136.27, which he paid to the city of Providence for taxes assessed, on June 15, 1937, against the defendant as the recorded owner on that date of certain real estate situated at 193 Hanover street in this city. The case was tried before a justice of the superior court, sitting without a jury, and resulted in a decision for the defendant. The plaintiff duly excepted to that decision and the case is now here on that exception solely.\\nThe material facts were stipulated in the superior court and are as follows: Emma K. Bushnell conveyed the above-mentioned real estate to one Hugh Mooney, on July 11,1927, and received from him a mortgage thereof in the sum of $6000. On July 22, 1927, Mooney conveyed this real estate to one Thomas L. Wynne, who later, on June 8, 1936, conveyed it to this defendant, subject to the mortgage of Emma K. Bushnell. The defendant, however, did not assume and undertake to pay this mortgage and she never paid any interest or any part of the principal sum to the mortgagee. On June 27, 1937, she conveyed her interest to Raymond B. Allen' and wife, subject to the Bushnell mortgage.\\nThe mortgagee died on January 8, 1938. At the time of her death, the interest on the mortgage note for 1937 was in arrears. On May 20, 1938, the plaintiff foreclosed the mortgage and purchased the mortgaged real estate at the foreclosure sale for the sum of $3000 for the benefit of the mortgagee's estate. Thereafter, the plaintiff paid to the city of Providence the 1937 taxes in the amount of $136.27, which were assessed against this defendant as the recorded owner of the mortgaged real estate on June 15, 1937. He then brought this action to recover that sum from her, on the ground that the law implied that she had requested him to pay it for her benefit.\\nThe plaintiff cites the following authorities in support of his position. Republic Building Loan Assoc. v. Webb, 12 Pa. Super. Ct. 545; Fidelity Ins. & Trust Co. v. Second Phoenix, etc., 17 Pa. Super. Ct. 270; Hogg v. Longstreth, 97 Pa. 255. He also quotes several texts, including that on taxation in 27 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, (2d. ed.) 749, to the effect that: \\\"When a party in interest, on default of the person primarily liable, is compelled to pay taxes to protect his own interests, he has a remedy over for the recovery of the amount so paid against the party primarily liable.\\\" The Pennsylvania cases which plaintiff cites applied this doctrine for the benefit of a mortgagee who had paid the taxes due from his mortgagor's grantee, who had not undertaken and. agreed to pay the mortgage.\\nIn Citizens Savings Bank v. Guaranty Loan Co., 62 R. I. 448, 6 A. 2d. 688, we had occasion to consider at some length the application of this doctrine to a mortgagee and its mortgagor's grantee, and this court, by a majority, came to the conclusion that a mortgagee could not, after foreclosure of its mortgage, maintain an independent action against the mortgagor to recover taxes which the mortgagee had paid to protect its security, since such payment did not create a lien or liability independent of the mortgage; and held that, a fortiori, this must also be true as to the mortgagor's grantee who held subject to the mortgage but had not undertaken and agreed to pay it. This court there observed that this appeared to be the general rule by the weight of authority; and, although recognizing the existence of authority contra, stated that those authorities which were in accord with the view of the court were supported by the better reasoning. Nothing has been presented in the instant case to lead this court to alter that view.\\nWe are of the opinion that by paying the taxes in the instant case after the foreclosure sale the plaintiff, as a purchaser in behalf of the estate of the mortgagee, stands in no better position than he would be in if he were a mortgagee who had bought the property at a foreclosure under the mortgage and sought to recover taxes paid by him before the foreclosure. We therefore hold that the decisive question at issue in this case is governed by the decision of this court in Citizens Savings Bank v. Guaranty Loan Co., supra.\\nCharles R. Easton, for plaintiff.\\nTaft & Beane, for defendant.\\nThe plaintiff's exception is, therefore, overruled, and the case is remitted to the superior court for the entry of judgment on the decision.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/2423233.json b/ri/2423233.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2e05da9806609e72a7070d062714f3d2b8293619
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/2423233.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"2423233\", \"name\": \"Rupert Bradley vs. Edith Bates Brayton\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Bradley v. Brayton\", \"decision_date\": \"1938-06-10\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"44\", \"last_page\": \"48\", \"citations\": \"61 R.I. 44\", \"volume\": \"61\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-09-21T20:02:18.861595+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"Harvard\", \"judges\": \"Present: Flynn, C. J., Moss, Capotosto, Baker and Condon, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Rupert Bradley vs. Edith Bates Brayton.\", \"head_matter\": \"Rupert Bradley vs. Edith Bates Brayton.\\nJUNE 10, 1938.\\nPresent: Flynn, C. J., Moss, Capotosto, Baker and Condon, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"1399\", \"char_count\": \"7976\", \"text\": \"Baker, J.\\nAt the trial in the superior court of this action of trespass on the case for negligence, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $1500. The defendant thereupon filed a motion for a new trial which, after hearing, was granted by the trial justice unless the plaintiff should remit within a specified time all of the verdict in excess of $500. The plaintiff filed such remittitur. The defendant then prosecuted her bill of exceptions to this court. The only exception now pressed by the defendant is to the refusal of the trial justice to grant her an unconditional new trial.\\nThe contention of the plaintiff, as set out in his declaration and supported by evidence introduced by him, in substance was that, at the defendant's request, he went on August 22, 1933, about 8:30 a. m. to certain premises owned by her but occupied by others, in order to assist in moving furniture and goods of the occupants, and that as he went up a short flight of three or four steps leading to the back door, one of the steps gave way, throwing him to the ground and causing the injuries complained of. He also contended that the defendant had notice of the dangerous and defective condition of the steps in question prior to his visit to the premises, but that she failed to warn him of such condition. The defendant, on the other hand, presented evidence tending to show that she did not request the plaintiff to go to the premises for the purpose or at the time claimed by him; that the steps in question were not defective; that the plaintiff was not at such premises at all on August 22, 1933, and that his case was without foundation in fact and was made up by the plaintiff with the assistance of the occupants of the premises.\\nThe trial justice, in deciding the defendant's motion for anew trial, used language of an equivocal nature. He stated in substance that, based on his observation of the witnesses, their credibility and the weight he would give their testi mony, he would have had no hesitancy in finding for the defendant. However, he stated that the questions presented were disputed questions of fact for the jury to determine and that he was unable to say that the jury were wrong because they did not agree with him, but that, it would be difficult to say that he approved the jury's finding as to liability. Finally, he used the following language: \\\"While the Court does no.t-agree with the, finding of the verdict of the jury on the quegtion of liability, the Court feels that it was such,--a question of fact that reasonable men might differ in their determination, and that the Court cannot say that the finding of the jury on the question of liability is clearly wrong.\\\" In so finding the trial justice did not apply the correct rule to be used by him in passing upon a motion for a new trial. It was his duty to determine whether or not, in his independent judgment, the verdict of the jury was supported by a fair preponderance of the evidence and did substantial justice-between the parties. He was not obliged to find that the verdict was clearly wrong in order to set it aside.\\nThe defendant argues that the trial justice plainly did not approve the verdict and, from the tenor of his statement, should have granted the defendant's motion for a new trial without condition, but failed to do so because of misconception as to his authority to set aside the jury's verdict. We are not able to follow the defendant's contention in this regard in its entirety. The trial justice did, as a matter of fact, permit the verdict of the jury on the issue of liability to stand, apparently on the ground that reasonable men might differ on the questions presented. We are of the opinion, however, that the trial justice has so expressed himself that his decision can not be given the weight ordinarily accorded to a decision expressly approving or disapproving a verdict.\\nSuch being the case, it becomes necessary for us to examine independently the transcript of evidence without the assistance we ordinarily receive from the findings of the trial justice on a motion for a new trial. In so examining the transcript, we apply the rule of a court of last resort; that is to say, we determine whether or not in our judgment the evidence submitted very strongly preponderates against the verdict. These matters, and the duties of a trial justice when passing upon a motion for a new- trial, were thoroughly .considered by this court in Spiegel v. Grande, 45 R. I. 437. See also Buttera v. Rhode Island Co., 110 A. 71 (R. I.); Humes v. Schaller, 39 R. I. 519; Willett v. Slocum, 47 R. I. 136, Nichols v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 57 R. I. 180; Raleigh v. Fitzpatrick, C. T., 60 R. I. 79, 197 A. 387. In the Buttera case the following holding was made; \\\"As the verdicts come to this court without the approval of the trial justice, the law applying to such a state of facts is that, where the evidence as to the existence of the facts which are put in issue is conflicting, and of such a character that fair-minded men might honestly differ as to the result thereof, the verdict of the jury is final and conclusive. And this is so, even though the court or another jury might come to a different conclusion upon the same evidence.\\\"\\nIn the present case we have carefully examined the evidence. The testimony of the witnesses on the main issues is sharply conflicting. There was ample evidence which, if believed, tended to support the plaintiff's contention that the steps were in bad condition and dangerous, and that the defendant had notice of that fact prior to the plaintiff's alleged fall. On the matter of being requested by the defendant to go upon the premises, the plaintiff had only his own testimony which was denied categorically by the testimony of the defendant and her son.\\nIn support of her contention that the plaintiff was not on the premises August 22, 1933, the defendant, in addition to her own evidence and that of her son, produced several witnesses who testified in substance that they were on or near said premises on that day doing work for the defendant, and that the premises were then unoccupied and without furniture. Most of these witnesses testified from memory. How ever, one, an electrician, had in a book a memorandum of working on the premises on August 22 and 23,1933. Another of these witnesses, however, testified in cross-examination that the occupants of the premises were there on the afternoon of August 21,1933, while a third gave evidence that the morning she and others went to the premises to do work the sheriff had delivered keys to the defendant.\\nCarroll & Dwyer, Edward F. J. Dwyer, for plaintiff.\\nPatrick H. Quinn, for defendant.\\nOn the other hand, the plaintiff presented as witnesses two occupants of the premises who testified that they vacated the place either on August 22 or 23,1933. One of these witnesses corroborated the plaintiff as to the latter's fall on the steps. The return of the deputy sheriff who had two executions to serve against these occupants, which executions ran in favor of the defendant in ejectment suits against them, read as follows: \\\"Kent, sc. In Warwick in said County, I have this 23rd day of August A. D. 1933, caused the within named plaintiff to have possession of the within described premises, with the privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging.\\\"\\nAfter careful consideration, and in view of the above state of the record, we are unable to say that the evidence in this case very strongly preponderates against the verdict on the question of'the defendant's liability. The matter of damages in this case has not been seriously argued before us.\\nThe defendant's exceptions are overruled, and the case is remitted to the superior court with direction to enter judgment for the plaintiff on the verdict as reduced by the remittitur.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/3030129.json b/ri/3030129.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b85f08193311ef9fa244e4ec82ebe58d94080c06
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/3030129.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"3030129\", \"name\": \"Ralph T. Cullen vs. Carl R. Adler et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Cullen v. Adler\", \"decision_date\": \"1970-12-08\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"749\", \"last_page\": \"757\", \"citations\": \"107 R.I. 749\", \"volume\": \"107\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:44:54.499509+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Paolino, Powers and Joslin, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Ralph T. Cullen vs. Carl R. Adler et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"271 A.2d 466.\\nRalph T. Cullen vs. Carl R. Adler et al.\\nDECEMBER 8, 1970.\\nPresent: Paolino, Powers and Joslin, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"2376\", \"char_count\": \"14352\", \"text\": \"Powers, J.\\nThis is a petition for certiorari which seeks to review the action of the respondent town council in removing the petitioner from the office of tax assessor-building inspector. We issued the writ and in accordance with its mandate the pertinent records were duly certified to this court for our examination. It appears therefrom that petitioner was appointed to the public office in question on June 1, 1967, for a six-year term as provided by P. L. 1961, chapter 53. It was by this legislative enactment that the office of tax assessor-building inspector was created and, in addition to providing for a six-year term, the statute provided that the necessary qualifications for the office were to be established by an ordinance adopted by the town council.\\nThe record further establishes that the respondent town council consists of five menibers. On December 17, 1968, the town council adopted a resolution appointing three of its members and the town solicitor as a committee to investigate the office of tax assessor-building inspector. As a result of the investigation accordingly conducted, said committee, on February 13, 1969, recommended to the council that petitioner be removed from office. The grounds for such recommendation, broadly stated, were first that petitioner did not possess the qualifications for the office mandated by the ordinance establishing such qualifications, and secondly that petitioner was chargeable with inefficiency, neglect of duty, and misconduct in office.\\nThe committee report further recommended that petitioner be advised of these charges and afforded a public hearing thereon if desired. Having been duly notified thereof, petitioner seasonably requested a public hearing together with a bill of particulars.\\nFurther, petitioner sought and obtained a restraining order in the Superior Court enjoining the town council from removing petitioner. The basis for petitioner's recourse to the Superior Court was, in essence, that the town council lacked jurisdiction to remove petitioner for the reason that the enabling act made no provision, for removal by the town council and secondly, that in any event three members of the council having participated in the investigation and recommended removal proceedings, a majority of the town council was demonstrably prejudiced and biased. This being so, petitioner contended that he was foreclosed from obtaining a fair hearing by the town council.\\nWhen the cause came on for hearing in \\\"the Superior Court on petitioner's claim for a permanent' injunction, the Superior Court justice before whom it was heard vacated the restraining order and denied injunctive relief. In rejecting petitioner's contention that the town council lacked jurisdiction to remove petitioner for cause, the Superior Court justice correctly followed the rule enunciated in Lewis v. Porter, 78 R. I. 358, 82 A.2d 399. There, this court held that when the power to remove was not expressly stated, it nevertheless existed by necessary implication. As to petitioner's contention that he could hot be afforded a fair hearing by reason of prejudice or bias on the part of a majority of the members of the town council, the Superior Court justice- pointed out that a quorum could.-be made up of the two members who were not part of the investigating committee and one of the three who were. He bases this on the decisions of this court in Poirier v. Martineau, 86 R. I. 473, 136 A.2d 814, and Poirier v. Martineau, 87 R. I. 60, 138 A.2d 331.\\nIn the first Poirier case this court held that the normal rule of disqualification must yield to the rule of necessity where the tribunal in question was the only body vested with jurisdiction to hear the charges.\\nIn clarification and supplementation of that decision, this court in the second Poirier case directed that the member of the city council who had participated in the investigation of misconduct and who was to serve with those-members of the city council, who had not participated in the misconduct investigation in order to achieve a quorum, should be drawn by lot.\\n' Although denying injunctive relief, the Superior Court justice retained jurisdiction to further hear petitioner's prayer in the event that the town council were to hold a hearing on the assigned charges without conforming to the Poirier formula.\\nPresumably guided by direction from the Superior Court justice, three members of the town council, sitting as a quorum, held a public hearing which began March 17, 1969. Two of the three members conducting the hearing had not served on the investigating committee and the third member who had so served was chosen by lot. The hearing was conducted over a period of fourteen evenings and evidence was adduced in conn\\u00e9ction with all the charges leveled at petitioner.\\nThe bill of particulars consisted of specific answers to questions asked by petitioner in connection with the charges as stated in the written notice thereof. Both charges and answers cover a wide area but, as previously indicated, we have concluded that certain of these charges and the evidence adduced thereon, are dispositive of the cause. For this reason, we deem it necessary to set forth only the charges and evidence with which we are concerned.\\nCharge number three which has multiple implications is as follows:\\n\\\"3. That in his capacity as Tax Assessor Mr. Cullen has:\\nA. Failed or neglected to maintain adequate records of explanation of individual assessments made.\\nB. Employed arbitrary and discriminatory methods of assessment detrimental to the rights and interests of the assessed owners and the public.\\\"\\nIn reaching their decision to remove petitioner, the town council found as a fact that the oral and documentary evidence received in connection with this charge clearly established the quoted allegations as having been proven. They stated that:\\n\\\"The testimony shows that after being in office only a few months, and by his own testimony not having had any previous experience in property valuations or assessing, Mr. Cullen discarded the system that had been approved previously by the taxpayers, and was then in effect, that required detailed information on a property assessing card, as a basis for arriving at the market value of property. He said he discarded the system because in his opinion it wasn't an up-to-date system. He substituted what he termed a comparable sales system. This system if based on detail records is an acceptable system. However as evidenced by the exhibits and the testimony of Mr. Cullen he kept no detailed records on which to assess in this manner or to substantiate any assessment at a later date when objection was raised by a taxpayer.\\\"\\nFrom our examination of the in evidence records kept by petitioner and the testimony of the several witnesses relied on by the council, we are constrained to hold that the council's finding of fact as to charge number three is supported' by the record.\\nHowever, in his oral argument and brief petitioner contends that the testimony of the witnesses, on which the respondent council relied, lacks legal competency. He bases this on a number of procedural objections, which, however valid when related to a civil or criminal trial, are lacking in merit here. It is well settled that when a legislative body sits to pass on charges looking to removal of a public official, the hearing is quasi-judicial and must be conducted conformable to a sense of fair play. This concept demands that the person sought to be removed shall receive written notice of the charges preferred; to a public hearing thereon at which he shall have the right to be represented by counsel; to offer testimony in rebuttal as well as the right to subpoena pertinent records and, moreover, to be heard on charges that are substantial. Mellor v. Leidman, 100 R. I. 80, 211 A.2d 633. What is not required, however, is that the hearing shall conform to the strict rules of evidence. Zimarino v. Zoning Board of Review, 95 R. I. 383, 187 A.2d 259; Whitney v. Judge of The District Court, 271 Mass. 448, 171 N. E. 648.\\nHere petitioner received written notice of substantial charges. It is self-evident that the financial affairs of a city or town are vitally related to sound record keeping practices in the office of its tax assessor. Without them, one side of the coin depicts loss of revenue to the municipality, while the other side can portray unjust taxation as to some property owners.\\nFurther,..petitioner here was given a public hearing at which he was represented by counsel and otherwise afforded the rights mandated in Mellor v. Leidman, supra.\\nEven so, petitioner further contends that the town' council's decision to remove him is fatally defective in several other particulars. Two such contentions, although unavailing to; him, are of such a nature as to call for a discussion as to why they lack merit.\\nThe first such is that the town council's decision is so tainted by bias and prejudice on the part of the respondents as to constitute a denial of the fair and impartial hearing to which petitioner was entitled, citing Kelley v. City Council of Cranston, 61 R. I. 472, 1 A.2d 185; Hanna v. Board of Aldermen, 54 R. I. 392, 173 A. 358 and others.\\nIn the latter cited case, this court held that the removal of the chief of police by a six-member board of aldermen on charges made by three members of the board, serving as a committee on police affairs who participated in the hearing and decision to remove was a nullity. This court reached its decision because the record established that at the hearing petitioner had protested that with the three members who preferred the charges participating, petitioner could not receive a fair and impartial hearing.\\nHowever, in Hanna, unlike the case here, all three accusers participated in the hearing and only one who could have been drawn by lot was necessary to constitute a quorum as in Poirier v. Martineau, supra. Had the procedure adopted in Poirier been employed in Hanna as it was here, a different case would have been presented.\\nNevertheless, prescinding from the apparent bias and prejudice inherent in a situation where the right to disqualification yields to the rule of necessity, petitioner further argues that there is a right to show actual bias, or prejudice on the part of those hearing the removal proceedings. So arguing, he refers our attention to the language of this court in Kelley v. City Council, supra.\\nThere, this court held that the existence of bias and prejudice must be shown as a matter of fact by the. person qlaiming a disqualification on such grounds and not merely presented as a matter of the opinion of that person. In other words, it is incumbent on him alleging bias and prejudice to bring evidence thereof on the record.\\nAt the commencement of the hearing in the case at bar, petitioner's counsel sought to examine the members of the council on the question of bias or prejudice in fact. He was precluded from doing this on the ground that in the Superior Court proceedings, where all councilmen were present, petitioner had ample opportunity to examine the council members, but refrained from doing so, even though the justice of that court had retained jurisdiction for the purpose of assuring petitioner of an impartial hearing.\\nHaving been denied the right to question members of the council for actual bias and prejudice, counsel for petitioner stated that he would like to make an offer of proof. Invited to make such offer counsel stated:\\n\\\"Our offer of proof will be that as a result of the cross-examination of council, we will attempt to place on the record certain facts tending to establish bias and prejudice over a period of time.\\\"\\nWe think it of controlling significance that the offer does no.t contain statements of fact as to the course of conduct regarding which counsel indicated would be brought forth on an- examination of council members. If there were a course of conduct on the part of members of the council, which would tend to establish such bias or prejudice as would prevent a member or members from reaching a decision based solely on evidence adduced, that conduct should have been affirmatively placed in the record.\\nF. Monroe Allen, Carl B. Lisa, for petitioner.\\nJohn H. Hines, Jr., for respondents.\\nClearly, either facts tending to establish the indicated course of conduct were within the knowledge of petitioner or, if not, searching for such facts through examination of council members would be a fishing expedition.\\nThis brings us then to a consideration of petitioner's remaining contention which calls for discussion. It is that, although the hearing on the preferred charges was conducted by the three member tribunal which unanimously miade the findings of fact allegedly constituting cause for removal, all five respondents participated in the vote to remove petitioner from office. Therecord establishes that respondents did indeed follow the procedure of which petitioner \\u00ab.complains. -However, it' seems clear that firs grievance is more fanciful than real. If it be conceded.that the. votes to remove cast by the two members who did not participate in the hearing tribunal must, be treated as a nullity, petitioner takes nothing thereby. There remains the unanimous vote of the three-man tribunal which on the basis of competent evidence found petitioner guilty of such inefficiency and neglect of duty as to justify his removal.\\nThe petition for certiorari is denied and dismissed. The writ heretofore issued is quashed and the records certified to this court are ordered returned to the respondent town council with our decision endorsed thereon.\\nRoberts, C. J. and Kelleher, J., did not participate.\\nSuch an ordinance was in fact adopted but in the view we take of what we \\u00a1consider to be the dispositive issue, further reference to said ordinance is -not required.\\nIf such were indeed the case, there is nothing to establish it in the record before us. What-is'in the record certified here is a'copy of the Superior Court justice's opinion. We have referred to that only as incidental to the travel of the cause and refrained from' expressing any opinion on the jurisdictional phase of the Superior Court proceedings.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/3032133.json b/ri/3032133.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f00a9257d9f46ca8c42b2a95e05b0001d87fcebb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/3032133.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"3032133\", \"name\": \"Manuel A. Penna v. Harold V. Langlois, Warden\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Penna v. Langlois\", \"decision_date\": \"1969-12-03\", \"docket_number\": \"M. P. No. 414\", \"first_page\": \"821\", \"last_page\": \"821\", \"citations\": \"106 R.I. 821\", \"volume\": \"106\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:10:19.818972+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Manuel A. Penna v. Harold V. Langlois, Warden.\", \"head_matter\": \"December 3, 1969.\\nM. P. No. 414.\\nManuel A. Penna v. Harold V. Langlois, Warden.\\nAlton W. Wiley, for plaintiff. Herbert F. DeSimone, Attorney General, for defendant.\", \"word_count\": \"43\", \"char_count\": \"259\", \"text\": \"Motion of Court to dismiss appeal for lack of prosecution in compliance with Rule 15 granted.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/3048074.json b/ri/3048074.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..aae35e3fccaf2c41df542ba07b47a41072e05334
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/3048074.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"3048074\", \"name\": \"James Edward McParlin v. Harold V. Langlois, Warden\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"McParlin v. LangLois\", \"decision_date\": \"1968-07-26\", \"docket_number\": \"M. P. No. 208\", \"first_page\": \"727\", \"last_page\": \"727\", \"citations\": \"104 R.I. 727\", \"volume\": \"104\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:21:39.561841+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"James Edward McParlin v. Harold V. Langlois, Warden.\", \"head_matter\": \"July 26, 1968.\\nM. P. No. 208.\\nJames Edward McParlin v. Harold V. Langlois, Warden.\\nJames Cardono, Public Defender, William F. Reilly, Special Counsel to Public Defender, for petitioner.\\nHerbert F. DeSimone, Attorney General, Donald P. Ryan, Asst. Attorney General, for respondent.\", \"word_count\": \"44\", \"char_count\": \"300\", \"text\": \"Reargument denied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/3054412.json b/ri/3054412.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a0152f4ab42e5ec6e7d2455ac6695ce6c86ab4c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/3054412.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"3054412\", \"name\": \"Petition of Nelson C. Drummond and Lucille F. Drummond\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re Drummond\", \"decision_date\": \"1968-05-14\", \"docket_number\": \"M. P. No. 430\", \"first_page\": \"723\", \"last_page\": \"723\", \"citations\": \"104 R.I. 723\", \"volume\": \"104\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:21:39.561841+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Petition of Nelson C. Drummond and Lucille F. Drummond.\", \"head_matter\": \"M. P. No. 430.\\nPetition of Nelson C. Drummond and Lucille F. Drummond.\\nDean J. Lewis, for petitioners.\\nMoore, Virgadamo, Boyle & Lynch, Salvatore L. Virgadamo, for respondents.\", \"word_count\": \"76\", \"char_count\": \"470\", \"text\": \"Petition for trial pursuant to G. L. 1956, \\u00a79-21-4, as amended, granted, and judgment entered in Superior Court, Newport County, C. A. No. 8507, Nelson C. Drummond et ux. v. Havana Cafe, Inc., vacated. All papers in said case under Appeal No. 353-A remanded to Superior Court, Newport County.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/3058481.json b/ri/3058481.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2566d59dffc76ec7ee54049c548ce5dcad33d14e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/3058481.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"3058481\", \"name\": \"Re: Petition of Constantine J. O'Rourke\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re O'Rourke\", \"decision_date\": \"1968-04-10\", \"docket_number\": \"M. P. No. 400\", \"first_page\": \"772\", \"last_page\": \"772\", \"citations\": \"103 R.I. 772\", \"volume\": \"103\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:14:28.209723+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Re: Petition of Constantine J. O\\u2019Rourke.\", \"head_matter\": \"M. P. No. 400.\\nRe: Petition of Constantine J. O\\u2019Rourke.\\nCarroll & Dwyer, John G. Carroll, for petitioner.\\nPaul J. Bordieri, for respondent.\", \"word_count\": \"26\", \"char_count\": \"167\", \"text\": \"Petition for trial denied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/3063139.json b/ri/3063139.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..bcdb5add0fbfe78f466c08c20419249490f81eb3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/3063139.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"3063139\", \"name\": \"Rosbro Plastics Corporation v. Joseph Davenport, et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Rosbro Plastics Corp. v. Davenport\", \"decision_date\": \"1968-03-12\", \"docket_number\": \"M. P. No. 368\", \"first_page\": \"770\", \"last_page\": \"770\", \"citations\": \"103 R.I. 770\", \"volume\": \"103\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:14:28.209723+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Rosbro Plastics Corporation v. Joseph Davenport, et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"M. P. No. 368.\\nRosbro Plastics Corporation v. Joseph Davenport, et al.\\nAdelson & Chernick, Joseph E. Adelson, Melvin A. Chernick, for plaintiff.\\nLuden Capone, for defendants.\", \"word_count\": \"39\", \"char_count\": \"260\", \"text\": \"Motion to dismiss appeal granted pro forma. Petition for writ of certiorari granted.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/3115424.json b/ri/3115424.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e87704648c51537a55529c575602908de379f8bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/3115424.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"3115424\", \"name\": \"George H. Wood v. Congdon Equipment Co. et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Wood v. Congdon Equipment Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1976-10-28\", \"docket_number\": \"M. P. No. 76-369\", \"first_page\": \"933\", \"last_page\": \"933\", \"citations\": \"117 R.I. 933\", \"volume\": \"117\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:00:49.327419+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"George H. Wood v. Congdon Equipment Co. et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"M. P. No. 76-369.\\nKeenan, Rice, Dolan, Reardon & Kiernan, Thomas C. Plunkett, for plaintiff-respondent. Pucci & Goldin, Samuel A. Olevson, for defendants-petitioners.\\nGeorge H. Wood v. Congdon Equipment Co. et al.\", \"word_count\": \"36\", \"char_count\": \"254\", \"text\": \"Petition for writ of certiorari denied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/3118789.json b/ri/3118789.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8efa3f5b410f9762175d1d25e43b9378067587d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/3118789.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"3118789\", \"name\": \"Emma Martineau et al. v. Frank King et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Martineau v. King\", \"decision_date\": \"1976-12-31\", \"docket_number\": \"Appeal No. 76-216\", \"first_page\": \"963\", \"last_page\": \"963\", \"citations\": \"117 R.I. 963\", \"volume\": \"117\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:00:49.327419+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Emma Martineau et al. v. Frank King et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Appeal No. 76-216.\\nAlbert B. Watt, for plaintiffs. F. Monroe Allen, for defendants.\\nEmma Martineau et al. v. Frank King et al.\", \"word_count\": \"36\", \"char_count\": \"206\", \"text\": \"Motion of plaintiff to affirm judgment below pursuant to Rule 16(g) is denied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/3137581.json b/ri/3137581.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c8164024b92fc1bb2a1ed1c6eb963adbb6728061
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/3137581.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"3137581\", \"name\": \"State vs. Juvenal J. Rezendes\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Rezendes\", \"decision_date\": \"1973-02-19\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"169\", \"last_page\": \"178\", \"citations\": \"111 R.I. 169\", \"volume\": \"111\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:40:57.781560+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Roberts, C.J., Paolino, Powers, Joslin and Kellelier, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"State vs. Juvenal J. Rezendes.\", \"head_matter\": \"300 A.2d 472.\\nState vs. Juvenal J. Rezendes.\\nFEBRUARY 19, 1973.\\nPresent: Roberts, C.J., Paolino, Powers, Joslin and Kellelier, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"2656\", \"char_count\": \"15430\", \"text\": \"Roberts, C. J.\\nThis is an indictment charging the defendant with possession of a burglary tool, to wit, a tire iron. The case was tried to a justice of the Superior Court sitting with a jury which returned a verdict of guilty as charged in the indictment. The defendant's motion for a new trial was subsequently denied by the Superior Court, and he is now in this court prosecuting a bill of exceptions.\\nIt appears from uncontradicted testimony that at approximately 9:20 on the evening of July 21, 1969, the Providence Police Department received a call to the effect that somebody was \\\"breaking in\\\" a market located at the corner of Cranston and Superior Streets. Patrolman Mark Donley, one of the arresting officers, testified that thereupon he and his partner, Patrolman Thomas E. Keune, proceeded to the location of the market. Donley was operating an unmarked police car that he drove into a parking area at the rear of the store. He further testified that as they turned into the parking lot, the lights of the police car were on high beam and that a bright light was suspended above the rear door of the store. At this time he observed defendant and a juvenile standing close to the back door of the market. As the car entered the lot, he observed defendant drop a tire iron as he and the juvenile turned to run. They were taken into custody after a short pursuit.\\nDonley further testified that, after capturing defendant, he placed him in the rear seat of the police car and then retrieved the tire iron from where it had been thrown by defendant, which was about 6 to 10 feet from the rear door of the store. The testimony of Patrolman Keune corroborated the testimony of Patrolman Donley, particularly in the fact that defendant, when first observed, was standing close to the rear door of the market under the overhead light and that, upon seeing the car coming into the parking lot, he threw the tire iron to the ground as he started to run.\\nWhile under direct examination Frank R. Andreozzi, the proprietor of the market and the parking lot, was queried concerning the physical characteristics of the parking area immediately behind the store. He answered: \\\"Where the back door is it's about fifteen feet in, because in here there is a walk-in freezer on the corner of the store so the door has to be at least fifteen feet in from the corner. Here there is plenty of room to see the back of the door from here. There is nothing obstructing the view. There was one car in the parking lot, and it was here. I have these spaces rented also, but we try to keep as much of this clear as possible because we had quite a bit of trouble in the neighborhood.\\\"\\nThe defendant moved immediately to strike that answer, which motion was denied. The court said it would let the answer stand because \\\"[i]t doesn't pertain to this defendant. That testimony has no bearing with respect to this particular defendant. I'll let it stand because it's part of the complete answer. Your exception is noted.\\\" In this court defendant contends that it was error to deny the motion to strike the testimony referring to trouble in the neighborhood, first, as irrelevant and, second, as being so prejudicial that it denied defendant his right to a fair and impartial trial.\\nThe admission of testimony objected to as immaterial or irrelevant rests in the sound discretion of the trial justice. State v. Glass, 107 R. I. 86, 265 A.2d 324 (1970). In the first place, the motion to strike made no reference to the particular part of the testimony to which it was directed. It is only in this court that defendant directs attention to the phrase \\\"trouble in the neighborhood\\\" and contends that it was without relevance or materiality on the issue of defendant's possession of burglary tools, the offense for which he was indicted. Ordinarily such a failure to specify the ground upon which the motion is based would cause us to overrule the exception. We assume, however, from the tenor of the language used by the trial justice in denying the motion, that he understood that it referred to the phrase \\\"trouble in the neighborhood.\\\" Therefore, we will consider the question further.\\nObviously, the testimony sought and adduced by the question would tend to sustain the testimony of the police witnesses identifying defendant as the man they observed discarding the tire iron in the parking area behind the store. That this is entirely relevant on the issue of defendant's guilt of the possession of burglary tools is clear. However, the witness's use of the phrase \\\"trouble in the neighborhood\\\" may imply that defendant had participated in other criminal conduct in the neighborhood. We must question whether retention in evidence of this phrase diverted the jury's attention from the issue of defendant's guilt of the offense with which he was charged.\\nIn State v. Reardon, 101 R. I. 18, 219 A.2d 767 (1966), we noted that vexing problems frequently arise from the question of whether the court exercised its sound judicial discretion in retaining evidence in the record that had been objected to on the grounds of its lack of relevance and materiality. The problem raised, of course, was whether such evidence would be sufficient to so prejudice jurors against the defendant that they could not give him a fair and impartial trial. In Reardon we said that any relevant testimony not barred by some specific rule of evidence should be given to the jury for its consideration unless it is clear that the probative force thereof is outweighed by its tendency to divert the jury from' a fair consideration of the guilt of the defendant with respect to the offense with which he is charged. Id. at 25, 219 A.2d at 772.\\nIn the instant case, we are not persuaded that the reference to \\\"trouble in the neighborhood\\\" generated prejudice to defendant sufficient to outweigh the probative force of the testimony identifying defendant as the man who discarded the tire iron behind the store. That identification of defendant by the police witnesses constituted an essen tial link in the proof of his guilt of the offense charged. However, the credibility of the police witnesses' testimony as to the identity of defendant depends largely on the store owner's testimony concerning existing characteristics and conditions of the parking area. Those conditions obviously affect the ability of the police to make the observations necessary for identification. It is our conclusion, then, that the police testimony identifying defendant had substantial probative value, and we cannot agree that the retention in evidence of the reference to \\\"trouble in the neighborhood\\\" was so prejudicial that it outweighed the probative value of the testimony of the store owner. In the circumstances, we are unable to conclude that the denial of defendant's motion to strike constituted an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial justice.\\nThe defendant contends also that it was error to deny his motion for a mistrial. After both sides had rested, defense counsel and the prosecutor summed up for the jury. At that point, the motion to declare a mistrial was made by defendant. He argued, and the record discloses, that the prosecutor in his summation to the jury had said that the defendant was unaware \\\" that these policemen in this car were responding to a complaint, that's why they were there.\\\"\\nAs we understand defendant, he is now urging that by using the word \\\"complaint\\\" in his summation to the jury, the jurors were misled into believing that defendant was apprehended while engaged in breaking and entering into the market. This, he contends, so confused the jury as to the real issue before it that defendant was deprived of a fair and impartial trial. Obviously, he is contending that the word \\\"complaint\\\" in this context was inherently prejudicial. With this we cannot agree. To buttress his position, defendant referred to the testimony given by Patrolman Donley at the opening of the trial. The patrolman had been asked whether, before he went to the market, he had received any kind of order from a superior. Patrolman Donley testified: \\\"Approximately 9:20 p.m. we received a call. Someone breaking in Gemma's Market.\\\"\\nThe defendant clearly is asking us to accept the theory that the cumulative effect of the testimony of the patrolman and the statement of the prosecutor was to generate a confusion in the minds of the jury as to the real issue on trial. By directing its attention to the offense of breaking and entering, an offense with which defendant is not charged in the indictment, the prosecutor misled the jury. This argument, in our opinion, fails to recognize the significance of the fact that immediately after Patrolman Donley testified using the word \\\"breaking,\\\" the court ordered the answer stricken and instructed the jury to disregard the reference by the patrolman to a break. There is nothing in the record that persuades us that the jury did not follow the instruction so given it by the court.\\nThis argument concerning the cumulative effect of the testimony and the summation also overlooks the fact that the court, in denying the motion to declare a mistrial, assured defendant that in his charge he would clarify the situation by informing the jury that there was no evidence in the case that there had been a break in the market on the night in question. This he did and further charged that the question of a break was not in issue. We cannot say that this instruction did not in and of itself cure any prejudice that might have developed from the use of the words \\\"breaking\\\" and \\\"complaint\\\" in the evidence. The court did not err in denying the motion to declare a mistrial, and this exception is overruled.\\nFinally, defendant argues that he was substantially prejudiced by that portion of the charge relating to a defendant's right to refrain from testifying in his own behalf. The rule is that a jury may draw no inferences of guilt from the fact that defendant did not take the stand to testify in his own behalf. A portion of the charge to which defendant refers was to the effect that no one, including a defendant, \\\" is obliged to incriminate himself and take the stand. This defendant is not obliged to prove his innocence. He doesn't have to present witnesses to prove his innocence. He can do legally and lawfully and constitutionally what he has chosen to do in this case and that is to remain silent. The fact that he has not taken the stand or introduced any evidence in his own behalf is not to be taken by any of you as any inference that he may be guilty. He has elected to utilize a constitutional guarantee, and he is not to be faulted for that reason.\\\"\\nThe defendant's contention of error is that the reference in this portion of the charge to self-incrimination necessarily led the jury to assume that the court was indicating its belief in the guilt of defendant to his resultant prejudice. In our opinion, the contention is valid only if it can be established that the jury was misled and confused by the reference to self-incrimination. We determine whether the charge was sufficiently clear and understandable on the basis not of how we would construe the instruction in question, but rather of how we believe it would be interpreted by a jury comprised of ordinary intelligent lay persons listening to it at the close of the trial. Anter v. Ambeault, 104 R. I. 496, 245 A.2d 137 (1968); D'Arezzo v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 102 R. I. 56, 228 A.2d 114 (1967). Would it follow, then, that, in view of the reference to self-in crimination, these jurors would necessarily assume that the trial justice was indicating his opinion that defendant was guilty?\\nWe think not. If we were to concede that the reference to self-incrimination could be misleading and confusing standing alone, we do not think that it is thus when read in the context of the charge as given. Clearly, the instruc tion points out that a defendant is obliged neither to prove his innocence nor to present witnesses to prove his innocence, and it necessarily implies that the burden of proof is on the state and that the presumption of innocence remains with him. It is our opinion that in the circumstances we cannot say that the jury was misled as defendant contends.\\nHowever, it is to be noted that the trial justice, upon exception being taken to the charge as given, immediately took steps to correct any such misunderstanding on the part of the jury and gave further instructions. The precise language of the curative instruction was: \\\"The Constitution says that no one charged with a crime has to incriminate himself. He doesn't have to take the stand, and no inference can be drawn from that. In other words, you can't say to yourself, well anybody who doesn't take the stand must be guilty. You can't do that. If you do it, you're not rendering a fair and impartial verdict.\\\" We are of the opinion that the instruction as given in the charge and in the curative instruction did not confuse and mislead the jury. We, therefore, find this exception to be without merit, and it is overruled.\\nWe turn to defendant's exception to the denial of his motion for a new trial. The record discloses compliance by the trial justice with the obligation, imposed upon him by a motion for new trial, of considering all of the evidence in an exercise of his own independent judgment, and passing upon the credibility and the weight to be given thereto. The trial justice having done this, we will not disturb his decision on the motion unless defendant sustains the burden of showing that he was clearly wrong in that he overlooked or misconceived material evidence on a controlling issue. State v. Ramsdell, 109 R. I. 320, 331, 285 A.2d 399, 406 (1971); State v. Mozzarella, 103 R. I. 253, 258, 236 A.2d 446, 449 (1967).\\nRichard J. Israel, Attorney General, Donald P. Ryan, Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff.\\nWilliam F. Reilly, Public Defender, Paul Kelley, Assistant Public Defender, for defendant.\\nThere is little doubt that the jury accepted as true the testimony of the police witnesses that the defendant was behind the store holding a tire iron in his hand which, as they approached, he discarded and fled. The trial justice clearly approved of the finding of the jury on the basis of this evidence. The defendant argues that the record contained neither credible evidence establishing that he was in possession of the tire iron nor credible evidence that a break had been attempted but aborted by the arrival of the police. To a substantial degree the arguments raised in this court by the defendant in challenging the court's denial of his motion for a new trial would have been more properly addressed to the jury and the trial justice than to this court. See State v. McCartin, 106 R. I. 674, 262 A.2d 826 (1970). It is our conclusion, then, that the defendant has failed to establish that the trial justice was clearly wrong in passing on the motion, and, therefore, we find that no error inhered in his denial of the motion.\\nAll of the defendant's exceptions are overruled, and the case is remitted to the Superior Court for further proceedings.\\nMr. Justice Powers participated in the decision but retired prior to its announcement. Mr. Justice Doris did not participate.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/3141862.json b/ri/3141862.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..79114e1424f3d8ea3f74e29e2f20475f0fad9256
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/3141862.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"3141862\", \"name\": \"Anthony J. Bottiglio v. State\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Bottiglio v. State\", \"decision_date\": \"1973-10-09\", \"docket_number\": \"M. P. No. 73-208\", \"first_page\": \"917\", \"last_page\": \"917\", \"citations\": \"112 R.I. 917\", \"volume\": \"112\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:35:31.121356+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Anthony J. Bottiglio v. State.\", \"head_matter\": \"M. P. No. 73-208.\\nAnthony J. Bottiglio v. State.\\nAnthony J. Bottiglio, petitioner, pro se. Richard J. Israel, Attorney General, Donald P. Ryan, Asst. Attorney General, for respondent.\", \"word_count\": \"51\", \"char_count\": \"316\", \"text\": \"Petition for writ of mandamus denied without prejudice to right of petitioner to renew same within 30 days from date of this order.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/3145710.json b/ri/3145710.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..65392149087406d0b749ffd2842be22e5fcb106c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/3145710.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"3145710\", \"name\": \"Darleen T. Johnson vs. Milton G. Johnson; Howard Martin Johnson, Incorporated et al. vs. Milton G. Johnson\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Johnson v. Johnson\", \"decision_date\": \"1973-02-23\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"183\", \"last_page\": \"191\", \"citations\": \"111 R.I. 183\", \"volume\": \"111\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:40:57.781560+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Roberts. C. J., Paolino, Powers, Joslin and Kelleher, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Darleen T. Johnson vs. Milton G. Johnson. Howard Martin Johnson, Incorporated et al. vs. Milton G. Johnson.\", \"head_matter\": \"300 A.2d 642.\\nDarleen T. Johnson vs. Milton G. Johnson. Howard Martin Johnson, Incorporated et al. vs. Milton G. Johnson.\\nFEBRUARY 23, 1973.\\nPresent: Roberts. C. J., Paolino, Powers, Joslin and Kelleher, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"2794\", \"char_count\": \"16750\", \"text\": \"Roberts, C. J.\\nThe matter, before us is an appeal from the denial by a justice of the Superior Court of a motion to charge the garnishees. The appellant is Darleen T. Johnson, the plaintiff in Darleen T. Johnson v. Milton G. Johnson, C. A. No. 70-1163, hereinafter referred to as Darleen's claim. Also involved is the case of Howard Martin Johnson, Incorporated, and Howard M. Johnson v. Milton G. Johnson, C. A. No. 70-2590, hereinafter referred to as Howard's claim.\\nMilton G. Johnson, defendant in the cases referred to above, was himself plaintiff in an action pending in the Superior Court for Kent County, that is, C. A. No. 67-251, entitled Milton G. Johnson v. Leonard T. Maynard, Jr. et al., which will hereinafter be referred to as Milton's claim. This latter action had been brought by Milton in an effort to recover from the defendants, hereinafter collectively referred to as the garnishees, moneys which he claimed were due him for legal services already rendered. As of March 5, 1970, Milton's claim had been referred by a Superior Court justice to special masters for a determination specifically of what amount was due Milton as legal fees.\\nThe motion which is the subject matter of this appeal was heard by the Superior Court on March 11, 1971, and on April 30, 1971, the trial justice rendered a decision, wherein he said: \\\"Therefore in the case of Darleen, which is 70-1163, the motion to charge the garnishees is denied and in the Howard case, which is 70-2590, the garnishees are charged to the full extent of the fixed sum, to wit, $10,-625.57.\\\" The record does not disclose that any motion to charge the garnishees was made in the Howard claim, and it is from the judgment entered in denying her motion to charge the garnishees in Darleen's claim, and, instead, charging the garnishees in Howard's claim that Darleen is pressing her appeal to this court.\\nWhile Milton's claim was under consideration by the masters, Darleen on April 23, 1970, caused the garnishees to be served with writs of attachment. The affidavits of the garnishees in response to the writs stated, in part, that at the time of the service of the writs they possessed none of Milton's personal estate except what amount might be proved due him on the basis of his claim for legal fees.\\nOn September 14, 1970, the masters having filed their report, judgment was entered in the Superior Court, County of Kent, for Milton in Milton's claim in the sum of $10,625.57 plus interest and costs. On that same day Darleen again caused writs of subsequent attachment to be served on the garnishees. The sheriff's returns stated that the service of the writs of subsequent attachment was made on the garnishees at 4:48, 4:49, and 4:50 p.m., respectively, on September 14, 1970. On that same day Howard .had caused writs of attachment to be served on the garnishees in Howard's claim. The sheriff's return on those writs stated that service was made on the garnishees at 4:45, 4:46, and 4:47 p.m., respectively, on September 14, 1970. The affidavits filed by the garnishees in response to the writs of attachment of both Darleen and Howard were similar to the affidavits filed by them in response to the writs of attachment of Darleen on April 23, 1970.\\nApproximately one week later, on September 22, 1970, in the matter of Milton's claim, a supersedeas judgment was entered for Milton for $10,625.57 plus interest from the date of entry and costs. Thereafter, on September 23, 1970, writs of subsequent attachment were caused to be served on the garnishees by Howard in Howard's claim, and in response thereto the garnishees filed affidavits similar in form and content to those previously filed in that action.\\nThereafter, on February 25, 1971, the Superior Court entered summary judgment for appellant in Darleen's claim in the amount of $20,959.30 with interest and costs. On the following day appellant moved to charge the garnishees in Darleen's claim. Subsequently, on April 2, 1971, judgment was entered in Howard's claim for the plaintiffs therein. On March 11, 1971, the motion of appellant to charge the garnishees in Darleen's claim was argued before the Su perior Court. On April 30, 1971, the trial justice denied the appellant's motion to charge the garnishees in Darleen's claim and, instead, charged the garnishees in Howard's claim in the amount of $10,625.57. In his decision the trial justice expressly found that the only effective attachments were the subsequent attachments in Howard's claim made on September 23, 1970, the day after the supersedeas judgment in Milton's claim was entered.\\nThe question is whether Darleen's attachments of April 23, 1970, constituted a valid garnishment of Milton's claim. If it were, it would be dispositive, as it would be error to have denied her motion to charge the garnishees. Under the controlling statute, the garnishment that is first in time has priority. General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment) \\u00a79-26-30. The trial justice gave no reason whatsoever in support of his conclusion that Darleen's garnishment on April 23, 1970, was invalid. It may be that he relied on the general rule that an unliquidated claim is not subject to garnishment. The appellant relies principally on McKendall v. Patullo, 52 R. I. 258, 160 A. 202 (1932), as providing an exception to the general rule stated above.\\nIn McKendall, the defendant, a builder, contracted with the garnishee to build two houses. By April of 1927, the garnishee took possession of the houses, but final payment had not been made. On September 8, 1927, McKendall, a materialman of the defendant, commenced his action by writ of attachment on the money owed on the contract. On November 3, another materialman, Burrows & Kenyon, Inc., also commenced suit with garnishment process. The garnishee's affidavit in both actions set forth the contract and certain claims against the defendant for recoupment for defective work and delay. She also requested to be made a party so that the court could determine what, if anything, she owed the defendant. The Superior Court found that the garnishee owed the defendant $2,416.35. Thereafter,\\nBurrows & Kenyon, Inc., again served the garnishee. Both materialmen then sought to charge the garnishee. This court ruled McKendall's garnishment first in time and valid. After first stating the general rule that unliquidated claims are not subject to garnishment, the court proceeded to outline its reasons for drawing an exception to that rule: \\\"The purpose of the garnishment statute is to render liable for the payment of debts, property that cannot be reached by the direct process of attachment. We see no valid reason why this purpose should be defeated because the amount due the principal defendant is made uncertain by a claim to a part of the fund by the garnishee. While she cannot be immediately charged, the security for the debt is maintained as contemplated by the statute until by appropriate proceedings the amount for which she is chargeable has been determined.\\\" Id. at 263, 160 A. at 204.\\nThe court's opinion appears to be based on the fact that there was an admitted obligation owing from the garnishee to the contractor. The garnishee had taken possession of the houses and was only contesting the amount due the contractor. The high likelihood that it would be determined that the garnishee would be liable to pay something to the defendants supported the validity of the garnishment even though the exact amount was indeterminate.\\nA number of other cases have allowed garnishment or attachment of an unliquidated claim. The same general\\nreasoning runs throughout these cases. Garnishment is allowed on an unliquidated claim where there is a certainty as to liability but a contingency as to amount. Where an obligation to pay exists, even though the amount of that obligation is undetermined, garnishment will lie where the amount is capable of definite ascertainment by the contract, or by the facts then known, or by testimony to be taken. The logic of the cases which permit garnishment where an obligation to pay pursuant to a contract exists even though the amount due is uncertain is that the garnishee holds something of the personal estate of the defendant-debtor.\\nIn opposition to this line of argument, appellee has cited a number of cases supporting the proposition that unliqui dated damages provide an insufficient basis for attachment. However, most of his cases are of a different posture than this one. In those cases the suit was instituted by writs of attachment; the plaintiffs' claims were for unliquidated amounts; and the courts held the attachments improper. Attachment is a drastic remedy which ties up an asset of a defendant by taking property prior to judgment. In the cited cases, the principal claim was unliquidated, but a fixed asset was attached. In the present case, it was merely the claim garnished which was unliquidated. No hardship was imposed on Milton by the garnishment, for he was not deprived of the use of any asset, inasmuch as he had no right to any money until judgment. Thus, appellee's authorities are not applicable to the circumstances of this case.\\nWe must now turn to the claim Milton G. Johnson had against Leonard T. Maynard, Jr. et al. The defendants had employed Johnson to resolve a problem arising under the will of Henry Warner Budlong. Budlong devised to the mother of Hope Maynard and Alice I. Hohler a life estate in 25 acres of land in Warwick and the remainder to the State of Rhode Island for a public park. The establishment of a public park on the property would have dislodged the people living there and deprived the defendants of income-producing property. Johnson proposed a plan which was adopted by the state, by which the state disclaimed the gift under Budlong's will and the defendants made an alternative gift of 25 acres to the state. From the pretrial memoranda, it is agreed that Milton G. Johnson performed legal services for the defendants, and that they accepted the plan he proposed and participated in the ultimate solution. In dispute, however, was the amount those services were worth. No written contract between Milton and the defendants was made. Milton had received $7,500. In his bill of particulars, Milton claimed about $4,000 out-of-pocket expenses and a total fee of $42,000. Deducting the $7,500 he had already received, he sought approximately $38,500. The defendants disputed the values Milton put on the land, but in their pretrial memo they indicated that after they had paid the $7,500, they felt that the balance due would be approximately $2,500. The trial justice then appointed special masters to determine what amount, if any, was due Milton.\\nWe must determine whether Milton's claim fits the McKendall exception to the general rule that an unliquidated claim cannot be garnished. Milton's claim is similar to McKendall in that it is undisputed that he rendered services to the defendants, and that the defendants accepted the fruits of those services. It is dissimilar in that Milton's services were not rendered pursuant to any written contract. Moreover, in McKendall, the garnishee was making a claim for recoupment and delay; thus, in reality, she was only making a claim to a part of the fund which she owed the defendant under the contract. Here, at issue was what was the value of the services performed by Milton, for there was no contract price. It might be argued that this difference is sufficient to distinguish the cases. However, we feel the difference is simply a product of the different services provided. When one hires a contractor to build a house, a price is normally established prior to commencement of construction. When one hires a lawyer to represent him in a certain matter, a fee may not be set prior to beginning work if the extent of the work to be done is not known at that time.\\nThe crucial issue in McKendall was whether it was reasonably certain that she [the garnishee] had in her hands personal estate belonging to the defendant.\\\" McKendall v. Patullo, supra at 263, 160 A. at 204. Applying that test to the factual context at the time of garnishment, we must conclude that it was sufficiently certain that something was owing Milton and thus his claim was subject to garnishment. The court had appointed masters; the defendants had conceded that Milton performed certain services for them; and they indicated in their memo that they had felt those services were worth $10,000. Since they had only paid Milton $7,500, it was likely that the masters would find that at least $2,500 would be due him. Since the obligation to pay existed, and only the amount was uncertain, Milton's claim seemed analogous to that in McKendall. Hence, Darleen's garnishment was valid, and it was improper for the trial justice to deny her motion to charge the garnishees.\\nHiggins, Cavanagh & Cooney, Albert D. Saunders, Jr., for appellant.\\nAram A. Arabian, for appellees.\\nNeither party to this appeal has raised the relevance of the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349 (1969). Milton had notice of Darleen's motion to charge the garnishees, and he made an appearance at the hearing on the motion. However, he is not a party to this appeal. Therefore, we have not considered the constitutional validity of this prejudgment garnishment on the grounds recognized in Sniadach.\\nThe appeal of the appellant, Darleen, is sustained, the judgment appealed from is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings.\\nMr. Justice Powers participated in the decision but retired before its publication. Mr. Justice Doris did not participate.\\nSome of these are: Meacham v. Meacham, 262 Cal.App.2d 248. 68 Cal.Rptr. 746 (Ct. of App. 1968) (Rights under a royalty contract were subject to garnishment.); Brunskill v. Stutman, 186 Cal.App.2d 97, 8 Cal.Rptr. 910 (Ct. of App. 1960) (Citing McKendall v. Patullo, 52 R.I. 258, 160 A. 202 (1932), the court allowed garnishment of retainage on a contract to repair a naval vessel.); Van Orden v. Anderson, 122 Cal.App. 132, 9 P.2d 572 (Ct. of App. 1932) (Garnishment was permitted of the amount due the beneficiary of a trust where the purposes of the trust had been accomplished even though the amount due had not yet been determined.); Parker, Peebles & Knox v. El Saieh, 107 Conn. 545, 141 A. 884 (1928); Finch v. Great American Ins. Co., 101 Conn. 332, 125 A. 628 (1924); Knox v. Protection Ins. Co., 9 Conn. 430 (1833) (These three Connecticut cases allowed garnishment of unadjusted insurance claims.); Ransom v. Bidwell, 89 Conn. 137, 93 A. 134 (1915) (Final payment under a construction contract became subject to garnishment when the contract was substantially complete even though the amount owed was to be determined by arbitration. This case was relied on and discussed at length by this court in McKendall v. Patullo, supra.); Hussey v. Titcomb, 127 Me. 423, 144 A. 218 (1929); Cutter v. Perkins, 47 Me. 557 (1859) (Both Maine cases permitted attachment of what an executor held for the residuary legatee of a will even though it might ultimately be proven that nothing was due the legatee.); Grise v. White, 351 Mass. 427, 221 N.E.2d 874 (1966) (Court allowed garnishment of the amount owed an insurance company on a judgment even though the insurance company had a right of set-ofi against that judgment.); Talbert v. Solventol Chemical Products, Inc., 304 Mich. 557, 8 N.W.2d 637 (1943) (Garnishment of commission due under a contract was allowed.); John W. McGrath Corp. v. Vera Cruz Cia. Naviera, S.A., 256 So.2d 505 (Miss. 1971) (Judgment on the issue of liability in favor of a debtor against the garnishee became subject to garnishment prior io any determination of damages.); American National Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 215 So.2d 245 (Miss. 1968) (The proceeds of an employee's fidelity bond were subject to garnishment even though the amount due had not yet been determined.); Petri v. Sheriff, 87 Nev. 549, 491 P.2d 43 (1971) (A certificate of deposit voluntarily placed with the county clerk by a debtor being sued was subject to garnishment.).\\nThe following facts about Milton's claim were obtained from the record in Kent County, C. A. No. 67-251 (Milton G. Johnson v. Leonard T. Maynard, Jr.; Hope Maynard; and Alice I. Hohler). This record was transferred from the office of the Clerk of the Kent County Superior Court upon the informal request of this court.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/3149500.json b/ri/3149500.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..189370495aec524396cb9a1169d786d469f9db38
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/3149500.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"3149500\", \"name\": \"Chernov Enterprises, Inc. vs. Deeb G. Sarkas, Liquor Control Administrator\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Chernov Enterprises, Inc. v. Sarkas\", \"decision_date\": \"1971-12-03\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"283\", \"last_page\": \"289\", \"citations\": \"109 R.I. 283\", \"volume\": \"109\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:29:00.850269+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Roberts, C. J., Paolino, Powers, Joslin and Kelleher, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Chernov Enterprises, Inc. vs. Deeb G. Sarkas, Liquor Control Administrator\", \"head_matter\": \"284 A.2d 61.\\nChernov Enterprises, Inc. vs. Deeb G. Sarkas, Liquor Control Administrator\\nDECEMBER 3, 1971.\\nPresent: Roberts, C. J., Paolino, Powers, Joslin and Kelleher, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"1598\", \"char_count\": \"9769\", \"text\": \"Joslin, J.\\nThis petition for certiorari was filed under the Administrative Procedures Act. The petitioner is Chernov Enterprises, Inc., a Rhode Island corporation and the operator of a restaurant and nightclub known as \\\"The Warehouse.\\\" It asks us to review a Superior Court judgment affirming a decision of the State Liquor Control Administrator. The administrator, in turn, had confirmed an order in which the Bureau of Licenses of the City of Providence refused to renew the petitioner's Class B liquor retail license.\\nWithin the time provided by law, petitioner applied to the bureau of licenses for a renewal of its Class B liquor license. Due notice of its application was given, and while no remonstrants appeared at the scheduled hearing to challenge the application, the bureau, acting on its own motion, ordered petitioner to appear and show cause why its application should be renewed. The show cause hearing was originally scheduled for November 28, 1969, but was postponed upon petitioner's request. It was held on December 5, and petitioner's application was denied. The bureau based its decision upon findings that (1) petitioner had violated the Sunday entertainment laws; and (2) that its president had suborned perjury by requesting two minors who had been served beer at \\\"The Warehouse\\\" to attest in writing and to testify that they were over 21 years of age when they were served. Following approval of that, decision first by the liquor control administrator after a de novo hearing, and then by a Superior Court justice sitting without a jury, petitioner moved for leave to file a petition for certiorari and we ordered the writ to issue. Chernov Enterprises, Inc. v. Sarkas, Liquor Control Administrator, 108 R. I. 922, 274 A.2d 906 (1971).\\nThe petitioner advances several arguments in aid of its claim for relief. The first, as we understand it, is that the bureau's failure to act on its application prior to December 1, 1969 had the twofold effect of depriving the bureau of jurisdiction to act thereon at a later date, and of auto matically renewing its license for another year. In support of that argument, petitioner points to section 14(b) of the Administrative Procedures Act. Even were we to assume that a local licensing authority like the bureau is an \\\"agency\\\" within the contemplation of section 14(b), the petitioner's argument would still be completely untenable. A cursory reading of section 14(b) makes this abundantly clear. It presupposes that there will be occasions where an \\\"agency\\\" will not act prior to the normal expiration date of a license, and it provides for that contingency by extending the life of the license, not for another year as petitioner argues, but until the last date provided by law for seeking review of the \\\"agency's\\\" post-expiration date action. Applying these principles to this case would have resulted in the life of petitioner's license being prolonged until December 15, 1969 or March 12, 1970, Having reached this conclusion, we find it unnecessary to consider the several contentions petitioner premises on the assumption that its license was renewed by operation of law for another year.\\nWe turn now to the record of the administrative proceedings in order to determine whether the Superior Court properly exercised its limited jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedures Act when it affirmed the administrator's decision. In the absence of any contention that petitioner has been denied procedural due process, our starting point is G. L. 1956, \\u00a73-7-6, as amended by P. L. 1961, chap. 164, sec. 1. It provides that an application for the renewal of a Class A, B, or C license may be rejected, but only for cause. In establishing cause as the controlling standard, the Legislature obviously did not intend to confer upon the licensing authority a limitless control or to permit the exercise of an unbridled discretion. The petitioner argues that the Legislature intended to circumscribe the power to review by restricting its scope to breaches or violations of those conditions, rules or regulations which under \\u00a73-5-21 and 3-5-23 qualify as grounds for revoking or suspending a license. We cannot agree. If that had been the Legislature's intention, it would have said so. Instead, it used only the phrase \\\"for cause.\\\" In construing other legislation where that term has been used to delineate controlling guidelines for administrative action, we have said that a cause, to justify action, must be legally sufficient, that is to say, it must be bottomed upon substantial grounds and be established by legally competent evidence. Davis v. Cousineau, 97 R. I. 85, 90, 196 A.2d 153, 156 (1963); Aniello v. Marcello, 91 R. I. 198, 207, 162 A.2d 270, 274 (1960); Narragansett Racing Association, Inc. v. Kiernan, 59 R. I. 79, 83, 194 A. 49, 51 (1937). We see no reason why the word \\\"cause\\\" as used in \\u00a73-7-6 should be construed differently.\\nOurs is now the responsibility of passing on the legal sufficiency of the cause relied upon as the basis for action in this case. In discharging that responsibility we examined the record, not to determine whether the evidence was strong or weak, direct or circumstantial, or to pass on credibility, but only to ascertain whether the action being reviewed was so arbitrary or capricious as to constitute. an abuse of discretion, whether there was any legal evidence to support it, and whether the licensing proceeding was otherwise affected by an error of law. Hobday v. O'Dowd, 94 R. I. 172, 176, 179 A.2d 319, 322 (1962); Board of License Commissioners v. O'Dowd, 94 R. I. 243, 248, 179 A.2d 579, 582 (1962).\\nIn this case, petitioner does not contend that it would have been an abuse of discretion to reject its application upon proper proof that it was convicted of violating the Sunday entertainment laws or that its president had been found guilty of suborning the perjury of the two minors who were served beer at \\\"The Warehouse.\\\" Instead, it argues that to deny renewal on the ground that its president had allegedly suborned perjury was fundamentally unfair and unjust because it subjected that officer to the possibility of twice being prosecuted for the same act, and impinged on his constitutional rights to a trial by jury and to the presumption of innocence.\\nEven were we to agree that petitioner could, in these proceedings, assert its president's constitutional safeguards, its argument could not prevail. It completely ignores the established principle that a proceeding under the laws regulating the sale of alcoholic beverages is entirely separate and distinct from a criminal prosecution for the same offense, and that the two proceedings, rather than being interdependent or mutually exclusive, are coexistent. While one is in the nature of an action in rem, the other is against a licensee personally. Both may be instituted and pursued simultaneously or otherwise. Cesaroni v. Smith, 98 R. I. 377, 202 A.2d 292 (1964); Cesaroni v. O'Dowd, 94 R. I. 66, 177 A.2d 777 (1962); Di Traglia v. Daneker, 83 R. I. 227, 115 A.2d 345 (1955).\\nSeth K. Gifford, Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr., for petitioner.\\nRichard J. Israel, Attorney General, Alexander G. Teitz, Special Asst. Attorney General, for respondent.\\nFinally, in a supplementary brief filed on the day before argument, petitioner advances several contentions. Some are of constitutional proportions. Its nonconstitutional arguments have already been considered and rejected. The constitutional issues it raises are susceptible to rejection on several grounds. One is that constitutional questions not specifically stated in the petition for certiorari cannot later be raised in argument. Brown v. Waldman, 93 R. I. 489, 494, 177 A.2d 179, 182 (1962). See Henry v. Thomas, 100 R. I. 564, 568, 217 A.2d 668, 671 (1966). That ground suffices here.\\nThe petition for certiorari is denied and dismissed, the writ heretofore issued is quashed and the papers heretofore certified to this court are ordered returned to the Superior Court with our decision endorsed thereon.\\nGeneral Laws 1956, \\u00a73-5-8 provides that \\\"every license except retailers' class F licenses and retailers' class G licenses shall expire on December 1 next after its issuance.\\\"\\nGeneral Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment) \\u00a742-35-14tb) provides:\\n\\\"Whenever a licensee has made timely and sufficient application for the renewal of a license or a new license with reference to any activity of a continuing nature, the existing license does not expire until the application has been finally determined by the agency, and, in case the application is denied or the terms of the new license limited, until the last day for seeking review of the agency order or a later date fixed By order of the reviewing court.\\\"\\nGeneral Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment) \\u00a742-35-1 (a) defines an \\\"agency\\\" as including \\\"each state board, commission, department, or officer, other than the legislature or the courts, authorized by law to make rules or to determine contested cases .\\\"\\nIn Vitterito v. Sportsman's Lodge, 102 R. I. 72, 228 A.2d 119 (1967) it was decided that an appeal from a denial of a renewal by a local licensing authority falls within the purview of G. L. 1956, \\u00a73-7-21. That section provides, in pertinent part, that an application to review a local board's decision \\\"shall be made within ten (10) days after the making of the decision or order sought to be reviewed Appeals from the administrator's decision, which in this case was rendered on February 10, 1970, are required to be taken within 30 days. General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment) \\u00a742-35-15 (b).\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/3153195.json b/ri/3153195.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a1ff4be273dc9eb093e1c57ed0c2f6935858e43a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/3153195.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"3153195\", \"name\": \"Gerard Joseph Salvail v. John F. Sharkey et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Salvail v. Sharkey\", \"decision_date\": \"1970-12-15\", \"docket_number\": \"M. P. No. 1035\", \"first_page\": \"901\", \"last_page\": \"901\", \"citations\": \"108 R.I. 901\", \"volume\": \"108\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:28:08.540653+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Gerard Joseph Salvail v. John F. Sharkey et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"December 15, 1970.\\nM. P. No. 1035.\\nAlfred Factor, Hayden C. Covington, for petitioner.\\nHerbert F. DeSimone, Attorney General, Donald P. Ryan, Asst. Attorney General, for respondents.\\nGerard Joseph Salvail v. John F. Sharkey et al.\", \"word_count\": \"44\", \"char_count\": \"286\", \"text\": \"Motion of respondents to supplement record is granted.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/3153272.json b/ri/3153272.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..778b27750ebce01485d615ea95793a9bd08a6e04
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/3153272.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"3153272\", \"name\": \"Lawrence Lema, p.p.a. et al. v. Anthony Travisono et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Lema v. Travisono\", \"decision_date\": \"1971-04-01\", \"docket_number\": \"M. P. No. 1300\", \"first_page\": \"922\", \"last_page\": \"922\", \"citations\": \"108 R.I. 922\", \"volume\": \"108\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:28:08.540653+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Lawrence Lema, p.p.a. et al. v. Anthony Travisono et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"M. P. No. 1300.\\nBarry A. Fisher a,nd Peter W. Thoms, Rhode Island Legal Services, for petitioners.\\nRichard J. Israel, Attorney General, Donald P. Ryan, Asst. Attorney General, for respondents.\\nLawrence Lema, p.p.a. et al. v. Anthony Travisono et al.\", \"word_count\": \"48\", \"char_count\": \"292\", \"text\": \"Motion for writ' of habeas corpus denied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/3158280.json b/ri/3158280.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c2026df94572d50928c7906d01e457c7f1038cba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/3158280.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"3158280\", \"name\": \"Carol Carroccio v. Onofrio Carroccio\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Carroccio v. Carroccio\", \"decision_date\": \"1971-04-06\", \"docket_number\": \"Appeal No. 1154\", \"first_page\": \"924\", \"last_page\": \"924\", \"citations\": \"108 R.I. 924\", \"volume\": \"108\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:28:08.540653+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Carol Carroccio v. Onofrio Carroccio.\", \"head_matter\": \"Appeal No. 1154.\\nGelfuso and Cappalli, A. William Gelfuso, for plaintiff-appellee.\\nOnofrio Carroccio, defendant-appellant, pro se.\\nCarol Carroccio v. Onofrio Carroccio.\", \"word_count\": \"79\", \"char_count\": \"503\", \"text\": \"Matter came on to be heard on Current Argument List on April 5, 1971, having previously been continued from March 1971 Current Argument List, for failure of appellant to appear, and having again failed to appear to argue said matter, on motion of counsel for appellee said matter is dismissed pursuant to Rule 14(f) of Supreme Court.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/3159091.json b/ri/3159091.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..add359a544cad1b9c5e5e1dcd46ca828c175ceac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/3159091.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"3159091\", \"name\": \"Arthur J. Swanlund et ux. v. Merchants Mutual Insurance Co.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Swanlund v. Merchants Mutual Insurance\", \"decision_date\": \"1971-07-23\", \"docket_number\": \"M. P. No. 1491\", \"first_page\": \"944\", \"last_page\": \"944\", \"citations\": \"108 R.I. 944\", \"volume\": \"108\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:28:08.540653+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Arthur J. Swanlund et ux. v. Merchants Mutual Insurance Co.\", \"head_matter\": \"July 23, 1971.\\nM. P. No. 1491.\\nLouis B. Cappuccio, for respondent-plaintiff.\\nMartin M. Zucker, for petitioner-defendant.\\nArthur J. Swanlund et ux. v. Merchants Mutual Insurance Co.\", \"word_count\": \"49\", \"char_count\": \"320\", \"text\": \"Motion of defendant for leave to file petition for writ of certiorari denied without prejudice to raise issues presented herein on appeal.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/3188628.json b/ri/3188628.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..73fd6e73e5bd459e312947e13612b0d7549d746f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/3188628.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"3188628\", \"name\": \"Lattingtown Group Limited et al. v. Eastern Telephone and Supply Manufacturing, Inc.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Lattingtown Group Ltd. v. Eastern Telephone & Supply Manufacturing, Inc.\", \"decision_date\": \"1979-04-19\", \"docket_number\": \"M. P. No. 79-117\", \"first_page\": \"960\", \"last_page\": \"960\", \"citations\": \"121 R.I. 960\", \"volume\": \"121\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:27:08.306695+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Lattingtown Group Limited et al. v. Eastern Telephone and Supply Manufacturing, Inc.\", \"head_matter\": \"M. P. No. 79-117.\\nLattingtown Group Limited et al. v. Eastern Telephone and Supply Manufacturing, Inc.\\nCorcoran, Peck-ham, \\u00e9r Hayes, Kathleen Managhan, for petitioners.\\nMoore, Virgadamo 6- Lynch, Ltd., Neil P. Galvin, for respondent.\", \"word_count\": \"42\", \"char_count\": \"281\", \"text\": \"The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/3192111.json b/ri/3192111.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..67ecfd4c6e9ef1974474ad4841af00fe30ea0ae6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/3192111.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"3192111\", \"name\": \"Lucy Murphy et al. v. James P. O'Neill et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Murphy v. O'Neill\", \"decision_date\": \"1979-05-17\", \"docket_number\": \"M. P. No. 79-144\", \"first_page\": \"969\", \"last_page\": \"969\", \"citations\": \"121 R.I. 969\", \"volume\": \"121\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:27:08.306695+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Lucy Murphy et al. v. James P. O\\u2019Neill et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"M. P. No. 79-144.\\nLucy Murphy et al. v. James P. O\\u2019Neill et al.\\nNugent ir Nugent, J. Joseph Nugent, Jr., Alfred J. Gemma, for plaintiffs-respondents.\\nJames L. O\\u2019Neill, pro se, for defendants-petitioners.\", \"word_count\": \"41\", \"char_count\": \"251\", \"text\": \"The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/4447864.json b/ri/4447864.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..751080477d5112b7eba5ec9a16c01b37d861a375
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/4447864.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"4447864\", \"name\": \"Mae P. Noyes vs. Zoning Board of Review of the City of Providence\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Noyes v. Zoning Board of Review\", \"decision_date\": \"1962-11-27\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"201\", \"last_page\": \"207\", \"citations\": \"95 R.I. 201\", \"volume\": \"95\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:14:28.630085+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Condon, C. J., Roberts, Paolino, Powers and Frost, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Mae P. Noyes vs. Zoning Board of Review of the City of Providence.\", \"head_matter\": \"Mae P. Noyes vs. Zoning Board of Review of the City of Providence.\\nNOVEMBER 27, 1962.\\nPresent: Condon, C. J., Roberts, Paolino, Powers and Frost, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"1780\", \"char_count\": \"10841\", \"text\": \"Roberts, J.\\nThis is a petition for certiorari to review a decision of the zoning board of review of the city of Providence denying the petitioner's application for a variance. Pursuant to the writ the board have returned to this court a 'Certified copy of the record of the proceedings before them.\\nThe property, which is located on Waterman street and zoned for residential uses, is owned by petitioner and is presently the site of a large single-family residence. The application specifically seeks permission to replace the existing dwelling with a business building, the major portion of which would be the offices of an advertising agency while the remaining portion would be used by the applicant as a residence.\\nThe application was originally filed on May 31, 1961 and after a hearing thereon was denied by the board on July 11, 1961. The applicant thereafter, pursuant to a writ of certiorari authorized by G. L. 1956, \\u00a745-24-20, brought that decision to this court for review. See Noyes v. Zoning Board of Review, 94 R. I. 15, 177 A.2d 529, wherein is contained an extended discussion of the facts material to the issues in this case.\\nIn the course of that proceeding three members of the respondent board voted to grant the application but the two remaining members, hereinafter referred to as the minority, did not concur. Concerning this the decision of the board read: \\\"Therefore, in accordance- with Section 45-24-19 of the General Laws of Rhode Island of 1956, requiring the concurring vote of four members of the Board to decide in favor of an applicant on any matter within the discretion of the Board upon which it is required to pass under such Ordinance or to effect any variation in the application of such Ordinance. Resolved: That the application of Mae P. Noyes is hereby denied.\\\" Section 45-24-19 provides in part that the concurring vote of four members of the board of review shall be required to decide in favor of an applicant who seeks to vary the application of the terms of a zoning ordinance.\\nThe applicant, as the petitioner in that proceeding, had vigorously pressed certain contentions upon which she based her right to a variance on the theory that the vote of the majority of the board by clear implication constituted a finding of the unnecessary hardship contemplated by the statutory provision providing for the granting of variances. She further argued that the character of the finding expressly made by the minority was such as to necessarily imply that they too found that a literal application of the terms of the ordinance would result in the unnecessary hardship prerequisite to the granting of a variance.\\nThis court in the prior opinion made clear our doubt as to the appropriateness of considering these arguments, and particularly that concerning the minority finding, because we were unable to conclude, as did petitioner, that the finding of the minority was reasonably susceptible of an inference that she had proved the unnecessary hardship. In that circumstance this court granted the petition for certiorari, quashed the decision denying the application for the variance, and remanded the cause to the respondent board with directions that they again consider the application, revealing in their decision thereon the ultimate facts upon which it rests. Noyes v. Zoning Board of Review, supra.\\nPursuant to such mandate the respondent board on February 27, 1962 conducted a hearing at which they again considered the application. By a resolution enacted on February 28, 1962 the board denied the application, stating that in the course of their deliberations three members thereof voted to grant it for the reason that the applicant \\\"had established unnecessary property hardship,\\\" while two members voted to deny the application \\\"on the grounds that a literal enforcement of the provisions of the Ordinance would not result in unnecessary hardship .\\\" The resolution then concludes that, because of the provisions of \\u00a745-24-19 which require the concurring vote of four members of the board to decide favorably upon an application for a variance, the application is denied.\\nThe record, as extended by the board's subsequent action, mal\\u00edes clear their understanding that the cause was remanded by this court for their further consideration because of the ambiguity inhering in their prior decision concerning their finding, if any, upon he question of unnecessary hardship. The record now makes clear the nature of their finding on that issue, the board dividing three to two on the issue of whether unnecessary hardship had been established by the evidence. The board then concluded that, by reason of the limitation upon the exercise of their fact-finding power arising under \\u00a745-24-19, they were without jurisdiction to grant the application. This is consistent with the view this court took of that portion of the statute in MayDay Realty Corp. v. Zoning Board of Review, 77 R. I. 469, 474.\\nIn the instant proceeding petitioner argues that there is in the record no evidence to support the minority's finding that unnecessary hardship had not been established. She contends specifically that on the undisputed facts the finding of the minority cannot be sustained, and that the testimony of the realtor on behalf of the objectors as an expert, who stated that the enforcement of the residential zoning classification now in effect would not result in unnecessary hardship, does not constitute legally competent evidence on that issue.\\nWe assume petitioner means that the only evidence in the record tending to prove that a literal application of the present zoning classification would not result in unnecessary hardship to petitioner inheres in the testimony of the realtor and that such testimony is incompetent by reason \\u2022 of being completely without probative force. We are unable to agree with the conclusion thus reached by petitioner who, in our opinion, is questioning the weight of such testimony.\\nAt the hearing before the respondent board petitioner conceded the expert qualification of the realtor who testi fied on behalf of the objectors. His opinion that an application of the zoning ordinance would not result in unnecessary hardship to petitioner was predicated on his knowledge of the property involved and of the neighborhood. The attack on the competency of his testimony as evidence is based entirely upon his admission that he did not inspect the interior of petitioner's house prior to so testifying. Obviously while a lack of such inspection might well impair substantially the weight to be given his testimony, it does not, in our opinion, deprive it of its character as legally competent opinion evidence. It is perhaps appropriate to note that this court will not ordinarily pass upon the weight of evidence when reviewing a decision of the zoning board of review. Lumb v. Zoning Board of Review, 91 R. I. 498, 165 A.2d 504.\\nWe are of the opinion that there is no merit in petitioner's contention as to the probative thrust of the undisputed facts in the record. She argues, as we understand her, that such facts are susceptible of only inferences that will tend to prove a loss to her of all beneficial use of her property if the present zoning classification remains in effect.\\nWe cannot agree that the undisputed facts are not susceptible of a reasonable inference that petitioner may have some beneficial use of her property under its present zoning classification as a residential area. It is to be conceded that in all the circumstances some such potential use may not constitute the most profitable use to which the property could be put, but the mere showing of a loss of some more profitable use does not constitute the hardship contemplated in the enabling act as warranting the grant of a variance. Hazen v. Zoning Board of Review, 90 R. I. 108, 155 A.2d 333. It is our opinion that the undisputed evidence in the record here is susceptible of a reasonable inference that the property under its present zoning classification may be put to some beneficial use.\\nThe decision of the minority of the board may be sustained as supported by competent evidence on the basis of another well-settled rule. It appears that the board made an inspection of the property in the neighborhood prior to conducting the first hearing. It appears further that the minority, in reaching their decision, acted in part at least on the basis of knowledge acquired by their own observations of the property and the neighborhood. Such decision, as extended, reads in pertinent part: \\\"The minority base their reasons therefore on observation of the area and the testimony adduced at the hearing, including that of expert witnesses who testified for the objectors.\\\" In our opinion the record thus discloses that the board, and more particularly the minority thereof, based their decision upon information and knowledge that they had acquired by reason of their observations.\\nIn Monforte v. Zoning Board of Review, 93 R. I. 447, 176 A.2d 726, this court said: \\\"It is the well-settled law in this state that a zoning board of review is presumed to have knowledge concerning those matters which are related to an effective administration of the zoning ordinance. Where it appears from the record that a decision was reached in reliance upon such knowledge, it is considered by this court to constitute legal evidence sufficient to support such a finding.\\\" We reiterated our adherence to this view in MacNevin v. Zoning Board of Review, 94 R. I. 407, 181 A.2d 232.\\nIt is our opinion that in the instant proceeding the record discloses clearly that the board reached their decision pursuant to knowledge and information, including some that was acquired by their own observations, as well as that which will be presumed to be possessed by the board by reason of the character of their function. In these circumstances this knowledge constitutes competent evidence that is sufficient to sustain the decision of the minority. Be cause we conclude that the decision of the minority of the board is supported by competent evidence, it will not be necessary to consider other contentions advanced by the petitioner.\\nHiggins, Cavanagh & Cooney, Joseph V. Cavanagh, for petitioner.\\nWilliam E. McCabe, City Solicitor, Harry Goldstein, Assistant City Solicitor, for the City of Providence.\\nTillinghast, Collins & Tanner, Richard F. Staples, for respondent.\\nThe petition for certiorari is denied and dismissed, the writ heretofore issued is quashed, the decision of the respondent board is affirmed, and the record in the case certified to this court is ordered sent back to the respondent board with our decision endorsed thereon.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/4448680.json b/ri/4448680.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b2849bc81430528e5a464ac078b0330bc8ac56ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/4448680.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"4448680\", \"name\": \"John B. Kelaghan vs. Public Utility Hearing Board\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Kelaghan v. Public Utility Hearing Board\", \"decision_date\": \"1962-03-02\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"93\", \"last_page\": \"98\", \"citations\": \"94 R.I. 93\", \"volume\": \"94\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:18:41.661801+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Condon, C. J., Roberts, Paolino and Powers, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"John B. Kelaghan vs. Public Utility Hearing Board.\", \"head_matter\": \"John B. Kelaghan vs. Public Utility Hearing Board.\\nMARCH 2, 1962.\\nPresent: Condon, C. J., Roberts, Paolino and Powers, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"1627\", \"char_count\": \"9851\", \"text\": \"Roberts, J.\\nThis is a statutory petition for the reversal of an order of the respondent board brought pursuant to the provisions of G. L. 1956, \\u00a739-5-14. While the petition was pending in this court the motion of Blackstone Valley Gas and Electric Company, hereinafter referred to as Black stone, and Valley Gas and Electric Company, hereinafter referred to as Valley, for leave to intervene was granted and thereafter the intervenors moved to dismiss the instant petition.\\nThe petitioner prays that this court reverse an order of said board entered by it on July 27, 1961. It is described in the petition as being an \\\"Addendum\\\" to certain prior orders entered by the board on October 19, 1960 in the matter of the joint petition of Blackstone and Valley that theretofore on an appeal from the public utility administrator had been heard and determined. The validity of such prior orders entered by the board pursuant to the joint petition of Blackstone and Valley was considered by this court in Kelaghan v. Public Utility Hearing Board, 92 R. I. 82, 166 A.2d 421.\\nThe record in that case reveals that Blackstone and Valley had jointly petitioned the public utility administrator for consent and approval of a plan under which Blackstone would convey certain of its properties to Valley and would purchase from Valley certain shares of its capital stock. After a hearing thereon the administrator entered an order giving consent and approval to the plan above referred to, and the petitioner in the instant case appealed therefrom to the respondent board. After a hearing thereon the board affirmed the order of the administrator granting consent and approval of the proposed plan set out in the joint petition of Blackstone and Valley, and its order giving effect thereto was entered on October 19, 1960.\\nThereafter the petitioner in the instant action in that case brought a petition seeking a reversal of the orders of the respondent board, and this court subsequently permitted Blackstone and Valley to intervene therein. The matter was heard by this court, and in an opinion filed thereafter the court held that a review of the merits of the entry of the orders of October 19, 1960 by the respondent board would be without purpose and thereupon granted the intervenors' motion to dismiss that petition.\\nFrom the record before us in the instant case it appears that pursuant to the decision of the board after hearing on the petitioner's appeal to it from the orders of the administrator, that board on October 19, 1960 entered two specific orders. The first of these denied and dismissed the then appellant's motion to dismiss the joint petition of Blackstone and Valley. The second gave the consent and approval of the board to \\\"the sale by Blackstone to Valley and the purchase by Valley from Blackstone of the gas properties and the related rights \\\" then owned by Blackstone. It does not appear from the record that the board entered any order concerning the giving of approval and consent to the acquisition by Blackstone of stock and securities owned by Valley.\\nWe are unable to perceive from the record any explanation for the entry on July 27,1961 of the addendum to which the instant petitioner objects. The addendum, as it appears in the record, is an order of the respondent board consenting and approving \\\"of the purchase by Blackstone from Valley of said 399,997 shares of stock at the par value thereof for the consideration described in the Petition, and the purchase by Blackstone from individuals of the additional three shares of common stock of Valley now outstanding for $30.00 in cash.\\\" From this language it could be reasonably assumed that the addendum was entered by the board for the purpose of giving its express consent and approval to the acquisition by Blackstone of stock and securities owned by Valley for which prayer had been made in the joint petition to the administrator.\\nThe petitioner contends that the respondent board was without jurisdiction to enter the order referred to above which constitutes the addendum. In so contending, petitioner appears to rely upon our decision in Kelaghan v. Public Utility Hearing Board, supra. In that case we found that the jurisdiction of the securities and exchange commission, hereinafter referred to as the commission, to approve the acquisition by a holding company of assets or securities of a utility pursuant to the provisions of sec. 10 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C.A. \\u00a779j, had become absolute and complete upon a finding by the commission pursuant to that section of the statute that compliance with applicable provisions of state law would be detrimental to the carrying out of the provisions of sec. 11 of the act, 15 U.S.C.A. \\u00a779k. The argument of petitioner is predicated upon a misconception as to the effect that the attainment of complete jurisdiction by the commission in the premises would have upon the jurisdiction of the respondent board to enter approve and consent orders pursuant to the provisions of G. L. 1956, \\u00a739-3-17 and 39-3-25.\\nIn Kelaghan v. Public Utility Hearing Board, supra, as petitioner appears to concede, we declined expressly to pass upon the validity of the entry of the orders that were the subject matter of the petition for reversal. In our opinion we noted with particularity that the proceeding before the respondent board in which the approve and consent orders were entered \\\"is in no manner a part of the proceedings that have been conducted before the commission We further stated that in our opinion the proceeding conducted before the respondent board was undertaken \\\"primarily for the purpose of having the consent and approval of the state administrator evidence to the commission that applicable provisions of state law had been complied with in making the acquisitions in question.\\\" We then concluded that in view of the acquirement of complete jurisdiction by the commission to approve the acquisitions herein under consideration, any decision on the part of this court concerning the validity of the entry of those orders by the respondent board would be without force and effect and therefore meaningless.\\nIn expressly declining to review the validity of the orders so entered by the respondent board, we found that such a review, even were it to result in our granting the petition for reversal of those orders, would \\\"in such circumstances constitute superfluous action in which this court will not engage.\\\" We are unable to perceive that there is anything in the language of the opinion which warrants a conclusion that this court therein ruled that the respondent board was without jurisdiction to enter the approve and consent orders contemplated in our statutes concerning such transactions between utilities. To the contrary, it is our opinion that the respondent board on July 27, 1961 had jurisdiction to enter such orders, however pointless an exercise thereof might be.\\nThe intervenors have urged that the instant petition be dismissed for several reasons, some of which, in our opinion, are meritorious. However, because we take the view that the respondent board was acting within its powers in entering the order that constitutes the addendum, the instant petition is without merit and, in our opinion, should be dismissed for that reason. An administrative agency may in appropriate circumstances so correct its records as to state the truth as to its doings therein. The character of the evidence that will be sufficient to warrant an agency in making such correction is a matter for determination by the agency in an exercise of sound discretion, although when such correction is proposed on the basis of evidence dehors the record the agency should act thereon with appropriate caution. See McQuiston v. Tyler, 186 Okla. 315.\\nHowever, in the instant case it is clear from the record that the order entered therein did not fully reflect the doings of the respondent board with respect to the joint petition of Blackstone and Valley before it on an appeal from an order of the public utility administrator. In the joint petition Blackstone had prayed for the entry of an order approving conveyance by it of certain assets and properties to Valley and for the approval of its proposal to acquire certain capital stock of Valley.\\nRaymond J. McMahon, Jr., for petitioner.\\nEdwards & Angel\\u00ed, Edward Winsor, Robert S. Davis, Ernest N. Agresti, Morrissey & Conley, Robert J. Conley, for intervenors.\\nThe appeal taken from the order of the administrator to the respondent board clearly brought up a matter of an order approving the acquisition by Blackstone of stock in Valley as well as the matter of a conveying by Blackstone of assets to Valley. An examination of the written decision of the respondent board reveals that its determination of the appeal was intended to include an approval of both prayers. However, the order entered did not include at least an express approval of Blackstone's proposed acquisition of certain of Valley's capital stock. In the circumstances it is clear that the record under consideration here did not contain an order, the inclusion of which would be necessary to reflect the board's determination to approve the acquisition by Blackstone of capital stock in Valley. In entering such an order on July 27, 1961 in the form of the addendum herein under consideration, the board's correction of its records was proper and within its powers. Therefore it is our opinion that the instant petition must be denied and dismissed.\\nThe intervenors' motion to dismiss the petition is granted, and the record certified to this court is ordered returned to the respondent board with our decision endorsed thereon.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/4449491.json b/ri/4449491.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..23dc576f12aee0f8ee4fbd60adf4b4f184319a24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/4449491.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"4449491\", \"name\": \"John J. Kelly vs. Zoning Board of Review of the City of Providence\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Kelly v. Zoning Board of Review\", \"decision_date\": \"1962-04-26\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"298\", \"last_page\": \"304\", \"citations\": \"94 R.I. 298\", \"volume\": \"94\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:18:41.661801+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Condon, C. J., Roberts, Paolino, Powers and Frost, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"John J. Kelly vs. Zoning Board of Review of the City of Providence.\", \"head_matter\": \"John J. Kelly vs. Zoning Board of Review of the City of Providence.\\nAPRIL 26, 1962.\\nPresent: Condon, C. J., Roberts, Paolino, Powers and Frost, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"1745\", \"char_count\": \"10596\", \"text\": \"Roberts, J.\\nThis petition for certiorari was brought to review a decision of the zoning board of review of the city of Providence denying the petitioner's application for an exception authorizing the extension of a nonconforming use now being conducted in a building located on lot 54 of assessor's plat 6 on Hope street in that city. This property is presently in a residential R-2 zoning classification. The writ issued, and pursuant thereto the respondent board certified to this court the records of the proceedings in the case.\\nIt appears therefrom that petitioner, a funeral director, owns the Hope street property and that for about thirteen years he has been using the building thereon located in part as a residence for his family and in part as a funeral home. That the use thus being made of the property constitutes a lawful nonconforming use under the ordinance is not disputed. It appears further from the record that petitioner proposes to erect a one-story addition to the present building in which there would be located a lounge and an additional layout room, so called. Included also in the record is a plot plan filed by petitioner, in which it is indicated that space for off-street parking would be provided for four automobiles.\\nThe petitioner has made application for a particular exception provided for in the ordinance which provides for the authorization of an extension of a nonconforming use within the confines of the same lot on which that use has lawfully been carried on. He refers expressly to sec. 23 of the ordinance, which relates to nonconforming uses. In sub-sec. E thereof provision is made for a special exception to so extend a nonconforming use and reads as follows: \\\"The regulations of this 'Section pertaining to nonconforming uses and buildings shall not preclude the extension of such nonconforming uses or buildings upon the same lot occupied by such use or building at the time this Ordinance became effective, if first approved by the Board as provided for in Sections 91 and 92.\\\"\\nOn September 19, 1961 the board made an inspection of the property of petitioner and thereafter on the same day held a hearing on his application. It appears from the transcript that it was of brief duration and that no' person appeared thereat to object to the granting of the exception. The transcript reveals that there was some discussion between petitioner and members of the board concerning the problem of parking in the vicinity of funeral homes and the adequacy of such off-street parking space as petitioner proposed to provide.\\nHowever, the record includes a letter from the traffic engineering department in which the traffic engineer stated that his department had no objection to the plan for off-street parking submitted by petitioner. Also included in the record is a letter from the city plan commission wherein the director of that commission recommended that the ap plication 'be denied. The reasons for this recommendation as stated in the letter are: \\\"The granting of this petition would overcrowd the lot and the increased commercial use on this lot would lower adjoining property values in this good residential neighborhood.\\\"\\nThe board thereafter by a unanimous vote adopted a resolution denying the application. They set out therein that they had inspected the property, had examined and weighed the evidence, and stated the grounds on which they denied the application as follows: \\\" in the opinion of the members of the Zoning Board of Review, the erection of the proposed addition for an additional layout room, without providing for adequate off-street parking facilities, would tend to substantially increase the traffic and parking problems in the area and would also tend to lower adjoining property values of the surrounding predominantly residential neighborhood\\nThe petitioner contends that the denial of his application on the ground that his proposed provisions for off-street parking were inadequate constitutes an abuse of discretion. This is so, he argues, because the proposed off-street parking facilities comply fully with the requirements for such parking set out in sec. 24C 2 (d) of the ordinance, which subsection is concerned with the off-street parking facilities required for certain commercial uses. Whether this subsection has application in the instant case we need not decide, it being clear from the record, in our opinion, that the denial was predicated upon the board's conclusion that they were without authority to grant the exception sought pursuant to the provisions of sec. 92 of the ordinance.\\nSection 92 provides that the board may make certain prescribed special exceptions to the terms of the ordinance \\\"when in its judgment the public convenience and welfare will be substantially served, or the appropriate use of neighboring property will not be substantially or permanently injured In Hazen v. Zoning Board of Review, 90 R. I. 108, 155 A.2d 333, this court held that when a board of review passes upon an application for an exception under an ordinance containing this or a similar provision, it is required, among other things, to make a finding as to whether a grant of the exception would substantially or permanently injure neighboring property and then said at page 335: \\\"If the board finds that granting the exception would injure such property it is without authority to act affirmatively upon the petition.\\\"\\nWhen the board's reasons for denying the exception are viewed in the light of the record here, it becomes clear, in our opinion, that they denied this application because they had concluded that they were without authority to grant the exception, having found that the inadequacy of the proposed off-street parking facilities would substantially injure neighboring property.\\nThe petitioner, however, also questions the validity of the board's exercise of their fact-finding power. This contention, as we understand it, raises a question as to whether there is in the record any legal evidence to support a finding that the inadequacy of the parking facilities proposed at the funeral home would result in substantial or permanent injury to neighboring property. There is merit in this contention. It is settled that this court, when reviewing a decision of a board of review on certiorari, will not weigh the evidence contained in the record, but it will examine the record for the purpose of ascertaining whether there is any legal evidence therein to support the decision of the board. Where there is legal evidence upon which the decision of the board may reasonably rest, it will not be disturbed. Laudati v. Zoning Board of Review, 91 R. I. 116, 161 A.2d 198. Upon an examination of the record here, it is our conclusion that there is therein no legal evidence upon which the decision of the board could reasonably rest.\\nIn the first place, the record is devoid of any testimony that the erection of the proposed addition to the funeral home would be accompanied by an increase in petitioner's business that would result in the generation of increased traffic in the neighborhood or the intensification of any traffic congestion therein. In fact, there is no evidence in the record concerning the extent to which the conduct of petitioner's business presently generates traffic or that any congestion results therefrom. Neither is there any testimony that in the circumstances an increase in the volume of traffic moving in the area would have an adverse effect upon the value of surrounding properties.\\nThere is in evidence the letter in which the director of the city plan commission concludes that the erection of the addition would result in an increased commercial use of the lot and would lower the value of surrounding properties. This letter constitutes a bare statement of a conclusion without supporting evidence and without any qualification of the writer as an expert. Neither does it appear that the record contains any evidence tending to prove that the erection of the addition would increase the commercial use of the lot or that such an increase in the commercial use would affect adversely the value of the neighboring properties.\\nIt is true that a board of review is presumed to have a special knowledge of matters that are peculiarly related to the administration of a zoning ordinance and of local conditions as they are affected by the provisions of a zoning ordinance. Harrison v. Zoning Board of Review, 74 R. I. 135, 141; Pistachio v. Zoning Board of Review, 88 R. I. 285. It is also true that a board of review may properly act on applications for an exception on the basis of knowledge that it has acquired through the making of an inspection of the property to which the application refers. Lawson v. Zoning Board of Review, 85 R. I. 54, 60.\\nHowever, while this court will presume the possession of such special knowledge by these boards of review, it will not presume that in making a challenged decision the board acted pursuant to such special knowledge in the absence of some disclosure to that effect in the record. Perrier v. Board of Appeals, 86 R. I. 138, 146. Neither will this court presume that a board reached a decision pursuant to^ knowledge acquired by it through an inspection of the property under consideration. To sustain a decision on the basis of the board's acting on knowledge acquired by inspection, the record must contain some reasonable disclosure as to the knowledge so acquired and their action pursuant thereto. Buckminster v. Zoning Board of Review, 68 R. I. 515.\\nFrancis B. Brown, for petitioner.\\nWilliam E. McCabe, City Solicitor; Harry Goldstein, Assistant City Solicitor, for respondent.\\nWe are unable to perceive anything in the instant record which discloses that the board in deciding that a grant of the exception here sought would lower the value of neighboring properties acted pursuant to any special knowledge they are presumed to have or knowledge that they acquired by their inspection of the premises. In these circumstances we are constrained to conclude that there is in the record here no legal evidence upon which the decision of the board can reasonably rest, and it is our opinion, therefore, that the decision was arbitrary and constituted an abuse of discretion.\\nThe petition for certiorari is granted, the board's decision is quashed, and the records certified are ordered returned to the board with our decision endorsed thereon.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/4453287.json b/ri/4453287.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f64fe815ac66ddb62f8c9d6fefc6fb3e71e03097
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/4453287.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"4453287\", \"name\": \"John J. Nixon vs. Charles M. Connery, Admr., et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Nixon v. Connery\", \"decision_date\": \"1945-06-20\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"142\", \"last_page\": \"147\", \"citations\": \"71 R.I. 142\", \"volume\": \"71\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:02:59.717239+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present : Flynn, C. J., Moss, Capotosto, Baker and Condon, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"John J. Nixon vs. Charles M. Connery, Admr., et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"John J. Nixon vs. Charles M. Connery, Admr., et al.\\nJUNE 20, 1945.\\nPresent : Flynn, C. J., Moss, Capotosto, Baker and Condon, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"1805\", \"char_count\": \"10313\", \"text\": \"Moss, J.\\nThis is a suit in equity begun by a bill of complaint against the respondent Charles M. Connery, as administrator of the estate of Lawrence F. Fitzgerald, deceased intestate, and against any claimants that there might be to that estate. It is before us on complainant's appeal from a final decree denying and dismissing the bill of complaint.\\nThe complainant asserted in his bill that, by reason of an agreement between them, he was entitled to all of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death. The complainant alleged that this agreement was made after the death of Fitzgerald's wife and was that, if he would live with Fitzgerald and care for him, when he needed care, until the latter's death, he should then have all of Fitzgerald's property; and that he had performed his part of the agreement. The administrator in his answer denied that there was any such agreement.\\nIt was also alleged in the bill, and admitted by the administrator's answer, that the decedent at the time of his death had a leasehold interest in certain land and the buildings thereon, in the town of Bristol in this state, which leasehold interest had belonged to himself and his wife as joint owners but of which he had become the sole owner upon her death. It was also alleged in the bill, and admitted in the administrator's answer, that the decedent at the time of his death owned certain other personal property inventoried at $5027.77.\\nThe substantial relief prayed for in the bill was that specific performance of the alleged agreement should be enforced \\\"against the heirs, legatees, devisees or distributees\\\" of the decedent, \\\"whether known or unknown and against the respondent Administrator\\\"; and that he should be directed, upon payment of debts and administration expenses, to transfer the balance of the estate subject to his control to the complainant.\\nThe complai nant also alleged that he had been frequently told by the decedent that the latter had no relatives to succeed to his property. The complainant further alleged that he himself had no knowledge of the existence or addresses of any such relatives or persons who might be entitled to claim as heirs or distributees of the decedent. He therefore prayed not only that a subpoena to the respondent administrator be issued, but also that notice be given, by publication in a certain newspaper published in the town of Bristol, to all persons who might be interested in the estate of the decedent, as heirs, devisees, legatees, distributees or otherwise, of the pendency of the bill of complaint and ordering them to make answer thereto within a certain time. This prayer was granted by an order of a justice of the superior court filed April 4, 1942, the date of the filing of the bill.\\nNotice was published in accordance with this order; and, no appearance having been entered or any plea, answer or demurrer filed within the time allowed by such notice, a decree was entered on May 6, 1942 that the bill of complaint be taken as confessed by all unknown heirs, devisees, legatees and distributees of the decedent. The complainant contends that this decree, not having been set aside thereafter, is decisive of his right to the relief prayed for in his bill of complaint.\\nWe find that there is no merit in this contention; that that decree did not affect the merits of the controversy between the complainant and the administrator; and that the burden was on the complainant, in order to be entitled to any of the substantial relief prayed for in his bill, to prove, at least by a preponderance of the evidence, that the decedent made with him the agreement that is set forth in the bill.\\nIt is well settled that such a decree pro confesso only operates to prevent any person against whom it has been entered from taking part in the hearing before the court on the merits of the case, and does not operate to prevent him from afterwards claiming the benefit of the rule laid down in Hazard v. Durant, 12 R. I. 99, at 100. That rule is as follows: \\\"And if a bill be taken pro confesso against one of two or more defendants, and the others, making answer, show that it is devoid of equity, it will be dismissed as against all of them.\\\"\\nThis court there cited, in support of that rule, Clason v. Morris, 10 Johns. Rep. 524, and Frow v. De La Vega, 15 Wall. 552. Those cases fully support that rule, the supreme court of the United States stating in the latter of them, at page 554, and citing the former case in support of the statement, as follows: \\\"The true mode of proceeding where a bill makes a joint charge against several defendants, and one of them makes default, is simply to enter a default and a formal decree pro confesso against him, and proceed with the cause upon the answers of the other defendants. The defaulting defendant has merely lost his standing in court. He will not be entitled to service of notices in the cause, nor to appear in it in any way. He can adduce no evidence, he cannot be heard at the final hearing. But if the suit should be decided against the complainant on the merits, the bill will be dismissed as to all the defendants alike\\u2014 the defaulter as well as the others. If it be decided in the complainant's favor, he will then be entitled to a final decree against all. But a final decree on the merits against the defaulting defendant alone, pending the continuance of the cause, would be incongruous and illegal.\\\"\\nIn view of the law as laid down in the cases above cited, we are of the opinion that there is no merit in the contention of the complainant in the instant cause that, by reason of the fact that no heir, devisee, legatee or distributee to whom notice by publication was given entered an appearance, he was entitled to the relief against the administrator which is prayed for in the bill. Moreover, the complainant did not, in the superior court, seek any decree against the administrator on that ground but had the cause assigned for hearing on its merits as against the latter and it was so assigned and heard. Nor did he, in his reasons of appeal from the final decree of the superior court, file any reason based on that ground.\\nOur final conclusion must then depend entirely on whether or not we are convinced, after examining and considering the very conflicting evidence in the cause, that the trial justice was wrong in finding, as he did in his final d\\u00e9cision, that the complainant had not proved, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, the agreement alleged in the bill of complaint and his faithful and full performance of his part thereof.\\nThe complainant testified, in substance and effect, that about eight months before the decedent's death, which occurred very soon after his seventieth birthday, it was agreed between them as follows: that Nixon, who was employed during the daytime, would sleep every night in a room in Fitzgerald's house and would, from the time when Nixon got there until he left in the morning, take care of Fitzgerald, when he needed care; and that if he performed his part of the agreement, until Fitzgerald's death, Nixon should have anything there that then belonged to the former. The complainant testified that he had fully performed his part of the agreement.\\nAnother witness testified that Fitzgerald said to him, in the presence of and referring to the complainant: \\\"If Jack will only come and live with me as long as I live, I will give Jack everything I have got.\\\" A third witness testified that Fitzgerald said to him that he had made an agreement with Nixon, when the latter had gone to live with him and take care of him for the rest of his life, that he would, when he died, leave everything to Nixon for the rest of the latter's life.\\nA fourth witness testified that about six weeks before Fitzgerald's death, the latter said that he and Nixon were getting on well together and that if Nixon stayed with him and he died before Nixon, the latter was to have everything. According to a fifth witness, Fitzgerald said, some time after Nixon went to live with him and referring to Nixon: \\\"Jack is living with me now and we get along fine. If he stays with me I have agreed to give him everything I have got when I die. I have asked him before but he wouldn't come out, but he finally came.\\\"\\nOn the other side there was much testimony, by numerous witnesses, of statements made by the complainant and conduct by him both before and after the death of Fitzgerald that were wholly inconsistent with the making of any such agreement and his performance of what would have been his obligations thereunder. We see no sufficient reason for stating and discussing this testimony in detail.\\nPhilip S. Knauer, Anthony Grilli, John R. Ferguson, for complainant.\\nWilliam, T. O'Donnell, Ralph M. Greenlaw, Edwin J. Tet-low, for respondent Connery.\\nLuden Capone, Town Solicitor, for town of Bristol.\\nThe conflict in the testimony raised a clear issue of credibility for the trial justice to decide and he decided it in favor of the respondent administrator. In his decision, after discussing the material evidence fairly and in considerable detail, he came to the conclusion therefrom that the complainant had not proved by a fair preponderance of the credible evidence the two requisites for a decree in his favor, viz., that the agreement alleged in the bill of complaint was made between the complainant and Fitzgerald, the decedent, and that the former had faithfully and fully performed the terms of such agreement on his part to be performed. The trial justice therefore decided that the bill of complaint should be denied and dismissed; and a final decree was entered accordingly.\\nWe have considered the testimony, which is conflicting, and the arguments of counsel for the respective parties and as a result we cannot say that the decision of the trial justice was clearly wrong. We are therefore of the opinion that the decree based thereon, in favor of the respondent, denying the relief prayed for in the bill of complaint, should be affirmed.\\nThe complainant's appeal is denied and dismissed, the decree appealed from is affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the superior court for further proceedings.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/4807454.json b/ri/4807454.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1914d9637963a79c5fba2101286d58e31c0e686d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/4807454.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"4807454\", \"name\": \"Joseph Gill vs. Leo Laquerre\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Gill v. Laquerre\", \"decision_date\": \"1931-01-08\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"158\", \"last_page\": \"162\", \"citations\": \"51 R.I. 158\", \"volume\": \"51\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:03:35.151571+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Stearns, C. J., Rathbun, Sweeney, and Murdock, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Joseph Gill vs. Leo Laquerre.\", \"head_matter\": \"Joseph Gill vs. Leo Laquerre.\\nJANUARY 8, 1931.\\nPresent: Stearns, C. J., Rathbun, Sweeney, and Murdock, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"1234\", \"char_count\": \"6900\", \"text\": \"Murdock, J.\\nThis is an action of trespass on the case for negligence. The- action is brought under Section 14, Chapter 333, General Laws, 1923, to recover damages for the death of plaintiff's daughter, a child five years and two months of age at the time of her death. As no administrator of her estate was appointed the father sues in behalf of all the beneficiaries. A jury in the Superior Court returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $4,698.91 and the case is in this court on defendant's bill of exceptions.\\nAll of the exceptions bearing on the liability of the defendant have been waived. The only questions presented relate to the damages and the admission of certain testimony to establish the same.\\nThe bill of exceptions does not conform to the statute and to the decisions of this court. The statute requires that a party filing a bill of exceptions . . . \\\"shall state separately and clearly the exceptions relied upon.\\\" The bill contains nine paragraphs. The first paragraph, although not in proper form, will pass as an exception to the refusal of the trial justice to grant a new trial. The next seven paragraphs are not exceptions at all but reasons assigned in support of the motion for a new trial. These may properly be set forth in a brief but they have no place in a bill of exceptions. The ninth paragraph is as follows: \\\"9. The trial justice erred in his rulings in the course of the trial as to which exceptions were noted on pp. 27, 41, 42, 43, 44\\\" 47, 69, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77, 80, and 81 of the transcript.\\\" Most-of these exceptions are to the admission of testimony. One is an exception to the action of the court in permitting plaintiff to reopen his case and one is to the refusal of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant. To group a number of exceptions in this manner does not conform to the statute and our decisions relating to the same. See Nichols v. Mason & Co., 44 R. I. 43; Fainardi v. Pausata, 45 R. I. 462; State v. Amaral, 47 R. I. 245. But as most of the exceptions have been abandoned and the issue narrowed to the question of damages, we will consider the exceptions relating to such question. \\u2022\\nThe defendant rests his case here on the proposition that for the death of a child only nominal damages may be recovered unless it be the unusual case of a child who has demonstrated a capacity for some particular vocation.\\nIn Dimitri v. Cienci & Son, 41 R. I. 393, in construing Section 14, Chapter 283, General Laws, 1909 (now Section 14, Chapter 333, General Laws, 1923), this court determined that the basis for recovery of damages under the statute for death by wrongful act is the same for an infant as for an adult, deducting in the case of an infant from the expectancy of life the years of minority. In the course of the opinion, Sweetland, C. J., said: . . . \\\"Should a different view of the purpose of the statute be taken, when the decedent is a minor? The statute in its language makes no distinction, and in our opinion a difference in construction based upon a difference in the ages of decedents would be entirely unwarranted.\\\" The rule of law in this State for the ascertainment of damages in case of death by wrongful act was established in McCabe v. Narragansett Electric Lighting Co., 26 R. I. 427, where the court said: \\\"It is obvious, too, that the loss sustained by the plaintiff here is the present value, of the net result remaining after his personal expenses are deducted from his income or earnings. To ascertain this it is, of course, necessary to ascertain first the gross amount of such prospective income or earnings, then to deduct therefrom what the deceased would have to lay out as a producer to render the service or to acquire the money that he might be expected to produce, computing such expenses according to his station in life, his means and personal habits, and then to reduce the net result so obtained to its present value.\\\"\\nIt is contended that, owing to the fact that the decedent in the instant case was too young to have had any earning capacity, it is impossible to comply with the above rule and therefore only nominal damages can be recovered. We can not give our assent to this view of the law applicable to a case of this kind. To so hold would in effect result in a nullification of the statute. It is true that no rule approximating certainty for the assessment of damages can be laid down in actions for damages to the estate of a child too young to have demonstrated an earning capacity but it does not follow that for this reason the courts are powerless to afford a remedy.\\nWe are of the opinion that the practical rule in these cases is to bring before a jury the facts relating to the age, sex, physical and mental characteristics of the child, the position in life and earning capacity of its parents as bearing upon the conditions under which the child would probably have been reared and educated and leave it to the jury to assess the damages subject to the power and duty of the trial justice to confine the award within the bounds of reasonable probability. While this rule leaves much to be desired as to certainty it is preferable to the alternative urged by the defendant which would permit one legally responsible for the death of a child to escape civil liability therefor. There is ample authority for this view of the law. Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act, 2d ed. 351; 8 R. C. L. pp. 835 to 842; Hoon v. Beaver Valley Traction Co., 204 Pa. 369; Fedorawicz v. Citizens Electric Illuminating Co., 246 Pa. 141; Love v. Detroit, 170 Mich. 1; Gorham v. Cohen, 102 Conn. 567. In Hoon v. Beaver Valley Traction Co., supra, the court said, in speaking of damages in the case of a child six and one-half years of age: \\\"All that a trial judge can do is to state clearly the true ground of recovery limiting it to the probable pecuniary loss, and pointing out the elements to be considered, and to permit no excessive verdict to stand.\\\"\\nAt the trial in the court below the plaintiff was permitted to testify that he intended to educate the child to become a school teacher and teachers in the public schools of Woonsocket were called to testify as to their earnings and the amount they were able to save after paying their living expenses. This line of testimony was inadmissible. Parents may influence but they can not always determine the occupation of their children and such testimony injects further uncertainty into a case already replete with uncertainties. The defendant's exception to the admission of this evidence is sustained.\\nJohn B. Higgins, for plaintiff.\\nBenjamin F. Lindemuth, Henshaw, Lindemuth & Baker, for defendant.\\nAll of the other exceptions are overruled.\\nThe case is remitted to the Superior Court for a new trial on the question of damages only.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/4823851.json b/ri/4823851.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c443e98e2dd5423b8d0c91c1946964993e97b572
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/4823851.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"4823851\", \"name\": \"Petition of Edward N. Browning and George W. Browning for an Opinion of the Court\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re Browning\", \"decision_date\": \"1889-02-09\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"441\", \"last_page\": \"444\", \"citations\": \"16 R.I. 441\", \"volume\": \"16\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:14:10.700421+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Petition of Edward N. Browning and George W. Browning for an Opinion of the Court.\", \"head_matter\": \"Petition of Edward N. Browning and George W. Browning for an Opinion of the Court.\\nA testator by the fifth clause of his will devised certain realty, subject to legacy charges, to A. and B. \\u201c for and during the term of their natural lives, and after them equally to their children, their heirs and assigns forever.\\u201d By the eleventh clause of his will the testator added, \\u201cIn clause fifth of my will my intention and meaning is that, after the decease of . said A. and B., or either of them, one half of said estates is to descend to said A.\\u2019s heirs and assigns, and the other half to descend to said B.\\u2019s heirs and assigns.\\u201d\\nHeld, that, under the eleventh clause explaining the fifth, A. and B., according to the wle in Shelley\\u2019s case, took each an undivided half of the realty in fee simple.\\nCase stated for an opinion of the court under Pub. Stat. R. I. cap. 192, \\u00a7 23.\\nProvidence,\\nFebruary 9, 1889.\", \"word_count\": \"1277\", \"char_count\": \"7123\", \"text\": \"Durfee, C. J.\\nThe case stated shows that tbe late Abijah Browning died leaving a will, wbicb has been duly proved, by the fifth clause of which he devised certain real and personal property, subject to certain lega cies charged thereon, to his half brothers, Edward N. Browning and George W. Browning, the petitioners, \\\" for and during the terra of their natural lives, and after them equally to their children, their heirs and assigns forever.\\\" The eleventh clause of the will is as follows, to wit: \\\" In clause fifth of my will, my intention and meaning is, that, after the decease of said Edward N. and George W. Browning, or either of them, one half of said estates is to descend to said Edward's heirs and assigns, and the other half to descend to said George's heirs and assigns.\\\" The case also shows that Edward has contracted to sell to George, and George has contracted to purchase of Edward, the latter's half of said estate, subject to the charges, if Edward can make a good and indefeasible title thereto in fee simple, and it propounds the question, whether he takes and can convey by his deed an indefeasible estate in fee simple in the one undivided half of said estate, and, if not, what estate does he take therein under said will.\\nWe think there is no doubt that the fifth clause taken by itself would give, both under our statute and at common law, the estate in equal moieties to Edward and George for life, and after them in remainder to their children respectively, in fee simple. Pub. Stat. R. I. cap. 182, \\u00a7 2; 3 Greenleaf Cruise Dig. Tit. xxxvin. cap. 14, \\u00a7 39-43 ; Smith v. Chapman, 1 Hen. & M. 240, 290-294. The question is, whether this disposition is altered by the eleventh clause so that Edward and George, instead of taking life estates merely, take estates in fee simple under the rule in Shelley's case. If, in place of the words \\\" and after them equally tb their children, their heirs and assigns forever,\\\" in the fifth clause, we substitute the words in which the testator states his intention and meaning, we shall have first a. devise to Edward and George, \\\" for and during the term of their natural lives,\\\" and then the following, to wit: \\\" and after the decease of said Edward N. and George W. Browning, or either of them, one half of said estates is to descend to said Edward's heirs and assigns, and the other half to descend to said George's heirs and assigns.\\\" If the clause had been originally so written, we think there can be no doubt that, notwithstanding some inaptnesses of expression, it would have to be construed as a devise to Edward and George for life as tenants in common, with remainders to their heirs and assigns respectively, which under the rule in Shelley's case would be a devise of one undivided half of the estates to each of them in fee simple. The eleventh clause, however, purports to be simply explanatory .of tbe fifth, and must be considered in that light, and the question is, whether, considering it so, we reach any different conclusion. The construction in this view is not wholly free from doubt, but the eleventh clause contains two expressions which, as they are connected with each other, seem to us to merit special attention. The clause declares \\\" one half of said estates is to descend to said Edward's heirs and assigns, and the other half to descend to said George's heirs and assigns.\\\" If the first takers take simply life estates, there will be nothing to descend from them to their heirs. The implication is that a fee was intended to be given to Edward and George. There are cases in which the word \\\" descend \\\" has been taken in this sense. Eaton v. Tillinghast, Trustee, 4 R. I. 276, 280 ; Griswell's Appeal, 41 Pa. St. 288. Furthermore, the estates are not only to descend, they are to descend to heirs and assigns. The connection is significant, for the words \\\" heirs and assigns \\\" are the common words of inheritance or limitation. If the word \\\" heirs \\\" had been used alone, it might be supposed that it was used, not in its technical sense to signify the entire line of descent, but popularly to signify tbe immediate heirs, or the persons answering to the description of heirs at the death of the first takers. The joinder of the two words heirs and assigns militates against this view; for mere tenants for life could have no assigns to take their estates after them, whereas tenants in fee could devise their estates, and the devisees would be their testamentary assigns. Baily v. De Crespigny, 10 B. & S. 1, 12. The two expressions both conflict with the supposition that Edward and George were intended to take only as life tenants ; and considering the rigor of the rule in Shelley's case, and the technical strin gency of the precedents, we are of opinion that said Edward and George must be held to have taken the estates in fee simple. And see Angell, Petitioner, 13 R. I. 630, and Burges v. Thompson, 13 R. I. 712, and cases cited.\\nJames Tillinghast, for petitioners. .\\nThe manner in which the legacies are charged favors this construction. The form of the charge is this, to wit: The devise is to Edward and George, as before stated, \\\" they, said Edward and George, paying out of the same five hundred dollars to each of my half sisters, Ida May Browning and Roby Ann Browning, within five years from my decease, to be paid to them in annual instalments of one hundred dollars, on the 25th day of December, in each year.\\\"\\nWe therefore declare it to be our opinion that Edward Browning took under the will of the late Abijah Browning an undivided half of the land, described in the fifth clause thereof, in fee simple, and can by his deed convey to his brother George an indefeasible estate in fee simple therein. Order accordingly.\\nAs follows:\\n\\\" Sect. 2. No person seized in fee simple shall have a right to devise any estate in fee tail for a longer time than to the children of the first devisee; and a devise for life to any person, and to the children or issue generally of such devisee, in fee simple, shall not vest a fee tail estate in the first devisee, but an estate for life only, and the remainder shall, on his decease, vest in his children or issue generally, agreeably to the direction of such will.\\\"\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/4841081.json b/ri/4841081.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2690a9a92adf94272b16b42848ba1b5eafc70888
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/4841081.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"4841081\", \"name\": \"William L. G. Phetteplace et al. vs. British & Foreign Marine Insurance Co.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Phetteplace v. British & Foreign Marine Insurance\", \"decision_date\": \"1901-05-17\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"26\", \"last_page\": \"34\", \"citations\": \"23 R.I. 26\", \"volume\": \"23\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:05:32.432230+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Presknt : Stiness, 0. J., Tillinghast and Douglas, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"William L. G. Phetteplace et al. vs. British & Foreign Marine Insurance Co.\", \"head_matter\": \"William L. G. Phetteplace et al. vs. British & Foreign Marine Insurance Co.\\nPROVIDENCE\\nMAY 17, 1901.\\nPresknt : Stiness, 0. J., Tillinghast and Douglas, JJ.\\n(1) Marine Insurance. Policy. Evidence.\\nWhere from the face of a marine insurance policy it is doubtful whether the intent of the parties was that the policy should protect against loss by leakage from whatever cause arising, or against marine risks only, parol evidence is admissible to show the intent of the parties and what \\u25a0 construction they themselves had put upon it.\\n(2) Marine Insurance.\\nA marine insurance policy covered all shipments of oil from ports in the Mediterranean Sea to New York, Philadelphia, or Boston, direct or via port or ports and at and thence to Providence, with privilege of transshipment, including risk of craft to and from the ship or vessel, each craft to be considered a separate risk; covered leakage amounting to five per cent, on each barrel over ordinary leakage, which was agreed to be two per cent.; not liable for particular average, nor for breakage of merchandise unless occasioned by stranding or collision with another vessel; the perils which the insurance company took upon itself were of the seas, fires, pirates, and all other perils, losses or misfortunes that should come to the hurt or damage of the goods\\nHeld, that overland transit to Providence of oils shipped from Mediterranean ports to Boston or Philadelphia was authorized under the above contract, the water route being greater and more dangerous and comparatively uncommon, all of which must have been known to the company; hence the company was liable for leakage under the policy, although it could not be shown where the leakage took place.\\n(3) Marine Insurance.\\nWhere an insurance company has paid a number of losses under a policy upon proofs similar to the one in the case at bar, it cannot, without any notice until the trial that it would no longer pay upon such proofs, refuse to pay further.\\n(4) Marine Insurance.\\nUnder the above policy the company is not liable for leakage unless the leakage on each barrel has amounted to seven per cent, or upwards; and when it becomes liable at all, it is liable for the whole leakage on each . barrel, without deducting either seven per cent, or two per cent.\\nAssumpsit on a policy of insurance. The facts are fully stated in the opinion.\\nHeard on petition of defendant for new trial, and new trial denied.\", \"word_count\": \"3087\", \"char_count\": \"17906\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam. The defendant's petition for a new trial is denied, and judgment will be entered upon the decision of Mr. Justice Bogers, for the reasons assigned by .him in said decision, which is adopted as the opinion of the court.\\nDecision.\\nRogers, J\\nThe plaintiffs, who are copartners under the firm name of the Phetteplace Olive Oil Importing Company, bring this action to recover for loss by leakage on several cargoes of oil shipped from Marseilles and other Mediterranean ports to them, at Providence, B. I.\\nI find the facts to be that the plaintiffs obtained insurance from the defendant through the latter's_ agents in Providence, Starkweather & Shepley, by policy dated December 28, 1893, which was in form an ordinary marine policy with some additions written in ; that said policy, after giving the name of the defendant company, continued in this wise (the written words of the quotation being italicized, while the printed words are not), viz.: \\\"Phetteplace Olive Oil Co. on account of whom it may concern. To cover all shipments of olive oil consigned to them direct, or to order, or to Bankers, if designed for the control of the assured. In case of loss to be paid in ffinds current in the United States to Brown Brothers & Co., or as interest may appear. Do make insurance and cause to be insured, lost or not lost, at and from port or ports in the Mediterranean Sea to New York ~ Philaclelpihia Boston, direct, or via port or ports and at and thence to Providence ^ Boston ~ Philadelphia, withprivilege of transhipment (including risk of craft to and from the ship or vessel, each craft to be considered a separate risk) on olive oil fto cover leakage amounting to five per cent, on each barrel over ordinary leakage, which is agreed to be two per cent. It is understood and agreed that any claims under the leakage clause are not payable to Brown Brothers, but direct to the assured, upon all kinds of lawful goods and merchandise, laden or to be laden, on board the good steamer or steamers, whereof is master,\\\" &c.; that said policy was continuous until discontinued, and either party could discontinue on giving thirty days' written notice to the other party ; that the premium named in the policy, by indorsement on the back, was eighty cents per hundred dollars insured, but it nowhere appeared on the policy whether this was an extraordinary or increased premium over and above what was ordinarily charged for marine insurance, and the policy provided that premiums were payable monthly in advance; that among the numerous printed provisions contained in the policy there was, under the title Memorandum, the following: \\\"Not liable for particular average on molasses or other liquids, nor for breakage of merchandise unless occasioned by stranding or collision with another vessel ; \\\" that one of the printed provisions in said policy was the following, viz.: \\\"Touching the adventures and perils which the said insurance company is contented to bear, and takes upon itself in this voyage, they are of the seas, fires, pirates, . . . and all the other perils, losses, or misfortunes that have or shall come to the hurt, detriment, or damage of the said goods or merchandise or any part thereof ; \\\" that several cargoes of olive oil, covered by said policy, were shipped from Marseilles and Naples, on the Mediterranean Sea, to the plaintiffs, on which the leakage amounted to more than seven per cent. ; that all of said oil was shipped by steamer to New York, Philadelphia, or Boston ; that some of said oil was forwarded from said American ports to Providence by rail, but how much thereof was so forwarded by, rail did not appear in evidence ; that said oil was shipped in good order at the Mediterranean ports, and that when it arrived in Providence examination showed that more than seven per cent, had leaked out, but where or on what part of the trip, or whether on sea or land, such leakage occurred the proof did not show, neither did it show that the leakage was occasioned by stranding or collision with another vessel, or how it was occasioned; that one of the printed clauses of the policy was as follows, viz. : \\\"Proofs of loss and all bills of expenses must be approved by the agents of the company, if there be one, at or near the place where the loss occurs or the expenses are incurred, or if there be none in the vicinity, by the correspondent of the National Board of Marine Underwriters; and such agent or correspondent must be represented on all surveys; \\\" that when a cargo arrived here, and there was a leakage, the plaintiffs would notify defendant's agents here that there was such a loss, and ask them to send an inspector, if they desired, and then the plaintiffs personally weighed the leaking packages and deducted the weight from the real weight, as shown by the invoice by which the plaintiffs had bought, the balance being the amount of loss, and being computed at the price of the oil at the point of shipment; that that was the only proof of loss furnished, that said defendant's agents made no objection thereto, but paid several losses arising from leakage under this policy upon the statements as made up by the plaintiffs ; that parol evidence was offered by the plaintiffs against the objection of the defendant, which was admitted cle bene, as to the conversations between the plaintiffs and the defendant's agents, of the nature of the insurance desired at the time of taking out the policy, also, that the rate of premium charged was a largely increased rate over the ordinary rate ; that the defendant paid several losses under this policy, that expert evidence was admitted, showing that this form of leakage clause was qualified insurance, and that it was customary in the trade for insurance companies to pay such leakage.\\nu The questions in this case all arise in regard to leakage, and the construction of the policy relating thereto, is, therefore, all-important. Leakage of liquids, especially on a long voyage, may result from various causes. It may result from strictly maritime causes, as from stranding, collision, &c. ; or it may result, without any injury to the ship or cargo, from strictly maritime causes, as by rough weather causing the ship to pitch and roll, thereby causing the barrels or cases containing the liquid to leak; or it may result from the proper vice of the subject-matter : so that ordinary leakage has become a well-known term. It is impossible, in very many cases, to determine just the cause of leakage, but it is a substantial loss, the risk of which some shippers do not care to assume, and so seek protection from insm-ance companies, not only for leakage arising from known strictly maritime causes, but also from any cause (except, of course, from the misconduct of the assured).\\nRelying on the language of the policy merely, the reading of it would incline the court to the opinion that it was not alone a policy against marine risks, but it was also a policy against loss by leakage from whatever cause ai-ising, provided the leakage amounted to seven per cent. The defendant contends that this was a marine policy only, and that it can be treated only as a marine policy. There is nothing in law to prevent this being treated as covering other losses than those arising from marine perils, if the insurers have so agreed. Emerigon says, in the English translation of his work on Insurance, at page 312 : \\\"Though the loss, says the ordonnance, which happens through the proper vice of the subject is not a maritime risk properly called, still nothing prevents the insurers from rendering themselves responsible by a special agreement.\\\"\\nAt the trial the defendant's counsel contended that the language of the policy was so clear, so free from ambiguity, that no doubt could arise as to this policy being against sea perils alone, and objected to parol evidence being admitted. The court admitted such evidence cle bene, as throwing light upon the intent of the parties, and now formally rules in such evidence as admissible.\\nPoland, J., in Lowry et al. v. Adams, 22 Vt. 160, 165, says : \\\" Bor the purpose of ascertaining the intent of the parties in entering into any contract, courts will look at the situation of the parties making it, the subject-matter of the contract, the motives of the parties in entering into it, and the object to be attained by it; and even in cases where the contract is reduced to writing, will allow all these circumstances to he shown by parol evidence, if the intent of the parties upon the face of the contract is doubtful, or the'language used by them will admit of more than one interpretation. When, from the contract itself and all the surrounding circumstances, the true object and intent of the parties has been ascertained, courts will enforce the contract according to that intent, unless there he found in the way some stubborn, inflexible rule of law, absolutely requiring a different determination.\\\" See also Shore v. Wilson, 9 C. & F. 355, 366; Nash v. Towne, 5 Wall. 689; McDonald v. Longbottom, 1 Ellis & Ellis, 977; Goodrich v. Stevens, 5 Lans. 230; Donlin v. Deagling, 80 Ill. 608; Buckmaster v. Jacobs, 27 La. An. 626.\\nThe evidence shows clearly that the intention of the parties was to insure against leakage, if amounting to seven per cent., from whatever cause arising (except, of course, the misconduct of the insured), and that an increased premium was to be, and was, paid therefor; and, hence, it was not necessary for the plaintiffs to show that the leakage was occasioned by stranding or collision with another vessel.\\nThe defendant contends that some of the oil in controversy was conveyed from some of the American ports, where it was landed, to Providence, by rail, and that, inasmuch as it is not known where the leakage took place, it may not have been on a vessel at all; and that, hence, it could not have been intended to be covered by this policy, unless shown to have been suffered on shipboard.\\nThat depends, however, altogether upon the contract and understanding between the parties, and the course of business. The distance between Naples and New York, Philadelphia, or Boston is between 3,000 and 4,000 miles, and between Marseilles and New York, Philadelphia, or Boston is but a few hundred miles less, and must necessarily be accomplished by water, while the distance from Boston to Providence by land is but forty-three miles, the distance by water being several times as far, and over dangerous waters, there being no regular water line between the two places ; so, also, the distance from Philadelphia to Providence is but a small percentage of the distance from Naples or Marseilles to Providence, and that water carriage between Philadelphia and Providence was comparatively uncommon, and all this must have been known to the defendant. The case at bar, so far as the overland transit is concerned, seems to me to be analogous to the case of Rodocanachi et al. v. Elliott, L. R. 8 C. P. 649, in this, that, in that case, as well as in this case, upon a marine policy, some overland transit was authorized.\\nParol evidence \\u2014 as to how the parties had treated this policy, and the risk covered by it, in other words what construction the parties themselves had put upon it \\u2014 was offered by the plaintiffs, and was admitted de bene; and as to such testimony, as well as to the other parol evidence offered at the trial, the court now rules it to have been admissible.\\nIn Davis v. Shafer, 50 Fed. Rep. 764, 768, Phillips, J., says : ' ' Where the contract in question employs words or terms of doubtful or ambiguous meaning and application, the meaning and application given them by the parties to the contract, and acted on by them, should prevail over any technical, grammatical, or logical interpretation of the words and phrases. But where the contract is free from ambiguity, and ' its meaning is clear in the eye of the law,' such evidence is clearly incompetent.\\\" See also R. R. Co. v. Trimble, 10 Wall. 367; Michael v. St. L. M. F. Ins. Co., 17 Mo. Ap. 23, 26; St. Paul, &c., R. R. Co. v. Blackmar, 44 Minn. 514, 518.\\nIt is in evidence, in this case, that the defendant has paid losses for leakage under the policy under consideration upon like proofs, and made up in the same manner, as were the proofs as to the losses it now refuses to pay.\\nThe defendant, having paid a number of losses under this policy, cannot now, in my opinion, without any notice, until upon the trial, that the procedure it had previously followed was unsatisfactory, refuse to pay further.\\nA a- to the amount of damage, it seems to me that the defendant is not liable to pay for leakage unless the leakage on each barrel on which leakage is claimed has amounted to seven per cent, or upwards ; and when it becomes liable at all, then it becomes liable for the whole leakage on such barrel, without deducting' either seven per cent, or two per cent. The policy reads: \\\"To cover leakage amounting to five per cent, on each barrel over ordinary leakage, which it is agreed to be two per cent.\\\" The policy does not say that ordinary leakage was to be first deducted and only the extraordinary leakage paid for, hut it seems to me to indicate that until seven per cent, leakage, or three and one-half times as much as ordinary leakage, has taken place, the defendant shall not be liable ; hut when the. seven per cent, leakage has occurred, then the defendant is to be liable' for the whole leakage; otherwise it would have been very easy, as in Indemnity M. M. Assur. Co. v. United Oil Co., 88 Fed. Rep. 315, to have stated \\\"that one-half of one per cent, of the quantity laden shall be-first deducted as ordinary leakage, the excess of such one-half of one per cent, to- be considered as extraordinary leakage, loss to be paid,.\\\" etc. In the case at bar two per cent., instead of one-half of' one per cent., was mentioned as ordinary leakage. Both parties claim the last above-named case to favor their respective contentions as to the amount to be paid, and it is not entirely clear exactly what the judge intended.\\nMatteson & Healy, for plaintiffs.\\nWilson & Jenckes and William J. Brown, for defendant.\\nIn the case of Donnell et al. v. Columbian Ins. Co., 2 Sumner, 366, involving the construction of a clause in a marine policy, that the underwriters should not be liable for any partial loss on other goods, or on the vessel and freight unless it amounts to five per cent., etc., Story, J., at page 382, says: \\\"All the commentators upon this article agree that, when the underwriters are liable at all under this clause, they are liable for the full amount of the average without deduction.\\\" Though the foregoing relates to average and not to leakage, yet the limiting clause seems to be similar in character to the one in question.\\nThe parties in the suit at bar have put their own'construction as to the amount to be paid, by the defendant's paying and the plaintiffs' receiving the full amount of the leakage where such leakage was more than seven per cent., and that seems to me to be the proper construction.\\nThe finding and decision of the court is that the defendant did promise in manner and form as the plaintiffs have declared against it, and damages are assessed in the sum of $1,064.24, with interest thereon from September 7, 1895, amounting to $347.75, making the sum of $1,411.99; for which last-mentioned sum the plaintiffs are entitled'to judgment against the defendant, together with costs.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/4847072.json b/ri/4847072.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b5caf1cd778830926e2a2a4e0c57d1fdd373df75
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/4847072.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"4847072\", \"name\": \"Peter F. Carr vs. American Locomotive Co.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Carr v. American Locomotive Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1910-07-12\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"234\", \"last_page\": \"252\", \"citations\": \"31 R.I. 234\", \"volume\": \"31\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:47:46.139991+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Dubois, C. J., Blodgett, Johnson, Parkhurst, and Sweetland, JJ~\", \"parties\": \"Peter F. Carr vs. American Locomotive Co.\", \"head_matter\": \"Peter F. Carr vs. American Locomotive Co.\\nJULY 12, 1910.\\nPresent: Dubois, C. J., Blodgett, Johnson, Parkhurst, and Sweetland, JJ~\\n(1) Bills of Exception by Both Parties.\\nWhere a plaintiff has brought his bill of exceptions to the decision of the Superior Court, granting a motion for a new trial, the defendant may properly file his bill of exceptions to rulings, etc., so that, if the court sustain the exceptions of plaintiff, it may consider defendant's exceptions, and, if they constitute reversible error, remit the case for a new trial.\\n(2) Concurring Verdicts. New Trial.\\nAfter three concurring verdicts, upon conflicting evidence, the court, having twice remanded the case for a new trial, and having given sufficient opportunity for a fair determination of the disputed questions, will not longer interfere with the finding of the jury, where there has been no error of law-which affects the verdict.\\n(3) Concurring Verdicts. Disapproval of Trial Judge.\\nThe doctrine of concurring verdicts is superior to the rule in Wilcox v. B. I. Co., 29 It. I. 292, as to the force to be given the decision of the trial judge in passing upon motion for new trial.\\n(4) Evidence.\\n\\u201c Q. Have you ever known of an operator being injured in operating the furnace before?\\u201d was properly ruled out, since the furnace might be defective, and a part blow out before, because of defects, and the operator at the time be uninjured.\\n(5) Master and Servant. Defective Appliances.\\nIn an action for injury caused by the blowing out of a valve stem, the facts with regard to the condition'of the stem which plaintiff actually knew was all the knowledge he was required to have, and he was\\u2019not required to inform himself as to the experience of other workmen about the furnace. He was under no duty to inspect the mechanism where his duties did not require or permit him to withdraw the stem and examine its threads.\\nBlodgett, J., dissents.\\nTrespass on the Case for negligence.\\nHeard on exceptions of plaintiff, and sustained.\", \"word_count\": \"7247\", \"char_count\": \"40939\", \"text\": \"Sweetland, J.\\nThis is an action of trespass on the case\\nfor damages for personal injuries resulting from an accident in the shop of the defendant company in June 28th, 1902. The plaintiff was at that time in the employ of the defendant, in said shop. The plaintiff had been engaged in such employment 'for several months prior to the accident, heating rivets for the boilermakers in defendant's boiler shop in certain rivet-heaters provided by the defendant for that purpose. At the time of the accident the plaintiff was working at a rivet-heater known as an oil-heater, provided with a burner adapted for the use of oil as a fuel when supplied under .pressure, so that oil was burned as it emerged in the form of spray from the burner and entered the furnace of the rivet-heater. This burner consisted of a combination of three valves fitted in an upright supply pipe at a convenient point opposite the opening in the furnace of the rivet-heater so as to permit the projection of the flame produced by the burning oil under pressure through said opening into the furnace. The top valve controlled the supply of air in the pipe carried under pressure to the burner for the purpose of producing the spray of oil desired for combustion. The bottom valve controlled the supply of oil in the pipe also forced under pressure to the burner.' The middle valve controlled the flow of the mingled oil and air, meeting in the burner, and regulated the supply. The burner was provided with a nozzle or nose several inches in length opposite this middle valve and extending into the furnace itself. The middle or burner valve was equipped with a threaded valve-stem adapted to screw into the body of the valve. This valve-stem, if in good condition, when inserted into the body of the valve, required about nine turns to be screwed to its seat in the valve. This valve-stem could be wholly unscrewed and withdrawn from the valve and was not provided with any checking or holding device to prevent its being so unscrewed and withdrawn. The plaintiff claims that the burner valve-stem upon the rivet-heater, at which he was working at the time of the accident, had become worn in its threads and loose in the valve; that it had been subjected to abuse and injury while it was being repaired and its handle replaced some time before the accident; that it was dangerously loose in the valve, and that when opened a very few turns, it was liable to be blown out by the pressure of the oil and air. The plaintiff alleges that this unsafe condition of the valve-stem was known to the defendant, but was unknown to him. The plaintiff claims that on the morning of the accident he began work by starting a fire in the oil-heater, in the usual way; that after the fire had been started he undertook to regulate the fire and the flow of oil by turning this middle valve as usual; that he turned the valve-stem two or three turns, when the stem blew out past him and fell to the floor some few feet away from the burner; that a stream of oil under pressure immediately followed the valve-stem through the opening in the valve, striking against his body with such force that portions of the oil rebounded, in the form of spray into the furnace fire, whereby it became ignited, and the flames were thus communicated to the oil, then playing upon him from the burner, so that he was enveloped in flames, his clothing took fire and his face, neck, chest, and arms were badly burned. The case was tried before a justice of the Superior Court and a jury. At the trial, the defendant produced in court as an exhibit, marked defendant's exhibit A., a combination of three valves fitted to a pipe, which the defendant claims were the same pipe and valves which were upon the rivet-heater, operated by the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, and which the defendant had removed, shortly after the accident, and had preserved to be offered as an exhibit at the trial. The plaintiff denied that the stem in the middle, or burner, valve in Exhibit A, was the same burner valve-stem that was in the appliance at the time of the accident. There can be no question that the burner valve-stem in exhibit A. is in good condition. The identity, therefore, of the burner valve-stem produced in court became a most important issue before the jury. At the trial the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $22,895. In addition to its general verdict, the jury returned a special verdict upon certain issues submitted to it. These special issues, with the jury's findings thereon, are as follows:\\n1. Was the valve-stem produced in court as a part of the burner-valve in question, and forming a part of defendant's exhibit A, the stem operated by the plaintiff at the time of the accident? No.\\nIf the answer to question one (1) be no, then the jury should answer the following questions:\\n2'. Was the thread on the stem of the burner-valve operated by the plaintiff at the time of the accident, then in good working condition? No.\\n3. Was the thread in the body of the burner-valve operated by the plaintiff at the time of the accident, then in good working condition? Yes.\\n4. Did the middle valve-stem in the apparatus operated by the plaintiff at the time of the accident blow out of the valve when operated two turns, while being so operated by him? Yes.\\n5. Were the agents of the defendant company in charge of the boiler-shop notified that the middle valve-stem used in said apparatus had blown out of the valve while in operation prior to the accident? Yes.\\nThe defendant duly filed and prosecuted its motion for a new trial in the Superior Court upon the grounds that the general verdict of the jury and the first, second, fourth, and fifth special findings of the jury were against the evidence and the weight thereof, and that the damages awarded by the jury were excessive. The justice presiding at the trial, after hearing the motion for a new trial, decided that on the issue whether the middle stem of exhibit A. was or not the stem that was on the apparatus at the time of the accident, the weight of the testimony was with the defendant and granted the motion for new trial. The case is before this court upon the plaintiff's exception to the decision of the Superior Court granting the motion for new trial. The defendant has also filed a bill of its exceptions, taken at the trial, to various rulings and instructions of the justice presiding. The defendant claims that these rulings and instructions to which it has taken exception constitute reversible error and entitle it to a new trial, and urges that, if this court should for any reason sustain the plaintiff's bill of exceptions, it should not sustain the verdict of the jury, but should order a new trial. We are of the opinion that the procedure of the defendant is proper, and that if the plaintiff's exceptions are sustained, the court should then consider the defendant's exceptions, taken at the trial; and if the defendant's exceptions constitute reversible error, the case should be remitted to the Superior Court for a new trial.\\nThis case has been tried four times. The first trial was in the Common Pleas Division of the Supreme Court, and resulted in a disagreement of the jury. The second trial was in the Common Pleas Division of the Supreme Court, and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for $18,000, with a special finding that exhibit A. includes the identical burner-valve and stem which were operated by the plaintiff at- the time of the accident. Upon petition, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court granted a new trial (Carr vs. American Locomotive Co., 26 R. I. 180). Upon the establishment of the Superior Court this case was transferred to that court, and the last two trials have been in that court. The third trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff for $20,000, with a special finding that the burner valve-stem forming a part of exhibit A. was not the stem operated by the plaintiff at the time of the accident. The justice who presided at that trial denied the defendant's motion for a new trial. Upon exception to that decision this court sustained the exception and ordered a new trial (Carr v. American Locomotive Co., 29 R. I. 276). A fourth and last trial was had with the result, herein stated, of a verdict of $22,895 for the plaintiff, with a special finding by the jury that the burner valve-stem forming a part of exhibit A; was not the stem operated by the plaintiff at the time of the accident.\\nIt therefore appears that there have been three concurring verdicts in favor of the plaintiff. At the time of the first verdict there was no procedure in this State permitting a review of the jury's finding by the justice presiding at the trial. After the second verdict the justice presiding, acting under such a procedure, after hearing the testimony, denied the motion for a new trial and approved the verdict. The justice presiding at the last trial has decided that the weight of the testimony is with the defendant. After the first and second verdicts this court reviewed the testimony and decided that in its opinion the evidence preponderated in favor of the defendant, and that there should be new trials. And now, after another jury has found in favor of the plaintiff's claims, this court is asked again to disregard the finding of the jury and to send the case again for another trial before another jury.\\nFrom the record before us it does not appear whether at the first two trials the justices were asked to direct verdicts in favor of the defendant; but in each instance the case was submitted to the jury. At the third trial a motion was made that the jury be directed to return a verdict for the defendant. The motion was denied, and this court said in Carr v. American Locomotive Co., 29 R.. I. at 290: \\\"The forty-sixth exception was taken to the court's denial of a motion to direct a verdict for the defendant upon all the testimony. The evidence was conflicting and was properly left to the jury.\\\" At the last trial the justice presiding refused to direct a verdict in the defendant's favor. We have carefully read and considered the transcript of the testimony given at the last trial. The plaintiff has produced the testimony of seven new witnesses in support of his claim as to the defendant's negligence and the identity of the middle stem on exhibit A. The case for the plaintiff is much stronger than at the former trial. Upon this testimony, to order judgment for the def\\u00e9ndant would be highly improper. If the case was before us for the first time, we should hesitate to disturb the verdict of the jury but for the decision of the justice presiding at the trial, whose decision will in ordinary cases be given much persuasive force by this court in appellate proceedings. Thus it has appeared to every judicial mind which has considered the testimony in this case that the deductions which may fairly be made upon the evidence are conflicting, that there is substantial evidence to support a verdict for the plaintiff, and that it is a case in which, under the constitution of this State, the determination of the facts must be made by a jury. The effect of the two opinions of this court in granting new trials was not that the verdicts in the plaintiff's favor were entirely unjustified, for in that case the court would have exercised its authority and ordered a judgment for the defendant. The opinions indicate, rather, that the court was not satisfied that justice had been done, that in its opinion another opportunity should be given to the parties to present further testimony if they were able, and that the court might have the benefit of the finding of another jury upon the issues. In McCann v. New York, etc., 73 N. Y. App. Div. 305, the court, in considering the effect of concurring verdicts, said: \\\" These issues of fact must be ultimately decided by the jury. The single question presented, therefore, is whether this court can or should accomplish indirectly by setting aside the verdict what it could not accomplish directly, viz., prevent a recovery by the plaintiff. . . . While the trial court and the Appellate Division should not hesitate to set aside a verdict as against the weight of evidence, where the ends of justice appear to require a new trial, yet when it comes to setting aside on this ground alone three verdicts rendered in' an ordinary action possessing no extraordinary features, the court should hesitate lest it usurp the functions of the jury.\\\" In some States it has been provided by statute that there shall not be granted in any case, to the same party, more than two new trials on the ground that the verdict is contrary to the evidence, or that it is not sufficiently supported by the evidence. Thus fixing in those States the rule as to the effect of concurring verdicts when there has been no error of law. In the absence of such statutory provision the doctrine has been generally accepted, by the courts of the various States, that, in cases where the evidence is conflicting and a judgment cannot be directed, and successive juries have returned a verdict for the same party, there comes a time when the court upon the facts will no longer oppose their judgment to that of the jury, but will bring long-continued litigation to a close. This doctrine has not been accepted in a few cases and by some eminent jurists in dissenting opinions, and the position has been taken, as in the dissenting opinion in McCann v. New York, &c. 73 N. Y. App. Div. 305: \\\"A wrong committed, no matter how often, never makes a right. This verdict is wrong; it is the result of misconception, prejudice or partiality and ought not to be approved by the court. Upon substantially the same state of facts we have 'several times declared that the plaintiff ought not to recover, and yet we are about to permit a recovery, because the jury forsooth have, for the fourth time, committed the same wrong. The .law imposes a duty upon this court to review verdicts, and whenever it can be seen that injustice has been done, by reason of the jury not properly considering the evidence, or that its action has been influenced either by prejudice or partiality, then the court ought, in the discharge of its duty, to fearlessly exercise the power given to it by the statute (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 1317) and right the wrong by setting the verdict aside and ordering a new trial, and this as many times as may be necessary to accomplish the proper result. Justice never tires, and an act ought not to be approved in its name which wrongfully takes property from one person and gives it to another.\\\" This position presupposes in the judicial mind an infallibility in the determination of conflicting issues of fact which few courts would claim for themselves. If it is unquestioned in the mind of the court that a wrong has been committed by the verdict of the jury, surely the verdict should not be allowed to stand. The law provides a method by which such wrong can be corrected, and, regardless of the jury's verdict, a judgment should be ordered for the other party. That an appellate court has twice remanded a cause for a new trial indicates that the evidence of a wrong committed is not indubitable. The court may have an opinion or a suspicion that an injustice has been done, but it is unable to so declare with certainty. Courts recognize that it is not given to human tribunals to determine with the exactness of mathematical demonstration what is the true and just conclusion upon conflicting facts, with regard to which there is the opposing testimony of witnesses, as to whose reliability and good faith different minds may reasonably disagree. Cases involving such conflicting statements of fact must of necessity be determined in the courts, ultimately by the finding of a jury, but the true solution can not be found with demonstrative certainty. Hence an appellate court, having given sufficient opportunity for a fair determination of such disputed questions, will not longer interfere with the finding of the jury. To take this course is not to weakly permit or to approve the doing of a wrong in the name of justice, but is to recognize the proper functions of the court and the jury, and, after exercising due caution to prevent injustice, places the determination of disputed questions of fact in the tribunal provided by our constitution and laws. This doctrine has been recognized by this court. In Steadman v. Wilbur, 7 It. I. 481, Ames, C. J., said: \\\"After two full trials in this court by impartial juries, in which verdicts were rendered for the defendants, we certainly shall not open this case for a new trial, without strong proof that justice imperatively demands it. We cannot say, looking at the evidence, direct and circumstan tial, although, not as full as might be desired, that the jury-must have been mistaken or partial to have rendered the verdict that they did. We do not see that this litigation can be rightfully permitted to go any farther; and upon all the grounds, dismiss this motion for a new trial, with costs.\\\" In Bounds v. Humes, 7 R. I. 535, the court found that the plaintiff had not only failed to prove the allegations of his declaration but had proved the precise contrary of it, and the court was obliged to set .aside a second verdict in the plaintiff's favor, and said: \\\" It is with reluctance that the court grants a new trial on the ground that the verdict is against the evidence, where the verdict is the second which has been obtained by the prevailing party. In the present case, however, we think that our duty leaves us no choice.\\\" The court in that case recognized the exception to the rule as to concurring verdicts afterwards followed in Burnham v. N. Y., Prov. & Bost. R. R., 17 R. I. 544 and 18 R. I. 494. That where it conclusively appears that the verdict is wrong the court will not permit it to stand although it may be the second or third successive verdict for the same party; In McNeil v. Lyons, 22 R. I. 7, the court said: \\\"In view of three .concurring verdicts for the plaintiff, the court must assume, even though it may not be satisfied, that the verdict is not against the evidence.\\\"\\n\\\"In Burnham v. N. Y., Prov. & Bost. R. R. Co., 17 R. I. 544, and 18 R. I. 494, this court set aside three concurring verdicts, but for reasons which do not apply to this case. In that case, in the opinion of the majority of the court, it conclusively appeared that the engine which Burnham was running, comparing its admitted rate of speed and the distance to be covered, must have been beyond the electric signal, so that he could have seen it if he had been looking. In this case there is no such degree of certainty.\\\"'\\nThe decisions in most of the other States are in accord with ours. In Brown v. Paterson Paper Co., 69 N. J. L. 474, a former verdict had been set aside because against the weight of the evidence. The court said: \\\"While in this state there is no statute or rule established by decisions, limiting the number of times this court may set aside a verdict and grant a new trial because it is against the weight of the evidence, still a second concurring verdict upon the same state of facts or on slightly varying evidence should cause the court to hesitate before granting a third trial. . . . There is evidence from which the pry might have found both these facts the other way, but, as upon both trials in this cause the jury have found these facts in favor of the plaintiff, we think, under the circumstances of the case the rule to show cause should be discharged.\\\" In Hazzard v. Mayor, &c., 77 Ga. 54, the opinion of the court was: \\\"The questions of fact being the peculiar province of the jury, and that body having three times, by three several and different representatives of the jury box each time, found for the plaintiff, and the last time a considerate and reasonable verdict, the law, which invests that body of men of the vicinage with the judgment over facts, as it does the presiding judge over law, will not permit this court in the last resort to allow the judge to control the jury ad infinitum upon facts, where there is evidence (though, in the judgment of that coyrt and this, it be comparatively weak) in which repeated findings may rest; because to allow this will be to allow the judge to oust the jury of its constitutional prerogatives, and thus to unite in one, two separate jurisdictional powers clothed by the constitution and laws with distinct functions.\\\" Keans v. Jones, 77 Ga. 90; Harrigan v. Railway Co. 84 Ga. 793. In the later Georgia case, Central Railroad Co. v. Kent, 91 Ga. 687, applying the rule as in Burnham v. N. Y., Prov. & Bost. R. R. supra, a majority of the court, after a third verdict for the plaintiff, refused to affirm it on the ground that there was no evidence to support it, and in that view of the case directed that the plaintiff's action be dismissed. In Handly v. Call, 30 Me. 9, a verdict obtained for the plaintiff at a former trial'had been set aside; the court said: \\\"Another jury has come to the same conclusion. The opinion of the court cannot be substituted for that of the jury.\\\" Hyde v. Haak, 132 Mich. 364; Joyce v. Charleston Ice Manuf'g Co., 50 Fed. 371; Frost v. Brown, 2 Bay (S. C.), 139; Fowler v. Attica Fire Ins. Co., 7 Wend. 270. In McCann v. New York, 73 N. Y. App. Div. 305, the court said: \\\"A sufficient number of trials has now been granted to remove any suspicion of the existence of bias, passion, prejudice or corruption, and it becomes a mere matter of judgment on questions of: fact. The administration of jurisprudence where trial by jury is preserved goes upon the theory that the judgment of twelve laymen upon a question of fact is safer than that of a smaller body of judges who are more removed from the people. An unwarranted exercise of this power to set aside verdicts as against the weight of the evidence would sooner or later bring the judiciary into disrepute. We think any further interference with the verdict of the jury in this case would be unauthorized and unjustified.\\\"\\nIn the case at bar, we are of the opinion that the time has now arrived when this rule with regard to concurring verdicts should be applied, and if there has been no error of law, occurring at the trial, which affects the jury's verdict, that verdict should be allowed to stand. This conclusion as to the force and effect of the three successive verdicts for the plaintiff, notwithstanding the decision of the justice of the Superior Court, is not in disregard of the rule in Wilcox v. Rhode Island Co., 29 R. I. 292. The doctrine as to the force of concurring verdicts is superior to the rule in the Wilcox case. When the time comes in any case for the application of that doctrine it will be applied, not only in disregard of the decision of the justice of the Superior Court, but also in disregard of our own former conclusions in the case.\\nIt now becomes necessary to examine the defendant's exceptions taken at the trial. Of these we shall consider the fifteenth, twentieth, twenty-third, twenty-fourth, twenty-fifth, and twenty-seventh, as they are the only ones now pressed by the defendant before this court.\\nThe fifteenth is: \\\"The presiding justice erred in refusing to permit one of the defendant's witnesses to answer the following question propounded by defendant's counsel: 'Have you ever known of an operator being injured in operating the furnace before? ' to which exception was taken.\\\" It is quite immaterial if the witness had known of no operator being injured before while operating the furnace. The furnace might be defective and the stem blown out of the valve many times before, because of its defective condition, and yet the operator at the time of such occurrences be entirely uninjured.\\nThe twentieth exception is: \\\" At the conclusion of the testimony the defendant requested the court to instruct the jury as follows: 'X. If you find that the valve with its stem was defective in not having any engagement between the threads on the stem and in the valve and would blow out when it was two turns removed from the seat, and that the plaintiff knew or might have known of such defective condition by the exercise of reasonable care, the verdict must be for the defendant.' The court refused the request so made, to which exception was taken.\\\" The justice presiding charged fully that the plaintiff could not recover if he knew of the defective condition of the stem. The defendant insists upon the rule laid down by this court that \\\"a workman is bound by such knowledge as he ought to have as well as by what he actually has.\\\" That rule has no application to the facts of this case. The facts with regard to the condition of this stem which the plaintiff actually knew is all the knowledge which the law required him to have. He was not required to inform himself as to the experience of other workmen about this furnace. His duties did not require or permit him to withdraw the stem and examine its threads. He was under no duty to inspect the mechanism.\\nThe tw\\u00e9nty-third, twenty-fourth, twenty-fifth, and twenty-seventh exceptions are to instructions given to the jury upon the request of the plaintiff. We find no error in those instructions. They are in accord with opinions of this court previously rendered. The defendant takes nothing by its exceptions.\\nThe defendant does not press before us the question of excessive damages, which was one of the grounds for its motion for a new trial before the Superior Court. We have, however, considered the question, and although the amount awarded by the jury is large, in view of the very serious permanent injury to the plaintiff, we can not say that it is excessive.\\nThe plaintiff's exceptions are sustained, and the case is remitted to the Superior Court with direction to enter judgment upon the verdict.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/4890638.json b/ri/4890638.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..53631404b06682be8515244ad8caecd4c6c7d41f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/4890638.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"4890638\", \"name\": \"Frank G. Myers, Exr., vs. Williston A. Cady\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Myers v. Cady\", \"decision_date\": \"1901-03-29\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"549\", \"last_page\": \"549\", \"citations\": \"22 R.I. 549\", \"volume\": \"22\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:11:05.397795+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present : Stiness, C. J., Tillinghast and Rogers, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Frank G. Myers, Exr., vs. Williston A. Cady.\", \"head_matter\": \"Frank G. Myers, Exr., vs. Williston A. Cady.\\nPROVIDENCE\\nMARCH 29, 1901.\\nPresent : Stiness, C. J., Tillinghast and Rogers, JJ.\\n<1) Wills. Powers. Executors and Administrators.\\nTestamentary provision as follows : \\u201cI desire that my home estate be sold within a year after my decease, provided a suitable price can be obtained for the same \\u201d:\\u2014\\nHeld, that the expression of desire was equivalent to a direction to sell, the purpose of the limitation of time being to prevent a sacrifice of the estate, and that the executor had authority to sell after the expiration of the year.\\nBill in Equity for specific performance. The facts appear in the opinion.\\nHeard on bill and answer, and relief granted.\\nJohn Palmer, for complainant.\\nE. C. Pierce for respondent.\", \"word_count\": \"317\", \"char_count\": \"1854\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nThe will of Agnes McWilliams said: \\\"I desire that my home estate on Narragansett boulevard in Edgewood, town of Cranston, State of Rhode Island, be sold within a year after my decease, provided a suitable price can be obtained for the same.\\\" It then provided that the money derived therefrom should be added to what she had, and that the whole should be paid to designated legatees.\\nThe question raised is whether the estate can be sold after the expiration of the year. It is perfectly clear from the will that the estate was to be sold. The will contained no residuary clause, except by providing that each of the legatees should be entitled to receive a proportional part of the surplus. The expression of desire was equivalent to a direction to sell. The limitation of time was dependent upon obtaining a suitable price. It evidently meant that while she desired a speedy sale she did not want the estate sacrificed by a sale before a suitable price could be obtained. We think, therefore, that the executor has authority to sell and is entitled to a decree for specific performance.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/4892746.json b/ri/4892746.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fbb657afd05bae7f5de744ce781462098e9e4677
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/4892746.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"4892746\", \"name\": \"Albert Walton vs. Joseph Frost\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Walton v. Frost\", \"decision_date\": \"1900-06-09\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"157\", \"last_page\": \"157\", \"citations\": \"22 R.I. 157\", \"volume\": \"22\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:11:05.397795+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Stiness, O. J., Tillingliast, and Rogers, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Albert Walton vs. Joseph Frost.\", \"head_matter\": \"Albert Walton vs. Joseph Frost.\\nPROVIDENCE\\nJUNE 9, 1900.\\nPresent: Stiness, O. J., Tillingliast, and Rogers, JJ.\\n(1) Slander. Words AetionaMe per se.\\nIn an action, for slander, tlie statement \\u201cI will go tell tlie superintendent and overseer about your taking that sleeve-lining out of the mill \\u201d is not actionable per se, it not necessarily implying' larceny. To make the words a foundation for an action of slander, facts must be set forth, in a colloquium, which would show that the words could only have been understood to apply to a felonious taking.\\nTrespass on the Case for slander. The declaration charged the defendant with uttering the words concerning the plaintiff: i\\u00a3I will go tell the superintendent and overseer about your taking that sleeve-lining out of the mill,\\u201d meaning and intending that the plaintiff stole certain sleeve-lining out of the mill where he was employed.\\nHeard on demurrer to declaration, and demurrer sustained.\\nThomas F. Vance, for plaintiff.\\nLellcm J. Tuck, for defendant.\", \"word_count\": \"307\", \"char_count\": \"1819\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nThe declaration in this case, which is an action for slander, does not set out words which are actionable per se. They were, in substance, that the defendant would tell the superintendent about the plaintiff's taking sleeve-lining out of the mill. These words might only refer to a violation of the rules of the mill. They do not necessarily imply larceny. To make the words a foundation for an action of slander, facts must be set forth, in a colloquium, which would show that the words spoken could only have been understood to apply to a felonious taking. Richmond v. Loeb, 19 R. I. 120; Blake v. Smith, 19 R. I. 476, 481.\\nThe cases relied on by the plaintiff are those where the words were actionable per se, or where they were explained by a colloquium.\\nDemurrer sustained, and case remitted.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/4925173.json b/ri/4925173.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b2e90a13c78431ffe260af877d7175a8927c0d05
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/4925173.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"4925173\", \"name\": \"Smith & Thayer Co. vs. John A. Arnold\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Smith & Thayer Co. v. Arnold\", \"decision_date\": \"1915-04-09\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"512\", \"last_page\": \"526\", \"citations\": \"37 R.I. 512\", \"volume\": \"37\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:11:25.695094+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Johnson, C. J., Parkhurst, Sweetland, Vincent, and Baker, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Smith & Thayer Co. vs. John A. Arnold.\", \"head_matter\": \"Smith & Thayer Co. vs. John A. Arnold.\\nAPRIL 9, 1915.\\nPresent: Johnson, C. J., Parkhurst, Sweetland, Vincent, and Baker, JJ.\\n(1) Corporations. Director\\u2019s Liability.\\nUnder Gen. Laws, 1909, cap. 214, \\u00a7 12, relating to manufacturing corporations, providing that the whole amount of the debts which any such corporation shall at any time owe shall not exceed the amount of its capital stock actually p^id in, and that in case of any excess the directors under whose administration it shall happen shall be jointly and severally liable, to the extent of such excess for all the debts of the company then existing and for all that shall be contracted as long as they shall respectively continue in office and until the debts shall be reduced to the amount of the capital stock of such company paid in, and under U. S. Bankruptcy Act, 1898 Section 7 (8) requiring a bankrupt to file a schedule of the property and a list of his creditors showing the amount due each of them, such schedule furnishes prima facie evidence of the amount of the debts, as of the date of the adjudication in the case of involuntary bankrupts, and such schedule was admissible in evidence in an action to enforce the statutory liability of a director; and if there were any debts in such schedule, arising otherwise than by contract or only contingently and not absolutely due, or that should be excluded from consideration, it was the duty of defendant to offer that fact by way of defence.\\n(\\u00a3) Corporations. Director\\u2019s Liability.\\nWhere in an action to enforce a director\\u2019s liability, under Gen. Laws, 1909, cap. 214, \\u00a7 12, a plaintiff proves by the admission of the corporation by its bankruptcy schedules the whole amount of the debts owed by the corpora- ' tion at the date of adjudication, it is not necessary for him to negative the existence of any possible items of indebtedness which should not legally be considered, but this is a matter of defence within the means of knowledge of defendant.\\n(3) Corporations. Director\\u2019s Liability.\\nIn an action to enforce a director\\u2019s liability under Gen. Laws, 1909, cap. 214, \\u00a7 12, where the plaintiff has proved the bankruptcy of the corporation and the amount of debts owed, he is entitled to a prima facie presumption that this state of things\\u2019continued and if, in fact, the excess of debts had been paid so as to exonerate defendant, it was a matter for defendant to prove.\\n(4) Corporations. Director\\u2019s Liability.\\nIn an action to enforce a director\\u2019s liability under Gen. Laws, 1909, cap. 214, \\u00a7 12, where defendant was also president of the company and a stockholder for several years, down to the time of its failure, and actively interested in its affairs, it will be presumed in the absence of denial on the part of defendant that he was cognizant of the proceedings at the time of the failure; and it will not be presumed that he had no knowledge of the contents of the bankruptcy schedules.\\n(6) Corporations. Director\\u2019s Liability.\\nIn an action to enforce a director\\u2019s liability under Gen. Laws, 1909, cap. 214, '\\u00a7 12, a note of the corporation secured by mortgage on real estate, was as much a debt owed by the company as any other debt, and it was immaterial that the company was solvent when the note was made and that it had then and later sufficient assets over and above the real estate mortgaged so that its capital stock fund was not impaired, and so that it could then have paid this note out of surplus assets, in view of the fact that it did not pay the note, and that after the adjudication of the company in bankruptcy its debts, including this note, had been increased in excess of its paid-in capital.\\n(6) Corporations. Director\\u2019s Inability.\\nWhere after an adjudication in bankruptcy a mortgage on real estate which secured a note for $4,000 was foreclosed, and at the time of the sale there were no surplus assets of the corporation, but its entire property in liquidation paid only a- percentage on its indebtedness, the amount for which the real estate was sold cannot be considered as a reduction of \\u201cthe amount of debts owed\\u201d by the corporation, in excess of its paid-in capital stock, but such amount stands on the same footing as payments made by the trustee in bankruptcy in liquidation of the bankrupt estate, and is not to be credited for the use of a director to reduce his liability under Gen. Laws, 1909, cap. 214, \\u00a7 12.\\nTrespass on the Case under Gen. Laws, Cap. 214, Section 12.\\nHeard *on exceptions of defendant and overruled.\", \"word_count\": \"5197\", \"char_count\": \"29828\", \"text\": \"Parkhurst, J.\\nThis -is an action of the case brought by the plaintiff, a creditor of the Pawtucket Steam & Gas Pipe Company, a Rhode Island corporation, to enforce a certain statutory liability to pay the plaintiff's claim alleged to have been incurred by the defendant as a director of said company under the provisions of Pub. St. R. I. 1882, Chap. 155, reenacted as Gen. Laws, R. I. 1896, Chap. 180, and Gen. Laws, R. I. 1909, Chap. 214.\\nThe declaration originally contained three counts, but only the first need be considered, the other two having been withdrawn by agreement. This first count seeks to impose upon the defendant a director's liability on the ground that the debts of the corporation were permitted to exceed the amount of its capital stock paid in, under the sections of the above-mentioned statute reading as follows:\\n\\\"The whole amount of the debts which any such corporation shall at any time owe shall not exceed the amount of its capital stock actually paid in; and in case of any excess, the directors under whose administration it shall happen shall be jointly and severally liable, to the extent of such excess, for all the debts of the company then existing, and for all that shall be contracted as long as they shall respectively continue in office, and until the debts shall be reduced to the amount of the capital stock of such company paid in.\\n\\\"Any director who shall be absent at the time of contracting any debt contrary to the foregoing provisions, or who shall object thereto, may exempt himself from said liability by forthwith giving notice of the fact to the stockholders at a meeting which he may call for that purpose. \\\"\\n(Pub. St. R. I. 1882, Chap. 155, \\u00a7 15, 16.)\\n(Gen. Laws, R. I. 1896, Chap. 180, \\u00a7 15, 16.)\\n(Gen. Laws, R. I. 1909, Chap. 214, \\u00a7 12, 13.)\\nTo this count the defendant pleaded the general issue, and a special plea which was subsequently withdrawn.\\nThe case was heard on the general issue before Mr. Justice Sweeney and a jury on April 29 and 30, 1914. For the purposes of the trial it was admitted that the corporation was incorporated under and amenable to the statutes as set forth in the declaration; that John A. Arnold was a director thereof from July 24, 1903, to May 4, 1907; and that it issued its capital stock as follows:\\nPreferred Stock, 107 m shares, par value....... $10,727 00\\nCommon Stock, 527 shares, par value......... 52,700 00\\nTotal stock issued..................... $63,427 00\\nIt was further admitted that on July 22, 1913, subsequent to the commencement of this action, \\\"the sum of $1,575.59 was paid to the J. L. Mott Iron Works in full satisfaction of the balance of its claim as a creditor of the Pawtucket Steam & Gas Pipe Company, \\\" and that said sum should be applied to reduce by that amount any liability of the defendant at present existing, because of the alleged excess of the corporation's indebtedness over its capital stock paid in. It was proved that the balance of the debt owed by the corporation to the plaintiff amounted to $733.99, and with interest added in the sum of $217.87, to $951.86; that this debt was contracted between the plaintiff and the corporation between February 1, 1907, and April 22, 1907; and that dividends in bankruptcy paid by the trustee of the corporation in bankruptcy from July 25, 1907, to December 3,1908, amounting to 35\\u00bf per cent, upon the face of the claim, were duly credited, so that the balance of the account without interest was found to be $733.99, as above stated.\\nIt further appeared that the corporation, having become insolvent and having made an assignment May 4,1907, was put into bankruptcy by its creditors and was adjudicated a bankrupt in the United States District Court for Rhode Island May 29, 1907; the bankrupt's schedules filed in the United States District Court, ,and sworn to by the treasurer of the Pawtucket Steam & Gas Pipe Company were produced in evidence through the clerk of the United States District Court, and against objection and exception on behalf of the defendant, it was permitted to be shown from these schedules, that the admitted liabilities of the Pawtucket Steam & Gas Pipe Company were stated to be $67,943.66, of which $4,000 was a note secured by mortgage on real estate, and the balance unsecured claims.\\nAs to the amount of outstanding capital stock, it is specifically admitted that the corporation had issued stock of the par value of $63,427, as above shown; it appears to be assumed on both sides of this case that most of this stock had been paid for when issued, and no claim is made that any of the shares had not been paid for except that the plaintiff attempted to show that nine shares were unpaid; there is evidence to show that seven of these were paid for by transfer of property and good will of a business, and that one of them was paid for in cash; it is not clear whether the ninth share was ever paid for or not; we think the plaintiff has failed to show that any of the shares was unpaid, and in the absence of more satisfactory proof than we have before us we shall treat the whole outstanding stock ($63,427) as \\\"actually paid in\\\" in the language of the statute, for the purposes of this case.\\nFrom the admissions and evidence in the case we think that it may be fairly stated that the extent of the director's liability is made out as follows:\\nTotal indebtedness........................ $67,943 66\\nCapital stock issued....................... 63,427 00\\nExcess of debts over capital stock........... 14,516 66\\nAmount of Mott execution................. 1,575 59\\nBalance of Arnold liability................. $2,941 07\\nThe bill of exceptions sets forth eleven grounds of exceptions, of which only the first, third, fourth, fifth, seventh, eighth, tenth and eleventh are pressed at this time. They are as follows:\\n\\\"1. During the trial of said cause William P. Cross, Clerk of the United States District Court, was sworn as a witness and produced certain bankruptcy papers filed in said United States District Court by the Pawtucket Steam & Gas Pipe 'Company, Bankrupt; against the objection of the defendant said witness was allowed to read from said bankruptcy schedules a statement of the liabilities of said Pawtucket Steam & Gas Pipe Company, as a bankrupt, on May 29, 1907. To the ruling of the presiding justice in admitting this testimony the defendant duly excepted, as appears in said transcript of evidence, Exhibit A, at pages 3 and 8, questions 5, 6, 7 and 8. The defendant submits that this ruling admitting said testimony was erroneous and prejudicial to his cause, and asks that his exception, duly taken at the time, may now be allowed. \\\"\\n\\\"3. The defendant during said cause offered to show through John A. Arnold, a witness produced by the defendant, that at the time the Pawtucket Steam & Gas Pipe Company placed a mortgage on its property, in 1901, said mortgage did not impair the fund created by the paid-in capital stock. The court sustained the objection of the plaintiff to the admission of this testimony and refused to permit the defendant to introduce evidence on this point, as appears in said transcript of evidence, Exhibit A, on pages 36, 37, 38, questions 11, 12 and 13. The defendant submits that this ruling excluding said testimony was erroneous and prejudicial to his cause, and asks that his exception, duly taken at the time, may now be allowed.\\n\\\"4. During the trial of said cause the defendant offered to show through John A. Arnold, a witness produced in his behalf, that at the time the Pawtucket Steam & Gas-Pipe Company gave a mortgage on its property, in 1901, the assets of said corporation exceeded its liabilities, and that said mortgage did not impair the fund created by the paid-in capital stock of said company. On the objection of the plaintiff the presiding justice excluded this testimony, as appears in said transcript of evidence, Exhibit A, at pages 38, 39, 40, questions 14 and 15. The defendant submits that this ruling excluding said testimony was erroneous and prejudicial to his cause, and asks that his objection, duly taken at the time, may now be allowed.\\n\\\"5. During the trial of said cause the defendant offered to show through John A. Arnold, a witness produced in his behalf, that at or subsequent to the date when the Pawtucket Steam & Gas Pipe Company placed the said mortgage on its property, in 1901, the assets of said Pawtucket Steam & Gas Pipe Company were greater than its liabilities. On the objection of the plaintiff the court excluded said testimony, as appears in said transcript of evidence, Exhibit A, at page 40, question 16. The defendant submits that this ruling excluding said testimony was erroneous and prejudicial to his cause, and asks that his exception, duly taken at the time, may now be allowed. \\\"\\n\\\"7. During the trial of said cause the defendant formally offered to prove that the liabilities of the Pawtucket Steam & Gas Pipe Company were reduced by the foreclosure of the mortgage given by the Pawtucket Steam & Gas Pipe Company on certain of its real estate, in 1901, and by the sale of said property under said foreclosure to the extent of $3,610, which said offer was made to establish a proper reduction of the indebtedness of said Pawtucket Steam & Gas Pipe Company. On the objection of the plaintiff the court excluded the testimony so offered by the defendant, as appears in said transcript of evidence, Exhibit A, at page 51. The defendant submits that this ruling excluding said testimony was erroneous and prejudicial to his cause, and asks that his exception, duly taken at the time, may now be allowed.\\n\\\"8. During the trial of said cause the defendant offered in evidence a mortgagee's deed to show that at the time the suit at bar was instituted by the plaintiff the total indebtedness of the Pawtucket Steam & Gas Pipe Company had been reduced by the amount received upon the foreclosure of said mortgage. On the objection of the plaintiff the presiding justice excluded said testimony, as appears in said transcript of evidence, Exhibit A, at pages 54 and 55. The defendant submits that this ruling excluding said testimony was erroneous and prejudicial to his cause, and asks that his exception, duly taken at the time, may now be allowed. \\\"\\n\\\"10. At the close of the testimony in said cause the defendant moved the court to direct a verdict for the defendant. The presiding justice denied the defendant's said motion, as appears in said transcript, Exhibit A, at page 56. The defendant submits that this ruling denying defendant's said motion was erroneous and prejudicial to his cause, and asks that his exception, duly taken at the time, may now be allowed.\\n\\\"11. At the close of the testimony of said cause the plaintiff moved the court to direct a verdict in its favor for the sum of $951.86. Against the objection of the defendant the court granted the plaintiff's said motion, and directed a verdict for the plaintiff in the said sum of $951.86, as appears in said transcript of evidence, Exhibit A, at pages 55 and 56. The defendant submits that this ruling directing a verdict for the plaintiff in said sum was erroneous and prejudicial to his cause, and asks that his exception, duly-taken at the time, may now be allowed. \\\"\\nA large part of the defendant's argument upon the first, tenth and eleventh exceptions is devoted to' an attempt to show that the plaintiff has not made out a prima facie case; and it is urged that it was the duty of the plaintiff to prove that all the debts owed by the corporation were incurred contractually, and were due absolutely and not contingently; and that such debts were due and unpaid at the date .of the plaintiff's writ; and that the plaintiff has failed to make such proof. We are not convinced by such argument. The plaintiff put in evidence the bankruptcy schedules of the Pawtucket Steam & Gas Pipe Company, and proved therefrom the admission by that company under oath of its treasurer in May, 1907, of total debts amounting to $67,943.66, which was largely in excess of \\\"the amount of its capital stock actually paid in, \\\" as shown in the discussion of the evidence above. We find no reason urged, and no authority cited on behalf of the defendant which convinces this court that such evidence was improperly admitted. The bankruptcy proceedings were under the United States.Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which by Section 7 requires that the bankrupt shall \\\" (8) prepare, make oath to and file in court within ten days, unless further time is granted, after the adjudication, if an involuntary bankrupt, and with the petition of a voluntary bankrupt, a schedule of his property, showing the amount and kind of property, the location thereof, its money value in detail, and a list of his creditors, showing their residences, if knowii, if unknown, that fact, to be stated, the amounts due each of them, the consideration thereof, the security held by them, if any. \\\". . The filing of this schedule as thus provided constitutes a solemn act of the corporation in a lawful proceeding before a court of competent jurisdiction and furnishes prima facie evidence of the amount of its debts as of the time of the filing of the schedule, in the case of the voluntary bankrupt and as of the time of the adjudication of bankruptcy in case of an involuntary bankrupt (as this corporation was). It is presumably a true statement of the assets and liabilities of the corporation as of the date of the adjudication (May 29, 1907). In putting this evidence before the Superior Court, it was expressly stated by the witness (Cross) that the schedule showed a $4,000 note secured by mortgage and the balance unsecured claims. There is nothing in this from which any inference should be drawn that any portion of the total debts was of a character such as should exclude that portion from consideration here, as being debts arising otherwise than by contract, or as being only contingently and not absolutely due at that time. If in fact there were any such debts shown in the schedule, it was the duty of the defendant's counsel to call attention to that fact by way of defence, when the schedule was before the court. It does not appear that counsel for the defepce attempted to show any such facts regarding any part of the total indebtedness; his attention was directed solely to the matter of the mortgage note of $4,000, secured upon real estate, with a view to claiming that by reason of the subsequent sale of the mortgaged property a reduction of the total debt was made whereby the defendant was exonerated from liability, as will develop in the consideration of the subsequent exceptions. The plaintiff alleged in its declaration an excess of debts owed over the amount of capital stock actually paid in, under the statute above quoted, whereby the defendant's liability as a director to pay the excess had accrued. The statute simply says: \\\"The whole amount of the debts which any such corporation shall at any time owe shall not exceed the amount of its capital stock actually paid in;\\\" the plaintiff proves by the admission of the corporation by its bankruptcy schedule \\\"the whole amount of the debts\\\" owed by the corporation at the date of adjudication of bankruptcy; it was not necessary for the plaintiff under this language of the statute to attempt by way of anticipation to negative the existence of any-possible items of indebtedness which the legal construction of the statute might determine should not be considered as a part of such debts for the purposes of the statute; that was manifestly a matter of defence, which, if it in fact existed, was quite within the knowledge or means of knowledge of the defendant.\\nTfye defendant further insists that even if the proof of the total amount of debts owed by means of the schedule is to be deemed sufficient prima facie proof for the purposes of this case, yet such proof only relates to the date of adjudication in bankruptcy (May 29, 1907), and is not sufficient proof that such excess of indebtedness existed at the date of the plaintiff's writ, which was issued May 19, 1909, and served May 20, 1909; and that the plaintiff should have shown as a part of its case that such excess of debts continued down to the date of the writ. And the defendant suggests and argues that in some way or other this excess of debts may have been paid in the meantime so as to exonerate the defendant, and that it was the duty of the plaintiff to have negatived this possibility. But the plaintiff having proved the bankruptcy of the corporation, and the amount of debts owed, was entitled to a prima facie presumption that this state of things continued; and if in fact the excess of debts had been paid so as to exonerate the defendant, it was a matter for the defendant to prove. 16 Cyc. pp. 1052-1054 and cases cited; p. 1054, notes 25-27.\\nThe fact to be proven by the plaintiff was that the total amount of debts owed by the corporation exceeded the paid-in capital stock; this schedule of liabilities under oath of the treasurer of the corporation was prima facie evidence of that fact as against the corporation and its directors, and it was expressly ruled by the trial judge that it was only prima facie proof and subject to be rebutted on behalf of the defendant if he saw fit to attempt so to do.\\nIt cannot be successfully maintained that the defendant should be presumed not to have knowledge of the contents of the bankruptcy schedules. He was president of the cor poration and a member of the board of directors and a stockholder for several years down to the time of its failure, and his own evidence shows that he was actively interested in its affairs, and cognizant of them to the extent of taking an active part in the purchase of property, the issue of the stock, and the payment of certain pressing debts of the company for which he took preferred stock. It will be presumed, in the absence of any denial on his part, that he was fully cognizant of the affairs and proceedings of the corporation at the date of its failure; and it was quite competent for him to have produced any facts which would have been available for his defence, if such facts existed. See Olney v. Chadsey, 7 R. I. 224.\\nOn careful examination of the whole record we are satisfied that the plaintiff made out a prima facie case for recovery upon all points.\\nWe now come to the real defence in this case as indicated by exceptions Nos. 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8, above set forth. It appears that the corporation, May 14, 1901, mortgaged certain real estate situate in Central Falls to the Slater Trust Company, of Pawtucket, to secure a note for $4,000, due one year after date, with interest at six per cent. It further appears that this mortgage was never paid by the corporation, but was allowed to remain upon the property until after the failure in May, 1907, and that thereafter on July 3, 1907, the property was sold under the power of sale in the mortgage; and the defendant offered to prove that at said sale the property was sold for the sum of $3,610. Defendant also offered to prove that at the time of the execution of the mortgage in 1901, and during certain other years thereafter the corporation was solvent, having assets in excess of its liabilities to such an extent that this note of $4,000 secured by mortgage, did not impair the fund created by the paid-in capital stock, but should be regarded as secured upon surplus assets and therefore payable out of surplus assets; and the defendant's counsel therefore claimed in the first place that this note of $4,000 should not be reckoned as a part of the total indebtedness; and further claimed that by the sale of the property under the mortgage for the sum of $3,610, after bankruptcy had taken place, the total indebtedness of the corporation above set forth was thereby reduced below the amount of the paid-in capital stock, and the defendant was thereby exonerated from further liability.\\nWe find it difficult to state these propositions in such a way as to present matter for argument, albeit defendant's counsel in their brief have argued at length in support of them. It seems to us that the evidence offered in this line and ruled out by the Superior Court was entirely irrelevant and immaterial. . The note for $4,000 secured by mortgage was as much a debt owed by the company as any other debt; the fact that the company was perfectly solvent when the note was made, and that it had then and later sufficient assets over and above the real estate mortgaged, so that its capital stock fund was not impaired, and so that it could then have paid this note out of surplus assets, had it seen fit to do so, is immaterial in view of the fact that it never did, as a matter of fact pay this mortgage note out of surplus assets, so that six years later, when the company failed, its debts* including this same $4,000 had been increased as above shown in excess of its paid-in capital. After the most careful consideration of the defendant's arguments we can find no ground either in reason or authority for holding that this mortgage note of $4,000 should not be included in the sum of the debts owed by the company in showing an excess of debts owed over paid-in capital; it has been expressly held to the contrary. The principle involved is well stated by the Supreme Court of Tennessee in the case of Tradesman Pub. Co. v. Car Wheel Co., 95 Tenn. 634, which holds that the term \\\"indebtedness\\\" as used in the charter of a company providing that, if the indebtedness of such company shall at any time exceed the capital stock paid in, the directors assenting thereto shall be individually liable to the creditors for said excess, includes all indebtedness of the corporation, thus including bonded indebtedness as well as floating indebtedness. The court said p. 657: \\\"The next question presented is whether the word indebtedness in the clause of the charter imposing personal liability on the directors assenting to an indebtedness in excess of the capital stock paid, includes bonded indebtedness. The Chancellor so held. The contention of the director's counsel is that the term means the floating indebtedness, and does not embrace the bonded debt. . . . The construction contended for by counsel for the directors would lead to this anomaly, that directors, having contracted indebtedness to the limit allowed by the charter, may fund this liability in bonds, secure them by a recorded mortgage, and then, without risk to themselves, incur additional indebtedness, and repeat the process toties quoties. . . . We think this section of the charter of the car wheel company is unambiguous, and the term indebtedness clearly includes the bonded debt. \\\" See, also, Morgan v. Hedstrom, 164 N. Y. 224, 229.\\nNor can we find either in reason or authority any support for the defendant's claim that the amount of $3,610 for which said real estate was sold under the mortgage after bankruptcy should be applied by way of reduction of the \\\"amount of debts owed\\\" by the corporation. At the time of this sale, there were no surplus assets of the corporation; it was insolvent and its entire property in liquidation by the trustee in bankruptcy .paid only 35 ^ per cent, upon the total debts. The foreclosure of this mortgage by the Slater Trust Company was but a step in the liquidation of the property in bankruptcy, in order to apply its mortgaged land to the debt due to the Slater Trust Company and to ascertain what if any balance of the $4,000 note remained to be included within the claims upon which the trustee in bankruptcy was to pay dividends. It turned out that a balance of $390 remained to be so included on behalf of the Slater Trust Company. So that it clearly appears that this sum of $3,610 was not paid out of surplus assets, for there were no such surplus assets; and there is nothing in the decision of the case of J. L. Mott Iron Works v. Arnold, 35 R. I. 456, which in any way supports the position here attempted to be taken by the defendant. On the contrary, we think the amount of $3,610 realized on the foreclosure sale of the mortgage, stands in principle upon the same footing as the payments made by the trustee in bankruptcy in the liquidation of the bankrupt estate and is no more to be credited for the use of the defendant in this case, than were the dividends in bankruptcy in the Mott case, supra.\\nMurdock & Tillinghast, for plaintiff.\\nWilliam A. Spicer, Jr., Frank H. Swan, Edwards & Angel\\u00ed, for defendant.\\nMany cases have been cited upon the elaborate brief filed on behalf of the defendant, all of which have been carefully considered. We have not found it necessary to cite or review any of them other than such as are mentioned herein; in none of them do we find any support for the defence in this case.\\nOn the consideration of the whole record we find no error on the part of the trial judge in the matter of any of the exceptions above set forth. We are of the opinion that the plaintiff made o\\u00fct a case for recovery and that no defence attempted on behalf of the defendant was of any force or validity. The trial judge was therefore justified in. directing a verdict for the plaintiff.\\nThe defendant's exceptions are all overruled and the case is remitted to the Superior Court with direction to enter judgment for the plaintiff upon the verdict.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/4976007.json b/ri/4976007.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..22d976118f1d4771f5721f4ab38ea9c62312ef42
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/4976007.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"4976007\", \"name\": \"Fred A. Young vs. R. I. Auto Sales Co., Inc. et als.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Young v. R. I. Auto Sales Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1932-04-06\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"199\", \"last_page\": \"203\", \"citations\": \"52 R.I. 199\", \"volume\": \"52\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:22:53.179633+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Stearns, C. J., Rathbun, Sweeney, and Murdock, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Fred A. Young vs. R. I. Auto Sales Co., Inc. et als.\", \"head_matter\": \"Fred A. Young vs. R. I. Auto Sales Co., Inc. et als.\\nAPRIL 6, 1932.\\nPresent: Stearns, C. J., Rathbun, Sweeney, and Murdock, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"1145\", \"char_count\": \"6713\", \"text\": \"Rathbun, J.\\nThis bill in equity is before us on appeal of respondent, R. I. Auto Sales Co., Inc., from a final decree granting relief to the complainant.\\nSaid respondent sold to the complainant on a conditional sale agreement a Viking automobile and received in payment a Velie automobile, a certain sum in cash and the balance in notes. In making said sale said respondent was acting either as agent for, or with the permission of, one Descoli who had previously purchased the Viking automobile on a conditional sale agreement from respondent Max Botvin. Descoli having failed to pay the balance due Botvin, the title was in the latter at the time respondent Auto Sales Co., Inc., assumed to make the sale to the complainant. Within a few days after the Viking automobile was delivered by said respondent to the complainant it was taken from him by Botvin who had the title thereto. The notes given by complainant in part payment were delivered for discount to respondent Arter who, attempting to clear the title to the automobile, offered to pay Botvin the amount due him on Descoli's notes. The offer, which was made after Botvin had taken the automobile from the complainant, was refused.\\nThe complainant is seeking alternative relief; he prays that Botvin be required to accept from Arter the amount due the former from Descoli and return the automobile to the complainant; and, failing in this, complainant prays that R. I. Auto Sales Co., Inc., be required to repay to him, with interest, the amount of cash paid by him to said company and return the Velie automobile, or pay him the value thereof, and that Arter be required to surrender for cancellation the notes delivered by complainant to said company.\\nRespondent R. I. Auto Sales Co., Inc., filed an answer in the nature of a cross-bill praying that Botvin be required to accept the amount due him on the Viking automobile and return it to the complainant or to said respondent.\\nThe trial court entered a decree dismissing the bill as .to Botvin and granting relief to the complainant substantially in accordance with the second prayer for alternative relief as above set forth. Respondent R. I. Auto Sales Co., Inc., appealed from said decree.\\nThe question in the case is whether Botvin was in duty bound to deliver title of the repossessed automobile either to the complainant or to said sales company upon tender by Arter of the amount due Botvin on Descoli's notes which were long overdue.\\nThe question must be answered in the negative. The trial justice found that there was no evidence to sustain the assertion in the cross-bill that Botvin had agreed to surrender the Viking automobile or to show that anything more was done by R. I. Auto Sales Co., Inc., or Arter than to inquire from Botvin's bookkeeper, after the sale to Young, as to the amount due. This finding was justified. It therefore appears that said company has no claim against Botvin for breach of contract.\\nThe document expressing the agreement between Botvin and Descoli was a conditional sale agreement, and not a mortgage, and was therefore not required to be recorded in order to be valid as to third persons. Arnold v. Chandler Motors, 45 R. I. 469. Said agreement contained provisions as follows:\\n\\\"1. Title to said property shall not pass to the purchaser until said amount is fully paid in cash. . . . 5. The purchaser . . . shall not transfer any interest in this contract or said property. . 6. Time is the essence of this contract, and if the purchaser default in complying with the terms hereof, the seller may take immediate possession of said property, (possession after default being unlawful), including any equipment or accessories thereto; and for this purpose the seller may enter upon the premises where said property may be and remove it. The seller may resell said property, so retaken, at public or private sale, without demand for performance, with or without notice to the purchaser. . . . From the proceeds of any such sale, the seller shall deduct all expenses for retaking, repairing and selling such property, including a reasonable attorney's fee. The balance thereof shall be applied to the amount due; any surplus shall be paid over to the purchaser; in case of deficiency the purchaser shall pay the same with interest and the purchaser does hereby confess judgment in the amount of said deficiency.\\\"\\nWhen Botvin took possession he was acting entirely within his rights as set forth in the agreement. By the terms thereof Descoli had no right to transfer his interest in the automobile, and he had no right to authorize another to effect a sale.\\nInasmuch as the agreement between Botvin and Descoli did not provide that all payments made under the agreement should be considered as rent until the full purchase price be paid, the appellee, said company, contends that a tender of the amount due on said notes vested title to the automobile in Descoli, in other words, that Descoli had a right to redeem, even after possession was taken, at any time before Botvin sold the automobile. Without consider ing in detail the general proposition of law suggested \\u2014 but not raised by the facts in the case \\u2014 it is sufficient to say that by the terms of the agreement Botvin, after rightfully retaking possession, was entitled to receive, in addition to the amount due on the notes, \\\"all expenses for retaking.\\\" The appellee suggests that' courts of equity do not favor forfeitures. However, even equity courts do not, without a showing of fraud, express or implied, ordinarily grant relief against contracts which are otherwise valid and contain no penalty clause. As this court said in Hamblin v. Sprague, 50 R. I. at 103: \\\"We are not to construe equities into the contract, but to carry it out as the parties were content to make it.\\\" Botvin protected his interests as he had a right to do, and, had he not been enjoined from selling, presumably would have sold the automobile and accounted to Descoli in accordance with the agreement.\\nJudah C. Semonoff, -for complainant.\\nKnauer & Fowler, for R. I. Auto Sales Co., Inc.\\nRaymond & Semple, Harold R. Semple, for respondent Max Botvin.\\nAs to respondent Arter, who had not appealed, it may be said that he knew before he accepted the notes that title to the automobile was in Botvin and that said company had no authority to sell to the complainant. Furthermore, it does not appear that he has advanced any money on said notes.\\nThe appeal is denied and dismissed. The decree appealed from is affirmed and the cause is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/4990072.json b/ri/4990072.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fd0111934ce13853e6bb440d279e34ca7564b4f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/4990072.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"4990072\", \"name\": \"Leander C. Marshall vs. George W. Perkins\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Marshall v. Perkins\", \"decision_date\": \"1897-04-17\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"34\", \"last_page\": \"35\", \"citations\": \"20 R.I. 34\", \"volume\": \"20\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:07:30.257665+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Matteson, C. J., Stiness and Tillinghast, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Leander C. Marshall vs. George W. Perkins.\", \"head_matter\": \"Leander C. Marshall vs. George W. Perkins.\\nPROVIDENCE\\nAPRIL, 17, 1897.\\nPresent: Matteson, C. J., Stiness and Tillinghast, JJ.\\nA husband is liable for necessaries furnished to his wife, but not for money to buy them with, as such money might be misapplied.\\nSemble, that the testimony of the wife alone that the money was laid out for necessaries would be insufficient, as it would open the door to a misapplication which it is the purpose of the law to prevent.\\nDefendant\\u2019s petition for a new trial.\", \"word_count\": \"415\", \"char_count\": \"2288\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nThe court is of opinion that the defendant is entitled to a new trial upon exception to the refusal of the third request for instruction to the jury, viz.: \\\"That he is in no case liable for money loaned to the wife, even though it be to purchase necessaries.\\\"\\nIn Gill v. Read, 5 R. I. 343, Ames, C. J., said : \\\"It is old law that neither a wife nor an infant has credit to borrow money, the credit being for necessaries and not for money to buy them with, which may he misapplied. If, indeed, the lender lays out the money or sees it laid out for necessaries, he may charge them as provided by himself, and thus the application of the loan is left, as it should be, at his peril. If, as we understand the bill of exceptions, the money was furnished by the plaintiff directly to the wife, and there was no evidence that the same was applied by her to the purchase of necessaries, which the plaintiff charged, as he might, as furnished by himself, the ruling as to these items was erroneous.\\\"\\nThe court is of the opinion that that case is not substantially different from the present. The credit which the law recognizes is for necessaries, and not for money to buy them with, which may be misapplied. The present case does not show that the plaintiff either furnished the necessaries or saw that the money advanced was laid out for necessaries, and hence he is not within the rule. If the testimony of the wife alone that the money was laid out for necessaries should he held to be sufficient, it would open the door to the liability for misapplication, which it is the purpose of the rule to prevent.\\nCharles H. Page and Franklin P. Oioen, for plaintiff.\\nDavid S. Baker, for defendant.\\nNew trial granted, and case remitted to the Common Pleas Division for further proceedings.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/5000494.json b/ri/5000494.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f779d1adccf6167f3dd9bd6a5e28ae881df88b38
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/5000494.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5000494\", \"name\": \"William McCanna vs. New England Railroad Company\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"McCanna v. New England Railroad\", \"decision_date\": \"1898-03-29\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"439\", \"last_page\": \"443\", \"citations\": \"20 R.I. 439\", \"volume\": \"20\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:07:30.257665+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Matteson, C. J., Tillinghast and Rogers, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"William McCanna vs. New England Railroad Company.\", \"head_matter\": \"William McCanna vs. New England Railroad Company.\\nPROVIDENCE\\nMARCH 29, 1898.\\nPresent: Matteson, C. J., Tillinghast and Rogers, JJ.\\nPlaintiff was injured and his horse killed on a grade crossing of the defendant\\u2019s railroad. He was familiar with the crossing, and had an unobstructed view of the railroad for some distance before reaching it, excepting a bank that obstructed his view when very near to it; he did not stop his horse, but listened ; his carriage made some noise, and he did not hear the whistle until so near that his horse became unmanageable and plunged forward striking one of the cars, although he gathered up the slackened reins and tried to stop him :\\u2014 Held, that plaintiff was guilty of negligence and had no claim agaiust the defendant.\\nThe duty to look and listen before crossing a railroad track at grade requires the traveler to select a position from which an observation can be made.\\nBut if looking or listening should be rendered unavailing and useless, then the law would excuse the traveler therefrom, as it never requires the performance of a futile act.\\nTrespass on the Case for negligence.\\nHeard, on defendant\\u2019s petition for a new trial.\", \"word_count\": \"1765\", \"char_count\": \"9845\", \"text\": \"Tillinghast, J.\\nThis is an action of trespass on the case for negligence. It was tried in the Common Pleas Division and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff for $500, and the defendant now petitions for a new trial on the grounds (1) that the verdict was against the evidence and the weight thereof, and (2) that the verdict was against the law.\\nThe injuries complained of were received by the plaintiff on the 9th of October, 1895, at about four o'clock in the afternoon, at a railroad crossing on the main road between East Blackstone, Mass., and Woonsocket, R. L, in the following manner : The plaintiff, who is an undertaker, had been to a burying-ground with a funeral and was returning along said road to Woonsocket, driving a one-horse hearse, and when he reached the point where the road crosses the railroad at grade, his horse, which was a spirited one, became unmanageable by reason of the approaching train and, despite the efforts of the plaintiff to control him, plunged forward and ran into the rear part of the third car of the limited express train running from Boston to Willimantic. The train was a regular one and was on time when the accident occurred. The hearse was overturned, and the plaintiff was thrown to the ground and injured by the collision, and the horse was so badly injured that he afterwards died in consequence thereof.\\nThe evidence shows that a person approaching said crossing from the direction in which the plaintiff was approaching it would have an unobstructed view of the railroad for a considerable distance, until he gets near to the crossing, when a hill or bank, covered with trees and shrubbery, would shut off his view until he comes near to said crossing.\\nThe plaintiff's declaration alleges negligence on the part of the defendant (a) in its failure to blow the whistle; (b) in its failure to ring the bell-; (c) in its failure to maintain any gate or flag-man at said crossing ; and (d) in its failure to give any warning or signal whatever that its locomotive and train were approaching said crossing.\\nThe plaintiff was perfectly familiar with the crossing and had been over it five times before the same day. He testified that he was looking out for any train that might come along ; that he was listening, with his head inclined to the left, and that the first he knew of the approach of the train was when he heard the whistle blow, he then being about seventy feet from the track; that he then gathered up the slack reins and tried to stop his horse but could not, as it threw up its head and made a plunge forward, striking the third car as afore said. In cross-examination plaintiff testified that he was trotting his horse right along until he got within sixty feet or so of the crossing, trying to listen at the same time \\\"with one ear,\\\" and that as he could not hear anything there was no occasion for him to,stop ; that the first he knew he heard the whistle, and then it was too late to pull up; that if he had heard the train coming he would have stopped, but not . hearing it he did not stop. He further testified that his carriage rattled along, making some noise while he was trying to listen as aforesaid, and that a hack was being driven just behind him. The plaintiff offered no testimony except his own in support of his case.\\nIt is very clear that upon such testimony as this the plaintiff has no legal claim against the defendant. In attempting to cross the railroad in the manner above stated he was guilty of gross negligence. He was evidently driving with a slack rein; he did not stop, or even slacken the speed of his horse ; and, according to his own testimony, the only listening which he did, if indeed it can be said that he listened at all within the fair and practical meaning of the term, was of such a perfunctory sort as to be of no avail. The fact that his view of the track was obstructed was not only no excuse for his attempting to cross the same without observing the customary rule, but rendered its observance, in so far at least as stopping and listening were concerned, all the more necessary and imperative. The further fact that he was driving a spirited horse also called for the exercise of a higher degree of care than would otherwise have been required, the well-understood rule everywhere being that the degree of care to be exercised in a given case must be commensurate with the degree of danger. Moreover, the duty to look and listen before crossing a railroad track at grade requires the traveler to select a position, if practicable, from which an observation can be made. That is to say, ' ' he must exercise care to make the act of looking and listening reasonably effective.\\\" 3 Elliot on Eailroads, \\u00a7 1166 ; Patterson on Eailway Accident Law, 111, and cases cited. Had the plaintiff stopped and listened at a reasonable distance from said crossing in the circum stances of the case, as it was clearly his duty to ' have done, and as even a modicum of common sense and common prudence would seem to have dictated, no harm could have befallen him. Having failed to observe such a simple and reasonable precaution, the law can afford him no redress.\\nIn the case of Papper v. So. Pacific Railway Co., 105 Cal. 389, cited by defendant, the court say: \\\"If he could not see an approaching train because his vision was obstructed, ordinary care for his own safety required him to stop in order that his hearing should not also be obstructed, and in any event to make his approach so slowly as to give him complete control of his team, and enable him to stop instantly if occasion required.\\\"\\nIn Chase v. Maine Central Railroad Co., 167 Mass. 383, the court state the rule as follows: \\\"The general rule in this Commonwealth undoubtedly is that, as a railroad crossing is a dangerous place, a traveler on the highway is bound to make a reasonable use of his sense of sight as well as of hearing, in order to ascertain whether he will expose himself to danger; that if he fails so to use his senses, without reasonable excuse, he fails to use reasonable care, and that the burden is on the plaintiff to show such care, even though the defendant is in fault. So, too, it may be said to be a general, although not a universal, rule that if there is anything to obstruct the view of a traveler on the highway at a crossing at grade, it is his duty to stop until he can ascertain whether he can cross with safety.\\\"\\nTo the same general effect are Littaur v. Narragansett Pier R. R. Co., 61 Fed. Rep. 591; Rhoades v. Chicago, &c. R. R. Co., 21 Am. & Engl. R. C. 659 ; and Chase v. Maine Central R. R. Co., 78 Me. 353, cited by defendant. It is true, as suggested by plaintiff's counsel, that in Ormsbee v. Boston & Prov. R. R. Co., 14 R. I. 102, this court held, in substance, that the rule requiring a traveler to stop and look and listen before attempting to cross a railroad was subject to certain exceptions, one of which is that where the view of the track is so obstructed that the traveler is unable to see up and down the same- as he approaches it, he is obliged to act upon his judgment at the time as to what precaution he shall take. That is, that where compliance with the rule is impracticable or unavailing, he is excused from observing it. We approve of the doctrine thus \\u00e9nunciated. Of course the rule is and must necessarily be subject to exceptions, as- indeed what rule of law or of human conduct is not ? If looking or listening, or both, should for some reason be rendered unavailing and useless, then the law would excuse the traveler therefrom, as it never requires the performance of a useless or futile act. So again, as said in the Ormsbee case, \\u00a3\\u00a3 where the direct act of some agent of the company had put the person off his guard and induced him to cross the track without precaution,\\\" this would excuse the traveler from observing said rule. These exceptions, however, furnish no support to the plaintiff's case. For, while his view was obstructed in manner aforesaid, yet there was evidently nothing which, interfered with his hearing the approaching train except the noise made by his own carriage, and perhaps that of the hack in his rear; and there can be no doubt whatsoever that if he had stopped and listened he would have heard the approaching train. As it is clear, therefore, that the plaintiff's own negligence was 'the proximate cause of the injury, there is no occasion for us to consider the alleged negligence on the part of the defendant or to consider the evidence offered by it in the case.\\nCharles H. Page and Charles PL. Page, Jr., for plaintiff.\\nJames M. Ripley and John Henshaw, for defendant.\\nPetition for new trial denied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/5007676.json b/ri/5007676.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..320597951bae538d7f47d0e1b0b8a72ba50ec585
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/5007676.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5007676\", \"name\": \"Gordon E. Haslam vs. Carl E. Carlson et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Haslam v. Carlson\", \"decision_date\": \"1924-06-11\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"53\", \"last_page\": \"57\", \"citations\": \"46 R.I. 53\", \"volume\": \"46\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:42:02.896708+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Sweetland, C. J., Vincent, Stearns, Rathbun, and Sweeney, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Gordon E. Haslam vs. Carl E. Carlson et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Gordon E. Haslam vs. Carl E. Carlson et al.\\nJUNE 11, 1924.\\nPresent: Sweetland, C. J., Vincent, Stearns, Rathbun, and Sweeney, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"1246\", \"char_count\": \"7231\", \"text\": \"Sweetland. C. J.\\nThis is a petition in equity in the nature of quo warranto brought under the statute to determine the title of the individual respondents to the office of president, vice president, treasurer and director, respectively, of the Narragansett Cotton Mill Inc.\\nThe cause involves the validity of an election by the stockholders of the seven directors of the corporation held on February 9, 1924. The officers of the corporation, except the secretary, are elected by the board of directors.\\nThe first claim of illegality made by the petitioners is that the election of the respondents was had in violation of the following provision of the by-laws of the corporation with regard to the order of business at the annual meeting. \\\"5. Election of directors and other officers, the president first naming the tellers.\\\" The petitioner alleges that the tellers were named by the president after the nomination of candidates for directors. The petitioner fails to support his contention upon this claim. There is conflict in the evidence. We find the fact to be that before the nomination of directors the president did appoint three tellers. One of the tellers named by the president was later nominated for the position of director and the president then named another stockholder as teller in place of the stockholder who had been nominated for director. All this occurred before the casting of ballots by the stockholders, and in no way affected the validity of the election.\\nThe second claim of illegality is that the tellers failed to comply with the following provision of the by-laws of the corporation: \\\"At all elections the president shall appoint two tellers who shall receive and count the ballots cast for all officers and shall report the result.\\\" The tellers did receive the ballots cast for directors. In the course of counting the ballots the tellers held that certain ballots so received by them were invalid. The tellers rejected as invalid two hundred and sixty-four ballots which were cast in favor of the petitioner for director. Of these two hundred and sixty-four ballots, the petitioner particularly objects to the action of the tellers in regard to ballots with proxies attached representing seventy shares of stock standing in the name of John E. Person and ballots with proxies attached representing one hundred shares of stock standing in the name of John A. Person.\\nIn their report to the meeting the tellers did not state that they had assumed to act judicially with reference to said 264 ballots and had conclusively determined that the same should be rejected. The tellers did report the result of their count of the other ballots. The presiding officer declared the seven candidates elected whose votes were the highest according to the report of the tellers. As to the correctness of the count and of the declaration of the president with reference to six of the candidates no question has been raised. The tellers reported that Andrew E. Johnson had received 6,401 votes and was the seventh in order according to number of votes received, and that the eighth was the petitioner with 6,315 votes in his favor. Mr. Johnson was declared elected as the seventh director. If the 170 votes, representing the 170 shares of John A. and John E. Person which were cast for the petitioner, had been counted in his favor his vote would have exceeded that for Mr. Johnson, as the same was reported by the tellers.\\nThe ground upon which the tellers based their determination of illegality with reference to the ballots upon said 170 shares of stock was that in the body of the appointment of proxy attached to each ballot the name of the person appointed did not appear in the blank space provided for that purpose nor elsewhere in the appointment. It is unquestioned that the person to whom each of the appointments in question was delivered by the stockholder had authority to fill the blank with his own name before casting the ballot. This was not done in either case. We are of the opinion that a ballot cast by a person claiming to have authority to do so, when his authority does not appear on the face of the appointment is an invalid ballot. In the circumstances of this case, however, it was an invalidity which the stockholders' meeting, after the report of the tellers and before the vote was declared by the officer presiding, might have permitted the proxy to remove by authorizing him to fill the blank in the appointment, which was attached to the ballot cast by him. It appears that in this corporation the number of stockholders is not great; that nearly all were present or were represented at this annual meeting, and from the evidence we are justified in assuming that they remained until the close of the meeting.\\nThe tellers failed in their duty under the provisions of the by-laws that they \\\"shall receive and count the ballots cast for all officers and shall report-the result.\\\" They did not report to the meeting that they had rejected the ballots representing said one hundred and seventy shares of stock and the grounds of such rejection. This they should have done that the meeting might, before the declaration of the vote, take such action as to it seemed proper in the circumstances. The tellers should also have reported the facts concerning the other ballots which they rejected. Ordinarily the failure of the tellers to inform the meeting that they had failed to count the 264 ballots in question would render the declaration of the vote invalid in so far as it was affected by this action of the tellers. Evidence was presented, however, by the respondents, through one of the tellers, that, from an examination of the memoranda used by the tellers in arriving at the result reported to the meeting as to the number of votes cast for Andrew E. Johnson, it appeared that an error had been made in the teller's count, and that Mr. Johnson should be credited with 6,701 votes rather than 6,401 votes as reported by the tellers. If we accept this testimony of the teller, then the petitioner failed of election even if all the rejected ballots had been counted in his favor. The ballots cast at the election have been filed in the office of the clerk of this court. They have been inspected by counsel on both .sides of the petition. No question is raised as to the correctness of the facts, testified to by the teller, and we take the same as true.\\nGreenough, Easton & Cross, Charles P. Sisson, for petitioner.\\nKnauer, Hurley & Fowler, for respondent.\\nThe action of the tellers in failing to report to the stockholders that they had rejected 264 ballots cast for the petitioner was irregular. It did not however affect the result of the election for the seven directors. In our opinion no good would be accomplished by declaring the election of Mr. Johnson invalid, nor in justice to him could it be done. He is entitled to the benefit of all the votes cast in his favor and his interests should not be affected by an impropriety on the part of the tellers in which he took no part.\\nThe petition is denied. Decree may be entered accordingly.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/5008742.json b/ri/5008742.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..46349d8c6fc077c901cab3fd827e9db1bcb1959b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/5008742.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5008742\", \"name\": \"Ferdinando Fainardi et al. vs. Louis W. Dunn, Justice\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Fainardi v. Dunn\", \"decision_date\": \"1925-03-02\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"344\", \"last_page\": \"347\", \"citations\": \"46 R.I. 344\", \"volume\": \"46\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:42:02.896708+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Sweefcland, C. J., Stearns, Rathbun, Sweeney, and Barrows, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Ferdinando Fainardi et al. vs. Louis W. Dunn, Justice.\", \"head_matter\": \"Ferdinando Fainardi et al. vs. Louis W. Dunn, Justice.\\nMARCH 2, 1925.\\nPresent: Sweefcland, C. J., Stearns, Rathbun, Sweeney, and Barrows, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"831\", \"char_count\": \"4825\", \"text\": \"Sweetland, C. J.\\nThis is a petition for a writ of certiorari directed to the respondent in his capacity as a magistrate in examining and acting upon the application of Ettore Sghelli to take the poor debtor's oath. The petitioner prays that the respondent be required to certify the record relating to said application to this court to the end that so much thereof as is illegal may be quashed.\\nThe respondent has forwarded the record in question to us and has also approved the truth of a transcript of the evidence taken before him at the hearing upon said application. This transcript is before us.\\nThe applicant for the oath, Ettore Sghelli, was one of the defendants in an action for deceit, against whom final judgment has been rendered in the superior court, and who is liable to be committed to jail upon execution issued on said judgment.\\nThere is no statutory method provided for review of the decision of a magistrate upon an application to take the poor debtor's oath. The petition sets forth that the determination of the respondent now in question was erroneous in law.\\nIn the exercise of its final revisory jurisdiction upon all questions of law and equity, this court has issued a writ of certiorari, when no other remedy has been specifically provided by statute for the review of alleged errors of law committed in an inferior tribunal. Providence Theatre Co. v. District Court, 38 R. I. 12.\\nThe respondent found said Sghelli entitled to take the oath, and administered the same to him. The statutory form of oath includes among other things the following: \\\"I have not, since the commencement of this suit against me or at any other time, directly or indirectly, sold, leased or otherwise conveyed or disposed of to, or entrusted any person or persons whomsoever with, all or any part of the estate, real or personal, whereof I have been the lawful owner or possessor, with any intent or design to secure the same or to receive or to expect any profit or advantage therefrom for myself or for any of my children or family or any other person, or have caused or suffered to be done anything else whatsoever whereby any of my creditors may be defrauded, so help me God.\\\" Section 5, Chapter 377, General Laws 1923.\\nThe petitioner claims that the action of the respondent, in administering said oath to Sghelli, was erroneous in law, for the reason that Sghelli testified before the respondent that he had, between the time of the commencement of said suit, in which judgment had been entered against him, and the time of the hearing before the respondent, made an assignment of his property. The petitioner further claims that it clearly appears from the testimony of Sghelli that said assignment was made by him with the intent to secure the same and receive profit and advantage to himself whereby his creditors were defrauded.\\nIn certiorari this court will not review and reverse findings of fact made by an inferior tribunal but will examine the evidence solely to pass upon questions of jurisdiction and questions of law, e. g., to determine if there was any competent evidence before that tribunal which supports its decision, or if such decision was made in disregard of the uncontroverted evidence before the tribunal. Lonsdale Co. v. License Commissioners, 18 R. I. 5; McCarty v. Aldermen, 38 R. I. 385; Baur v. Town Council, 39 R. I. 500. An examination of the evidence fully supports the petitioner's claim that, previous to the hearing before the respondent and since the entry of judgment, the debtor had made an assignment of all claims and demands which he had against the Outlet Company, a corporation doing business in Providence; that said assignment ostensibly secured to the assignee named therein certain claims due and arising to the debtor before the time of the hearing but that the debtor had a secret agreement with the assignee whereby nearly all of said assigned claims were secured to the debtor's own use. This assignment was in fraud of the creditors of Sghelli. Robinson v. McKenna, 21 R. I. 117; Lennon v. Parker, 22 R. I. 43. With this undisputed evidence, given by the debtor himself, before the respondent, it was error in law for him to administer the oath to the debtor.\\nFlynn & Mahoney, James W. Leighton, for petitioner.\\nWilliam C. H. Brand for respondent.\\nThe writ of certiorari will issue and on it judgment will be entered that the record of the action of the respondent in admitting the debtor to take the poor debtor's oath is quashed, as is also the certificate to that effect given to the debtor under the hands and seal of the respondent, in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Chapter 377, General Laws 1923.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/5015051.json b/ri/5015051.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6f731c49aedbc1a3e5e624693c81f54bbc8ea8ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/5015051.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5015051\", \"name\": \"Abby J. Blake et al. vs. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company, Ex.; Same vs. Same\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Blake v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1933-01-18\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"87\", \"last_page\": \"89\", \"citations\": \"53 R.I. 87\", \"volume\": \"53\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:28:00.256190+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Steams, C. J.,'Rathbun, Sweeney, Murdock, and Hahn, JJ. .\", \"parties\": \"Abby J. Blake et al. vs. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company, Ex. Same vs. Same.\", \"head_matter\": \"Abby J. Blake et al. vs. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company, Ex. Same vs. Same.\\nJANUARY 18, 1933.\\nPresent: Steams, C. J.,'Rathbun, Sweeney, Murdock, and Hahn, JJ. .\", \"word_count\": \"592\", \"char_count\": \"3457\", \"text\": \"Rathbun, J.\\nThese proceedings involve the will of Adeline L. Thomas which was admitted to probate on March 18, 1930, by the Probate Court of the City of Provi dence. From the decree of said court certain relatives claimed an appeal on the ground of lack of testamentary-capacity. Before the appeal was heard by the Superior Court certain descendants of a half sister of the testatrix were permitted to become parties appellant to said appeal. The appeal was heard by a justice of the Superior Court, sitting without a jury, who decided that at the time of the execution of the will the testatrix had testamentary capacity. The case is here on exception of said descendants to the decision of said justice and also on their petition, based upon Sec. 3, Chap. 347, G. L. 1923, that they be allowed to file in the Superior Court a motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence.\\nAs to the exception to the decision of said justice, it is sufficient to say that the decision is amply supported by the evidence. There was little opposed to a mass of evidence clearly showing business shrewdness and testamentary capacity, except the testimony of a physician, a stranger to the testatrix, called in a few days before her decease, and of a nurse whom he at that time placed in the home of the testatrix. The testimony of these two witnesses was specifically discredited by said justice in his oral opinion.\\nWe will now consider the petition for leave to file a motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. There was some evidence tending to show that testatrix believed that her said half sister, the ancestor of these petitioners, was illegitimate and that for this reason she cared little for the petitioners and as a result made no provision for them in the will. The evidence newly discovered consists of a marriage certificate purporting to show that Abby Horswell, mother of the testatrix and of her said half sister, was married to one John D. Washburn. Whether, with the aid of said certificate and other evidence, the petitioners could establish that said half sister was legitimate does not clearly appear. By the use of said certificate the petitioners hope to establish that the testatrix was suffering from an insane delusion. Admitting that testatrix was mistaken, that fact has little tendency to show that she had insane delusions. The testimony as to the sanity and testamentary capacity of the testatrix appeared to be very clear and convincing to the trial justice, and a study of the record satisfies us that there was ample foundation for his opinion. It is our opinion that if said certificate had been before said justice his decision would have been the same and that the introduction of the certificate at another trial would not be likely to change the result. See Shepard v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 27 R. I. 135.\\nHinckley, Allen, Tillinghast, Phillips & Wheeler, S. Everett Wilkins, Jr., for appellants and petitioners.\\nTillinghast & Collins, Malcolm D. Champlin, for appellee and respondent.\\nThe petition for leave to file a motion for a new trial is denied and dismissed. The exception to the decision of said justice is overruled and the papers in the original case are ordered remitted to the Superior Court for further proceedings.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/5023720.json b/ri/5023720.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..dfa82f0c08a8207833756bb54c3f2afd66f3af88
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/5023720.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5023720\", \"name\": \"State vs. Frank S. Domanski et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Domanski\", \"decision_date\": \"1937-03-16\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"500\", \"last_page\": \"506\", \"citations\": \"57 R.I. 500\", \"volume\": \"57\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:14:15.554355+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Flynn, C. J., Moss, Capotosto, Baker, and Condon, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"State vs. Frank S. Domanski et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"State vs. Frank S. Domanski et al.\\nMARCH 16, 1937.\\nPresent: Flynn, C. J., Moss, Capotosto, Baker, and Condon, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"1840\", \"char_count\": \"10467\", \"text\": \"Capotosto, J.\\nIn this case a constitutional question is certified to us under General Laws, 1923, Chapter 348, Section 1. The defendants contend that the form for robbery set out in Public Laws, 1932, Chapter 1954, Section 3, Clause 5, which the indictment in the instant case follows, is unconstitutional in that it fails to inform them of the nature and cause of the accusation, in violation of Article'I, Sec. 10 of the Constitution of Rhode Island.\\nThe above-cited clause reads as follows: \\\"The following forms may be used in the cases in which they are applicable: . . . Robbery. \\u2014 A. B. robbed C. D.\\\" The indictment charges that these defendants on June 1, 1936, in Central Falls, \\\"did rob one William J. Wilbek.\\\" Section 3, Clause 4 of the statute in question provides that: \\\"The indictment or complaint may charge, and is valid and sufficient if it charges, the offense for which the defendant is being prosecuted in one or more of the following ways: (a) By using the name given to the offense by the common law or by a statute.\\\"\\nThe common law crime of robbery consists in the \\\"felonious taking of money or goods of any value from the person of another, or in his presence, against his will, by violence, or putting him in fear.\\\" 2 East P. C. 707; 4 Black, Comm. 243; Hale P. C. 532. The gist of the crime of robbery is the taking by force and fear. The nature and value of the property is immaterial, so long as it is property which may be the subject of larceny. State v. Denby, 143 Wash. 288; Wesley v. The State, 61 Ala. 282, 287; State v. Burke, 73 N. C. 83; State v. Howerton, 58 Mo. 581; People v. Nolan, 250 Ill. 351; State v. Perley, 86 Me. 427. The common law definition of the word \\\"robbery\\\" includes both the nature and cause of the offense. The manner in which that crime must be committed indicates its nature, and the kind of property that must be taken identifies the cause.\\nA word may acquire a specific meaning and become a word of art through constant and unmistakable usage. -At common law the term \\\"robbery\\\" or \\\"to rob\\\" has but a single meaning. When used in criminal proceedings or in connection with legal matters these words have a technical meaning and, unless otherwise defined by statute, they include within themselves all the elements of the common law crime of robbery. We cite the following rather old cases to illustrate the sole meaning that for years has been impressed by the courts upon the words \\\"robbery\\\" and \\\"to rob\\\" in the general field of the law.\\nIn De Rothschild v. The Royal Mail Steam Packet Co., 7 Exch. 734, the defendant was sued for the theft of boxes of gold dust, while in transit from Panama to London, under a bill of lading which excepted loss by \\\"robbers\\\". Looking at the nature of the contract and the circumstances under which it was made, the court agreed with counsel for the defendants \\\"that the word 'robbers' ought not to be construed in the technical sense given to the word 'rob' by the English law writers, and by some of the English statutes (1 Vict. c. 87, s. 2, for instance) where it means the felonious taking from the person or in the presence of another, of money or goods, against his will, by force, as putting him in fear\\\", but the court nevertheless held the defendants liable on the ground that the gold dust was stolen and not \\\"taken by force by a vis major.\\\" The statute cited by the court provides a penalty for \\\"whosoever shall rob any Person\\\" and at the time \\\"of such Robbery\\\" shall cut, stab or wound him.\\nIn Tomlinson v. Brittlebank, 4 Barn. & Adolph, 630, the declaration in an action for slander alleged that the defendant said of the plaintiff: \\\"He robbed John White, thereby meaning that the said plaintiff had been and was guilty of an offense punishable by law.\\\" There being no allegation of special damage, counsel for the defendant contended that the. word \\\"rob\\\" was of equivocal import and that, therefore, the suit could not be maintained without such an allegation. The court overruled this contention and, at page 632 of the opinion, says: \\\"Almost any words may be used in more than one sense. But the word to 'rob' gives a sufficient description of an offence punishable by law in the very terms of the statute 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 29. It has but one legal sense.\\\"\\nIn Tyson v. United States, 7 Okla. Crim. 433, the defendant was indicted in the words of the statute for an \\\"assault with intent to rob.\\\" The court sustained the indictment and, at page 434, says: \\\"The term 'rob' is used therein in its common-law sense and has a well-defined meaning.\\\" The case of Robinson v. The State, 11 Tex. App. 309, is to the same effect. In Acker v. Commonwealth, 94 Pa. 284, the indictment for robbery failed to charge that the property was taken from the person and against the will of the prosecutor. The defendant filed motions- to quash the indictment and in arrest of judgment on the ground that the indictment did not charge any offense known to the law. These motions were overruled and, at page 286 of the opinion, the court says: \\\"It is not necessary that all the circumstances which enter into the definition of robbery at common law should be particularly averred in the indictment. The word rob, which is used ex vi termini, includes all those circumstances, and it sufficiently appears that a taking from the person of the prosecutor and against his will, that being the legal definition of robbery, was substantially charged in the indictment.\\\"\\nThe common law meaning of the word \\\"robbery\\\" was well established in this State long before P. L. 1932, Chap. 1954, now under consideration, was passed by the legislature. No definition of that word appears anywhere in our statutes, where robbery is referred to only by name. For years the State has made it a crime with severe penalty to \\\"commit robbery\\\"; (G. L. 1923, Chap. 395, Sec. 4) or to \\\"make an assault with intent to commit robbery\\\" (idem. Sec. 18); or \\\"to enter any dwelling house in the night time with intent to commit robbery\\\" (G. L. 1923, Chap. 397, Sec. 9); or to be a \\\"principal or accessory in any robbery\\\" (idem. Sec. 27); and \\\"Every murder . . . committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate any . . . robbery\\\" is murder in the first degree'. (G. L. 1923, Chap. 395, Sec. 1). In the absence of any statutory definition of the word \\\"robbery\\\", it is clear to us that throughout our statutes the legislature used that word to identify the crime of robbery as known to the common law.\\nThe provision in our constitution that the accused shall be informed of the \\\"nature and cause\\\" of the accusation is found not only in the federal constitution but in the constitutions of various States. Whatever else this provision may mean, it certainly signifies that the charge in an indictment shall be sufficient in law to fully and plainly identify the offense with which a defendant is sought to be charged. The accused undoubtedly has the constitutional right to be clearly informed of the accusation against him so that he may defend the same and later plead a conviction or acquittal in bar of a subsequent charge for the same offense, and, further, so that the court, upon conviction, may pronounce sentence according to the right of the case. No simplification of an indictment which deprives an accused of this constitutional guarantee could be sustained by the court. See People v. Farson, 244 N. Y. 413, 417.\\nPublic Laws, 1932, Chap. 1954, is a permissive statute allowing the prosecution, if it so elects, to eliminate some of the technical requirements which have surrounded the practice of criminal law. It was designed to simplify criminal procedure, not to change the substantive law. If the indictment charges an offense known to the common law in technical word or words which admit of but one meaning, and especially where the language used is the same as that of the statute that prescribes the penalty for that offense, the defendant's constitutional guarantee is fully satisfied.\\nThe indictment in the instant case is drawn under the short form authorized by the statute above cited, which declares that it shall be sufficient in a case of robbery to charge that \\\"A B. robbed C. D.\\\" There can be no doubt at this late date as to what crime the words \\\"robbery\\\" or \\\"to rob\\\" identify in criminal law. These words, when used as words of art, include within themselves all the necessary component elements that constitute the offense. When the State charged that these defendants \\\"did rob one William J. Wilbek\\\", the defendants were left with no doubt of the nature and cause of the accusation against them.\\nWhere, as in this case, the indictment is in short form and charges the offense by its technical name without specification of further details, the defendant may secure whatever additional and proper information he may require to prepare for trial by a bill of particulars. It should be noted that Section 3, Clause 7, of the statute provides that, upon motion by the defendant, the court shall \\\"order the prosecution to furnish him with such particulars\\\" of the offense as to enable him to adequately prepare his defense. (Italics ours.) This provision of the statute is designed to fully protect the accused and should be liberally construed.\\nIt is well established that a statute is presumed to be constitutional until the party raising the question of its unconstitutionality proves beyond a reasonable doubt that it is unconstitutional. A reasonable doubt is to be resolved in favor of the legislative action and the act sustained. State v. Smith, 56 R. I. 168, and cases cited. There is a limit to the simplification of criminal pleading, and the legislature may have gone to the verge of it in allowing the form that was used in the case at bar, but we are not satisfied that any constitutional right of the defendants has been violated in this instance.\\nOur decision is that the form for robbery allowed by Public Laws, 1932, Chap. 1954, Section 3, Clause 5, which was used in the indictment in the case at bar, does not violate Article I, Sec. 10 of the Constitution of Rhode Island.\\nJohn P. Hartigan, Attorney General, John J. Cooney, 2nd Asst. Atty. Gen., for State.\\nKirshenbaum & Kirshenbaum, Lester T. Murphy, for defendant.\\nThe papers in the case, with our decision certified thereon, are sent back to the Superior Court for further proceedings.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/5053763.json b/ri/5053763.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..99e4ad66faf3e7c15add925838fb3eb258cc5136
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/5053763.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5053763\", \"name\": \"Francesco Marsella et al. vs. Attillio Simonelli\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Marsella v. Simonelli\", \"decision_date\": \"1920-07-06\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"153\", \"last_page\": \"155\", \"citations\": \"43 R.I. 153\", \"volume\": \"43\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:34:45.976390+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Sweetland, C. J., Vincent, Stearns, Rathbun, and Sweeney, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Francesco Marsella et al. vs. Attillio Simonelli.\", \"head_matter\": \"Francesco Marsella et al. vs. Attillio Simonelli.\\nJULY 6, 1920.\\nPresent: Sweetland, C. J., Vincent, Stearns, Rathbun, and Sweeney, JJ.\\n(1) New Trial. Remittitur.\\nWhere on petition for new trial the justice presiding set the whole verdict aside because he was unable to determine the amount of the excess satisfactorily to himself, it was error for under Gen. Laws, cap 298, \\u00a7 12, it was his duty to determine the amount which appeared to him to represent such excess and fix a remittitur; but in view of the decision of the justice, as bearing on the question of the credibility of plaintiff and from the unsatisfactory nature of all of plaintiff\\u2019s testimony and the grave doubt as to the validity of his claim as a whole, the decision unconditionally granting a new trial will not be disturbed.\\nAssumpsit.\\nHeard on exception of plaintiff and overruled.\", \"word_count\": \"1042\", \"char_count\": \"5981\", \"text\": \"Sweetland, C. J.\\nThe above entitled case is in assumpsit brought to recover for goods alleged to have been sold and delivered by the plaintiffs, Francesco Marsella and his wife Caterin\\u00e1 Marsella, to the defendant, and for money alleged to have been loaned by the plaintiffs to the defendant.\\nThe case was tried before a justice of the Superior Court, sitting with a jury, and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiffs for $816. The defendant duly filed his motion for a new trial. In his decision upon said motion it appears that the justice presiding did not approve of the verdict in so far as it was a finding in favor' of the plaintiffs upon that portion of their claim which was not represented by the checks of the plaintiff Francesco, which checks the plaintiff Francesco testified he gave to the defendant as a method of loaning the money of the plaintiffs to the defendant. In his decision said justice stated that, \\\"A verdict for plaintiff for the debt represented by the checks I should not disturb.\\\" Because of his uncertainty as to the amount of the claim represented by the checks said justice states that he will not attempt to fix the amount of a remittitur and grants the defendant's motion for a new trial. To this decision of said justice the plaintiff excepted and the case is before us upon said exception.\\nSection 12, Chapter 298, General Laws, 1909, provides in part as follows: \\\"A verdict shall not be set aside as excessive by the supreme or superior court until the prevailing party has been given opportunity to remit so much thereof as the court adjudges excessive.\\\"\\nFrom his decision it clearly appears that said justice regarded the verdict as excessive and set the whole verdict aside because he was unable to determine the amount of the excess satisfactorily to himself. When said justice had determined to his own satisfaction that some portion of the verdict was unwarranted, and hence' that the jury's award was excessive, it became his duty under the statute to determine the amount which appeared to him to represent such excess and fix a remittitur. An examination of the transcript indicates that such a task was not without difficulty, nor could said justice hope to reach an entirely satisfactory conclusion, but he had the same data as the jury, to whom upon the evidence he had submitted the claim as to the checks. In the event of another trial the plaintiffs' claim as to money loaned by checks will undoubtedly be submitted to the jury upon much the same evidence as was introduced at this trial. We are of the opinion if the defendant's liability upon the checks is established it can be determined on the evidence, with reasonable certainty, as to the amount due upon that item of the plaintiffs' claim. Many cases are presented to the courts for determination, in which the plaintiff is clearly entitled to a verdict but the evidence does not permit the fixing of damages with exactness. Such causes should be allowed to reach a final determination and questions of doubt as to the amount of the damages may well be resolved in favor of the defendant. We are of the opinion that under the statute as the justice approved the verdict in part only he should have fixed the amount of a remittitur.\\nLee, Boss & McCanna, George J. Sheehan, of counsel, for plaintiff.\\nWashington R. Prescott, Pasquale Romano, for defendant.\\nWe have examined the transcript and find the evidence to be sharply conflicting upon all the matters in controversy. A conclusion as to where the preponderance lies must depend upon where credence is placed in passing upon the conflicting testimony of the plaintiff Francesco and that of the defendant. In his charge to the jury said justice stated as follows: \\\"Briefly, the question of liability here depends on what you determine'as to who is telling the truth and who isn't.\\\" We think that this statement was entirely justified from an examination of the transcript. In his decision the justice has given credit to one portion of said Francesco's testimony and not to the other. If Francesco is discredited with regard to the items of the plaintiffs' claim other than as to the money alleged to have been loaned on checks, he must be held to have disregarded his oath, and, as to a large part of his evidence, to have wilfully testified falsely. From our examination of the evidence it appears to us that the plaintiffs are no more entitled to recover for the money alleged to have been loaned upon checks than upon the other items of their claim.\\nFrom the Justice's point of view, as set out in his decision, we think he was in error in not fixing a remittitur; but in view of his decision, as it bears upon the question of the credibility of the witness Fx-ancesco, and from what appears to us to be the very unsatisfactory nature of all of said Francesco's testimony and by reason of the grave doubt which we have as to the validity of the plaintiffs' claim as a whole, we think there was no error in the decision unconditionally granting a new trial.\\nThe plaintiffs' exception is overruled and the case is remitted to the Superior Court for a new trial.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/5054581.json b/ri/5054581.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e8fe389de0dbc4ec1f7eb9bbb8b74a99f7234112
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/5054581.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5054581\", \"name\": \"Lawrence A. Faccenda, Admr. vs. Rhode Island Company\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Faccenda v. Rhode Island Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1920-07-08\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"199\", \"last_page\": \"201\", \"citations\": \"43 R.I. 199\", \"volume\": \"43\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:34:45.976390+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Sweetland, C. J., Vincent, Stearns, Rathbun, and Sweeney, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Lawrence A. Faccenda, Admr. vs. Rhode Island Company.\", \"head_matter\": \"Lawrence A. Faccenda, Admr. vs. Rhode Island Company.\\nJULY 8, 1920.\\nPresent: Sweetland, C. J., Vincent, Stearns, Rathbun, and Sweeney, JJ.\\n(1) Requests to Charge. Trial.\\nWhere the issues in a case are few and simple, the instructions upon the law applicable to the case to be of value to the jury should, be clear and concise, and the court condemn the action of counsel in such an action in offering forty eight requests to charge involving argumentative, involved, complex and some improper requests for instructions; especially in a case where there had been a comprehensive charge.\\nTrespass on the Case for negligence.\\nHeard on exceptions of plaintiff and overruled.\", \"word_count\": \"874\", \"char_count\": \"5180\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nThis is an action of trespass on the case brought under the provisions of the statute by the plaintiff as administrator of the estate of his father Carmine Faccenda, to recover damages for the death of said Carmine Faccenda alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant and its servant.\\nThe case was tried before a justice of the Superior Court, sitting with a jury, and resulted in a verdict for the defendant. Said justice denied the plaintiff's motion for new trial and the case is before us upon the plaintiff's exception to the decision of said justice on his motion for new trial and upon-the plaintiff's exceptions to certain rulings of said justice made in the course of the trial.\\nThe plaintiff's claim is that on December 28, 1911, while the deceased, Carmine Faccenda, was a passenger on one of the electric cars of the defendant, because of the defective condition of the electrical mechanism or appliances on said car, fire and smoke enveloped the front portion of said car, terrifying the deceased, Carmine Faccenda, and causing him to jump from the rear platform of said car to the street, whereby said Carmine received fatal injuries. The defendant sought to explain the occurrence and claimed that the presence of the smoke and flame in the front part of said car was consistent with due care on the defendant's part. It produced evidence in support of its contention that the trouble was caused by the breaking of a brush-holder spring in one of the motors on said car and that proper inspection had failed to disclose the latent defect in said spring which caused it to break. It thus became a material issue in the case as to whether the defendant had used proper methods in inspecting the motors on said car, including the brush-holder springs, and whether the breaking of the spring could have been avoided by inspection. The justice presiding, upon the defendant's request, properly directed the jury, over the exception of the plaintiff, to return a special finding on the question, \\\"Could the trouble which caused the breaking of the spring have been avoided by any reasonable and practical inspection?\\\" To this question the jury answered, \\\"No.\\\" Upon the issues in the case the evidence was conflicting, though from an examination of the trans-script it appears to us decidedly to preponderate in favor of the defendant. The jury's verdict has been approved by the justice presiding and we find no error in his decision.\\nJohn P. Brennan, Thomas W. Gilchrist, for plaintiff.\\nAlonzo R. Williams, Charles A. Kiernan, for defendant.\\nWe have examined the numerous exceptions taken to rulings of the justice made in the course of the trial upon the admission of evidence, and upon other matters, and the plaintiff's exceptions to the charge of said justice. We find no merit in any of them.\\nAt the close 9f the case the plaintiff presented to the justice forty-eight requests for instructions to the jury, most of which said justice refused to give and the plaintiff has insisted before us upon his exceptions to these refusals of the justice.\\nThese forty-eight requests cover sixteen pages of the transcript. Some are argumentative, others are involved and complex, and still others, if given, would improperly invade the province of the jury. In so far as they correctly state legal principles applicable to the case they are, in more involved and less suitable form, merely a repetition of instructions contained in the general charge of the justice. If said justice had given these sixteen pages of instructions to the jury, aside from the erroneous nature of some of them, he would have subjected himself to the just criticism of confusing the jury by the prolixity of his charge. We most strongly condemn the action of counsel in presenting this unreasonable number of unnecessary requests. Although the trial lasted for a long time, apparently an unnecessarily long time, the issues were few and simple; and the instructions upon the law applicable to the case, to be of value to the jury, should have been clear and concise. Of such a nature was the comprehensive charge of the justice presiding. The preparation of this mass of useless requests for instructions indicates a misconception on the part of counsel as to the true purpose of a charge, which is to enlighten the minds of the jury.\\nAll of the plaintiffs exceptions are overruled. The case is remitted to the Superior Court with direction to enter judgment for the defendant upon the verdict.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/5065059.json b/ri/5065059.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f3ae897920bc4633e5429a85a86d1dccaf44c74c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/5065059.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5065059\", \"name\": \"Geigy Company, Inc. vs. William Wilfling et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Geigy Co. v. Wilfling\", \"decision_date\": \"1930-04-07\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"506\", \"last_page\": \"509\", \"citations\": \"50 R.I. 506\", \"volume\": \"50\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:45:50.746990+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Stearns, C. J., Rathbun, Sweeney, Barrows, and Murdock, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Geigy Company, Inc. vs. William Wilfling et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Geigy Company, Inc. vs. William Wilfling et al.\\nAPRIL 7, 1930.\\nPresent: Stearns, C. J., Rathbun, Sweeney, Barrows, and Murdock, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"1064\", \"char_count\": \"6237\", \"text\": \"Stearns, C. J.\\nThis bill' in equity is brought by complainant, a New York corporation, against William Wilfling and Joseph Cavedon of Woonsocket and Otto C. J. Haufe and Victor E. Meyer of New York City. The bill alleges that complainant sold merchandise to the Quality Piece Dye Works, Inc., a Rhode Island corporation, for which partial payment only has been made; that Quality Piece Dye Works was adjudged bankrupt prior to October 31,1927, when said corporation owed complainant $4770.70; that, each respondent received shares of the capital stock of said Dye Works of the book value of $50,000 for which full consideration was not paid; that complainant brought suit against Quality Piece Dye Works in the Superior Court and recovered judgment March 3, 1928, on which execution issued March 7, 1928 and was returned wholly unsatisfied; that complainant within one year from the date on which said execution was returnable brings this bill of complaint under the provisions of Chapter 248, General Laws 1923. The prayer for relief is that respondents and each of them may be held liable to the complainant for the amount of said judgment. Separate demurrers of Cavedon and Haufe to the bill were sustained by the Superior Court on the grounds that it appears by the bill that the Geigy Company is not a proper party complainant and also that if any right of action exists against respondents such action exists in favor of the trustee in bankruptcy and not in the complainant.\\nThe cause is in this court on complainant's appeal from the decree sustaining the demurrers and dismissing the bill as to respondents Cavedon and Haufe.\\nThe averments of fact and time in the bill are rather vague.. No neglect or refusal of the trustee to act is charged and, so far as appears, the estate of the debtor corporation is still in process of settlement in the bankruptcy court.\\nComplainant by this proceeding seeks to recover for his own benefit several unpaid subscriptions for stock of the bankrupt corporation. Section 37 of Chapter 248, General Laws 1923, provides that: \\\"When the whole issued capital stock of a corporation shall not have been paid in, and the assets shall be insufficient to satisfy its debts and obligations, each stockholder shall be bound to pay on each share held by him the sum necessary, if any, to complete the amount of the par value of such share as fixed by the charter or articles of association, or such proportion of that sum as shall be required to satisfy the debts and obligations of the corporation; in the case of stock without par value, this liability shall be limited to the unpaid balance, if any, of the consideration for which such stock was issued by the corporation; Such liability of any stockholder may be enforced by an action of the case or by a bill in equity brought by the corporation or by its receiver, assignee or trustee in bankruptcy, but only in case such action or bill is brought during such stockholder's record ownership of unpaid stock or, where such liability continues after a transfer of such stock, within six years after such transfer has been recorded on the corporation's books; and such liability may be enforced by any creditor of the corporation by an action of the case or bill in equity, but only after judgment or decree has been obtained by such creditor against the corporation and execution on such judgment has been returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, or said decree has not been complied with )\\nThe liability of the delinquent stockholder under Section 37 arises when the assets of the corporation are insufficient to satisfy its obligations; it is limited to the amount still due to the corporation on each share, or to such proportion of that amount as is required to satisfy the debts of the corporation. Section 37 is supplemental to the right of the corporation itself to enforce full payment of a stockholder's contract of stock subscription. .That right is a property right and an asset of the corporation which vests in the trustee in bankruptcy by operation of law; it is his duty to conserve it.\\nThe liability under this section is primarily for the corporate debts; any liability of the stockholder to the creditor is not direct but is through the corporation. The indebtedness is an indebtedness to the corporation and not to its creditors. The contract of the stockholder is with the corporation and any action to collect an indebtedness for an unpaid subscription should be such as to secure an equal distribution to the creditors. Patterson v. Lynde, 106 U. S. 519.\\nThe entire property of the bankrupt, except what is exempt, vests in the trustee under the National Bankruptcy Act. The creditors by application to the bankruptcy court and for cause shown may, by order of the court, compel the trustee to take any proper steps to secure the due administration of the bankrupt law. Glenny v. Langdon, 98 U. S. 20.\\nThe chief object of the bankrupt law is to secure the equal distribution of the property of the bankrupt of every kind among his creditors and to avoid preferences. This can best be effected through the rights vested in the trustee and by the faithful discharge of his duties. Trimble v. Woodhead 102 U. S. 647. The act in question was not intended to enable a creditor to secure a preference. The precise extent of a creditor's right of action under the act need not now be defined. In the circumstances now under consideration, the right to sue delinquent stockholders is in the trustee only. Any recovery by complainant in this proceeding, if it was permitted, would belong to the trustee. The complainant creditor can enforce its legal rights through action by the trustee. It loses nothing by the denial of its suit, except a preference, to which it has no right either finder the State or the Federal laws.\\nArchambault & Lambert, for complainant.\\nComstock & Canning, Andrew P. Quinn, George A. Johnson, for respondent Haufe.\\nThe appeal of complainant is denied and dismissed. The decree appealed from is affirmed and the cause is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/5087322.json b/ri/5087322.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ced87a038021223adbe531fc3ee66f6250df605f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/5087322.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5087322\", \"name\": \"Luigi Carbonetta vs. Nicholas Panone et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Carbonetta v. Panone\", \"decision_date\": \"1941-03-24\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"310\", \"last_page\": \"315\", \"citations\": \"66 R.I. 310\", \"volume\": \"66\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:38:34.940971+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Flynn, C. J., Moss, Capotosto, Baker and Condon, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Luigi Carbonetta vs. Nicholas Panone et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Luigi Carbonetta vs. Nicholas Panone et al.\\nMARCH 24, 1941.\\nPresent: Flynn, C. J., Moss, Capotosto, Baker and Condon, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"1604\", \"char_count\": \"9106\", \"text\": \"Capotosto, J.\\nThis is a bill in equity to set aside a tax deed from the town of Barrington to Nicholas Panone. They are the named respondents in this cause. After duly filing its answer, the said town apparently had no further interest in these proceedings. Hereafter the word \\\"respondent\\\" will refer solely to Panone. The cause was heard in the superior court on bill, answers and proof. The trial justice thereafter filed a rescript dismissing the bill, and a final decree to this effect was duly entered. The cause is before us on complainant's appeal from this decree.\\nThe only question before us in this cause is whether the complainant was deceived by an alleged statement of the town treasurer of Barrington, who was also its tax collector, in response to an inquiry in behalf of the complainant as to what taxes were due and unpaid to said town on certain land owned by the complainant. The land in question was subsequently sold to the respondent at a tax sale for nonpayment of the 1934 tax. The town treasurer, who was not made a party respondent, died before the hearing in the superior cpurt.\\nIt appears in evidence that, by warranty deed of October 29, 1934, which was recorded the following day, Joseph Di Matteo and his wife Michelina Di Matteo, conveyed three certain lots of land in the town of Barrington to the complainant, Luigi Carbonetta. At the time of the conveyance from the Di Matteos to the complainant, the tax on the lots in question had been assessed on June 15, 1934 to Joseph and Michelina Di Matteo. In his testimony Joseph Di Matteo professed ignorance of this fact, although he had been the owner of this and other real estate in Barrington for a number of years. Taxes by cities or towns in this state are assessed \\\"as of the fifteenth day of June in each year at twelve o'clock noon, said date being known as the date for assessment of town taxes\\\", unless that date falls on Sunday when other provision is made. G. L. 1923, chap. 60, sec; 1.\\nTaxes for 1935 on the three lots in dispute were assessed to the complainant, Luigi Carbonetta, on June 15 of that year. On November 15, 1935, the town of Barrington, through its tax collector, advertised these lots for sale for nonpayment of the 1934 taxes, which, as we have already stated, were assessed to the Di Matteos, the complainant's predecessor in title.\\nThe testimony of Joseph Di Matteo in substance is that, upon hearing of the proposed tax sale, he first informed the complainant of such safe and then went to the town hall in Barrington to inquire about the matter, where he spoke to Ebenezer Tiffany, the town treasurer and tax collector; that he asked Tiffany what was the full amount of taxes due from Luigi Carbonetta; that Tiffany's answer was that Luigi Carbonetta only owed the tax for 1935, whereupon he told Tiffany he would get the money and pay that tax. A 1935 tax bill for $11.88 to Luigi Carbonetta is in evidence and shows that such tax was paid, with 12 cents interest for delayed payment, on December 9, 1935.\\nA tax sale for nonpayment of the 1934 tax assessed to the Di Matteos was held on March 14, 1936, when the respondent bid in the lots in dispute. Three tax deeds, one for each of the lots, and each dated March 21, 1936, were received by the respondent, and were later put on record by him. It is conceded by the complainant that all statutory requirements in connection with such sale were complied with.\\nAt the time of this tax sale, an owner of real estate sold for taxes could \\\"redeem the same upon repaying to the purchaser the amount paid therefor, with twenty per centum in addition, within one year after the sale.\\\" G. L. 1923, chap. 62, sec. 18. Under date of August 9, 1937, almost seventeen months after the tax sale, the respondent wrote to \\\"Mrs. Matilda Carbonetta\\\", wife of the complainant, advising her that he was willing to reconvey the lots upon receipt of the money paid by him plus legal charges, and that if he did not hear from her in fifteen days he would sell them to \\\"one who wishes to purchase them.\\\" This letter was addressed to \\\"Mrs.\\\" Carbonetta due to respondent's erroneous recollection as to the person who held title to the lots at the time of the tax sale. However, the - complainant does not question that such a letter was sent and received, nor does he deny that he had knowledge of its contents.\\nThe respondent's offer to reconvey the lots was apparently ignored by the complainant, and so, on October 29, 1937, the respondent conveyed the lots to one Alphonse Mancini, who, for some unexplained reason, was not made a party respondent. However, in view of the result which we reach in this opinion, such omission is of no consequence.\\nThe bill in equity now before us was brought November 1, 1937. While the cause was pending in the superior court, complainant's attorney, on December 17, 1937, sent two letters, one to the respondent and the other to his attorney, stating, for the first time, that the complainant was willing and ready to pay the taxes paid by the respondent on the lots in dispute. Nothing came of this letter as the respondent no longer had title to the lots.\\nThe complainant suggests that the testimony of Joseph Di Matteo, upon which he strongly relies, should be liberally interpreted in his favor, as Di Matteo was not conversant with the English language. We have so interpreted it, but are unable to accord Di Matteo's testimony any more weight than his language reasonably imports. He testified understandingly without the use of an interpreter, and throughout his testimony he consistently and repeatedly stated that his inquiry of the tax collector concerned the tax or taxes that were owed to the town of Barrington by Luigi Carbonetta. At no time did he testify that he inquired about the tax or taxes that were due and owing on the lots in dispute here.\\nThe complainant, seeking to charge the town authorities with a neglect of duty prejudicial to him, argues that the complainant was misled by the failure of the town to note on his 1935 tax bill that the tax for 1934 had not been paid. We find no sound basis for such an argument. First, there is no statutory provision concerning the inclusion of such information in a tax bill. Second, the printed words \\\"Due on 1934 Balance\\\" on the 1935 tax bill to Luigi Carbonetta before us do not call for any such statement in the circumstances of this cause. The quoted words do not refer to any tax on the property to whomsoever assessed, but only to any \\\"balance\\\" that might'be due on the 1934 tax from the person to whom the property was taxed in 1936 and to whom the tax bill for that year is addressed, provided such person had also been taxed for that property in 1934. We cannot overlook the fact, as the complainant would like to have us do, that the 1934 tax was assessed to the Di Matteos and not to him, Luigi Carbonetta.\\nFurthermore, there is credible evidence in the record before us that the Di Matteos and the complainant were given adequate notice of the tax sale. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that thereafter the complainant could reasonably rely upon any alleged statement previously made by the town treasurer. Another important consideration is that Di Matteo, wlm was the complainant's predecessor in title and who acted for the complainant in the inquiry of the town treasurer, knew whether or not he, Di Matteo, had paid the 1934 tax on the land in question.\\nThe authorities cited to us by the complainant in his brief are inapplicable to the situation revealed by our examination of the evidence in this cause. Relief in the cases upon which he relies is generally based upon a finding that the landowner was prevented from paying the tax, which later resulted in a tax sale of his property, by the neglect, wrong or mistake of the officer charged with the duty of collecting the tax. No such finding has been made in this case.\\nAside from any question as to the credibility of Di Matteo's testimony, there is no evidence in the instant cause either direct or by way of reasonable inference, to even indicate that the town treasurer of Barrington, who was charged with the duty of collecting the tax under consideration here, did anything that was improper and misleading to the complainant's damage. The town treasurer correctly gave Di Matteo all the information as to the amount of the taxes due to the town of Barrington from Luigi Carbonetta. He was never asked by Di Matteo concerning what taxes were due on the three lots in dispute, irrespective of the person in whose.name such taxes may have been assessed. If the complainant has suffered damage, he cannot, in the circumstances of this cause, attribute his present situation to these respondents.\\nNathan Perlman, Mervin N. Bachman, for complainant.\\nWilliam H. McSoley, for Nicholas Pannone.\\nThe complainant's appeal is denied and dismissed, the decree appealed from is affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the superior court for further proceedings.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/5111515.json b/ri/5111515.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f4c84380053f01b8d846b26536fda367edcb9b34
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/5111515.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5111515\", \"name\": \"James Keats vs. Board of Police Commissioners of the City of Providence\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Keats v. Board of Police Commissioners\", \"decision_date\": \"1919-07-03\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"240\", \"last_page\": \"246\", \"citations\": \"42 R.I. 240\", \"volume\": \"42\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:01:51.253692+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Pkbsent: Parkhurst, C. J., Sweetland, Vincent, Stearns, and Rathbun, 'JJ.\", \"parties\": \"James Keats vs. Board of Police Commissioners of the City of Providence.\", \"head_matter\": \"James Keats vs. Board of Police Commissioners of the City of Providence.\\nJULY 3, 1919.\\nPkbsent: Parkhurst, C. J., Sweetland, Vincent, Stearns, and Rathbun, 'JJ.\\n(1) Police Officers. Charges. Buies of Commissioners. Jurisdiction.\\nWhere a police officer was suspended pending investigation of charges, the fact that he was acquitted under an indictment for an offence forming the basis of some of the charges, does not prevent the Board of Police Commissioners from proceeding thereafter with the hearing of the charges for violation of rules of the department but it is not only their right but their duty to make the investigation before reinstating the officer, unless they are satisfied he had no criminal intent in his acts.\\n(\\u215e) Police Officers. Rules of Commissioners. Charges.\\nRule 12 of the Rules and Regulations of the Board of Police Commissioners of the City of Providence authorizing the Board in its discretion to punish police officers by various penalties on conviction by the Board of any legal offence is not in violation of Gen. Laws, 1909, cap. 50, \\u00a7 30.\\n(S) Police Officers. Charges. Buies of Commissioners.\\nRule 2, Section 6 of the Rules and Regulations of the Board of Police Commissioners of the City of Providence, requiring a written complaint to be filed within 24 hours of the suspension of a police officer, does not prevent the amplification later of the original charges properly filed in compliance with the rule, such amplification being in the nature of a bill of particulars based upon additional information.\\n(4) Police Officers. Buies of Commissioners. Jurisdiction.\\nWhere no rule of the Board of Police Commissioners of the City of Providence or any statute of the State requires the Board to act upon charges against a police officer while he was not seeking a hearing, it was proper for the Board to continue the hearing while the officer was awaiting trial on a criminal charge, and the jurisdiction of the Board over the charges is not lost for want of prosecution.\\nProhibition.\\nPetition denied and dismissed.\", \"word_count\": \"2331\", \"char_count\": \"13274\", \"text\": \"Rathbun, J.\\nHeard on petition for writ of prohibition to enjoin respondent fro,m hearing charges preferred against petitioner in his capacity as a police officer.\\nUpon the 8th day of March, 1918, and for a long time prior thereto the petitioner was a member of the police force of the city of Providence. On said 8th day of March he was \\\"suspended from duty pending investigation\\\" by the super intendent of police and was served with the following charges:\\n\\\"Officer James Keats,\\nPrecinct One.\\nDear Sir:\\u2014In consequence of a. report received at this office charges have been preferred against you for violation of Rule No. 12, Section No. 1, of the Rules and Regulations of the Board of Police Commissioners; to wit, conduct unbecoming an officer. The specific charge being that on the night of March 5, 1918, at 12:30 A. M., you were seen to enter the liquor saloon licensed to James Lavell, 24-28 Fountain St., and to remain there for about ten minutes, also on the night of March 7, 1918, at 12:35 A. M., you entered the same premises. During the night of March 5th Mr. Lavell reports fire dollars was stolen from the money drawer and also that the place has been entered on different occasions for the past several weeks and money and liquor stolen.\\nAs you have already been suspended from duty pending investigation of the above charge, you will await further orders from this office.\\nPeter F. Gilmartin,\\nSuperintendent of Police.\\nOn said 8th day of March the petitioner was arrested on a warrant and complaint charging that the petitioper did break and enter in the night time the store of James Lavell with intent to commit larceny' therein. On this complaint the petitioner was adjudged probably. guilty by the Sixth District Court and bound over to await the action of the grand jury. An indictment was returned charging petitioner with the offense set forth in the complaint. The petitioner was tried on this indictment and on May 1, 1919, the jury ret\\u00fcrned a verdict of not guilty. On the 8th day of May, 1919, the following notice was served on the petitioner:\\n\\\"Officer James Keats,\\nPrecinct One.\\nDear Sir:-\\u2014In addition to complaint against you when you were suspended from police duty March 8, 1918, the following amplification has been made of the charges preferred against you at that time for violation of Rule No. 12, Section No. 1, of the Rules and Regulations of the Board of Police Commissioners;'to wit, conduct unbecoming an officer, and further added thereto, neglect of duty.\\nThe specific charge being that on the night of March 5, 1918, at 12:30 A. M., you were seen .to enter the liquor-saloon licensed to James Lavell, 24-28 Fountain St., and remain for about ten minutes, during which time Mr. Lavel reports that five dollars was stolen from the money drawer,, also on the night of March 7, 1918, at 12:35 A. M., you entered the same premises with a key and were apprehended by Inspector Franklin and Sergeant McShane, who were-waiting in said saloon, detailed there as a result of the complaint from Mr. Lavell that the said premises had been entered on different occasions and money and liquor stolen. Further, while waiting for Sergeant McShane to secure the-saloon, you endeavored to get Inspector Franklin to help you, square yourself or at least to take the key to the saloon so that it would not be found in your possession. Further, when near the Church House on the way to the station, you. threw away the key and attempted to escape until halted by shots from Sergeant McShane's revolver. Further, when questioned by me in my office, you said that when you tried the door to the above saloon you found the key in the door and that you put it in your pocket, tried the other doors, on your post and then returned to the saloon, admitted that you later threw the key away saying that you did not want, it found in your possession, that you made no attempt to ascertain if anybody had entered the saloon at the time you claimed you found the key, and that you had not reported the matter to your superior officer nor had you intended to do so knowing fnll'well that such neglect of duty was a direct violation of the police rules.\\nTke Board of Police Commissioners will give you a hearing on the above charge on Monday, May 12, 1919, at 10:30 A. M., at which time you will be present with any witnesses you may' have.\\nRespectfully yours,\\nPeter F. Gilmartin,\\nSuperintendent of Police.\\\"\\nThe petitioner coptends (1) that after the verdict of not guilty all issues involved in that trial are res adjudicata and that the respondent is thereby barred from considering the charges in so far as they raise questions which were issues in the trial on the indictment; (2) that rule 12 of the Board of Police Commissioners is in violation of Gen. Laws, Chap. 50, \\u00a7 30, in so far as said rule authorizes the Board of Police Commissioners in its discretion to punish \\\"either by reprimand, forfeiture of. pay for not exceeding thirty days for any one offence, by being reduced in rank, or by dismissal from the force, on conviction\\\" by said Board of any legal offence; (3) that the charges on May 8, 1919, in so far as they are additional to the charges of March 8, 1918, are void because not filed within the time limit prescribed by the rules and regulations of said Board; and (4) that the charges of March 8, 1918, are void for want of prosecution.\\nThe petitioner's first contention is unsound. Of course he cannot be again placed on trial for the same offence in a criminal court. So far as the criminal laws of the state are concerned, he is not guilty of the offence charged in the indictment. But the verdict of not guilty is simply a bar to further criminal prosecution for the same offense. Had he in the indictment been charged with larceny from Mr. Lavell and on trial found not guilty the judgment of not' guilty would not have precluded Mr. Lavell from proceeding against the petitioner in a civil action and recovering the value of the goods carried away. Mr. Lavell would be per mitted in spite of the verdict of not guilty to prove that the petitioner was, as a matter of fact, guilty.\\n23 Cyc. p. 1349 lays down the rule as follows: \\\"Where the same acts or transactions constitute a crime and also give to a private individual a right of action for damages or for a penalty, the acquittal of the defendant, when tried for the criminal offence, is no bar to the prosecution of the civil action against him, nor is it evidence of his innocence in such action.\\\"\\nMr. Lavell would not be barred by the verdict for the reason, first, that he was not a party to the criminal action, and second, because the rule' as to the burden of proof is different in a civil case. To secure a conviction in a criminal case the state must prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In a civil action the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict if he can prove his case by a fair preponderance of the evidence.\\nFor the reasons stated it is clear that the Board of Police Commissioners has jurisdiction. It is not only the right but the duty of the Board of Police Commissioners, before reinstating the petitioner to investigate this phase of the charge unless they are satisfied that the petitioner had no criminal intent.\\nNo part of rule 12 of said Board is in violation of Gen. Laws, Chap. 50, \\u00a730, which reads as follows: \\\"No ordinance or regulation whatsoever, made by a town council, shall impose or at any time be construed to continue to impose, any penalty for the commission or omission of any act punishable as a crime, misdemeanor or offence, by the statute law of the state.\\\"\\nIt is sufficient to say that the rule of the Board of Police Commissioners is not an ordinance or regulation made by a town council or by the ordinance making power for the city of Providence. The Board of Police Commissioners has no authority and does not assume to legislate. But it may make rules for the efficient management and direction of the police department.\\nSections 3 and 7 of Chapter 930 of the Public Laws, passed November 22, 1901, read as follows: \\\"Sec. 3. Said board shall have authority to appoint, remove, organize, and control the chief of police and the police and the police matrons and all other attaches of the police department .of said city as said city is now or hereafter may be constituted, and shall have authority to make all needful rules and regulations for their efficiency, management, and direction not inconsistent with the laws of the state.\\\"\\n\\\"Sec. 7. Said board may remove from office at any time any officer appointed by it or placed under its control by law.\\\"\\nThe petitioner was suspended March 8, 1918. On the same day charges in writing were preferred against him. Since that date the petitioner has been continuously and still is suspended from duty. The communication from the Board to the petitioner imder date of May 9, 1919, only purports to be an amplification of the charges preferred March 8, 1918. It is in the nature of a, bill of particulars, based upon additional information. Rule 2, Section 6 imposes on the superintendent of police the duty of making a written complaint to be filed within twenty-four hours of suspension. The rule was complied with in this case. The Board is not a court of law. Therefore the strict rules of pleading and practice applicable to courts of law do not apply. There is no rule of the Board which prevents the filing of further written complaints at any time. The only requirement as to preferring charges against a member of the police force is that the charges must be in writing.\\nIt does not appear that the petitioner demanded a hearing before or during the time he was awaiting trial on the criminal charge. If the petitioner did not ask for a hearing it was proper for the Board of Police Commissioners to continue the hearing on the charges in order that his cause before the criminal court might not be prejudiced. No rule of the Board of Police Commissioners or law of the state required the Board to act while the petitioner was not seeking a hearing. The Board of Police Commissioners has jurisdiction to hear the charges preferred against the petitioner unless its procedure fails to comply with its own rules or violates a law of the state.\\nJohn J. Fitzgerald, Joseph C. Cawley, for petitioner.\\nElmer 8. Chace, Henry C. Cram, Ellis L. Yatman, for respondent.\\nThe Board is charged with that important duty of enforcing the laws of the state and the ordinances of the city of Providence and protecting the lives and the property of the citizens of the community. In order to obtain the best results, it is necessary that the police department should be maintained at the highest standard of efficiency and discipline, and, in order to accomplish the purpose for which the Board of Police Commissioners was established, broad powers are specifically conferred on this Board by Chapter 930 of the Public Laws of 1901.\\nIt is evident from the facts as set out in the petition that the Board of Police Commissioners has acted in accordance with the laws of the state and that it has complied with its own rules.\\nThe petition is denied and dismissed and the restraining order heretofore entered by this court is dissolved.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/5122330.json b/ri/5122330.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2014734fc0cddb051ecd45a3cb84fcab26ad3c91
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/5122330.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5122330\", \"name\": \"James Fine vs. United Plumbing and Heating Supply Company, Inc.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Fine v. United Plumbing & Heating Supply Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1956-11-16\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"97\", \"last_page\": \"100\", \"citations\": \"85 R.I. 97\", \"volume\": \"85\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:14:16.226786+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Flynn, C. J., Condon, Roberts, Andrews and Paolino, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"James Fine vs. United Plumbing and Heating Supply Company, Inc.\", \"head_matter\": \"James Fine vs. United Plumbing and Heating Supply Company, Inc.\\nNOVEMBER 16, 1956.\\nPresent: Flynn, C. J., Condon, Roberts, Andrews and Paolino, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"880\", \"char_count\": \"5181\", \"text\": \"Roberts, J.\\nThis is an action in assumpsit for the recovery of a brokerage fee. The case was tried before a justice of the superior court sitting without a jury and resulted in a decision for the plaintiff in the sum of $3,000 with interest from the date of the writ. The defendant has prosecuted a bill of exceptions to this court, relying solely on its exception to the decision, all other exceptions having been waived.\\nIt appears from evidence, which is substantially undisputed, that the defendant corporation was the owner of a building located at 231 West Exchange street in the city of Providence; that late in 1954 it was endeavoring to sell this building, but without success; and that in the latter part of January 1955 plaintiff, who testified that he was engaged in the real estate business, conferred with the secretary of the defendant corporation, Milton Levin, concerning the sale of the property.\\nIt further appears that on March 2, 1955 plaintiff again conferred with Levin, informing him that he had a prospect for the purchase of the building, and they discussed the terms of their contract for the brokerage fee. At approximately nine o'clock on the morning of March 3, Levin signed and returned to plaintiff a written agreement dated March 2 which had been left with him the day before. This agreement authorized plaintiff to represent the defendant corporation as its broker and provided that his commission would be such part of the purchase price as was in excess of $25,000. The agreement also set forth that on February 10, 1955 at a properly constituted meeting of the board of directors it was voted that any duly elected officer of the defendant corporation was authorized to execute an agreement with a real estate agent for the sale of this building at a price of $25,000 less the apportionment of taxes and water bills at the date of the sale, and that the agent's commission would be the difference between the sale price of $25,000 and the total purchase price.\\nIt further appears that on March 4, 1955 around four o'clock in the afternoon an agreement, dated March 3, 1955, to purchase and sell was executed on behalf of the defendant corporation by Milton Levin as secretary and assistant treasurer of such corporation. This agreement had also been executed by the purchaser. On March 28, 1955 the said agreement was carried out and the property at that time was conveyed to the purchaser by the defendant. It appears that upon the conveyance the president of the defendant corporation had payment withheld of the difference between the $25,000 and the purchase price of $28,000 which, according to the agreement, was to have been the commission of the plaintiff broker.\\nThe defendant contends that plaintiff breached the contract dated March 2, in that at the time it was entered into plaintiff concealed the fact that he had had an offer of $28,000 for the property. The defendant in taking this position relies upon the rule laid down by this court in Rushton v. Andersen, 47 R. I. 441, 443, that it is the duty of an agent to fully inform his principal as to all facts concerning the transaction which are material to the principal's interest. Conceding that this is a correct statement of the law, we do not perceive that it is controlling because of the evidence and decision in the instant case.\\nWe have carefully examined the transcript and in our judgment there is conflicting evidence on the question of whether plaintiff did have an offer of $28,000 at the time he entered into the agreement dated March 2 concerning his commission. The plaintiff's testimony contradicts that of witnesses adduced by defendant and is to the effect that he did not receive a firm offer of $28,000 from the purchaser until late in the afternoon of March 3, several hours after the contract had been entered into. It appears from this testimony that until that time plaintiff and the ultimate purchaser had been engaged only in preliminary negotiations.\\nRobert Rf. Greene, for plaintiff.\\nJacob J. Alprin, for defendant.\\nConsequently the trial justice here was confronted with conflicting evidence on the factual question of whether plaintiff concealed a material fact from his principal. It is our well-settled rule that where the parties submit a case involving matters of fact as well as law to a justice of the superior court sitting without a jury his findings of fact on conflicting evidence are entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed unless they are clearly wrong. Vitullo v. Ambrosino, 78 R. I. 354. It is clear from the rescript of the trial justice that on the conflicting evidence he reached his conclusion that plaintiff had received no firm offer at the time the parties entered into the agreement. In reaching that conclusion we cannot say that he either misconceived or overlooked any material evidence or that his decision was clearly wrong.\\nAll of the defendant's exceptions are overruled, and the case is remitted to the superior court for entry of judgment on the decision.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/5127300.json b/ri/5127300.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..99095a178271666d80bec5b729e3bbd5ea33d13b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/5127300.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5127300\", \"name\": \"Sabatino Fiore vs. Wanskuck Company\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Fiore v. Wanskuck Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1955-07-28\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"344\", \"last_page\": \"348\", \"citations\": \"83 R.I. 344\", \"volume\": \"83\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:08:03.982056+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Flynn, C. J., Capotosto, Baker, Condon and O\\u2019Connell, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Sabatino Fiore vs. Wanskuck Company.\", \"head_matter\": \"Sabatino Fiore vs. Wanskuck Company.\\nJULY 28, 1955.\\nPresent: Flynn, C. J., Capotosto, Baker, Condon and O\\u2019Connell, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"1168\", \"char_count\": \"7035\", \"text\": \"Condon, J.\\nThis is an employee's petition to review an agreement and receipt which suspended h preliminary agreement providing compensation during total incapacity. The case is here on the petitioner's appeal from a decree of the workmen's compensation commission affirming the decree of a single commissioner which denied and dismissed the petition. Such decree specifically found that the petitioner had not established by the required proof that he was totally or partially incapacitated by reason of the injury stated in the preliminary agreement as amended; that he had completely recovered from all such injuries; and that any incapacity he has now is not causally connected with those injuries.\\nIn support of his appeal petitioner has duly filed five specific reasons of appeal. However, in his brief he has compressed them into two questions, namely: Were the findings in the decree determined by the commission by applying the proper rules of law in weighing the evidence, and were such findings supported by a fair preponderance of the evidence? The petitioner contends that the commission in weighing the evidence did not follow the correct rule of law. And he also contends that if it did, it nevertheless erred because the decision is contrary to the fair preponderance of the evidence.\\nIt appears from the evidence that petitioner was injured on October 18, 1951 while working as an elevator operator in respondent's mill in the city of Providence. Thereafter on November 15, 1951 the parties entered into a preliminary agreement which described the cause of the injury as \\\"Cable of elevator broke falling on cross beam and dropped thru on to operator.\\\" The nature and location of the injury was given as \\\"Contusion upper back.\\\" The agreement provided for compensation of $28 a week for the duration of total incapacity. The petitioner received such compensation until February 15, 1952. In a settlement receipt dated February 21 he acknowledged receipt of a final payment of $39.20 making a total of $476, and also that he had returned to work at regular wages February 18, 1952. Such receipt was duly approved by the director of labor on March 28, 1952.\\nIt further appears from the evidence that petitioner did not return to his former job of elevator operator but was given work cleaning bobbins which could be done while he was seated. He worked at this job about two months and then was laid off because there was no more work. The petitioner has not worked since and claims that he is unable to do heavy work because of his back, which he testified still pains him. On May 21, 1954, four months prior to the hearing before the single commissioner, [he was examined by Dr. Caroll M. Silver, an orthopedic specialist. The doctor diagnosed petitioner's condition at that time as myofascial low back strain associated with moderately advanced hypertrophic arthritis of the lumbar spine and obesity. He attributed petitioner's back strain to the injury of October 18, 1951 as it was described to him, by petitioner.\\nDoctor Louis A. Sage examined petitioner on May 20, 1954 and found that he could not do his regular work largely because of his obesity but that he could do light work such as he had been doing cleaning bobbins. From the doctor's testimony as a whole the commissioner could have reasonably inferred that petitioner, if incapacitated at all, was not able to work because of other ailments not resulting from his injury.\\nDoctor Jarvis D. Case, respondent's plant physician, att\\u00e9nded petitioner after the accident at the mill. The last time he saw him was February 11, 1952, one week before petitioner went back to work. When he saw him previously on January 9, 1952 the doctor did not believe there was much real trouble with him and ordered X rays taken to determine whether petitioner had arthritis. Such X-ray photographs showed arthritis in the lower cervical spine.\\nThe petitioner's credibility as a witness was attacked by respondent in cross-examination. Several matters on which he was questioned at some length, and which we need not detail here, could very well have impressed the commissioner as weakening if not destroying petitioner's credibility, thus rendering much of his testimony of doubtful value. The commissioner appears to have considered such matters in weighing the evidence and he comments on one of them in his decision. It is reasonable to assume that the full commission in reviewing such decision and weighing the evidence also considered them. In reaching its final conclusion that petitioner had not proved his case by a fair preponderance of the evidence, its view of petitioner's credibility could have adversely affected not only his testimony but also the history of his ailments and general physical condition which he gave to the medical examiners before they examined him and upon which they based that part of their diagnoses favorable to him.\\nThe petitioner contends, first, that the commission did not weigh the evidence in accordance with the fair preponderance rule. There is no indication in the record that it placed upon petitioner the burden of a more onerous rule. Apparently he thinks that it must have done so because, in his opinion, the evidence preponderates in his favor. We cannot agree with such an assumption. It may not be thus inferred that the commission has deliberately chosen not to follow the rule for weighing the evidence that is prescribed by the statute. In the absence of a clear showing to the contrary we assume that an inferior tribunal exercising the judicial process does so according to law. The possible incorrectness of its ultimate decision on the facts before it does not necessarily show that it failed to follow the law.\\nThe petitioner's second contention, that such decision of the commission in the case at bar is erroneous because it is contrary to the weight of the evidence, is based upon his claim that public laws 1954, chapter 3297, authorizes this court on appeal to weigh the evidence and determine for ourselves where the true preponderance lies. By our opinion filed this day in Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co. v. Lavoie, 83 R. I. 335, we held that the statute does not confer such power on this court. The review here remains as it was under the1 former statute, solely one of law. We still examine the transcript only to determine if there is any legal evidence to support the decree appealed from, since the absence thereof would be an error of law. We are satisfied that there is such evidence here, and therefore there is no reason for disturbing the decree of the commission on that ground.\\nEdward I. Friedman, Anthony E. Pontarelli, Aram N, Berberian, for petitioner.\\nWorrell & Hodge, Paul H. Hodge, for respondent.\\nThe petitioner's appeal is denied and dismissed, the decree appealed from is affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the workmen's compensation commission for further proceedings.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/5135443.json b/ri/5135443.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ff10cc71d385bcc370a74660619532f53ef32d50
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/5135443.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5135443\", \"name\": \"George S. Bell, Jr. vs. Providence Gas Company; Henry W. King vs. Providence Gas Company\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Bell v. Providence Gas Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1914-06-09\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"382\", \"last_page\": \"385\", \"citations\": \"36 R.I. 382\", \"volume\": \"36\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:54:43.539129+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Johnson, C. J., Parkhurst, Sweetland, Vincent, and Baker, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"George S. Bell, Jr. vs. Providence Gas Company. Henry W. King vs. Providence Gas Company.\", \"head_matter\": \"George S. Bell, Jr. vs. Providence Gas Company. Henry W. King vs. Providence Gas Company.\\nJUNE 9, 1914.\\nPresent: Johnson, C. J., Parkhurst, Sweetland, Vincent, and Baker, JJ.\\n(.1) Pleading. Double Damages.\\nIn order to recover double damages under a penal statute such statute must be declared upon.\\nPub. Laws, 1909, cap. 577, Sections 1 and 3, provide that any person causing injury to the public or private fisheries shall be liable in double damages to be recovered in an action of the case.\\nPlaintiff brought a common law action for injury caused to his oyster beds, without any reference to the statute.\\nHeld, that as the damages which plaintiff claimed to have suffered extended over a period both prior to and after the passage of the statute, assuming that plaintiff might be entitled to double damages, such damages would be limited to the time subsequent to the passage of the act and there was nothing in the record which would enable the court to separate the damages suffered after the passage of the act from those which preceded it, but as plaintiff\\u2019s declaration disclosed a common law action rather than an action under the statute, motion of plaintiff after verdict that judgment be entered for double damages would be denied.\\nTeespass on the Case.\\nHeard on motion of plaintiffs that judgment be entered for double damages under the statute and motion denied.\", \"word_count\": \"1136\", \"char_count\": \"6581\", \"text\": \"Vincent, J.\\nEach of the above named plaintiffs brought his suit in the Superior Court, alleging that the Providence Gas Company had in carrying on its business as a manufacturer of gas discharged into the waters of the Providence river certain deleterious substances which, carried down by the tides, were deposited upon his oyster bed and caused the death of his oysters.\\nThe cases were tried to a jury in the Superior Court and a verdict in each case was rendered for the plaintiff.\\nBoth cases came to this court upon the exceptions of the defendant. The defendant's exceptions were all overruled, by a majority opinion, and the cases were ordered to be remitted to the Superior Court for judgment on the verdict in one case and for judgment as reduced by the remittitur in the other.\\nSince the opinions were rendered in these cases sustaining the verdicts the plaintiffs have filed in this court their respective motions asking that the cases be sent back to the Superior Court with a direction to enter judgment for double damages to which they claim they are entitled under Sections 1 and 3, Chapter 577 of the Public Laws, amending Chapter 206 of the General Laws of 1909, which said sections are as follows:\\n\\\"Section 1. No person shall deposit in, or allow to escape into, or shall cause or permit to be deposited in, or allowed to escape into any of the public waters of this state, any substance which shall in any manner injuriously affect the growth or sale of the shell-fish in or under said waters, or which, shall in any manner affect the flavor or odor of such shell-fish so as to injuriously affect the sale thereof, or which shall cause any injury to the public and private fisheries of this state.\\\"\\n\\\"Sec. 3. Every person violating any of the provisions of this chapter shall be liable to pay, to the party injured by such violation, double the amount of damages caused thereby, to be recovered in an action of the case in any court of competent jurisdiction. It shall not be necessary, before bringing suit for the recovery of such damages, for a criminal prosecution to have been first instituted for the violation of the provisions of this chapter, nor shall the recovery of damages under this section be a bar to such criminal prosecution.\\\"\\nIn neither of the declarations nor in any other papers filed in these cases is there any mention of or reference to this statute and the defendant claims, without contradiction, that at no time.from the commencement of the actions, through the trial and down to the hearing upon exceptions in this court, did either of these plaintiffs ever suggest or even intimate that his suit was based upon the statute referred to or that he had any intention of claiming double damages thereunder.\\nThis statute was passed April 13, 1905. The damages which these plaintiffs claim to have suffered extended over a period both prior to and after its passage.\\nThe defendant raises two points: (1) That the statute is penal and cannot be given a retroactive construction and (2) that the plaintiffs not having declared upon the statute they cannot now, after \\u00e1 verdict has been rendered, ask for double damages.\\nWe think these points are well taken. Assuming that the plaintiffs might be entitled to double damages, they would only be entitled to double such portion of the damages as accrued to them, by reason of the unlawful acts of the defendant, subsequent to the passage of the act. This, however, the state of the evidence would not permit the court to determine. There is nothing in the record which would enable the court to separate the amount of damages suffered, by the acts of the defendant, after the passage of the act from those which had preceded it. The difficulty would be a. practical one which would render the court powerless to act..\\nA. B. Crafts, James Ah Williams, for plaintiff Bell.\\nJames A. Williams, for plaintiff King.\\nHarold W. Thatcher, Seeber Edwards, Edwards & Angel\\u00ed, for defendant.\\nThe general principle that a plaintiff's declaration must' be in such form as, and sufficiently explicit, to apprise' the defendant of the nature and full extent of his claim is too' well settled to be discussed. The plaintiffs, in the suits now under discussion, had the right to proceed under the statute for the recovery of double damages and they also had an equal right to ignore the statute and seek a remedy under the common law. Which of these courses were being pursued by the plaintiffs in their suits must be determined from the record. The record shows them to be simply common law actions to recover damages, without any reference to statute or statutory penalties and we cannot conclude that they are anything more.\\nThe great weight of authority seems to be that in order to recover double damages under a penal statute, such statute must be declared upon. Sedgwick on Damages, 9th Ed., Sec. 1263; Sutherland on Damages, Sec. 464; Palmer v. President, etc., of York Bank, 18 Me. 166; Chipman v. Emeric, 5 Cal. 239; Newcomb v. Butterfield, 8 Johnson (N. Y.) 264; Bell v. Norris, 79 Ky. 48.\\nThe motion of each of these plaintiffs that the Superior Court be directed to enter judgment for double damages is denied and dismissed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/5135527.json b/ri/5135527.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..bf4bf5c8f87f273649e04c45310d6e33e1388db5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/5135527.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5135527\", \"name\": \"Emma E. Krickau vs. James A. Williams\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Krickau v. Williams\", \"decision_date\": \"1913-12-31\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"85\", \"last_page\": \"90\", \"citations\": \"36 R.I. 85\", \"volume\": \"36\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:54:43.539129+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Johnson, C. J., Parkhurst, Sweetland, Vincent, and Baker, J. J.\", \"parties\": \"Emma E. Krickau vs. James A. Williams.\", \"head_matter\": \"Emma E. Krickau vs. James A. Williams.\\nDECEMBER 31, 1913.\\nPresent: Johnson, C. J., Parkhurst, Sweetland, Vincent, and Baker, J. J.\\n(I) Attorney and Client. Summary Action of Court.\\nAn attorney obtained a loan from petitioner for which he gave her a mortgage, not having the legal title to the property which the mortgage purported to convey. At the time the relation of attorney and client did not exist between them, and the mortgage was given at his suggestion and was not the inducement for making the loan. Respondent claimed that the mortgaged property was purchased with his money, and the holder of the legal title acknowledged his ownership and admitted that the mortgage constituted a valid lien upon it.\\nHeld, that a summary order would be denied, since the transaction was entirely unrelated to the professional character of respondent.\\nHeld, further, that while the court would in any case for the integrity of the profession and the protection of the public, exercise proper discipline over an attorney even if a summary order would not lie; in this case no moral turpitude appeared warranting the entry of any disciplinary order.\\n(2) Attorney and Client. Summary Action of Court.\\nWhere the relation of attorney and client exists, the summary jurisdiction of the court will not be exercised against an attorney, if it appears that there exists a fair dispute between him and the client which can be decided only on the settlement of doubtful questions of fact or law, but the parties will be left to their ordinary remedies, and summary action by the court should be taken only in cases where the action of the attorney is dishonest, oppressive, or clearly illegal.\\nPetition for summary order against an attorney at law and denied.\", \"word_count\": \"1817\", \"char_count\": \"10669\", \"text\": \"Sweetland, J.\\nThis is a petition asking for summary action against the respondent as an attorney at law. The petition was referred to the committee on complaints against members of the bar. After hearing, said committee reported the matter as one requiring examination by the court. A hearing was had before us at which the parties presented their testimony and arguments.\\nThe petitioner claims that she loaned five hundred dollars to the respondent, and that in the transaction, the respondent committed fraud by reason of a false representation which he made to her as to his ownership of certain real estate upon which he gave the respondent a mortgage as collateral security for said loan.\\nAt the time of making said loan and giving said mortgage the relation of attorney and client did not exist between the parties. The respondent at one time, had acted as attorney for the petitioner in an unimportant matter, but that had been concluded a number of years ago.\\nThe respondent admits that he received five hundred dollars from the petitioner, but claims that he received said sum for the purpose of investing it for the petitioner in a venture in which he was interested with others. The respondent, however, is willing that said transaction should be regarded as a loan of money to him, and herein it will be treated in that manner. The respondent admits that he gave the mortgage in question to the petitioner, and at the time of its delivery he did not have the legal title to the land and building which said mortgage purported to convey; but that the legal title to the same was in his mother-in-law, a Mrs. Crittenden. The respondent claims, however, that the mortgage in question was given as collateral security for said loan entirely upon his suggestion; that it was not demanded by the petitioner; that she agreed to loan the money to him before he suggested the giving of said mortgage; and that said mortgage was not the inducement for making said loan. This is admitted by the petitioner in cross-examination.\\nThe respondent further claims that although the legal title to said real estate was in his mother-in-law, the said mortgage in fact constituted a valuable security for said loan; that said lands and building were purchased by him with his own money and that, although the legal title was taken in the name of Mrs. Crittenden, she acknowledges the respondent's ownership of said real estate and will recognize said mortgage as constituting a valid lien upon said real estate. In this claim, the respondent is fully supported by the affidavit of Mrs. Crittenden, which affidavit was admitted in evidence without objection by the petitioner.\\nThe respondent further claims that at the time of giving said mortgage to the petitioner he fully explained these circumstances to her. This latter claim of the respondent is denied by the petitioner.\\nIt appeared at the hearing that the respondent, since the commencement of these proceedings, has offered to repay said loan with interest and is still ready to do so; but that the petitioner has not felt at liberty to accept said payment until the conclusion of these proceedings.\\nFrom the circumstances of this matter, it does not appear to us that a summary order against the respondent should be made upon this petition. The transaction in question was entirely unrelated to the professional character of the respondent. The summary jurisdiction of the court invoked by the petitioner arises from the control which the court will exercise over its officers in regard to those relations of trust and confidence existing between such officers and their clients, which relation arises from the special privilege conferred upon such officers and the special credit given to them by the court as persons worthy to assume such relations of trust and confidence. It is the well settled rule in this country that courts will not exercise such jurisdiction to compel an attorney to pay money or to perform any other act in matters unconnected with the professonal character of the attorney. 18 Ann. Cas. 115; 27 Ann. Cas. 234. In Windsor v. Brown, 15 R. I. 182, the money, for the payment of which the petitioner sought to obtain a summary order against the respondent, an attorney at law, came into the respondent's hands by reason of his position of attorney at law acting for the petitioner. The petitioner, however, before filing her petition had brought an action at law against the respondent for the recovery of said money and had obtained judgment against him. The court recognized the principle that its summary jurisdiction over the respondent depended upon the existence of the relation of attorney and client between the parties and held that \\\"the summary jurisdiction of the court cannot be invoked when the relation of attorney and client has been changed to that of debtor and creditor. \\\" Anderson v. Bosworth, 15 R. I. 443, was a petition for an order requiring the respondent to pay over certain moneys received by him as attorney. The court in that case held that, although the relation existing between the parties was not that of attorney and client it would grant the order on the ground that the money came into the respondent's hands as an .attorney at law; and the court recognized the principle as well settled that jurisdiction of this kind is restricted to matters in which the attorney has been employed in his professional character. Although the court will not make .a summary order against an attorney in matters of business between him and other persons, when such business is not related to his'profession, yet the court will, in any circumstances, for the integrity of the legal profession and the protection of the public, when it appears that the attorney is no longer worthy of confidence, declare his privilege as an .attorney entirely forfeited or restrain him by proper discipline. Crafts v. Lizotte, 34 R. I. 543.\\nIn the matter at bar the court does not find that moral turpitude on the part of the respondent has been established or that under the testimony the court would be justified in the entry of any disciplinary order against the respondent.\\nIt further appears to the court that the order which the petitioner seeks should not be made even if the relation of attorney and client existed between the parties. From the testimony given before us it is by no means established that the respondent was guilty of misrepresentation in obtaining said loan from the petitioner. Upon the establishment of that fact depends the petitioner's right to have the order which she seeks. There is a dispute between the parties as to such alleged misrepresentation; and in that dispute the contention of the respondent is not so unreasonable that it should be disregarded. If a dispute of this nature exists between attorney and client the rule followed in summary proceedings by the courts of the United States is well stated in Strong v. Mundy, 52 N. J. Eq. 834: \\\"The behavior which will justify the exercise of this summary jurisdiction must be such as is dishonest or oppressive or clearly illegal. If it appears that there exists between a lawyer and his client a fair dispute, which can be decided only on the settlement of doubtful questions of fact or law, the court should not exercise its summary power, but should leave the parties to their ordinary remedies.\\\" That rule' has been recognized by this court in Peirce v. Palmer, 31 R. I. 432, p. 445: \\\"But the principles which govern the action of the court in those cases are equally applicable to any case where a summary order is sought. They arise from the nature of the proceeding. The court, in the exercise of its control over attorneys, will not suffer a manifest injustice on the part of such officers to go uncorrected, and at once, in such a case, without requiring the injured party to resort to the ordinary procedure of the courts, this court will direct its officers to take such action, or to make such payment as justice plainly requires. It makes no difference whether the money has been collected by the-attorney for the benefit of the client or whether, as in this case, it has been placed in the hands of the attorney by the client for a specific purpose'. If it is beyond reasonable question that there has been misconduct on the part of the attorney in retaining the money, the court will promptly make an order for its payment. But, alike in all cases, for the client to be given this extraordinary relief it must be clear that there has been an injustice done to him. In all cases the client has relief in the ordinary tribunals for the determination of legal controversies, and when his right to have a summary order can be reasonably questioned he must be referred to these ordinary remedies, whatever be the nature of the controversy.\\\"\\nEdward L. Singsen, for complainant.\\nJames A. Williams, pro se ipso.\\nThe petition is denied and dismissed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/5307929.json b/ri/5307929.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..45bcef3b7aa63ef61b9f355c2ec67b1aa0a5b79a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/5307929.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5307929\", \"name\": \"Leslie E. Armfield vs. Frank N. McClure, Inc. et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Armfield v. Frank N. McClure, Inc.\", \"decision_date\": \"1950-08-04\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"390\", \"last_page\": \"396\", \"citations\": \"77 R.I. 390\", \"volume\": \"77\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:06:01.456396+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Flynn, C. J., Capotosto, Baker, Condon and O\\u2019Connell, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Leslie E. Armfield vs. Frank N. McClure, Inc. et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Leslie E. Armfield vs. Frank N. McClure, Inc. et al.\\nAUGUST 4, 1950.\\nPresent: Flynn, C. J., Capotosto, Baker, Condon and O\\u2019Connell, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"1675\", \"char_count\": \"9967\", \"text\": \"Capotosto, J.\\nThis is an action in assumpsit to recover on a written contract for services. It was heard in the superior court without a jury and resulted in a decision for the plaintiff in the sum of $1125.68. The case is before us on defendants' exception to that decision, all other exceptions being expressly waived.\\nFrank N. McClure of Mass., Inc. is the real defendant in this case and hereinafter will be referred to as the defendant. It is a corporation engaged in the food brokerage business, that is, taking orders from wholesalers for manufacturers of food products. The manufacturer billed the wholesaler and payment of commission to the broker was usually made when the manufacturer was paid. From May 1947 to February 20, 1948 the plaintiff was employed by defendant as a salesman covering all of Rhode Island and specified portions of Massachusetts and Connecticut. His compensation under the parties' oral agreement was 40 per cent of the gross commissions received by the defendant on all business from firms in that territory.\\nIt appears in evidence that in February 1948 plaintiff informed defendant that he intended to go into business for himself, whereupon the latter persuaded him to remain in its employ under a written contract which is the subject of controversy in this case. The contract, which was drawn by defendant, is dated February 20, 1948. After stating that defendant would pay plaintiff \\\"40% of the gross brokerage\\\" paid on all business from all firms in the above-mentioned territory, it then provides, among other things, that: \\\"Frank N. McClure of Mass., Inc. agrees to guarantee Leslie Armfield the sum of $5,000 a year as long as he covers the territory in the manner it has been, handled as to sales and obtains satisfactory results as prior to this agreement. Payment will be made monthly in the sum of $416.67. A statement will be furnished monthly as to the standing of the account of Leslie Armfield with Frank N. McClure of Mass., Inc., and a final accounting will be made of this account by January 15th each year. This Agreement is to bind both parties and can only be terminated by failure of either party to their fulfillment of its terms or may be terminated by Leslie Armfield in written notice 90 days before January 1st of each year.\\\"\\nThe plaintiff and Joseph N. McClure were the only witnesses in the case. McClure testified that shortly after the signing of the contract he asked plaintiff if he had told Marcus Jones, another employee, that he could take away all of defendant's business; that as plaintiff admitted making that statement McClure said to him: \\\"Well as long as that is the way you feel, the arrangement [contract] we have between us is hereby null and void and as far as I am concerned if you want to go about your business you are perfectly at liberty to do so and if you stay, you stay under the original form of doing business\\\"; and that plaintiff \\\"didn't agree to anything, he just left.\\\" On the other hand plaintiff testified that McClure questioned him about the alleged statement to Jones before the contract was signed; that he denied making such statement to Jones; that he made no admission in relation thereto to McClure; and that the latter did not speak to him in the manner just above quoted. Jones did not testify nor was his failure to do so explained.\\nThe evidence further shows that plaintiff worked until September 28, 1948, when, according to defendant, he was discharged because he was then soliciting business for himself. The only moneys received by plaintiff, in varying sums and at irregular intervals, from the signing of the contract on February 20, 1948 to the time of his discharge amounted in all to $1263.17, notwithstanding that, irrespective of any guarantee, he had admittedly earned $1525.41 on the basis of 40 per cent of the commissions paid to defendant during that period. On this point plaintiff testified in substance that defendant was dilatory in paying him what was due even on its own computation; that in almost every instance when he was able to collect any money he asked for payment in accordance with the contract; that McClure's answer always was that he did not have enough money to pay him \\\"in full,\\\" saying that what he was giving him was \\\"all he could spare at that time\\\"; and that with such understanding and because of necessity he accepted whatever money McClure gave him.\\nOn the other hand McClure denied that plaintiff ever asked him for the payment of the monthy amount specified in the contract, and he asserted that his sales had dropped and that his services were otherwise generally unsatisfactory. This testimony is, however, weakened by the undisputed evidence that sometime in August 1948, when plaintiff needed money for his father's illness, defendant assisted him in securing a loan of $600 from its bank by means of a note which it later paid. Plaintiff freely admitted that defendant was entitled to a credit of that amount.\\nThe trial justice found that the contract was one for hire at the rate of $416.67 a month in accordance with the guarantee; that it had not been rescinded shortly after its execution, as defendant contended; that plaintiff acted in good faith until September 28, 1948; and that, giving due consideration to all equities between the parties, there was a balance of $1125.68 due and owing to plaintiff. Defendant's contentions are: first, that the trial justice misconstrued the contract; secondly, that in any event the contract had been rescinded soon after it was signed; and thirdly, that the damages were excessive in a certain particular which will hereinafter appear. We will consider these contentions in the order stated.\\nGenerally speaking, a contract, especially if in writing, is to be construed in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the language used in order to ascertain the intention of the parties at the time the instrument was executed. If such intention is reasonable and lawful the contract will be enforced as thus construed. Furthermore, it is well established that if the language of a written contract is ambiguous it is ordinarily interpreted more strongly against the writer thereof. Barden v. Sarkin, 73 R. I. 170; Pelletier v. Bozoian, 73 R. I. 332; Gilman v. Murphy, 67 R. I. 149, 154; Marcaccio, Inc. v. Santurri, 51 R. I. 440, 442, and cases cited. In the instant case the contract is clearly open to a construction that the guarantee of a minimum monthly payment of $416.67 was the inducement that led plaintiff to sign that instrument and remain in defendant's employ. Since the contract was written by defendant it was within its power to express itself clearly if it intended something different from the import of the language that it used. In the circumstances the language adopted by the writer will be given its ordinary meaning and under the above-cited authorities will be construed more strongly against that party.\\nIn its brief defendant argues that \\\"It would certainly be most reasonable in this case to consider the agreement, as far as the guarantee is concerned, as an entire contract for each year, from year to year, and that the agent must complete one year's satisfactory performance as a condition precedent to recovery on the guarantee.\\\" The difficulty with that argument is that defendant imports into the contract a condition which is neither expressly stated nor necessarily implied from its language.\\nConsidering all the circumstances of record our judgment is that, as written by defendant, the contract was an open-end and continuing agreement of employment which, unless ended for cause, was terminable only as therein provided ; that plaintiff was to be compensated for his services, either by actual payment or by a credit, at the rate of $416.67 a month, said sum to include commissions actually earned, so as to guarantee him a yearly income of $5000; and that there should be a \\\"final accounting\\\" of the account between the parties by January 15 each year. In other words, our conclusion is that in regard to plaintiff's right to compensation at a guaranteed monthly rate the contract was severable and that he was entitled to recover on the basis of such rate up to the time he ceased to act in good faith for his principal. See Barker v. Barker Artesian Well Co., 45 R. I. 297, 303. The trial justice therefore did not err in his \\u00e9onstruction of the contract.\\nDefendant's next contention is that the contract was rescinded shortly after its execution. As herein appears the testimony of plaintiff and McClure on this issue was .in conflict. This raised a clear question of fact for the determination of the trial justice. He saw and heard those witnesses testify, an advantage we do not have, and his rescript shows that he gave due consideration to the conflicting evidence on the issue thus presented to him before deciding against the defendant. From our examination of that evidence we cannot say that his decision was clearly wrong. In such case our well-established rule, which needs no citation of authority, requires us to sustain the decision.\\nDefendant finally contends that the damages are excessive. Although plaintiff testified that he began \\\"looking\\\" for accounts of his own about September 1948 with the intention of terminating the contract in January as therein provided, the trial justice in effect found from his consideration of the conflicting evidence that the plaintiff had acted in good faith up to September 28, 1948. Here again, following the appellate rule hereinbefore mentioned, we cannot say that such conclusion was clearly wrong.\\nFrancis J. O'Brien, for plaintiff.\\nTemkin & Temkin, Alexander G. Teitz, for defendants.\\nThe defendants' exception is overruled, and the case is remitted to the superior court for entry of judgment on the decision.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/5311037.json b/ri/5311037.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..28302e07cdc9a9063ba9d96ad140f9f07ba7dc9d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/5311037.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5311037\", \"name\": \"Thomas A. Kennelly, Public Utility Adm'r vs. Kent County Water Authority et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Kennelly v. Kent County Water Authority\", \"decision_date\": \"1952-05-29\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"376\", \"last_page\": \"382\", \"citations\": \"79 R.I. 376\", \"volume\": \"79\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:00:31.269246+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Flynn, C. J., Capotosto, Baker and Condon, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Thomas A. Kennelly, Public Utility Adm\\u2019r vs. Kent County Water Authority et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Thomas A. Kennelly, Public Utility Adm\\u2019r vs. Kent County Water Authority et al.\\nMAY 29, 1952.\\nPresent: Flynn, C. J., Capotosto, Baker and Condon, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"1615\", \"char_count\": \"9959\", \"text\": \"Condon, J.\\nThis is a petition brought by the public utility administrator pursuant to general laws 1938, chapter 122, \\u00a728, praying this court to direct the respondent Kent County Water Authority, hereinafter called the Authority, to file in the office of the administrator a schedule of rates and charges together with a copy of its rules and regulations. The petition further prays that said respondent and its predecessor companies, which are also respondents, be permanently enjoined from putting into effect any rates until they have been so filed, and that all moneys which the respondent Authority has received from ratepayers in excess of legally approved rates heretofore filed by said companies be held in trust pending the determination of this proceed ing. Upon the filing of the petition we granted the last-mentioned prayer and such moneys are now on deposit with the Industrial Trust Company, a banking corporation of this state, as trustee.\\nIn reality this controversy is between only the administrator and the Authority, the respondent companies having disclaimed any interest. It concerns the construction of the following proviso in section 2 of chapter 122: \\\"Provided, that this chapter shall not be construed to apply to any public water works and water service owned and furnished by any city, town, water district, fire district or any other municipal or quasi-municipal corporation.\\\" The Authority, which will hereinafter be considered as the sole respondent, contends that it is included within that proviso and is there- ' fore not required to file a schedule of its rates or a copy of its rules and regulations in the office of the administrator. The administrator argues that only a municipal or quasi-municipal corporation can claim the benefit of such proviso and that the respondent is neither. He further contends that if the proviso is more broadly construed so as to include the respondent it would be invalid. However, on the view which we take it will not be necessary to consider this latter contention.\\nThe respondent Authority was created by public laws 1946, chap. 1740, and was authorized to acquire the water works and services of several privately-owned water companies then serving the municipalities of Kent county and some users of water in Scituate and Cranston in Providence county. The rates of such companies were on file in the office of the administrator when the respondent acquired those companies, but within a short time thereafter, following a survey by engineers retained by respondent, it revised such rates upward without first submitting them to the administrator for his approval. It relied for its right to take such action on the provisions of sections 1 and 5 of chapter 1740 which read as follows:\\n\\\"Section 1. There is hereby created a district to be known as the Kent county water district (hereinafter called the 'district'), a political subdivision, whose boundaries shall be co-terminus with the boundaries of Kent county. A board to be known as the Kent county water authority is hereby created. Such board shall be a body corporate and politic constituting a public benefit corporation and shall serve as the governing body of the district for the purposes of this act.\\\"\\n\\\"Sec. 5. It is hereby declared that the authority and the carrying out of its corporate purposes is in all respects for the benefit of the people of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, for the improvement of their health, welfare and prosperity, and the authority will be performing an essential governmental function in the exercise of the powers conferred by this act, and the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations covenants that the bonds of the authority and the income therefrom shall at all times be exempt from taxation.\\\"\\nThe claim is made, as we understand it, that the language of those sections indicates an intention of the legislature to endow respondent with the attributes of a quasi-municipal corporation such as a fire district. If that claim is valid there can be no question that respondent would not bh obliged to comply with chapter 122, and conversely if it is invalid respondent would be so obligated. Originally, the proviso of section 2 was expressly limited to a city or town. In East Providence Water Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 46 R. I. 458, decided in 1925, this court held that a fire district was not included under the words \\\"city or town\\\" as they were municipal corporations whereas a fire district was merely \\\"a quasi municipal corporation of limited powers.\\\" Several years thereafter the legislature amended the proviso by adding the words \\\"water district, fire district or any other municipal or quasi-municipal corporation.\\\"- P. L. 1936, chap. 2438.\\nApparently before that amendment this court was of the opinion that such exemption should not be extended by judicial construction and that if the legislature meant to exempt quasi-municipal corporations as well as municipal corporations, that is, cities and towns, it should expressly so declare. However, although the legislature finally did so in 1936 it expressly confined the exemption to municipal or quasi-municipal corporations as is evidenced by the use of the word \\\"other\\\" in the above-quoted amendment. In other words, it clearly meant to exempt only such districts as were municipalities. At that time no such corporation as the Kent County Water Authority was in existence in this state.\\nIn view of this legislative and judicial history of the proviso the question arises: Is the Authority a true quasi-municipal corporation within the contemplation of such proviso? It will be noted that although it is declared in chapter 1740 to be a \\\"body politic\\\" that act does not incorporate the inhabitants of Kent county as a self-governing corporate body of the newly established water district, nor does it provide that the ratepayers of such district shall have any political rights in the government of the district or in the management of the corporation. And no part of the state's power of taxation is vested either in them or the board. On the contrary the act designates certain individuals as a board and incorporates it as a \\\"water authority\\\" with no powers other than those necessary to maintain and operate a water works system. In this respect such \\\"authority\\\" does not correspond to fire districts heretofore created by the legislature which are vested with a portion of the state's taxing power and have been characterized by this court as quasi-municipal corporations.\\nSuch districts are true bodies politic in that the inhabitants thereof are the corporators exercising a part of the sovereign power of the state. This is one of the basic elements of a municipal corporation. See Mathewson v. Hawkins, 19 R. I. 16, 20. The term \\\"body politic\\\" is of ancient origin and generally connotes tlie collective body of citizens exercising political functions of the state. 11 C.J.S. Body, 380. The distinguishing feature of a municipal or quasi-municipal corporation is that it is not only a body corporate but also a body politic the components of which, the corporators, are endowed with the right to exercise in their collective capacity a portion of the political power of the state.\\nSuch a corporation is more than a mere \\\"public benefit corporation.\\\" There are a variety of corporations of that character such as railroad, telephone, gas, electric, water, and turnpike corporations which, even though privately owned, perform a public service and are sometimes referred to as public service corporations, but they are neither municipal nor quasi-municipal corporations. In recent years a special type of corporation denominated an \\\"authority\\\" rather than a \\\"corporation\\\" has been created to perform some of those functions, but, as far as we are aware, such \\\"authorities\\\" heretofore have never been considered by this court to be municipal corporations, although they may be clothed with some of their attributes and be publicly owned or controlled.\\nNotwithstanding that public laws 1946, ~hapter 1740, creating the Kent County Water Authority, describes tt\\u00edS board as a \\\"body politic,\\\" constitutes it as \\\"a public benefit corporation,\\\" and declares that in exercising its powers it \\\"will be performing an essential governmental function,\\\" such language by itself is not effective to clothe the Authority with the distinguishing characteristics of a municipal or quasi-municipal corporation. It does no more than establish the Authority as an agency of the state to \\u2022 perform the same service which was theretofore rendered by several privately-owned companies. In our opinion, therefore, the Authority is not a true body politic in the nature of a quasi-municipal corporation such as the legislature intended to exempt from the provisions of chapter 122.\\nOur conclusion, therefore, is that the respondent Kent County Water Authority must comply with the order of the public utility administrator requiring it to file a schedule of its rates and a copy of its rules and regulations in accordance with that chapter. This is not to say, however, that the legislature is powerless to exempt the respondent if it desires to do so. We do not so decide. All that- we decide here is that such an exemption cannot reasonably be read into the proviso, chapter 122, section 2, by judicial construction.\\nWilliam E. Powers, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Coogan, Ass't Atty. Gen., for petitioner.\\nMichael DeCiantis, Town Solicitor, as amicus curiam, for town of West Warwick.\\nHinckley, Allen, Salisbury & Parsons, Stuart H. Tucker, Douglas W. Franchot, for respondent.\\nThe prayer of the petition for relief is granted, and on June 4, 1952 the parties may present to this court for approval a form of decree in accordance with this opinion.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/5312190.json b/ri/5312190.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c167ac7a503e2a918c2c695f15c553bb16d83ebe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/5312190.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5312190\", \"name\": \"Joseph Valliere vs. Mutual Realty Co., Inc.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Valliere v. Mutual Realty Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1953-04-30\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"298\", \"last_page\": \"301\", \"citations\": \"80 R.I. 298\", \"volume\": \"80\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:29:35.753118+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present : Flynn, C. J., Capotosto, Baker and Condon, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Joseph Valliere vs. Mutual Realty Co., Inc.\", \"head_matter\": \"Joseph Valliere vs. Mutual Realty Co., Inc.\\nAPRIL 30, 1953.\\nPresent : Flynn, C. J., Capotosto, Baker and Condon, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"848\", \"char_count\": \"5068\", \"text\": \"Baker, J.\\nThis is an action of the case brought under the provisions of the federal Housing and Rent Act of 1947, as amended, to recover from defendant treble damages and also a reasonable attorney's fee, because of an alleged willful overcharge of rent by defendant as landlord in violation of the pertinent federal acts and regulations then in effect. In the superior court a justice thereof sitting without a jury rendered a decision in plaintiff's favor for $438 and defendant duly prosecuted its bill of exceptions to this court. \\u2022 It relies solely on the exception to such decision.\\nAt the trial plaintiff introduced certain exhibits and presented as witnesses his wife, himself, the attorney for the Providence area rent office, and a young woman officer of the defendant corporation. Such officer also testified for defendant and stated its position to the trial justice. The record shows that defendant was not represented at the trial by an attorney, but that the parties were heard at considerable length and the defendant's rights were duly preserved.\\nIt appears from the evidence that plaintiff rented, from defendant, which had fifty-four apartments, a two-room apartment at 336 Pine street in the city of Providence, which at that time was in a defense rental area. Apparently the apartment was to be furnished by defendant which also was to pay the charges for gas and electricity. The plaintiff and his wife began to occupy the apartment January 2, 1949 and the agreed rent was $10 per week. That rental was paid to about September 21, 1949 when a discussion as to the rent took place between the parties, plaintiff having filed a complaint against defendant at the area rent office. However, they adjusted their difficulty, the complaint was withdrawn, and defendant charged plaintiff no rent for a period of about six weeks from approximately September 21 to October 26, 1949, thus giving him a credit of $54. Thereafter from October 26, 1949 to March 8, 1950 plaintiff paid a rental of $9 per week. From the date last mentioned to June 12, 1950, when plaintiff vacated the apartment, he paid $7.50 a week and he makes no claim covering the last-named period.\\nIn substance it is plaintiff's contention that, based on the legally-established rent, while he was paying defendant a rental of $10 a week for forty weeks he was being overcharged at the rate of $3.50 a week amounting to $140, and that while he was thereafter paying rent of $9 a week he was similarly overcharged $2.50 a week for twenty weeks amounting to $50. On the other hand, defendant argues that at most plaintiff is entitled to $61.50 as treble damages based on its computation of possible overcharges.\\nWe deem it unnecessary to review the evidence in detail. It is clear that at no time during the tenancy of plaintiff was the legally-established rent for the apartment in question as high as either $9 or $10 a week. A serious difficulty in d\\u00e9termining how much plaintiff was overcharged arises from the fact that the rent was legally established at different times in varying amounts between $8 and $6.50 a week, and that certain of these reductions were retroactive for a considerable period. Furthermore the evidence indicates that some of the gas and electric charges were paid by plaintiff, although that matter was to some extent adjusted by the parties themselves.\\nAfter consideration the trial justice concluded that plaintiff had been overcharged $96 during his tenancy and that treble damages would amount to $288 to which he added an attorney's fee of $150, making a total of $438. In reaching his decision the trial justice took into consideration the credit of $54 which the parties agreed to in 1949. In our opinion that adjustment did not amount to a complete settlement and release of all rent accounts between them up to October 26, 1949 as defendant urges. The evidence shows that the action of the parties at the time of the above-mentioned agreement was based on certain representations of defendant and on a rent of $9 a week which was still not the legally-established rate. The trial justice also found that defendant's action in overcharging plaintiff had been willful. It knew that the allowable rent was not $9 or $10, but those amounts were deliberately charged apparently in anticipation that defendant would get an upward adjustment of the rent. The evidence fully supported that finding.\\nArthur N. Votolato, Leo T. Cormors, for plaintiff.\\nFrancis Castrovillari, for defendant.\\nWe have examined the exhibits and the somewhat confused evidence as it appears in the transcript. The trial justice had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses testify which we do not have. It is our opinion that his decision is not clearly wrong and in the circumstances does substantial justice between the parties.\\nThe defendant's exception is overruled, and the case is remitted to the superior court for entry of judgment on the decision.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/5482405.json b/ri/5482405.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1d7da785d42cebb0211f43c3287cbeb244efc795
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/5482405.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5482405\", \"name\": \"State vs. Andrew Gannites\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Gannites\", \"decision_date\": \"1966-07-19\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"216\", \"last_page\": \"223\", \"citations\": \"101 R.I. 216\", \"volume\": \"101\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:37:45.445846+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Roberts, C. J., Paolino, Powers, Joslin and Kelleher, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"State vs. Andrew Gannites.\", \"head_matter\": \"221 A.2d 620.\\nState vs. Andrew Gannites.\\nJULY 19, 1966.\\nPresent: Roberts, C. J., Paolino, Powers, Joslin and Kelleher, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"1927\", \"char_count\": \"11467\", \"text\": \"Joslin, J.\\nThis indictment charging the defendant with the murder of a police officer is before us for the second time. When first here we reversed on the ground that the jury had been incorrectly 'charged on the issue raised by the defendant's plea of insanity. State v. Gannites, 91 R. I. 209. Thereafter in June of 1961 the defendant was again tried before a justice of the superior court sitting with a jury and was again found guilty. He is now serving a life sentence. His bill of exceptions was allowed and the papers in the case were certified here on May 23, 1963. The case was submitted to us on briefs on June 10, 1966, both parties with our permission having waived oral arguments. The long delay between the docketing of the bill of exceptions and the submission is attributable to the parties and not to a crowded condition of our docket.\\nThe only substantial question is whether the admission into evidence over defendant's objections of certain inculpatory oral and written statements made under the following described circumstances makes necessary the granting of a new trial.\\nOn January 6, 1958 shortly after noontime defendant, then under suspicion of having at about 6 o'clock that morning shot and killed an East Providence policeman, was apprehended by the police and taken to the office of deputy chief Hourigan in the Pawtucket police station. It was then about 1:15 p.m. Hourigan knew Gannites from previous contacts and without any preliminary interrogation asked him \\\"Andy, who shot the policeman?\\\" Gannites answered, \\\"I did, Mr. Hourigan.\\\" Gannites was questioned intermittently throughout the remainder of that day and its early evening and was also taken to the place where the murder weapon had been hidden as well as to the scene of the killing where at the request of the police he participated in a reenactment of what had taken place early that morning. At about 11:15 that night after approximately two hours of continuous questioning Gannites signed a statement in which he confessed to the fatal shooting.\\nThe confession which is in question and answer form opens with Gannites' statement that it is made voluntarily without any threats or coercion or promise of reward or leniency and with the knowledge that whatever might be said could be used for or against him. It, as well as certain oral admissions made during his custodial interro-\\ngation starting with the original statement, \\\"I did, Mr. Hourigan,\\\" was introduced into evidence at the trial, some over and others without objection. The record fails to disclose that defendant was at any time before or during the interrogation either advised that he could maintain his silence or told that he had the right to have either retained or appointed counsel present.\\nThe submission in this court followed in point of time our decisions in State v. Dufour, 99 R. I. 120, 206 A.2d 82, and State v. Mendes, 99 R. I. 606, 210 A.2d 50, and came after arguments but before decisions in Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, and Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719.\\nIn Dufour and in Mendes the justices of this court sharply disagreed, as have judges wherever the question has arisen, on the implications which flow from Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478. By a one-vote majority this court which had divided evenly in Dufour on the thrust of Escobedo enlarged it in Mendes beyond its precise factual situation and held that the failure of the police to advise a defendant of his right to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel during his custodial interrogation made his incriminating statement inadmissible.\\nWhatever doubts which the opinion in Escobedo may have created in the courts as to its true meaning have now in the light of Miranda where the court divided 5-4 been resolved. Escobedo has been enlarged and the rule now in both the state and the federal courts is that evidence of exculpatory or inculpatory statements made by an accused during in-custody interrogation is inadmissible unless he has clearly and unequivocally been advised of his right to remain silent, warned that anything he may say can be used against him, and told that he is entitled to the presence of retained or appointed counsel during the questioning process.\\nHaving announced the rule the court was still faced with whether it should be applied prospectively or retrospectively. This was decided in Johnson v. State of New Jersey, supra, which, although argued at the same time as was Miranda, was not decided until a week later. There the court, this time with seven 'justices voting in favor of the conclusion, came face to face with the problem of whether Escobedo and Miranda, notwithstanding the long-settled principles which they overturned, were to be applied retroactively. Influenced obviously by the considerations but recently expressed in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, which go to the \\\"administration of justice and the integrity of the judicial process\\\" the majority refused retrospective application to Escobedo' or Miranda. An additional compelling reason undoubtedly was that a rule of retrospectivity \\\"would require the retrial or release of numerous prisoners found guilty by trustworthy evidence in conformity with previously announced constitutional standards.\\\" Johnson v. State of New Jersey, supra.\\nWhile reiterating the principle announced by Mr. Justice Cardozo in Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U. S. 358, 364, which gives to each state the right to \\\"make a choice for itself between the principle of forward operation and that of relation backward,\\\" the court in Johnson held that any accused whose trial begins after the June 22, 1964 date of the Escobedo decision is protected against the use of a statement elicited by the police during an interrogation purposed upon obtaining an incriminating statement if he had \\\"requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute 'constitutional right to remain silent Escobedo v. Illinois at 491. In addition, Johnson holds that an accused whose trial begins after the June 13, 1966 date of the Miranda decision is protected against the use at a criminal trial of an exculpatory or inculpatory state- m-ent elicited by the authorities during- in-custody interrogation unless prior to questioning he has been warned that \\\"he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one- will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.\\\" Miranda v. Arizona, supra at 479.\\nFor the same reasons which influenced the- supreme court we refuse to give retroactive effect to either Escobedo or Miranda beyond what may be constitutionally required of us by Johnson. While we apply the Johnson principle of prospective application to Mendes we hinge it to the time of the interrogation rather than to the date of the commencement of the trial. Recognizing that the passage of a reasonable time was necessary to disseminate our opinion and to apprise the authorities of the strictures it imposed upon the investigatory process, we now hold that the amplification given to Escobedo by the majority in Mendes is to be applied only to -persons whose in-custody interrogation took place at least thirty days after our May 10, 1965 decision in that case.\\nThat retroactive application would result in a disservice to tbe public interests and to- a proper enforcement of our laws is graphically illustrated by the facts of this case. Gannites does not claim that his statements were involuntary, or that his constitutional rights as -they were understood when he was questioned at the police station or tried at -the courthouse were violated. Indeed, he does not even contend that he is not guilty of th-e crime with which he is charged. Instead he seeks the protection of constitutional safeguards which were unheard of when he was interrogated and unknown when he was tried. He argues for a reversal on the ground that the- rule the majority announced in Mendes in 1965 made inadmissible at his trial in 1961 his 1958 confessions of guilt to the police including his very first response to the very first \\u2022question asked of him within minutes after his apprehension upon probable cause for the cold-blooded killing of a police officer. To hold now, in the absence of any requirement constitutional or otherwise, that Gannites should have been given the warnings and advice made obligatory by Mendes the necessity for which could not have been known to the police at his interrogation, would strain the concepts of what either fairness or reasonableness demands.\\nIn considering what is fair and just in these circumstances, Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618 (1965), and Tehan v. United States, ex rel. Shott, 382 U. S. 406 (1966), make it clear that our constitution \\\"neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect\\\" and that we are at liberty to \\\"weigh the merits and demerits,\\\" to consider the pros and the cons and to strike a balance between the interests of an accused and those of society. When we strike that balance we must be mindful, as Mr. Justice White put it in his dissent in Miranda at 537, that \\\"More than the human dignity of the accused is involved; the human personality of others in the society must -also be preserved.\\\"\\nIn our judgment, the interests of society in cases' like this far outweigh those whose trials antedated Escobedo and Miranda and whose interrogation preceded Mendes. There being no persuasive reason or precedent requiring otherwise, we apply Escobedo, Miranda and Mendes prospectively and to the extent as in each instance we have indicated. Our ruling of prospectivity applies to cases whether here on direct appeal or otherwise.\\nThe defendant has a further contention. His trial began on May 8, 1961 and the first day was consumed in the \\u2022examination of prospective jurors. When court convened the following morning defendant moved for a mistrial on the ground that a news broadcast reporting on the .pending trial had referred to his prior conviction and the ordering of a new trial on a technical ground. In arguing the motion counsel with candor advised the court that he had been unable to verify that the contents of the broadcast were in fact as stated by him and in response to a question from the bench agreed that he intended as a part of his defense to make use of the transcript of the earlier trial.\\nJ. Joseph Nugent, Attorney General, Corinne P. Grande, Special Assistant Attorney General.\\nLeo Patrick McGowan, Public Defender, Eugene F. Toro, Special Counsel to Public Defender.\\nWe find nothing in the circumstances relied on by defendant which in any way either menaced or threatened the integrity of his trial or so disturbed its atmosphere that the conclusions of the jury would be induced by anything other than the evidence and the arguments. Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367; Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Atty Gen., 205 U. S. 454, 462; Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333. The defendant's exception to the denial of his motion for a mistrial is overruled.\\nAll of the defendant's exceptions are overruled, and the case is remitted to the superior court.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/5485500.json b/ri/5485500.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..55a9784339d56a946f26d40939a78b927a1382c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/5485500.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5485500\", \"name\": \"Tony Bahry vs. Masonwear Company\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Bahry v. Masonwear Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1966-11-23\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"402\", \"last_page\": \"411\", \"citations\": \"101 R.I. 402\", \"volume\": \"101\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:37:45.445846+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Roberts, C. J., Paolino, Powers, Joslin. and Kelleher, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Tony Bahry vs. Masonwear Company.\", \"head_matter\": \"224 A.2d 316.\\nTony Bahry vs. Masonwear Company.\\nNOVEMBER 23, 1966.\\nPresent: Roberts, C. J., Paolino, Powers, Joslin. and Kelleher, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"2399\", \"char_count\": \"14539\", \"text\": \"Powers, J.\\nThis employee's petition for review is before us on his appeal fro-m a decree of the workmen's compensation commission -afikming the decree of a single commissioner .and denying and dismissing the employee's appeal from that decree.\\nThe record establishes that the petitioner sustained an injury in the employ of respondent on November 23, 1960, and pursuant to- the terms of a nonp-reju-dicial agreement wa-s paid compensation benefits until August 20, 1962. Thereafter in W.C.C. No. 63-0255 respondent's liability was established by a decree entered April 22, 1963. It contained certain findings which in pertinent part are that as a sweeper earning an average weekly wage of $73.60 petitioner sustained a co-mpensable injury to his left leg, ankle and foot, from which he is and has ibeen totally incapacitated- since August 20, 19-62, as a -result of injuries sustained November 23, 1960.\\nThe record further discloses that petitioner returned to w-ork f-or respondent as a sweeper on August 25, 1964 and, because he- began to earn wages equal to- or in excess of his average weekly wage, compensation payments were suspended by a decree entered September 30, 1964.\\nThereafter petitioner continued working until January 15, 1965, on which date he did not report for work because of excessive pain. During most of this time he was under the care of Dr. John H. Gordon, an orthopedic surgeon.\\nOn March 24, 1965 the instant petition was filed alleging that total incapacity had returned. Hearings were held thereon at divers times and a decree was entered by the single -commissioner on January 24, 1966. It contains three findings of fact, each of which will' be set out at a more appropriate juncture-.\\nFrom this decree both parties claimed an appeal to- the full commission. The respondent, however, although filing reasons of appeal, furnished neither memorandum nor brief. In any event, the -commission denied its appeal and- from the decree entered pursuant thereto -respondent claimed no-appeal to this court.\\nThe- petitioner on the other hand duly perfected and prosecuted his appeal to th-e- full commission and assigned as reasons in support thereof that the findings of fact and the order -relating to- compensation contained in the single commissioner's decree were against the law, the evidence, the law and the evidence and weight thereof.\\nIn its decision the -full commission commented on the evidence, summarized petitioner's 'arguments and concluded that the appeal was without merit. On April 20, 1966 the commission entered its decree affirming the decree of the single commissioner and denying and dismissing petitioner's appeal.\\nAn examination of the record discloses that at the hearing before the single commissioner testimony was received from Dr. John H. Gordon, Dr. Richard Bertini and petitioner in support of the petition and from Mr. Murphy, respondent's assembly department foreman, as well as from Dr. Vincent Zeechino on respondent's behalf. Further, reports were received from Dr. William V. Hindle, who' examined petitioner at the request of the single commissioner, and Dr. Zeechino'.\\nIt is the substance of petitioner's testimony, a\\u00ae wiell as that of his doctors that on January 15, 1965 and continuing thereafter, petitioner was unable to perform his regular work as a sweeper, but that he was able to do light to moderate work which would not require him to be on his feet for prolonged periods. Moreover, it was the opinion of his two doctors, and petitioner also testified, \\u00a1that his capacity for work was the same in July 1965 when the hearings closed as it had been since January 14, 1965 when the incapacity commenced.\\nDoctor Hindle, the impartial medical examiner, examined petitioner June 29, 1965 and filed his report the following week. It concluded:\\n\\\"Fully aware of the patient's age and the fact that he has not shown an indication of returning to work, I would still feel that on the basis of findings at this time that he would be capable of light work and light to moderate work. The only restriction that I might make would be prolonged standing on the extremity.\\\"\\nParenthetically we might observe that petitioner was sixty-two years of age at the time to' which Dr. Hindle refers.\\nThe petitioner first contends -that finding of fact No. 1 in the decree of the single commissioner and affirmed by the full commission is against the law in that there is no' competent evidence on which such finding can rest. This finding is as follows:\\n\\\"(1) Petitioner's incapacity for work returned in part for the period beginning January 14, 1965 and ending June 30, 1965 and he was .able to earn the sum of not less than $40.00 weekly at sedentary work such as jewelry bench hand or as an elevator operator during such period\\nSuch contention is clearly without merit as to the nature of the incapacity, since his own doctors as we! as the- impartial medical examiner were of the opinion that he was able to do fight work such as that described by the single commissioner. There being such evidence the finality of that finding is not opien to. review by us, there being no question of fraud. Ferguson v. George A. Fuller Co., 74 R. I. 98; Carr v. General Insulated Wire Works, Inc., 100 R. I. 203, 213 A.2d 700.\\nHe next contends that finding of fact No. 3 is not supported by competent evidence. This finding is as follows: \\\"(3) Petitioner's incapacity for work ended on July 1, 1965.\\\"\\nIn support of this contention he cites Catoia v. Eastern Concrete Products Co., 84 R. I. 402. There we held that where the testimony of four doctors was evaluated by the single commissioner and he accepted that of two of the doctors, he and the fu! commission on review inferentially rejected the testimony of the other two doctors, it being in conflict with the testimony relied upon.\\nIn the instant cause Dr. Zeechino-, who. examined petitioner February 5, 1965, testified and concluded in his report that as of the date of his examination petitioner was no longer incapacitated and could return to his regular employment.\\nSince, as evinced by his finding of partial incapacity through June 30, 1965, the single commissioner and the full commission on review accepted the testimony of Doctors Gordon and Bertini as well as the opinion of Dr. Hindle, they inferentialy rejected the opinion of Dr. Zeoehino. Thus, petitioner argues, there remained no competent evidence upon which to1 support the finding that petitioner's incapacity ended July 1, 1965.\\nThis contention presupposes, however, that Dr. Hindl'e's quoted opinion was not open to- the inf erence that petitioner could resume his regular employment as a sweeper, assuming of course that this work was available.\\nFrom the nature of petitioner's regular work as described by him and the assembly department foreman Murphy, respondent argues that the single commissioner and the full commission on review, giving a reasonable interpretation to Dr. Hindie's opinion, were warranted in finding that petitioner was capable on July 1, 1965 of returning to' his regular work at which he would earn an amount equal to or in excess of his average weekly wages.\\nAssuming that there is merit in this' contention, we next turn to the second finding in the decree on which such contention necessarily rests. It is as follows:\\n\\\"(2) Petitioner was offered suitable work by the Respondent 'and there was available to him such suitable work which he was .and has been able to do since July 1, 1965 and to earn the weekly wages of not less than 173.60\\nOn this finding then the instant appeal necessarily turns.\\nIn his fourth, fifth and sixth reasons of appeal, petitioner assigns as error -that said finding is against the law and the evidence in that there is no legal evidence on which such finding can be supported. We think this contention has merit.\\nIt appears from the record that assembly department foreman Murphy was not, petitioner's full-time supervisor or superior. Rather, petitioner was subject to Murphy's supervision only when .petitioner was engaged at work in the assembly department. Murphy testified for respondent in direct examination as follows: \\\"Q. And the job as sweeper is still available to Mr. Bahry, is that correct? A. Yes: Q. Now, this job pays at least $1.83 an hour. Is that correct? A. Yes.\\\" The foregoing must, from our reading of the transcript, constitute the evidence on which the second finding of fact is predicated.\\nHowever, in cross-examination the witness was asked, \\\"Excuse me, Mr. Murphy, do you have the authority to offer work to Mr. Bahry?\\\" His answer was \\\"No.\\\" Recognizing what this admission did to Murphy's previous testimony, counsel for respondent then asked: \\\"This1 job as a sweeper is available now. You are in a position to tell him that.\\\" This inquiry drew the equivocal answer, \\\"I imagine so. We ,are on vacation now. I assume when it's open.\\\" Counsel for petitioner then asked, \\\"On a full time basis.\\\" Mr. Murphy responded, \\\"Well, that's up to' Mr. Miller.\\\"\\nIt seems obvious from the foregoing that the single commissioner misconceived the import of Murphy's testimony if he relied thereon in finding as a fact that respondent offered to make petitioner's regular work available to' him. The testimony lends itself only to' speculation, falling short of that which is necessary to' support -an inference based on probabilities, as distinguished from a mere possibility. See Antonelli v. Walsh-Kaiser Co., 72 R. I. 1. As this court observed in Papineau v. Personnel Board (Michalczyk v. same), 101 R. I. 359, 223 A.2d 549, an inference predicated on conjecture or speculation lacks probative force.\\nThe Murphy testimony las set out herein, being all the evidence upon which the single commissioner oo-uld have based his finding that suitable work which petitioner could do and earn his average weekly wages had been offered to him by respondent, lacking probative force, finding No. 2 is erroneous as a matter of law. Rosewater v. Jean's Inc., 72 R. I. 489; Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates, Inc. v. Label, 74 R. I. 6.\\nFurther, since finding No-. 3 that petitioner's incapacity ceased July 1, 1965, is predicated on the validity of finding No. 2, it follows that (both the second and third findings are not supported by legal evidence and the decree of the full commission to the extent that it affirms those findings is erroneous.\\nMoreover, having concluded that there is no probative evidence to- support the finding that petitioner's partial incapacity Which 'commenced January 14, 1965 ceased June 30, 1965, that portion of finding No. 1 limiting the period of partial incapacity is also erroneous.\\nWe hold therefore that the finding that petitioner became partially incapacitated for work on January 14, 1965 and was entitled to the applicable benefits resulting therefrom is supported by competent evidence, but that all other findings .as set forth in the decree are not so supported and on remand the commission is ordered to modify the decree so as to conform with this opinion.\\nThe petitioner's final reason of appeal rests on the proposition that the full commission erred in refusing to- award him a counsel fee for successfully resisting respondent's appeal from the decree of the single commissioner. He argues that since this is an employee's petition for review and compensation benefits were ordered as a result of the hearings thereon, from which award respondent appealed, the clear intendment of G. L. 1956, \\u00a728-35-32, as amended, entitles him to an assessment of a counsel fee by reason of the full commission's dismissal of respondent's appeal. The cited section provides in pertinent part: \\\" costs shall be awarded, including counsel fees to- employees who successfully prosecute .petitions for compensation and to employees who successfully defend, in whole or in part, petitions for review filed by employers. Such costs shall be assessed against the employer by a single commissioner, by -the full commission on appeal and by the supreme court on appeal consistent with the services rendered before each .tribunal and shall be made a part of the decree.\\\" (italics ours)\\nIn United States Rubber Co. v. Marino, 97 R. I. 142, 196 A.2d 169, we held that where the single commissioner failed to- order a counsel fee to- an employee who- had been partially successful in defending against an employer's petition for review, and the employee had appealed to the full commission to review the refusal .of the single commissioner to make such an order, the employee was entitled to an award of a counsel fee for the proceedings before the full commission as well as to the counsel fee ordered by the full commission for the proceedings before the single commissioner.\\nIn 97 R. I. at page 146,196 A.2d at page 172, we observed, \\\"If we should now hold that petitioner should not be required to pay respondent's counsel for his services on such appeal, her partial success before -the full commission will have been at best a pyrrhic victory.\\\"\\nIn the instant cause, however, although respondent claimed an appeal to the full commission and filed its reasons in support thereof, it filed neither brief nor memorandum as provided in G. L. 1956, \\u00a728-35-28; and, moreover, petitioner had prosecuted his own appeal from the decree of the single commissioner. His 'appearance before the full commission therefore was not in .defense of 'the decree appealed from and he performed no services directed to. that end. Nor did he prevail on his own appeal. In such circumstances we cannot say that the full commission erred in deciding that, consistent with the services rendered, \\u00a1there was no counsel fee to be awarded.\\nAbedon, Michaelson, Stanzler and Biener, Richard A. Skolnik, for petitioner.\\nWorrell and Hodge, Eldridge H. Henning, Jr., for respondent.\\nHowever, petitioner has prevailed in this court and the services performed in connection therewith may be considered on motion filed pursuant to provisional order No. 5 of the rules 'and orders of the supreme court which became effective September 8, 1966.\\nThe petitioner's appeal is sustained to the extent that it has not otherwise been denied, the decree appealed from is ordered modified as heretofore siet forth, and after the award of a counsel fee on petitioner's motion the cause will then be remanded to the workmen's compensation commission for further proceedings.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/5491078.json b/ri/5491078.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9250b6815f104ba8f8670f9652f1ca6f6bcaa262
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/5491078.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5491078\", \"name\": \"Frank J. Scullian, Jr. vs. Gladys Finley\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Scullian v. Finley\", \"decision_date\": \"1965-06-07\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"4\", \"last_page\": \"7\", \"citations\": \"100 R.I. 4\", \"volume\": \"100\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:05:16.306762+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Condon, C. J., Roberts, Paolino, Powers and Joslin, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Frank J. Scullian, Jr. vs. Gladys Finley.\", \"head_matter\": \"210 A.2d 646.\\nFrank J. Scullian, Jr. vs. Gladys Finley.\\nJUNE 7, 1965.\\nPresent: Condon, C. J., Roberts, Paolino, Powers and Joslin, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"1112\", \"char_count\": \"6401\", \"text\": \"Condon, C. J.\\nThis is an action of assumpsit which was tried to a justice of the superior court without a jury and resulted in a decision for the defendant for costs. The case is here on the plaintiff's bill of exceptions to an evidentiary ruling and to such decision.\\nThe declaration is in a single count as follows:\\n\\\"For that the defendant at the place aforesaid, on the day of the issuance of the within writ, being justly indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of $4,000.00 for .certain goods, wares and merchandise, to wit, one portable diner together with tractor therefor and cooking equipment and utensils located therein, there before that time sold and delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant at the special instance and request of the defendant and for monies due and owing from the defendant to the plaintiff then and there in consideration thereof promised the plaintiff to .pay him the said sum of money on request the which sum though often- requested the defendant has hitherto refused and still does refuse to pay.\\\"\\nThe defendant pleaded non assumpsit and the trial proceeded on that- issue. At the trial plaintiff presented no evidence but moved that the record in Howard I. Frederick-son v. Anthony Petrucci et al., superior court Equity No. 26,711, foe admitted in evidence as an exhibit. There being no objection thereto the trial justice ruled that he would take judicial notice of that record.\\nPrior to such ruling defendant had requested the trial justice to admit the record in Frank J. Scullian, Jr. v. Howard I. Frederickson, superior court Law No. 161,384. That record was received on the same basis as Equity No. 26,711. The plaintiff thereupon moved that defendant's plea of puis darrein continuance in Law No. 161,384 be admitted as an exhibit in his, plaintiff's, case. On defendant's objection the court denied the motion but observed that since such plea was among the papers in Law No. 161,384, of which he would take judicial notice, he would consider the plea \\\"For what it is worth.\\\"\\nThe plaintiff duly excepted to such ruling and in support thereof argued here that admission of the plea was a necessary part of his case as proof that the chattels referred to in the plea were the same as those described in the declaration in the case at bar. There -is no- merit in such exception. The plaintiff suffered no prejudice by the ruling since the trial justice had already stated that he would consider the plea as one of the papers in Law No. 161,384 which he had already ruled would be .accorded judicial notice. In any event .plaintiff co-uld have suffered no prejudice by the denial of his motion since the identity of the chattels in the case at bar and in Law No. 161,384 was not questioned by defendant. The -plaintiff's first exception is therefore overruled.\\nThe second exception is to the decision of the trial justice on the merits. In order to understand the controversy which he was called upon to decide it is necessary to describe the content of the record before' him as a result of the admission in evidence by way of judicial notice of the record in Equity No. 26,711 and Law No. 161,384. Equity No. 26,711 is a petition to enforce a common-law lien under G. L. 1956, chapter 35 of title 34. In accordance with the prayer of the petition which was taken as confessed an order of sale of the chattels in question was entered and a sale held to satisfy the lien. As a result of the sale a Mr. Theodore Vitucci took possession of the dining car trailer and placed it upon, his land. Yitucci deceased intestate and the chattels thereupon by operation of law came into the possession of his widow, now Gladys Finley, defendant in the case at bar.\\nLaw No. 161,384 is an action of trover and conversion brought by Frank J. Scullian, Jr. against Howard I. Frederickson, the petitioner in Equity No. 26,711. This case was tried before a justice of the superior court without a jury and was decided in favor of the defendant for costs. At the trial the plaintiff had contended that the sale in Equity No. 26,711 was illegal and void in violation of his rights under the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution and that the defendant Frederickson had converted bis, the plaintiff's, property by selling it to Vitucoi.\\nThe trial justice in that ease rejected Scullian's contention that the proceedings under chapter 35 of title 34 were illegal and expressly held that there was no merit in his claim that the sale to Vitucoi was void, saying in his decision: \\\"In the first place he claims them to have been unconstitutional as being in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in that they deprived him of his property without due process of law, he being the owner and the defendant having no lien for storage against him. The Court however finds that he knew that the property had been stored with the defend ant, at least for the last two years and accordingly the plaintiff not being in a position to deny defendant rightful storage at least for that period, with the result that some money became due for storage.\\\" On this point the court concluded: \\\"It follows therefore that no demand having been made upon the defendant and the sale being legal no conversion took place.\\\"\\nPontarelli & Berberian, Aram K. Berberian, for plaintiff.\\nHendel, Strauss & Surdut, Raymond J. Surdut, Maurice W. Hendel, for defendant.\\nSince the plaintiff did not press an exception to that decision the question of the legality of the sale in Equity No. 26.711 having been expressly raised and decided the point thereafter became res judicata. Matteodo v. Pesce, 68 R. I. 188. Therefore in the case at bar the trial justice was justified in holding as he did that: \\\"An examination of the evidence here and of the pleadings and decrees and decisions in Law No. 161,384 and Equity No. 26..711 shows that plaintiff here did not on the date of the alleged conversion have general title to the chattels in question. Not having general title and not claiming any special title or interest, his proof therefore fails.\\\" The exception to the decision is overruled.\\nAll of the plaintiff's exceptions are overruled, and the case is remitted to the superior court for entry of judgment on the decision.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/5501510.json b/ri/5501510.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8724dab015ead86b9846c5a32216e588ff55d8ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/5501510.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5501510\", \"name\": \"Albert Beauchesne vs. David London & Co.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Beauchesne v. David London & Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1977-07-18\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"651\", \"last_page\": \"661\", \"citations\": \"118 R.I. 651\", \"volume\": \"118\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:14:28.628712+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Bevilacqua, C. J., Paolino, Joslin, Kelleher and Doris, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Albert Beauchesne vs. David London & Co.\", \"head_matter\": \"375 A.2d 920.\\nAlbert Beauchesne vs. David London & Co.\\nJULY 18, 1977.\\nPresent: Bevilacqua, C. J., Paolino, Joslin, Kelleher and Doris, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"2897\", \"char_count\": \"17518\", \"text\": \"Kelleher, J.\\nThis employer's appeal from a decree of the Workmen's Compensation Commission awarding benefits to an employee for injuries received at a company-sponsored Christmas party raises an issue of first impression in this jurisdiction. Hereafter we shall refer to the employer as \\\"the company\\\" and the employee by his last name.\\nThe 'company, whose specialty is the sale of burlap bags and reconditioned barrels, is a family corporation whose ownership and management team consists of a father and his three sons. Beauchesne began working for the company in February of 1974 as a part-time employee and switched to full-time upon his graduation from high school. At the time Beauchesne began his full-time employment, he was 18 years old. On December 24, 1974, he attended the annual Christmas party, which was held in the third-floor offices of the company building, with pizza, soda, beer, and whiskey being supplied by the company. About 2:30 in the afternoon the day's work was put aside, and the festivities commenced.\\nThe employees were told that they could come to the party or leave for the day, as they chose, and that they would be paid for a full day. All the employees (five in number), as well as the London brothers, attended, although one employee left early without telling anyone. The others received a $10 bonus at the party, and the one who left was given his bonus later. Beauchesne apparently partook of the proverbial Christmas cheer, and sometime later in the afternoon became intoxicated. At about 4 p.m. he fell from a third-floor window and suffered a fractured skull, a fractured cervical spine, and severe damage to the arteries and veins in the area of the left knee. Subsequently, his left leg had to be amputated above the knee.\\nThe trial commissioner's findings pertinent to this appeal are that Beauchesne was intoxicated on December 24, 1974; that he sustained his injuries \\\"in the employment of the [company], connected therewith and referable thereto\\\" ; and that since December 25, 1974 he has been totally incapacitated. In turn these were affirmed by the full commission.\\nThe company contends first that the full commission erred in affirming the trial commissioner's finding of fact that Beauchesne's injury occurred in the course of employment. We note at the outset that when we are asked to review the commission's findings, our role is limited to searching the record to see if there is any legal evidence to support the commission's findings, Knowlton v. Porter Trucking Co., 117 R.I. 28, 362 A.2d 131 (1976). If there is, those findings cannot be disturbed absent fraud. Cilbane Bldg. Co. v. Zorabedian, 113 R.I. 129, 318 A.2d 466 (1974); St. Laurent v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 113 R.I. 10, 316 A.2d 504 (1974).\\nThe company maintains that the injury was not in the course of employment because work had ceased for the day and attendance at the party was optional. We feel that these points are not in themselves determinative and that all the facts surrounding the party must be considered. An examination of the cases dealing with injuries suffered by employees while attending or traveling to and from employer-sponsored social or recreational events disclosed that generally jurisdictions are split on the question of recovery, but that basically each case is unique, turning on its own facts. See 47 A.L.R.3d 566 (1973).\\nPerhaps the most lucid opinion on the subject is Moore's Case, 330 Mass. 1, 110 N.E.2d 764 (1953). The court there set forth criteria to be examined in determining whether employment and recreational activity are sufficiently related to warrant an award. These factors are: (1) the \\\"customary nature of the activity\\\"; (2) the \\\"employer's encouragement or subsidization\\\" of it; (3) the employer's management or direction of the enterprise; (4) the \\\"presence of substantial pressure or actual compulsion to attend and participate\\\"; and (5) whether the employer expects or receives a benefit from employee participation in the activity. Moore's Case, supra at 4-5, 110 N.E.2d at 766-67. As the court there noted, \\\"[wjhat is required in each case is an evaluation of the significance of each factor in relation to the enterprise as a whole.\\\" Id. at 5, 110 N.E.2d at 767.\\nProfessor Larson has observed in 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law \\u00a722-11 at 5-63 (1972) that placing the activity \\\"physically in contact with the employment environment\\\" and associating \\\"the time of the activity somehow with the employment\\\" go a long way towards establishing a link between the recreation and employment. He notes that, having done this, \\\"the exact nature and purpose of the activity itself does [sic] not have to bear the whole load of establishing work connection, and consequently the employment-connection \\\" does not have to be as conspicuous as it otherwise might.\\\" Id.\\nWe have said that an employee's injury is compensable if the peculiar facts and circumstances of a particular case establish a causal connection or nexus between the injury and the employment. We have also stressed that, the term \\\"causal connection\\\" when employed in workmen's compensation cases does not carry the same connotation as does the term \\\"proximate cause\\\" when it is used as a term of reference in negligence actions. A causal connection or nexus can be established for the purposes of workmen's compensation if the conditions and nature of the employment contribute to the injury. To find a nexus, we first attempt to determine if the injury occurred during the period of employment at a place where the employee might reasonably have been and while he was reasonably fulfilling the duties of his employment or doing something incidental thereto or to the conditions under which those duties were to be performed. Carvalho v. Decorative Fabrics Co., 117 R.I. 231, 366 A.2d 157 (1976); Montanaro v. Guild Metal Prods., Inc., 108 R.I. 362, 275 A.2d 634 (1971); Boullier v. Samsan Co., 100 R.I. 676, 219 A.2d 133 (1966). Compensation is not to be denied merely because the employee's injury occurred off the premises or at a time other than his regular working hours, but the facts and circumstances of each case will be examined with an eye to ascertaining if the record establishes a nexus or a link between the injury and the employment. Lima v. William H. Haskell Mfg. Co., 100 R.I. 312, 215 A.2d 229 (1965).\\nIt is obvious that when we take the criteria of the Moore case and apply them to the company's Christmas party, we find the necessary nexus between Beauchesne's injuries and his employment. The party was held in the plant during a period usually reserved for work and for which the employees were actually paid. While the party may not be classified as an expressed \\\"command performance\\\" for the employees, one can certainly conclude, as did the commission, that their attendance was expected. The testimony giving rise to that inference rests on the facts that the weekly paychecks and the bonus checks were given to all of the employees at the party by one of the London brothers. Additionally, all employees and the three brother-employers attended. As one court has noted, \\\"[l]iteral compulsory attendance at the company's affairs would not have produced the desired employee enthusiasm . It would not be realistic to find that respondent's complete control of the [party] and the inducement to the employees of wages without work while enjoying the affair did not constitute a far greater and more effectual compulsion upon the employees\\\" than mandatory attendance. Kelly v. Hackensack Water Co., 10 N.J. Super. 528, 536, 77 A.2d 467, 471 (1950).\\nWe come now to the question of what, if any, benefit the company might have expected to glean from the party. When the president of the company was asked if the goal of the Yuletide festivities was the promotion of good fellowship, he replied that such an event is a \\\"common thing\\\" and that \\\"[w]e have always had a Christmas party.\\\" These responses were a clear indication that management felt that a Christmastime get-together financed by the company did much to create good will between labor and management. Certainly, improved employee relationships, which can and frequently do result from such activities, create a more congenial working atmosphere. Kohlmayer v. Keller, 24 Ohio St. 2d 10, 12, 263 N.E.2d 231, 233 (1970). This in turn produces greater job interest and better service. Additionally, the expense of the party may constitute a 'business expense for income tax purposes and, as the Kohlmayer court observed, \\\"[tjangible business benefits are even more likely to be realized where, as here, a small business is involved.\\\" Id. Thus, we agree with the proposition that benefits may accrue to an employer from a purely social affair. Id. at 13, 263 N.E.2d at 233; Ricciardi v. Damar Prods. Co., 45 N.J. 54, 211 A.2d 347 (1965); Hill v. McFarland-Johnson, Eng., 269 N.Y.S.2d 217 (1966). We are sure that almost up until the time the president saw the open window, looked around, and observed Beauchesne lying on the first-floor platform everybody believed that the annual Christmas party was a great vehicle for promoting peace on earth and good will toward men.\\nThe full commission found a nexus, and there is certainly evidence in the record which affords the requisite basis for this finding. In taking this position, we are well-aware of our holding in Lawrence v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 92 R.I. 1, 165 A.2d 735 (1960), where this court upheld the commission's denial of benefits to an employee who was injured while returning home from what he said was an outing given by his employer. The record in Lawrence, however, paints an evidentiary picture which differs considerably from that presented by Beauchesne. The outing attended by Lawrence was not sponsored by his employer. It was a joint outing held by two associations of company employees. The employees were not compelled to join either association, and while the employer agreed to make up any deficit incurred by those in. charge of the outing, it did not sponsor the event. Indeed, its personnel director, when asked if he thought the outing contributed to the welfare of his company, replied that that event was \\\"a source of concern\\\" to him and many other officers of the company and had been for some time. Thus, the Lawrence case 'affords no support for the position now taken by the company.\\nThe second argument urged by the company is that even if Beauchesne was injured in the course of his employment, G.L. 1956 (1968 Reenactment) \\u00a728-33-2 precludes him from recovery. The statute provides that \\\"[n]o compensation shall be allowed for the injury of an employee where it is proved that his injury resulted from his intoxication while on duty.\\\" The question before us is whether this provision constitutes an absolute bar to recovery or is unavailable to an employer who has authorized or condoned the drinking. Needless to say, the company favors the former view, citing in support thereof Hopper v. F.W. Corridori Roofing Co., 305 A.2d 309 (Del. 1973), which ruled that the defense of intoxication is complete, leaving no room for estoppel.\\nThe contrary view is exemplified by McCarty v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 12 Cal. 3d 677, 527 P.2d 617, 117 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1974). California Labor Code \\u00a7 3600(d) contains a provision comparable to \\u00a728-33-2, and the McCarty court reasoned that an employer's approval of and consent to drinking amount to an \\\" 'implied representation that the employer will not hold it against the employee if he drinks, and will not deprive him of his job or his compensation benefits if he does so.' \\\" Id. at 685, 527 P.2d at 622, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 70.\\nIt seems to us that this latter rationale is more persuasive than that presented in Hopper, particularly in this case, which falls squarely within the \\\"course of employment\\\" analysis discussed above, with all the Moore cri \\u2022teria, as well as the Larson factors of time and place of the party, militating in favor of the employee. It is only fair to say that when a recreational activity is sufficiently employment-related to allow recovery and the employer permits the use of alcohol, he has elected to shoulder the risks occasioned by such \\\"spirited\\\" activity. We, therefore, conclude that \\u00a728-33-2 does not constitute an absolute bar to recovery and that in this case the company is estopped from raising it as a defense.\\nThe company's final contention deserves a high mark for its ingenuity, but the same cannot be said for its logic. Beauehesne filed his petition for compensation benefits in early February 1975. The hearing began before the trial commissioner in late April 1975. Thereafter, the commissioner heard evidence on three additional occasions. The presentation of testimony concluded on August 5, 1975. The trial commissioner's decision was issued approximately 10 months later, and the full commission's decision was another 9 months in coming.\\nThe company first points to the 19-month hiatus between the conclusion of the presentation of evidence and the filing of the full commission's decision and then claims that the actions taken by the trial commissioner and the full commission are directly contrary to the provisions of \\u00a7 \\u00a728-35-27 and 28-35-28. Section 28-35-27 specifies that the trial commissioner shall render his decision within 10 days after the hearing has concluded. Section 28-35-28 states that within the time fixed by the trial commissioner the appellant shall file reasons of appeal with the commission, together with so much of the transcript as he deems pertinent. Within 10 days after the filing of the reasons of appeal and the transcript, the parties may file such briefs \\u2022and memoranda as they desire with the commission. According to \\u00a728-35-28, the commission has 10 days following the expiration of the 10-day period for the filing of briefs in which to file a decision.\\nThe company complains that the failure of the commission to abide by the statutory timetable robs its finding as to Beauchesne's incapacity of any validity. It argues that what may have been true in the spring of 1975 may not necessarily be true 19 months later, when the full commission affirmed the trial justice's findings.\\nIn our opinion, the time lag does not void the award. Sections 28-35-27 and 28-35-28 are designed to expedite justice, not straight jacket commissioners. We addressed a similar question involving the predecessor to \\u00a728-35-27 in Morton C. Tuttle Co. v. Carbone, 84 R.I. 375, 125 A.2d 133 (1956), where we observed that although the statute places a duty on the commissioner to act within certain time constraints, no burden is placed on the parties whereby they would be bound to bear the expense and inconvenience of a hearing de novo because of the commissioner's failure to perform his duty.\\nThe question is somewhat analogous to that presented in Providence Teachers Union, Local 958 v. McGovern, 113 R.I. 169, 319 A.2d 358 (1974), where we construed a provision in a collective bargaining agreement which specified that the first meeting of the arbitrators should be held within 10 days after their appointment. There we observed that since the purpose of the proviso was \\\"to secure order, system, and dispatch,\\\" Id. at 177-78, 319 A.2d at 364, the proviso was directory rather than mandatory. Essentially, that is how we read \\u00a728-35-27's predecessor. Morton C. Tuttle Co. v. Carbone, supra at 384, 125 A.2d at 138. Although we noted in Tuttle that the statute in question was in a sense mandatory, in that a party could seek to compel a commissioner to comply with the time provisions, the statute is not mandatory in the sense that failure to comply entirely voids the action taken, as, for example, failure of a party to give requisite notice of intent to bargain. See Town of Tiverton v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge #23, 118 R.I. 160, 372 A.2d 1273 (1977).\\nAbedon & Visconti Ltd., Girard R. Visconti, for plaintiff.\\nKeenan, Rice, Dolan, Reardon & Kiernan, H. Eliot Rice, for defendant.\\nSince the company has apparently conceded that there is evidence to support the finding of total incapacity as of August 5, 1975, when testimony was concluded, and we have determined that the time lag does not void the award, our inquiry ends there.\\nWe wish to point out, however, that the company was not remediless during the 19-month period to which it has alluded. First, the company could have initiated proceedings to compel the trial commissioner's compliance with \\u00a728-35-27. Morton C. Tuttle Co. v. Carbone, supra at 384, 125 A.2d at 138. And, secondly, the company could have invoked the terms of \\u00a728-35-45 and filed a petition for review and modification of the award.\\nThe appeal is denied and dismissed, and the decree appealed from is affirmed.\\nThe Moore court- did not consider this to be an exhaustive list, nor do we.\\nThis was the second time that the president had gone to the window. Minutes before, he had left the executive suite and observed Beauchesne standing on the sill beside the open window. The president forcibly-removed Beauchesne from the area and brought him back into the office.\\nThe times for filing the reasons of appeal and the transcript were extended three times by the trial commissioner, and these extensions were apparently given -at the company's request.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/5503541.json b/ri/5503541.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c3d4784a365bc738c6f2cd05dcaf90c0f27e8ba1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/5503541.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5503541\", \"name\": \"Armand G. Ambeault vs. Burrillville Racing Association d.b.a. Lincoln Downs Racetrack\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Ambeault v. Burrillville Racing Ass'n\", \"decision_date\": \"1977-05-24\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"310\", \"last_page\": \"315\", \"citations\": \"118 R.I. 310\", \"volume\": \"118\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:14:28.628712+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Bevilacqua, C.J., Paolino, Joslin, Kelleher and Doris, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Armand G. Ambeault vs. Burrillville Racing Association d.b.a. Lincoln Downs Racetrack.\", \"head_matter\": \"373 A.2d 807.\\nArmand G. Ambeault vs. Burrillville Racing Association d.b.a. Lincoln Downs Racetrack.\\nMAY 24, 1977.\\nPresent: Bevilacqua, C.J., Paolino, Joslin, Kelleher and Doris, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"1377\", \"char_count\": \"8210\", \"text\": \"Kelleher, J.\\nOn January 29, 1973, Armand G. Ambeault went to the horseraces. What ensued thereafter may bring a tear to the eye or smile to the face of any given individual depending upon his particular proclivity for or against the world of the pari-mutuel bettor. Ambeault purchased tickets for the \\\"daily double\\\" at Lincoln Downs Racetrack. For the first race he chose a thoroughbred called Wawa Ducey. For the second race he chose every horse in the field, combining them with Wawa on his respective ticket purchases.\\nTo Ambeault's undoubted delight, Wawa Ducey crossed the finish line first. With victory apparently well within his grasp, Ambeault was awaiting only the finish of the second race and the tote board's flash of the payoff when all his expectations became just another one of a horse-player's shattered dreams. As noted earlier, the day's racing was taking place in late January 1973. Sometime after the completion of the first race, the public address system carried a message which told the patrons that the remaining races were being cancelled because the jockeys refused to imperil themselves and their steeds on the track's frozen surface.\\nIn light of the cancellation, the track offered to refund to all holders of \\\"daily double\\\" tickets a share of the pool, which amounted to $23,278. Each share was determined by the total cost of the tickets purchased by each bettor. Ambeault refused the offer and instituted the present suit.\\nAmbeault commenced this litigation as a class action in the Superior Court, suing as the defendant the owner and operator of Lincoln Downs, the Burrillville Racing Association. His claim is based upon the theory that the refund offer is a breach of a valid contract between himself and the track. An examination of his pleadings indicates that Ambeault contends that the distribution offer also violates the Rules of Horse Racing promulgated by the Rhode Island Commission on Horse Racing and Athletics. The Superior Court, on Burrillville's motion, dismissed Ambeault's complaint because he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. We affirm but for reasons somewhat different from those expressed by the trial justice.\\nInitially, we think the contractual status of the litigants should be clarified. In her decision the trial justice ruled that there was no contract between the racetrack and Ambeault. In taking this position, she relied on a line of New York cases, one of which notes that there is \\\"no wagering contract, agreement or bet between the Racing Association and the patron. The transaction is between \\u2022the .participants'in the pari-mutuel pools, the odds and terms thereof being determined by the participants according to the amount of their payments into the pool.\\\" Holberg v. Westchester Racing Ass'n, 184 Misc. 581, 583, 53 N.Y.S.2d 490, 493 (1945). That there is not a wagering contract directly between Ambeault and the track is true; the track has guaranteed no specific payout should Ambeault win \\u2014 \\u2022 that is entirely dependent upon the amount of the pool and the number of winners. .\\nHowever, there is a contractual relationship between the track and Ambeault. Wise v. Delaware Steeplechase & Race Ass'n, 28 Del. Ch. 532, 45 A.2d 547 (1945). The track is contractually bound to distribute to any winner the share of the pool to which he is statutorily entitled. Shapiro v. Queens County Jockey Club, 184 Misc. 295, 53 N.Y.S.2d 135 (1945). It is also clear that a winning ticket holder may institute an action at law against the \\\"stakeholder\\\" for its refusal to pay the winner the balance due to him. Ballin v. Los Angeles County Fair, 43 Cal. App.2d Supp. 884, 111 P.2d 753 (1941); Feeney v. Eastern Racing Ass'n, 303 Mass. 602, 22 N.E.2d 259 (1939); see Annot., 165 A.L.R. 838, 843 (1946).\\nWhen, however, the racing association has paid to the bettor what it is required to pay under the prevailing statutory rules and regulations, its liability is at an end. Shapiro v. Queens County Jockey Club, supra at 298, 53 N.Y.S.2d at 137. Such is the case before us. Rule 390(1) of the Rules of Horse Racing provided:\\n\\\"If, for any reason, the first race of a Daily Double, or if, for any reason, the second race of a Daily Double, is cancelled or declared 'no race,' full and complete refund shall be made of the Daily Double pool.\\\"\\nIn accordance with this rule, Lincoln Downs distributed the pool among all the \\\"daily double\\\" ticket holders, regardless of whether or not they had Wawa Ducey in the first race. Ambeault contends that only those ticket holders who had Wawa Ducey should be entitled to share in the \\\"daily double\\\" pool.\\nClearly, then, Ambeault's grief is not with the track but with the rule under which the refund payments were made. Lincoln Downs had no alternative other than to comply with the rule. Consequently, the track was entitled to a dismissal of Ambeault's complaint.\\nHowever, the trial justice rested the dismissal on Am beault's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies and, in doing so, referred to those portions of G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) ch. 2 of title 41 which provide for an appeal by any person aggrieved by any order or decision of the commission. Here we are dealing with a rule which has been promulgated by the commission pursuant to the rulemaking power conferred upon it by \\u00a741-3-9. The Legislature has provided a vehicle for administratice relief in such circumstances. It is to be found in the Administrative Procedures Act, specifically \\u00a742-35-8. The statute permits an individual to petition an agency and \\u2022ask for a declaratory ruling as to the applicability of the agency's rule to the petitioner's particular circumstances. We would point out, however, that if Ambeault took this route, it would have been a fruitless trip because the rule, rather than being ambiguous, is crystal clear and certainly encompassed within its terms all those, including Ambeault, who purchased \\\"daily double\\\" tickets on that cold, wintry day in January 1973. Thus it is that we affirm the dismissal not on Ambeault's failure to seek administrative assistance, but on the principle that because of the express language of the rule, Lincoln Downs had no choice but to obey its provisions.\\nArmand G. Ambeault, pro se, plaintiff.\\nHanson, Curran, Bowen & Parks, William A. Curran, Michael T.F. Wallor, for defendant.\\nThe plaintiff's appeal is denied and dismissed, and the judgment appealed from is affirmed.\\nAt oral argument Ambeault told us that this betting technique is known as \\\"wheeling.\\\" Ostensibly then Wawa was the hub and the other horses in the second race the spokes. Webster's Third International Dictionary (1971 ed.) tells us that \\\"daily double\\\" is \\\"a system of betting on horse or dog races in which the bettor must pick the winners of two stipulated races in order to win, such bets forming a pool separate from the ordinary bets.\\\"\\nIn support of its motion to dismiss, the track presented an affidavit of its auditor. The auditor reported that refunds were made on 770 $10 tickets and 7,449 $2 tickets, and that the track paid a total of $22,598 to satisfy these claims, leaving a balance in the pool of $680. The auditor also averred that in June, 1974 the track, while acting in accordance with the rules of the Commission on Horse Racing and Athletics and G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) \\u00a741-4-10, paid the balance of the pool to Rhode Island's General Treasurer.\\nInterestingly, the commission later amended Rule 390(1) to conform with Ambeault's contention. The rule now reads:\\n\\\"If for any reason the first race of a Daily Double is cancelled and declared off, full and complete refund will be made of the Daily Double Pool.\\n\\\"If the second race of the Daily Double is cancelled or declared off, the entire Daily Double pool shall be distributed as a win pool to the holders of winning tickets on the first half of the Daily Double. If there are no such holders, the pool shall be distributed as a win pool to the holders of second place horses in the first half of the Daily Double.\\\"\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/5543167.json b/ri/5543167.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a98989c6914802da169be609be91f50e28514292
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/5543167.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5543167\", \"name\": \"Agnes Scott MacGlaflin v. Department of Employment Security Board of Review\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"MacGlaflin v. Department of Employment Security Board of Review\", \"decision_date\": \"1980-02-28\", \"docket_number\": \"M. P. No. 80-25\", \"first_page\": \"917\", \"last_page\": \"917\", \"citations\": \"122 R.I. 917\", \"volume\": \"122\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:14:29.406911+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Agnes Scott MacGlaflin v. Department of Employment Security Board of Review.\", \"head_matter\": \"M. P. No. 80-25.\\nAgnes Scott MacGlaflin v. Department of Employment Security Board of Review.\\nNatale L. Urso, Thomas J. Liguori, Jr., for petitioner, Gary R. Pannone, Special Legal Counsel, Board of Review, for respondent.\", \"word_count\": \"43\", \"char_count\": \"270\", \"text\": \"The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/5780490.json b/ri/5780490.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b97e23fd023d9a92be90be43018325c6a9078164
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/5780490.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5780490\", \"name\": \"Richard Thomas Tilley, p.a. vs. William A. Mather; Harold L. Tilley vs. William A. Mather; Harold L. Tilley vs. Newport Taxi Service, Inc.; Richard Thomas Tilley, p.a. vs. Newport Taxi Service, Inc.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Tilley v. Mather\", \"decision_date\": \"1956-08-23\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"499\", \"last_page\": \"503\", \"citations\": \"84 R.I. 499\", \"volume\": \"84\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:19:54.193781+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Flynn, C.J., Condon, Roberts, Andrews and Paolino, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Richard Thomas Tilley, p.a. vs. William A. Mather. Harold L. Tilley vs. William A. Mather. Harold L. Tilley vs. Newport Taxi Service, Inc. Richard Thomas Tilley, p.a. vs. Newport Taxi Service, Inc.\", \"head_matter\": \"Richard Thomas Tilley, p.a. vs. William A. Mather. Harold L. Tilley vs. William A. Mather. Harold L. Tilley vs. Newport Taxi Service, Inc. Richard Thomas Tilley, p.a. vs. Newport Taxi Service, Inc.\\nAUGUST 23, 1956.\\nPresent: Flynn, C.J., Condon, Roberts, Andrews and Paolino, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"1065\", \"char_count\": \"6048\", \"text\": \"Roberts, J.\\nThese are four cases of trespass on the case for negligence arising out of an accident which occurred in the city of Newport wherein a minor child was struck by a taxicab owned by the corporate defendant and operated by the individual defendant. Two of these actions were brought by the minor child by his next friend against each defendant and the other two by the father of the minor child against each defendant. The cases were tried together in the superior court to a jury which returned verdicts for the plaintiff child in each case in the amount of $10,000 and for the plaintiff father in each case in the amount of $2,500. On a motion of the defendant for a new trial in each case the trial justice ordered a new trial unless the plaintiff father would remit all of the verdict in excess of $1,300 in his case and unless the plaintiff child would remit all of the verdict awarded him in excess of $3,750. The cases are here solely on the exception of each plaintiff to the ruling of the trial justice granting a new trial unless such remittitur was filed within the time prescribed.\\nThe trial justice in his charge to the jury stated that if the plaintiff father was entitled to recover at all, he was entitled to recover in the amount of $1,200. No exception was taken to this charge and it therefore became the law of the case. Narell v. Sasso, 76 R. I. 483. The jury in returning a verdict in the amount of $2,500 for the plaintiff father disregarded this instruction. It is clear that they failed to follow the law as given to them by the trial justice and therefore the motion for a new trial was properly granted unless a remittitur was filed. Barry v. Kettelle, 49 R. I. 50, 53. The exception of the plaintiff father is therefore overruled.\\nThere remains for consideration the question of the exception of the plaintiff child. The defendants contend that the verdicts in these cases are grossly excessive and it is apparent that the trial justice agreed with them. Both plaintiff and defendants have urged that an examination of prior decisions reveals that the court has followed some general formula in deciding what is grossly excessive. This court has1 not adopted a formula, nor has it ever recognized any so-called \\\"rule of thumb\\\" for the computation of the damages to be awarded for pain and suffering. The establishment of the amount to be awarded for such damages has always been left, under proper instructions, to the discretion of the jury. Its findings have been subject to review by the trial justice on a motion for a new trial and by this court on a bill of exceptions. It has been our policy to allow the jury substantial latitude in computing the amount to be awarded as damages for pain and suffering and to reduce the jury's verdicts in this respect only when it appears that they are grossly excessive. The phrase \\\"grossly excessive\\\" is not an empty one. To be grossly excessive, there must be a demonstrable disparity between the amount awarded and the pain and suffering shown to have been endured as a consequence of the injury sustained.\\nIt is the duty of a trial justice when he reduces the amount of a verdict on the grounds that it is grossly excessive to indicate reasonably in what particular he holds the award to be grossly excessive. In the instant case the trial justice has discharged that duty. He has pointed out that there is no evidence as to any permanent injury or future consequences within the meaning of such evidence as is stated in MacGregor v. Rhode Island Co., 27 R. I. 85. The MacGregor case states that for a plaintiff to recover present damages for apprehended consequences from the accident there must be such a degree of probability of their occurring as amounts to a reasonable certainty that they will result from the original injury. We have examined the transcript carefully and agree with the trial justice that it contains no evidence as to future damages which would be admissible under the rule laid down in the MacGregor case, supra. The trial justice has also pointed out that despite the serious nature of the plaintiff child's injuries, fracturewise he made a very good recovery.\\nIn certain respects the trial justice was in a more advantageous position than this court to perform this duty. He presided at the trial and saw the plaintiff and witnesses in the courtroom and on the witness stand. From these vantage points his evaluation of the testimony is of strong and persuasive force if he has applied to the evidence his careful and independent judgment. We think the trial justice has done that. His decision therefore should not be set aside unless it is clearly wrong or unless we find that he has overlooked or misconceived some vital evidence or has applied a wrong rule of law thereto. It is our opinion that he did not err in any of these respects and therefore we cannot say that he was clearly wrong. The exception of the plaintiff child in each case is therefore overruled.\\nCornelius C. Moore, Salvatore L. Virgadamo, for plaintiffs.\\nJames E. Flannery, Corcoran, Peckham & Hayes, Patrick O'N. Hayes, for defendants.\\nThe plaintiff's exception in each case is overruled, and each case is remitted to the superior court for a new trial unless the plaintiff father shall, on or before September 5, 1956, file in the office of the clerk of that court a remittitur of all of the verdict in his case in excess of $1,300, and unless the plaintiff child shall, on or before September 5, 1956, file in the office of the clerk of the superior court a remittitur of all of the verdict in his case in excess of $3,750. If such remittiturs are filed, the superior court is directed to enter in each case judgment for the plaintiff on the verdict as reduced by the remittitur.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/6761103.json b/ri/6761103.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2331ee0e9aef5313d8ee76b487538d9443af7e1d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/6761103.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"6761103\", \"name\": \"Catherine F. Sutcliffe, et al. vs. Pawtucket Amusement Company\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Sutcliffe v. Pawtucket Amusement Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1933-08-01\", \"docket_number\": \"Eq. No. 10242\", \"first_page\": \"68\", \"last_page\": \"74\", \"citations\": \"10 R.I. Dec. 68\", \"volume\": \"10\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Decisions\", \"court\": \"Rhode Island Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:35:58.571690+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Catherine F. Sutcliffe, et al. vs. Pawtucket Amusement Company\", \"head_matter\": \"Catherine F. Sutcliffe, et al. vs. Pawtucket Amusement Company\\nEq. No. 10242.\\nAugust 1, 1933.\", \"word_count\": \"3851\", \"char_count\": \"22174\", \"text\": \"BAKER, P. J.\\nHeard on bill, answer, replication and proof.\\nThis is a proceeding -to fix rent, brought by the lessors against the lessee, of certain property known as the Strand Theatre and located on the westerly side of East Avenue about 150 feet south from Main Street in the-City of Pawtucket.\\nThe Court has taken a view of the property involved and also of other theatre properties in said city. The premises in question consist of two buildings. The first is probably at least fifty years old and is about three and one-half stories high. It has a frontage of 40 feet on East Avenue and extends back about 100 feet. Here' the lot widens out and extends back another 100 feet. The lot is somewhat irregular in shape and has a gang-way on the northerly side and on most of the southerly side. On the rear portion of the lot is a large building about four stories in height, built in 1907, which comprises the theatre proper. The other building contains an entrance and lobby to the theatre, a small store on East Avenue which is-rented for $2,500 a year by the thea-tre company, and the second and third floors of said older building are used as a rooming house for which the the-atre company receives a rent of $1,200--a year.\\nThe respondent corporation was organized November 15, 1919, and later on changed its name. The rear portion of the property involved herein formerly 'belonged to a Mr. Adam Sut-cliffe. The large building thereon was used partly as a garage, partly for mill purposes, and it also contained a hall in which games and entertain ments were held. Later on the whole building was used for warehouse purposes. Mr. Sutcliffe held an option to purchase the front portion on East Avenue, which is now part of the thea-tre property and contains the entrance. This option was to expire in December, 1919. Mr. Sutcliffe entered into an arrangement to lease to the respondent both the front and the rear property for theatr\\u00e9 purposes. He died, however, in November, 1919, but the trustees named in his will exercised the option to purchase the other property and thereafter, under date of December 31, 1919, exercised with the respondent the lease which is in dispute herein.\\nThis lease is to continue for 30 years from January 1, 1920. This time is divided into three ten-year periods. The annual rent for the first ten-year period is fixed at $9,000 per year. Provision is made in the lease for fixing, by arbitration in case the parties cannot agree, the annual rent for the other two ten-year periods, at an amount to be in no event less than $9,000 per year. The lease contains the usual covenants in connection with paying the rent, surrendering possession, agreeing not to commit or permit waste, and the like. It also contains the further terms, which are of importance, namely, that the lessee agrees to make both exterior and interior repairs, to furnish and equip the building with fire escapes and all sanitary and health equipment, to pay all taxes and assessments of every kind against the property, and to maintain fire insurance and to carry liability insurance for the benefit of both parties to the lease.\\nThe lessee further undertook to remodel the buildings on the premises in accordance with certain plans and specifications already prepared and to expend therefor not less than $88,459. As a matter of fact, it appears in evidence that it actually spent in the neighborhood of $160,000. Finally, the lease contained the option agreement that the lessee might purchase the premises for various sums between certain fixed dates, the final understanding being that it might buy the property between January 1, 1925, and January 1, 1930, for the sum of $150,-000. This option was never exercised by the lessee.\\nAt the end of the first ten-year period of the lease, the parties were unable to agree as to what the rental for the ten years from January 1, 1930, to December 31, 1939, should be, and three arbitrators were appointed to fix the rent. Two of them agreed that the figure of $10,500 would be the proper rent for the second ten-year period. A question had also arisen as to the consideration to be given the buildings as improved. These issues were presented to the Supreme Court. (See Sutcliffe vs. Pawtucket Amusement Company, 51 R. I. 493.) In this opinion it was determined that the award, not being unanimous, was void and that the arbitrators must consider the value of the improvements as affecting the value of the property under the lease. Following this decision the present proceeding was brought.\\nThe first question which has presented itself relates to the proper construction to be applied to the lease now before the Court. The complainants urge very strenuously that by the lease the respondent is required to pay the full annual market value for the right to use and occupy the property and, in addition thereto, carry the other burdens which are placed upon it by the other covenants of the lease.\\nThe complainants contend that the lease naturally falls into two parts and that there are two groupings of the burdens involved. They argue that all through the lease the rent, which is the money payment to them, is clearly and distinctly separated from all the other covenants. They refer to the language of the habendum clause in this connection.\\nThe respondent, on the other hand, contends that the complainants herein under the provisions of this lease are entitled only to what might be termed net rent as contrasted with a gross rent. It claims that all the provisions of the lease must be taken into consideration and that the covenants do not fall into two groupings. It calls to the Court's attention the fact that the term \\\"rents\\\" is used in the lease and argues that this language is broad enough to cover all the money payments, such as the taxes, insurance, and repairs, which under the lease the respondent is compelled to make.\\nIn passing upon this question undoubtedly it is of primary importance, if possible, to ascertain the intention of the parties who entered into the lease. Fundamentally this would appear to be a ground lease. It seems to the Court that the rental fixed for the first ten years cannot be considered as merely more or less nominal. It may be noted that this rent yields six per cent on the value of $150,000 as fixed in the option of purchase agreement in the lease. The language of the lease in relation to the duties of the arbitrators and in relation to the basic question now before the Court is that it is now attempting to fix \\\"a fair and just sum for the annual rental of said demised land and the buildings thereon\\\". In this connection it should be noted that the lease does not call upon the Court in so many words to fix the annual market value of the property or the total annual market value for use and occupation of the premises, but does call for the fixing of a fair and just sum for the annual rental. In order to arrive at this fair and just sum, the Court is of the opinion that all of the provisions of the lease in question must be taken into consideration. The provisions of the lease may naturally fall into certain divisions or groupings but it would seem that it should be considered as a whole and not in sections. The Court must. bear in mind the burdens and the benefits to both parties arising from all the covenants of the lease. After giving the matter careful consideration, the Court has come to the conclusion that this is the construction which should be given the lease. It would not seem that a fair and just sum for the annual rental could be arrived at without considering the remaining burdens and obligations which the respondent is called upon to assume.\\nIn this connection it may be well to refer to the matter of the cost of the improvements made by the respondent. The complainants contend that as the lease called for the expenditure of nearly $90,000 and that, as a matter of fact, about $160,000 was spent in improving the property, these amounts should be apportioned over the first ten years of the lease and properly be considered as part of the rent for that period. The Court finds itself unable to agree with the complainants on this point. When the property was rented, it was entirely unsuited for theatre purposes and had to be improved. It is very probable that the lessee was willing to expend this money in return for the long lease and the opportunity to recover it over the period of years. It was held, of course, that in fixing the fair and just sum for the annual rental for the second ten-year period the value of the property as improved should be taken into consideration. In the opinion of the Court, however, this does not bring the matter down to a mere mathematical computation by spreading the expenditures over the first ten-year period. The amount of money to be expended in improvements was almost entirely within the discretion of the lessee, provided the sum of '$88,459 was spent. In order to place the property in the condition in which it desired it, the respondent spent much more than this. The money paid may have added to the fair market value of the property as a whole or it may not have. Money may have been spent to satisfy the lessee's own desire without adding anything to the value of the property. In any event, under the lease the respondent had a right to rely on the provision that a fair and just sum for the annual rental would be fixed, taking into consideration, of course, the then value of the land and buildings as improved.\\nIn order to assist the Court in making its finding, a great mass of evidence relating to the geographical location of the theatre in Pawtucket, rentals and sales of property in the vicinity of East Avenue, rentals of other theatres in Pawtucket and Providence, and general economic trends, was introduced. It is impossible, and probably not necessary, for the Court to refer in detail to this testimony but some reference thereto is advisable.\\nIt appears that the theatre is located on the west side of East Avenue, a short distance from Main Street. It is not greatly disputed that from a business point of view the west side of East Avenue is less desirable than the east side. The testimony further discloses that the chief business district of Pawtucket is Main Street between Main Street Square and Trinity Square. The theatre involved herein is just outside of this district but very close to it. A witness for the complainants who has had considerable theatre experience testified that the majority of theatre goers in the daytime were people shopping. Unquestionably, this theatre can easily be reached from the shopping district. The evidence also reveals that Paw-tucket is the business center for most of the Blackstone Valley and possibly part of Attleboro. It caters to a population in the neighborhood of perhaps .125,000. It cannot be disputed that the recent growth of the city has been toward the west and northwest from Main Street, namely, toward what is known as Times Square and Broad Street. The doing away with the grade crossing and the old rialroad station, the widening of streets, the building of the new Exchange Street bridge, have been indications of this general trend. There has also been a re-routing of street car and automobile traffic in the city in recent years. The testimony is perhaps not entirely clear as to how this affects the district in the neighborhood of Main Street Square where the theatre in question is located, but on the whole the evidence would seem to show that persons coming into Pawtucket from the north and west are in the main directed into the Times Square area. It is, on the other hand, quite clear that there has been, during the decade of the twenties, a very considerable development of the end of East Avenue near Main Street and in the immediate vicinity of this theatre. Several new buildings have been built, nearly all the buildings have been renovated or reconstructed in some way, the street itself has been repaved, and unquestionably very large sums of money have been expended upon developing property .in this general neighborhood. The net result of the examination of all the testimony on these issues would seem to show that while on the whole the general trend of new development in Pawtucket has 'been toward the west and the northwest and toward the Times Square area, nevertheless the portion of the city around Main Street Square has seen a considerable development in the past ten years and has at least held its own.\\nTestimony relating to rentals and sales of property in the immediate vicinity of the theatre, while of course helpful, is not in any way conclusive. There have not been many sales which could be of great assistance in guiding the Court. Most of the property in this neighborhood is store property and some of it small stores. Obviously a comparison of rentals of property of this type with the theatre property now before the Court does not furnish a very great degree of similarity, particularly when it is attempted to place a rental on a square foot basis. Further, in this connection it should be noted that since the year 1929 there have been some reductions in rent in this neighborhood, either voluntarily by the parties or when it became necessary to make new leases.\\nThe . theatre property under discussion has an area of about 16,517 square feet, the larger part of which is back from East Avenue and about 14,642 square feet of which are covered by the buildings. Similarly, the rentals of other theatres in Pawtucket and Providence, while material and helpful, are in no way conclusive. The Court believes that the rents of moving picture theatres in the downtown district of Providence cannot be very closely compared to the rent of the theatre involved herein. There is a considerable difference, of course, in the land value in the two places. In Providence there is a larger population to draw from, and in many cases it is difficult to tell whether the rent to the lessor is gross or net, and just what burdens the lessee has to carry. Further, in the Providence theatres considerable rent is derived by the lessee from stores and the like. The thea-tres in Pawtucket, of course, are undoubtedly more of a guide, although no two theatres are similarly situated or otherwise alike. Here, again, the question of gross and net rents comes into the situation. It is undisputed that for the particular property before the Court, the theatre use is the best use. In Pawtucket undoubtedly the best theatre is- the LeRoy Theatre in Times Square, which is owner operated. The Strand Theatre is the second theatre of importance. It is well arranged, contains about 1,907 seats, is a first run house, and on the whole is reasonably well situated in the city. It is undoubtedly a much better theatre property than the other small theatres there. It would appear that the rent of the Imperial Theatre, which is in Times Square, but which is not as large nor as well arranged as the Strand Theatre, was formerly $10,000 per year and was later reduced to $9,000. Also, it is not entirely clear just what additional burdens beside paying the rent the lessee in this case has to assume. Undoubtedly during the decade of the twenties, there was considerable activity and development in real estate in Pawtucket, particularly during the middle of that period. After 1929, and possibly a little before that date, interest in real estate fell off to some extent and rents and values declined somewhat. The complainants argue that, drawing upon previous experience, it is reasonable to expect that during the decade of the thirties there will be a continued growth and expansion in Pawtucket and that values and rents will tend to increase. Of course, since 1929 and particularly at the present time, the real estate market has been and is more or less inactive. Undoubtedly, history and experience tend to show that following a period of depression there is likely to be a period of prosperity. As to the limit and extent of any such movement, this, of course, must be a matter of personal judgment and such judgment is always fallible. Looking at the entire situation, however, the Court is inclined to feel th\\u00e1t during the decade of the thirties, taken as a whole, there will be somewhat less growth and somewhat less new activity in real estate in the general neighborhood of the theatre in question than there was during the decade of the twenties. The Court is inclined to believe that the character of this locality is more or less fixed at least for some years. Obviously, the great difficulty in attempting to place a fair and just sum for rental under such a lease as this is the length of the period. During ten years it is possible to have great periods of prosperity and great periods of depression. However, the parties entered into a lease of this type and both ran the risk of having a situation develop which in any one or two years might seem inequitable. For the sake of a continuous fixed sum over a period of years, they very possibly took the chance, the lessor of being compelled to receive a lower rent in times of good business and high values, and the lessee of having to pay, perhaps, an increased rent in a time of poor business and depression. The question seems to be one of attempting to strike a fair average over the ten-year period, taking into consideration all the circumstances of the property, the location and the economic development.\\nIn order to bring definite figures to the Court's attention, both parties placed on the stand several expert witnesses. Some of these witnesses were real estate operators in the city of Pawtucket and others were from outside of the city. Many of them testify frequently in cases involving real estate and all are men of standing and responsibility. These witnesses took into consideration the lease, the property in question, the general economic situation, the business development in Pawtucket, and rentals and sales of property, in order to assist them in arriving at definite figures. It is quite clear, however, from an examination of their testimony that they approached the subject from an entirely different viewpoint. The result is that the figures presented are so very divergent and so radically different that it is extremely difficult for the Court to know just what consideration and weight to give their testimony. The experts procured by the complainants quite clearly presented figures which were based on what might be termed the gross rental value of the property involved,- or what they believed it should 'be figured on .the total annual market value for use and occupation. There is some indication that they were giving effect to replacement value or sound value. Under our decisions, this clearly would not seem to be the proper test to apply. As a result of this they presented figures which ran from -approximately $40,000 a year gross rent to about $20,000 a year gross rent. They applied different tests to check their figures, such as attendance or gross receipts of the theatre, rent per seat, cubical contents of the building, and value per square foot. In passing the Court may say that it was not particularly impressed with the testimony of Mr. Henderson, who gave the highest gross estimate.\\nAfter careful consideration of all the evidence, the Court finds itself unable to accept without reservation the estimates presented by these witnesses. On the other hand, the experts presented by the respondent approached'the problem obviously from the point of view of a fair return on the investment. Their figures rhnged from $9,900 .to $10,800. The Court, after consideration, is inclined to think that possibly neither one of these methods in and of itself is entirely correct or sufficient. The problem faced is the fixing of a fair and just sum for the annual rental, taking into consideration all the terms of the lease in question. Undoubtedly, the fair return on the investment is an element to be considered, as is also the fair rental value of this property at this time, in the open market, keeping in mind the provisions of the lease involved herein.\\nIn this connection a consideration of the option to purchase in the lease is of interest. The parties to the lease of their own volition placed the figure of $150,000 as the sale price of the property up to the first day of January, 1930. Clearly, this must have some relation and bearing on the reasonable value of the property at that time. There is evidence in the ease that the economic life of a theatre of this type is approximately 25' years.Giving these facts recognition, nowever, it would seem to the Court that probably some figure in the neighborhood of $175,000 might be a reasonable average value of this property extended over the present decade. This, perhaps, may not apply to any one particular time during the ten years, as, for example, at present it is common knowledge that the market for real estate is very low, but the above figure may perhaps be taken as representing a fair average over the whole period. If this be so, and taking into consideration the provisions of the lease before the Court and that any rental now fixed is, in effect, a net rental, practically clear to the lessor, and taking into consideration the property, its location, and general conditions in Pawtucket, as disclosed by the evidence. The Court believes that a fair and just sum for the annual rental of the land and the buildings thereon for the ten-year period from January 1,.1930, to December 31, 1939, would be $12,500. This figure may, of course, be checked on the basis of a return on the investment, on the 'basis of value per square foot, and on the return per seat, keeping in mind, however, the added burdens which the lease requires the lessee to assume and the fact that the rental fixed is in effect net to the lessor.\\nFor complainants: Messrs. Curran, Hart, Gainer & Carr.\\nFor respondents: Messrs. Edwards & Angel\\u00ed.\\nA*5 decree may be entered in accordance herewith.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/6762343.json b/ri/6762343.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a5c7f2323e3779f7b577d077bd30bc0e521b8859
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/6762343.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"6762343\", \"name\": \"L. F. Pease Company Inc. vs. The Di-Hard Golf Course; Felix Sylvestre et al. vs. L. F. Pease Company, Inc.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"L. F. Pease Co. v. Di-Hard Golf Course\", \"decision_date\": \"1933-02-11\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 85529; No. 85445\", \"first_page\": \"134\", \"last_page\": \"137\", \"citations\": \"9 R.I. Dec. 134\", \"volume\": \"9\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Decisions\", \"court\": \"Rhode Island Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:25:18.142683+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"L. F. Pease Company Inc. vs. The Di-Hard Golf Course Felix Sylvestre et al. vs. L. F. Pease Company, Inc.\", \"head_matter\": \"L. F. Pease Company Inc. vs. The Di-Hard Golf Course Felix Sylvestre et al. vs. L. F. Pease Company, Inc.\\nNo. 85529\\nNo. 85445\\nFebruary 11, 1933.\", \"word_count\": \"2193\", \"char_count\": \"12885\", \"text\": \"DECISION.\\nJOSLIN, J.\\nDuring the year 1930, the game of outdoor miniature golf rose to considerable popularity in southern New England. Messrs. 'Syl-vestre and Pomfret constructed a course for this game on a lot of land just beyond the Louisquisset Pike in Woonsocket. It was completed late in September, 1930, and the venture was an immediate success. The cold weather was approaching and they were considering the matter of enclosing the course when the sales representative of Pease Company called upon them. There was some conversation at this meeting and several days thereafter (October 13, 1930), said representative, together with the construction superintendent of Pease Company, called upon Sylvestre and Pomfret and submitted the following agreement, which was signed by both parties.\\n\\\"Furnish canvas roof, side walls and wooden construction to enclose golf course. Price 'erected complete $3,000. Delivery three to four weeks.\\n\\\"25% payment when job is completed, balance net 30 days from date of completion, account not to run over 90 days.\\\"\\nIt is not disputed that said agreement required the erection of a canvas enclosed structure supported by center and side poles. By means of guy cables these poles were to be attached or fastened to anchors cemented in the ground. The structure was to be 30 feet high at its highest point. It was to be triangular in form, measuring 191 feet on the north, 220 feet on the east and 212 feet on the Park Avenue side. Work was immediately commenced and continued until December 6, 1930. On December 23rd, there was a heavy fall of snow accompanied by a gale. Due to the weight of the snow, there was a serious collapse of parts of the structure which ultimately resulted in serious damage. The structure remained without reconstruction or repair for several months, when it was entirely removed by Sylvestre and Pomfret.\\nEach of the parties has brought an action against the other. Both actions were tried together by the Court without 'a jury.\\nThe declaration of L. F. Pease Company is in one count. It alleges that the defendants in that case, by written agreement, ordered the plaintiff to furnish a canvas roof, side walls and wooden construction to enclose the golf course, for the sum of $3,000; that it did furnish the same to the defendants and that the defendants have refused to pay the amount agreed upon.\\nThe declaration of Sylvestre and Pomfret makes no mention of a written agreement. It alleges that the Pease Company, the defendant in that case, agreed to erect a certain building which would be adequate and sufficient to enclose the golf course and keep the interior reasonably and adequately protected from bad weather, and be sufficient in construction so that it could be heated with reasonable assurance that when so heated it would be comfortable for patrons; that the canvas would be strong with sufficient and proper interior wooden construction so as to properly support the roof and walls; and that the building would be of sufficient strength so as to withstand destruction by the elements; that the defendant breached the agreement in that the building was improperly and inadequately erected; that the building was demolished by storms; that it was not completed; and that they were damaged thereby.\\nThe agreement being ambiguous upon its face and the meaning of the language -therein being in doubt and susceptible of more than one construction, the Court admitted evidence of the surrounding facts and circumstances as they existed when the agreement was made, as well as evidence of the conduct of the parties during -construction, to aid in the determination of the meaning of the words as used and the intention .of the parties. This opened up the negotiations leading to the signing of the agreement. No fraud was claimed.\\nIf the agreement was substantially performed by Pease Company, it follows -that it is entitled to a verdict in its favor in both cases. Sylvestre and Pomfret maintain that there was not such a performance in the following respects:\\nFirst: They contend that the agreement virtually gave them a guaranty of certain results, all of which are detailed in their declaration. It will serve no useful purpose to discuss these, as there is no credible testimony to predicate a finding in favor of the agreement containing any guaranty of results.\\nSecondly: They maintain -that it was definitely understood before and at the time the agreement was signed that -the Pease Company would so pitch the roof and so paraffin the canvas that snow would not stick -to it but would slide off before accumulating. This, phase of the case is most important as it apparently is agreed by both parties that one, if not the sole, cause of the collapse of the structure on December 24th, was the accumulation of snow during the storm of that date. At any rate, we find from the evidence that said accumulation of snow, and no other agency, was the cause of the said collapse.\\nSylvestre and Pomfret had a talk with Hr. Dunton, the former sales representative of Pease Company, several days prior to October 13th, the date of signing the agreement. They testified -that they agreed in detail as to the character of the structure they desired and the purposes for which it was to be used. Among other things, they say they obtained the promise that the canvas roof would be so erected and treated that snow would in and of itself and of its own motion slide off. They further testified that on October 13th, Guy R. Huntley, construction superintendent of Pease Company, came to them, presented the contract in question and asked for their signatures \\\"to show good faith.\\\" On this -occasion they say that they were told by Huntley that the roof would be built in such a way that \\\"snow will not stay.\\\"\\nSylvestre has been in business for 13 years as the owner of a diner. Pom-fret is general manager of several branches of a loan company and is a man of more than ordinary intelligence and ability. They were corroborated generally in their statement by their employee O'Keefe and also by Dunton, the discharged sales representative of Pease Company, who had signed as a witness to the contract. Dunton was brought here for the trial by Sylves-tre and Pomfret from Camden, New Jersey. He testified that Huntley said: \\\"Due to the pitch of the roof and the treatment of the canvas with paraffin, that snow would slide off it.\\\" This was denied by Pease Company witnesses. Counsel for Sylvestre and Pomfret argue that on this point all the witnesses except Dunton were interested. To the Court, Dunton did not appear to be disinterested.\\nSylvestre and Pomfret call this a building; Pease Company insist it is a tent, claiming it has all -the essential elements of a tent; namely, canvas, poles, cordage \\u2014 and no more. For the purposes of this case the Court is treating it as a structure.\\nIt is inconceivable that either Dun-ton or Huntley would have made the claim in respect to snow that is contended for by Sylvestre and Pomfret. It is likewise highly improbable that Sylvestre and Pomfret, particularly the latter, would! have believed that a canvas roof could be so erected that snow would fall off or slide off of its own motion. Paraffining the canvas is a process to make it waterproof. The structure was erected to and did withstand rain and wind, but it was not designed nor intended to withstand snow upon its roof. There was evidence, which we believe to be true, that Sylvestre and Pomfret were told during the erection -that they would have to take care of snow when it came. Had 'Sylvestre and Pomfret given the roof proper care and maintenance, the structure would not have collapsed. Such care and maintenance would include heating the interior with the contemplated elaborate heating equipment and removing the snow from the roof before it accumulated in any considerable quantity. Practical methods of doing this were testified to.\\nThere is nothing in the written agreement and the Court finds from the evidence that the parties did not intend that Pease Company should be re-required to construct the canvas roof so that the snow would not adhere to it and would slide off before accumulating.\\nFinally, Sylvestre and Pomfret argue that the structure was not completed and, in any event, was not built substantially as agreed upon.\\nThere was a storm on November 30th. The structure was not then completed and had not yet been delivered to Sylvestre and Pomfret. Some damage was done but it was speedily repaired. The building inspector of the City of Woonspcket came to the premises. Among other things, the building inspector testified that he made certain recommendations, principally that Huntley reinforce the poles and extend the guy cables from the eaves to the anchors at a different angle. The Court is satisfied that all the recommendations made by the building inspector, which were reasonably necessary, were complied with. In fact, the building inspector admitted that at his suggestion \\\"Nick\\\" was engaged by Pease Company to do the work. To change the angle of the guy cables would have been improper. The building inspector admitted his inexperience with tent construction.\\nThe building inspector states that he condemned the building. The Pease Company did not admit that they were subject to the order of the building inspector or that they were required to obtain a permit for their work, claiming that the structure was a tent for which a permit was not required. In view of the conclusion to which the Court has come, it is unnecessary to decide this point, but the Court is of the opinion that the building inspector had the right to enter this structure, examine it, and if he considered it unsafe to cause it to be made safe, or take any other action deemed necessary for the public safety.\\nSections 11 and 211 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Woonsocket provide for the appointment of a building inspector and define his duties and powers. Among these are that he shall make an examination of all buildings reported dangerous from any cause and \\\"shall make a record of such examination and shall make a record of the condition of the same.\\\"\\nThe building inspector admitted that his office makes records of all condemnations. It is significant that he made no record of this one. He sent no notice thereof either to the owners or to Pease Company. He admitted that he made no mention of condemnation to the foreman on the premises. At times, lie seemed hazy about the whole matter in respect to which he was testifying and it appeared to the Court that he was laboring in an effort to aid his fellow townsmen. The Court is of the opinion, and so finds from the evidence, that the building inspector did not condemn this structure prior to December 6th. He did go there, probably on two occasions, and advised as to several matters, but that was the extent of his interest.\\nAttorney for L. F. Pease Company: Fergus J. McOsker, Esq.\\nAttorney for The Di-Hard Golf Course & Felix Sylvestre et al: John R. Higgins, Esq.\\nSylvestre and Pomfret complain vaguely, and more or less generally, that the canvas, poles, guy cables, anchors, and perhaps other of the materials, were inadequate and improper. There is also a suggestion attacking the quality of the workmanship. The evidence does not substantiate these charges. In addition to the testimony of Pease Company employees, the testimony of the expert witnesses, 'Milo Young and George W. Huntley, leaves no room for doubt that the proper materials and workmanship were employed.\\nThe Court finds from the evidence that the requirements of the agreement as to materials and workmanship have been substantially complied with by Pease Company, that it performed its part of the agreement in proper and workmanlike manner, and \\u00a1that the structure was delivered to and' accepted by Sylvestre and Pomfret on or about December 6th. On that date Lacey and Armour of the Pease Company went over the job with O'Keefe and Pomfret and thereafter both O'Keefe and Pomfret made the statement that everything was all right so far as they could see. Pease Company withdrew from the structure and never returned. The collapse of the structure occurred on December 23rd or 24th. This was due to the failure of Sylves-tre and Pomfret to give it reasonably proper care and maintenance during and following the snow storm. For this, Pease Company cannot be held\\nat fault.\\nFor the foregoing reasons, in the case of L. F. Pease Company, Inc. vs. The Di-Hard Golf Course, the Court gives decision for the plaintiff in the sum of $3,360, the full amount claimed plus interest. In the case of Felix Sylvestre et al. vs. L. F. Pease Company, Inc., the Court gives decision for the defendant.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/6763036.json b/ri/6763036.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1313ac3e233d3e3b75d6e444c41eefe7d8ac7f2d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/6763036.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"6763036\", \"name\": \"Berrick Schloss vs. William Schloss & Son, Inc.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Schloss v. Schloss\", \"decision_date\": \"1929-03-19\", \"docket_number\": \"Eq. No. 9032\", \"first_page\": \"102\", \"last_page\": \"103\", \"citations\": \"5 R.I. Dec. 102\", \"volume\": \"5\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Decisions\", \"court\": \"Rhode Island Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:21:36.558259+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Berrick Schloss vs. William Schloss & Son, Inc.\", \"head_matter\": \"Berrick Schloss vs. William Schloss & Son, Inc.\\nEq. No. 9032\\nMarch 19, 1929.\", \"word_count\": \"404\", \"char_count\": \"2276\", \"text\": \"TANNER, P. J.\\nThis matter is heard upon the appeal of a creditor from the disallowance of his claim by a receiver.\\nThe claim is predicated upon a lease for 5 years. The lessee became insolvent and a receiver was appointed a little more than a year from the beginning of the lease, so that there is now about four years to run on the lease. The lease provides that if the lessee shall elect or fail to perform or observe any of the covenants in the lease, or if a receiver he appointed to take charge of the property or wind up the affairs of the lessee, then in either of said cases the lessor lawfully may terminate the lease and the lessee shall pay to the lessor as damages a sum equal to the amount of the rent reserved in the lease for the residue of the term.\\nFor complainant: P. C. Joslin.\\nFor respondent: Greenough, Lyman & Cross. Harvey S. Reynolds.\\nThe claim for damages is about .$35,000. The assets were $4,400 and merchandise liabilities $10,000.\\nThere is great confusion in the authorities as to whether such damages as are claimed in this case are liquidated damages or merely a penalty. Various tests have been adopted in different decisions. The intention of the parties is decided upon consideration of the provisions of the whole agreement in view of the circumstances in each case and the intention of the parties as thus disclosed is the decisive test.\\nWholey Boiler Works vs. Lewis, 45 R. I. 441.\\nin our opinion the fact that the same measure of damages is provided in this case for 'breach of all the different covenants of the lease varying in terms giving rights to different amounts of damages is a very important indication of the intention of the parties to the lease.\\n\\\"The fact that a single sum is named to secure the performance of various stipulations, the damages for the breach of which are necessarily different, tends to show that the provision is one for penalty.\\\"\\nTiffany, Landlord & Tenant, Vol. 1, p. 1054.\\nConsidering, therefore, all the circumstances of the case and the consequence of construing this provision as a liquidated damage rather than a penalty, we are of the opinion that it should be construed as a penalty and the appeal is therefore denied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/6763119.json b/ri/6763119.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3725d3768c06c7094c4cb65fff5398982b39eb75
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/6763119.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"6763119\", \"name\": \"Mabel E. Fitzgerald v. E. Rosen Co.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Fitzgerald v. E. Rosen Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1928-02-28\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 61895\", \"first_page\": \"93\", \"last_page\": \"94\", \"citations\": \"4 R.I. Dec. 93\", \"volume\": \"4\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Decisions\", \"court\": \"Rhode Island Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:25:14.772542+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Mabel E. Fitzgerald v. E. Rosen Co.\", \"head_matter\": \"Mabel E. Fitzgerald v. E. Rosen Co.\\nNo. 61895\\nFebruary 28, 1928\", \"word_count\": \"460\", \"char_count\": \"2674\", \"text\": \"CAPOTOSTO, J.\\nThis is an action for negligence involving a collision between an automobile in which the plaintiff was a passenger and a truck of the defendant company. The accident occurred near the entrance to the Sunny-Meade Riding Academy on the Narragansett Pier road in the afternoon of July 26, 1924. The jury having returned a verdict for the defendant, the plaintiff moves for a new trial.\\nThe weather conditions were favorable and the road dry. The plaintiff claims that as the automobile in which she was a passenger was stopped in the driveway immediately outside the wall of the Riding Academy grounds, the defendant's truck, driven at a high rate of speed, left the macadam part of the main highway, side-swiped the plaintiff's car on its left side, pushed it on to the travelled part of the road, passed by its rear, and stopped some considerable distance beyond near a pole situated off the main highway. The defendant, on the other hand, claims that the plaintiff's automobile came out of the driveway when he was four or five truck lengths away; that at that time the plaintiff's automobile came to a stop; that confronted with a sudden emergency, he tried to avoid striking the automobile but was unsuccessful, and that if the plaintiff had kept on going the accident would not have happened.\\nThe driver of the plaintiff's car was operating an automobile belonging to a Miss Oonnelly. On the front seat with the driver was Dr. Ralph P. Bennett, a veterinarian. The plaintiff, who was the wife -of the driver, and Mrs. Bennett were in the rear seat.\\nWere this a case in which the driver himself was suing for damages the verdict would not be disturbed by the Court. The jury could reasonably find that at the time of the accident both drivers were at fault. But, inasmuch as Mrs. Fitzgerald was a passenger, the real question involved is quite different. Taking into consideration all the evidence in the case, including the fact -that the operator of the defendant's truck had been fined for speeding on two different occasions shortly before the occurrence of this accident, the Court finds from the testimony that at the time of the collision complained of the defendant was not in the exercise of reasonable care. The plaintiff, on -the other hand, did what a prudent person would or reasonably might be expected to do: rely upon the driver in the absence of circumstances calling for action on her part. The jury ap parently overlooked this distinction. In this ease justice demands a new trial.\\nFor plaintiff: T. M. O'Reilly.\\nFor defendant: Jos. W. Grimes.\\nMotion for new trial granted.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/6764057.json b/ri/6764057.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..151649cfe636351ccda696c5b75ffde36bcb47b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/6764057.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"6764057\", \"name\": \"Helen A. Sleeper vs. William G. Rich\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Sleeper v. Rich\", \"decision_date\": \"1926-03-12\", \"docket_number\": \"N. 64620\", \"first_page\": \"127\", \"last_page\": \"129\", \"citations\": \"2 R.I. Dec. 127\", \"volume\": \"2\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Decisions\", \"court\": \"Rhode Island Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:25:11.561895+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Helen A. Sleeper vs. William G. Rich\", \"head_matter\": \"Helen A. Sleeper vs. William G. Rich\\nN.. 64620\\nMarch 12, 1926\", \"word_count\": \"1264\", \"char_count\": \"6846\", \"text\": \"SUMNER, J.\\nPlaintiff has brought suit to recover a sum of money claimed to have been loaned to the defendant. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $1990, and defendant has filed his motion for a new trial on the usual grounds, and also alleging that a document, not in evidence, prejudicial to the defendant was communicated to the jury while they were considering their verdict.\\nThe plaintiff, Mrs. Sleeper, testified that she had been acquainted with the defendant Rich ever since he was a child, was on intimate terms with him and his wife, and had also-employed him as an attorney; that on December 16, 1921, she loaned him the sum of $1000; that he agreed to pay her interest on it; that he subsequently gave her a deed of a piece of real estate to hold as seeruity for the loan and that later this deed disappeared at a time when the defendant's wife was in plaintiff's house; that the defendant paid her interest on the loan up to June 1924. A clerk in the bank testified that the plaintiff withdrew the sum of $1000 on December 16, 1921. Another witness, named Ballou, testified that in De cember 1923, while he was at her house on an errand, Mr. Rich came in- and paid Mrs. Sleeper some money, saying: \\\"I have come to pay some interest.\\\" He thinks the amount was $30.\\nThe defendant Rich denied receiving the money and offered two papers in evidence in contradiction of plaintiff's testimony, one a receipt for $10, purporting to be signed 'by Mrs. Sleeper, and another a note given to Mrs. Rich for the sum of $1200. Mrs. Sleeper declared that her name was forged, to both of these papers, saying that they looked like her signatures but that the writings in both cases had apparently been inserted over the signatures.\\nMrs. Sleeper, a woman 75 years old, was an intelligent witness and made a good appearance. It was a question of veracity between the witnesses for the two parties, and the Court believes that the jury were justified in bringing in a verdict for the plaintiff.\\nThe defendant claims misconduct on the part of the jury and offers the affidavit of one George J. Wheelock. The affiant says that he was in the court room in Woonsocket when the jury came in about 12:30 P. M.; that after the jury had given their verdict and been dismissed, he went to a water-closet on the same floor with the court room, and' coming back fhom it discovered sheets of typewritten paper lying on the floor of the jury room five feet from the door; that he picked them up, read some of them, and when he got a chance showed the paper to Mr. Rich, who read it through, handed it back to him. and asked him to hold it. Mr. Rich makes an affidavit as to Wheelock showing this paper to him at the time. Mr. Walling, the attorney for the plaintiff, makes a counter affidavit identifying the paper in question as his office copy of a complaint made to the Supreme Court against Mr. Rich by Mrs. Sleeper, which paper had been with his other papers on the plaintiff's table in the court room while he was using th\\u00e9m in the trial of the case. He denies that he had anything to do with putting it in the jury room and states that Mr. Rich sat at the plaintiff's table during the whole of the triai (a fact noted at the time !by the Court.)\\nWaldo S. Cook, foreman of the jury, makes a counter-affidavit that the paper entitled \\\"Complaint\\\" was not in' the jury' room at any time during their consideration of the case and that he looked around carefully just before the jury returned with their verdict. Mr. Rich makes an affidavit in rebuttal denying that he ever took or had this paper in his possession except as' stated in his first affidavit.\\nDefendant questions the admissibility of the affidavit of the foreman of the jury.\\nOur Supreme Court has held that affidavits of jurors are not admissible to impeach their verdict.\\nSee Phillips vs. R. I. Co., 31 R. I. 26. In that same opinion the Court cites cases in New Jersey and Vermont deciding, however, that affidavits may be read to exculpate the jurors and sustain their verdict.\\nCyc. Vol. 29, page 989, says that affidavits of jurors are admissible to disprove alleged bias, or prejudice, or misconduct.\\nThe Court had no opportunity to see or examine Mr. Wheelock and find out what sort of a man he was. The Court would have liked to know why he was waiting around the court house. Why did he give such a paper to Mr. Rich, evidently being a complaint made against him? Why did he not give it to a court officer? Why did he say nothing about it to the Court or anybody else but Mr. Rich, and why did he take a paper away that -did not belong to 'him and without making any further inquiry about it?\\nFor Plaintiff: Walling & Walling.\\nFor Defendant: Wilson, Churchill & Curtis.\\nThere is an entrance to the water-closet from the corridor but it is kept locked, as the water-closet is attached to the jury room. If Mr. Wheeloclc went .through the jury-room to go to the water-closet, why did he not see the paper then if it was there, or if by chance the corridor door was unlocked, why did he go into the jury room at all and find this particular paper five feet from the door, unless he was looking for something-? The water-closet is so situated that one passing from it through the corridor would not be apt to look into the jury room. He would have to turn his head sharply to the left in order to do so.\\nThe conduct of Mr. Rich is inexplicable. If the paper was shown him as he says, why did not he, a member of the bar and so an officer of the court, take up the matter with the Court at once or even wdthin a day or two as involving a most serious charge, that of tampering with the jury? The Court could have made a full inquiry then when the matter was fresh and the facts easily accessible. His conduct would seem lacking in candor and good faith. His attorney, Mr. Churchill, returned to Providence at the conclusion of the trial.\\nMr. Walling is a level-headed, reputable member of the bar, and it is inconceivable that he had anything to do with placing this paper in the jury room, and Mr. Churchill expressly exonerated him from that charge. The notes of the Court show that the jury brought in their verdict at 12:21 and that the Court recessed at 12:40, so that there was nearly 19 minutes within which the paper might have been \\\"planted\\\" there. It may be said that the so-called complaint or paper was merely a summary of Mrs. Sleeper's case against Mr. Rich. It made no charges of fraud or forgery such as she testified to on the stand.\\nThe Court does not believe that the plaintiff or her attorney had anything to do with putting this paper in the jury room. It believes that it was \\\"planted\\\" there after the jury had left the room.\\nAccordingly the defendant's motion for a new trial is denied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/6765322.json b/ri/6765322.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e7e102fb04d352f2f71ccf991b276f98b50ec4ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/6765322.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"6765322\", \"name\": \"Moorad Najarian vs. H. O. Boyajian et als.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Najarian v. Boyajian\", \"decision_date\": \"1926-05-06\", \"docket_number\": \"Eq.No.7088\", \"first_page\": \"180\", \"last_page\": \"181\", \"citations\": \"2 R.I. Dec. 180\", \"volume\": \"2\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Decisions\", \"court\": \"Rhode Island Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:25:11.561895+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Moorad Najarian vs. H. O. Boyajian et als.\", \"head_matter\": \"Moorad Najarian vs. H. O. Boyajian et als.\\nEq.No.7088\\nMay 6, 1926\", \"word_count\": \"671\", \"char_count\": \"3882\", \"text\": \"TANNER, P. J.\\nThis is a bill in equity for specific performance of an agreement to sell a farm.\\nThe complainant was in possession of the farm in question as a tenant and claims that the respondents agreed to sell him the farm for $15,-000 upon the payment of $3000 cash and a mortgage for $12,000 for five years at six per cent.\\nIt is disputed by the respondents that they ever orally agreed to sell the farm or that there is any suffi7 cient memorandum in writing.\\nComplainant claims, first, that there was a sufficient memorandum in writing; second, that there was an oral agreement to convey, accompanied by possession and substantial improvements, sufficient to constitute a part performance.\\nWe rely strongly upon the testimony of Sarkis Boyajian who was a disinterested witness and had acted as attorney for the respondents and was a nephew of one of them. He testifies that he prepared a deed for the purchase of this property; that $500 was paid on account of it by the complainant; that he was instructed, by Mugrdich Boyajian to prepare the deeds; that he saw the three brothers and they wanted to know if everything was all right; that John and Avedis Boyajian referred to Mugrdich as representing them in the matter; that both parties asked him to draw the papers; that Mugrdich and Avedis Boyajian signed the deed and he was only prevented from getting' the signature of John because the wife of Avedis refused to release .dower; that neither Avedis nor John had any objection to the proceeding; that the respondents said the farm was sold to the complainant for $15,000 and the terms of sale were that they were to receive $3000 cash and $12,000 on mortgage for five years at six per cent; that he drew the agreement of sale which was not executed around the first of July, 1923, and the parties agreed that it was not necessary to sign the agreement to sell when they were going to sell and were ready to do so. Receipts were given by Mugrdich for the $500 deposit and also for money received as interest.\\nFor Complainant: Knauer' <fc Fowler.\\nFor Respondents: Henshaw & Sweeney.\\nWe think upon the testimony of Sarkis Boyajian that Mugrdich was authorized to sign these receipts for money as interest and the receipt for the deposit money.\\nComplainant's Exhibit M is an agreement executed between Mugr-dich Boyajian, Hovannes Boyajian and Katoon Boyajian, the widow and administratrix of her husband Avedis, dated October 1, 1924. This agreement recites that the complainant is to pay $15,000 for the farm, and Ka-toon, the administratrix, to receive $5,000 \\u2014 $4,000 in cash; a mortgage on the farm should be taken by Hovan-nes and Mugrdich, and that in this way the farm matter should be settled and closed with Katoon.\\nWe think this family agreement in connection with the receipts are not sufficient memorandum under the statute of frauds. The two signed deeds may be sufficient as against two of the brothers but not as against the third.\\nThe family agreement, Exhibit M, might be a sufficient memorandum if it corroborated the complainant's statement of the agreement as to terms, but it seems to us rather to corroborate the respondents' claim that $5000' cash was to be paid instead of $8000 as claimed by the complainant.\\nWe are convinced by the testimony of the complainant, and especially of Sarkis Boyajian, that the three brothers agreed to sell this farm on the terms stated by the complainant, and that they would have done so but for the objection of the wife of Avedis. We think that this oral agreement was accompanied by substantial part performance attended by possession and is .thus taken out of the statute of frauds.\\nWe think the complainant is entitled to a conveyance of the interest that the three brothers had in the farm with compensation for the dower rights not released.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/6766006.json b/ri/6766006.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..61e2b8d6f104ebb6b4791fdd0d03b0f798141718
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/6766006.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"6766006\", \"name\": \"Albert F. Cole vs. New England Tree Expert Co., Inc.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Cole v. New England Tree Expert Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1932-03-03\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2483\", \"first_page\": \"228\", \"last_page\": \"229\", \"citations\": \"8 R.I. Dec. 228\", \"volume\": \"8\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Decisions\", \"court\": \"Rhode Island Superior Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:25:17.277575+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Albert F. Cole vs. New England Tree Expert Co., Inc.\", \"head_matter\": \"Albert F. Cole vs. New England Tree Expert Co., Inc.\\nNo. 2483.\\nMarch 3, 1932.\", \"word_count\": \"294\", \"char_count\": \"1698\", \"text\": \"CARPENTER, J.\\nAfter verdict for plaintiff for the sum of $515.00, defendant moved for a new trial upon the usual grounds.\\nPlaintiff is the owner and operator of a large dairy and owns and keeps a large herd of dairy cattle in the Town of Warwick near Pawtuxet. The defendant is in the business of spray-\\\" ing trees. On the day in question, the defendant was spraying trees with ar-senate of lead near the pasture in which the cattle of the plaintiff were feeding.\\nThe plaintiff claimed by his evidence that the defendant conducted the spraying negligently, and also contended that defendant should have notified him of said spraying and that by reason of said negligence the spraying mixture, arsenate of lead, blew or fell onto the grass in the pasture of the plaintiff, which grass one of the cows of the plaintiff ate and thereupon became sick and died.\\nProfessor Franklin Strickland examined the grass and found arsenate of lead, and also examined the inwards of the cow and testified that the cow died of lead poisoning.\\nDr. Cole, a veterinary surgeon, testified that the cow died of lead poisoning.\\nThe defendant contended that it was not negligent and that arsenate of lead would not kill a cow.\\nUpon the evidence the jury by their verdict decided that the defendant was negligent and that the cow died as a result of the defendant's negligence, and assessed damages in the sum of $515.00.\\nThis Court feels that the jury were justified in their finding and that substantial justice has been done.\\nFor plaintiff: Joseph W. Grimes, .James O. McManus.\\nFor defendants: Edward W. Lincoln.\\nMotion for new trial denied:\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/6870302.json b/ri/6870302.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..96c19eb471755894cba12e5c011b68f93d68a315
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/6870302.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"6870302\", \"name\": \"MEDICAL MALPRACTICE JOINT UNDERWRITING ASSOCIATION OF RHODE ISLAND v. CHARLESGATE NURSING CENTER, L.P., et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass'n v. Charlesgate Nursing Center, L.P.\", \"decision_date\": \"2015-06-05\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2013-359-Appeal\", \"first_page\": \"998\", \"last_page\": \"1008\", \"citations\": \"115 A.3d 998\", \"volume\": \"115\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:59:54.953503+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"MEDICAL MALPRACTICE JOINT UNDERWRITING ASSOCIATION OF RHODE ISLAND v. CHARLESGATE NURSING CENTER, L.P., et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"MEDICAL MALPRACTICE JOINT UNDERWRITING ASSOCIATION OF RHODE ISLAND v. CHARLESGATE NURSING CENTER, L.P., et al.\\nNo. 2013-359-Appeal.\\nSupreme Court of Rhode Island.\\nJune 5, 2015.\\nDavid P. Whitman, Esq., Providence, for Plaintiff.\\nErica M. O\\u2019Connell, Esq., Mitchell R. Edwards, Esq., Providence, for Defendants.\\nPresent: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"4950\", \"char_count\": \"31395\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nChief Justice SUTTELL, for the Court.\\nThis insurance-coverage dispute presents a novel legal question regarding an insurer's duty to defend that arises from a set of tragic circumstances involving the alleged sexual assault of a nursing home resident. The plaintiff, Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Association of Rhode Island (JUA), sought a declaratory judgment from the Superior Court to establish that it owed no duty to defend its insured, Charlesgate Nursing Center, L.P. (Charlesgate), two of Charlesgate's general partners, and two of its employees (collectively Charlesgate defendants), against the allegations set forth in a separate civil action filed by the administrator of the estate of a former resident of Charlesgate (complaint or estate's complaint). The JUA now appeals from the judgment denying its motion for summary judgment and granting the Charlesgate defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment on their counterclaim for declaratory judgment. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.\\nI\\nFacts and Procedural History\\nThis appeal proceeds from an alleged sexual assault that purportedly occurred at the Charlesgate Nursing Center in June 2009. From December 2008 to December 2009, the JUA insured Charlesgate under a policy (JUA policy or policy), which provided coverage for both: (1) hospital professional liability (HPL) and (2) commercial general liability (CGL). In June 2009, a fifty-six-year-old woman, suffering from Huntington's disease and residing at and in the care of Charlesgate, claimed that she was the victim of a sexual assault perpetrated by Josiah Ajibade Olowoporo-ku, an employee and certified nursing assistant (CNA) at Charlesgate. The resident passed away on October 17, 2011. On February 28, 2012, her son, in his capacity as administrator of her estate, filed suit in' the Superior Court against Charlesgate, along with its partners, Davenport Associates, LTD., Paul S. Davenport, and its employees, Lynda Gaboriault, Sandra James, and Olowoporoku.\\nTo resolve this appeal, this Court must determine whether the allegations contained in the estate's complaint bring the injury complained of within the coverage of the insurance policy. Accordingly, we confine our recitation of the facts to only those alleged in the estate's complaint, mindful that at this stage of the proceedings no facts have been adjudicated by a judge or jury. The complaint details a terrible sequence of events occurring at Charlesgate, beginning on June 16, 2009, when Olowoporoku sexually and physically assaulted the resident in her room. At the time of the assault, defendant Sandra James, a CNA, was at the nurse's station where she heard the resident's cries for help, but she did not respond. Instead, James reported the resident's screams to defendant Gaboriault, her colleague and a registered nurse at Charlesgate, but Gabo-riault also failed to respond. At some point that day, the resident informed Sharon Scott, a medical technician at Charles-gate, that she had been raped by Olowopo-roku, and Scott reported the incident to Gaboriault on June 16 and again on June 17. Also on June 17, the resident reported the assault to James. According to the complaint, Charlesgate continued to employ Olowoporoku even after the resident had informed several Charlesgate employees of his alleged misconduct.\\nIn an affidavit, the administrator of the resident's estate stated that his grandmother received a call from Charlesgate on June 18, 2009, notifying her of the alleged sexual assault of his mother. Thereafter, he went to Charlesgate on June 18 at which time he \\\"insisted\\\" that Charlesgate \\\"immediately report the incident to the police department.\\\" The same day a rape kit was administered to the resident at Women and Infants Hospital. The estate alleges that, after the assault but prior to the administration of the rape kit, the resident was given at least three bed baths and one shower at Charlesgate. The estate asserts in its complaint that the \\\"results of the rape kit administered on June 18, 2009 revealed bruising, a laceration, excoriation, and trauma or penetration to the vaginal area.\\\"\\nIn addition to these factual allegations, the estate's complaint contained six counts, including: negligence against Charlesgate (count 1), Davenport Associates (count 2), Davenport (count 3), Gaboriault (count 5), and James (count 6); and assault and battery against Olowoporoku (count 4). With regard to the negligence counts, the complaint set forth specific allegations against the Charlesgate defendants, including the failure: to properly supervise, train, or screen its employees; to provide proper security measures; to. report that a resident had been abused or mistreated within twenty-four hours in accordance with G.L. 1956 \\u00a7 23 \\u2014 17.8\\u20142; and to discipline its employees following the alleged sexual assault. As a direct and proximate result of this alleged negligence, the estate claims that the resident suffered \\\"severe personal injuries, shock and injury to her nervous system, extreme pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life, humiliation, embarrassment, severe emotional distress, and was otherwise injured and damaged.\\\"\\nAfter receiving notice of the estate's complaint, the JUA issued a reservation of rights letter and initiated an investigation to determine whether it had a duty to defend the Charlesgate defendants under the policy. After conducting its review, the JUA concluded that: \\\"no defense coverage is afforded to Charlesgate or the other insureds referenced above as to the [estate's complaint] and, thus, at this juncture, no indemnity coverage under either HPL or the CGL insurance coverage afforded by the JUA.\\\" In reaching this conclusion, the JUA reasoned that (1) the alleged sexual assault did not constitute a \\\"medical incident\\\" within the ambit of HPL coverage, and (2) the alleged sexual assault \\\"cannot be construed as an accident under any definition\\\" and therefore is not an \\\"occurrence\\\" within the meaning of the CGL insurance coverage.\\nSubsequently, the JUA filed the instant declaratory-judgment action in Superior Court seeking a declaration that it has no duty to defend the Charlesgate defendants against the allegations set forth in the estate's complaint. The Charlesgate defendants responded by filing a two-count counterclaim. In the first count, they requested a declaratory judgment establishing that the JUA has a duty to defend each of the Charlesgate defendants in the action by the estate. In the second count, they sought damages for the JUA's alleged breach of contract based on its refusal to defend the Charlesgate defendants in the suit.\\nIn January 2013, the JUA filed a motion for summary judgment in its declaratory-judgment action. In February 2013, the Charlesgate defendants filed an objection along with a cross-motion for summary judgment with regard to the first count of their counterclaim requesting the declaratory judgment. A hearing on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment occurred in the Superior Court on May 14, 2013. On May 17, 2013, an order was entered denying the JUA's motion for summary judgment and granting the Charlesgate defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment with respect to the declaratory-judgment count of their counterclaim. The order specified that the JUA owed a duty to defend Charlesgate, Davenport Associates, Davenport, Gabo-riault, and James against the claims alleged in counts 2, 3, 5, and 6 of the estate's complaint. The JUA filed a motion, which was joined by the Charlesgate defendants, requesting an entry of final judgment in accordance with Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. This motion was granted and subsequently a Rule 54(b) judgment was entered. On July 31, 2013, the JUA filed a timely notice of appeal.\\nII\\nStandard of Review\\nThis Court examines an appeal from cross-motions for summary judgment de novo. Quest Diagnostics, LLC v. Pinnacle Consortium, of Higher Education, 93 A.3d 949, 951 (R.I.2014). \\\"In reviewing the Superior Court's judgment on the parties' motions for summary judgment, we apply the same standards as those used by the trial court.\\\" Id. (quoting Peloquin v. Haven Health Center of Green-ville, LLC, 61 A.3d 419, 424 (R.I.2013)). \\\"Thus, [sjummary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the [C]ourt determines that there are no issues of material fact in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\\\" Id. (quoting Peloquin, 61 A.3d at 424-25).\\n\\\"An insurance policy is contractual in nature[.]\\\" Derderian v. Essex Insurance Co., 44 A.3d 122, 127 (R.I.2012) (quoting Papudesu v. Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Association of Rhode Island, 18 A.3d 495, 498 (R.I.2011)). Accordingly, when interpreting the disputed terms of an insurance policy, we must do so in accordance with the rules of construction that govern contracts. Nunez v. Merrimack Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 88 A.3d 1146, 1149 (R.I.2014). \\\"It is well-settled that this Court shall not depart from the literal language of the policy absent a finding that the policy is ambiguous.\\\" Id. (quoting Koziol v. Peerless Insurance Co., 41 A.3d 647, 650 (R.I.2012)).\\nIn order to determine whether the terms of a policy are ambiguous, \\\"we give words their plain, ordinary, and usual meaning.\\\" Derderian, 44 A.3d at 128 (quoting Bliss Mine Road Condominium Association v. Nationwide Property and Casualty Insurance Co., 11 A.3d 1078, 1083 (R.I.2010)). \\\"The Court considers the policy in its entirety and does not establish ambiguity by viewing a word in isolation or by taking a phrase out of context.\\\" Id. (quoting Bliss Mine Road Condominium Association, 11 A.3d at 1088). When a policy term is found to be ambiguous, this Court has clearly established that \\\"the policy will be strictly construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer.\\\" Id. at 127 (quoting Sjogren v. Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Co., 703 A.2d 608, 610 (R.I.1997)). \\\"Indeed, as this Court often has said, we shall 'refrain from engaging in mental gymnastics or from stretching the imagination to read ambiguity into a policy where none is present.' \\\" Koziol, 41 A.3d at 651 (quoting Bliss Mine Road Condominium Association, 11 A.3d at 1083).\\nIll\\nDiscussion\\nThe precise language of the JUA policy lies at the heart of this appeal. As such, all three parties' arguments center on core terms in the CGL and HPL coverage forms of the JUA policy. On appeal, the JUA argues that the language set forth in the estate's complaint does not trigger HPL coverage under the policy because there was no \\\"medical incident\\\" alleged. With regard to CGL coverage, the JUA avers that the sexual assault alleged in the complaint does not constitute an \\\"occurrence,\\\" which is defined in the policy as an \\\"accident.\\\"\\nThe Charlesgate defendants counter that the alleged negligence claims against them are indeed an \\\"occurrence\\\" under the terms of the CGL coverage in the policy. In addition, the Charlesgate defendants argue that neither the sexual act nor the criminal act exclusion applies because none of these defendants are alleged to have committed sexual or criminal acts. In terms of CGL coverage, the estate largely mirrors the argument of the Charlesgate defendants in that the language in the complaint does allege an \\\"occurrence,\\\" as defined in the JUA policy, based on the proximate cause of the injuries alleged. Finally, the estate asserts that the HPL and CGL coverage exclusions for criminal and sexual acts are not applicable in this case.\\nIt is well settled in Rhode Island that the \\\"pleadings test\\\" is applied in order to ascertain whether an insurer has a duty to defend an insured. Peerless Insurance Co. v. Viegas, 667 A.2d 785, 787 (R.I.1995). \\\"That test requires the trial court to look at the allegations contained in the complaint, and 'if the pleadings recite facts bringing the injury complained of within the coverage of the insurance policy, the insurer must defend irrespective of the insured's ultimate liability to the plaintiff.' \\\" Id. (quoting The Employers' Fire Insurance Co. v. Beals, 103 R.I. 623, 632, 240 A.2d 397, 402 (1968), abrogated by Peerless Insurance Co., 667 A.2d at 789 on other grounds). Moreover, in Peerless Insurance Co., we recognized that, although the blind application of the \\\"pleadings test\\\" may lead an insurer to defend an insured against \\\" 'groundless, false or fraudulent' suits,\\\" the insurer is nevertheless bound to do so. See id. (quoting Beals, 103 R.I. at 631, 240 A.2d at 402). \\\"[I]n other words, when a complaint contains a statement of facts which bring the case within or potentially within the risk coverage of the policy, the insurer has an unequivocal duty to defend.\\\" Beals, 103 R.I. at 632, 240 A.2d at 403.\\nIn its arguments, the JUA urges this Court to treat all the facts alleged in the complaint as averring only \\\"a violent, intentional sexual assault.\\\" We decline to take such a narrow view of the facts alleged. The complaint also includes independent factual allegations offered in support of the claims of negligence on the part of the Charlesgate defendants. Furthermore, the Charlesgate defendants are the insureds seeking coverage under the JUA policy, not Olowoporoku who allegedly raped the resident in her room. As such, there are no allegations of intentional or sexual activity on the part of the Charles-gate defendants set forth in the complaint. Accordingly, in reviewing the complaint alongside the JUA policy, we focus our attention on the factual allegations of negligence with regard to each of the respective Charlesgate defendants. Under well-settled Rhode Island law, \\\"[w]e confine our analysis to the four comers of the policy, viewing it 'in its entirety, affording its terms their plain, ordinary and usual meaning.' \\\" Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ahlquist, 59 A.3d 95, 98 (R.I.2013) (quoting Casco Indemnity Co. v. Gonsalves, 839 A.2d 546, 548 (R.I.2004)). We begin our analysis by examining the contractual language of the policy.\\nThe CGL coverage is afforded to the Charlesgate defendants under an endorsement to the JUA policy. The cornerstone of the CGL policy is the term \\\"occurrence.\\\" The policy offers coverage to Charlesgate only for the risks of \\\"bodily injury\\\" or \\\"property damage\\\" that are caused by an \\\"occurrence.\\\" The terms of this coverage are set forth in the policy as follows:\\n\\\"SECTION I \\u2014 COVERAGES\\n\\\"COVERAGE A \\u2014 BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY\\n\\\"1. Insuring Agreement\\n\\\"a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of 'bodily injury' or 'property damage' to which this insurance applies.\\n\\\"b. This insurance applies to 'bodily injury' and 'property damage' only if:\\n\\\"(1) The 'bodily injury' or 'property damage' is caused by an 'occurrence' that takes place in the 'coverage territory't.]\\\"\\nThe \\\"Definitions\\\" section of the policy defines \\\"bodily injury\\\" as \\\"bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by a person, including death resulting from any of these at any time.\\\" It also defines \\\"occurrence\\\" to mean \\\"an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.\\\"\\nThe issue of whether the JUA owes the Charlesgate defendants a duty to defend them in the estate's underlying suit hinges on whether the facts alleged in the estate's complaint constitute an \\\"occurrence\\\" to which CGL coverage potentially applies. By defining an \\\"occurrence\\\" as an \\\"accident,\\\" the policy's definition offers little guidance on this inquiry because the word \\\"accident\\\" is not defined in the policy. Black's Law Dictionary defines \\\"occurrence\\\" as \\\"[s]omething that happens or takes place; specifically], an accident, event, or continuing condition that results in personal injury or property damage that is neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured party. This specific sense is the standard definition of the term under most liability policies.\\\" Black's Law Dictionary 1248 (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added). The legal term \\\"accident\\\" is also defined in Black's Law Dictionary, as \\\"[a]n unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence; something that does not occur in the usual course of events or that could not be reasonably anticipated; any unwanted or harmful event occurring suddenly, as a collision, spill, fall, or the like, irrespective of cause or blame Black's Law Dictionary at 18.\\nThe plain and ordinary meaning of the term \\\"accident\\\" as \\\"an unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence\\\" invites the threshold question of from whose perspective is the unforeseen occurrence to be assessed. The Charlesgate defendants argue that an \\\"accident\\\" must be defined from the viewpoint of the insured. The hearing justice was also persuaded that the term \\\"accident\\\" should be interpreted from \\\"the perspective of the insureds.\\\" Rhode Island law dictates that \\\"[t]he test to be applied is not what the insurer intended , but what the ordinary reader and purchaser would have understood [the language] to mean.\\\" Ahlquist, 59 A.3d at 98 (quoting Pressman v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 574 A.2d 757, 760 (R.I.1990)). Moreover, the Black's Law Dictionary definition of \\\"occurrence\\\" similarly provides that this term is often defined or interpreted from the standpoint of the insured party in the context of insurance policies. Here, Charlesgate purchased an insurance policy from the JUA to secure CGL coverage against certain risks delineated under the terms of its policy. From the viewpoint of Charles-gate, the sequence of events that allegedly took place in June 2009 appears to be both unexpected and unforeseen. It was surely not the usual course of events when an employee, whom Charlesgate hired, supervised, and trained, was later alleged to have sexually assaulted one of its patients.\\nThe JUA principally focuses on the intentional character of the alleged sexual assault to substantiate its position that the factual allegations set forth in the estate's complaint do not constitute an \\\"accident.\\\" In support of this position, the JUA relies chiefly on three Rhode Island cases in which there was alleged intentional sexual misconduct and, ultimately, no duty to defend on the part of the insurer. We observe that the factual allegations and policy language at issue in the instant matter distinguish it from these cases.\\nMoreover, in our opinion, two of the three cases, Craven v. Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Co., 693 A.2d 1022 (R.I.1997) (mem.) and Sanzi v. Shetty, 864 A.2d 614 (R.I.2005), are inapposite. In Craven, 693 A.2d at 1022, the named insured in a homeowner's policy sought a declaratory judgment that his insurer was required to defend him against claims of sexual assault and negligent infliction of emotional distress. This Court, however, determined that the insurer had no duty to defend because allegations of intentional sexual misconduct did not fall within the risks covered by the insured's policy. Id. at 1023. Similarly, in Sanzi, 864 A.2d at 615-16, a pediatric neurologist and named insured sought a declaration that his insurer had a duty to defend him against claims by a former patient of alleged intentional sexual assault. This Court held that the insurer had no obligation to defend the doctor because the allegations of intentional sexual abuse did not fall within the \\\"professional services\\\" coverage of the doctor's professional liability policy. Id. at 619-20. Both of these cases present factual scenarios with a notable distinction from the present matter in that it was the individual insureds who personally faced allegations of intentional sexual misconduct. Ultimately, it was the intentional character of the insureds' actions that fell outside the covered risks in those respective policies. On the contrary, the Charlesgate defendants are not facing any allegations of intentional sexual misconduct, but rather only alleged negligence with regard to supervising, hiring, and training an employee, among other claims.\\nThe JUA also relies on American Commerce Insurance Co. v. Porto, 811 A.2d 1185 (R.I.2002), in support of its argument that the allegations of negligence \\u2014 negligent hiring, training, and supervision, among others \\u2014 in the complaint against the Charlesgate defendants do not constitute an \\\"accident\\\" and therefore not an \\\"occurrence\\\" under the policy. The facts in Porto bear a striking resemblance to those in the present case in that the insured, Sebastian M. Porto, a Boy Scouts of America (BSA) troop leader, held a supervisory position over another troop leader who allegedly sexually assaulted a minor troop member. Porto, 811 A.2d at 1188\\u2014 89. In that case, the minor victim and his parents advanced allegations in their complaint against Porto and the BSA for negligent hiring and supervision, separate and apart from their allegations of intentional sexual assault against the troop leader. Id.\\nNotwithstanding these factual similarities, the policy language at issue in Porto is quite different from the term at issue in the present case. The analysis in Porto centered on the \\\"arising out of' policy language that delineated those bodily injuries covered and those excluded under the policy. Porto, 811 A.2d at 1197. This Court in Porto interpreted the \\\"arising out of' language of a policy exclusion broadly and concluded that all of the allegations in the family's complaint have \\\"a causal connection with, and thus arise out of' the troop leader's sexual misconduct. Id. Accordingly, in Porto, we affirmed summary judgment in favor of the insurer, concluding that it owed no duty to defend its insured. Id. at 1201-02.\\nAt the summary-judgment hearing in the present case, the hearing justice declared the Porto case as \\\"significant in the analysis of this matter\\\" but nevertheless proceeded to distinguish the present matter from the result we reached in that case. In doing so, he reasoned that:\\n\\\"in Porto the Supreme Court said that one of the distinguishing factors [in that case] was that there were no discrete injuries alleged in the family's complaint that ar[o]se solely out of Porto's alleged negligence.\\n\\\"That's simply not the case here. The allegations in th[is] case are not only creative, but there are factual allegations that are made in the complaint by the plaintiffs that Charlesgate and its employees acted in a particular way or failed to act in a particular way that added to the injuries caused by the CNA who committed the sexual act. So it may be that Charlesgate is not responsible for damages as great as the CNA, but there's certainly a decision to be made there.\\\"\\nWe agree with the hearing justice in this regard. Furthermore, we emphasize that, in Porto, this Court examined the language of a policy exclusion specifically related to sexual molestation. Porto, 811 A.2d at 1197. In contrast, here we are confronted with the core policy coverage terms \\\"accident\\\" and \\\"occurrence.\\\" Therefore, we need not evaluate the estate's claims of negligent hiring and supervision in the context of a policy exclusion for sexual molestation. Moreover, the JUA has made it clear that, although the policy includes sexual and criminal act exclusions, it is not arguing on appeal that either of these exclusions in the CGL policy applies. On balance, we find that the JUA's resolute reliance on our Porto analysis in the context of a policy exclusion is misplaced. As such, this case presents us with a novel inquiry distinct from this Rhode Island precedent.\\nThe hearing justice declined to adopt the JUA's narrow reading of \\\"occurrence\\\" within the policy, which he dismissed as \\\"somewhat restrictive.\\\" Conversely, the hearing justice was persuaded that the term \\\"accident\\\" should not only be interpreted from the perspective of the insured party, but also that it should be interpreted more broadly than the JUA suggests. We agree. This Court does not consider the subjective intent of the parties, but rather \\\"the intent expressed by the language of the contract.\\\" Derderian, 44 A.3d at 128 (quoting Bliss Mine Road Condominium Association, 11 A.3d at 1088-84). In accordance with this principle, we consider the term \\\"accident\\\" in the context of the policy as a whole. See id. In essence, the various arguments asserted by the JUA contend that, because of the intentional nature of the alleged sexual assault by a Charlesgate employee, there was no \\\"accident\\\" and therefore no \\\"occurrence\\\" under the policy. We are of the opinion that those arguments ignore other provisions \\u2014 the sexual act and intended-injury exclusions \\u2014 in the policy.\\nIf we adopted the JUA's narrow reading of \\\"accident,\\\" then that reading would obviate the need for some exclusions included in the policy. The intended-injury and sexual act exclusions would serve no purpose if all intended injuries and injuries arising out of sexual acts were excluded in the first instance by the terms of the policy itself. See King v. Dallas Fire Insurance Co., 85 S.W.3d 185, 186, 192-93 (Tex.2002). The JUA is effectively advocating for this result by claiming that the factual allegations of negligence in the estate's complaint do not constitute an \\\"accident.\\\" This interpretation of the policy language would render both exclusions mere sur-plusage. We decline to endorse such a reading of the term \\\"accident\\\" within the context of the JUA policy.\\nWe are satisfied that the JUA has a duty to defend the Charlesgate defendants against the allegations of negligence set forth in the complaint. This Court has articulated a clear mandate that \\\"any doubts as to the adequacy of the pleadings to encompass an occurrence within the coverage of the policy are resolved against the insurer and in favor of its insured.\\\" Beals, 103 R.I. at 632, 240 A.2d at 403. Furthermore, the \\\"pleadings test\\\" establishes an unequivocal duty to defend on the part of the JUA when the complaint in the underlying action contains factual allegations that bring the case \\\"within or potentially within the risk coverage of the policy.\\\" Id. Accordingly, we affirm both the hearing justice's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Charlesgate defendants and the denial of the JUA's motion for summary judgment with regard to the declaratory-judgment count of the Charlesgate defendants' counterclaim.\\nIV\\nConclusion\\nFor the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. The record of this case shall be returned to the Superior Court.\\n. The defendants named in the declaratory-judgment action include: Charlesgate Nursing Center, L.P. (Charlesgate), Davenport Associates, LTD., Paul S. Davenport, Lynda Ga-boriault, and Sandra James (collectively Charlesgate defendants).\\n. The underlying civil action, docketed as PC 2012-1071, is currently pending in the Superior Court.\\n. Olowoporoku was subsequently found by a-jury not guilty of all criminal charges relating to these allegations.\\n. General Laws 1956 \\u00a7 23-17.8-2 provides, in pertinent part, that:\\n\\\"(a) Any physician, medical intern, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, nurse's aide, orderly, certified nursing assistant or any person, within the scope of their employment at a facility or in their professional capacity, who has knowledge of or reasonable cause to believe that a patient or resident in a facility has been abused, mistreated, or neglected shall make, within twenty-four (24) hours or by the end of the next business day, a telephone report to the director of the department of health or his or her designee for those incidents involving health care facilities\\n. The estate was also named as a defendant in the declaratory-judgment action.\\n. Specifically, count 1 of the Charlesgate defendants' counterclaim requested a declaration that the JUA is contractually obligated to defend each of said defendants based on the allegations in counts 2, 3, 5, and 6 of the estate's complaint.\\n. After the entry of the judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, the sole count remaining in the declaratory-judgment action is the breach-of-contract claim, which is the second count of the Charlesgate defendants' counterclaim.\\n. We do not address the arguments with respect to potential HPL coverage under the JUA policy because the Charlesgate defendants, as the insured parties under the JUA policy, do not contend that they are entitled to HPL coverage under the terms of the policy. Nevertheless, we are mindful that the estate, for its part, argues that the complaint triggers HPL coverage under the \\\"pleadings test\\\" because it alleged a \\\"medical incident\\\" as defined by the JUA policy.\\n. We note that we need not address the arguments made by the Charlesgate defendants with regard to the sexual and criminal act exclusions in the JUA policy. Although the JUA raised this argument in its prebriefing statement, it did not raise the argument in its full brief before this Court. In fact, the JUA explicitly acknowledged in its reply brief that it was not raising any argument that the \\\"sexual or criminal act exclusions of the CGL policy apply.\\\" This was confirmed by counsel for the JUA at oral argument.\\n. Black's Law Dictionary defines \\\"occurrence-based liability insurance,\\\" such as the CGL coverage in the JUA policy, as \\\"[ijnsurance that covers bodily injuries or property damage suffered during the policy period. Each instance of injury or damage is an 'occurrence' that may trigger an insured's entitlement to benefits. The terms of occurrence-based liability insurance policies are usufally] broad, limited only by specific exclusion.\\\" Black's Law Dictionary 924 (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added).\\n. In discussing complaints drafted with both intentional and negligent allegations, we are mindful of the potential for \\\"creative\\\" pleadings without an appropriate factual predicate. We pause to note our concern with opening the door to such a disfavored practice. This Court echoes the point made by the hearing justice that the factual allegations set forth in the estate's complaint are more than merely \\\"creative.\\\" In the instant matter, the complaint includes not only allegations of negligence with regard to the Charlesgate defendants, but also facts alleged in support of those negligence claims.\\n. The pertinent provisions in the JUA policy provide that:\\n\\\"2. Exclusions\\n\\\"This insurance does not apply to:\\n\\\"a. Expected Or Intended Injury\\n\\\" 'Bodily Injury' or 'property damage' expected or intended from the standpoint of the Insured. This exclusion does not apply to 'bodily injury' resulting from the use of reasonable force to protect persons or property.\\n\\\"r. Sexual Acts\\n\\\" 'Bodily Injury' arising out of sexual activity, sexual misconduct, sexual abuse or sexual harassment by the Insured or any person for whom the Insured is legally responsible.\\\"\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/718408.json b/ri/718408.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e00cc400180a43412f50c59a45291842ed7fd17c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/718408.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"718408\", \"name\": \"Susan Haszard et al. vs. Sarah Jeanette Haszard\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Haszard v. Haszard\", \"decision_date\": \"1896-02-24\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"374\", \"last_page\": \"380\", \"citations\": \"19 R.I. 374\", \"volume\": \"19\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:18:45.396333+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Susan Haszard et al. vs. Sarah Jeanette Haszard.\", \"head_matter\": \"PROVIDENCE COUNTY.\\nSusan Haszard et al. vs. Sarah Jeanette Haszard.\\nA testator bequeathed to Ins wife all his household furniture and family stores \\u201cin lieu of her right of dower in my personal property.\\u201d He directed his wife as executrix of the will to sell certain of his real estate and buildings on leased land and to invest \\u201cthe net proceeds\\u201d of the sales in the name of his four daughters in one or more of the savings banks in the city of Providence. He also gave to his wife for life the income of all his money on deposit in two specified savings banks, and of all moneys due and owing to him after payment of his debts, funeral expenses and expenses of administration. Lastly, he gave and devised all his real estate subject to his wife\\u2019s right of dower, and \\u201c the then remaining portion of the investment of personal estate\\u201d to his four daughters during their lives with remainder on the death of either or any of them as to the share of the deceased, to her child or children absolutely, and in default of issue aDd descendants of suck issue to the survivors of kis daughters for life, witk remainder to tkc descendants of suck deceased daugkter or daughters absolutely.\\nThe testator\\u2019s wife as executrix of Ike will in pursuance of the power conferred upon her sold the land and buildings mentioned in the power, and, to induce purchasers to accept the title to the land and the deeds under the sales, released in the deeds to the purchasers her right of dower in the lands conveyed without receiving any compensation therefor.\\nOne of the daughters married and has two children living.\\nOn a bill for instructions\\u2014\\nHeld, that as there was no intimation in the will that the sale of the realty which the executrix was directed to make was for any specific purpose the sale was an out and out conversion of such realty into personalty, and must be deemed to have been made from the testator\\u2019s decease.\\nHeld, further, that the provisions made for the wife out of the personalty were intended by the testator to be exclusive of any claim on her part to any other portion of his personal estate.\\nHeld, further, that the wife was not entitled to any portion of the proceeds of the realty sold under the power as dower or as compensation in lieu of dower.\\nHeld, further, that the children of the married daughter of the testator are not now and will not be entitled to any portion of such proceeds unless they shall survive their mother.\\nInstructions given as to the disposition to be made by the executrix of the proceeds of sale.\\nBill in Equity for instructions.\\nFebruary 24, 1896.\", \"word_count\": \"2214\", \"char_count\": \"12389\", \"text\": \"Matteson, 0. J.\\nThis is a bill for instructions. The case is as follows : George W. Haszard died March 17, 1875, leaving a widow, Susan Haszard, and four daughters, viz., Susan Abbie Arnold' Haszard, Ann Maria Haszard, Hannah Haszard and Sarah Jeanette Haszard. Ann Maria Haszard is now the wife of George E. B. Fairbanks, and has two children, viz., George Walter Fairbanks and Nettie Fairbanks. George W. Haszard in his will, which was duly admitted to probate, named his widow as executrix, and she duly qualified herself to act. The following extracts from the will are the portions material to the consideration of the questions made :\\u2014\\n\\\"I give and bequeath to my beloved wife, Susan Haszard, all my household furniture and family stores, to and for her own use benefit and behoof forever, in lieu of her right of dower in my personal property.\\\"\\n\\\"I direct that my two lots on the Pine Grove Plat in North Providence, my buildings situated on leased land on Carpenter street in said Providence, and my Real Estate in South Kingstown, be sold at as early a period as in the opinion of my said wife shall be consistent with the interest of my estate, and on sale thereof I do authorize and empower my said wife, as executrix of this my will, to sign, seal, acknowledge and deliver to the purchaser or purchasers thereof the requisite Bills of Sale and Deed or Deeds thereof, receive of and from the purchaser or purchasers thereof the amount' the same may he sold for, she investing the net proceeds of such sale or sales in the names of her four children, to wit:\\u2014 Susan Abbie Arnold Haszard, Sarah Jeanette Haszard, Ann Maria Haszard and Hannah Haszard, in the Peoples Savings Bank in Providence or some one or more of the savings institutions in said city, or in lieu of selling said buildings to buy the lot on said Carpenter street if it can be bought.\\\"\\n' ' I also give and bequeath to my said wife, Susan Haszard, all my money with accumulated interest thereon now on deposit in my name in the Peoples Savings Bank and Rhode Island Institution for Savings in Providence, and also all sums of money due owing and payable to me from any person or persons, for and during the term of her natural life, she applying and appropriating the net amount of such receipts and collections in the first place to the payment of all my just debts, funeral expenses and expenses of settling my Estate, and in the second place to invest the residue thereof in some one or more of the Savings Banks or Institutions in said City in her name as executrix, receive the income and produce thereof, and apply and appropriate the same or so much thereof as she shall deem requisite and necessary to and for her comfortable support and maintenance.\\\"\\n\\\"I give and bequeath, subject to the right of dower and power of thirds of my said wife in to and out of the same the free use of the improvements rents profits and income of all my real estate and the then remaining portion of the investment of personal estate to my said children, Susan Abbie Arnold Haszard, Sarah Jeanette Haszard, Ann Maria Haszard and Hannah Haszard, for and during the term of their natural lives, and from after and upon the decease of any or either of them, said Susan Abbie Arnold Haszard, Sarah Jeanette Haszard, Ann Maria Haszard and Hannah Haszard, I give and bequeath the share or portion of said deceased estate to-the child or children of said deceased in fee simple, and in case of the decease of either of my said children or living issue or descendants of any such issue, I give devise and bequeath the then remaining portion of my real and personal estate to the survivors of my said children for life and the descendants of such deceased child or children, their heirs executors administrators and assigns in fee simple.\\\"\\nSusan Haszard, in the exercise of the power conferred on her as executrix, sold and conveyed the two lots on the Pine Grove Plat in North Providence, the buildings situated on the leased land on Carpenter street in Providence, and the real estate in South Kingstown, receiving from the lots on the Pine Grove Plat and the real estate in South Kingstown, less expenses, $1305.08, and for the buildings on the leased land on Carpenter street in Providence $150, which moneys with interest amounting to $88.40, $9.50 of which is for interest on the $150 received for the buildings on Carpenter street, she now holds. . To induce purchasers to accept the title to the land and the deeds under the sales, the executrix released in the deeds to the purchasers her right of dower as widow of the deceased in the lands conveyed, without receiving any compensation for the release.\\nThe questions presented for decision are the following :\\n1. \\u2014 Whether the complainant Susan Haszard, as the widow of the testator, is entitled to any portion of the moneys received from the sales of the real estate or of the income derived from the investment thereof, as compensation for her release of her right of dower or in lieu of such right, and if so in what manner and to what amount should she receive her share or proportion ?\\n2.- \\u2014 Whether the children of Ann Maria Fairbanks are entitled to any portion of the proceeds of the sale ?\\n3. \\u2014 Whether the shares of the complainants therein and the share of the respondent shall be paid directly to them, or de posited in. their names in such manner that they may have the control and use of the principal during their lives?\\n4. \\u2014 Whether the share of the complainants other than Susan Haszard, and of the respondent, shall be invested and held so that the said several children of George W. Haszard shall have the use of the income only during their lives, with remainders over as provided in the residuary clause, and if so as to the method to be followed by the complainant Susan in order to preserve the said remainders ?\\nThe testator directs the sale of his two lots on the Pine Grove Plat in North Providence and his real estate in South Kingstown. As there is no intimation in the will that this sale is for any specific purpose, it must be regarded as an out and out conversion of this real estate into personalty, and must be deemed to have been. made from the testator's decease. King v. King, 13 R. I. 501, 506. The testator bequeaths to his wife his household furniture and family stores in lieu of her right of dower in his personal estate. Though the term \\\"dower\\\" is inapplicable to personalty, his intent is apparent that the provision made for his widow in this and the subsequent clause which gives to her for life the income of his moneys on deposit in the savings banks and of the moneys due and owing to him after payment of his debts, funeral expenses and expenses of administration, was to be exclusive of any claim on her part to any other portion of his personal estate. Having accepted the provision made for her in the will, and the proceeds of the realty directed to be sold being deemed personalty, the widow is estopped from claiming dower or compensation in lieu of dower out of such proceeds, on the principle that one cannot avail himself of the provisions of an instrument which are for his benefit and reject those which are not, but must accept or reject the instrument as a whole. Wilson v. Townshend, 2 Ves. 693, 696 ; Thelusson v. Woodford, 13 Ves. 209, 220 ; Hyde v. Baldwin, 17 Pick. 303, 308 ; Brown v. Ricketts, 3 Johns. Ch. 553, 556.\\nThe view that the widow was not to take any portion of the proceeds of the realty converted into personalty is strengthened, by the direction to her to invest the net proceeds of the sale or sales in the name of the testator's four daughters.\\nIt is our opinion, therefore, in answer to the first question, that the complainant is not entitled to any portion of the proceeds of the realty sold under the power, as dower or as compensation in lieu of dower.\\nThe testator directs that the proceeds of the property sold under the power shall be deposited in the names of his four daughters in the Peoples Savings Bank in Providence, or in some one or more of the other institutions for savings in said city, and gives the income of the fund so deposited to his daughters during their natural lives, with remainder on the decease of either or any as to the share or shares of such deceased, to her child or children absolutely, and in default of such issue and the descendants of such issue, to the survivors of his daughters for life, with remainder to the descendants of such deceased daughter or daughters absolutely. In view of this direction and disposition of the fund, we answer to the third and fourth questions that the fund should be deposited in the names of the daughters in the Peoples Savings Bank or other institution or institutions for savings in Providence, with the provision that the income only shall be paid in equal shares to the daughters for life, and that on the death of either, leaving a child or children, the share of the one so dying shall be paid to her child or children, and that on the decease of the last survivor of the daughters, without leaving a child or children or the descendants of a child or children, the portion of the fund then remaining shall be paid to the descendants of any deceased daughter or daughters.\\nIt follows from the foregoing, and we therefore answer to the second question, that the children of Ann Maria Fairbanks are not at present and will not be entitled to any portions of the fund unless they shall survive their mother. It is unnecessary for the guidance of the complainant to go further and determine in advance the shares of the fund to which they may become entitled on the decease of their mother, and we will not now undertake to do so.\\nCyrus M. Van Slyck & Charles C. Mumford, for complainants.\\nJames Tillinghast, for respondent.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/718443.json b/ri/718443.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..833a3c7eea8cf9f9ed790f15ee7de2ad2ce43273
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/718443.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"718443\", \"name\": \"Allen K. Wilson vs. Edward F. Donnelly et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Wilson v. Donnelly\", \"decision_date\": \"1895-05-16\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"113\", \"last_page\": \"114\", \"citations\": \"19 R.I. 113\", \"volume\": \"19\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:18:45.396333+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Allen K. Wilson vs. Edward F. Donnelly et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"PROVIDENCE COUNTY.\\nAllen K. Wilson vs. Edward F. Donnelly et al.\\nAn action on a bond to satisfy a judgment given to an officer for the purpose of dissolving an attachment, must be brought in the name of the officer; but as he is merely a nominal party his neglect to file the bond with the clerk of the court to which the writ in the attachment suit is returnable, as required by Pub. Stat. R. I. cap. 207, \\u00a7 18, in consequence of which a surety in the bond was led to surrender the security he had taken on becoming surety, constitutes no defence against the surety\\u2019s liability on the bond.\\nSemble, that the surety\\u2019s remedy in such case if he has been injured by the officer\\u2019s neglect to file the bond would be against the officer.\\nDependant\\u2019s petition for new trial.\\nThis was an action of debt on a bond brought in the District Court of the Tenth Judicial District, August 15, 1893. The bond was conditioned to satisfy a judgment and was given to the plaintiff for the purpose of dissolving an attachment made by him on a writ against the defendant Edward F. Donnelly.\\nMay 16, 1895.\", \"word_count\": \"492\", \"char_count\": \"2664\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nWe do not think that the defendants make a case for a new trial. Though the plaintiff may have no personal interest in the bond in suit, but only as trastee for the plaintiff in the attachment suit in which it was given, the bond runs to him and suit on it must be brought in his name. The exceptions were presented to the court for allowance three days later than the extended time allowed by the court. The court could not do otherwise than disallow them for that reason. The petition does not set forth nor is there any affidavit accompanying it which sets forth the facts on which -the accident, mistake or unforeseen cause relied on as the ground of a new trial arose.\\nThomas W. Robinson, for plaintiff.\\nThomas J. McParlin, for defendants.\\nThe defence set up by the defendant John E. Donnelly against his liability on the bond in suit, as appears by the statement of exceptions on file among the papers, was that the plaintiff on accepting the bond did not file it with the clerk of the court as provided by Pub. Stat. it. I. cap. 207, \\u00a7 18, and that the defendant surety in consequence of such neglect was led to surrender the security which he had received for becoming surety. We do not think th\\u00e1t such neglect of the officer would constitute any defence to the present suit in which he is merely a nominal party, the real party in interest being the plaintiff in the attachment, to dissolve which the bond was given. If the surety has been injured by the officer's neglect to file the bond as alleged, his remedy would seem to be a suit against the officer.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/7308315.json b/ri/7308315.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3c19f497389b66122cb5ac497c5f39d4a430dc1a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/7308315.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7308315\", \"name\": \"STATE v. Derrick R. OLIVER\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Oliver\", \"decision_date\": \"2013-06-26\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2009-340-C.A.\", \"first_page\": \"549\", \"last_page\": \"558\", \"citations\": \"68 A.3d 549\", \"volume\": \"68\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:03:34.570220+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"STATE v. Derrick R. OLIVER.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE v. Derrick R. OLIVER.\\nNo. 2009-340-C.A.\\nSupreme Court of Rhode Island.\\nJune 26, 2013.\\nChristopher R. Bush, Department of Attorney General, Providence, for State.\\nJanice M. Weisfeld, Office of the Public Defender, Providence, for Defendant.\\nPresent: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"4399\", \"char_count\": \"26880\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nJustice ROBINSON,\\nfor the Court.\\nThe defendant, Derrick R. Oliver, appeals after being convicted of five criminal counts. On appeal, the defendant raises two issues. First, he argues that the trial court erred when it did not dismiss the charges against him after the state allegedly failed to comply with the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (the IADA or the act), G.L.1956 chapter 13 of title 13. Specifically, the defendant, who was a prisoner in Massachusetts, contends that he should have been brought to trial in Rhode Island within 180 days after receipt of his request for h final disposition of the charges against him. Second, the defendant argues that his convictions for both larceny and assault with a dangerous weapon violated the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgments of conviction.\\nI\\nFacts and Travel\\nThis appeal relates to two criminal cases that were eventually consolidated for trial. On June 23, 2005, the state filed a criminal information in the Superior Court for Providence County charging defendant with (1) domestic assault with a dangerous weapon (a motor vehicle), (2) assault with a dangerous weapon (a motor vehicle), and (3) violation of a protective order issued by the Family Court (P2/05-1869A). Those charges arose from an incident on September 21, 2004; it was alleged that defendant had purposefully followed and rear-ended a car in which his ex-girlfriend and a friend of hers were the occupants.\\nOn October 28, 2005, a Providence County grand jury indicted defendant for (1) first degree robbery, (2) assault with a dangerous weapon (a knife), and (3) violating a no-contact order (P1/05-3178A). Those charges related to an incident that occurred in a parking lot on April 25, 2005; it was alleged that defendant had stabbed the same ex-girlfriend with a knife and repeatedly hit her face against the ground as she was trying to enter her car after work. It was further alleged that defendant had then taken his ex-girlfriend's purse and cell phone and had driven off in her car.\\nOn July 27, 2005, defendant was arrested in Fall River, Massachusetts; he was thereafter tried and convicted in Massachusetts on a separate assault charge. In a letter dated January 13, 2006 (the de-tainer), the Rhode Island Office of the Attorney General notified the Bristol County House of Corrections (the Massachusetts institution in which defendant was imprisoned) that there were outstanding arrest warrants relating to the two above-referenced Rhode Island criminal cases. The detainer went on to ask that defendant be advised of his \\\"right to make a request for final disposition\\\" of the Rhode Island charges pursuant to the IADA; that act provides that a defendant must be brought to trial within 180 days after \\\"he or she shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court written notice of the place of his or her imprisonment and his or her request for a final disposition Section 13-13-2, art. 111(a).\\nAt some time after the January 13, 2006 detainer was sent, the state received defendant's request for disposition under the IADA. On May 5, 2006, defendant was arraigned in Rhode Island with respect to P2/05-1869A and P1/05-3178A. On April 26, 2007 \\u2014 almost a year after his arraignment \\u2014 defendant filed motions to dismiss with respect to both cases; he contended that dismissal was required because the criminal charges against him had \\\"not been disposed of within the time period mandated by\\\" the IADA.\\nOn May 15, 2007, the state objected to defendant's motions, and the Superior Court held a hearing on that same day. At the hearing, the motion justice denied defendant's motion to dismiss, reasoning that the continuances that had been obtained by defendant made it \\\"unreasonable to expect that the case [would] be tried\\\" within the IADA timeline.\\nOn May 31, 2007, the Superior Court consolidated the two cases for trial. On November 6, 2007, defendant filed a motion requesting that the court reconsider its May 15 decision denying the motion to dismiss. In his motion for reconsideration, defendant reiterated his argument that, since trial had not commenced within the time frame mandated by the IADA, the case must be dismissed. The defendant also requested an evidentiary hearing with respect to the IADA issues.\\nOn April 24, 2008, after extensive briefing and after hearing oral arguments by both parties, the motion justice issued a written decision denying defendant's motion to reconsider. Regarding defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing, the motion justice noted that, when litigating defendant's initial motion to dismiss, defense counsel had \\\"opted to rely on the [c]ourt documents and docket sheets in determining the travel of the case.\\\" The motion justice stated that defense counsel had made \\\"a tactical decision\\\" that \\\"[could not] be revisited\\\"; accordingly, he denied defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing.\\nThe motion justice then turned to the merits of defendant's motion to reconsider. The court noted that it was \\\"difficult for [the court] to calculate when the one hundred eighty (180) day deadline would have expired because none of the three[ ] case files contained] a request from the Defendant seeking disposition of the pending charges.\\\" The motion justice recognized, however, that one of the case files included a document filed with the court on April 26, 2006. He noted that the document \\\"seem[ed] to indicate that custody was offered to Rhode Island at the request of the Defendant\\\" on April 17, 2006. The motion justice's decision stated that, \\\"[i]f the [April 17 request was] accurate, the one hundred eighty (180) days began to run on April 17, 2006.\\\" The motion justice then stated that, regardless of the exact date on which the 180-day deadline began to run, it was clear that defendant was not brought to trial within the time frame provided for in the IADA.\\nThe motion justice went on to find that the case had been \\\"continued nineteen times before the Defendant moved to dismiss the charges for untimely prosecution.\\\" The motion justice further found that thirteen of those continuances were attributable to defendant and that four of those thirteen continuances were for the purpose of allowing defendant \\\"to consider offers by the prosecution to dispose of the cases by way of a plea agreement.\\\" The motion justice denied defendant's motion to reconsider, ruling as follows:\\n\\\"The Defendant cannot be permitted to request numerous continuances and then move for dismissal when the trial does not occur within the proscribed time period. Permitting him to do so would undermine the judicial system, and would allow a defendant to avoid prosecution through his own delay.\\\"\\nOn September 15, 2008, defendant filed another motion to dismiss, which was unrelated to his earlier IADA motions. This most recent motion contended that the charges against defendant for both first degree robbery and assault with a dangerous weapon in P1/05-3178A should be dismissed \\\"on the grounds of double jeopardy.\\\" The defendant argued that the charge of assault with a dangerous weapon would \\\"not require proof of a fact that is not already required to be proved as part of the robbery.\\\"\\nOn March 11, 2009 \\u2014 the day before trial began \\u2014 the justice of the Superior Court who would be presiding over the trial conducted a hearing on defendant's double jeopardy motion. After listening to arguments from both parties, the trial justice, noting that she would be sitting without a jury, deferred her ruling on defendant's motion; she stated that she would \\\"address [the motion] if it becomes pertinent as time goes on.\\\"\\nThe defendant's three-day bench trial began on March 12, 2009. On March 16, defendant was convicted of domestic assault with a dangerous weapon and assault with a dangerous weapon in P2/05-1869A (involving charges which stemmed from the motor vehicle incident on September 21, 2004). As for P1/05-3178A (involving charges which stemmed from the incident in the parking lot on April 25, 2005), defendant was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon and violating a no-contact order.\\nWith respect to the robbery charge in P1/05-3178A, the trial justice requested further briefing from the parties on the double jeopardy argument that had been raised in defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss.\\nOn May 21, 2009, after the requested additional briefs were filed, the Superior Court convicted defendant of the lesser included offense of larceny. The trial court, in finding defendant guilty of larceny rather than robbery, stated:\\n\\\"Although the defendant committed the theft of the purse and car, grabbing the keys, within a short time frame after he completed the assault with a dangerous weapon on [his ex-girlfriend], it was a subsequent event. He did not attack her to steal her car or her purse. [The assault] had nothing to do with a robbery. It had to do with rage against a particular woman. [B]ased on the evidence presented, I cannot reasonably infer that the assault was committed so that he would have access to her purse and her car. [T]he lesser included of larceny is the more appropriate finding.\\\"\\nOn August 6, the court sentenced defendant to a total of twenty-nine years to serve. The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.\\nII\\nAnalysis\\nA\\nThe IADA Contention\\nThe defendant argues that, because the state did not bring him to trial within 180 days of its receipt of his request for disposition, the state thereby failed to comply with the IADA, and his case should have been dismissed. We disagree.\\nThis Court reviews de novo a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss based on the IADA deadlines. State v. Clifton, 111 A.2d 1272, 1279 (R.I.2001). However, we accord deference to the factual findings which underlie such a decision. State v. Werner, 831 A.2d 188, 191 (R.I.2003).\\nThe IADA is an interstate compact among participating states which is \\\"designed to expedite the trial of criminal charges pending in one state (the receiving state) while the person is incarcerated in another state (the sending state).\\\" Werner, 831 A.2d at 191. In Rhode Island, the IADA is codified within chapter 13 of title 13 of the General Laws. The section of the IADA that is pertinent to defendant's appeal provides as follows:\\n\\\"Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment, information, or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he or she shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty (180) days after he or she shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his or her imprisonment and his or her request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint; provided, that, for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his or her counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.\\\" Section 13-13-2, art. 111(a).\\nThe IADA further provides that, if a defendant's trial does not begin within the above-referenced time frame, then the court must dismiss the charges against the defendant. Section 13-13-2, art. V(c). However, that statutory mandate concerning dismissal of charges has been the subject of significant judicial construction; as a result, dismissal does not automatically occur every time that the 180-day period has run without a trial having begun. Indeed, we have expressly stated that the IADA \\\"was not designed to protect against delays caused by actions of a defendant.\\\" State v. Shatney, 572 A.2d 872, 875, 876 (R.I.1990) (upholding a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss pursuant to the deadlines set forth in the IADA where the delay was due to continuances requested by the defendant). Rather, \\\"[t]he purpose of the [IADA] is to assure incarcerated defendants speedy trials and to protect them from delays in trial caused by prosecuting authorities.\\\" State v. Lionberg, 533 A.2d 1172, 1179 (R.I.1987) (emphasis added).\\nAssuming that the 180-day time-line began to run on April 17, 2006, the deadline for trial to begin would have been October 13, 2006. The defendant's trial did not begin until March 12, 2009. Those facts, however, do not tell the entire story. According to the timelines submitted by the parties to the motion justice, there were nine continuances granted by the court between April 17, 2006 and the deadline of October 13, 2006. The record that was before the motion justice reflects that six of those continuances were attributable to the actions of defendant: four included a request for a continuance that was made on behalf of defendant and two were due to the fact that defense counsel was court-excused. Applying to the facts of this case the principle that the IADA \\\"was not designed to protect against delays caused by actions of a defendant,\\\" we hold that defendant should not be permitted to take advantage of the delays for which he was responsible. See Shatney, 572 A.2d at 875.\\nThe remaining three continuances were requested by the state. The defendant, however, never objected to those continuances, nor did he ever raise the IADA deadline during any of the nine hearings on the continuances.\\nGiven defendant's failure to ever raise his IADA argument before the deadline expired (despite having had numerous opportunities to bring it to the court's attention), it is our opinion that he forfeited that argument. As the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stated in United States v. Dowdell, 595 F.3d 50, 64 (1st Cir.2010):\\n\\\"We do not look favorably on [IADA] arguments that are not raised until the trial judge is no longer in a position to avoid a violation. Addressing a similar scenario arising on habeas review, the Supreme Court endorsed the lower court's observation that '[i]t would not have been difficult for the judge to advance the date of the trial or make a finding on the record of good cause, either of which would have satisfied [an IADA deadline]. Because the subject never came up, however, the trial judge overlooked the problem.' [Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 351, 114 S.Ct. 2291, 129 L.Ed.2d 277 (1994) (quoting Reed v. Clark, 984 F.2d 209, 213 (7th Cir.1993)) ]. The Court concluded that '[w]hen a defendant obscures [an IADA deadline] and avoids clear objection until the clock has run, cause for collateral review scarcely exists.' [Id. at 349, 114 S.Ct. 2291.] The same is true on direct review. A defendant who does not timely raise his IAD rights in district court forfeits those rights on appeal.\\\" (Emphasis added.)\\nIn our judgment, a defendant should not be permitted to ask for and assent to continuance after continuance and then seek to suddenly ensnare the state and the court in a \\\"gotcha\\\" moment once an IADA deadline has passed. See id.; see also Puleio v. Vose, 830 F.2d 1197, 1203 (1st Cir.1987) (\\\"The law ministers to the vigilant not to those who sleep upon perceptible rights.\\\").\\nThe defendant also argues that the continuances did not affect the IADA deadline because the act provides for extensions only \\\"for good cause shown in open court.\\\" The United States Supreme Court, however, has recognized that the \\\"good cause\\\" provision \\\"is, by clear implication, the sole means by which the prosecution can obtain an extension of the time limits over the defendant's objection.\\\" New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 116, 120 S.Ct. 659, 145 L.Ed.2d 560 (2000) (emphasis added). In this case, defendant never objected to the continuances sought by the prosecution.\\nThis case simply \\\"does not present a situation in which a defendant is banging on the court house doors demanding that he be tried immediately.\\\" See State v. Moosey, 504 A.2d 1001, 1003-04 (R.I.1986) (internal quotation marks omitted) (rejecting a defendant's argument based on the IADA deadline where \\\"the actions of [the] defendant and his counsel resulted in delay of the trial\\\"). Accordingly, it is our opinion that the trial court did not err when it denied defendant's motion to dismiss.\\nB\\nThe Double Jeopardy Contention\\nThe defendant was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon and larceny in P1/05-3178A (relating to the April 2005 incident in a parking lot). On appeal, the defendant argues that conviction on those two charges violated his constitutional rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Again, we disagree.\\nOur analysis of an alleged error based on double jeopardy principles \\\"is a mixed question of law and fact of constitutional dimension; thus, our review is de novo.\\\" State v. Stone, 924 A.2d 773, 778 (R.I.2007). However, within that review, \\\"we still accord a hearing justice's findings of historical fact, and inferences drawn from those facts, great deference Rice v. State, 38 A.3d 9, 16 (R.I.2012).\\nThe Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution \\\"protects criminal defendants from being 'twice put in jeopardy' for the same offense.\\\" State v. Bolarinho, 850 A.2d 907, 909 (R.I.2004); see also State v. Gordon, 30 A.3d 636, 639 (R.I.2011) (recognizing that the \\\"essence\\\" of the Double Jeopardy Clause \\\"prohibits multiple prosecutions for the same offense\\\" (internal quotation marks omitted)). This Court applies the \\\"same evidence\\\" test to determine whether a defendant has indeed been twice put in jeopardy. State v. Scanlon, 982 A.2d 1268, 1277 (R.I.2009) (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932)). That test provides that, \\\"where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.\\\" State v. Davis, 120 R.I. 82, 86, 384 A.2d 1061, 1064 (1978) (quoting Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. 180); see also State v. Day, 925 A.2d 962, 977 (R.I.2007).\\nThe defendant's argument focuses on the fact that, in the indictment in P1/05-3178A, he was originally charged with (1) robbery and (2) assault with a dangerous weapon. He contends that the \\\"charge of assault with a dangerous weapon was clearly a lesser-included offense[ ] of robbery\\\" and that, therefore, he could not have been convicted on both counts. It is true that, given the protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause, a defendant cannot be punished for both a greater and lesser included offense based on the same act. E.g., State v. Tessier, 589 A.2d 1199, 1200 (R.I.1991).\\nAssuming, for the sake of argument, that the charge of assault with a dangerous weapon was a lesser included offense of the robbery charge, defendant's argument overlooks a critical fact: he was not convicted of robbery. Instead, the trial court convicted defendant of larceny. Assault with a dangerous weapon is clearly not a lesser included offense of larceny (a crime that has nothing to do with a threat of injury). Compare State v. Briggs, 787 A.2d 479, 487 (R.I.2001) (defining larceny as a \\\"wrongful taking without right and a carrying away of another's personal property with a felonious intent to steal\\\" (internal quotation marks omitted)) with State v. Cabo, 887 A.2d 370, 372-73 (R.I.2005) (noting that assault with a dangerous weapon consists of \\\"[1] any unlawful offer to do corporal injury to another[,] [2] under such circumstances as may create a reasonable apprehension of immediate injury unless the person so threatened takes action or inaction to avoid it, coupled with [3] a present ability to carry the offer into effect\\\" (internal quotation marks omitted)).\\nIt is our opinion that, in view of the facts of this case, the convictions for larceny and assault with a dangerous weapon do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial justice found that the assault and larceny convictions were based on distinct acts. Specifically, she found that the defendant \\\"did not attack [his ex-girlfriend] to steal her car or purse.\\\" Rather, the trial justice recognized that the larceny \\\"was a subsequent event\\\" that was not related to the assault with a dangerous weapon \\u2014 the latter being a crime which was motivated by the defendant's \\\"rage\\\" against his ex-girlfriend. The Double Jeopardy Clause is concerned with successive punishment for \\\"the same act or transaction.\\\" Davis, 120 R.I. at 86, 384 A.2d at 1064 (emphasis added) (quoting Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. 180). The convictions in this case do not raise such concerns because the assault with a dangerous weapon was an event that was entirely distinct from the larceny.\\nIII\\nConclusion\\nFor the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the Superior Court's judgments of conviction. The record in this case may be returned to that tribunal.\\n. The defendant's ex-girlfriend, who was the alleged victim in the two Rhode Island cases at issue in the present appeal, was also the victim involved in the Massachusetts assault case.\\n. In addition to the two criminal cases that defendant is challenging on appeal, the state had filed charges against defendant in a third case; the Superior Court eventually dismissed those charges.\\n. The defendant waived his right to a jury trial at the March 11, 2009 hearing.\\n. The charge in P2/05-1869A relating to an alleged violation of a protective order was dismissed by the trial justice after the state tried (unsuccessfully) to amend that charge to reflect the fact that defendant had allegedly violated a District Court protective order\\u2014 and not, as the information charged, a Family Court protective order.\\n. In P2/05-1869A, defendant was sentenced as follows: (1) for domestic assault with a dangerous weapon, twenty years, with eight years to serve, twelve years suspended with probation; and (2) for assault with a dangerous weapon, ten years, with two years to serve, eight years suspended with probation (to be served concurrently with the assault sentence). In P1/05-3178A, defendant was sentenced as follows: (1) for larceny, ten years, with one year to serve, nine years suspended with probation; (2) for domestic assault with a dangerous weapon, twenty years to serve (to be served concurrently with the larceny sentence and consecutively to the sentences imposed in P2/05-1869A); and (3) for the violation of a no-contact order, one year to serve (to be served consecutively to all sentences).\\n. The IADA \\\"rests its constitutional footing on the Compact Clause of the United States Constitution\\\"; therefore, the act \\\"is subject to construction under federal law.\\\" State v. Clifton, 777 A.2d 1272, 1279 (R.I.2001).\\n.In this case, it is unclear when (or if) the 180-day clock actually began to tick. The timeline begins once the out-of-state prisoner's request for final disposition \\\"has actually been delivered\\\" to both the prosecuting officer and the court. Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 52, 113 S.Ct. 1085, 122 L.Ed.2d 406 (1993). The motion justice found that \\\"[r]ecords at the Department of the Attorney General indicate that the State received notice from defendant on April 17, 2006.\\\" As for notice to the court, the Superior Court files in P2/05-1869A and P1/05-3178A do-not include defendant's request for a final disposition. The motion justice noted that the record contained a letter filed with the court on April 26, 2006 that \\\"seem[ed] to indicate that custody was offered to Rhode Island at the request of the Defendant.\\\" That filing, however, does not technically satisfy the statute, which requires delivery of the request for disposition itself.\\nWe note that the \\\"inmate bears the burden of demonstrating compliance with the formal procedural requirements of Article III.\\\" United States v. Henson, 945 F.2d 430, 434 (1st Cir.1991). Despite the lack of clear evidence as to when (or if) the court received defendant's request for disposition, we shall follow the trial justice's lead and assume (without deciding) that the IADA clock began to run on April 17, 2006.\\n. The motion justice found that those time-lines \\\"serve[d] as an accurate summary of the continuances granted in this case.\\\"\\n. A transcript submitted to the motion justice indicates that defense counsel had \\\"No objection\\\" to the state's first request. As to the state's second request, defense counsel stated: \\\"I don't mind a week continuance, your Hon- or.\\\" As for the state's third request for a continuance, defense counsel voiced no objection.\\n. The defendant attempts to distinguish the Dowdell case that is cited in the text by noting that the defendant in that case \\\"never moved to dismiss in the trial court on IADA grounds.\\\" While that is true, the First Circuit's opinion does not rely on that point. Instead, the Dowdell opinion turns on the fact that the defendant \\\"obscure[d] [an IADA deadline] and avoid[ed] clear objection until the clock ha[d] run\\\" \\u2014 which is exactly what happened in the case that is now before us. See United States v. Dowdell, 595 F.3d 50, 64 (1st Cir.2010).\\n. The defendant challenges his convictions on the basis of the Double Jeopardy Clauses in both the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions. This Court has noted that the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution \\\"is echoed in [a]rticle 1, section 7, of the Rhode Island Constitution.\\\" State v. Grayhurst, 852 A.2d 491, 501 (R.I.2004); see also State v. Marsich, 10 A.3d 435, 442 (R.I.2010).\\n. A lesser included offense is \\\"[o]ne that does not require proof of any additional element beyond those required by the greater offense.\\\" State v. Briggs, 787 A.2d 479, 487 (R.I.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).\\n.Larceny is a lesser included offense of robbery. State v. Rolon, 45 A.3d 518, 524 (R.I.2012). In this nonjury trial, the trial justice was able to enter such a conviction-an \\\"accusation of [a] greater crime carries with it the charge that he has committed all necessarily included lesser offenses.\\\" See State v. Walker, 667 A.2d 1242, 1249 (R.I.1995); see also G.L. 1956 \\u00a7 12-17-14; cf. State v. Tessier, 589 A.2d 1199, 1200 (R.I.1991) (\\\"Since the defendant is effectively put on notice of the possible conviction of a lesser offense supported by the evidence, such an individual may adequately prepare a defense.\\\" (internal quotation marks omitted)).\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/7365839.json b/ri/7365839.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c63dc50a430f9cb903faa7a134d9d0dcc3173b50
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/7365839.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7365839\", \"name\": \"Arthur D'AMARIO, III v. LAW FIRM OF TATE & ELIAS et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"D'Amario v. Law Firm of Tate & Elias\", \"decision_date\": \"1993-11-19\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 93-186-Appeal\", \"first_page\": \"270\", \"last_page\": \"270\", \"citations\": \"633 A.2d 270\", \"volume\": \"633\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:28:33.573515+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"LEDERBERG, J., did not participate.\", \"parties\": \"Arthur D\\u2019AMARIO, III v. LAW FIRM OF TATE & ELIAS et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Arthur D\\u2019AMARIO, III v. LAW FIRM OF TATE & ELIAS et al.\\nNo. 93-186-Appeal.\\nSupreme Court of Rhode Island.\\nNov. 19, 1993.\\nPlaintiff, pro se.\\nMark Reynolds, John Boland, Robert D\\u2019Amico, Seth Bowerman.\", \"word_count\": \"220\", \"char_count\": \"1391\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nThis matter came before the Supreme Court on November 1, 1993 pursuant to an order requiring the plaintiff to appear and to show cause why his appeal should not be summarily denied and dismissed..\\nAppearing pro se, plaintiff appeals the denial by a justice of the Superior Court of his motions under Super.R.Civ.P. 15(a) and 60(b). The plaintiff advances several arguments to support his position. They include his assertions that the Superior Court justice abused his discretion in denying his motions, that plaintiff has newly discovered evidence, and that defendants made fraudulent representations upon which his lawyers relied. The plaintiff has not persuaded this court that he has newly discovered evidence or any other reason to justify reversing the Superior Court justice's denial of his motions. After hearing the arguments of counsel and Mr. D'Amario and reviewing the memoranda that the parties submitted (including a twenty-page memorandum of law that Mr. D'Amario filed), it is the conclusion of this court that cause has not been shown.\\nThe plaintiffs appeal is therefore denied and dismissed. The judgment appealed from is affirmed.\\nLEDERBERG, J., did not participate.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/7366486.json b/ri/7366486.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cf51a24f38a2e5ae4ef7c96d8e832d01f682540d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/7366486.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7366486\", \"name\": \"Ruth ROY et al. v. RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Roy v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services\", \"decision_date\": \"1993-05-18\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 92-661-Appeal\", \"first_page\": \"1092\", \"last_page\": \"1093\", \"citations\": \"624 A.2d 1092\", \"volume\": \"624\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:28:40.322489+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Ruth ROY et al. v. RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Ruth ROY et al. v. RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES et al.\\nNo. 92-661-Appeal.\\nSupreme Court of Rhode Island.\\nMay 18, 1993.\\nGretchen Bath, Rhode Island Legal Services, Providence, for plaintiff.\\nJeffrey Pine, Atty. Gen., Jacqueline Kelly, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.\", \"word_count\": \"749\", \"char_count\": \"4694\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nSHEA, Justice.\\nThis matter was before the Supreme Court on appeal by the defendant, the Rhode Island Department of Human Services (DHS or the department), from a judgment of the Superior Court that enjoined enforcement of an emergency rule promulgated by the department. The judgment ordered that all persons whose benefits had been terminated under the emergency rule were to be given \\\"notice relief,\\\" and it ordered the restoration of lost benefits.\\nThe department is an agency within the executive branch of State government, G.L. 1956 (1988 Reenactment) chapter 12 of title 42. Under its statutory mandate DHS is responsible for the management, supervision, and control of various social-service programs. Among those functions vested within DHS are the supervision and management of various forms of state and federally funded public financial-assistance programs. Section 42-12-4. Such programs include the General Public Assistance program (GPA), which is the subject of this litigation. Unlike other various financial-assistance programs, the GPA program is a 100-percent state-funded program. It is the purpose of the program to provide general public assistance to any resident of the State of Rhode Island who is eligible, pursuant to applicable statutes and in accordance with rules and regulations promulgated by DHS, and who is in need. G.L.1956 (1990 Reenactment) \\u00a7 40-6-3, as amended by P.L.1992, ch. 133, art. 46, \\u00a7 1. The plaintiffs are indigent women who for many years received state GPA benefits as \\\"essential persons,\\\" persons who are required to stay at home to provide care for severely disabled family members.\\nThe department abruptly terminated their benefits in August 1992 after promulgating an emergency rule eliminating \\\"the essential person category\\\" from the GPA program. The plaintiffs filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment in regard to the validity of the emergency rule pursuant to G.L.1956 (1988 Reenactment) \\u00a7 42-35-7 of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).\\nAfter a hearing in the Superior Court, the trial justice entered a final judgment and order on December 14, 1992. The judge declared the emergency rule invalid on two bases under the APA. First he ruled that DHS had no basis for proceeding with the emergency rule making and thus had adopted the emergency rule in violation of \\u00a7 42-35-3(a) by failing to provide advance notice and opportunity for comment. The second basis was that even if DHS had the authority to proceed with emergency rule making, it failed to make the filing and statement required by \\u00a7 42-35-3(b).\\nThe trial justice enjoined enforcement of the emergency rule, \\\"unless and until DHS promulgated a rule in accordance with G.L. 1956 (1988 Reenactment) \\u00a7 42-35-3(a).\\\" The trial justice ordered that all persons whose benefits had been terminated under the rule be given \\\"notice relief,\\\" and he ordered the restoration of lost benefits.\\nAt the request of DHS the trial justice granted a temporary stay entered on January 25, 1992, to allow DHS to seek relief in this court. This court denied the DHS request for a stay on January 22, 1993. Meanwhile DHS had initiated a \\\"notice and comment\\\" process, thereby providing the public with notice and an opportunity for comment and a public hearing as was ordered by the Superior Court.\\nOn December 31,1992, shortly before the motion for stay was considered in this court, DHS filed a final rule in accordance with the requirements of \\u00a7 42-35-3(a), eliminating the essential-persons category. That rule has been in effect since January 22, 1993, and plaintiffs do not challenge its validity.\\nAt oral argument plaintiffs conceded that DHS has complied with all other provisions of the Superior Court order in that they have been issued the required notice and have received their retroactive benefits and other essential persons have received the relief to which the Superior Court order under review entitled them.\\nAlthough the defendants argue that this court should consider this appeal and address the department's emergency-rule-making authority under the APA, it is clear that the issues have become moot. At this juncture the court could not provide either party with any practical relief.\\nFor these reasons the defendant department's appeal is denied and dismissed, pro forma, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, and the papers of the case are remanded to the Superior Court.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/7389903.json b/ri/7389903.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e75593bc237f46902106c9abfa84d7ce4e9b6ab7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/7389903.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7389903\", \"name\": \"GENERAL ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA v. Richard R. OLIVIER et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"General Accident Insurance Co. of America v. Olivier\", \"decision_date\": \"1990-05-23\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 89-3-Appeal\", \"first_page\": \"1240\", \"last_page\": \"1243\", \"citations\": \"574 A.2d 1240\", \"volume\": \"574\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:11:58.553564+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"GENERAL ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA v. Richard R. OLIVIER et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"GENERAL ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA v. Richard R. OLIVIER et al.\\nNo. 89-3-Appeal.\\nSupreme Court of Rhode Island.\\nMay 23, 1990.\\nFrank J. Manni, John A. Baglini, Higgins & Slattery, Providence, for plaintiff.\\nArlene M. Violet, Barrington, for defendants.\", \"word_count\": \"1971\", \"char_count\": \"12095\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nWEISBERGER, Justice.\\nThis case comes before us on the appeal of the defendants from a declaratory judgment entered in the Superior Court denying coverage under the uninsured-motorist provisions and medical-payment provisions of an insurance policy. We reverse. The facts of the case as agreed by the parties are as follows.\\n\\\"AGREED STATEMENT OF FACTS\\n\\\"1. Plaintiff, on or about, October 10, 1982, issued and delivered to Susan E. Olivier, of 152 Carlson Drive, in Cumberland, Rhode Island, its Personal Auto Policy, bearing No. RPA45-356-59, with effective dates from October 10, 1982 to April 10, 1983.\\n\\\"2. Said policy contains an uninsured motorist coverage section designated Part C, as well as a medical payments coverage section designated Part B.\\n\\\"3. Defendants have asserted a demand for arbitration under the uninsured motorist coverage for the wrongful death of the insured, Susan Olivier, and also presented a demand for payment to recover funeral expenses under the medical payments coverage.\\n\\\"4. Plaintiff, General Accident Insurance Company of America, asserted that the policy did not afford uninsured motorist coverage for either claim and filed this complaint for declaratory judgment and obtained a stay of the arbitration proceeding pending resolution of the issue of coverage.\\n\\\"5. On or about November 7, 1982, Susan E. Olivier was a passenger in a motor vehicle owned and operated by Mark E. Sawaia, which was in collision with a motor vehicle operated by Richard W. Morin on Diamond Hill Road in Cumberland, Rhode Island.\\n\\\"6. Subsequent to said accident, while the said Susan E. Olivier was present and while the accident was under investigation by members of the Cumberland Police Department, the said Richard W. Morin shot and killed the said Susan E. Olivier.\\n\\\"7. Richard W. Morin's negligent operation of his motor vehicle was the proximate cause of the accident when he struck a vehicle in which the insured, Susan E. Olivier, was a passenger. Mr. Morin's vehicle was uninsured on the date of the accident.\\n\\\"8. At the time Susan E. Olivier was shot and killed, she was not physically present in any motor vehicle, but was about 117 feet away from Mark Sawaia's vehicle in which she had been a passenger, and at the time she was shot, she was near the left rear wheel of Police Car 483.\\n\\\"9. Cumberland Police Officer Joseph James, asked decedent, Susan E. Olivier, and Mark Sawaia to sit in Police Vehicle 433 where it was warm and to stay there until someone would come and talk to them, as the police intended to speak with them regarding the automobile accident, and in walking to Police Car 433, the insured, Susan E. Olivier, and Mark Sawaia walked from a point just south of the Morin vehicle, continuing about 15 feet past the rear of the Morin vehicle to get to Police Car 433.\\n\\\"10. Officer Joseph James left them to go and retrieve Mr. Sawaia's registration and Susan E. Olivier's pocketbook from Sawaia's vehicle.\\n\\\"11. The Sawaia vehicle was located at all times after the accident lh on and lk off the sidewalk in front of 1320 Diamond Hill Road facing south about 103 feet south of the Morin vehicle.\\n\\\"12. The defendants are the duly appointed Co-Administrators of the Estate of Susan E. Olivier, having been appointed by the Cumberland Probate Court.\\\"\\nIn support of their appeal, defendants, the co-administrators, argue that there is a sufficient nexus between the automobile accident clearly caused by the negligence of Richard W. Morin and the death of the decedent to warrant coverage under the policy conditions. We shall divide this contention into its component parts.\\nI Occupancy\\nThe plaintiff insurer claims, and the trial justice held, that coverage under this policy must be denied as a result of the fact that at the time defendants' decedent was shot, she was not an occupant of her motor vehicle. The facts indicate that plaintiff had left the motor vehicle in order to furnish information to a police officer and was located approximately 117 feet away from the vehicle in which she had been a passenger. In determining whether the decedent came within the term \\\"occupying,\\\" we are persuaded by the analysis of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court contained in Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Contrisciane, 504 Pa. 328, 473 A.2d 1005 (1984). In that case the court found that a motorist who had been involved in an accident with another party was struck by another vehicle while he stood by a police car providing information relating to his driver's license and owner's card. The driver of the vehicle causing the accident was uninsured. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court set forth criteria under which a motorist using an insured vehicle would be considered to be \\\"occupying\\\" that vehicle within the meaning of the policy.\\n\\\"(1) there is a causal relation or connection between the injury and the use of the insured vehicle;\\n\\\"(2) the person asserting coverage must be in a reasonably close geographic proximity to the insured vehicle, although the person need not be actually touching it;\\n\\\"(3) the person must be vehicle oriented rather than highway or sidewalk oriented at the time; and\\n\\\"(4) the person must also be engaged in a transaction essential to the use of the vehicle at the time.\\\" 504 Pa. at 336, 473 A.2d at 1009.\\nIn applying the facts of the case to the foregoing criteria, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania observed:\\n\\\"At all times the decedent was engaged in transactions essential to his continued use of the vehicle, and it was only be cause of the mandated requirements of the statute and the police officer that decedent found himself physically out of contact with his vehicle. Finally, it was the use of the vehicle which precipitated the whole unfortunate series of events.\\\" Id.\\nIn the case at bar, the holding of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would be most applicable. The decedent here was a passenger in an insured motor vehicle when the accident occurred. She was requested to leave that motor vehicle by a Cumberland police officer and sit in his police vehicle until they were interviewed concerning the facts relating to the accident. As in Contrisciane this transaction was related to her occupancy of the insured motor vehicle. She was certainly vehicle oriented at the time the fatal shot was fired. It was her status as a passenger in the insured vehicle that precipitated the whole unfortunate series of events. Consequently we are of the opinion that at the time the decedent was shot she came within the definition of \\\"covered person\\\" as a passenger occupying a covered automobile.\\nII Accident\\nUnder the terms of the policy of insurance relating to uninsured-motorists' coverage, it was necessary that the injury be \\\"caused by an accident.\\\" The plaintiff argues and many courts have agreed that an intentional injury would not come within the definition of \\\"accident.\\\" This precise question was carefully considered by the Supreme Court of Florida in Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Novak, 453 So.2d 1116 (Fla.1984).\\nIn that case the personal representative of a deceased motorist sought compensation for his daughter's death from her uninsured-motorist carrier. The decedent had been shot by a deranged person who had asked her for a ride. The insurance carrier denied coverage partly on the ground that this injury was willful rather than accidental. The court held that viewed from the perspective of the decedent, the occurrence was a most unexpected and unfortunate accident. The court noted the definition of accident as \\\"an unusual, fortuitous, unexpected, unforeseen, or unlooked for event, happening, or occurrence .\\\" Id. at 1118 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 30 (rev. 4th ed.1968)). The court also relied in part upon the mental illness of the person who had fired the fatal shot. We do not believe that this latter element was essential to the court's determination. It is, of course, most significant that viewed from the perspective of the decedent in the case at bar, the shooting by Richard Morin as he was being held by the Cumberland police was certainly an unusual, unexpected and unforeseen occurrence. We therefore conclude that the decedent's death, from her perspective, was caused by an accident.\\nIll Nexus between Occupancy of Automobile and Decedent's Injury\\nThe policy provision for uninsured-motorist coverage does require that the injury \\\"must arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured motor vehicle.\\\" In Novak the Supreme Court of Florida construed this phrase as not meaning \\\"proximately caused by\\\" but as having a broader meaning that simply required some nexus between the motor vehicle and the injury. The court further suggested that there had been a wholly sufficient connection between the decedent's use of the motor vehicle and the event causing her fatal injury. The court went on to say that it was unnecessary that the automobile be the instrumentality of the injury; neither would the type of conduct that causes the injury of necessity be foreseeably identifiable with the normal use of the vehicle. In substance the majority opinion enunciated the principle that the clause \\\"arising out of the use of the motor vehicle\\\" is framed in general, comprehensive terms in order to express the intent to effect broad coverage. Such terms should be construed liberally because their function is to extend coverage broadly. Valdes v. Smalley, 303 So.2d 342 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1974).\\nSimilarly we believe that there was a substantial nexus in the case at bar between the decedent's status as a passenger in the insured motor vehicle and her being attacked with a dangerous weapon by an enraged motorist while she was waiting to be interviewed concerning the circumstances of an accident.\\nOther Florida courts have come to similar conclusions when dealing with violent acts on the part of uninsured motorists that caused injury to covered persons. See Halpin v. Hilderbrand, 493 So.2d 75 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1986) (battery by uninsured motorist after the insured had inadvertently \\\"cut off\\\" his vehicle); Fortune Insurance Co. v. Ferreiro, 458 So.2d 834 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984) (covered passenger injured by gunshot wound inflicted by uninsured motorist).\\nWe are aware that other courts in various jurisdictions have come to contrary conclusions. We have considered these cases and find them less persuasive than the Florida opinion. See, e.g., Rustin v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 254 Ga. 494, 330 S.E.2d 356 (1985); Foss v. Cignarella, 196 N.J. Super. 378, 482 A.2d 954 (1984); Day v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 261 Pa.Super. 216, 396 A.2d 3 (1978). Essentially we conclude that the breadth of the language that defines coverage in the uninsured-motorist section of the policy under the liberal interpretation that should be given to effectuate such definition requires us to hold that this tragic accident arose out of the use by the operator of the uninsured-motorist vehicle. Nothing contained in this opinion should be construed to prevent an insurance company from limiting its liability by appropriate exclusionary language so long as such language does not violate statutory policy.\\nThe reasoning in respect to the uninsured-motorist claim would apply as well to the medical-payments section of the policy. The decedent's death was caused by an \\\"accident\\\" as that term is construed herein, while she was constructively occupying a covered motor vehicle as a passenger. The decedent was, therefore, a covered person as defined in Part B of the policy.\\nFor the reasons stated, the defendants' appeal is sustained and the declaratory judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff is reversed. The case may be remanded to the Superior Court with directions to enter judgment requiring the plaintiff to proceed to arbitration pursuant to the requirements of the policy.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/7390162.json b/ri/7390162.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1f82184ca42794eafca07f9f1681ae4c4699a1d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/7390162.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7390162\", \"name\": \"Manuel BRUM et al. v. William J. CONLEY, Jr., in his capacity as City Solicitor for the City of East Providence; EMPIRE PROPERTIES, Inc. v. Richard CROKE et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Brum v. Conley\", \"decision_date\": \"1990-04-13\", \"docket_number\": \"Nos. 89-160-M.P., 89-414-M.P.\", \"first_page\": \"1332\", \"last_page\": \"1336\", \"citations\": \"572 A.2d 1332\", \"volume\": \"572\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:12:59.757954+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Manuel BRUM et al. v. William J. CONLEY, Jr., in his capacity as City Solicitor for the City of East Providence. EMPIRE PROPERTIES, Inc. v. Richard CROKE et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Manuel BRUM et al. v. William J. CONLEY, Jr., in his capacity as City Solicitor for the City of East Providence. EMPIRE PROPERTIES, Inc. v. Richard CROKE et al.\\nNos. 89-160-M.P., 89-414-M.P.\\nSupreme Court of Rhode Island.\\nApril 13, 1990.\\nWilliam C. Maaia, Cathy LaMarca Gibson, Slepkow, Slepkow & Rappoport, Inc., East Providence, for Empire Properties.\\nWilliam Conley, Jr., City Sol., pro se. James M. Russo, Marzilli & Lanni, East Providence, for petitioners.\", \"word_count\": \"2339\", \"char_count\": \"14189\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nFAY, Chief Justice.\\nWe have granted a motion to consolidate these matters since these actions present identical issues of law. These matters come before us by means of petitions for writs of certiorari filed by William J. Conley, Jr., to review two separate decisions by the Superior Court reversing the City of East Providence Zoning Board of Review and granting the petitions of both respondents for variances to build on certain undersized lots. We reverse the judgments of the Superior Court and affirm the decisions of the zoning board.\\nThe respondents, Manuel and Maria E. Brum (the Brums), own a parcel of land in East Providence, located in an R-6 zoning district. The minimum-lot-area requirement is 5,000 square feet. The Brums applied to the zoning board for a variance to divide their parcel into two 3,360-square-foot lots and to build a single-family house on the created lot for their daughter (the other parcel would contain the already existing residence). The property was originally purchased as two separate lots in 1977 but was transformed into one conforming lot. A hearing was held on March 25, 1987, and the variance was denied. The board decided that without a variance the applicants would not be deprived of all beneficial use. Additionally, it was pointed out that the division would create two nonconforming, undersized lots. The petition was resubmitted at a hearing on March 30, 1988, and was subsequently denied. The Brums' application for a building permit was denied as well.\\nThe Brums appealed the decision to the Superior Court on April 17, 1987, pursuant to G.L.1956 (1980 Reenactment) \\u00a7 45-24-20 (the two subsequent matters were incorporated into the record by stipulation). The Superior Court reversed the board's decision, holding that the principle enunciated by us in Redman v. Zoning and Platting Board of Review of Narragansett, 491 A.2d 998 (R.I.1985), should have been applied, thereby precluding the merger provision of the East Providence zoning ordinance (passed in 1966) from taking effect. The court found that the merger provision was rendered ineffective because the original lots were recorded in 1900, long before the relevant ordinance was passed.\\nThe respondent, Empire Properties, Inc., also owns property in East Providence. Its land is located in an R-4 zone (with a minimum-lot requirement of 5,000 square feet) and measures 7,200 square feet. The respondent purchased the property in 1987 as two separately recorded lots (lot Nos. 26 and 27), but the lots were merged to form one conforming lot pursuant to the zoning ordinance. This respondent also applied to the zoning board for a variance to divide its property into two parcels of 3,600 square feet, one containing an existing single-family dwelling and one to be the site of a new single-family dwelling. The respondent had previously been denied a building permit to build a new house because the parcel did not contain 5,000 square feet of land as required by the ordinance. The respondent attempted to establish that the parcel to be created qualified as a prior recorded lot and was entitled to the status of a legal nonconforming use pursuant to the Redman case. The board denied the variance at the hearing on April 27, 1988, since there was no evidence of unnecessary hardship. The respondent appealed its decision to the Superior Court on May 16, 1988.\\nOn August 11, 1989, the Superior Court reversed the decision of the zoning board and held that the board should have applied the principle enunciated in Redman precluding the operation of the merger provision of the zoning ordinance. The court reasoned that since the original lots were recorded in 1919, well before the original ordinance was passed, the lot could be considered as exempt from the minimum-lot requirement.\\nThe petitioner, William Conley, Jr., petitioned us for a writ of certiorari regarding the Brum decision on April 14, 1989, and regarding the Empire Properties decision on August 31, 1989. The petition for the first case was granted on June 15, 1989, and for the second case on November 9, 1989. The order for consolidation of the two cases was issued on February 9, 1990.\\nThe only issue before us on appeal is whether the trial court erred in holding that the zoning board should have applied the principles enunciated by this court in Redman v. Zoning and Platting Board of Review of Narragansett, 491 A.2d 998 (R.I.1985), to the case at bar, thereby precluding the merger provision of the East Providence zoning ordinance from taking effect.\\nThe zoning provisions relevant to this appeal are sections 19-132 and 19-133(a) of the Zoning Ordinance of the City of East Providence:\\n\\\"Sec. 19-132. Prior recorded lots.\\nExcept as required in section 19-133, a lot or group of contiguous lots having a lot area, width or depth of lesser amounts than required in section 19-145 for the district in which such lot is located may be considered as coming within the minimum lot requirements of section 19-145, provided that such lot or group of contiguous lots was shown on a recorded plat or on a recorded deed on the effective date of this chapter.\\\"\\n\\\"Sec. 19-133. Contiguous lots under single ownership.\\n(a) If two (2) or more contiguous lots having continuous frontage are under single ownership at any time after the effective date of this chapter and one (1) or more of these lots fails to meet the requirements of section 19-145 with regard to minimum lot area or minimum lot width, such lots shall be considered to be an individual parcel of land for the purpose of this chapter. No single lot shall be used in violation of the requirements of section 19-145 with regard to minimum lot area or minimum lot width, except as hereinafter provided.\\\"\\nPursuant to section 19-133(a) the two sets of contiguous lots in question were merged to form individual lots under single ownership so the parcels would meet the minimum-lot requirements of section 19-145. (This section sets out a schedule of area requirements depending on the zoning district. Both R-4 and R-6 districts require an area-lot measurement of 5,000 square feet.) We have recently noted that the combining of substandard lots, a concept known as merger, is a valid zoning mechanism governed by the provisions of G.L.1956 (1988 Reenactment) chapter 24 of title 45. McKendall v. Town of Barrington, 571 A.2d 565, 567 (R.I.1990). This chapter empowers the city of East Providence to create a merger provision in its zoning ordinance for the purpose of promoting the general welfare. Id. at 566; \\u00a7 45-24-1.\\nThe merger provision in the instant case has a valid purpose. It will, for example, operate to decrease congestion in the streets and to prevent the overcrowding of land by limiting the number of new dwellings built in the residential districts. See \\u00a7 45-24-3. The merger mechanism is therefore perfectly valid here. In reviewing this case, we do not weigh the evidence but we review the record to determine whether competent evidence exists to support the Superior Court's decision. We shall not reverse that decision unless the Superior Court justice misapplied the law, misconceived or overlooked material evidence, or made findings that were clearly wrong. R.J.E.P. Associates v. Hellewell, 560 A.2d 353, 354 (R.I.1989). We conclude that the trial justice misapplied the law to the facts in the instant case.\\nThe respondents and the trial court have relied heavily upon our decision in Redman in concluding that the zoning board was mistaken in applying the merger provision and denying a variance. The Redman situation is not applicable to the instant case. Redman involved five lots, the ownership of which the petitioners had split between themselves. Title to lot Nos. 122, 123, and 126 was put in the name of Mrs. Redman, and title to lot Nos. 124 and 125 was put in Mr. Redman's name. The four contiguous lots could be combined in sets of two (each set under different ownership) to meet the zoning requirement. The fifth lot already had a house on it, and the petitioners argued that since it was under different ownership from lot No. 125, it was therefore a legal nonconforming use. We agreed and ruled that the lot had become entitled to a variance because it contained a pre-existing use and had become a separately owned, substandard lot, no longer contiguous to other lots in the same ownership. Redman, 491 A.2d at 999-1000. We also held in Redman that the vacant contiguous lots should be merged and a building permit for the lots should be granted. Id. at 1000. We never held that an undersized lot could be built on, as respondents would like us to hold here.\\nThe instant situation factually is distinctly different from the one in Redman and much simpler. Two contiguous lots were acquired by both petitioners. Under the zoning ordinance these lots are required to merge to conform to the zoning-district requirements. This case does not concern five contiguous lots wherein the fifth was deemed a pre-existing, nonconforming use because it was already developed and did not border any contiguous lots under the same ownership. The lots here are contiguous and under single ownership and should therefore be merged as set out in section 19-133 of the East Providence zoning ordinance.\\nWe also reject respondents' argument that the buildable lots qualify as prior recorded lots and are therefore legal nonconforming uses in accordance with section 19-132 of the zoning ordinance. Since the buildable lots are contiguous to the lots already built on, the merger provision governs instead. Section 19-132 provides that a lot shown on a recorded plat or deed on the effective date of the zoning ordinance may be considered as coming within the minimum-lot requirements of the district, except as required in section 19-133, the merger provision. In R.J.E.P. Associates, we examined the concept of merger and noted that merger \\u00abprovisions frequently contained exceptions \\\"whereby a lot that is smaller than the minimum zoning requirements will be exempted from the merger rule if it was a lot of record prior to the effective date of the zoning ordinance.\\\" 560 A.2d at 356. We explained, however, that if the landowner owns any adjacent lots that, if combined, would satisfy the square-footage requirements, then the landowner is not entitled to the exception and the landowner must merge the lots to form a single parcel. Id. Moreover, section 19-132 may govern existing lots of land when the ordinance was passed but does not pertain to the situation wherein a new owner buys two contiguous substandard parcels of land after the zoning ordinance was passed. The new owner is held to be on notice of the applicable zoning provisions and, if so provided for in the ordinance, should expect a merger of substandard parcels of land. We have pointed out in the past that \\\"[t]he question of whether an applicant is entitled to a variance because of hardship flowing from a literal application of the terms of the ordinance is in no way dependent on his knowledge or lack of knowledge of the existence of zoning restrictions affecting the land.\\\" Gard-iner v. Zoning Board of Review of Warwick, 101 R.I. 681, 691, 226 A.2d 698, 704 (1967) (quoting Denton v. Zoning Board of Review of Warwick, 86 R.I. 219, 223, 133 A.2d 718, 720 (1957)).\\nFor the reasons stated, we are of the opinion that in a case such as the one at hand in which no evidence of unnecessary hardship exists and two contiguous lots have been purchased under single ownership after the effective date of the zoning ordinance, the merger provision takes precedence over section 19-132, pertaining to prior recorded lots. We are hereby merely focusing on the language in section 19-132, which provides that it only applies \\\"[e]xcept as required in section 19-133.\\\" The lots should therefore be merged, and the decision of the zoning board should be affirmed.\\nFor the aforementioned reasons the petitions for certiorari are granted, the judgments of the Superior Court are quashed, and the papers of the cases are remanded to the Superior Court with our decision endorsed thereon.\\n. General Laws 1956 (1988 Reenactment) \\u00a7 45-24-1 reads in pertinent part:\\n\\\"Power of councils \\u2014 Scope of ordinances.\\u2014 For the purpose of promoting the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, the city council of any city shall have the power in accordance with the provisions of this chapter within the limits of the city or town by ordinance to regulate and restrict the height, number of stories and size of buildings and other structures, the percentage of lot that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts and other open spaces, the density of population, the location and use of buildings, structures and land for trade, industry, residence, or other purposes.\\\"\\n. Section 45-24-3 provides in pertinent part:\\n\\\"General purposes of ordinances. \\u2014 Regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan prepared and adopted in accordance with chapter 22 of this title and designed to lessen congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire, flood, panic, and other dangers; to promote the public health and the general welfare; to provide adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concentration of population; to facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks, and other public requirements. The regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration, among other things, to the character of the district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout the town or municipality.\\\"\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/7860857.json b/ri/7860857.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..50026b2a3d260c1cbdd0788eb9a66e2128099454
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/7860857.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7860857\", \"name\": \"Sharon VATER v. HB GROUP\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Vater v. HB Group\", \"decision_date\": \"1995-12-04\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 94-293-M.P.\", \"first_page\": \"283\", \"last_page\": \"287\", \"citations\": \"667 A.2d 283\", \"volume\": \"667\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:47:09.385373+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Sharon VATER v. HB GROUP.\", \"head_matter\": \"Sharon VATER v. HB GROUP.\\nNo. 94-293-M.P.\\nSupreme Court of Rhode Island.\\nDec. 4, 1995.\\nRobert Ferrieri, Providence, for Plaintiff.\\nJames A. Currier, Providence, for Defendant.\", \"word_count\": \"2011\", \"char_count\": \"12345\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nMURRAY, Justice.\\nThis case came before us on the petition for certiorari of the employee, Sharon Vater (Vater). The employee seeks review of a decree of the Appellate Division of the Workers' Compensation Court reversing the trial judge's decision directing the employer, HB Group, to pay Vater \\\"compensation for partial disablement in the amount of twenty-five (25%) percent from August 3, 1992 and continuing in accordance with the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act.\\\" We quash the decree of the Appellate Division.\\nThe facts of the case are not in dispute. Vater testified that she had worked for HB Group as a line packer for three months until August 5,1992. Her job duties at HB Group included packing photo albums and picture frames into boxes, lifting these boxes, which weighed a maximum of eighty pounds, and putting them on skids. On August 5, 1992, she stopped working for HB Group because her right forearm hurt. She went to the Landmark Medical Center on that date where she was given a wrap-around splint. Approximately one week later, she commenced treatment with Harvey Baumann, M.D., a hand specialist. Doctor Baumann diagnosed her as having right carpal tunnel syndrome.\\nBefore August 1992 Vater had had continuous problems with her right forearm which commenced in April 1990, while working for Kidde Fenwal in Ashland, Massachusetts. At Kidde Fenwal, she assembled thermostats and probes, filling them with epoxy. She used squeeze bottles until the last few months at Kidde Fenwal when she switched over to using air guns with foot pedals. At times, she would work on approximately 500 pieces or more per day, depending on the number of orders Kidde Fenwal received per day. In August 1990 Vater was assembling probes which were fitted improperly. Her right hand began to hurt, and she sought medical treatment with Coleman Levin, M.D., the company doctor. Doctor Levin treated her for several months. She did not, however, miss any time from work. She worked for Kidde Fenwal for one year until she was laid off.\\nIn February 1991 she worked at Gem Electronics in Franklin, Massachusetts. In May 1991 she worked at Brine Sports Screen in Hopedale, Massachusetts, where she assembled lacrosse equipment. She then worked at Potpourri Collections in Medfield, Massachusetts, where she operated a heat press and placed monograms on shirts. She denied taking time off from any of these jobs as a result of the pain in her right arm. In December 1991 Vater was laid off from Potpourri Collections, and in January 1992 she returned to Brine Sports Screen. She continued working at Brine Sports Screen for three months, and in May 1992 she began her employment with HB Group. She has not worked anywhere since leaving HB Group on August 5, 1992.\\nAfter Vater ceased her employment with HB Group, she filed a petition for workers' compensation benefits, alleging an injury to her right hand and right wrist resulting from repetitive use. The trial court granted benefits to Vater on the basis that Vater had sustained a disablement arising out of and in the course of her employment with HB Group. The trial court further found that Vater's disablement was defined as right carpal tunnel syndrome and was due to \\\"causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to the particular trade, occupation, process or employment of the employee.\\\" HB Group thereafter appealed the trial court's decision to the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's decision and found that \\\"there was insufficient evidence for the Court to determine that the employee's disability was caused by the cumulative effects of working for any employers subsequent to working for [Kidde] Fenwal.\\\" In response Vater filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of certiora-ri, which was granted by this court on September 19, 1994.\\nVater raises two issues on review. First, Vater argues that because her injury is characterized as an occupational disease arising from any cause connected with or arising from the peculiar characteristics of her employment pursuant to G.L.1956 (1986 Reenactment) \\u00a7 28-34-1 and 28-34-2, she is entitled to compensation pursuant to \\u00a7 28-34-3. Second, Vater contends that the trial judge misconstrued the law when he apportioned liability among her prior employers. Although the issue of apportionment was on appeal before the Appellate Division, the Appellate Division did not address the issue as it reversed the trial court's decision on HB Group's liability and ordered Vater's petition be dismissed.\\nAt the outset it should be noted that chapter 34 of title 28 was enacted \\\"in order to protect the worker who was exposed to conditions that resulted in disability because of an occupational disease.\\\" Tavares v. A.C. & S. Inc., 462 A.2d 977, 979 (R.I.1983). The Legislature \\\"recognized that an occupational disease is set apart from accidental injuries in that it is not unexpected \\u2014 because it is incident to a particular employment \\u2014 and it is gradual in development.\\\" Id. Accordingly, \\u00a7 28-34-1(3) defines the term \\\"occupational disease\\\" as a \\\"disease which is due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation, process or employment.\\\" Disability \\\"arising from any cause connected with or arising from the peculiar characteristics of the employment\\\" is listed in \\u00a7 28-34-2(33) as a compensable occupational disease and is therefore treated as a personal injury. Section 28-34-2. Moreover, \\u00a7 28-34-3 and \\u00a7 28-34 \\u2014 4, as amended by P.L.1992, ch. 31, \\u00a7 12, provide that a disabled employee is entitled to compensation if the occupational disease is due to the nature of the employment and was contracted within that employment.\\nIn the present case Vater argues that her disablement resulted from an occupational disease arising from the peculiar characteristics of her employment with HB Group. Specifically, Vater contends that it was the repetitive motion of her right arm, characteristic of her job duties with HB Group, which caused the carpal tunnel syndrome to her right arm. The Appellate Division, however, found that \\\"[ajlthough this injury presents itself as an occupational disease, there was insufficient evidence for the court to determine that the employee's disability was caused by the cumulative effects of working for any employers subsequent to working for Fenwal.\\\" It is unclear whether the Appellate Division found that Vater's injury is an occupational injury. However, a finding that Vater's injury does not constitute an occupational injury is clearly unsubstantiated by the record. The record supports the trial judge's conclusion that Vater's injury is an occupational type of injury and that her injury was caused by the repetitive type of motion characteristic to her employment with HB Group in 1992.\\nIt should first be noted that at the hearing Vater denied any trauma to her right hand and right arm or forearm prior to or subsequent to April of 1990. She testified that she had never banged her right arm, right forearm, or right hand since April of 1990 when she first noticed pain in that area. Doctor Baumann testified that upon examining Va-ter in August of 1992, he diagnosed her injury as right carpal tunnel syndrome. Doctor Baumann further testified that \\\"this would finally explain the difficulties that [Va-ter] had been having since I guess April or so of 1990, [and 19]91.\\\" This diagnosis is supported by medical reports and affidavits submitted by Vater. Specifically, William J. Golini, M.D., concluded, in his report dated September 3, 1992, that Vater's \\\"abnormal EMG [electromyogram] and nerve conduction study demonstrat[es] a right sided carpal tunnel syndrome.\\\" Moreover, Douglas Howard, M.D., in a report dated February 12, 1993, suggested that Vater suffers from carpal tunnel syndrome in her right arm and recommended that she obtain an electromyo-gram.\\nIn addition, Dr. Baumann testified at the hearing that Vater's injury was caused by a repetitive type of motion. This testimony was corroborated in Dr. Baumann's report dated November 23, 1992, in which he stated that the carpal tunnel syndrome was causally related to the type of work that Vater did. Doctor Baumann did not state that one specific event caused Vater's injury. Rather Vater's injury was caused by the repetitive type of motion consistent with her job duties at HB Group. We therefore believe that the only reasonable conclusion open to the trial judge and the Appellate Division, relying upon the record, was that Vater's injury constitutes an occupational injury pursuant to chapter 34 of title 28. See Johnson v. State, 634 A.2d 863, 865 (R.I.1993) (\\\"we have noted that a question of law is presented when the facts, as determined by a trial judge or the appellate division, permit reasonable men to draw only one conclusion\\\"). While it is unusual to reverse an Appellate Division's decision in factual matters, we feel that a reversal is warranted in this case based upon the evidence presented during the hearing.\\nVater next argues that the trial judge erred in concluding that HB Group was only liable for 25 percent of her total compensation. She argues that because HB Group did not petition for an apportionment of benefits as required by \\u00a7 28-34-8, as amended by P.L.1990, ch. 332, art. 1, \\u00a7 4, the trial judge erred by finding that HB Group is only responsible for a portion of her total compensation. Section 28-34-8 provides, in pertinent part, that:\\n\\\"The total compensation due shall be recovered from the employer who last employed the employee in the employment to the nature of which the disease was due and in which it was contracted. If, however, the disease was contracted while the employee was in the employment of a prior employer, the employer who is made liable for the total compensation as provided by this section, may petition the workers' compensation court for an apportionment of the compensation among the several employers who since the contraction of the disease shall have employed the employee in the employment to the nature of which the disease was due.\\\"\\nHowever, the Workers' Compensation Act further provides that \\\"[t]he employee if so requested, shall furnish the last employer or the director or the workers' compensation court with such information as to the names and addresses of all his or her other employers during the twenty-four (24) months and if that information is not sufficient to enable the last employer to take proceedings against the other employers under \\u00a7 28-34-8, the last employer shall be liable only for that part of the total compensation as under the particular circumstances the workers' compensation court may deem just.\\\" Section 28-34 \\u2014 10, as amended by P.L.1990, ch. 332, art. 1, \\u00a7 4.\\nIn the present case the trial justice found that Vater's \\\"prior employers are outside of the State and not subject to our jurisdiction.\\\" In these circumstances the trial justice concluded that \\\"[t]he part of compensation which is the responsibility of the HB Group (the last employer) is governed by \\u00a7 28-34 \\u2014 10\\\" and that \\\"the disablement which is the responsibility of the last employer (HB Group) is only for that part of the total compensation that the evidence of this case may deem just, that is twenty-five (25%) percent.\\\" The trial justice therefore exercised his discretion under \\u00a7 28-34-10 and found HB Group responsible for a portion of Vater's total compensation.\\nIt should be noted that neither party discussed the applicability of \\u00a7 28-34-10 to the issue of apportionment in the present case, either on appeal to the Appellate Division or on appeal to this court. Upon our examination of \\u00a7 28-34-10, we conclude that the trial judge was aware that he had the responsibili ty under \\u00a7 28-34-10 to make the apportionment which he deemed just.\\nFor the reasons stated herein, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decree of the Appellate Division is quashed. The papers in this case are remanded to the Appellate Division with our opinion endorsed thereon and with directions to affirm the decision of the trial judge.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/7876149.json b/ri/7876149.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..56e86a6b94eb47c22263dae7b4cedb0d4a721115
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/7876149.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7876149\", \"name\": \"James E. O'NEIL, Attorney General v. CODE COMMISSION FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"O'neil v. Code Commission for Occupational Safety & Health\", \"decision_date\": \"1987-12-11\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 86-41-Appeal\", \"first_page\": \"606\", \"last_page\": \"608\", \"citations\": \"534 A.2d 606\", \"volume\": \"534\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:28:42.924339+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"James E. O'NEIL, Attorney General v. CODE COMMISSION FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"James E. O'NEIL, Attorney General v. CODE COMMISSION FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH et al.\\nNo. 86-41-Appeal.\\nSupreme Court of Rhode Island.\\nDec. 11, 1987\\nJames E. O\\u2019Neil, Atty. Gen., Nicholas Trott Long, Terence J. Tierney, Asst. At-tys. Gen., for plaintiff.\\nJames M. Sloan, III, Christine Engustian, Gardner, Sawyer, Gates & Sloan, Providence, Robert J. Rahill, Rahill & Rahill, Pawtucket, for defendant.\", \"word_count\": \"911\", \"char_count\": \"5544\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nKELLEHER, Justice.\\nThe focus of this dispute is G.L. 1956 (1984 Reenactment) \\u00a7 42-46-8, as amended by P.L. 1985, ch. 373, \\u00a7 1. Chapter 46 of title 42 is known as the Open Meetings Law. In essence, the pertinent portions of \\u00a7 42-46-8 specify that any Rhode Island citizen who is \\\"aggrieved\\\" by any violation of chapter 46 of title 42 \\\"may file a complaint with the attorney general\\\"; and if that officer determines that the complaint has merit, the official may file a complaint on behalf of the complainant in the Superi- or Court. This section also makes it clear that an individual can retain private counsel for the purpose of filing a complaint. Each complaint must be filed within sixty days of the date of the public approval of the minutes of the meeting in question.\\nIn mid-September 1985, a complaint was filed by the then-Attorney General against the Code Commission for Occupational Safety and Health and its members, alleging that the members had conducted meetings without posting prior notices of such events and had failed to keep minutes of what happened at the meetings. Both the postings and the minute keeping are required by the Open Meetings Law.\\nThe issue before the trial justice was, and before this court is, whether the Attorney General may sua sponte initiate a complaint in the Superior Court alleging a violation of the Open Meetings Law.\\nThe Attorney General contends that the trial justice's rejection of his predecessor's complaint runs counter to the general powers accorded his office and the public policy of the Open Meetings Law. He also argues that in light of past pronouncements of this court, he can be considered an \\\"aggrieved\\\" person.\\nThe defendants, on the other hand, emphasize that \\u00a7 42-46-8 is clear and unambiguous and needs no interpretation.\\nThe Attorney General has placed great emphasis on a line of cases in which this court has afforded standing to a variety of agency directors and commissioners seeking judicial review and has granted standing upon the agency itself in situations in which the public has an interest that the issue in dispute be resolved because of implications that reach beyond the immediate parties' concerns.\\nThe Legislature, in its treatment of the Open Meetings Law, could have followed the path it laid down in G.L. 1956 (1980 Reenactment) \\u00a7 45-24-7 where it specifically provides that the only avenue avail able for the enforcement of local zoning ordinances is by seeking the assistance of the solicitors who are employed by the various municipalities in this state. Town of Charlestown v. Beattie, 422 A.2d 1250 (R.I. 1980); Zeilstra v. Barrington Zoning Board of Review, 417 A.2d 303 (R.I. 1980). However, the Legislature has seen fit specifically to limit recourse to the judicial branch to the individual citizen who may seek the assistance of the office of the Attorney General or hire private counsel.\\nThis court has said on numerous occasions that when the language of the statute is unambiguous and expresses a clear and sensible meaning, no room for statutory construction or extension exists and we are required to give the words of the statute their plain and obvious meaning. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 504 A.2d 456 (R.I. 1986); City of Warwick v. Aptt, 497 A.2d 721 (R.I. 1985); Fruit Growers Express Co. v. Norberg, 471 A.2d 628 (R.I. 1984).\\nBecause of the explicit language used by the Legislature, the public-interest criteria that may have been invoked by this court in other controversies cannot be applied here. We note that one of the defendants has alleged that the imposition of fines that was embodied in a 1985 amendment to the Open Meetings Law became effective subsequent to the time he resigned from the commission. However, there is no necessity, in light of our conclusions stated above, for any consideration being given to this issue.\\nConsequently the Attorney General's appeal is denied and dismissed, and the judgment appealed from is affirmed.\\n. Under Super. R. Civ. P. 25(d)(1), when a public officer ceases to hold office, his or her successor is automatically substituted as a party. Consequently, we have substituted the incumbent Attorney General as party plaintiff.\\n. The commission consists of five members, of which two members represent industry; and two members represent labor; with the fifth member, designated as chairperson, representing the public interest. Each commission member is to receive compensation of up to $25 for each day spent in discharging his or her duties, not to exceed $1500 annually. The committee's charge is the elimination of safety and health hazards in the work place by the adoption of codes that comply with the standards established by nationally recognized organizations. G.L. 1956 (1986 Reenactment) \\u00a7 28-20-22 through 28-20-24.\\n. Renza v. Murray, 525 A.2d 53 (R.I. 1987); Newman-Crosby Steel, Inc. v. Fascio, 423 A.2d 1162 (R.I. 1980); Matunuck Beach Hotel, Inc. v. Sheldon, 121 R.I. 386, 399 A.2d 489 (1979); Altman v. School Committee of the Town of Scituate 115 R.I. 399, 347 A.2d 37 (1975); and Buffi v. Ferri, 106 R.I. 349, 259 A.2d 847 (1969).\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/7883812.json b/ri/7883812.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ccb1226a37bf2ae350e532159d228d974ffee931
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/7883812.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7883812\", \"name\": \"Hugh M. JONES, Jr. et al. v. Herbert F. ROMMELL, et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Jones v. Rommell\", \"decision_date\": \"1987-02-24\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 84-431-M.P.\", \"first_page\": \"543\", \"last_page\": \"546\", \"citations\": \"521 A.2d 543\", \"volume\": \"521\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:36:21.526871+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Hugh M. JONES, Jr. et al. v. Herbert F. ROMMELL, et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Hugh M. JONES, Jr. et al. v. Herbert F. ROMMELL, et al.\\nNo. 84-431-M.P.\\nSupreme Court of Rhode Island.\\nFeb. 24, 1987.\\nJames Purcell, Tillinghast, Collins & Graham, Providence, for plaintiffs.\\nKathleen Managhan, Corcoran, Peckham & Hayes, and Turner C. Scott, Kelly & Scott, Newport, for defendants.\", \"word_count\": \"2157\", \"char_count\": \"13461\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nWEISBERGER, Justice.\\nThis petition for certiorari was brought to review a judgment entered in the Superi- or Court reversing a decision of the Zoning Board of Review of the City of Newport. We granted review on January 10, 1985. The plaintiffs, Hugh M. Jones, Jr., and Jeffrey M. Farrar, individually and in their capacities as general partners of Mill Street Partners, a limited partnership, and the plaintiff Mill Street Partners, as the owner of property located at 75 Mill Street, Newport, Rhode Island, filed a complaint in Superior Court alleging that the defendants Herbert F. Rommell, John J. Greichen, John J. Crowley, Jr., Betsy Ray, and Roland Chase, in their capacities as members of the Zoning Board of Review of the City of Newport, erred in revoking a building permit previously issued to the plaintiffs and further alleging that the defendant Ann B. Canole Twomey, an owner of property located in the mill's vicinity, had no standing to challenge the validity of the permit. The plaintiffs sought a stay of the zoning board's decision as well as an injunction to prevent the defendants, Roy B. Anderson, in his capacity as building official of the city of Newport, and Francis B. Edwards, in his capacity as zoning officer of the City of Newport, from revoking the building permit. The relevant facts are as follows.\\nOn April 20, 1984 the Newport building inspector issued plaintiffs a building permit to convert property located at 75 Mill Street from a lumber mill into an inn. Pri- or to the issuance of the permit, plaintiffs sought city approval of their proposed parking plan for the twenty-three-unit inn and were advised that their plan was in accordance with the off-street parking requirements under \\u00a7 1270.01 of the Newport City Code. The city reached this determination by applying the credit-parking formula utilized in its implementation of \\u00a7 1270.01. The defendant Ann B. Canole Twomey filed an appeal from the issuance of the permit to the Newport Zoning Board of Review on May 9, 1984. Following a hearing, the zoning board rendered a decision sustaining Twomey's appeal and ordering revocation of the permit. The board made two findings of fact relevant to this petition: (1) the building inspector correctly concluded that under the 1977 zoning ordinance six parking spaces were required for former mill use and (2) prior to 1977 the mill had at least four valid parking spaces. The board further determined that application of the credit-parking formula was not permitted under \\u00a7 1270.01.\\nIn reversing the zoning board, the Superior Court held that \\u00a7 1270.01, although somewhat ambiguous, allows application of the credit-parking formula. Finding no evi-dentiary support for the board's finding that four valid parking spaces existed on the premises prior to the 1977 amendment to \\u00a7 1270.01, the trial justice reversed that finding as clearly erroneous. Further, the trial justice found that equitable principles militated against revocation of the building permit since plaintiffs incurred substantial obligations in good-faith reliance on the issuance of the permit.\\nThis case presents for our determination the question of whether the credit-parking policy is allowable under \\u00a7 1270.-01. We hold that it is not. It is well settled that the rules governing statutory interpretation are equally applicable to the interpretation of an ordinance. Mongony v. Bevilacqua, 432 A.2d 661 (R.I.1981); Town of Warren v. Frost, 111 R.I. 217, 301 A.2d 572 (1973). An ordinance, therefore, must be construed in a manner consistent with its stated intent. Hydron Laboratories, Inc. v. Department of Attorney General, 492 A.2d 135 (R.I.1985); Valley Resources, Inc. v. South County Gas Co., 486 A.2d 1076 (R.I.1985); State v. Gonsalves, 476 A.2d 108 (R.I.1984).\\nSection 1270.01 provides as follows:\\n\\\"It is the intent of this chapter to ensure that off-street parking and loading spaces are provided to accommodate the motor vehicles of all persons normally vising or visiting a use or structure at any one time. For any permitted use hereafter established, such spaces shall be provided in accordance with the standards hereinafter specified. Any off-street parking and loading provision existing shall conform to these standards to the extent that they conform at the time of the adoption of this Zoning Code. All spaces required to be provided by this chapter shall be permanently maintained and made available for occupancy in connection with and for the full duration of the use of land or structures for which such spaces are herein required. If any existing use of land or a structure is changed to a use requiring additional spaces to comply with this chapter, such additional spaces shall be provided for the new use in accordance with the standards hereinafter specified.\\\" (Emphasis added.)\\nSince the intent underlying the enactment of \\u00a7 1270.01 is patently clear, we must endeavor to effectuate that intent in interpreting the language on which the credit-parking policy is based.\\nThe credit-parking policy was derived from the construction of the following sentence: \\\"If any existing use of land or a structure is changed to a use requiring additional spaces to comply with this chapter, such additional spaces shall be provided for the new use in accordance with the standards hereinafter specified.\\\" The only reasonable interpretation of this sentence requires the provision of additional parking spaces in conformity with zoning code standards for the new use whenever the use of property is changed to a use that requires additional spaces. Any other construction of this provision would be contrary to the plain language of the ordinance and its stated intention. Further, such an interpretation is the only one consistent with basic principles of zoning law.\\nA change of use results when the proposed use is \\\"substantially different from the nonconforming use to which the premises were previously put .\\\" Souza v. Zoning Board of Review of Warren, 104 R.I. 697, 699, 248 A.2d 325, 327 (1968). A change of use eliminates the exemption of a nonconforming use from recently enacted zoning ordinances. Thus, although an established use may continue notwithstanding the subsequent enactment of a prohibitory zoning ordinance, any change of use mandates compliance with the zoning regulations in effect at the time the change is made. See 1 Anderson, American Law of Zoning \\u00a7 6.36 at 558 (3d ed. 1986). The sentence in question refers only to changes of use. Therefore, under well-settled principles of zoning law, the change of use precludes exemption from compliance with effective zoning regulations. In other words, after a change in use, property owners should not be entitled to any \\\"credit\\\" representative of prior noncompliance.\\nThe plaintiffs, however, assert that they incurred substantial expenses because of their good-faith reliance on the apparently validly issued building permit and that, therefore, equitable considerations prohibit the permit's revocation. In Shalvey v. Zoning Board of Review of Warwick, 99 R.I. 692, 210 A.2d 589 (1965), we held that equity immunizes a building permit from cancellation when the property owner incurs substantial obligations in good-faith reliance on the issuance of the permit. See also A. Ferland & Sons, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Review of East Providence, 105 R.I. 275, 251 A.2d 536 (1969); Tantimonaco v. Zoning Board of Review of Johnston, 100 R.I. 615, 218 A.2d 480 (1966). Although this rule has only been applied to situations in which a subsequent amend ment to a zoning ordinance prohibits the use authorized under the permit, we are of the opinion that equitable considerations mandate application of the rule to cases like the one at bar.\\nHere the use of the credit-parking formula was based upon a commonly accepted interpretation of \\u00a7 1270.01 of the Newport City Code. The building inspector and city solicitor's office have consistently applied this formula in their administration of off-street parking requirements since 1981. The zoning board's rejection of credit parking, therefore had the same effect upon plaintiffs' building permit as a later amendment to \\u00a7 1270.01 would have had if that amendment rejected credit parking. The case before us varies in no important respect from our decisions in which a subsequent zoning ordinance revokes a use valid when the permit was issued. Since the factual difference between the instant case and our decisions respecting the effect of subsequently enacted zoning amendments is a difference without a material distinction, we hold that the rule first enunciated by this court in Shalvey, supra, governs the case at bar.\\nThe trial justice noted in his decision that plaintiffs expended \\\"enormous sums of money\\\" in good-faith reliance on the issuance of the permit and the historic interpretation of \\u00a7 1270.01 and that revocation of the permit would cause plaintiffs to suffer irreparable harm. The trial justice then correctly concluded that revocation of the building permit would be contrary to general equitable principles. The trial justice's conclusion in this regard is amply supported by the record, and therefore, it is not within our province to reverse it. See Mendonsa v. Corey, 495 A.2d 257 (R.I. 1985); Redman v. Zoning and Platting Board of Review of Narragansett, 491 A.2d 998 (R.I.1985).\\nThe trial justice further determined that the zoning board's finding that four parking spaces existed at the mill property prior to 1977 was clearly erroneous. We agree. Because formulation of the parking credit has uniformly been based on whether formally designated parking spaces in conformity with the zoning ordinance existed in 1977 and because it is undisputed that there has never been such a formal designation on the property, the fact that cars may have been parked there with or without permission has no effect on the grandfathered credit as it has consistently been applied under \\u00a7 1270.01. The board's finding that for credit-parking purposes four parking spaces were in existence prior to 1977 is therefore completely unsupported by competent evidence. See Ervin v. Ervin, 458 A.2d 342 (R.I.1983); Caswell v. George Sherman Sand & Gravel Co., 424 A.2d 646 (R.I.1981); Barber v. Exeter-West Greenwich School Committee, 418 A.2d 13 (R.I.1980).\\nFor the reasons stated, the petition for certiorari is granted in part and denied in part. The judgment of the Superior Court is hereby affirmed in part and reversed in part. The papers in the case are remanded to the Superior Court with our decision endorsed thereon.\\n. The credit-parking formula was applied by the building inspector as follows. The planned inn required one parking space for each of its twenty-three rooms plus an additional space for its employees, for a total of twenty-four required spaces as well as a loading zone. Under the credit-parking formula, the number of parking spaces that the mill should have had in 1977 but did not have by virtue of its nonconformance was subtracted from the amount required. Determining that the mill should have had six parking spaces and a loading zone in 1977 but that it actually had neither the six parking spaces nor a loading zone, the building inspector reduced the amount of spaces required under \\u00a7 1270.01 for the proposed new use by \\\"grandfathering in\\\" the prior nonconformity of six spaces and a loading zone and crediting the property with those spaces. As a result, it was determined that the proposed inn would require only eighteen parking spaces and would not require a loading zone.\\n. The board reached this conclusion relying on testimony that cars had in fact been parked on mill property, although it remained undisputed that the mill had no specifically designated parking spaces. This finding had the effect of reducing plaintiffs' parking credit from six spaces to two, thereby requiring that the mill have four additional spaces. The board further found that the building plan proposed twenty-seven, rather than twenty-three, guest units and that the Mill Street property is within the Historic Hill Redevelopment Plan. The latter two findings were reversed by the trial justice. Since these two issues have not been raised in defendants' brief, we shall not address them here. See DaRosa v. Carol Cable Co., 121 R.I. 194, 397 A.2d 506 (1979); Calcagno v. Calcagno, 120 R.I. 723, 391 A.2d 79 (1978); Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v. Israel, 119 R.I. 298, 377 A.2d 341 (1977).\\n. Although in Zeilstra v. Barrington Zoning Board of Review, 417 A.2d 303 (R.I.1980), we stated that because a building inspector lacks authority to issue a permit for a use not authorized by the zoning code, the issuance of a permit for an unauthorized use is void, we believe that the consistent interpretation of \\u00a7 1270.01 by the city solicitor as well as the building inspector over a period of time, reasonably inducing plaintiffs' good-faith reliance on the issuance of the permit, distinguishes this case from Zeilstra. Moreover, Zeilstra involved a nonpermitted use. In the instant case only an ancillary regulation relating to off-street parking is involved.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/7897039.json b/ri/7897039.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..54967f18c1bd49b3282262325679e151f7ad3bdc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/7897039.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7897039\", \"name\": \"Joseph FERREIRA v. BRISTOL SCHOOL COMMITTEE\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Ferreira v. Bristol School Committee\", \"decision_date\": \"1984-05-31\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 84-24-M.P.\", \"first_page\": \"218\", \"last_page\": \"218\", \"citations\": \"475 A.2d 218\", \"volume\": \"475\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:45:16.820818+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Joseph FERREIRA v. BRISTOL SCHOOL COMMITTEE.\", \"head_matter\": \"Joseph FERREIRA v. BRISTOL SCHOOL COMMITTEE.\\nNo. 84-24-M.P.\\nSupreme Court of Rhode Island.\\nMay 31, 1984.\\nStephen Robinson, Providence, for petitioner.\\nVincent J. Piccirilli, Providence, for respondent.\", \"word_count\": \"36\", \"char_count\": \"255\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nThe petition for writ of certiorari is denied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/7903497.json b/ri/7903497.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d62a0f909b9b7f66f213f02a24f931b9254a5033
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/7903497.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7903497\", \"name\": \"Frank SOUZA v. ERIE STRAYER CO. et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Souza v. Erie Strayer Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1989-05-15\", \"docket_number\": \"87-382-M.P.\", \"first_page\": \"1226\", \"last_page\": \"1228\", \"citations\": \"557 A.2d 1226\", \"volume\": \"557\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:44:36.290387+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"SHEA, J., did not participate.\", \"parties\": \"Frank SOUZA v. ERIE STRAYER CO. et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Frank SOUZA v. ERIE STRAYER CO. et al.\\n87-382-M.P.\\nSupreme Court of Rhode Island.\\nMay 15, 1989.\\nSusan Carlin, Mandell, Famiglietti & Schwartz, Ltd., Providence, for plaintiff.\\nMichael G. Sarli, Raymond A. LaFazia, Gunning, LaFazia & Gnys, Inc., Thomas C. Plunkett, Kiernan & Plunkett, Providence, for defendants.\", \"word_count\": \"1609\", \"char_count\": \"9900\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nFAY, Chief Justice.\\nThis case comes before the Supreme Court pursuant to our grant of a writ of certiorari. The defendant, B.T. Equipment Company (B.T. Equipment), seeks review of a Superior Court judgment denying its motion for summary judgment. We affirm the trial justice's decision to deny summary judgment. However, we reverse his finding of due diligence and remand the case for a full determination of this factual issue.\\nInitially we shall discuss our standard of review following the denial of a motion for summary judgment. Normally we would not review an order denying a motion for summary judgment, because such a determination is clearly interlocutory and not entitled to review by appeal as of right. We issued a writ of certiorari in the instant case, because it involved the statute of limitations and because B.T. Equipment claimed to be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This is the standard of review that we shall apply. If there is an issue of fact to be determined, then clearly the trial justice was correct in denying the motion for summary judgment. Lennon v. MacGregor, 423 A.2d 820 (R.I.1980); Ludwig v. Kowal, 419 A.2d 297 (R.I.1980). In the case at bar, B.T. Equipment Company can only prevail in the event that no genuine issue of material fact was presented and that it was entitled to judgment based upon the statute of limitations or upon failure of timely service as a matter of law. Mindful of our standard of review, the pertinent facts are as follows.\\nOn December 31, 1981, plaintiff, Frank Souza (Souza), was an employee of Gilbane Building Company. Souza was working at a construction site when a concrete bucket, suspended by a crane, fell and injured him. Souza collected workers' compensation benefits from his employer's insurance company. On December 20, 1984, he filed a complaint against Erie Strayer Company as the manufacturer of the concrete bucket and against \\\"John Doe Corporation\\\" as the unknown company that manufactured, distributed, marketed, and sold concrete buckets.\\nSouza's attorney discovered, sometime between December 20, 1984, and May 16, 1985, that the identity of the John Doe Corporation was B.T. Equipment. Thereafter, Souza filed an amended complaint naming B. T. Equipment and other parties as defendants, pursuant to G.L.1956 (1985 Reenactment) \\u00a7 9-5-20. The amended complaint alleged that B.T. Equipment had distributed, marketed, rented, and/or sold the concrete bucket that had injured Souza. B.T. Equipment was later served with process on May 16, 1985.\\nB.T. Equipment moved for summary judgment under Super. R. Civ. P. 56(b), asserting that plaintiff's action was barred pursuant to the applicable statute of limitations. B.T. Equipment argued that Sou-za's original complaint naming John Doe Corporation failed to toll the statute of limitations against B.T. Equipment; therefore, the amended complaint did not relate back to the date of the filing of the original complaint. In denying B.T. Equipment's motion, the trial justice found that B.T. Equipment was properly listed as a John Doe defendant and was served with due diligence. The trial justice also determined that the description of the John Doe Corporation in the original complaint sufficiently described B.T. Equipment. Therefore, the statute of limitations was effectively tolled when Souza filed the original complaint.\\nIn order to determine whether \\u00a7 9-5-20 is applicable, we must examine the legislative intent in enacting the statute. We indicated in Sousa v. Casey, 111 R.I. 623, 306 A.2d 186 (1973), that the object of \\u00a7 9-5-20 is to provide a plaintiff with an opportunity to toll the applicable statute of limitations against a fictitiously named defendant upon the filing of a complaint. \\\"[Tjhe filing of a complaint tolls the statute of limitations even [if it] is filed on the last day of the statute's running.\\\" Prudential Investment Corp. v. Porcaro, 115 R.I. 117, 118-19, 341 A.2d 720, 721 (1975) (citing Caprio v. Fanning & Doorley Construction Co., 104 R.I.197, 243 A.2d 738 (1968)). Once a complaint is filed, however, \\u00a7 9-5-20 further provides that \\\"the summons and other process\\\" must be served with due diligence in order to bring a defendant before the court and subject him to its jurisdiction. 115 R.I. at 118-19, 341 A.2d at 721. Due diligence does not require that service upon a defendant be made within the applicable statute of limitations. Rather, service must be made within a reasonable time subsequent to the filing of a complaint, absent a showing of excusable delay. Id. at 119, 341 A.2d at 721; Sousa, 111 R.I. at 633, 306 A.2d at 192; Caprio, 104 R.I. at 199-200, 243 A.2d at 740.\\nIn construing \\u00a7 9-5-20, we have recognized that an amended complaint may be filed after the applicable statute of limita tions has run. Sousa, 111 R.I. at 633, 306 A.2d at 192. Moreover, if a plaintiff substitutes the name of a specifically identified defendant for a fictitiously named defendant in an amended complaint, then the amendment may relate back to the date of the filing of the original complaint for purposes of the statute of limitations. Id.\\nThe filing of a complaint, however, does not excuse or circumvent, neither before nor after the applicable statute of limitations has run, the requirement that a plaintiff must exercise due diligence in serving a defendant within a reasonable time after the complaint is filed. If a plaintiff fails to effectuate service of process within a reasonable time after the complaint has been filed, upon a defendant's motion the court may exercise its discretion and dismiss the action. Caprio, 104 R.I. at 200, 243 A.2d at 741; Super. R. Civ. P. 41(b)(2).\\nAs previously stated, the underlying purpose of \\u00a7 9-5-20 is to provide a plaintiff with a mechanism to toll the applicable statute of limitations against a fictitiously named defendant. In construing a statute, we adhere to the basic proposition of establishing and effectuating legislative intent. Valley Resources, Inc. v. South County Gas Co., 486 A.2d 1076, 1078 n. 4 (R.I.1985); Howard Union of Teachers v. State, 478 A.2d 563, 565 (R.I.1984). We shall not interpret a statute to achieve a meaningless and/or absurd result. We stated that \\\"the legislature could never be presumed to have intended to enact laws which are absurd, unjust or unreasonable.\\\" Wilkinson v. Harrington, 104 R.I. 224, 239, 243 A.2d 745, 753 (1968) (citing State v. Haggerty, 89 R.I. 158, 151 A.2d 382 (1959)). See also State v. Jordan, 528 A.2d 731, 734 (R.I.1987); Trembley v. City of Central Falls, 480 A.2d 1359, 1363 (R.I.1984).\\nApplying the above principles to the instant case, it is necessary to examine the relevant dates. On December 31, 1981, Souza suffered injuries. He filed the original complaint against known and unknown defendants on December 20, 1984, pursuant to the provisions of \\u00a7 9-5-20. The original complaint alleged that Souza was unaware of the names and identities of the manufacturer, distributor, and seller of the concrete bucket. The complaint was filed within the three-year statute of limitations, which expired on December 31, 1984. Thereafter, Souza learned the identity of B.T. Equipment and served it with a summons and an amended complaint on May 16, 1985. Although Souza argued that he duly served B.T. Equipment, contradictory evidence was presented regarding whether service of process was made within a reasonable time subsequent to the filing of the original complaint. Because of the time that elapsed between the filing of the original complaint and actual service upon B.T. Equipment, we find that a material question of fact exists regarding effective service of process as required by \\u00a7 9-5-20.\\nRelying on the foregoing, we hold that the trial justice did not commit an error of law in denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment. However, the trial justice committed reversible error in finding that B.T. Equipment was served with due diligence without an evidentiary hearing. We therefore remand this case for a factual determination of whether B.T. Equipment was duly served pursuant to \\u00a7 9-5-20.\\nFor the reasons stated, the decision of the trial justice is hereby affirmed in part and reversed in part. The writ of certiorari is quashed. This case is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\nSHEA, J., did not participate.\\n. General Laws 1956 (1985 Reenactment) \\u00a7 9-5-20 provides:\\n\\\"Writs and other process against unknown defendant. \\u2014 Whenever the name of any defendant or respondent is not known to the plaintiff, the summons and other process may issue against him by a fictitious name, or by such description as the plaintiff or complainant may select; and if duly served, it shall not be abated for that cause, but may be amended with or without terms as the court may order.\\\"\\n. The statute of limitations is found in G.L.1956 (1985 Reenactment) \\u00a7 9-l-14(b) and provides:\\n\\\"Limitation of actions for words spoken or personal injuries.\\u2014\\nActions for injuries to the person shall be commenced and sued within three (3) years next after the cause of action shall accrue, and not after.\\\"\\n.The Federal District Court of Rhode Island has specifically stated in Westfall v. Whittaker, Clark & Daniels, Metropolitan Talc Co., 571 F.Supp. 304, 315 (D.R.I.1983), that what constitutes a reasonable time for a defendant to be served \\\"under Rule 4 of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, is not necessarily the same as a 'reasonable time' within which an unknown defendant should be served pursuant to \\u00a7 9-5-20.\\\"\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/7922495.json b/ri/7922495.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..593ef0068a4cef178b00dcb1cb475edd3b5c84ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/7922495.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7922495\", \"name\": \"Frances VICKERS ANTONE v. Thomas R. VICKERS\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Antone v. Vickers\", \"decision_date\": \"1992-07-03\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 90-533-Appeal\", \"first_page\": \"120\", \"last_page\": \"124\", \"citations\": \"610 A.2d 120\", \"volume\": \"610\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:27:35.655593+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Frances VICKERS ANTONE v. Thomas R. VICKERS.\", \"head_matter\": \"Frances VICKERS ANTONE v. Thomas R. VICKERS.\\nNo. 90-533-Appeal.\\nSupreme Court of Rhode Island.\\nJuly 3, 1992.\\nMichael R. McElroy, Schacht & McElroy, Providence, for plaintiff.\\nGilbert T. Rocha, East Providence, Constance M. Pannone, Smithfield, for defendant.\", \"word_count\": \"1852\", \"char_count\": \"11341\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nKELLEHER, Justice.\\nThis civil matter comes before us as a result of an appeal by the plaintiff, Frances Vickers Antone (Frances), from a Family Court order denying her motion to adjudge the defendant and former husband, Thomas R. Vickers (Thomas), in contempt for failure to comply with the final judgment of the divorce. Frances also appeals the granting of Thomas's motion to modify the final divorce judgment. We affirm.\\nOn May 19, 1985, Thomas and Frances were divorced by final judgment after twenty-four years of marriage. In the hearing on the merits at which Thomas was not represented by counsel, the trial justice accepted and approved a property-settlement agreement (agreement) reached between the parties and merged the agreement into the decision and judgment. Paragraph 4 of the agreement, which comprises the nucleus of this dispute, provides:\\n\\\"Forthwith, upon execution of this Agreement, the Husband shall execute and deliver to wife a deed in form satisfactory to the Wife's counsel, conveying all of his right, title and interest in and to property at 70 Holland Avenue, in said East Providence, including all of the buildings and improvements thereon, subject to the existing mortgage of the same.\\n\\\"The wife shall pay all of the expenses related to said Holland Street property including but not limited to mortgage payments, taxes and insurance from the date of the delivery of said Deed, and the husband shall have no liability to pay the same.\\n\\\"The Husband shall save the Wife harmless with respect to the claims of any creditors of the Husband asserted against said real property and shall promptly cause any attachments on said property made with respect to claims against the Husband to be discharged, excluding the balance of the curbing bill owed to the City of East Providence, for which Husband and Wife will each pay one-half (V2) of the balance.\\n\\\"In the event that said real property is sold, one-half (V2) of the proceeds of sale (less all reasonable closing expenses) shall belong to each of the parties and, notwithstanding the provisions of the tax code in effect at the time of sale both parties shall be responsible for one-half (V2) of any said capital gain and the tax resulting therefrom. In addition, there shall be deducted from the Husband's one-half (V2) share, one-half (x/2) of the present value of the Husband's pension plan as of the date of this Agreement. The present value is approximately $5,150.00.\\n\\\"The Wife shall have sole authority to agree to any sales price for the real property that she feels is reasonable and may select the Broker, Attorney, etc. and otherwise take all steps necessary to sell said property without obtaining the consent of the Husband.\\\"\\nIn violation of the above portion of the agreement, Thomas failed to convey his interest in the property to his wife. Frances continued to pay the mortgage, taxes, and related expenses for the property. However, it must be noted that in 1989 Frances remarried and no longer resides in the house in question. Moreover, the parties' minor daughter has completed her college education and has moved away. In fact, the property is rented, and Frances is collecting money therefrom, a practice prohibited under the initial financing arrangement for the property with Rhode Island Housing and Mortgage Finance Corp. (RIHMFC), which required that the mortgaged property be occupied by an owner. Subsequently RIHMFC demanded that Frances repay the RIHMFC mortgage on the property. In order to discharge this debt, Frances initiated suit against her former husband and demanded that Thomas convey his interest to her so that she could attempt to obtain refinancing.\\nOn October 10, 1990, the trial justice denied Frances's motion to hold Thomas in contempt and granted in part Thomas's motion to modify and/or amend the final judgment. The trial justice concluded that the failure to sell the house would result in the enforcement of an illusory promise, as the agreement evidenced an intent of both parties to sell the property in the future. Further the trial justice ordered Frances to put the property up for sale and to disburse the proceeds in accordance with paragraph 4 of the final judgment.\\nBoth statutory and case law establish the principle that the Family Court has broad jurisdiction over equitable matters that arise as a result of the familial relationship. General Laws 1956 (1985 Reenactment) \\u00a7 8-10-3(a), as amended by P.L.1988, ch. 84, \\u00a7 7 marks the ambit of the Family Court's authority\\n\\\"[t]o hear and determine all petitions for divorce and other matters arising out of petitions and motions relative to real and personal property in aid thereof, including such other equitable matters arising out of the family relationship, wherein jurisdiction is acquired by the court by the filing of petitions for divorce property settlement agreements and all other contracts between persons, who at the time of execution of said contracts, were husband and wife.\\\" See also Lubecki v. Ashcroft, 557 A.2d\\n1208, 1211-12 (R.I.1989); Fox v. Fox, 115 R.I. 593, 596, 350 A.2d 602, 603 (1976). In this instant controversy, the trial justice correctly determined that it was within the Family Court's jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. A thorough examination of the record indicates that the trial justice observed that he did not consider his order as amending the agreement but instead as construing certain ambiguities within the agreement. The trial justice determined that a reasonable person would conclude that at the time the agreement was entered into, Thomas did not consider the fact that Frances would use the marital domicile purely for rental income but instead believed that the home would be retained for the use of his former wife and minor child indefinitely. The trial justice noted the fact that Frances had remarried and was renting the marital domicile, apparently a use not contemplated in the original agreement. Consequently the one-year time limit barring a motion for relief from a judgment or decree pursuant to G.L.1956 (1985 Reenactment) \\u00a7 9-21-2(b) and the parallel prohibition pursuant to Rule 60 of the Rules of Procedure for Domestic Relations are inapplicable here.\\nIn her appeal Frances contends that the trial justice erred in determining that paragraph 4 described an illusory promise if the provision was not interpreted in such a fashion so as to allow Thomas to force the sale of the property.\\nAn illusory promise is one comprising words that \\\"form a promise that is conditional on some fact or event that is wholly under the promisor's control and his bringing it about is left wholly to his own will and discretion. This is not true, however, if the words used do not leave an unlimited option to the one using them. It is true only if the words used do not in fact purport to limit future action in any way.\\\" 1 Corbin On Contracts, \\u00a7 149 at 657 (1963). Frances was obligated to make mortgage payments as well as tax, insurance, and related payments for purposes of maintaining the marital domicile. These additional responsibilities belie the claim that her promises were merely illusory. However, this court is of the opinion that it is nonetheless ambiguous.\\nThe effect of the agreement is controlled by the actual terms that are included in the contract. \\\"When the terms are found to be clear and unambiguous, the task of judicial construction is at an end. The contract terms must then be applied as written and the parties are bound by them.\\\" Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Graziano, 587 A.2d 916, 917 (R.I.1991)(quoting Malo v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 459 A.2d 954, 956 (R.I.1983)). Prior to construing the provisions of a contract, this court must first discern whether an ambiguity exists. Bush v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 448 A.2d 782, 784 (R.I.1982). In determining whether a contract is clear and unambiguous, we view the agreement in its entirety and give to its language its \\\"plain, ordinary and usual meaning.\\\" Arnica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Streicker, 583 A.2d 550, 552 (R.I.1990)(quoting Sentry Insurance Co. v. Grenga, 556 A.2d 998, 999 (R.I.1989)); Malo, 459 A.2d at 956. A court shall conclude that a contract is ambiguous if it is \\\"reasonably susceptible of different constructions.\\\" Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. v. Dial Media, Inc., 122 R.I. 571, 579, 410 A.2d 986, 991 (1980).\\nWhen the contested provision of a contract or agreement is capable of two separate constructions, this court has previously stated that it should \\\"adopt that construction which is most equitable and which will not give to one party an unconscionable advantage over the other; and where the meaning is doubtful a construction which will entail a forfeiture should be avoided, especially where there is nothing in the language used which expressly requires such result.\\\" Massasoit Housing Cory. v. Town of North Kingstown, 75 R.I. 211, 217, 65 A.2d 38, 40 (1949).\\nIn the instant controversy both parties clearly espoused wholly different interpretations of paragraph 4. Frances contends that the trial justice erred in modifying the final judgment because he granted Thomas's motion to modify and/or amend the agreement. Furthermore, Frances main tains that what she contracted for, that is, a lack of obligation to sell the marital domicile at any particular time, is a reasonable and fair construction of the provision. Thomas argues that although he testified and understood the agreement to mean that the property may \\\"never\\\" be sold, he intended the property never to be sold so as to afford his ex-wife and daughter a home and not the scenario that is now before us.\\nWe believe the trial justice was correct in his decision in addressing the substance, if not the form, of Thomas's pleading to modify and/or amend the agreement before him. The trial justice did not redistribute the property or alter the obligations of the parties. Realizing that the parties intended that the property could never be sold during the time in which Prances and their youngest daughter resided in the home, the trial justice concluded that the motivation for providing the home no longer existed, as Frances had remarried, vacated the home, and was collecting rent therefrom. Consequently the marital domicile had served its purpose. He applied the correct rules of contract interpretation when he construed the evidence presented to determine the meaning of the language in paragraph 4, as a trial justice's primary task is to ascertain the intent of the parties. Woonsocket Teachers' Guild, Local 951 v. School Committee of Woonsocket, 117 R.I. 373, 376, 367 A.2d 203, 205 (1976). Indeed, the trial justice neither modified nor reformed the agreement but simply clarified a necessary factual ambiguity regarding the intentions of the parties in order to enforce the agreement.\\nThe plaintiff's appeal is denied and dismissed. Accordingly we affirm the denial of Frances's motion to adjudge Thomas in contempt and affirm the granting of Thomas's motion to modify the final judgment of divorce.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/7941263.json b/ri/7941263.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ac6433c49fcb6335ea67224b207869a842f1d34b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/7941263.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7941263\", \"name\": \"STATE v. Richard A. COOK\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Cook\", \"decision_date\": \"1982-01-22\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 81-249-C.A.\", \"first_page\": \"137\", \"last_page\": \"139\", \"citations\": \"440 A.2d 137\", \"volume\": \"440\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:30:11.215884+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE v. Richard A. COOK.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE v. Richard A. COOK.\\nNo. 81-249-C.A.\\nSupreme Court of Rhode Island.\\nJan. 22, 1982.\\nDennis J. Roberts II, Atty. Gen., Anthony DelBonis, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff.\\nAram K. Berberian, Michael Kiselica, Warwick, for defendant.\", \"word_count\": \"1345\", \"char_count\": \"7887\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nKELLEHER, Justice.\\nThis appeal seems to be nothing but another chapter in the ongoing feud of the defendant, Richard A. Cook (Cook), with various members of the East Providence police department. Earlier this term we denied Cook's appeal from a conviction on a charge that he had obstructed an East Providence police officer while the officer was engaged in the execution of his duties.\\nThis prior offense occurred on October 28, 1978, after Officer John J. Lynch, Jr., had stopped Cook's son for a violation of the motor vehicle code. When Cook arrived on the scene, he shouted obscenities at Officer Lynch and Officer Richard J. Holland, who was also present. He not only bumped Officer Holland as Officer Lynch was filling out the violation citation but also grabbed Officer Lynch's arm when Lynch attempted to deliver the completed citation to Cook's son. Cook concluded his tour de force on this day by taking the citation from his son and tearing it up. The main thrust of Cook's defense was his claim that although Officer Lynch was in uniform at the time of the incident, he was not really a police officer because the oath administered to Lynch by the East Providence city manager was a nullity as city managers, in Cook's opinion, were not authorized to administer oaths.\\nTwo days after the citation confrontation Officer Holland, working the 4 p.m. to 12 p.m. shift, received a radio message to proceed to the Providence County Courthouse and there pick up a fellow officer who had testified that day at a Superior Court trial. Upon receipt of this directive, Holland proceeded to interstate Route 195 and traveled westerly on that highway to the South Main Street exit ramp. Once he was on South Main Street, Officer Holland traveled in a northerly direction. Shortly after his entrance onto South Main Street, Holland observed a red sports car that, in his words, \\\"pulled up on the left and swerved over and cut me off.\\\" The red car then \\\"proceeded off,\\\" and Holland \\\"proceeded down\\\" the street.\\nWhen Holland was approximately fifty to seventy-five feet away from the Hopkins Street side of the courthouse, the red car once again came up on the officer's left, pulled in front of his vehicle, and stopped. Holland was then required to bring his cruiser to a halt. The red car's driver alighted from his vehicle and walked over to the driver's side of the cruiser. Holland recognized the driver; it was Cook, who, addressing Holland through an open window, asked the officer what he was doing in Providence. When Holland responded that his business in Providence was none of Cook's business, Cook uttered \\\"some profanities,\\\" some of which were employed in concert with \\\"different names\\\" he called the officer.\\nHolland then told Cook to return to his car and depart because traffic was becoming congested. Cook turned as if he were going to return to the red car; suddenly he spun around, leveled a punch through the open window, and hit Holland in the face. The force of the blow broke the sun glasses Holland was wearing and cut the left side of the officer's nose.\\nAt this point, Holland's fellow officer, who had been waiting in front of the courthouse on the South Main Street side, appeared on the scene and restrained Cook. In time the Providence police took over, and less than nine months later Cook was in the Providence County Courthouse on trial on a charge contained in a criminal information that alleged that he had, in violation of G.L. 1956 (1981 Reenactment) \\u00a7 11-5-5, knowingly and willfully struck a uniformed police officer while the officer was engaged in the performance of his duties.\\nAlthough Cook at trial denied ever having touched the officer, on the appellate level his defense is more direct and simple. According to Cook, at the time of the South Main Street encounter, Holland was not acting in the performance of his duties because providing taxi service for a fellow officer is not part of a police officer's responsibility. Thus, if he, Cook, were the East Providence police chief, any officer required to come to the courthouse and testify would have to return to headquarters by way of a public transit authority bus, or a taxi, or the officer's personal vehicle.\\nIn espousing this position, Cook, for all we know, might be recalling the days of his early youth when one's leisure time could be occupied playing such games as \\\"cops and robbers.\\\" However, we would remind him of the sagacious comment made by Mr. Justice Rehnquist when he observed that oftentimes municipal and state police are called upon to perform \\\"community care-taking functions\\\" that have nothing to do with the apprehension and conviction of alleged criminals. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2528, 37 L.Ed.2d 706, 714-15 (1973). Any police officer at any given time may perform the responsibilities of the office by acting as a domestic-relations counselor in an attempt to reconcile two belligerent spouses who at some prior time had solemnly promised to love and honor each other, or as a midwife to a newcomer to this planet who cannot delay his or her appearance until the cruiser makes it to the hospital, or as a sympathetic emissary who has the unpleasant task of informing some citizen of the loss of a loved one, or even as a taker of measurements or the preparer of accident reports that may prove of value solely to some insurance adjuster. The incidents to which we have just alluded are but a few of the many varied daily tasks that may be performed by anyone who joins a police department.\\nWhen the General Assembly sought to give some protection against bodily harm to the uniformed officer performing the duties of the office, we do not believe that the scope of this protection was to be restricted in such a manner as Cook would have it. The Legislature used the term \\\"duty\\\" in a broad sense, that is, what an officer should do simply because he or she is an officer. See United States v. Reid, 517 F.2d 953, 964 (2d Cir. 1975). We are of the opinion that an officer is occupied in the exercise of duty when he or she is carrying out official orders.\\nAs Officer Holland drove toward the Providence County Courthouse in obedience to his superior's command, he was engaged in the performance of his duties. The broad scope of statutory relief envisioned by the Legislature with its enactment of \\u00a7 11-5-5 affords no basis for Cook's reliance on the holding of Page v. Staples, 13 R.I. 306 (1881), where this court ruled that a Providence County sheriff who took a prisoner to the Providence County jail by way of Kent County lost his authority to retain custody of the prisoner once the two crossed into Kent County. Notwithstanding the rule of Page, when a police officer, in compliance with the order of his superior officer, leaves the municipality of his or her employer, the officer still retains the protection afforded by \\u00a7 11-5-5.\\nCook, by his continuous confrontation with Officer Holland and his colleague, gives a continued ring of truth to Gilbert and Sullivan's prophetic lament: \\\"When constabulary duty's to be done \\u2014 The policeman's lot is not a happy one.\\\" However, this distinguished duo further caught the constabulary's sergeant in song as follows: \\\"When a felon's not engaged in his employment \\u2014 Or maturing his felonious little plans \\u2014 His capacity for innocent enjoyment \\u2014 Is just as great as any honest man's.\\\" Hopefully, the time has come when Cook will cease hostilities and turn to matters of \\\"innocent enjoyment.\\\"\\nThe defendant's appeal is denied and dismissed, and the judgment of conviction appealed from is affirmed.\\n. The Pirates of Penzance, act II.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/7944218.json b/ri/7944218.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..27b4192bd5748271dd6fee3558d9ff65048915cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/7944218.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7944218\", \"name\": \"BLACKSTONE VALLEY CHAMBER OF COMMERCE et al. v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Blackstone Valley Chamber of Commerce v. Public Utilities Commission\", \"decision_date\": \"1980-06-12\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 80-236-M.P.\", \"first_page\": \"92\", \"last_page\": \"92\", \"citations\": \"420 A.2d 92\", \"volume\": \"420\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:18:31.237640+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"WEISBERGER, J., did not participate.\", \"parties\": \"BLACKSTONE VALLEY CHAMBER OF COMMERCE et al. v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION.\", \"head_matter\": \"BLACKSTONE VALLEY CHAMBER OF COMMERCE et al. v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION.\\nNo. 80-236-M.P.\\nSupreme Court of Rhode Island.\\nJune 12, 1980.\\nJames F. McCoy, Pawtucket, for petitioners.\\nCarl Freedman, Rhode Island Legal Services, Inc., Providence, for Intervenor Coalition for Consumer Justice.\", \"word_count\": \"75\", \"char_count\": \"503\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nThe motion of the Coalition for Consumer Justice to dismiss the petition for certiorari is denied without prejudice to its right to renew said motion at oral argument.\\nWEISBERGER, J., did not participate.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/7954859.json b/ri/7954859.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..01a2ae2721d021a0b0c4e1ea4e2547ef0e9226ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/7954859.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7954859\", \"name\": \"Louis V. JACKVONY, Jr. et al. v. Anthony MONAFO et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Jackvony v. Monafo\", \"decision_date\": \"1981-02-11\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 80-505-M.P.\", \"first_page\": \"1322\", \"last_page\": \"1322\", \"citations\": \"426 A.2d 1322\", \"volume\": \"426\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:54:30.664119+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"BEVILACQUA, C. J., did not participate.\", \"parties\": \"Louis V. JACKVONY, Jr. et al. v. Anthony MONAFO et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Louis V. JACKVONY, Jr. et al. v. Anthony MONAFO et al.\\nNo. 80-505-M.P.\\nSupreme Court of Rhode Island.\\nFeb. 11, 1981.\\nWilliam A. Gosz, Providence, for plaintiffs-respondents.\\nTimothy D. O\\u2019Hara, Warren, for defendants-petitioners.\", \"word_count\": \"65\", \"char_count\": \"435\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nThe petitioners' motion that we reconsider their petition for writ of certiorari and petitioners' request for oral argument are both denied. R.I., 425 A.2d 86.\\nBEVILACQUA, C. J., did not participate.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/7966292.json b/ri/7966292.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..658d6608903a2dae7c4c2dc5d9def27d5732585e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/7966292.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7966292\", \"name\": \"George McINTOSH v. Antonio A. MOREY\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"McIntosh v. Morey\", \"decision_date\": \"1981-04-30\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 80-451-Appeal\", \"first_page\": \"429\", \"last_page\": \"430\", \"citations\": \"431 A.2d 429\", \"volume\": \"431\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:22:49.417091+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"George McINTOSH v. Antonio A. MOREY.\", \"head_matter\": \"George McINTOSH v. Antonio A. MOREY.\\nNo. 80-451-Appeal.\\nSupreme Court of Rhode Island.\\nApril 30, 1981.\\nJohn Quattrocchi, Jr., Providence, for plaintiff.\\nHanson, Curran & Parks, Robert D. Par-rillo, Providence, for defendant.\", \"word_count\": \"222\", \"char_count\": \"1446\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nThis is a medical malpractice action in which the patient appeals from the grant by a justice of the Superior Court of the physician's motion for a directed verdict, which was based upon the patient's failure to produce expert evidence indicating that, in making a diagnosis, the physician failed to exercise the same degree of diligence and skill as physicians in good standing engaged in the same type of practice in similar localities in like cases. Sehenck v. Roger Williams General Hospital, R.I., 382 A.2d 514 (1977); Marshall v. Tomaselli, 118 R.I. 190, 372 A.2d 1280 (1977).\\nThe original diagnosis attributed the patient's abdominal pain to viral gastroenteritis. Eleven days later, another physician discovered a tender abdominal mass. Subsequent surgery disclosed a burst sigmoid colon.\\nAfter consideration of the arguments and an examination of the transcript, we believe that in matters involving viral gastroenteritis and a burst sigmoid colon, the jury had to have the assistance of expert testimony before it could properly evaluate the physician's actions. Young v. Park, R.I., 417 A.2d 889 (1980). Consequently, we grant the physician's motion to affirm the judgment entered in the Superior Court.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/7999432.json b/ri/7999432.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b8aa0b1a08dfda9fec2592e6330f65673eced6f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/7999432.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7999432\", \"name\": \"Edward J. HAYES v. PLANTATIONS STEEL COMPANY\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Hayes v. Plantations Steel Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1982-01-06\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 79-430-Appeal\", \"first_page\": \"1091\", \"last_page\": \"1097\", \"citations\": \"438 A.2d 1091\", \"volume\": \"438\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:22:31.128510+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Edward J. HAYES v. PLANTATIONS STEEL COMPANY.\", \"head_matter\": \"Edward J. HAYES v. PLANTATIONS STEEL COMPANY.\\nNo. 79-430-Appeal.\\nSupreme Court of Rhode Island.\\nJan. 6, 1982.\\nKeven A. McKenna, Cheryl A. Asquino, Providence, for plaintiff.\\nDeSimone & Del Sesto, Herbert F. DeSi-mone, Ronald W. Del Sesto, Providence, for defendant.\", \"word_count\": \"2818\", \"char_count\": \"17371\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nSHEA, Justice.\\nThe defendant employer, Plantations Steel Company (Plantations), appeals from a Superior Court judgment for the plaintiff employee, Edward J. Hayes (Hayes). The trial justice, sitting without a jury, found that Plantations was obligated to Hayes on the basis of an implied-in-fact contract to pay him a yearly pension of $5,000. The award covered three years in which payment had not been made. The trial justice ruled, also, that Hayes had made a sufficient showing of detrimental reliance upon Plantations's promise to pay to give rise to its obligation based on the theory of promissory estoppel. The trial justice, however, found in part for Plantations in ruling that the payments to Hayes were not governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.A. \\u00a7 1001-1461 (West 1975), and consequently he was not entitled to attorney's fees under \\u00a7 1132(g) of that act. Both parties have appealed.\\nWe reverse the findings of the trial justice regarding Plantations's contractual obligation to pay Hayes a pension. Consequently we need not deal with the cross-appeal concerning the award of attorney's fees under the federal statute.\\nPlantations is a closely held Rhode Island corporation engaged in the manufacture of steel reinforcing rods for use in concrete construction. The company was founded by Hugo R. Mainelli, Sr., and Alexander A. DiMartino. A dispute between their two families in 1976 and 1977 left the DiMartinos in full control of the corporation. Hayes was an employee of the corporation from 1947 until his retirement in 1972 at age of sixty-five. He began with Plantations as an \\\"estimator and draftsman\\\" and ended his career as general manager, a position of considerable responsibility. Starting in January 1973 and continuing until January 1976, Hayes received the annual sum of $5,000 from Plantations. Hayes instituted this action in December 1977, after the then company management refused to make any further payments.\\nHayes testified that in January 1972 he announced his intention to retire the following July, after twenty-five years of continuous service. He decided to retire because he had worked continuously for fifty-one years. He stated, however, that he would not have retired had he not expected to receive a pension. After he stopped working for Plantations, he sought no other employment.\\nApproximately one week before his actual retirement Hayes spoke with Hugo R. Mainelli, Jr., who was then an officer and a stockholder of Plantations. This conversation was the first and only one concerning payments of a pension to Hayes during retirement. Mainelli said that the company \\\"would take care\\\" of him. There was no mention of a sum of money or a percentage of salary that Hayes would receive. There was no formal authorization for payments by Plantations's shareholders and/or board of directors. Indeed, there was never any formal provision for a pension plan for any employee other than for unionized employees, who benefit from an arrangement through their union. The plaintiff was not a union member.\\nMr. Mainelli, Jr., testified that his father, Hugo R. Mainelli, Sr., had authorized the first payment \\\"as a token of appreciation for the many years of [Hayes's] service.\\\" Furthermore, \\\"it was implied that that check would continue on an annual basis.\\\" Mainelli also testified that it was his \\\"personal intention\\\" that the payments would continue for \\\"as long as I was around.\\\"\\nMainelli testified that after Hayes's retirement, he would visit the premises each year to say hello and renew old acquaintances. During the course of his visits, Hayes would thank Mainelli for the previous check and ask how long it would continue so that he could plan an orderly retirement.\\nThe payments were discontinued after 1976. At that time a succession of several poor business years plus the stockholders' dispute, resulting in the takeover by the DiMartino family, contributed to the decision to stop the payments.\\nThe trial justice ruled that Plantations owed Hayes his annual sum of $5,000 for the years 1977 through 1979. The ruling implied that barring bankruptcy or the cessation of business for any other reason, Hayes had a right to expect continued annual payments.\\nThe trial justice found that Hugo Mainel-li, Jr.'s statement that Hayes would be taken care of after his retirement was a promise. Although no sum of money was mentioned in 1972, the four annual payments of $5,000 established that otherwise unspecified term of the contract. The trial justice also found that Hayes supplied consideration for the promise by voluntarily retiring, because he was under no obligation to do so. From the words and conduct of the parties and from the surrounding circumstances, the trial justice concluded that there existed an implied contract obligating the company to pay a pension to Hayes for life. The trial justice made a further finding that even if Hayes had not truly bargained for a pension by voluntarily retiring, he had nevertheless incurred the detriment of foregoing other employment in reliance upon the company's promise. He specifically held that Hayes's retirement was in response to the promise and held also that Hayes refrained from seeking other employment in further reliance thereon.\\nThe findings of fact of a trial justice sitting without a jury are entitled to great weight when reviewed by this court. His findings will not be disturbed unless it can be shown that they are clearly wrong or that the trial justice misconceived or overlooked material evidence. Lisi v. Marra, R.I., 424 A.2d 1052 (1981); Raheb v. Lemenski, 115 R.I. 576, 350 A.2d 397 (1976). After careful review of the record, however, we conclude that the trial justice's findings and conclusions must be reversed.\\nAssuming for the purpose of this discussion that Plantations in legal effect made a promise to Hayes, we must ask whether Hayes did supply the required consideration that would make the promise binding? And, if Hayes did not supply consideration, was his alleged reliance sufficiently induced by the promise to estop defendant from denying its obligation to him? We answer both questions in the negative.\\nWe turn first to the problem of consideration. The facts at bar do not present the case of an express contract. As the trial justice stated, the existence of a contract in this case must be determined from all the circumstances of the parties' conduct and words. Although words were expressed initially in the remark that Hayes \\\"would be taken care of,\\\" any contract in this case would be more in the nature of an implied contract. Certainly the statement of Hugo Mainelli, Jr., standing alone is not an expression of a direct and definite promise to pay Hayes a pension. Though we are analyzing an implied contract, nevertheless we must address the question of consideration.\\nContracts implied in fact require the element of consideration to support them as is required in express contracts. The only difference between the two is the manner in which the parties manifest their assent. J. Koury Steel Erectors, Inc. v. San-Vel Concrete Corp., R.I., 387 A.2d 694 (1978); Bailey v. West, 105 R.I. 61, 249 A.2d 414 (1969). In this jurisdiction, consideration consists either in some right, interest, or benefit accruing to one party or some forbearance, detriment, or responsibility given, suffered, or undertaken by the other. See Dockery v. Greenfield, 86 R.I. 464, 136 A.2d 682 (1957); Darcey v. Darcey, 29 R.I. 384, 71 A. 595 (1909). Valid consideration furthermore must be bargained for. It must induce the return act or promise. To be valid, therefore, the purported consideration must not have been delivered before a promise is executed, that is, given without reference to the promise. Plowman v. Indian Refining Co., 20 F.Supp. 1 (E.D.Ill.1937). Consideration is therefore a test of the enforceability of executory promises, Angel v. Murray, 113 R.I. 482, 322 A.2d 630 (1974), and has no legal effect when rendered in the past and apart from an alleged exchange in the present. Zanturjian v. Boornazian, 25 R.I. 151, 55 A. 199 (1903).\\nIn the case before us, Plantations's promise to pay Hayes a pension is quite clearly not supported by any consideration supplied by Hayes. Hayes had announced his intent to retire well in advance of any promise, and therefore the intention to retire was arrived at without regard to any promise by Plantations. Although Hayes may have had in mind the receipt of a pension when he first informed Plantations, his expectation was not based on any statement made to him or on any conduct of the company officer relative to him in January 1972. In deciding to retire, Hayes acted on his own initiative. Hayes's long years of dedicated service also is legally insufficient because his service too was rendered without being induced by Plantations's promise. See Plowman v. Indian Refining Co., supra.\\nClearly then this is not a case in which Plantations's promise was meant to induce Hayes to refrain from retiring when he could have chosen to do so in return for further service. 1 Williston on Contracts, \\u00a7 130B (3d ed., Jaeger 1957). Nor was the promise made to encourage long service from the start of his employment. Weesner v. Electric Power Board of Chattanooga, 48 Tenn.App. 178, 344 S.W.2d 766 (1961). Instead, the testimony establishes that Plantations's promise was intended \\\"as a token of appreciation for [Hayes's] many years of service.\\\" As such it was in the nature of a gratuity paid to Hayes for as long as the company chose. In Spickelmier Industries, Inc. v. Passander, 172 Ind.App. 49, 359 N.E.2d 563 (1977), an employer's promise to an employee to pay him a year-end bonus was unenforceable because it was made after the employee had performed his contractual responsibilities for that year.\\nThe plaintiff's most relevant citations are still inapposite to the present case. Bredemann v. Vaughan Mfg. Co., 40 Ill.App.2d 232, 188 N.E.2d 746 (1963), presents similar yet distinguishable facts. There, the appellate court reversed a summary judgment granted to the defendant employer, stating that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether the plaintiff's retirement was in consideration of her employer's promise to pay her a lifetime pension. As in the present case, the employer made the promise one week prior to the employee's retirement, and in almost the same words. However, Bredemann is distinguishable because the court characterized that promise as a concrete offer to pay if she would retire immediately. In fact, the defendant wanted her to retire. Id. 188 N.E.2d at 749. On the contrary, Plantations in this case did not actively seek Hayes's retirement. DiMartino, one of Plantations's founders, testified that he did not want Hayes to retire. Unlike Bredemann, here Hayes announced his unsolicited intent to retire.\\nHayes also argues that the work he performed during the week between the promise and the date of his retirement constituted sufficient consideration to support the promise. He relies on Ulmann v. Sunset-McKee Co., 221 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1955), in which the court ruled that work performed during the one-week period of the employee's notice of impending retirement constituted consideration for the employer's offer of a pension that the employee had solicited some months previously. But there the court stated that its prime reason for upholding the agreement was that sufficient consideration existed in the employee's consent not to compete with his employer. These circumstances do not appear in our case. Hayes left his employment because he no longer desired to work. He was not contemplating other job offers or considering going into competition with Plantations. Although Plantations did not want Hayes to leave, it did not try to deter him, nor did it seek to prevent Hayes from engaging in other activity.\\nHayes argues in the alternative that even if Plantations's promise was not the product of an exchange, its duty is grounded properly in the theory of promissory estoppel. This court adopted the theory of promissory estoppel in East Providence Credit Union v. Geremia, 103 R.I. 597, 601, 239 A.2d 725, 727 (1968) (quoting 1 Restatement Contracts \\u00a7 90 at 110 (1932)) stating:\\n\\\"A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbear- anee is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of its promise.\\\"\\nIn East Providence Credit Union this court said that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is invoked \\\"as a substitute for a consideration, rendering a gratuitous promise enforceable as a contract.\\\" Id. To restate the matter differently, \\\"the acts of reliance by the promisee to his detriment [provide] a substitute for consideration.\\\" Id.\\nHayes urges that in the absence of a bargained-for promise the facts require application of the doctrine of promissory es-toppel. He stresses that he retired voluntarily while expecting to receive a pension. He would not have otherwise retired. Nor did he seek other employment.\\nWe disagree with this contention largely for the reasons already stated. One of the essential elements of the doctrine of promissory estoppel is that the promise must induce the promisee's action or forbearance. The particular act in this regard is plaintiff's decision whether or not to retire. As we stated earlier, the record indicates that he made the decision on his own initiative. In other words, the conversation between Hayes and Mainelli which occurred a week before Hayes left his employment cannot be said to have induced his decision to leave. He had reached that decision long before.\\nAn example taken from the restatement provides a meaningful contrast:\\n\\\"2. A promises B to pay him an annuity during B's life. B thereupon resigns profitable employment, as A expected that he might. B receives the annuity for some years, in the meantime becoming disqualified from again obtaining good employment. A's promise is binding.\\\" (Emphasis added.) 1 Restatement Contracts \\u00a7 90 at 111 (1932).\\nIn Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo.App.1959), the plaintiff-employee had worked for her employer for nearly forty years. The defendant corporation's board of directors resolved, in view of her long years of service, to obligate itself to pay \\\"retirement privileges\\\" to her. The resolution did not require the plaintiff to retire. Instead, the decision whether and when to retire remained entirely her own. The board then informed her of its resolution. The plaintiff worked for eighteen months more before retiring. She sued the corporation when it reduced her monthly checks seven years later. The court held that a pension contract existed between the parties. Although continued employment was not a consideration to her receipt of retirement benefits, the court found sufficient reliance on the part of the plaintiff to support her claim. The court based its decision upon the above restatement example, that is, the defendant informed the plaintiff of its plan, and the plaintiff in reliance thereon, retired. Feinberg presents factors that also appear in the case at bar. There, the plaintiff had worked many years and desired to retire; she would not have left had she not been able to rely on a pension; and once retired, she sought no other employment.\\nHowever, the important distinction between Feinberg and the case before us is that in Feinberg the employer's decision definitely shaped the thinking of the plaintiff. In this case the promise did not. It is not reasonable to infer from the facts that Hugo R. Mainelli, Jr., expected retirement to result from his conversation with Hayes. Hayes had given notice of his intention seven months previously. Here there was thus no inducement to retire which would satisfy the demands of \\u00a7 90 of the restatement. Nor can it be said that Hayes's refraining from other employment was \\\"action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character.\\\" The underlying assumption of Hayes's initial decision to retire was that upon leaving the defendant's employ, he would no longer work. It is impossible to say that he changed his position any more so because of what Mainelli had told him in light of his own initial decision. These circumstances do not lead to a conclusion that injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of Plantations's promise. Hayes received $20,000 over the course of four years. He inquired each year about whether he could expect a check for the following year. Obviously, there was no absolute certainty on his part that the pension would continue. Furthermore, in the face of his uncertainty, the mere fact that payment for several years did occur is insufficient by itself to meet the requirements of reliance under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.\\nFor the foregoing reasons, the defendant's appeal is sustained and the judgment of the Superior Court is reversed. The papers of the case are remanded to the Superior Court.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/8000168.json b/ri/8000168.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..48d6c79636659f4a5396bbc076ff805d713b46a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/8000168.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8000168\", \"name\": \"STATE v. Thomas C. ANTHONY\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Anthony\", \"decision_date\": \"1981-07-02\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 81-203-C.A.\", \"first_page\": \"683\", \"last_page\": \"683\", \"citations\": \"433 A.2d 683\", \"volume\": \"433\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:22:51.581852+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"STATE v. Thomas C. ANTHONY.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE v. Thomas C. ANTHONY.\\nNo. 81-203-C.A.\\nSupreme Court of Rhode Island.\\nJuly 2, 1981.\\nDennis J. Roberts II, Atty. Gen., for plaintiff.\\nJanice M. Weisfeld, Asst. Public Defender.\", \"word_count\": \"43\", \"char_count\": \"273\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nThe defendant's motion to supplement the record with the trial transcript is granted.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/8005077.json b/ri/8005077.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9c67235d5b5e04d6c7adb85416f2bc7769e12a6f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/8005077.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8005077\", \"name\": \"STATE v. Alfred BISHOP\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State v. Bishop\", \"decision_date\": \"1979-12-13\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 77-453-C.A.\", \"first_page\": \"1246\", \"last_page\": \"1246\", \"citations\": \"409 A.2d 1246\", \"volume\": \"409\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:43:48.404855+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"DORIS, J., did not participate.\", \"parties\": \"STATE v. Alfred BISHOP.\", \"head_matter\": \"STATE v. Alfred BISHOP.\\nNo. 77-453-C.A.\\nSupreme Court of Rhode Island.\\nDec. 13, 1979.\\nDennis J. Roberts II, Atty. Gen., Stephen Lichatin III, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Chief, Appellate Division, for plaintiff.\\nJohn F. Cicilline, Providence, for defendant.\", \"word_count\": \"70\", \"char_count\": \"459\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nThe Director of the Department of Corrections is ordered to continue defendant's confinement at a facility within the State of Rhode Island until December 16, 1979.\\nDORIS, J., did not participate.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/8518639.json b/ri/8518639.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b29c38275ab9023e7d18558730c9c39788aa14d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/8518639.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8518639\", \"name\": \"Elizabeth Leonard vs. State Mutual Life Assurance Company\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Leonard v. State Mutual Life Assurance Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1902-03-07\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"7\", \"last_page\": \"10\", \"citations\": \"24 R.I. 7\", \"volume\": \"24\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:45:58.111205+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"PRESENT: Stiness, C. J., Tillingliast and Rogers, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Elizabeth Leonard vs. State Mutual Life Assurance Company.\", \"head_matter\": \"Elizabeth Leonard vs. State Mutual Life Assurance Company.\\nPROVIDENCE\\nMARCH 7, 1902.\\nPRESENT: Stiness, C. J., Tillingliast and Rogers, JJ.\\n(1) Life Insurance. Pleading.\\nThe defendant can show the falsity of answers in an application for life insurance under the general issue; and a special plea is not necessary.\\n(2) Pife Insurance. Agent of Company.\\nWhere the rules of the company required the medical examiner to put the questions and fill out the answers in his own handwriting, he was, in this respect, the agent of the company; and if he received correct answers and took the signature of the applicant \\\"before the answers were recorded, this must be regarded as the action of the company and not within the rule that the writer of the application is the agent of the insured,\\n(3) Life Insurance. Notice to Agent.\\nA medical examiner required to fill out a medical certificate is not the agent of the company for anything more than the certificate. Notice to him of anything not called for by the certificate is not notice to the company. He is without authority to waive answers or to give advice binding on the company to write an answer as it was written.\\n(4) Life Insurance. Warranties.\\nTJnder the rule making the answers of an insured warranties, the falsity of the answers and not the fraud of the insured is the test.\\nAssumpsit on a policy of life insurance. Heard on petition of defendant for new tidal, and judgment ordered for defendant.\", \"word_count\": \"1302\", \"char_count\": \"7369\", \"text\": \"Stiness, C. J.\\nIt is not necessary to consider the exceptions which relate to the pleadings in this case, because the special pleas themselves were not necessary,\\nThe long-settled rule in this State is that statements in an application for insurance, made as of the applicant's own knowledge, upon which the contract is based, are warranties, the burden of proving which are upon the plaintiff. Wilson v. Hampden Co., 4 R. I. 159 ; Lyons v. Providence Co., 14 R. I. 109 ; Sweeney v. Metropolitan Co., 19 R. I. 171.\\nIn the latter case it was said that they may be sustained, prima facie, by the presumption of truth which attaches to a man's solemn acts and declarations in the course of a contract ; but, having been made a part of the contract, the-plaintiff must sustain them if they are attacked.\\nIt follows from this that a denial of the truth of the statement does not require a special plea, for they are a part of his case. Special pleas are never mere denials of necessary averments in the declaration, but they are used where the averments may be true and the plaintiff have a color of action, but some other fact exists which will defeat it. Familiar illustrations are pleas of the statute of limitations, discharge in bankruptcy, license, justification, and the like.\\nThe defendant was therefore entitled to show, under the general issue, that certain answers were untrue, and to these the plaintiff would reply. This was done by special pleas, but, as the result was right, the mode of reaching it and the questions of law raised thereby are of no consequence.\\nIt is also a settled rule in this State that one who is only authorized to solicit insurance is not the agent of the company in making the application, and that if he takes part in making the application he is in that respect the agent of the applicant and not of the company. Wilson v. Conway Co., 4 R. I. 141; Reed v. Equitable Co., 17 R. I. 785.\\nTwo statements in the application are set up by the defence as untrue : one in omitting to state that two sisters had. died of phthisis, and one in stating that the insured did not contemplate other insurance.\\nThe statement in regard to the death of the sisters occurred in the certificate of the medical examiner, and, as in Leonard v. New England Co., 22 R. I. 519, the company required the medical examiner to put the questions and fill out the answers in his own handwriting, thereby making the examiner the agent of the company in this respect. Hence, if this agent received correct answers to the questions and took the signature of the applicant before the answers were recoi'ded, .all this must be regarded as the action of the company and not within the rule,_ above stated, that the writer of the application is the agent of the insured.\\nUpon this ground there was no error.\\nThe second statement, that he did not contemplate other insurance, is simply a question of fact. The jury was correctly instructed that it must find the answer to be true in order to return a verdict for the plaintiff.\\nThe insurance in this company was $3,500, and at the same time Leonard applied for and afterwards received in- * surance to an equal amount in another company, the same doctor examining for both companies. The statement about other insurance was not a part of the medical certificate, but of the application filled out by the solicitor of the insurance. The latter testified that when he came to this question he asked the doctor if it would \\\"make any difference,\\\" and he said \\\"No.\\\" It is not at all clear what this means, but the argument is that as the examination for both companies took place at the same time, and this answer was made in the presence of the medical examiner, that, therefore, the insured supposed it was all one transaction and that the company had notice of the fact, notwithstanding the answer.\\nBut evidently the insured knew that there were two applications, and the doctor was not the agent of the company for anything more than the medical certificate. Notice to him, therefore, of anything not called for by his certificate was not notice to the company. He had no authority to\\nIrving Champlin and Hugh J. Carroll, for plaintiff.\\nEdward D. Bassett, for defendant.\\nwaive the answer or to give advice binding on the company to write the answer as it was written. Indeed, it is almost incredible that anybody, without an intent to deceive, could have answered the very simple question ' ' Is any application for insurance in any other company now pending or contemplated?\\\" \\\"No,\\\" upon the reason that the application was made at that time instead of some other time. At no time could the insured be so certain that he contemplated other insurance as then, while he was being examined for it. The answer was untrue, and the insured was not misled in making it by anyone representing the company in that respect.\\nThe plaintiff claims, however, that the answer does not avoid the policy, because it was innocently made and the real fact was known to the company's agent. The reply to this claim is that falsity, not fraud, is the basis of liability on a warranty. Ingraham v. Union R. R. Co., 19 R. I. 356; Fogarty v. Barnes, 16 R. I. 627; Place v. Merrill, 14 R. I. 578.\\nThe cases cited by the plaintiff follow the rule that the one who takes the application is the agent of the company, which is not the rule of this State, and the medical examiner is made the agent of the company only as to that part of the application which he is required to write.\\nThe answer being untrue, and being a part of the contract and relating to a matter within the knowledge of the applicant, it must he regarded as a material misstatement which avoids the contract.\\nThis being conclusive of the rights of the parties, judgment must be for the defendant.\\nPetition for new trial granted, and case remitted to Common Pleas Division with instructions to enter judgment for the defendant.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/8518672.json b/ri/8518672.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..55d0fcd329d003ea01716fcde16b001bc157367c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/8518672.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8518672\", \"name\": \"Luigi Tirocchi, Ind. & as Ex. et al. vs. Lucia Tirocchi, Ex. et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Tirocchi v. Tirocchi\", \"decision_date\": \"1941-06-18\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"71\", \"last_page\": \"80\", \"citations\": \"67 R.I. 71\", \"volume\": \"67\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:14:15.250918+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Flynn, C. J., Moss, Capotosto, Baker and Condon, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Luigi Tirocchi, Ind. & as Ex. et al. vs. Lucia Tirocchi, Ex. et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Luigi Tirocchi, Ind. & as Ex. et al. vs. Lucia Tirocchi, Ex. et al.\\nJUNE 18, 1941.\\nPresent: Flynn, C. J., Moss, Capotosto, Baker and Condon, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"2917\", \"char_count\": \"17113\", \"text\": \"Condon, j.\\nThis is a bill for the construction of the will of Louisa Tirocchi, which has been certified to this court in accordance with general laws 1938, chapter 545, \\u00a7 7. The bill was brought originally' by Luigi Tirocchi and his living brothers against Lucia Tirocchi, executor, solely. It was here previously in such form and was sent back to the superior court for the addition of necessary parties. See Tirocchi v. Tirocchi, 66 R. I. 301, 19 A. 2d. 7. These parties, grandchildren of the testatrix, have now been added as parties respondent.\\nThe will consists of seven numbered paragraphs.- The first paragraph directs the payment of debts and funeral expenses; the second devises certain real estate to Giovanni Tirocchi, a son of the testatrix; the third, fourth and fifth make specific bequests of $100 each to three grandchildren; the sixth expressly excludes Reverend Father Achille Tiroc-chi, another son of the testatrix, from any share in her estate ; and the seventh contains the disposition which has caused the bringing of this bill for construction.\\nParagraph Seventh reads as follows:\\n\\\"I give, devise and bequeath to my sons, Luigi Tiroc^ chi, Gerardo Tirocchi, Giuseppe Tirocchi, Augusto Tirocchi, and Giovanni Tirocchi all my property and estate that I may die seized and possessed of, whether real, personal or mixed, and wherever the same may be located, each to share and share alike. Said property and estate to be used by my said sons, all united in a Partnership, in conducting the business in the Rhode Island Improvement Cement Works and the Rhode Island Laundry, under the following conditions:\\n\\\"(a) In order to perpetuate the said property, estate and business, if any of my said sons desire, for any reason, to sever his relation with the said Partnership, he must notify the remaining brothers in writing of his intention to sever his relation with the said Partnership, and then the said brothers, to-wit, my sons, shall have the said property and estate appraised and, after having deducted his proportionate share in the encumbrances and debts of any kind laying in the said property, estate and business, they shall pay to the brother desiring to sever his relation with the said Partnership his proportionate share, provided further that said proportionate share .be payable within ten years from the date of appraisal, and that no interest shall be due or payable on said proportionate share within said period of ten years.\\n\\\"(b) In the event that any of my sons hereinbefore mentioned has no issue, and he desires to sever his relation with the said Partnership, he shall lose all rights to his said share of the said property, estate and business, and he cannot claim anything from his brothers, to-wit, my sons. In the event that the said son continues to be united in Partnership with his brothers until his death, then upon his death his said share shall go to and vest in my other sons hereinbefore mentioned, or to their children, if any of them shall have deceased; the purpose of this paragraph being that I desire my property and estate to remain in my own family. ,.\\n\\\"(c) In the event that any of my sons hereinbefore mentioned die leaving issue, after having deducted his proportionate share in the encumbrances and debts of any kind laying in the property, estate and business, the widow and children of said son shall be entitled to his proportionate share payable within ten years from the date that an appraisal is made' of said property and estate after the death of said son, and interest of four per cent shall be charged to the remaining sons on the money due the widow and children during said period of ten years.\\n\\\"(d) In the event that any of my sons hereinbefore mentioned desire to conduct a separate business of his own during the time he is united in Partnership with his brothers, then he cannot continue to. remain in Partnership with his brothers, but if he has issue after having deducted his proportionate share in the encumbrances and debts of any kind laying in the said property, estate and business, he shall be entitled to his proportionate share, provided that said proportionate share shall be payable within ten years from the date of the appraisal of my property and estate and that no interest shall be due or payable on said proportionate share within said period of ten years. If the said son has no issue, he shall lose all rights to his said share of the said property, estate and business, and he cannot claim anything from his brothers, to-wit, my .sons.\\n\\\"(e) I direct that my sons hereinbefore mentioned united in the said Partnership continue to receive each the same weekly amount of money they used to receive before my death, provided that the said money shall be taken from the proweeds or from the earnings of the business hereinbefore mentioned. In the event that any of my said sons hereinbefore mentioned needs some more money for his personal use, he must notify his brothers, to-wit, my sons, of his need of more money and his brothers shall decide by a majority whether the said money shall be taken from the proceeds or from the earnings of the said business hereinbefore mentioned and shall be given him.\\n\\\"(f) I direct that any surplus of money coming from the proceeds and earnings of the business herein-before mentioned, be spent for the enlarging and increasing of said business.\\n\\\"(g) I direct that the said Partnership of my said sons be lasting until two of my said sons desire to conduct the said business in the Rhode Island Improvement Cement Works and the Rhode Island Laundry.\\\"\\nThe five sons therein mentioned were all living and married at the time of their mother's death. Gerardo died September 8, 1939, without issue, leaving surviving him his widow, Lucia Tirocchi, whom he made his executrix and to whom he devised and bequeathed all of his estate. She contends that the seventh paragraph of the will is void for vagueness and inconsistency, and that therefore Louisa Tirocchi died intestate as to all of her property not specifically bequeathed and devised.\\nThe complainants have brought this bill to obtain a construction of the seventh paragraph and answers to two specific questions as follows:\\n\\\"(1) What disposition shall your complainant, Luigi Tirocchi, as Executor under said will, make of the five (5) one-share certificates of said Rhode Island Laundry Co., Inc. standing in the names of Luigi Tirocchi, Augusto Tiroc-chi, Giovanni Tirocchi, Giuseppe Tirocchi and Gerardo Tirocchi?\\n\\\"(2) What disposition shall your complainant, Luigi Tirocchi, as Executor under said will, make of the certificate of stock for ninety-five (95) shares in said Rhode Island Laundry Co., Inc. standing in the name of Louisa Tirocchi?\\\"\\nLouisa Tirocchi's estate at the time she executed her will consisted principally of unincorporated businesses known as the Rhode Island Improved Cement Works and the Rhode Island Laundry, which were owned by her exclusively. Later in 1931, the year before she died, she incorporated the laundry business under the name of Rhode Island Laundry Co., Inc., with an authorized capital of one hundred shares of stock. Certificates' of this stock were issued as follows: ninety-five shares to herself, and one share to each of her five sons, Luigi, Augusto, Giovanni, Giuseppe and Gerardo. The stock certificates of the sons' shares were never delivered by Louisa to any of them and none of the sons ever demanded such certificate.\\nThe complainants contend that the seventh paragraph, if properly read and construed, in the light of the expressed intention of the testatrix, is not inconsistent with any other paragraph of the will nor is any clause thereof inconsistent with any other, although at first reading some of these clauses might appear to be vague. They contend that, upon careful reading of the seventh paragraph, it becomes clear that the testatrix had a definite plan which is consistent and workable. They further argue that, by virtue of this plan, the rights of Gerardo in their mother's estate passed to them, upon his death without issue, in accordance with the express directions of such plan.\\nIt must be admitted that this plan on first reading appears vague, but, upon further study, we agree with the complainants that this apparent vagueness disappears. This is true also of a seeming inconsistency, in part, between clauses (a) and (b) and between clauses (a) and (d) of the paragraph. However, if we consider all of the clauses together and do not confine our consideration of them strictly to the order in which they are set out in the paragraph, we find a unique but well-thought-out plan by means of which the testatrix provided for the continuance by her sons of the two businesses, which were successfully conducted by her in her lifetime, and for the exclusion from said businesses of any person or persons not of her family, that is, not of her blood.\\nFirst and foremost, she gave to her five sons all of her property in equal shares, to be used by them, united in a partnership, for the purpose of conducting the two businesses of the family, Rhode Island Improvement Cement Works and Rhode Island Laundry Co., Inc., both together hereinafter referred to as the business. This gift, however, was subject to certain conditions. These conditions were, substantially, that the business was to be conducted exclusively by said sons; that if any son wished to conduct a separate business, he was required to withdraw from the business; and that if any son without issue so withdrew or died, his proportionate share was to go to his remaining brothers; but that if such a son had issue, then his proportionate share was to be paid to him or to such issue, and the remaining brothers were to have ten years within which to make such payment.\\nBy clauses (b) and (c) provision was made for such sons as might die while still in the partnership, actively conducting the business. Under clause (b) if such a deceased son left no issue, his rights in the property were to pass to his brothers and their issue. But under clause (c) if he left issue, his widow and children were to receive his pror portionate share, which was to be paid to them within ten years after appraisal thereof, and the remaining sons were to be chargeable with four per cent interest on such share until it was paid.\\nClause (a) appears to provide that any son who desired to withdraw could do so and receive his share, regardless of whether he was without issue. \\u2022 If we confined ourselves to a reading of this clause alone in order to find the intention of the testatrix, we would be forced to conclude that any son was entitled to his share as thus provided. But such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the dominant intention of the testatrix, gathered from the whole will, for a number of reasons.\\nIn the first place, it would imperil in no slight degree the continued existence of the partnership, which the testatrix expressly planned in the first portion of the seventh paragraph of which (a) is merely a conditional clause. Secondly, it would allow a son, without issue, who withdrew from the partnership, a substantial and unreasonable preference over a son who, though without issue, had remained, in accordance with the strongly expressed desire of the testatrix, in the partnership until his death. Thirdly, it is overridden by the clear unequivocal language of (b), which provides that a son dying without issue loses all' his rights, and this is so also of a son who withdraws. Clause (a) ought to be reconciled with such an explicit provision if it can reasonably be done, especially in view of the very clearly and definitely expressed intention of the testatrix that: \\\"I desire my property and estate to remain in my own family.\\\"\\nFor these reasons, we read (a) in connection with the other clauses and construe it as intending to provide generally for the method of payment of the share of any son who retired from the partnership and who was entitled to receive the appraised value of his share. We cannot construe it as declaring that a son was entitled to his proportionate share if he withdrew, because the testatrix has gone to great pains to set out specifically, in the next succeeding clauses, under what conditions a son would or would not be entitled to receive such share.\\nThe first of those conditions is that he must have issue if he withdraws, or leave issue if he dies while a member of the partnership. It is true that the testatrix has adopted a peculiar method to make certain that her property will remain in her family, but we see no legal obstacle to it being given effect.\\nIt is obvious from the provisions of (c) and (f) that the testatrix strongly desired the family business to be \\u2022continued by her sons and that she was keenly solicitous concerning the future growth of the business. Not only \\u2022did she provide that the partnership would not be embarrassed by any son suddenly withdrawing and demanding his proportionate share, but she expressly provided that the sons remaining in the partnership should draw only the regular compensation which they were receiving before her death. And finally, with a mind centered on the same purpose, she directed in clause (f) that surplus earnings be ploughed back into the business.\\nThe testatrix further provided that as long as at least three of her sons desired to conduct the business under the plan which she had thus so carefully set forth for its conservation and growth, it should be confined exclusively to members of her own family, meaning and intending thereby her own sons. Three was a majority of the five sons to whom she gave the business and, therefore, it is not difficult to understand the meaning of the language of the testatrix in clause (g), although she may not have expressed it as clearly as could have been done.\\nBefore we conclude, we must consider a further contention of the respondents. They point out that the seventh paragraph is preceded by six other paragraphs in the will in which the testatrix has bequeathed portions of her real and personal property to others, and yet, by the seventh paragraph she purports to give all her property and estate of every kind to her sons. Respondents contend that this is an insuperable inconsistency which necessarily renders the seventh' paragraph void for repugnancy.\\nThe respondents cite, in support of their contention, Buffington v. Work, 61 R. I. 133. That case involved a repugnant provision which we declared must be held void because of the absolute nature of the estate disposed of in the prior gift. Such is not the situation here. The testatrix has made certain specific bequests and devises of a portion of her property and those gifts are absolute. But there was a great portion of her property not affected by those bequests and devises and this she undertook to devise in the seventh paragraph. Although she did not expressly say so, it is reasonable to infer that when she used the express language she did in that paragraph, she was referring only to all of her property then remaining after the prior bequests and devises.\\nTo hold rigidly to the letter of the will and find testatrix's elaborate disposition under the seventh paragraph void, merely because she did not expressly exclude prior disposed of property, therefrom, would not be warranted. Rather it is more reasonable and more consistent with the testatrix's intention to give effect to the seventh paragraph, especially since it can be done without doing any harm to the prior gifts. By doing so, we are favoring the clearly expressed intention of the testatrix and are resolving an apparent inconsistency so as to avoid intestacy as to the greater part of her property. \\\"Courts will construe a will so as to avoid partial intestacy if such construction appears reasonable and natural.\\\" Hammill v. Anderson, 43 R. I. 103, 107, 110 A. 422.\\nCharles P. Sisson, Benjamin Cianciarulo, Sisson & Fletcher, for complainants.\\nFrancis J. O'Brien, Peter L. Cannon, for respondents.\\nFor the reasons above stated, the questions propounded should be answered as follows:\\n1. The executor is directed to cancel the five shares issued to Luigi, Gerardo, Giuseppe, Augusto and Giovanni Tirocchi, these not having appeared to have ever become the property of said persons but to have remained the property of the testatrix.\\n2. The executor is further directed to divide all of the stock of Louisa Tirocchi, including the five shares above, into four equal portions and to give one of such portions to each complainant; and he is further directed to stamp or otherwise imprint on the face of each certificate of stock which is issued to each complainant a statement that it is subject to the conditions set forth in the will of said Louisa Tirocchi as herein construed.\\nOn July 7, 1941, the parties may submit to us a form of decree, in accordance with this opinion, for entry in the superior court.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/8519784.json b/ri/8519784.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4af29ed8f695aaee0ff231c0ffee15c62b14f715
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/8519784.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8519784\", \"name\": \"Sarah A. Wilbur vs. Rhode Island Company\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Wilbur v. Rhode Island Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1905-05-29\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"205\", \"last_page\": \"209\", \"citations\": \"27 R.I. 205\", \"volume\": \"27\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:24:44.820841+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Sarah A. Wilbur vs. Rhode Island Company.\", \"head_matter\": \"Sarah A. Wilbur vs. Rhode Island Company.\\nPROVIDENCE\\nMAY 29, 1905.\\nPresent: Douglas, C. J., Johnson and Parkhurst, JJ.\\n(1) Negligence. Unknown Cause. Res Ipsa Loquitur.\\nWhere the thing which .occasioned an injury is unknown the maxim res ipsa loquitur has no application; since, where the thing is unknown, it can not be said to speak or to indicate the existence of causative negligence.\\n(2) Common Carriers. Negligence. Unknown Cause of Injury.\\nDeclaration for negligence against a common carrier alleged in a single count that there were in the running-board, or step, of the car certain apertures, projections, and-defects negligently made or permitted to be and remain by the defendant, the nature whereof was and is unknown to plaintiff and which she could not more particularly describe, and that her foot or shoe was caught upon the running-board, or step, by reason of said apertures, projections, or defects, whereby the heel of her shoe was torn off and she was thrown and injured:\\u2014\\nHeld, that the description of the alleged defects was inconsistent and contradictory. and that, further the declaration charged simply that defendant was guilty of negligence without alleging in what it consisted.\\nTrespass on the Case for negligence. Heard on demurrer to declaration, and sustained.\", \"word_count\": \"1697\", \"char_count\": \"9786\", \"text\": \"Johnson, J.\\nThe declaration in this case sets o.ut, in substance, that the defendant was negligent in providing, without the plaintiff's knowledge and without any warning to her, a car with a defective running-board, or step, wherein there were certain apertures, projections, and defects negligently made, or permitted to be and remain, by the defendant, the nature whereof was and is unknown to the plaintiff, and she can not more particularly describe the same, and that said car has remained in the defendant's possession; that she has never examined it nor had an opportunity to examine it, and has never seen it except at the time set out in said declaration; and that, while she was a passenger on said car and in the exercise of due care, and while ignorant of the existence of said apertures, projections, and defects, and while alighting from said car at the end of her journey, her foot or shoe was caught upon said running-board, or step, by reason of said apertures., projections, or defects, whereby the heel of her shoe was torn off, and she was violently thrown from said car to the ground and injured; and that the defendant knew, or, if in the exercise of due care, would have known, of the existence of said apertures, projections, and defects.\\nTo this declaration the defendant demurs, on the grounds:\\n1. That it does not appear in and by said amended declaration what the apertures, projections, and defects were, as referred to in said declaration.\\n2. From all that appears in said amended declaration the defendant was not guilty of any negligence whatever.\\nThe plaintiff contends that, as it appears in the declaration that while alighting from the car the heel of the plaintiff's shoe was caught in the running-board, whereby it was torn off, and the plaintiff was thrown to the ground and injured, and that the car has always been in the exclusive possession of the defendant, and that she never saw it before nor after the time she was injured, and has had no opportunity to inspect it, and therefore does not know and can not state the exact cause of the accident, therefore the case comes within the class of cases to which the maxim res ipsa loquitur applies.\\nIn support of this contention the plaintiff's counsel cites: Cox v. Providence Gas Co., 17 R. I. 199; Parker v. Providence and Stonington Steamship Co., Id. 376; Ellis v. Waldron, 19 R. I. 369; Kearney v. London, &c. Ry. Co., L. R. 5 Q. B. 411, .and numerous other cases.\\nIn Cox v. Providence Gas Co. the plaintiff was injured while at work as an employee of the defendant, at its gas works, in consequence of an explosion of a tank in the ground near where he was at work. The fact that the plaintiff was injured did not speak for itself so as to impute.negligence to the defendant; but the attendant circumstance that the injury was caused by the explosion of a tank belonging to the defendant and under its control brought it within the class of cases to which the maxim applies.\\nIn Parker v. Providence and Stonington Steamship Co. there was a collision in the public waters of the State, the declaration charging that the defendant's servants so negligently and carelessly navigated its steamer that it ran upon and sank the vessel of the plaintiff's testator, without stating particularly in what the negligence consisted, and the court says (p. 377): \\\" This raises a presumption of negligence, nothing appearing to the contrary, because of the defendant's control of the agent of the injury, and because such accidents do not occur without negligence.\\\"\\nIn Ellis v. Waldron, the injury complained of was caused by the fall of an elevator, and the court says (p. 371): \\\"The mere fact that the elevator fell, taken in connection with the attendant circumstances, may be sufficient to raise a presumption of negligence and thereby cast upon the defendants the burden of establishing their freedom from fault. That is to say, when the machine or thing in question is shown to be under the control of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the control exercise proper care, it affords prima facie evidence that the accident happened from want of care.\\\"\\nIn Kearney v. London, &c. Ry. Co., L. R. 5 Q. B. 411, as the plaintiff was passing along the highway, under a railway bridge of the defendant, a brick fell from the top of one of the pilasters and injured him. In delivering the opinion, Cockburn, C. J., said: \\\"My own opinion is, that this is a case to which the principle res ipsa loquitur is applicable, though it is certainly as w\\u00e9ak a case as can well be conceived in which that maxim would be taken to apply.\\\"\\nThese cases are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar, as are all the cases cited by the plaintiff's counsel. In this class of cases it is not the fact of injury alone which speaks for itself so as to give evidence of negligence on the part of a defendant. The mere fact that a person is injured does not speak as to the negligence of anybody. An injury having been sustained, however, it may be, and often is, the case that the attendant circumstances are such that the mind naturally and necessarily infers negligence therefrom. As was said by McSherry, C. J., in Benedick v. Potts, 88 Md. 52, at p. 56: \\\"The maxim does not go to the extent of implying that you may from the mere fact of an injury infer what physical act produced that injury; but it means that when the physical act has been shown or is apparent and is not explained by the defendant, the conclusion that negligence superinduced it may be drawn as a legitimate deduction of fact. It permits an inference that the known act which produced the injury was a negligent act, but it does not permit an inference as to what act did produce the injury. Negligence manifestly can not be predicated of any act until you know what the act is. Until you know what did occasion an injury, you can not say that the defendant was guilty of some negligence that produced that injury. There is, therefore, a difference between inferring as a conclusion of fact what it was that did the injury; and inferring from a known or proven act occasioning the injury that there was negligence in the act that did produce the injury. To the first category the maxim res ipsa loquitur has no application; it is confined, when applicable at all, solely to the second. In no case where the thing which occasioned the injury is unknown has it ever been held that the maxim applies; because when the thing which produced the injury is unknown it can not be said to speak or to indicate the existence of causative negligence.\\\" See also Fagan v. Rhode Island Company, 27 R. I. 51.\\nIn the case at bar the fact that the plaintiff caught her shoe on the running-board and the heel of the shoe was tom off and she was thrown does not - speak as to the negligence of the defendant. Proof of such fact would not raise a presumption of negligence which it would be necessary for the defendant to rebut. It would be necessary for the plaintiff to go further and show some circumstance, attendant upon the accident, of such a character as to justify the jury in inferring negligence as the cause of the accident. Paynter v. Bridgeton & M. Traction Co., 52 Atl. Rep. (N. J.) 367; Benedick v. Potts, supra.\\nIt therefore becomes necessary to consider the sufficiency of the allegation of negligence. The declaration is in a single count. It is alleged that there were in the running-board, or step, of the car certain apertures, projections, and defects negligently made, &c., the nature whereof was and is unknown to the plaintiff, and she can not more particularly describe the same, and that the plaintiff's foot or shoe was caught upon the. running-board, or step, of said car by reason of said apertures, projections, or defects, whereby the heel of her shoe was torn off and she was thrown and injured. The descriptions of the alleged defects are inconsistent and contradictory and, being contained in the same count, nullify each other; and the allegation that the injury was caused by an aperture, projection, or other defect, the nature whereof is unknown to the plaintiff, is equivalent simply to a general allegation that the defendant was guilty of negligence without saying in what the negligence consisted.\\nIrving Champlin, for plaintiff.\\nHenry W. Hayes, Frank T. Easton, Lefferts 8. Hoffman, and Alonzo B. Williams, for defendant.\\nDemurrer to declaration sustained.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/8521118.json b/ri/8521118.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ad2a2d4b11b5e318a05349076a1af527254bf05a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/8521118.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"8521118\", \"name\": \"Batchelder v. White\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Batchelder v. White\", \"decision_date\": \"1907-11-15\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"466\", \"last_page\": \"467\", \"citations\": \"28 R.I. 466\", \"volume\": \"28\", \"reporter\": \"Rhode Island Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:56:59.498604+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: Douglas, C. J., Dubois, Blodgett, Johnson, and Parkhurst, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Lucinda A. Batchelder vs. J. Ellis White, City Treasurer.\", \"head_matter\": \"Lucinda A. Batchelder vs. J. Ellis White, City Treasurer.\\nNOVEMBER 15, 1907.\\nPresent: Douglas, C. J., Dubois, Blodgett, Johnson, and Parkhurst, JJ.\\nThe giving of the notice of claim to a city council, under Gen. Laws cap. 36, \\u00a7\\u00a7 16,18, is no part of the suit, but is a condition precedent to the right to bring suit.\\nThe allegation in a declaration that such notice has been given is put in issue by the general issue and must be proved to entitle a plaintiff to recover.\\nTrespass on the Case for Negligence.\\nHeard on motion for leave to file a petition for re-argument, and denied.\", \"word_count\": \"291\", \"char_count\": \"1649\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam.\\nAfter the filing of the opinion in this case, November 6r 1907, the plaintiff's counsel moves for leave to file a petition for re-argument, on the ground that the defendant had waived its right to object to the failure of the plaintiff to give legal notice of the claim. The application assumes that the giving of the notice in cases like the present is the commencement of the suit, and hence may be waived like any irregularity in process.\\nUnder our system of practice this assumption is erroneous. As stated in the recent opinion, the giving of the notice is no part of the suit, but is a condition precedent to the right, to bring suit. This well-settled principle is recognized by the plaintiff in this case, who alleges in the declaration that legal notice was given. This allegation, like all the other material statements of the declaration, is put in issue by the general issue and must be proved by the plaintiff to entitle her to recover.\\nHugh J. Carroll, for plaintiff.\\nEdward W. Blodgett, for defendant.\\nThe motion must therefore be denied.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/ri/9125946.json b/ri/9125946.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..f80f83ffd39c67a3fc671e552f7e3932e1857d79
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ri/9125946.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"9125946\", \"name\": \"Don KRIVITSKY d/b/a Coastline Copters v. TOWN OF WESTERLY\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Krivitsky v. Town of Westerly\", \"decision_date\": \"2003-06-03\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2002-370-Appeal\", \"first_page\": \"1144\", \"last_page\": \"1147\", \"citations\": \"823 A.2d 1144\", \"volume\": \"823\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Rhode Island\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Rhode Island\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:46:42.780345+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., and FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Don KRIVITSKY d/b/a Coastline Copters v. TOWN OF WESTERLY.\", \"head_matter\": \"Don KRIVITSKY d/b/a Coastline Copters v. TOWN OF WESTERLY.\\nNo. 2002-370-Appeal\\nSupreme Court of Rhode Island.\\nJune 3, 2003.\\nMichael P. Lynch, Westerly, for Plaintiff.\\nLauren E. Jones, Providence, and Steven T. Hartford, Westerly, for Defendant.\\nPresent: WILLIAMS, C.J., and FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"1441\", \"char_count\": \"8823\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nPER CURIAM.\\nThe Town of Westerly (town) appeals from a Superior Court justice's order directing the town clerk to issue Don Krivit-sky d/b/a Coastline Copters (Coastline) a class III amusement license to operate a helicopter for hire by selling rides to the public. This case was ordered expedited, pursuant to an order directing both parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. Having reviewed the record and the parties' briefs, and having considered the oral arguments, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown and proceed to decide the appeal at this time. For the reasons indicated below, we conclude that the Superior Court was without jurisdiction to hear the matter and, consequently, we vacate its order. The pertinent facts are as follows.\\nCoastline applied for a class III amusement license to operate a helicopter on property in Westerly to provide rides for a fee. The Licensing Board for the Town of Westerly (board) held a hearing on the application on May 9, 2002. The board heard testimony that Coastline's proposal met federal aviation regulations and that it also received the required state approval. At the hearing, the police chief expressed his concerns about excessive noise and flying dust and debris thrown around during takeoff and landing. After addressing those concerns, the board voted to grant the license for conducting the rides between 11 a.m. and 7 p.m. subject to the approval of other proper authorities. The license was dated May 9, 2002, with an expiration date of May 15, 2003.\\nThe Code of Ordinances for the Town of Westerly (code) states that all persons operating or conducting any amusements:\\n\\\"shall have a license issued by the town clerk, upon approval of the town council, and subject to the written approval of the chief of police, braiding official and zoning inspector; provided, however, in case the chief of police refuses or fails to approve the issuance of such license, the applicant may appeal to the town council .\\\" Westerly Code of Ordinances, pt. III, ch. 7, art. V, \\u00a7 7-81 (1991).\\nAfter the board approved the license, the police chief signed it. However, the police chief changed his mind and obliterated his signature before delivering the license to the town manager. He gave the town manager a memorandum dated May 13, 2002, citing safety concerns as his reason for disapproval. Thus, the license never was issued. Coastline appealed the police chiefs disapproval to the town council, pursuant to \\u00a7 7-81 of the code. On appeal, the town council sustained the police chiefs action and refused to issue the license.\\nCoastline petitioned the Superior Court to issue a writ of mandamus directing the town to issue the license. The trial justice granted the writ, finding that the police chief did not have \\\"the authority to act arbitrarily and revoke a duly executed license.\\\" The trial justice indicated that the board fully addressed the police chiefs safety concerns. As a result, the trial justice ordered the town to issue the license because \\\"the application [met] all applicable Federal, State and Town Ordinances, was approved by the [board], and signed by the Chief of Police\\\" and \\\"[p]lain-tiff has [the legal] right to the issuance of the license.\\\"\\nOur first task is to address the potentially dispositive issue of mootness. Coastline avers that whether the Superior Court justice properly issued the writ of mandamus is moot because (1) the license's proposed expiration date was May 15, 2003, (2) Coastline no longer has access to a helicopter, and (3) federal and state approval for the operation lapsed on September 7, 2002. Conversely, the town contends that the issue is not moot because if the writ were issued properly, Coastline need only renew the license, instead of reapplying. In the alternative, the town asserts that even if the issue is moot, it is of great public importance, probably will arise again and is capable of evading review.\\nAn issue is moot \\\"if the original complaint raised a justiciable controversy, but events occurring after the filing have deprived the litigant of a continuing stake in the controversy.\\\" Cicilline v. Almond, 809 A.2d 1101, 1105 (R.I.2002) (quoting Associated Builders & Contractors of Rhode Island, Inc. v. City of Providence, 754 A.2d 89, 90 (R.I.2000)). This Court will not adjudicate a case that is moot \\\"unless the issues raised are 'of extreme public importance, which are capable of repetition but which evade review.' \\\" Id. at 1105-06 (quoting Sullivan v. Chafee, 708 A.2d 748, 752 (R.I.1997)). Because the license, if issued, would not have expired at the time of oral argument and because, at oral argument, counsel represented that the town council was scheduled to hear Coastline's new application for this year's license, we conclude that the issues in this matter are not moot.\\nNext, the town argues that the Superior Court lacked the necessary jurisdiction to hear the case because a writ of certiorari to this Court was the only proper avenue for review. Coastline responds that because the license was properly issued at the moment the police chief initially signed it, there was no denial but rather an unlawful revocation and, therefore, Coastline believes that it could seek a writ of mandamus-in Superior Court. We agree with the town.\\nThe code provides that if the police chief or town manager denies a license, the applicant may appeal to the town council. See \\u00a7 7-81. Thereafter, the proper procedure for review of a town council decision to grant or deny a license is by a writ of certiorari to this Court, unless \\\"a right of appeal is specifically provided by statute.\\\" Tillinghast v. Town of Glocester, 766 A.2d 946, 946 (R.I.2001) (mem.). Although the town did not raise this jurisdictional issue in Superior Court, we may address issues of subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte. See Woonsocket Teachers' Guild, Local 951, AFT v. Woonsocket School Committee, 770 A.2d 834, 837 (R.I.2001).\\nWe conclude that when the police chief obliterated his earlier signature of approval it constituted a denial, not a revocation, of the license. The code gives him the authority to unilaterally deny amusement licenses subject to an appeal to the town council. We will not second-guess the police chiefs decision-making process because he changed his mind while still in possession of the pending license. Therefore, the police chief properly denied the license under the code, subjecting his decision to an appeal to the town council.\\nCoastline filed an appeal with the town council on May 22, 2002, requesting that it order the clerk to issue the license. On June 3, 2002, Coastline appeared in front of the town council to address its appeal. Coastline presented its case through counsel. Several town officials testified, including the police chief, who reiterated the safety concerns that he expressed at the first hearing. Five residents also opposed the approval of the license. Subsequently, the town council decided to deny the appeal and sustain the police chiefs decision by a vote of six to zero.\\nWe conclude that this hearing satisfied \\u00a7 7-81 of the code. First, as explained above, the police chief denied the license; he did not revoke it. Second, Coastline's hearing before the town council addressed all the concerns discussed at the first hearing and allowed additional comments from other officials and residents, not only providing appellate review of the denial before the town council, but also essentially affording a de novo review. As a result, Coastline's only appropriate avenue for review was to petition this Court for a writ of certiorari. Therefore, the Superior Court did not have jurisdiction to issue the writ of mandamus.\\nAccordingly, we sustain the town's appeal and vacate the order of Superior Court. The papers in the case may be returned to the Superior Court.\\nJustice Flaherty did not participate.\\n. Although the town contends that Coastline need only renew its application, the code does not specifically address the renewal requirement for amusement licenses. The code does, however, delegate to the town clerk the power to issue renewals for thirty different types of licenses upon approval of the proper authorities. See Westerly Code of Ordinances, pt. Ill, ch. 7, art. X, \\u00a7 7-217, 7-218 (1991). Amusement licenses are not among those listed. See id. at \\u00a7 7-217. Therefore, it is clear that when an amusement license expires, the operator must reapply.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file